Emotions are not the beginning and end of ethical deliberation. — Banno
I agree. But ethical
statements do rely on emotional positions. I do not see anything else happening when one makes such statements. The deliberation may include some ratiocination - but this would just move the ticker on the emotional position (or, more likely for humans, the reverse: the emotional is driving the reason). No one is thinking "I
feel strongly that X, but
reason tells me Y and so my position is Y". That seems pretty much counter to the basic concept of morality at least and is not what people mean when they make ethical statements, I don't think.
Is there another description of the "statement" aspect here? I am ignoring your "truth" Aspect as we both know how we feel about that, I'd say. I'm interested in how you think it
occurs rather than what it results in.
To close off personal reply to your comments, emotivism denies that
there are ethical truths. The question it seems you're answering doesn't arise.
Or maybe people have emotions vis-á-vis questions of value because the events in question are good or bad? That is, "I feel repelled by x because x is evil," as opposed to "x is evil because I feel repelled by x." — Count Timothy von Icarus
I cannot understand how that could be hte case, without first telling me, objectively, why something is 'evil'. Given our only source of such claims is humans, .....where are we going?
However, the dedicated emotivist often ends up resorting to claims like: "being stomped isn't actually bad for babies," and defending this claim (which I think most would judge to be obviously false) by appealing to the notion that all value judgements are just statements of emotion. But that's obviously question begging — Count Timothy von Icarus
This doesn't seem like a very serious discussion, at this point. The dedicated emotivist is only committing to rejecting an
objective claim to wrongness. I'm more than welcome to agree that stomping babies is bad. That's my position. It doesn't rely on anything but that. I am not committed to saying anything else. It just so happens our emotive positions are the same (I addressed this earlier:
There are fairly universal emotional reactions (such as the one Banno lays out here) that have infomed policy in almost every single instance there has been a policy across all of human history. — AmadeusD
This doesn't move hte needle, though. I pretty much accept both the above, and your take, but I can't see how that changes anything. The fact that lots of people have the same emotional reaction is no evidence for anything more than a collection of emotional reactions informing policy (and thereby, probably, further influencing emotional positions in future).
Basically, where's the
a priori evil you need for that to not be reverse of your claim?