This is a fiction. — Leontiskos
Absolutely not, per the majority of what i've put forward in this thread, completely ignored.
The confluence of the senses ("common sense") and their registering is not preceded by any form of decision-making. Others have pointed to the infinite regress at play in this. — Leontiskos
It is precedent TO the 'decision-making'. This has been shown by experiments subsequent to Libet, also. There's a window of decision between receiving data and having an experience
of the data.
Unless you can outline how our physically indirect system of sight grants us direct experience, there is no way around this fact. THe fiction is the particularly perniciious habit of ignoring the empirical facts when discussion perception. This has been ignored.
Presumably if the eye sees objects, then the ear also hears objects. — Leontiskos
This goes directly to my attempts to use these words usefully, instead of ways that are useless for this discussion. If 'seeing' is done by the eyes, then 'to look at' means absolutely nothing in contrast to the experience of representations (which is unavoidable, making the distinction the fundamentally important one in this discussion.. more on that below). We experience representations, not objects, in terms of sight. That seems inarguable, and therefore there is no way to pretend what we see
is the object. No one but philosophers posit this, anyway, and so we can be fairly sure there's hide-the-ball going on. Obviously, hiding hte ball here is the process between the object/light/refraction/photoreception/electrical impulse/synaptic activity/experience. There are at least five obstacles to the direct conception of sight.
It seems to me that we should be consistent and either talk about media (light/sound) or else mediated objects (the object which is seen/the object which is heard). — Leontiskos
This is getting there, but if your position is to take the 'thing-in-itself' are genuinely un-speakable, im unsure where to go. We must be able to refer to ab object to be able to speak of the 'media' objects can 'aim' at our sense organs. That said, I think your distinction here is at least much, much further toward reality than is a pretend notion that objects in thought (i.e experience) are the objects out in the world rather than some
version, at best, of them.
Distinguishing direct from indirect realism is not a matter of terms — Leontiskos
You'll, probably, note on re-reading, that you are not addressing my point at all. Distinguishing
anything in a way that has any meaning relies on best-fit terminology and terminology which is consistent, not illogical, and as best we can, exclusive. I have tried to do so - it doesn't touch the concepts. It touches our ability to discuss them and the use of 'seeing' throughout this thread has, on my account, cause the vast majority of dumb quibbling over positions that seem to just be different words to describe the empirical facts, adjusted merely for hte comfort of the speaker. The commitments entailed by avoiding discomfort could be overcome with better words being used, or at least, better use of the words involved.
The glove is a fine example. Here, indirect touch or feel makes sense — Banno
(on your terms) yes, I can see that this is a fine example for you. For me, it's
another level of mediation. A different
kind, for sure, though.
Is there something similar for smell or hearing? — Banno
Again, the 'data' actually enter the sense organs as-they-are rather than by essentially shadow, as is the case with touch. The space indented into the skin is reflected in the electrical impulses, rather than the actual feel and shape of the object. But, you can know you're touching something via the other senses. You can't know you're seeing something, or hearing something, based on the other senses. There seems to be something unique about touch. With the other four, there is material entering the body by way of light, sound waves or chemicals(smell and taste) physically interacting with the sense organs. Touch works by a kind of inference - which is probably why its so prone to mistake vs other senses that tend to be construed as 'delusive' or 'hallucinatory' if they don't comport with the world around us. We just accept that some people feel cold differently, for instance, but not that we all hear the note E4 differently. There is measurable data input that can be measured without hte sense organs. Not so with touch.
I don't agree with that at all. Of course you feel the sandpaper - 200 grit is very different to 40 grit; a fact about sandpaper, not about nerves. — Banno
You feel the differential effect of sandpaper of varying grit on your nervous system. That can be aberrant, as an example of why this is obviously mediated. You may
touch the sand paper directly, but what you experience is not that touch. And that is just a fact about our sense systems. Its not a philosophical argument. For every sense, despite disparate types of input, electrical impulses in the brain are what constitutes an experience subsequent to the sensitivity in question.
I'm thinking its possible you don't deny this, but you're saying that 'well, what else could we possibly experience?" and call that direct.
I can accept that, but just don't think its accurate enough for a proper discussion.