So you would say that when you tell me that, "I will try to enforce [my moral positions] where i am not obviously violating rights," this act of enforcement is not moral in nature? — Leontiskos
This is tricky to give a yes or no to. The answer properly is 'yes'. But what i've said there is about how I behave, Not what I try to have others do around me, if you can grok the difference. I wil behave in ways that appear morally righteous to me. The world around me will go on. But my behaviour
in the world is a form of enforcement on my account. Perhaps my terms are just shoddy.
So all you have ever done in this thread is spoken about how to help other people achieve their goals? Don't you think you've also spoken about how to get other people to achieve your goals? — Leontiskos
I think you're being a little callous in your capturing of the situation, but in a significant sense, yes, that's right. When I speak about how i interact with other people, i try my best to help people toward their goals. The decision to do so is moral. The activity of, lets say, educating someone as how best to achieve their goal in my view, is entirely practical as I see it. I could just as easily leave off and nothing would be different morally.
And you never would? Similarly, why would you stop enforcing your own moral positions "where I am not obviously violating rights"? Why would rights prevent you? — Leontiskos
Not that I can imagine, no but I wont stand too strongly behind that. I don't know the future. It seems wrong, in most cases, to me. I just understand the efficiency for social cohesion so I'm not railing against police as an institution.
If my behaviour violates other people's rights, that's counter to an overarching moral intention to maintain social and cultural cohesion. This is a legal argument rather than a strictly moral one, but to be sure, I am making a moral call to resile from a behaviour once I note it may be violating another's rights of some kind.
Well look at quotes like these: — Leontiskos
There's no inconsistency. If I am trying to get someone to act, its on practical grounds
due to a moral decision to help them. You must clearly delineate the two modes. A moral decision is made in my mind - I then behave without moral reasoning in persuading the other to act toward their own goal (not mine. That's incorrect). My (moral) desire is to help the person. Not their goal, per se. The how-to is somewhat arbitrary.
But you think this doesn't really count against your position because you dub it "rational" rather than "moral." — Leontiskos
It simply doesn't., because it simply is. I understand if you feel those things can't come apart. That's fair, but not my position and I don't see it as required to make sense of all this.
Can you tell me what the difference is? — Leontiskos
The quote you use there is let's call it unfinished, as a response to this quesiton. Roughly moral reasoning is that which gets us to do something
because of its rightness or wrongness. Practical reason is trying to do things which will
achieve an arbitrary goal. So, in my example, if my moral position was that it's good to help
anyone whatever then you might find me teaching a racist how best to gut Chinese children. But my
moral reasoning tells me not to help that person toward their goal. The reasoning-to-act issue never arises. Had it, the moral problem would be in my decision to help them, not my reasoning on how best they could achieve their barbaric (i presume moral) outcomes.
My general point here is that it is hard to believe that you are a thoroughgoing moral subjectivist (or emotivist). — Leontiskos
I think most people have this trouble; particularly the theologically inclined. For instance I don't need answers to 'why are we here' or 'what does it mean to be human' or whatever to get on with my life all hunky dory. I don't care. We are here. We are human. What the 'means' is made up stuff we do for fun, basically. I get that its tough to understand, but there's a massive difference between being a subjectivist when it comes to morality, and being either a-moral, or dismissing morality entirely. Alex O'Connor does a good job of discussion emotivist in these terms imo.
How does a moral subjectivist claim that the law is often wrong when it comes to moral regulation? — Leontiskos
As an example, with wills and estates there is generally a 'moral duty' to provide for one's children after death (if one has anything to pass on, anyway). I think this is wrong, overreach and inapt for a legal framework that doesn't interfere with people's personal affairs. So, that's my personal moral view. I don't think that's going to be true for the next guy. So i don't care to do anything about the policy. I have to enforce it regularly, actually (well, I have a part in doing so regularly).
This is why I think the Law does a pretty good job. For the most part, its been 'democratically' hammered out over time, through common law, into something resembling a "close-to-consensus" and I'm happy to live with that.