The answer is no. What I "observe" is a recreation of images on a device other than the brain, but your are not looking the brain and finding those images.

Anyway, I think the key to the Nature of Ideas is to view them as Abstractions from Concrete Reality — Gnomon

I disagree. An abstraction leaves us with something general and something specific. And their relationship is one of similarity. I consider, on the other hand, following Deleuze, that an idea is a virtual set of relationships and powers that revolve around a nucleus. For example, the Idea of colour is a system of relationships of intensity, light and vibration which, when actualised in a body or object, produces a multiplicity of concrete colours. The Idea is the network of relationships, not the final object. We create the concept of red as a result of this network of relationships and potentials. But the concept of red no longer represents anything neither is something specific to something general. The idea is the relational that creates something concrete. In this sense an idea is something objective and virtual.

That doesn’t mean that the emergent phenomenon can be predicted, constructed, or deduced from the principles of the lower level of organization. — T Clark

If so, then I do not understand what the concept of emergency introduces that helps us understand the phenomenon of experience.

That seems obviously false to me. Can you provide some evidence? — T Clark

It follows from our methodological approach. We start from experience as something given and from there we establish relationships with the neurological, but imagine that we know nothing about consciousness and experience, that we are robots; how would we deduce that a being has experiences?

Mind emerges out of neurology. — T Clark

But how?

An explanation is needed that can account for the phenomena we call mental or conscious. For example, I see a glass of water. What is the neurological configuration from which we can deduce the glass of water as a conscious experience? Can we go inside the brain, see the neurons, and find the image of a glass like a movie and a proyector? The answer is no.

The thing is, we could be beings without consciousness and without experience, and yet the neurological explanation would still persist and remain valid. We cannot deduce experience from neurological explanation. In that sense, methodologically, we always start from consciousness and experience as something given, and we try to explain their origin, but we can never do so in reverse. That is why the idea of emergence is not very useful to us here and lacks capacity of explanation.

The primary difference between a song and an idea is their origin. While a song can be represented and then experienced, an idea seems to emerge directly from experience and the ultimate dimension. An idea isn't a pre-existing entity that we stumble upon; it arises from a cognitive system, such as a brain, that processes and interconnects data. — Wayfarer

There seems to be a problem here: if the Idea arises directly from experience, it requires a kind of intuition of something objective (intellectual intuition), but contrary to intuitionism, you say that the idea arises from cognition, reasoning and data processing (data from the senses?).

The question is: do we access a layer of ideas through a faculty (intellectual intuition) or do we simply create them based on cognition and reasoning?

To what extent is thought an aspect beyond the experience of thought in lived experience, or some independent criteria of ideas and knowledge? — Jack Cummins

Thought is an activity of the subject. Ideas are those that transcend it. There is a virtual field of ideas that exceeds the subject, allowing the subject to learn and transmit them. Ideas are related to other ideas. As I have said, an AI does not question the idea of freedom, but when we question the idea of freedom, we enter a field that is not our own. The idea forces us to think about it in a series of relationships with other ideas and concepts that are not present for the subject (we must investigate), and that may be elsewhere, in other minds, in books, or in the cloud itself.

In short, the idea transcends the subject; it transcends the act of thinking. AI can access the virtual field of ideas, but it cannot take the initiative, since thinking means actualising the idea for the here and now.

Following Deleuze, I believe that an idea is an objective problematic field accessed by the subject. It is not an answer to a problem. It is not a concept. It is the problematic that revolves around a meaningful core. The idea of justice, for example, beyond how we define it, moves within a virtual field of questions and relationships with other ideas. In this sense, the thinking subject actualises by thinking about a meaningful core on which the problematic is established.


Can an AI think?


Thinking is the act of choosing and establishing the meaningful core around which an entire problematic field revolves like a galaxy. An AI does not question the idea of justice. But it can access to a problematic field (namely the cloud). In this sense, humans think because they can decide where and when the problematic occurs. Whereas an AI cannot decide this. However, when we ask an AI something, it is capable of responding and giving us a series of ideas and concepts. In this sense, it conforms to our thinking. But without us deciding and establishing the problematic field, there is no thought.

In conclusion, AI does not think, but it can be part of human-directed thinking. It compose with us an apparatus of thinking.

We did communicate something. With the use of signs. — Patterner

That depends on what we mean by "communicate". I claim that this communication consists solely of provoking significant effects from one person to another. In other words, through signs we provoke something in the other person's understanding. But nothing is transmitted. What we provoke is meaning, or information.

Still, I had information in my mind, I wanted it in your mind, I took actions that I hoped would accomplish that goal, coding that information in the medium we are using to communicate, and that information is now in your mind. It's still the same information, but it changed form.

All the information in anybody's DNA can be written down in the book, or entered into a computer. Again, it's the same information, but in different form. — Patterner

From my point of view, nothing is encoded as if we were locking a door with a key. What we call encoding is choosing a VERY SPECIFIC, unique series of signs that will have an effect on us or a machine. Signs that other people may not know, which is what makes encoding purpose. But the relationship is the same: one person utters signs and these have meaningful effects on another person. Here, meaning refers to the creation of something that did not exist before. A "Hello" appears in us as the creative effect of the series of signs we have heard.

But you are right. There is no substance, not even ghost-like, that crosses over. I guess proof if that is when the receiver gets wrong information. Thinking I meant one thing when I meant another. That happens when you incorrectly interpret my signs. It wouldn't be possible if there was a substance going from my mind to yours. (A scenario that sounds like a fantasy/scifi story, and would lead to horrible manipulation.) — Patterner

Exactly.

I don't dispute the continuity between the measuring device and the physical world being measured. Both are part of the given world. — Metaphysician Undercover

The measuring device and that which is measured enter into a teleological operational dynamic. Here, it is the act of measuring. That is why neither can be excluded from the non-given of the world. This is even more so when things in quantum physics are decided from one moment to the next with the intervention of the measuring device.

How can you say this? The reality of what you refer to as "the measuring apparatus and that which is measured" is supported by their existence in the past, and sense observation of them, in the past. — Metaphysician Undercover

I can say this because it is essential for their participation in scientific practice that the world is not given once and for all. The creation of the entire experiment depends on it. Experimenting implies a relationship with the future, and so we create the conditions for an experiment just as we create a measuring device.

Yes, think about the translation of a philosophical work from one language to another. The signifiers are different, but the idea can be ''transmitted'' from one language to another.

An idea is the meaningful core of a series of signifiers. And its nature is transcendence.

Our intentional acts, as they are thrown into the possible and the non-given of the world, imply operationally a continuity between the measuring apparatus and that which is measured. For, after all, to act in a non-given world is to act in relation to something other than the presence of the present and the present of consciousness. There is, then, a relationship between our operational actions and the non-given of the world. That is, because non-consciousness is involved in operativity, there is a continuity between the measuring apparatus and that which is measured. This continuity is therefore beyond consciousness, just as the future is beyond the present (which is the form of consciousness). And our intentional acts such as "measuring" are also thrown beyond consciousness and the presence of the present.

There is no place here to talk about the past, since conscious and intentional acts occur in relation to a possible future. There may be a discontinuity in time (I leave the question open), but there is no discontinuity between the measuring device, that which is measured, and our intentional-operational act. All three are beyond what is given to consciousness. That is why subjectivist interpretations of quantum physics are wrong. Measuring here is seen as an act that is thrown into the possible and the not-given for consciousness. It is no coincidence that operativity is closely related to the body, and that the body has long been conceived as the other of the mind and consciousness.

The non-given, the body, intentional acts (measuring), and non-consciousness are all intertwined.

I am a little disappointed with your response. You have simply reiterated what you already said, reaffirming your position but without providing any arguments against what I said.

In terms of composition, things do not improve. Imagine saying that the number pi is made up of hydrogen atoms. Or that the idea of justice is made up of the same atoms. These are categorical errors. If you talk about composition, you must necessarily talk about decomposition, and if we decompose the number pi and the idea of justice, we do not have atoms, we have more numbers (or ratios, circumferences and diameters) and more ideas (an idea is composed by more ideas).

It is said that a reduction by composition fails when the path of decomposition fails and we do not have the components we thought we had in the first place. This happens with most of the knowledge we have (the entire set of sciences and disciplines). Ethical principles cannot be broken down into atoms without losing all the meaning of what a principle means. Hence, physicalism by composition is also erroneous.

Even physics is not entirely physics. Do not forget the mathematical part that composes it and gives it its scientific and exact status. And that is despite the fact that mathematics is supposed to be a higher level in terms of composition. So it would have to be said that the universe has an ideal-objective aspect (Plato's realm) - (or ideal-subjective if you think mathematics is all mental, that will be funny, to think the universe with mental properties), as does mathematics. In that sense, it must be said that physicalism by composition is false even in the case of the universe.

Example: chemical reactions can (in principle) be explained in terms of fundamental physics. Chemistry is concerned mainly with the structure and reactions of atoms and molecules. These structures and reactions are a consequence of the properties of their components. The study of those components, and their properties, is fundamental physics. I doubt that anyone suggests there's some ontological emergence occurring when molecules interact that is not due to the properties of the components (as studied by physics). This relationship can be described as "Chemistry is reducible to Physics". This relationship between chemistry and physics is uncontroversial. — Relativist

I am not referring to the physical/ chemical sciences, which are indeed reducible to each other. I am referring to the vast array of sciences and disciplines that we possess and which, nevertheless, are not reducible to the physical and chemical sciences. I have mentioned some of them, such as phenomenology, mathematics/geometry, logic, psychology, economics, aesthetics, etc.

Reduction would take place if we used, for example, the terms and concepts of physics to derive and explain laws, correlations, principles, theorems and so on from other sciences such as those I have mentioned.

This cannot be done. For example, you have concepts of speed, time, energy, mass, etc., and you have to use them to develop Pythagoras' theorem. It cannot be done. Therefore, there is no reduction. And physicalism has no place in science as a set of sciences. It could be said that physicalism is anti-scientific in this sense, since it does not respect the identity of many sciences and disciplines.

Now, you could argue that your intention is not to carry out that reduction but to establish that the properties of the world described by other sciences are emergent properties. But then emergence is not explanatory, and physicalism has no explanatory power. And if it has no explanatory power, then I don't know why anyone would choose physicalism as a general ontology of the world.

Chemistry provides a more useful explanation of interactions between atoms and molecules associated with chemical bonds than quantum field theory. Biology is the more useful means of understanding physiology and disease than quantum chemistry. In all these cases, this does not imply that reductionism is false. — Relativist

I don't think you fully understand what a reduction means. What do you understand by reduction in any case?

Yes. But we must keep in mind that physicalists have chosen a couple of sciences (in this case, physics and chemistry) from which they seek to derive, reduce, or explain everything else. We must be very attentive to how things are derived and ask ourselves if there really is a valid explanation and reduction of the world to specific categories and concepts from specific sciences.

I believe that this cannot be done without losing the operability of the other sciences (or disciplines) that describe the world. Imagine that in mathematics there is a reduction to physics and you have concepts of speed, time, energy, mass, etc., and you have to use them to develop Pythagoras' theorem. You can't!

Can any of the physical-chemical sciences explain the intentionality of consciousness or explain what a noema is better than phenomenology? Or the Pythagorean theorem better than geometry? Or what a universal better than philosophy? Or what is beauty better than aesthetics? Or what is a correct argument better than logic? Or how prices functions better than economy? Or what is a morphema better than linguistics?

For me, there are several categories in the world that are irreducible to one another.

You should accept the premise of the possible world, since in our relationship with the world, it is shown as something that is not given once and for all (the future is not given). That is why the horizon I am talking about is presented as a possibility, because, for example, we do not know what will happen in the future, and the future is the future of the world where our actions will take place. So there is a continuity between the state of the world "not given once and for all" and our horizon of possibility of the world. For it is obvious that when we look at the world, it is not given once and for all, that is, the future has not yet happened.

I have not changed things, I have simply expressed a series of implications that are in the notion of the horizon of the world. As I said, there is a non-given world, and this is closely related to the concept of possibility. How is it related? Well, it is very simple: if the world is not given once and for all and we project ourselves into the future, these projections are possibilities that have the non-given world as their horizon, that is, the future, that is, the possible.

The possible world that is our horizon of action and intentional acts cannot, however, be necessary, as this contradicts our experience of the world, since it is not always given once and for all. Nor can it be impossible, because impossibility negates possibility. And our intentional acts are expressed as possibility and something that can happen, as something not given but that can happen. So there is a continuity between the non-given world and our horizon of the world, which is the horizon of the possible world.

Possibilities are determined by minds, and it is commonly recognized that possibilities are distinctly determinations which are NOT IN THE WORLD. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not in the world just like that, but in a possible world. But it is still a world as telos and exteriority. That is why possibility has a horizon of realisation, and the world is realisation, possible, actual or not. It does not matter if our purposes do not fit into the actual world, but what matters is that they have the world and realisation as their telos. The world is inscribed in the concept of possibility, which is why I say that it is its inherent horizon. In this sense, minds are also thrown into the world; our intentional acts, being possibilities, are inscribed in this telos. Thus, there is a continuity between mind and world, but the world is no longer that thing that is determined once and for all, but rather possesses two shadows, which we call past and future as possibilities and as contingencies. What is actual is at once possible but neither necessary nor impossible. The world thus, a world of pure possibility, is in continuity with the consciousness of possibility.

If you look closely, its possibility is determined by the horizon of the world. How can something be possible if it does not mean possible IN THE WORLD? This shows that its nature of possibility has the world as its horizon.

Why do you say that the dualism is hidden? I don't think that free will and intention can be understood without dualism so the dualism is blatant. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ok. Then si no hidden.

Your use of "operationally" indicates that we have a common ground here. However, it seems that I recognize intention as a discontinuity, whereas you attempt to sweep it under the rug, and claim "continuity" regardless of the break which intention produces between concepts and the world. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is a discontinuity because of the lack of necessity in relation to ends. — Metaphysician Undercover

I speak of continuity because our intentions are thrown into the world. That is, there is a determining exteriority in our intentional acts (It is no coincidence that the world has historically been understood as exteriority). Our intentions have purposes in the world. Hence, it is necessary to speak of intentions extended in our operations (the body, for example, building and manipulating a machine to measure something). The fact that there are many possible ends does not change this continuity at all as long as it remains on the horizon of the world. A world that demands that we and our intentions be operational, whatever the purpose we are talking about.

There is a hidden dualism in your position. You think of a kind of purpose and intentional acts that have nothing to do with the world and its operational demands. It is the division between mind and body that makes the mind something totally detached from the world and the body, as if walking and having a different horizon. And I cannot agree with that. As I have said, our intentional acts (including madness) have the world as their horizon.

So when we deal with the quantum system, we are not simply inventing concepts and ideas that happen to be adequate by pure chance, but there is an operational continuity that allows us to deal accurately with different phenomena in the quantum world.

What is measured is a quantity of energy, and that is purely conceptual, just like 1.3 metres is purely conceptual in the example above. And 20 marbles is purely conceptual, as is 35 millimetres of rain. — Metaphysician Undercover

If it is purely conceptual, then it is impossible to explain how, operationally, there is a correspondence between our concepts (language) and the world. Operationally means that we work with the world, and ideas and concepts help us to deal with things. And it works! There are also restrictions that limit us in our language and concepts. That is what allows us to differentiate between science and pure imagination.

Thus, your idealistic and anti-realist position fails to account for the usefulness of concepts and ideas, and above all, it cannot justify why, when we deal with the world through ideas and concepts, we are even able to predict future events. Your position is anti-realist, while mine is pragmatic and operational. So when we deal with the quantum system, we are not simply inventing concepts and ideas that happen to be adequate by pure chance, but there is an operational continuity that allows us to deal accurately with different phenomena in the quantum world.

Of course the device interacts with the system — Metaphysician Undercover

System is a concept just like apparatus. You should flatly deny this, since there is no continuity or operability between our concepts and ideas and the world.

Therefore design and construction of the device, as well as interpretation of the reading, are both essential aspects of the measurement act — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree. I should not have said measurement excluding the scientist's intentional acts. What I should have said to avoid this misunderstanding that you point out is the following:

"I believe that ontologically there is continuity between the device and what is measured. The same applies to the phenomena that occur in the device, like detections and interferences."

But what you correctly point out does not change my argument, it only changes the words. The argument is that of the necessary ontological continuity between the device and what is measured. That is why the scientist's interpretation does not affect the phenomenon of detection and brakeup of isolation that ultimately causes the quantum system to acquire classical properties.

This rules out the idealistic interpretation of quantum physics that gave scientists powers they do not actually possess. Interpreting data, although an essential part of measurement, does not interact with the isolated quantum system. That is the job of the measuring device, which does interact with the quantum system.

In your determination to avoid attributing agency to the observer you assign it to the device, as if it were itself autonomous. But it’s just a projection, and one I think that is mistaken for the reasons I’ve already given. — Wayfarer

Not at all. I am simply describing what is actually happening. Since we do not interact with the isolated quantum system, the measuring device does so. Causally, what happens is as follows:

The scientist activates the device —> the device interacts with the quantum system —> the quantum system is affected by the device —> the scientist interprets.

I don't think there is any truth to such a proposition of continuity. Measurement is always based in principles, and carried out as an intentional act. Therefore there is always a medium between what is measured and the measurement. This medium, of intentional acts carried out according to principles, necessitates that we understand a discontinuity between measurement and the thing measured. — Metaphysician Undercover

I am referring to measurement as the phenomenon that takes place in the measuring device. For example, interference, detection, etc. I am not referring to the intentional acts by which the scientist interprets what happens there.

If you do not want to go that route, you either adopt other 'realist' interpretations or you adopt an epistemic one, where the 'collapse' is simply a way to describe the change of knowlege/degree of belief of an agent after a measurement. These views do not say that mind creates reality but they recognize that we have a limitation in our ability to know the physical world. 'How the workd is' independent of any observation is not knowable. — boundless

Keep in mind that the quantum system is in isolation. The measuring device, as I understand it, breaks that isolation at the moment of measurement. Then the classical properties appear. What I am saying is that epistemic interpretation has no place here, since it is the measuring device that breaks that isolation, not the calculations we make. This is where the problem arises: the measurement interferes with the system and takes it out of its isolation. But it is the apparatus, not our calculations, since they do not interact with the isolated system.

but what makes it a measuring device is not its material composition but its role as an artifact that embodies human purposes and generates observables. It’s precisely that interpretive element that material continuity by itself can’t account for. — Wayfarer

Measuring is actually an interaction, like with a quantum sensor. There is simply an interference that appears and was not there before. We are the ones who become aware of that sign.

But I'm beginning to understand where you're going. You seem to be referring to all types of measurement, quantum or otherwise, and how it becomes meaningful to us. Here, the theory of signs that I use is useful, where meaning is an intrinsic property of things, regardless of whether the thing is material or not. A sign is in place of something else and refers to it. Meaning arises as a product of the relationship between signs. A sign can be linguistic or non-linguistic, material or non-material. In the case of quantum physics, we deal with linguistic and non-linguistic signs.

An interference is a sign because, but not only because, it interacts with us who have a language (a system of learned signs). In my case the mystery is solved by discovering the pansemiotic nature of the world. However, contrary to idealism, we must recognise that signs and semiosis exceed consciousness and its present. This is due to the nature of signs, which constantly refer to the non-present (in this case, the present of consciousness).

Have you considered non-linear and retroactive causality?

You are proceeding in the wrong direction with this. The quantum phenomenon itself, as produced in the lab, and observed, is completely artificial. It's all created with specific experimental intentions. There is nothing "natural" about it, it is entirely artificial — Metaphysician Undercover

For me, what is artificial is not another world, as if it were necessary to establish an ontological dualism between the natural and the artificial. I believe that ontologically there is a continuity between measurement and what is measured. Even if the entire experiment is artificial, there is still an ontological continuity that allows us to interact and 'create' the experiment. In that sense, the experiment is like a work of art, which may be artificial and created, but does not break with our natural world.

The attempt to 'naturalise the instrument' conceals rather than resolves the very interpretive questions that quantum physics forces on us. — Wayfarer

Consider the material from which the measuring device is made. Don't you think there is an ontological continuity between the device and the quantum phenomenon? In other words, there must be a reason why there can be an interaction. Just as our hands can grasp a piece of wood because both are composed of atoms, etc. The measuring instrument is the hand and the quantum phenomenon is the piece of wood. In that sense, the measuring device is 'natural' because it belongs to nature, because it is made of metal parts, etc. That is why I simply say that the measuring device is actually an improbable object, but that it does not defy the laws of physics nor is it made of unnatural compounds.

That is a strange statement you make. If it possesses some kind of mental property and it is ours, it is like simply saying that it does not possess it and we possess it. In any case, do you agree that it is the measuring device without mental properties that collapses the wave function and not our subjectivity?

And that is the cost — the de-humanisation is the legacy of this division. When you say “the machine provokes a response in us,” you’re still trying to frame the matter purely in terms of physical causation. But signs are not physical things. They are relations, interpretations, meanings — irreducible to mechanism, yet not “ghostly” either. This is precisely the false dichotomy that the ghost of Descartes has saddled us with. The irony is that by trying to exorcise the ghost, we remain haunted by it. The world this ghost inhabits is one in which the entire cosmos is stripped of interiority and meaning, and we ourselves are left as the orphaned offspring of blind physical causes that somehow, against all odds, have given rise to mind. — Wayfarer

If you look closely at what I am trying to explain, I do not limit the idea of a sign to mechanism or physicalism. I only limit it to our relationship with the machine. For me, a sign can be mental or material, and it is the bridge I have discovered between the mental and the non-mental. However, the measuring device as a producer of signs does not produce mental signs. The sign simply has the function of 'being in place of'. And of pointing to other signs with which they enter into various relationships. And we are precisely a system of signs, complex but a system of signs.

So this measuring device has effects on us, semiotic effects that respect everything human about us. However, we are not only human, we are also systems of signs and producers of them, we also have something of machines or bodies (transhumanism) and this is what allows us to interact with the device. Why not say that there is something mental in the measuring device? It is a remnant of humanism and anthropomorphism, which for me is outdated and for which we have no proof. But we do have proof of the non-human, the non-mental through the possibility of corporal and operative interaction with the device (otherwise we should manipulate the device only with our minds). That is why it is important to think of the measuring device as something extra-mental.

From the measuring device's side, yes, the signs are material and mechanical. And these signs have effects on us; they create information and knowledge.

Must? Why? — Manuel

Because You interact with the quantum world through the measuring device. But this device has no mental properties. So you have to adapt to the device in order to learn anything about the quantum world. And this adaptation is through signs.

And consciousness? What about the experience of consciousness is "mechanical", colors, sounds, smells, thoughts seem to me to be extremely different from a "machine" in any meaningful way this word may be used — Manuel

I leave the mystery of consciousness intact. I simply speak of a necessary ontological continuity that is expressed through signs. Colours, sounds and smells are not something that the measuring device perceives consciously. We must think of ourselves in terms of the device and not the other way around, since everything that identifies us as conscious beings is not found in the device except for interaction through physical signs. That is why I think it is wrong to talk about intentions in the apparatus.

The apparatus measures, but not with the intention of measuring. It is characteristic of idealism in quantum physics to introduce mental aspects into the apparatus. But these aspects are nowhere to be found.

To me, that sounds like the ghost in the machine. But if we look closely at how the measuring device works, that fantasy of the ghost in the machine disappears. The measuring device simply interacts, and it does so physically, and that is all there is to it, nothing more.

A question arises: how can the machine provide us with information? For me, if there is no Ghost in the machine the answer no longer lies in how the machine resembles us, but in how we resemble the machine. The machine affects us and informs us, but it no longer informs us in the sense that the machine transmits something (a ghost in the numbers it produces and in how it responds to specific events), but rather it provokes something in us and in our cognitive apparatus.

In other words, instead of embodying our intentions, the machine has an effect on us through physical signs. And these effects on us (knowledge) would not take place if we were not also an apparatus of signs. An ontological continuity between us and the machine is necessary without the need to introduce mysterious intentions into the measuring apparatus; something like an intention is never something that can be proven, and is simply anthropomorphism.

I wouldn't say they are unnatural. Rather, improbable. Something like a measuring device is not out of this world. That is, there is a reason why there is interaction with quantum states. A reason why they can be measured. There is an ontological continuity between the measuring device and that which is measured.

I take your point that we should not confuse subjectivity with the role of the measuring apparatus. Of course it is the detector, not personal awareness, that interacts with the system. But the question that persists — and this is what makes the problem metaphysical — is: why does the interaction only count as a measurement when it enters the domain of observables, that is, when it becomes information available to us? — Wayfarer

Once we naturalise the measuring device, it becomes something external to subjectivity. In this sense, measurement is a natural process like any other in nature. It should be noted that our quantum physics experiments require isolation. That is why the measuring device breaks that isolation and what is in quantum coherence becomes decoherent. But that apparatus is part of the experiment's environment! This means that the measuring apparatus and non-subjective reality are identified.

For me, this is a sufficient explanation that frees us from possible idealistic interpretations of quantum physics. Measuring is a natural act that is identified with the external world.

I believe that philosophy takes a stand against common sense. Philosophy must question our most deeply rooted certainties. In that sense, philosophy is there to sadden us, as Deleuze would say, and make us realise our stupidity. Philosophy today has the task of teaching us counter-intuitive things.

With the benefit of hindsight, at least some of Berkeley’s philosophy remains plausible. In On Physics and Philosophy (2006), physicist Bernard d’Espagnat refers to Bishop Berkeley — not to endorse his immaterialism, but to acknowledge that quantum theory has unsettled the once-unquestioned assumption of an observer-independent reality⁸. Paradoxically, a scientific revolution formerly anticipated as the pinnacle of physical realism ends up reviving precisely the kind of metaphysical questions Berkeley posed in the early 18th century! — Wayfarer

I have always been somewhat perplexed by this. The Copenhagen interpretation revives a strong idealism like that of Berkeley. My position, as seen elsewhere, attempts to rid quantum physics of this idealism, which implies rejecting the Copenhagen interpretation. There is a mentalism, or mental causation, which, in my opinion, must be eliminated from the interpretation of quantum physics. But such elimination requires naturalising the measuring apparatus. In other words, understanding that it is our measuring apparatus that interacts with this quantum reality and not our subjectivity. Our subjectivity cannot interact with, say, the box in which the cat is placed.