Your comment highlighted a very interesting point that I wasn't aware of, as I don't speak Italian. With the help of AI, I was able to examine the grammatical constructions using essere and stare, from which I've found that:
Sono arrabbiato (I am angry) vs. Sto arrabbiato (I am in a state of being angry). The first sentence can be perceived as a more fundamental characteristic of a person's identity, while the second is a temporary, transient mood.
In Russian, this is expressed as: «Я злой» (I am angry, i.e., always angry) or «Я злюсь» (I'm getting angry, I am in a state of anger).
Another example: Come sta? (How are you staying/being?) is a standard greeting that focuses attention on the current moment of one's well-being. It is not a question about "who you are" (Chi sei?), but about "how you are situated" (Come stai?).
One might think there's no difference, as English also has the verbs to be and to become. However: To become in English describes the process of transitioning from one state to another. For example, "The caterpillar becomes a butterfly." This is a verb of change, not a verb of being in a state. And the verb to become is not used as a linking verb in just any sentence.
Similarly, English has the present continuous tense (am/is/are + V+ing), which describes an action happening at the moment, not a state or a quality. It is used like this: "I am writing a letter"—this is an action, not a state of being.
BUT! Let's take the greeting, "How are you doing?" Is this an action or a state?
All of this points to the following:
One cannot radicalize the assertion of being as process for the East and being as static for the West.
The existence of such distinctions in the Italian language suggests that it is natural for humans to feel both a certain sense of the processuality of being and its static nature.
As Count Timothy von Icarus correctly observes, there are indeed works in Western philosophy that discuss processuality, and I don't dispute that. I'm arguing that the very act of thinking about processuality requires a conscious effort to break free from the pattern of substantialism.
You're absolutely right to point out those philosophers. However, while processualists existed (and had a significant impact), they were in the minority. The dominant paradigm was, and remains, substantialism. To speak of process, one had to deliberately step outside of this paradigm, and that was not an easy task.
The influence of processualist philosophers is undeniable, but they were working against the current. Philosophers who thought in terms of an unchanging essence and substance had a far greater impact on the broader worldview: Parmenides, Aristotle, for whom substance was the foundation of reality; René Descartes with his ideas of the substances res cogitans and res extensa.
It is this tradition that, I believe, created a pattern of thinking that influenced European languages and, as a result, philosophy itself.
Here is what I write about the hypothesis of linguistic relativity in another chapter of my work:
The previous analysis of the linguistic structures of various cultural traditions revealed a diversity of ways of expressing (or not expressing) being and entities. This diversity, manifested in the grammatical features of languages - from the Indo-European copula "is" to its optional nature in Russian and its absence in Turkic and Chinese languages - emphasizes the variability of ontological perspectives rooted in language. However, this observation requires strict methodological reflection in order to avoid hasty or unfounded conclusions. The assertion of a fundamental difference in ontological attitudes, for example, between Western and Eastern traditions, cannot be accepted without further in-depth analysis. Language, as E. Sapir and B. L. Whorf noted in their hypothesis of linguistic relativity, can influence cognitive and philosophical categories, but the extent of this influence remains a matter of debate. Conclusions about the direct determination of thinking by language require caution, since cultural, historical and social contexts also play a significant role and language changes dynamically. Language is constantly subject to change and formation. It follows that one should not blindly rely only on the “feeling of the word”. Nevertheless, the phenomenological approach to linguistic differences, which presupposes living these differences as a direct experience, opens up new perspectives for the philosophical understanding of being. The very feeling of recognizing the fundamental differences between languages is significant for us. The value of such an approach lies not in establishing universal patterns, but in the possibility of rethinking familiar ontological categories through a change in perspective.