There is very much said in detail about liberalism as a system that optimally balances societal interests in motion. I also want to draw attention to another feature of liberalism, one that should be mentioned when unpacking this phenomenon closely.
To this end, let us return to the question: what is power, in its essence? This might open new paths for reflection.
Take, for instance, the master–slave relationship in a classical slave-owning society, such as Ancient Rome. The slave is in complete bodily subjection to the master. The master may coerce him, command his life, beat him, punish him — and this is how history textbooks, films, and literature often present it. (By the way, in historical dramas where Roman characters are shown as noble, it is always understated or omitted that they were slave-owners — as if this shadow of history no longer casts light upon them.)
But the same sources repeatedly omit a fundamental point: the slave was not simply a thing, but a resource, and therefore required investments. By purchasing a slave, the master acquired not absolute freedom, but a bundle of obligations, without which the slave loses his value as an object of mastery.
Any “careful” master was obliged to:
1. Keep the slave healthy — without health, no work is possible.
2. Provide housing — else the slave might perish, escape, fall ill.
3. Ensure food — a hungry slave is a restless, even dangerous, slave.
4. Provide some minimal education — so the slave may work, obey commands, manage tools or tasks.
5. Maintain obedience — whether by discipline or reward, but inevitably.
6. Oversee the procreation of slaves — offspring could become additional resource.
7. Ensure minimal welfare — for productivity depends on not pushing the body beyond collapse.
8. And finally — protect against external threats: theft, murder, flight, even revolt among slaves.
This is structural care, not humanist fancy. It arises not from moral goodness but from the logic of property. And despite all the barbarism of the system, it is compelled to include care, otherwise it collapses as a system of mastery.
Now let us place on the other side of the scale liberal relations of freedom.
Here, the owner of capital does not have slaves but workers. He goes to the market, recruits personnel. This new‑master doesn’t care how the worker survives, where he lives, how he eats, how he reproduces, whether he is happy or not. What matters to him is the worker’s efficiency. To work more and demand less. If the worker falls ill or dies tomorrow, it is not a problem for the master: he simply goes to the market and finds another, one already raised from childhood to be efficient, fast, better. These workers themselves aspire to everything; they themselves take care of themselves.
I used two extremes as examples. If someone offered me to choose where I’d prefer to be a master, I’d, without hesitation, choose the second variant. Humanity, in general, seems to have arrived here, which is sensible. However, between these two extremes there have existed many other forms of social order: tribal communities where the leader bore responsibility even for the stability of the rains; feudal regimes where one had to defend one’s peasants from raids, administer justice, be a model of mercy; socialism, where the working people were guaranteed free housing, education, etc.; finally authoritarian regimes where the master is held responsible for the prosperity of the people who follow him.
Liberal demagogues, speaking of tyranny and the absence of choice, forget this element. If someone calls himself a master, he is obligated to care.
From personal experience, I have noticed a difference between working in a liberal state and a non‑liberal (authoritarian) one. In a liberal state you must give your maximum at work; in a non‑liberal one you may not have to be the most excellent or efficient. Why? Because non‑liberal regimes generate a whole stratum of people who believe someone should come and give: freedom, salary, guarantees, safety. It is precisely for this that they vote. Unlike in liberal societies, where people strive themselves to forge their happiness.
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Perhaps herein lies the main metaphysical kernel of liberalism:
it is power without the master.
Not because the master no longer exists, but because he has become invisible, elusive, inaccessible to reproach.
He no longer commands — he regulates. He does not care — he provides platforms. He does not answer — he disconnects.
Are you free?
Then be responsible for everything.
But freedom that does not include structures of responsibility — this is not emancipation, but a form of finely crafted abandonment.
And if the slave, despite all his unfreedom, was once held by the master’s sleeve, today the free person — falls alone.
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As an example of the stability of a nonliberal regime, I would like to cite Gaddafi. Personally, I do not justify him - this is important to emphasize. But let's try to look at his regime not from the position of conventional morality, but from the point of view of the structure of responsibility.
During his rule, every citizen of Libya received: free education and health care, often housing, assistance with the birth of a child, subsidies for newlyweds, subsidies for food and gasoline. The state, as a figure of the master, was forced to take care - because such was the model of power.
After NATO's military intervention and the overthrow of Gaddafi in 2011, Libya plunged into chaos, civil war, fragmentation. Millions of citizens lost not only their previous guarantees, but also the very structure on which they relied.
The master disappeared - along with him, the guarantor disappeared.
One can argue about what Gaddafi was like as a person. But the philosophical fact remains: an authoritarian regime was associated with responsibility for its subject.
This form can be terrible, violent, cruel - but it was there, it worked.
Liberal societies often perceive this as a "tyrannical cage" from which one must escape. But when the cage disappears, and with it the food, warmth and protection disappear - then the question becomes different:
What is more important: to be free and nobody's, or unfree, but in a system where someone needs you?