Late to this debate, but I take it that despite all the heat of the public debate, this is just an issue in metaphysics.

The public debate - my impression of it anyway - is that it is almost exclusively conducted by those with no training in metaphysics and it shows, for there seem to be two camps, both fairly obviously false. The two views seem to be either that you're a woman if you identify as one (so, identifying as a woman constitutively determines that one is one), or alternatively a biologist determines whether you're a woman. So, it's either you, or a biologist.

Both views are silly. It's true that both are reliably proxies for being a woman. Virtually all people who identify as women are women (just as virtually all people who identify as lawyers are lawyers). And virtually all people who satisfy the biologist's criteria for being a woman are women too. But being a reliable proxy is not the same as being the thing one is a proxy for.

Let's do some entry level metaphysics: first, not every concept can be defined, for that would generate an infinite regress in which it turns out nothing can be defined.

Thus, if there are true definitions, then there are concepts that cannot be defined.

Most people don't realize this and believe - fallaciously - that unless one can provide a definition for a concept, one doesn't understand it or have it. That's demonstrably false. But becausea they believe it, they will not believe they grasp a concept - even one of those basic concepts that are unamenable to definition - unless a definition is provided. And the first one that presents itself or is offered, will normally then be the one they cleave to thereafter, refining it if necessary but not giving it up. It's so common it's got a name: the definist fallacy.

Here's how one might fallaciously arrive at the conclusion that being a woman is constitutively determined by one's own subjective states: virtually everyone who believes they are a woman is a woman, therefore believing you're a woman is what makes you a woman, and thus a woman is just someone who identifies as one.

The other 'side' notices that there are clear counterexamples to this thesis - there are clear cases of men who are identifying as women, yet are not thereby becoming women (for they still seem to answer to the concept of a man, despite their identifying otherwise). And so they offer a different definition: that a woman is someone with immobile gametes, because when biologists look in detail at women's bodies, they find they all have that feature. And biologists - who are not metaphysicians and are just as capable of fallacious reasoning as the next person - reason that as all women they've examined have immobile gamates, then that must be what makes a woman a woman. That's fallacious. All square things have a colour, but that doesn't make the definition of a shape 'coloured'. Plus we can easily imagine someone who answers to the concept of a woman, yet does not have immobile gamates or any at all. So, it's as plainly false upon reflection as the individual subjectivist view about what makes someone a women.

But both sides think understanding comes from definitions and so they just double down on their own and get increasingly angry at the other side (as is typical of the ignorant).

The truth seems to be that we have the concept of a woman without being able to define it. It is in this respect like the concept of a mountain or a tree. Those are not amenable to definition either. In fact, there are loads and loads of concepts like this, or seem to be (we know there have to be some, remember).

We have evidence that we have an indefinable concept - though one that we nevertheless 'have' and are adept at applying - when our best attempts to define it fail. And we know that our best attempts at defining it are failing when there seem to be things that clearly answer to the concept in question, yet do not answer to the definition (and vice versa).

Is there currently a huge debate over the correct definition of a woman? Yes, that's obvious. So, the very existence of the debate - and the fact that both definitions in play are quite plainly false (which is why the debate continues, for each side can correctly highlight the absurdity of the other's defintion) - gives us reason to think that the concept of a woman is indefinable. A woman is someone who answers to the concept of a woman - that, it seems, is as much as can be said. And we already know well enough how to apply the concept - for we judge the credibility of a definition by whether or not it delivers verdicts consistent with the concept. It's just the definist fallacy prevents people from recognizing that they have the concept prior to any attempted definition - and then they feel themselves obliged to substitute their concept for the definition instead.

So, are transwomen women? Well, if a transwoman is someone who identifies as a woman but would not be considered one by a biologist in the grips of the definist fallacy....then some of them might be, and some of them might not be. It depends on whether they answer to the concept of a woman - a concept that is not amenable to definition and that biologists are not authorities about.

What a juvenile response.

But it wouldn't clarify what the term means. Its current meaning is not determined by the content of Aristotle's work titled 'metaphysics'. That would literally be the same as thinking that to understand what the word cartoon means it is important to go and look at some drawings by Leonardo.

Metaphysics is the study of what things are, in and of themselves.

I think you quite clearly are committing the etymological fallacy.

The etymological fallacy occurs when someone argues that the current meaning of a word is determined by its original or historical meaning, yes?

For example, take the word 'cartoon'

The word 'cartoon' originally referred to a kind of paper on which artists would draw the outline of a painting for transfer onto wood or canvas.

Then it came to refer to the actual depiction - the working drawing itself.

Then it came to refer to, well, what we call cartoons today.

But if you want to know what 'cartoon' means it would be quite misguided to suggest going and looking at drawings by Raphael or a paper mill in Italy.

I am saying that it is not the way to understand what 'metaphysics' means.

That commits the etymological fallacy.

Imagine 'The House Next Door' is the title someone gives to a book I wrote about the composition and appearance of the house next door.

Subsequently 'Thehousenextdoor' becomes a word that starts to be systematically used to refer to what a house - any house - may be made of.

Well, it would be quite misguided to think that one gains insight into what the word 'thehousenextdoor' means by reading the original work that gave the world the word, for then one would believe it is exclusively about what a particular house is made of, plus about its appearance.

Words change their meaning over time. It is of philosophy pub-quiz use to know that the word's origin came from its being used to denote a particular book's placement in an author's list of works.

Because we're just discussing how a word is used. That's a first order question, not a second order one.

"What does the word 'metaphysics' mean?" is not a metaphysical question. I'm not doing philosophy in answering it, I'm just trying to explain what it means in philosophy (though with the caveat that there will be grey areas). It means the study of what things are, in and of themselves. I don't think it can be captured any better than that.

But in point of fact, 'metaphysics' was first used as a label (not by Aristotle himself) denoting the placement of a treatise. It's like 'the house next door'. It literally just meant 'the work that I have placed after the physics'.

That's not what the word means today. In philosophy it has come to mean the study of the nature of things - so, what something is in and of itself (partly no doubt as a result of the content of the treatise that had been so-labelled). Not that there are any strict rules about it and not that there isn't room for some dispute over exactly when an area of philosophical inquiry becomes metaphysical (there is room for that).

Only insofar as that will tell you something about what sort of a thing it is, in and of itself.

It is a properly of the act of wantonly killing another that it is wrong. But that is not a metaphysical claim, though the fact acts can have that property may tell us something about what wrongness itself is. And that - the investigation of what wrongness is, in and of itself, is metaphysical.

No, it was simply the title given to the work that had been placed 'after the physics'.

It denoted its placement in an order, not its subject matter.

No. It's about the meaning of the word 'metaphysics'.

It might do on ordinary usage, I am not sure.

It comes from 'metaphysics' which was simply the title given to one of Aristotle's treatises - the one that came 'after the physics'.

In philosophy it is the study of what things are, in and of themselves.

I understand metaphysics to be about what things are, in and of themselves.

For example, "which propositions are true?" is not a metaphysical question. But "what is truth?" is.

"Which propositions are known?" is not a metaphysical question. But "what is knowledge?" is.

"Which actions are right and which ones wrong?" is not a metaphysical question. But 'what is rightness?' is.

And so on. I think the same distinction is drawn by talking about 'first order' questions and 'second order' questions, where the latter are about the nature of the subject matter of the first.

The word 'meta' originally meant 'after', but I think it has subsequently come to mean the above.

I think unless there is a 'logical' problem of evil, there is no real problem of evil.

I think there isn't a logical problem of evil as all one has to do is conceive of a circumstance in which God exists and evils of the world exist. If one can conceive of just one such scenario, the logical problem is defeated.

Here is one. Imagine that just as some people among us enjoy danger and like doing things like climbing mountains, there are people in heaven like that as well who want the thrill of living in a genuinely dangerous world that has no safety nets (apart from death - which by hypothesis, takes one back to safety in heaven). Well, wouldn't God allow them to go to such a place? To deny them would seem, if anything, wrong. It's not as if they wouldn't be returning to safety eventually. God might not recommend it - just as I would not recommend climbing a mountain - but it's plausible at least that if someone really wanted that kind of experience, God would not deny them it.

This is that place - an adventure holiday park that has only one safety net: death. If we have all chosen to be here - signed-off on it, signed all the waivers and so on - then our situation is logically compatible with God's existence.

Yes, it would only be a heuristic and so would not assume AI is actually a person. It's just that - with a few notable exceptions - the ethical verdict seems to carry-over. It would be unethical, for instance, for me to ask a perfect stranger for their view about some sensitive material I've been asked to review - and so similarly unethical for me to feed it into AI. Whereas if I asked a perfect stranger to check an article for typos and spelling, then it doesn't seem necessary for me to credit them...and likewise if I use AI for a similar purpose. And the heuristic respects the fact there's a big grey area where legitimate disagreement reigns over exactly how much credit someone deserves for something. I think I'm right in saying that an anonymous reviewer suggested that William Golding remove a large scene setting introduction to his Lord of the Flies - which he did - and which no doubt greatly improved the work. But that person isn't credited - perhaps fairly.

There are exceptions - a perfect stranger deserves thanks for help and shouldn't be addressed rudely, whereas AI deserves no thanks or politeness. But it seems to me quite an effective heuristic - one that underlines that AI doesn't create any novel ethical problems, but just exaggerates existing ones. And I suppose on the plus side, it has made cheating available to the masses. It used to only be the rich who could afford to hire someone to write their essays for them....now such cheating is available to virtually everyone!

Yes, precisely.

Isn't the best policy simply to treat AI as if it were a stranger? So, for instance, let's say I've written something and I want someone else to read it to check for grammar, make comments, etc. Well, I don't really see that it is any more problematic me giving it to an AI to do that for me than it is me giving it to a stranger to do that for me. The stranger could corrupt my work, going beyond the brief and changing sentences in ways I did not license. Likewise with AI. The stranger could pass my work to others without my consent; likewise with AI. And so on. AI doesn't - I think - raise any new problems, so much as amplify existing ones. Though perhaps I simply haven't thought about this enough. But what's wrong with this principle for AI use - for (nearly) all intents and purposes, treat AI as if it were a stranger (I say 'nearly' because as it is not actually a person, it doesn't require acknowledgement or praise for any effort it has put it....but that's sort of trivial). Edit: another qualification - you don't have to worry about AI's feelings, so norms of politeness don't apply to AI but do to strangers.

Thank you for your very thought provoking response. And I agree that it is vulnerable in the way you mention and have been pondering this.

I mentioned that something might be morally valuable due to intrinsic properties of the concept to which it answers, but that also something might be morally valuable due to intrinsic properties of the thing itself. I have now found that the distinction in question is expressed by talking about something's 'de re' identity versus its 'de dicto' identity. And so I now have the terminology I need to distinguish between something's being intrinsically valuable 'de re' (where this means that it is intrinsically valuable because of what it, the object itself, is) and something's being intrinsically valuable 'de dicto' (where this means that it is valuable due to intrinsic features of the concept to which it answers).

The pen example you gave would be an example of something that is intrinsically valuable de dicto, as it is morally valuable not because it is a physical thing - even though it is - but because it answers to the concept 'pen used by Lincoln'.

What I hold is that my mind's intrinsic moral value is represented to be de re, not de dicto. This is because whether I am represented to be this person, the thinker of this thought, the human being now speaking, or me with a phenomenal past or me without one, or in any other way that truly refers to me, the truth of what my reason represents to be the case is unchanged. That is, regardless of which description I am given, I am intrinsically morally valuable no less. This invariance under co-referring substitution shows that my reason’s representation is de re: it concerns the object that I am, not any description or concept under which I may fall (I think).

if that is correct, then as my intrinsic moral value is intrinsic de re not de dicto, and none of any physical object's de re intrinsic properties are plausible candidates for the ground of my value, the argument goes through....I think.

Well, I suppose my point is that the moral premises of my argument are very strong.

Someone who denies that anything has intrinsic moral value would also have to deny that anything has extrinsic moral value as well (as extrinsic moral value presupposes intrinsic moral value - not everything can be extrinsically morally valuable, for instance).

But that means denying intrinsic moral value means being a moral nihilist.

Now, of course a moral nihilist would reject my argument as unsound. But then all I'm going to do is say that my argument establishes the truth of this claim:

Either moral nihilism is true, or our minds are not physical things.

That, I think, is quite an astonishing conclusion! I think we can safely say that the vast bulk of physicalists about the mind have no idea they need to affirm moral nihilism if they're to be consistent!

But think of a photon. — Banno

I am not sure I can, not unless I am being asked to think of a very tiny shaped thing. But anyway, I think this misses the point - which is that whatever features are proposed as being definitive of a physical thing, they're not going to include consciousness. And that's really all my argument needs. Precisely what is definitive of a physical thing can be left open, then.

I think the talk of essences distracts from that basic problem. The Aristotelian idea of an essence - "that which makes something what it is" - vergers on useless. If the argument could be reworked in model terms, using necessary properties rather than essences, the issue might be made clearer. — Banno

I do not see what you're getting at here. We could talk of intrinsic properties instead - the point is just that intrinsic moral value supervenes on intrinsic properties (which seems analytic). It's not clear to me that introducing necessity could make anything clearer, given the exact relationship between necessity and intrinsic properties seems open to some dispute.

But let's say - and I am not convinced this is true - that an object's essential (or intrinsic, if one prefers) properties are properties it has of necessity. Then all that would mean where my argument is concerned is that we are necessarily not physical things.

As it is often put, a valid deductive argument extracts the implications of its premises. That's its function. I assume that it is no vice in an argument that it does this, but the point of such arguments.

Where a vice may arise is if one of the premises asserts the conclusion (although this would not by itself render the argument invalid - 'T, therefore T' is valid - so much as uninformative). But it seems to me that none of the premises of my argument assert the conclusion. And so if the conclusion follows from the premises, then nothing has been gotten out that was not put in. The argument will simply have successfully shown us what was implicit in what our reason already tells us.

For example, the claim that -


1. If an object is intrinsically morally valuable, then it is morally valuable in virtue of some/all of its essential properties.

- does not assert that no physical thing has consciousness as a property (and so does not beg the question of what kind of a thing our minds are).

Likewise -

2. Our minds are intrinsically morally valuable objects

does not assert it either. Both premises, taken by themselves, are entirely consistent with the thesis that we are physical things.

3. Conclusion: therefore the objects that are our minds are morally valuable in virtue of some/all of their essential properties

As this just follows deductively from 1 and 2, this is not question begging (for neither 1 nor 2 are question begging).

This -

4. Our minds are (plausibly) intrinsically morally valuable because they bear conscious states

is a neutral premise too. It does not assert that no physical thing can bear conscious states.

This -

5. Conclusion: therefore the objects that are our minds have bearing conscious states as one of their essential properties.

is entailed by 3 and 4 and so cannot possibly be question begging unless a premise that preceded it is.

This -

5. Consciousness is not an essential property of physical objects

is not question begging either. Indeed, I think most physicalists about the mind would accept it, for they do not typically argue that it is definitive of a physical object that it can bear conscious states, but make the much more modest claim that it is possible for physical objects to bear conscious states. This premise also seems independently verifiable by reason - it is prima facie implausible to think consciousness is a defining feature of a physical thing. (Even if there is disagreement over exactly what a physical things defining features are, consciousness seems clearly not to be among the plausible candidates).

And this -

6. Conclusion: therefore, the objects that are our minds are not physical objects

follows logically. And so 6 does not contain more than was in the premises and the premises whose implication it extracts are not question begging.

Maybe that's wrong and it does beg the question against the physicalist about the mind - but I don't think it does at this stage. I think the average physicalist about the mind would accept all the premises. Perhaps upon learning what their combined implication is they might set about trying to challenge one of the premises (although I personally think that would be question begging....), but that'd be a burden or cost or embarrassment given they each seem independently plausible.

I am not sure how plausible it is to claim that every existing thing has intrinsic value. Does a germ have intrinsic moral value?

Maybe everything does have some intrinsic value. Even so, my argument would not really be affected, I think. As clearly I have a different order of intrinsic moral value to a germ. And so whatever my intrinsic features of me my moral value is supervening on will be different to those on which a germ's intrinsic moral value (if have it it does) is supervening on. And I think that's all my argument needs. For if I just focus on me, then my intrinsic moral value does not seem to be supervening on any of the plausible candidate intrinsic properties of physical things. My moral value seems to be supervening on the fact I am a bearer of conscious states. Thus I can conclude that I am essentially a bearer of conscious states - something no physical thing seems to be.

I admit that I am groping around in the dark where views about essential properties are concerned.

I suppose that if someone says humans are essentially physical and essentially conscious, that's consistent with what's of intrinsic value about us being something that is essentially not physical. And so I think I can agree with someone who says that humans are essentially physical and essentially conscious. I am a human, but I do not think I am essentially a human. If I were to discover I was a cow, my reason still represents me to be intrinsically morally valuable.

Someone who says that we - the things that are of intrinsic moral value - are essentially physical and essentially conscious would be saying that consciousness is an essential feature of physical things. And that, I think, does not appear to be true.

Perhaps something can be intrinsically morally valuable due to answering to a concept and the moral value supervene on something essential to the concept rather than the thing itself. For want of a better example, perhaps someone could be intrinsically morally valuable due to being a bachelor with the intrinsic value supervening on the fact they are unmarried. I think we would actually describe that as extrinsic value precisely because the one who is a bachelor is not essentially a bachelor. But even so, we can simply run the thought experiment where we ourselves are concerned and simply remove any and all of those features that our moral value is proposed to be supervening on and see if it remains.

For example, if my intrinsic moral value is claimed to be supervening on the fact I am a human, then I can simply imagine finding out that I am not one (as I did above) and see if this affects my intrinsic moral worth. As it does not, then my intrinsic moral worth is not grounded in that fact about me. And as that can continue until we arrive at something like "the fact I am a bearer of conscious states" - something that does not seem an essential feature of any physical thing - we still arrive at the conclusion that we are not physical things.

But a person, or a balloon, remains what it is despite change in shape, size or location. So these do not seem to be good candidates for essential properties. It seems to me that, for example, personality might be a good candidate for an essential property of a person, and that's not physical anyway. Seems your conclusion is already present in values not being physical. You've given a different articulation of Hume's fork. — Banno

However, though a physical thing's shape and size and location can change, it doesn't seem possible for it not to have a shape, size or location. The claim that these are essential features of a physical thing is not equivalent to the claim that they do not change, but only that without them it could not be that kind of thing at all.

Seems your conclusion is already present in values not being physical. You've given a different articulation of Hume's fork. — Banno

I don't think I have committed to a view about the composition of moral values. I think my argument is neutral on that. Thank you for your comments though.

I take 'intrinsic' moral value to be moral value that is supervening on something's essential properties. i take that to be true by definition. So, I take it to be uncontroversial that moral value - any and all - supervenes on something's other properties. The difference between intrinsic and extrinsic moral value resides in what it is supervening upon - if it is supervening on something's essential properties, then we can call it intrinsic moral value, whereas if it is supervening on something's non-essential properties, then we can say that it has extrinsic moral value (for then it does not have its value due to what it is, but rather due to some accidental feature of it).

I think all that's widely accepted - well, at least the idea that moral properties supervene on other properties (or, to put it another way, there can't be bare moral differences).

As such, if something is represented to be intrinsically morally valuable, then we can safely conclude that it has that moral value in virtue of some of its essential features. But when we consider all of those properties that are plausible candidates for being a physical thing's essential features - such as shape, size, location etc. - none of them seem to be that in virtue of which we have our intrinsic moral value. As such, the conclusion that is then forced is that we must be non-physical things.

The only plausible - and I'm not saying this 'is' the property in virtue of which we are intrinsically morally valuable, only that it is a good candidate (because 'if' something has this property, then it does seem to follow that it has intrinsic value) - candidate is that we have intrinsic moral value due to being the kind of thing that has conscious states. But as that doesn't seem to be an essential property of physical things - that is, it would be odd to suggest that part of what makes a physical thing a physical thing is that it can bear conscious states - then what we learn is that we're not physical things, but things that essentially bear conscious states.

I take the soundness of this case to be unaffected by what moral value itself is, as what it capitalizes upon is widely agreed-to seeming conceptual truths about moral value (ones that any plausible account of what moral value itself is would have to respect or be deemed implausible).

Another form of what is essentially the same argument focusses instead on candidate essential properties of physical things - such as shape and size and location. And that version of my argument simply goes that those properties are clearly not the ground of our intrinsic moral value. As this can continue for any and all of the properties that are plausibly essential to something being physical, then this would establish that our minds are not physical things.

"First you say that your premise "is consistent with [some physical things being conscious]," but then you go on to say that the whole argument entails the proposition that no physical thing is conscious."

Yes, I think the premise is consistent with that. And I'd say it is important that it is, for otherwise it would beg the question. However, the argument as a whole seems to entail that physical things are essentially not conscious. That wouldn't be question begging, but would constitute an apparent refutation of the idea that physical things can have conscious states.

I am not sure how best to lay out the argument. Here is an attempt:

1. If an object is intrinsically morally valuable, then it is morally valuable in virtue of some/all of its essential properties.
2. Our minds are intrinsically morally valuable objects
3. Conclusion: therefore the objects that are our minds are morally valuable in virtue of some/all of their essential properties
4. Our minds are (plausibly) intrinsically morally valuable because they bear conscious states
5. Conclusion: therefore the objects that are our minds have bearing conscious states as one of their essential properties.
5. Consciousness is not an essential property of physical objects
6. Conclusion: therefore, the objects that are our minds are not physical objects

As I see it premise 5 is not question begging, for taken in isolation it is consistent with physical objects being capable of having conscious states. Just as, by analogy, colour is (plausibly) not an essential feature of physical objects, yet that is consistent with physical objects having colour. And I think that premise 5 would be accepted by most physicalists about the mind, for they are not going to hold that any and all physical things have conscious states (or that any or all of them are intrinsically valuable). Their claim - typically and as I understand it - would be only that it is possible for physical objects to bear conscious states.

There are, no doubt, some who would deny this. Pansychists do, I think. But i think they would accept that they have the burden of making a case for that. That is, I think even they would accept that premise 5 is prima facie plausible.

The main weakness, as I see it anyway, in my case is the possible conflation of what might be termed (and probably is) 'definitional' essentialism and 'metaphysical' essentialism. To use a familiar example, a bachelor is essentially unmarried. But the person who is a bachelor is not essentially unmarried. And so perhaps it could be objected that a mind is by definition something that bears conscious states - and so consciousness is an essential feature of minds in the way that being unmarried is an essential feature of bachelors - but consciousness is not thereby an essential feature of the objects that are minds, anymore than being unmarried is an essential feature of those who are bachelors.

My reply to that, which I am not sure is successful, is that when it comes to intrinsic moral value, that attaches to the object rather than the concept that the object answers to.

I don't think that's widely accepted. The notion of 'intrinsic moral value' doesn't seem to presuppose a divine command theory of ethics. As I understand it, the ontological commitments of moral value - whether intrinsic or extrinsic - are matters of debate. My argument, in helping itself to the notion of intrinsic value, does not commit me to any particular view about those ontological commitments, I think.

I take it to be a conceptual truth that moral properties supervene on other properties. That is, there is always a 'because' where something's possession of a moral property is concerned (it is morally valuable 'because' it has this or that feature etc.). This is why if something is represented to be morally valuable, there is a further question of why or in virtue of what it has that moral value. It is, of course, upon this that my case hinges.

But if an object can have moral value in addition - rather than because - of its other features, then granted the argument would not work, for then we could not read more into what our reason represents to be the case.

Although we are essentially objects, I don't think that fact about us can be what our intrinsic moral value supervenes on, for that would then mean that every object is intrinsically morally valuable (yet our reason does not represent this to be the case).

I am glad you think the argument has some merit.

I mean by "X is an essential property of Y" metaphysical essence - so, something that makes it the kind of object it is. I would take shape and size to be essential properties of physical objects, whereas 'colour' does not seem to be (though that is just to illustrate what I mean, but it would not affect my case if colour was an essential attribute of physical things).

I agree that if physical things are essentially conscious then that would stop the argument. But consciousness does not seem to be an essential feature of physical things. Those who believe us to be physical things do not - I think - typically hold that we are essentially conscious. Consciousness would then have to be held to be a feature of all physical things (and by extension, they would have to hold that all physical things are equally intrinsically morally valuable - which seems false).

My premise that consciousness is not an essential feature of physical things is not equivalent to denying that any physical things are conscious, for it is consistent with consciousness not being an essential feature of such things that nevertheless, some have that feature (just as, by analogy, if colour is not an essential feature of physical things, that does not prevent physical things from having colour). However, if the argument as a whole is sound, then I think it would establish that no physical thing is conscious. For if we are morally valuable because we are things of a sort that are conscious, then that would be an essential property of the kinds of thing we are, and as that is not an essential feature of physical things, the sorts of thing that have consciousness would have been demonstrated to be non-physical.

No, I wouldn't say that the attitude is intrinsic to the thing. Rather, something essential to the thing is what is responsible for my valuing attitude.

To use my valuing of something as an example, if I value something intrinsically, then I would be valuing it due to something essential to it, whereas if I value something extrinsically, then I would be valuing it due to something non-essential about it. Were I to say that I find something intrinsically valuable, then, I would be saying that I value it due to some of its essential properties, rather than saying that my valuing of it is an essential property of that thing.

Applied to moral value, for something to be intrinsically morally valuable is for it - the thing - to have moral value due to some its essential properties. I think that's correct anyway.

Thank you for your reply.

That something is morally valuable would be a property of that thing. But it would be a supervenient property, meaning that it is resultant from some of the thing's other properties. The difference, I take it, between something being 'intrinsically' morally valuable and 'extrinsically' morally valuable is that in the former case the moral value is supervening on essential properties of the thing, whereas in the latter case it is not.

So all moral value - whether possessed intrinsically or extrinsically - supervenes on something's other features. But intrinsic value supervenes on something's essential features. I think that's right, anyway.