Put another way, Pegasus (the natural horse) has never been directly detected by a pair of eyes. — ucarr

Best to pick something unobserved (and not alive) if you're going to assert that.
Being unobserved is not what makes something mind-independent since the moon seems mind independent despite being observed. Does it exist (E1)? That's a different question.

Your quoted statement, ”I have no trouble defining existence sans perception…” can be read as: a) I can define existence without (using my) perception; b) I can define a type of existence that lacks perception.

Both wrong. Perhaps a type of existence that lacks the necessity of perception. Else the stop sign doesn't exist because you perceive it.

In response to the latter definition, nearly anyone might say, “Oh, yeah. I know whatcha mean. Take for example a rock.” In response to the former definition, "I have no trouble defining existence sans perception, but it's still not an objective reality, only a relational one. So I am similarly encumbered by my inability to find objective existence meaningful in any logical way." we see that it, when compared with "Language is very much used to prove or give evidence for things, but the rules of language do not in any way dictate how 'reality' (whatever that entails) works." reveals serious conflict between the two statements.

I don't see one. Language and proofs are the media of concepts and epistemology, but none of that has any effect on mind-independent existence, only our potential knowledge of it.

Your main purpose in this conversation is to examine mind-independent reality with an eye towards using this examination to establish that EPP cannot be eliminated without creating a contradiction. Doing this would establish the necessity of EPP.

Agree

You first say you can't find objective existence logically meaningful. Next you say the rules of language do not in anyway influence the workings of mind-independent reality.

Yes, it seems that an immediate contradiction would follow if this 2nd statement were not the case.

If the latter is true, then you know that mind-independent reality has rules not governed by rules of language. You can't make this claim without inferring logical rules in application to objective existence.

Still agree, but keep separate the making of the claim, knowledge of the way things work, and the actual way things work, the latter of which would be entirely independent of the others.

This claim is incompatible with your other claim you can't find objective existence meaningful in any logical way.

How so? Objective existence seemed not even mentioned anywhere except the statement that I didn't find a way it would be meaningful, at least in the absence of EPP. With EPP, E1 and E3 are almost identical. Almost...

If, as you imply, mind-independent reality has rules (metaphysics) not influenced by language

I imply that only with some definitions. E3 or E5 for instance have rules, which can be described by language, but are not a product of language. Most of the others seem to select some arbitrary domain to suit the purposes of the chooser of the definition, and that does seem to make them mind dependent. E1 stands out as having no mind dependence, but also having no particular rules.

... , then [mind-independent reality] produces material things predication, a linguistic entity, cannot impact.

How did 'material things' suddenly appear from that sequence? I hadn't specified material as being in any way special. It might be under some forms of E4 existence, but I maintain that any such definition is just a less solipsistic version of human-mind-dependent reality.

This is existence prior to (and isolated from) predication.

It does not since I gave so many counterexamples of predication without existence, especially when one of the 'restricted domain' definitions was used.

Therefore, elimination of EPP leads to predications about things isolated from predication.

Wait, I didn't see that argued, and there's no example. I don't see how this follows from lack of EPP. What does it mean to be 'isolated from predication'? That concept was never introduced.

Such predications are tantamount to empty sets.

An empty set has zero members, which is a predicate of an empty set. Pegasus is not an empty set. The set of all existing Pegasus' is (for the sake of argument) empty, but Pegasus having 2 wings does not directly contradict that.

... a set containing paradoxes called “non-existent things with predications.”

"“non-existent things with predications.” has not been shown to be paradoxical.
You seem to be trying to show this, but my critiques need to be addressed.

Santa does not exist. E1=T, E2=F, E3=T, E4=F, E5=T, E6=T
Santa is non-existent. E1=T, E2=F, E3=T, E4=F, E5=T, E6=T

For either, E3=F, E4=T E6=domain dependent. Seems I disagree with half of your assessments. Still, pretty nice demonstration that 'does not exist' and 'is nonexistent' mean the same thing in an ontological sense.

So “Santa is there-not-being-an-existing-Santa.” equals “Santa is non-existent.”

So why did I say otherwise? Suppose EPP is the case. Then the former might be true, but the latter is paradoxical, listing a predicate of a nonexistent thing. That's the distinction I was referencing, but it isn't an ontological distinction, so the assessment of E1-E6 is unchanged.

Why did I agree to Santa not existing (E1)? Probably because Santa is contradictory, and while I don't see a lot of rules for E1, 'is possible' seems to be a reasonable one.

No, not that at all. It's due to my mind being involved in the act of abstracting, preventing by some definitions the direct (causal?) access to this mind-independent thing. — noAxioms

Wow, even that is wrong, since a rock is supposedly mind-independent and yet I have empirical access to it. I need to be more careful with my wordings.

Explain how you can have direct experience of a mind-independent thing (or of anything) without a mind? — ucarr

Ask somebody who claims that.

We know the newborn has a brain before it knows that.

How a baby's brain works is irrelevant. Epistemology is almost on-topic since there is the issue of how one might know something exists. Answer E1:No test E2 by definition, E3 everything E4 empirical E5 ill-phrased E6 domain dependent

If it's true nothing can be thought prior to existent mind, then refuting pre-existent mind with the predication of that selfsame mind is a refutation of EPP that examples a contradiction.

I don't know what 'pre-existent' means in the context of this topic. If it is true that nothing can be thought prior to existent mind, then EPP holds at least for minds, but not necessarily anything else. And if that is not true, then EPP does not hold at all.

Since MPP is dependent upon EPP, rejection of MPP implies rejection of EPP.

That doesn't follow at all. It only implies that rejection of EPP means that MPP also doesn't hold, and even then only if the premise is true.
For example, a chandelier is dependent on the chain from which it hangs. You're saying that absence of the chandelier implies the absence of the chain, but it could still be there, holding a plant hook or something. This is basic logic.

I am not concerned about how a mind works, and how it develops in an infant. Off topic. — noAxioms
If this is your response to my delivery of a refutation of EPP necessitating a contradiction without begging the question

The example didn't show this. Here's what you said:

Consider that your inability to access directly mind independence is due to the existence of your mind. Its existence precedes your knowledge of its existence — ucarr

The bold part is straight up begging EPP by asserting the existence of this mind without justification, and without specifying even what kind of existence. Not even under E2 does mind existence precede the predication of self-awareness.

And, as I said, how an infant's brain works is irrelevant to my rejection of that act of begging.

The unedited version of my quote above makes it clear I think the Standard Model the material ground of existence — ucarr

Sure, but so many of your other quotes make it quite clear that you consider perception to be the mental ground for existence. So you regularly switch between two primary definitions of E2 or E4. If E4, then cognition has nothing to do with it. If E2, then material emerges from mind, not the other way around.

Now E2 & E4 are just definitions, and being definitions and not theories, they're not things that are metaphysically true or not, but just different usages of a word in different contexts. It is valid to use both E2 and E4 without contradictions, but in doing so, they lose all metaphysical existence.

Apparently you think abstractions immaterial — ucarr

Not sure where you get this. Human abstraction (a human process) is material since a human consists of material. Something immaterial doing its own abstracting would be an example of immaterial abstraction, so I can conclude that abstraction is not necessarily material, but my own abstracting seems to be a material process.

This is your main interpretation of what I have to say on the topic of defending EPP, my purpose in our dialogue. It is wrong. You are confusing MPP, viz., Mind Precedes Predication with EPP.

I am not since nowhere am I discussing mind. I keep batting away all your comments talking about concepts instead of the thing itself.

So above you confine existence to material things. 14 has been my example of an immaterial thing (it's an integer, not a material object subject to supposed conservation laws), and it has a predicate (among thousands of them) of being even. Thus EPP fails. No mention of mind appears anywhere in that example.

Simple reasoning makes it clear that if cognition is emergent from objective reality, then mind is emergent from objective reality. Given this chain of reasoning, it follows that mind doesn't precede objective reality. — ucarr

That doesn't follow from that chain of reasoning due to the bolded word above. The first statement is trivially true since the two words are essentially synonyms. What follows from that statement is "if cognition is emergent from objective reality, then mind doesn't precede objective reality", but you said something else, something that doesn't follow at all.

Another important clarification: mind does precede expression of existence as an abstract idea.

Depends on definitions. There are plenty of those on these forums that restrict the word 'mind' to 'human mind', meaning that if something nonhuman does the exact same thing, it isn't mind and it probably isn't abstracting. Anyway, I will accept the statement if it doesn't come with the anthropocentric baggage.

The mind-independent reality of objective reality is something we can only infer from social consensus, a premise I've discussed repeatedly.

Social consensus is still a form of mind-dependency. Material is what's real only because human infer it in that manner. But the inference is a starting point, and one hopes that one can infer more than just what is immediately seen. All of this is still a restricted relational existence, nothing objective about it despite it frequently being asserted that way.

Below we have one of your quotes. It talks about the impact of subjectivity upon the QM state of super-position (inferred from Schrödinger's Equation).

...measurement (not mind-specific) defines presence and therefore precedes it. This is pretty consistent with quantum mechanics where measurement is what collapses a wave function and makes some system state in the past exist where it didn't exist before the measurement. — noAxioms — ucarr

No mention of subjectivity (except the phrase 'not mind-specific) appeared anywhere in my statement you quoted. I explicitly state that mind/subjectivity plays no role.

The observer interacts with QM super-position and collapses it to a definite outcome.

No. 'obsersver' carries a connotation of human subjectivity, and QM does not give humans any special role. We're just piles of atoms, just like any other system. Use a different word than 'observer'.

No. Given your stated definition of existence within the context of EPP:

E3 seems to be the only definition 'within the context of EPP".

Property before existence is illogical; property after predication posits predication as the idealism of objective reality by verbal utterance.

I'm not in any way talking about verbal utterances. None of my definitions (not even E2) mentioned that.

My definition of existence implicitly refutes E2 and E6.
...
likewise, the limitation of the scope of existence of E6 is refuted

I can reword your definition to fit E6, so this is wrong. Your definition very much limits scope to a very restricted domain (of material), so illustrated, not refuted.

You say, "¬O → ¬C." This means that because Columbus is encompassed by Ohio, Ohio, which includes all of Columbus plus more, necessarily implies Columbus and thus its negation implies Columbus' negation.

No, the statement does not mean that. It was what could be concluded from "Columbus implies Ohio", which in this case is, in the absence of Ohio, there is no Columbus.

This means Columbus is always included within the scope of Ohio.

Not it doesn't. An Ohio without Columbus is completely consistent with the statement "Columbus implies Ohio". This is trivial logic.

When we say, "The predication makes a claim about the subject regarding: a) the state of being of the subject; b) the actions of the subject."

In the absence of EPP, a) is false. b) is false regardless since there's no necessity of 'action'. There is no necessity of claim. So for instance with 14 being even, "is even" is the predicate. That predicate is performing no action and is not something making a claim. It is just a property that applies to some integers and not to others.
No mention of existence is there, except as part of the domain of integers. Is pi not even? Unclear if the predicate applies at all to something not an integer. So 14 being even gives it a certain E6 kind of existence. There exists in the set of integers, 14, which happens to be even.

Can you show me how EPP doesn't assume existence?

No, the principle seems to assume existence, and worse, it seems to assume E1 existence, but as worded, it's not explicit about that, only demonstrably false with some of the others.

This means the existence of existence is presumed.

That doesn't even make syntactic sense, let alone follow from anything. Maybe you mean some sort of empty tautology, that all that exists exists.

The presumption of its existence is necessary to examining it relationship to something else, in this case, predication, right?

Wrong. I have zero trouble examining relationships without presuming E1 existence. You didn't specify E1 though.

Can you show yourself examining EPP, or anything else, without making use of your cognition?

I can't, but no such claim was ever made.

I don't restrict my scope to material things. — ucarr

See your definition quoted at the top then, defining existence grounded in material.

Define the domain that lies between material thing and abstraction.

Didn't know there was one.

Can you explain how it is that, "but the rules of language do not in any way dictate how 'reality' (whatever that entails) works" doesn't make a definitive statement about the independence of the ontological from the epistemological towards aligning you with realism?

But it does make such a statement.

I see that you attempt to keep the meaning of reality vague, however, if the word has meaning in your statement

The statement is valid with most definitions of the word, except definitions where existence/reality is dependent on language rules..

I, too, am closely aligned with E1.

Your 'material' definition above aligns with E4, not E1. There are empirical tests for existence under E4, and not under E1.

The difference between us is that, in context, I ascribe foundational importance to E2 in the examination of EPP.

E2 isn't foundational under E1. Neither is the standard model.

Can you demonstrate direct knowledge of mind-independent things apart from perception and its predications? — ucarr

You define direct knowledge as that learned through perception, so here you seem to be asking me to demonstrate perception apart from perception, which would be a contradiction.

E4 Existence is part of the objective state of this universe (existence inhabits a domain) — ucarr

If it is 'of this universe', it is part of a limited domain, a relation, not an objective existence. So E4 is 'part of this universe', and there's no 'objective' about that. The word 'this' is a reference to humanity, making it anthropocentric if not outright mind dependent.

but EPP in the context of E4 does not hold?

I've given counterexamples, so no, it doesn't hold. Let's suppose a roughly rectangular rock exists in (is part of some other domain of: )some other universe. It is rectangular and yet does not exist in this universe, so it doesn't exist under E4, despite having that 'roughly rectangular' predication.

Does this tell us we can specify that EPP does not hold by restricting the domain of existence?

I think so.

Our only option is to examine mind independence with mind.

Agree, but by definition, the ontology of the independent thing doesn't depend on it being thus examined.

There's no perception nor even audience for a mind independent predication. — noAxioms

This seems to be a mis-statement. The perception is possible but not mandatory for predication and separately for existence. Some mind-independent things nevertheless have an audience.

When you declare, "Pegasus can't count his own wings because you personally don't perceive them." you likewise don't perceive them except through actions completely internal to you.

Not talking about the concept of Pegasus.

Consider your posted definition of metaphysics, "...the branch of philosophy that deals with the first principles of things, including abstract concepts such as being, knowing, substance, cause, identity, time, and space."

You're claiming principles and abstract concepts have no relationship with cognition? — ucarr

Not claiming that, nor is the quoted definition.

Is Pegasus independent of all human minds — ucarr

So now human minds are special? If that's true, then Pegasus probably doesn't exist.

I have no trouble defining existence sans perception, but it's still not an objective reality, only a relational one. So I am similarly encumbered by my inability to find objective existence meaningful in any logical way. — noAxioms
Your bold clause above examples a contradiction: It has you practicing the perception of defining a word in the absence of perception.

No contradiction since nowhere does it suggest an absence of perception in the act of defining something.

I wasn't talking about my act of defining a phrase. — noAxioms
This is a declaration. Where's your argument supporting it?

OP disclaimer says what I am talking about.

Santa is not non-existent. — ucarr

Definition dependent, and definition not specified.
Santa being nonexistent is different than there not being an existing Santa. Santa being anything is a predication.

Consider that your inability to access directly mind independence is due to the existence of your mind.

No, not that at all. It's due to my mind being involved in the act of abstracting, preventing by some definitions the direct (causal?) access to this mind-independent thing.

Its existence precedes your knowledge of its existence

It's existence is unknown (definition dependent again).

What is your response?

I am not concerned about how a mind works, and how it develops in an infant. Off topic.

Have you considered the insuperability of your mind as the reason? Its prior to all of your predications. — ucarr

Doesn't seem to be.

E1 Existence is a member of all that is part of objective reality

Objective Reality → E

Yes, but sans EPP, objective reality could be empty, a property that nothing has, that nothing needs. Hence it seems empty in absence of justification, and an unjustified assumption of EPP seems its only justification.

E3 Existence has predicates

No, E3 says X exists if X has predicates. It doesn't say any thing about existence itself (whatever that means) having predicates.

E → Phenomena

Arrow potnkints the wrong way, but yes, this is a definition that directly leverages EPP. Any predication implies existence, hence I think therefore I am.

E4 Existence is part of the objective state of this universe (existence inhabits a domain)

Not objective. Part of 'the' universe, like the one that humans find happens to be the preferred one. All very anthropocentric, and thus very questionably mind independent.

E5 Y exists IFF Y is part of the causal history of X

X (Causal History) ↔︎ Y

Y exists relative to X .... This doesn't mean that Y exists. Existence is a realation, and a 1-way relation, not 2-way like you drew it.

E6 "existential quantification", where 51 is not prime because there exists an even divisor that is neither 1 nor 51.

Can you counter-narrate the following:

Although some scientists have analyzed data in search of evidence for other universes, no statistically significant evidence has been found. Critics argue that the multiverse concept lacks testability and falsifiability, which are essential for scientific inquiry, and that it raises unresolved metaphysical issues.
-- Wikipedia — ucarr

I agree. Explanatory power does not constitute testability, and lack of alternative explanation does not constitute falsification of not-multiverse.

Existence cannot be analyzed.

By some apparently.

You cannot analyze the brute fact of your existence.

You can, just not by starting with an assumption of it being brute fact.

so I'll pick E1, as I've been doing throughout the conversation.

Fine. Pegasus has no access (no way to test for) E1 existence. It in no way helps or hinders his ability to count his wings.
If Pegasus wasn't logically possible, that's another story. That would inhibit said ability. I didn't even list 'logcially possible' as one of my definitions. Should have.

[direct knowledge is] With your empirical eyes, you look at a white horse racing around the paddock of a horse ranch. This is direct observation because your eyes are detecting something external to your mind. — ucarr

Direct is a relation, by your description. If it implies existence, then existence relative to you, nothing at all objective.

In your mind's eye, you imagine Pegasus with wings. This is indirect observation because your eyes are not detecting something external to them.

So indirect is imagination. You called it knowledge? Of what? That you are imagining a flying horse? I'd say you have direct knowledge of that.

I'm not referring to your choice to focus on mind-independent reality. I'm referring to the fact that all things within the lens of perception, whether detected empirically or logically, hold within mind-dependence.

I don't consider that to be fact, nor does any realist.
I also do not presume anything's specific membership in objective reality (R1), in contrast with said realists. I'm not big on presuming things.

How are you able to state facts about things independent of your mind?

My making statements is not a mind independent activity.

I also don't think I can set it aside, but the existence of some rock doesn't depend on my subjectivity. — noAxioms


Saying you can't set aside your mind WRT reality acknowledges a through-line of connection linking your mind to the rock.

Maybe, but the ontology of the rock is unaffected by my perception of it, link or no link. I will actually question this for the apple. I suspect there are no mind-independent apples, meaning no apples in worlds lacking minds. Not so much with the rocks.

This tells us the existence of the rock, as you know it, does depend upon your mind's perception of it.

So, no, it does not tell me that, and existence is undefined here.

Correlation simply means that as the value of P changes, so does the value of Q.

OK, so you're talking about a different sort of correlation than what you get with say entangled particle measurements.

Inertial frames of reference for different actions are about the differential rate of elapsing time between the inertial frames. If you believe elapsing time pertains to P → Q, then you should be able to measure the amount of time it takes for P to imply Q. So tell me, how much time does it take for P to imply Q?

Frame dependent, and no, that's not how inertial frames work. Elapsed time between two events is a difference in one abstract coordinate of each of those two events. and that difference is frame dependent.

P → Q specifically establishes a correlation between the two variables.

No, just one way. Q does not exist relative to P under E5.

Existence has no location, so it cannot be used as an origin for a coordinate system.— noAxioms

Existence, like other abstractions, localizes in the temporal forms of emergent material things.

No idea what those words mean, but perhaps you can tell me Earth's location relative to existence. Can't do that? Case in point.

Do you believe in mind independence outside of social consensus?

Social consensus is an argument against solipsism, but it's still a form of mind dependence.

Do you equate existence with metaphysics to the exclusion of identifying metaphysics with material things? — ucarr

What I equate 'existence' with is definition dependent. Most of them don't exclude material things.

I equate metaphysics with cognition of the mind-scape.[/quote]Metaphysics is nowhere defined as any kind of cognition or grammar. Please use a definition that is at least slightly close to "the branch of philosophy that deals with the first principles of things, including abstract concepts such as being, knowing, substance, cause, identity, time, and space"

I think the Standard Model is the source of cognition and therefore of metaphysics

Cognition has been going on long before there was a standard model.

I agree that existence, being the largest of all possible contexts (environments), does not reside within a larger, encompassing context.

OK, but you defined existence as cognition, which is emergent from the larger context of material (still a very restricted context), so you seem to contradict yourself. The bit about 'largest of all possible contexts' seems to be E1, but all your discussion and assertions revolve around using E2 as your definition, and the two mean very different things.

For example, E2, your only statement about subjectivity, nevertheless says nothing about QM entanglement and its subject-object complex.

That's because QM says nothing about the role of subjectivity in any of its predictions.

I want to modify your characterization of general existence. I think it incorrect to say it has no properties. Like white light within the visible light spectrum, which contains RGB, viz., all of the colors, general existence contains The Quintet (mass_energy_force-motion_space_time), viz., all of the properties. Temporal forms of material things are emergent forms whose properties are funded by The Quintet. I don't expect any modern physicist to deny any property is connected to the Standard Model. In effect, assertion of predication sans existence is a claim that properties exist apart from the Standard Model. As an example, this is tantamount to saying the color red of an apple has nothing to do with the electromagnetism of the elementary charged particles inhabiting the visible light spectrum. — ucarr — ucarr

All that is your characterization of existence, not in any way a modification of any of mine (any one of the six). It seems to be existence relative to a model, and a model is an abstraction of something else. So this is closest to my E2. The standard model makes no mention of apples, so apparently apples don't exist by this definition. You've provided more definitions than I have probably, but all of them mind dependent.

We have options for predicating the Venn diagram relationship linking Columbus and Ohio. For example, "Columbus implies Ohio." By this statement we see Columbus is always a predicate of Ohio.

Not true. You can conclude ¬O → ¬C from that, but not O → C

For example, an adjective changes the perceivable state of its object-noun by giving the reader more information about the attributes of the object-noun. I'm saying the modification of an adjective cannot be carried out in the absence of its object-noun.

But there is a subject noun. The subject just doesn't necessarily meet some of the definitions of existence. You seem to be using a mind-dependent one here, which makes the whole comment pretty irrelevant to my experimental denial of mind-independent EPP.

Since this is an argument for proper procedure in the application of EPP, specifically WRT predication

Predication is not a procedure, except perhaps under your mental definitions.

I'm not trying to prove existence. I'm trying to prove existence precedes predication. Given this fact, the assumption of the existence of existence is allowed.

You're directly saying that begging your conclusion is not fallacious.

Can you explain how abstracting to 14 isn't an example of rendering 14 as an abstraction? — ucarr

I cannot. Best to ask whoever asserts that.

I see we both place our main focus on E1 WRT to EPP.

I don't see this since your focus is always on E2, occasionally E4 which is still mind-dependent.

I seek to defend EPP and, as you say, you're examining its status. An important difference separating us is my thinking subject-object entangled and your thinking them isolated.

It is important, because your insistence on approaching it from subjectivity prevents any analysis of E1.

My main point is that language - in the form of logic - seeks to evaluate to valid conclusions as proof of truth content in statements.

Disagree. Language is used for far more than just proofs and finding of truth.

Can you explain how it is that, "but the rules of language do not in any way dictate how 'reality' (whatever that entails) works"

The way it is typically put: Language (and models) describe, they do not proscribe.

realism:
1 Philosophy the doctrine that universals or abstract concepts have an objective or absolute existence...
. .
reality:
2 the state or quality of having existence or substance.
•Philosophy existence that is absolute, self-sufficient, or objective, and not subject to human decisions or conventions.
- The Apple Dictionary

I see that you attempt to keep the meaning of reality vague, however, if the word has meaning in your statement, then it means what the dictionary says it means

The dictionary definitions you quoted do not specify which usage of 'exists' it is referencing. OK, the realism definition says 'absolute' and not 'objective as opposed to subjective', but it's reference to abstractions also suggests the latter meaning.

The 'absolute' reference suggests R1. Definitions from other dictionaries vary.

I'm saying existence reduces to the Standard Model. — ucarr

I have no clue what you mean to say when you say existence (metaphysics) reduces to a physical model of the universe. The model isn't an ontological one. At best, one might say that things that are part of this universe (rocks and such) exist, but that's existence relative to a domain, and is essentially E4. I've shown how EPP is incompatible with any definition of the form 'exists in some restricted domain'. So maybe you're not trying to define E4 existence, but mean something else by those words.

Does 14 exist under this unclear definition? If not, is 14 an even number?

I think it incorrect to say it has no properties.

Good because nobody ever claimed such a paradoxical statement, regardless of what 'it' is.

If Ohio disappears totally, Columbus disappears totally — ucarr

Columbus is not a predicate of Ohio. 'Contains Columbus' is, but Ohio would still contain Columbus even if both no longer 'appear' to whatever is apparently defining their existence. I walk out of a room and the ball on table disappears from my view, but the ball is still round despite not appearing to me.

When there's nothing to modify, there are no modifiers because modification is attached to things that exist. — ucarr

Does this statement beg EPP? — ucarr

How can you not see that? It is a mild reword of EPP, both forbidding predication of a things that don't exist, despite all my examples of predication of things that don't exist.

You want an abstract and fundamental definition of existence as it pertains to material things, and not as it pertains to abstractions, right? — ucarr

I don't restrict my scope to material things. 14 has been one of my frequent examples and it isn't a material thing, nor is it an abstraction, although abstracting is necessary to think about it.

I came up with a nonexhaustive list of 6 definiitions, one or two of which are mind dependent. None are fundamental, and being definitions, I think all 6 are abstract. Mostly I was trying to see if EPP makes any sense (has any meaning) relative to definition 1. The other five I've already analyzed.

... do not in any way dictate how 'reality' (whatever that entails) works. — noAxioms
The second part of your claim marks you as a realist_materialist.

Nope, which is why I carefully put 'whatever that means' in there.

Yes, bolstered by QM, I give credence to entanglement of epistemics and ontics.

QM does not give any ontic state that is dependent on epistemics, pop articles notwithstanding.

The infinite series of negations, an asymptotic approach from existence to non-existence, the limit of existence, can't arrive at non-existence and talk about it because such talking sustains existence. True non-existence is unspeakable. Its negation is so total, it even negates itself, a type of existence. — ucarr

I could not parse much of what you said, but this bit makes it pretty clear that a mind-dependent definition of existence is being used, and 'nonexistence' is some sort of location somewhere, unreachable. I could not figure out how the size of the universe had an relevance whatsoever to a thing being talked about.

The whole comment seems irrelevant if a different definition of 'exists' is used, especially a mind-independent one that this topic is supposed to be about.

We can only talk about mind independence via use of our minds. — ucarr

I didn't say otherwise, but the mind-independent existing things don't require being talked about to exist.

My statement specifically addresses mind independence lying beyond our direct access.

So don't access it directly.

I have no trouble defining 'existence sans perception', but it's still not an objective reality, only a relational one. So I am similarly encumbered by my inability to find objective existence meaningful in any logical way.. — noAxioms
Your bold clause above examples a contradiction: It has you practicing the perception of defining a word in the absence of perception.

I wasn't talking about my act of defining a phrase.

I think your final sentence above expresses your primary motivation for seeking to refute EPP.

I don't think EPP can be refuted, but perhaps my motivation for seeking its justification and not finding it.

Consider that your inability to access directly mind independence is due to the existence of your mind. — ucarr

I don't think my mind exists by all 6 definitions, so I cannot accept this statement without explicit meaning. Being self-aware is a predicate, and without presuming EPP, that awareness may very much be predication without certain kinds of existence. I've already given several examples where this must be the case, none being refuted.

Can you counter-narrate the following:

Although some scientists have analyzed data in search of evidence for other universes — ucarr

I think if there was direct evidence of them, they by definition wouldn't be other universes. Most of the basic multiverse types fall necessarily out of theories that explain observation that no single classical universe theory can. For instance, Greene's inflationary multiverse (Tegmark's type II) explains the fine tuning issue, a very serious problem in a mono-universe interpretation.
The simplest (by far) quantum interpretation necessitates Greene's quantum multiverse. Sure, you can't prove or falsify any of these interpretations, but explaining their predictions without a multiverse gets either very complicated or insanely improbable, both violating Occam's razor.

The only relevant quote in the wiki multiverse page was references to existence.

"Together, these universes are presumed to comprise everything that exists: the entirety of space, time, matter, energy, information, and the physical laws and constants that describe them."
This one seems to presume a sort of E4 existence, substituting the multiverse for just our universe. Same relation, but far less anthropocentric.
Most of the references seem to use something like the E4 definition, but I think the intent is meant objectively despite the authors not thinking that out though. It isn't the point of the web page.

I now know you think numbers don't exist. — ucarr

I didn't say that either, especially since the type of existence wasn't specified. I would not make a claim that vague. You seem to be under the impression that I have beliefs instead of having an open mind to such matters. Part of learning is not presuming the answers before looking for evidence only in support of your opinions.

In your assessment of what I wrote, by having Pegasus count himself, you err. If he counts himself, he exists.

By which definition? I might agree to it with some definitions and not with others. You statement without that specification is vacuously ambiguous.

You assume Pegasus exists when you have him perform the action of counting himself. — ucarr

No, I just don't presume EPP when having him perform that. But as I said, you cannot conceive of no EPP, leaving you in no position to justify it. Trust me, there are lots of people on Earth that don't exist by your definition, and yet have no problem counting their own fingers and such. Pegasus is kind of like that, quite capable of counting wings without the bother of your sort of existence.

Proof is the point. You're trying to refute EPP by demonstrating predication sans existence.

Sure. One counterexample is plenty, and I provided several, so EPP does not hold for existence defined as any form of 'part of some limited domain', which covers E2,4,5,6. That proof is simple.
Where proof isn't the point is where it cannot be shown. EPP cannot be proven true or false under E1 or E3, so barring such proof, and it being demonstrated false with other definitions, EPP is accepted on faith, never on rational reasoning.

Can you demonstrate direct knowledge of mind-independent things apart from perception and its predications?

I don't know what you think 'direct knowledge' is.as distinct from knowledge that isn't direct.

Since our conversation proceeds on the basis of perception

It does not. It is about existence independent of perception.

I say predication is a statement about the actions or state of being of a material thing. Predication modifies the subject in the perception of the predication's audience by giving it more information about the subject. — ucarr

There's no perception nor even audience for a mind independent predication.

I argue that when you suggest my talking about "...the whole apple and not just one of its states." you change your focus from the temporal state of a material object to the abstract composite of all the possible states of an abstraction. — ucarr

Spacetime is 4D and that means that all 'objects' have temporal extension. It is not just an abstraction, it is the nature of the thing in itself. To assert otherwise as you are doing here is to deny the standard model and pretty much all of consensus physics.

You claim I can't distinguish between a) and b). You argue to this claim by characterizing my practice of inference as being fundamentally flawed.

It's not your practice of inference that I'm pointing out, it is the continuous practice of defining existence in a way that requires perception by you, counting by you, utterances by you, or in short in any way that requires you. Pegasus can't count his own wings because you personally don't perceive them.

A key difference between our thinking has you believing we can set aside our subjectivity whereas I don't believe we can.

I also don't think I can set it aside, but the existence of some rock doesn't depend on my subjectivity.

The fundamental flaw, you say, is my insistence on mental perception in any consideration of mind independence.

It's not fundamental (outside of idealism). Yes, consideration is mind dependent, but I'm not talking about the consideration, I'm talking about the existence of the subject of predication. This exactly illustrates my point. I'm trying to talk about the subject, and you concentrate instead on the necessity of it being considered. There is no such necessity.

So yes, use your mind to consider this or that, but don't talk about the considering or the perceiving. Four consecutive examples below where you talk only of the concepts and not about the mind independent thing.


1

If predicates don't have temporal coordinates, then they only exist as emergent properties of their subjects. This is true of them, as it is true of all abstraction — ucarr

I am not talking about abstractions of predicates.

2

The number 14 does possess mass_energy_force-motion_space_time plus position and momentum because it is only conceivable through ...

Not talking about the concept of 14.

3

You're using the temporal coordinates of your neuronal circuits to make claims about predicates that don't have them.

I am not talking about conceptualizing or neurons.

4

Cognitive Baker St. is never independent of your material subjectivity.

And again. Not talking about cognitive Baker St. I'm talking about Baker St.

Concerning E5 definition: — noAxioms

P → Q. P is a correlation of Q. Consider P alone. Can you detect from P alone whether or not P is a correlation of Q? — ucarr

What are P & Q? Events? I am presuming so. They are effectively each a set of four coordinates

I don't know what you think it means for one event to be a correlation of another. Measurement of entangled pairs are said to be correlated, but not that one is a correlation of the other. It's a mutual thing, not an arrow going one way, I'm presuming this sort of mutual thing in my answers.

I am guessing that "is a correlation of" means that a measurement at P and Q are found at some later event R to be correlated. That means that P & Q both exist relative to R, but that neither P nor Q necessarily exists relative to the other.

Consider Q alone. Can you detect from Q alone whether or not Q is a correlation of P?

There is no P in 'Q alone'. There is just Q. P does not exist relative to Q. It is a counterfactual, and E5 does not posit counterfactuals.

Given P → Q, where is the elapsing time in this measurement?

Frame dependent, and said 'measurement' is done by R, not P or Q.

Correlations are not causations, but causation always implies correlation, and no laws require a uni-directional arrow of time.

Locality is not violated since neither P nor Q exists relative to the other, so no correlation exists relative to either of them either. The correlation only exists relative to R.

As you say, events have no time coordinates WRT existence.

Existence has no location, so it cannot be used as an origin for a coordinate system. The assignment of an origin event is arbitrary. Coordinate systems are frame dependent, origin dependent, and are very much abstractions. Events on the other hand, as well as intervals, are frame independent and physical.

then all events - including predications

Predications are not events. They don't have coordinates.

The presumed mind independence of the white horse is founded upon social interaction and its characteristic responses to public stimuli across vast numbers of individual observers.

Yes, such is the basis for E4, but it is still anthropocentric existence, still dependent on perception. Such is presumed by the wiki article on the multiverse, which still suggests a restriction that what exists is defined as what we see and infer from it.
E1,3,5,6 go beyond that to actual mind independence.

I have a route to this contradiction that extends from my definition of "existence" already presented but forgotten by you.

Non-existence, an infinite series of negations... negates anything in its presence, even itself. Attributes, like the things they predicate, are negated in the presence of non-existence. Predication implies existence because it implies the sentient being making predication possible. — ucarr — ucarr

I already commented on that definition. What is a negation in this context? Usually it is a transform of a logical statement, like A -> ~B negates to B -> ~A. Why does a finite series of negations not equate to nonexistence? What does it mean to negate a nonexistent thing? Sounds like predication to me.

Your definition also is based on perception. I didn't forget it, I ignored it as irrelevant to mind independent existence.

you cannot experience a time when you were not alive and therefore non-existent.

Not being alive is not necessarily equated with nonexistence. A rock isn't alive and you probably consider it to exist (I don't think it follows with the rock either, at least not without presuming EPP).

By your own understanding of mind independent reality, you cannot know it directly, but only by inference. — ucarr

You are very bad at knowing anything by inference due to your contradictory insistence of mental perception in any consideration of mind independence. As I said, you apparently can't do it. I have no trouble defining existence sans perception, but it's still not an objective reality, only a relational one. So I am similarly encumbered by my inability to find objective existence meaningful in any logical way.

Per my definition of non-existence as an infinite series of negations, to attempt an approach to it, you must negate everything you can think of as part of an unending series that gains no purchase upon non-existence.

I don't know what it means to negate a 'thing'. I don't know what 'purchase upon nonexistence' means at all. I don't see any proof here, just words that I cannot make out. Maybe if you formalized it and defined the terms, I could critique it. It all sounds very mind dependent. If I think of a thing, no amount of negating will make it not exist in an E2 sort of way.
Without knowing what these words mean, why cannot I negate human existence as part of an unending series? There is no mention of humans in there, and yet you claim this somehow proves human existence by this baffling definition of nonexistence.

Present your argument proving our universe and its conservation laws have nothing to do with objective reality. — ucarr

That burden is yours, to prove that the conservation laws of just this one particular universe have any objective relevance at all. It's your assertion, not mine. All I see it an attempt to slap an E1 label on an E4 definition, with some E2 thrown in since perception always seems to creep in there as well.

a relation between a presumably nonexistent number and a presumably existent set of planets. — noAxioms
Although we're debating whether you can make predications of relations between existing things and non-existence, you seem to be arguing numbers exist.

Read the bold part. I said the opposite. You asked for an example of a relation between an existent thing and a nonexistent thing. That was one example.

Unicorns (and dragons) valuing human female virgins is another example.
If you feel that numbers exist (or you think that I assert that), then we can relative Pegasus to its count of wings, making that an example of such a relation.

Any number, no matter how great, when multiplied by zero, evaluates to zero. — ucarr

OK, how is the count of Pegasuses (Pegasi?) determined? Maybe there are 5. Subjectively Pegasus counts himself as 1, as does anybody that sees him. Not zero. It seems that you already must presume the nonexistence of Pegasus to conclude a count of zero of them, rather than determining in some way a count of zero and from that concluding nonexistence.
This is pretty easy if existence means 'in some domain'. Pegasus does not exist in Moscow, so Pegasus can count himself or his wings all he wants, but that doesn't put him in the specified domain. Predication works fine despite the nonexistence. But if you mean E1 existence, then there's no domain. The thing either exists or not, and Pegasus counting himself isn't empirical evidence one way or the other.

If we stipulate Pegasus existed in the past — ucarr

I didn't even put temporal restrictions in my list of 6. Exists in the (abstract) domain of 'now', which has a general form of existence within a restricted domain.

Reversing our direction and beginning by saying two wings are a predication about a non-existent Pegasus, we cannot prove this connection between Pegasus and two wings

Proof is not the point. We presume Pegasus has two wings. Proving a premise negates the point of it being a premise.

unless we posit the contradiction of Pegasus simultaneously existing and not existing.

No such premise is required for nonexistent Pegasus to have two wings since existence of anything was not mentioned, let alone posited, in the above description. You've not justified why anything needs to exist in this scenario that explicitly references only nonexistent things.

We never leave mind-dependent perception. No brain, no mind, no perception. — ucarr

I don't dispute that perception is mind dependent, but the topic is about predication of mind-independent things, not perception or mind dependent concepts of predication. How many times do I have to remind you of that? This is about mind-independence. Perception plays zero role in that by definition.

We see in the definition that "modify" is an action that changes of the state of being of the object of its action. — ucarr

Different definition. I reject this usage as how predication applies to the predicate. Predication does not imply an action of change of state over time, as does the definition quoted. Surely your dictionary had more appropriate definitions than that one.

Since you're not exploring nonexistence of concepts, I pointed out your example deals with an abstraction

None of my examples are about abstractions. If I meant the abstraction of X, I would have said something like 'the concept of X'. I didn't use those words, so I'm not talking about the existence of concepts, but rather the mind-independent X. The OP is very clear about this distinction.

I am sorry that you cannot distinguish the two. I'm trying to help out out of that hole but I don't think I can, in which case you have no hope of justifying EPP except perhaps under E2, the only definition that you seem to be able to grasp.

14 does not have mass energy force, motion, nor location in space or time. — noAxioms

The neuronal circuits that support your articulation of your above quote do possess: mass_energy_force-motion_space_time plus position and momentum. — ucarr

That they do, but if I was talking about those, I would have said 'concept of 14'. I was not talking about the conception of it.

Are their predicates outside time?

Predicates don't have coordinates. They're not objects. One can apply predicates to objects within time, such as a person having a tatoo only after a certain age, but only because a person very much does have temporal coordinates.

Similarly I can talk about 14 being even, despite 14 not having a time coordinate (nor a spatial coordinate).

If Baker St doesn't exist in Moscow, then no predicates of Baker St are present in Moscow

Again, predicates don't have coordinates. They not predicates located at/near Baker St, but instead are predicates of Baker St itself, independent of the street's nonexistence in Moscow.



Concerning E5 definition:

There is no future-to-past relationship at the time of measurement. Neither role of "cause" or "effect" exists before the connection linking the two roles. — ucarr

There is such a relationship at the time of measurement since the measurement defines the existence of the cause event relative to the measurement event. The two events are ordered, cause first, measurement later. That part of the definition holding to the principle of locality. There is no coming into existence of anything. An event is an event and as such, has a time coordinate. E5 is not relevant to non-events, so asking of 14 exists under D5 is a category error. Oddly enough, the definition is relevant to something like the set of all possible chess states.

Speaking reciprocally, material things without the awareness of sentient beings knowing them would be a thicket of unparsed redundancies, which is pretty close to the vacuous circularity of knowledge. — ucarr

No, it would be a vacuous absence of knowledge, but this topic is not concerned with knowledge of mind-independent things, but rather the existence of them.

The entanglement of ontology and epistemology is a big message to us from QM.

QM does not posit or conclude any role to knowledge or perception. If you think otherwise, you read too many pop articles.

With your empirical eyes, you look at a white horse racing around the paddock of a horse ranch. This is direct observation because your eyes are detecting something external to your mind. — ucarr

Oh you do have a concept of something external to your own mind.

In your mind's eye, you imagine Pegasus with wings. This is indirect observation because your eyes are not detecting something external to them.

OK. But neither mental activity creates the object in question. Empirical perception does not create a white horse where there wasn't one without it. Hence it being mind independent. Similarly, Pegasus does pop into existence because of your imagination. It is also independent of your mind, but lacks the causal relationship that you have with the white horse. Per D5, the white horse exists relative to say your belt buckle and Pegasus does not.

I'll maintain that it is. In which case science and the scientists it consist of is free to scientifically study such things as ESP. — javra

Just so, and I've seen it (the study) done for water dowsing. It seemed to fail spectacularly under controlled conditions and yet it seems to work in the field. I tried it, and it worked for me (I was a kid at the time), but didn't work well. I quickly forgot how to hold the stick.
If it worked, there is probably a natural explanation for it. Maybe even ESP.
Dualism makes some really obvious empirical predictions, and yet these are never investigated AFAIK.

And yes, all that sort of falls under 'magic'.

BTW, in relation to this boogieman word "magic": even for a naturalistic pantheist who most can't hardly distinguish from a diehard atheistic physicalist, the whole of reality can only of itself be, in one word, magic.

I actually agree with that, which is why I don't label myself a realist.

To disprove this affirmation one would need to find a cogent reason for being's so being.

Exactly. The old 'why is there something instead of nothing?'. Wrong first question. Better to ask, 'is there something?', and only after justifying that one way or another go on to what follows. But naturalistic rules cannot explain being's being.

If people are saying determinism is compatible with randomness — flannel jesus

They (the ones using the D1 definition) are not saying that about determinism defined roughly as 'not randomness'. It's a different definition than that one, different from the scientific definition given in wiki, which is (wait for it) not random.

I've edited the linked post, and removed 'philosophical' from the description of E1.

Given what you've previously said - namely, that the opposite of "philosophical determinism" is not randomness but supernaturalism - this term of "science-determinism" would be akin to calling all scientists atheists — javra

You seem to confuse science with scientist. There are plenty of theists in the science world, but science itself, since around the renaissance has operated under methodological naturalism, which is indeed the presumption of no magic. So science operates as if there is no god, true, but it makes no demand on the beliefs of the people doing the science.
Heck, I believe stuff that I know is wrong. I hold contradictory beliefs. I don't explode because of this.

I was educated in a Christian school since the public ones were in serious need of help. My school taught good science, but not all of them do.

Which, to be blunt, is quite contrary to facts.

Could well be, yes.
I'm just trying to clarify definitions, and I don't want to coin the phrase scientific-determinism, but the science glossary would give a definition that is essentially "not-random"

As to the adjective "philosophical", determinism, being of itself a purely metaphysical stance regarding what ontically is, can only be philosophical. (That in itself threw me off a bit.)

True. All six are philosophical. Maybe I should have referred to it as dictionary-determinism, but then you'd google that and still come down on me for making up how other people use the word instead of just making up names.

Can only hope I can return the phrase to you some day.

Not likely. What do I know? I've avoided opinion in this topic as much as I can, so it's not like there's anything new I'm likely to spout.

Do I believe in determinism? I find belief to be very restrictive, a door closed for no reason. The way I look at things, the word isn't even meaningful without a bunch of premises I don't presume.

In trying to presume the best here: your usage of the term does not equate to the usage of the term. — javra

You said it's your term. Now you're saying it's "very much used that way" — flannel jesus

The people that use it in the D1 way (it seems pretty prevalent) just call it 'determinism'. I added the adjective, as I said above, since it is a dictionary definition used in philosophy discussions (not all discussions) as opposed to D2-5 which are physics definitions of 'deterministic' (and also used in philosophy discussions like this one). I could have called those 'science-determinism' but there are several kinds of that.

D6 is a form, but admittedly the theology people that push that view do not call the omniscience 'determinism'. I've never seen it used that way, but it's still a form of the 'inevitability' meaning.
Izzat so? : "a theism which upholds theological determinism" in the following post. I stand corrected.

I think this equivocation on your part between "philosophical determinism" and "naturalism" is where our disagreement might likely primarily reside. — javra

There are many valid definitions of various words, and that definition is the first one that comes up if I ask for determinism, definition. The adjective 'philiosophical' is something I put there to distinguish this definition from the others. The definition is real, and seems to be the one most often used by proponents of dualist free will. They don't care if physics has randomness or not. They care that the physics isn't involved in the making of the choice. Naturalism is something they deny, but they call it determinism because it means one's will is determined by causal physics. I agree it's a stupid choice of words because by their assertion, their will is 'determined' by their immaterial mind. How is that any less 'determinism' the way they're using it?

Ah, I don't think javra was assuming you're just making the term and the meaning of it up. — flannel jesus

The adjective I made up. None of the rest.

I agree with javra that calling such a concept "determinism" is very confusing

Lumping it with the others is perhaps confusing, but the word is very much used that way, and it needed to be on my list. All six of my definitions have different meanings and sometimes one can glean the definition used by context, and sometimes not.


This topic got kind of sidetracked. The argument in the OP I feel is a strong one against the libertarian (dualist) view being any more 'free' than one that uses physics, hard-deterministic or not.

Maybe we can focus on what it means to bear responsibility, and which view support and don't support that. Not sure if that discussion belongs here.

Since monism too comes in different flavors - to include both neutral monism and idealism - it can only be a naturalism in the form of physicalism/materialism. — javra

So does naturalism. If 'dualism' is actually how things work, then it's by definition natural. I can see why the dualist want to pick a different word for something they don't consider to reflect how natural things work.

How is the <usual> definition of naturalism different from physicalism? Materialism is quite controversial, but those two are almost the same, and neither is necessarily a realist position, stating only that mential processes supervene on the physical. I see no obvious distinction.

Hopefully he takes the feedback and just doesn't continue to insist on calling this "philosophical determinism". — flannel jesus

I'll find something else. Does it belong on my list of 6 at all then? When people talk about determinism vs randomness, they're not using that definition. But if they talk about determinism vs free will, they are using it.

you're saying that Philosophical Determinism allows for randomness, because Philosophical Determinism is somehow substantially different from Causal Determinism? — flannel jesus

'Philosophical determinism' is my term, and is often the sort of determinism referenced by the dualists. It means naturalism, but that sounds good, and they don't want their stance to be 'unnaturalism', so they pick a word 'determinism' that means that your decisions are determined by natural physics and not by you (the immaterial thing they envision themselves to be). So D1 boils down to 'not dualism', and has nothing to do with the presence or absence of randomness in natural law.

I am not sure if that's the definition that SEP talks about with the term 'causal determinism'. The page is pretty vague about single or multiple evolutions being possible from a given state, but their definition of 'determinism' (not the causal determinism definition higher up) has the word 'fixed' in it, which sort of implies that.

Yes. God rolling dice, as Einstein put it. — noAxioms

Want to point out that this example is not good, though. Given a metaphysics of determinism, though epistemically unpredictable in it's outcome, a rolling of the dice can only be ontically determinate. — javra

Disagree. Given metaphysics of determinism (D2, 3 say), there is no dice rolling at all. I was defining ontic indeterminism, anything where true randomness is going on.
None of this has anything to do with predictability. A simple program running very deterministic code can be utterly unpredictable, as proven by Turing. Unpredictability is a feature of our universe. There's no getting around that, even in principle.

If determinism and randomness are ontological opposites - as we then here agree - then, logically, how can "a determinism in which randomness occurs" yet be validly assigned the term "determinism

Determinism and randomness are ontological opposites only under D2 and D3. The opposite of D1 is supernaturalism, which makes the physical universe not a closed system, open to external causes from outside. Those causes are presumably not random but rather conveying intent.

D2 - D5, however, are all models of physics which are construed to be different types of determinism only in so far as they can each be deemed a subcategory of D1. — javra

Yes, D2-5 are all naturalistic views. D6 is not.

Because of this, the only one of the six categories listed which validly counts toward a "philosophical reference for what the term “determinism” signifies such that it does not entail causal inevitability, be it via this or similar phrasing" will strictly be that of D1.

To this effect, I for example found this article in relation to "D2":

Why Bohm was never a determinist

Marij van Strien

Forthcoming in Guiding Waves In Quantum Mechanics: 100 Years of de Broglie-Bohm Pilot-Wave
Theory (ed. Andrea Oldofredi). Oxford University Press, 2024.

Abstract
Bohm’s interpretation of quantum mechanics has generally been received as an attempt to restore
the determinism of classical physics. However, although this interpretation, as Bohm initially
proposed it in 1952, does indeed have the feature of being deterministic, for Bohm this was never
the main point. In fact, in other publications and in correspondence from this period, he argued that
the assumption that nature is deterministic is unjustified and should be abandoned. Whereas it has
been argued before that Bohm’s commitment to determinism was connected to his interest in
Marxism, I argue for the opposite: Bohm found resources in Marxist philosophy for developing a non-
deterministic notion of causality, which is based on the idea of infinite complexity and an infinite
number of levels of nature. From ca. 1954 onwards, Bohm’s conception of causality further
weakened, as he developed the idea of a dialectical relation between causality and chance. — https://philarchive.org/archive/VANWBW

Cool. I saw the interpretation not as an attempt to restore the determinism of classical physics (which classical physics never was), but to restore a classical feature to quantum physics. It is a full embrace of the intuitive principle of counterfactual definiteness, at the expense of the classical notion of locality. But I can agree that the goal never was to keep determinism. Some other (far simpler) interpretations also keep that.
Funny that Marxism held resources for any of this.

It allows for it, but does not necessitate it. — noAxioms

Your answer is unjustified.

I don't understand the question then.

Haven't you ever been in a situation where the future outcomes of options were unclear to you? How could reason help you in such a situation?. — MoK

Only if I ignore reasons for the choice. Say I am crossing the street. I can ignore reason and just choose a time to do it. Or I can look both ways and use the information about the traffic as my reason for when it is a safe time to cross.

I can eat when I get hungry instead of randomly, and even randomly, I cannot eat because my random gyrations don't result in food being ingested. Knowing where the food is constitutes a reason to reach in that direction. In short, decisions without reason result in unfitness. You'd not survive 10 minutes.

Like when "experts" say the universe is infinite and expanding. That's called mental masturbation. A bad habit — Gregory

While the "experts" might say something like that, the experts don't. Space is expanding, but saying the universe is expanding implies that it has a size, which it doesn't if it isn't bounded.

I said the continuous doesn't make sense because spatial infinity squished into a finite size makes no sense. — Gregory

Zeno did not describe infinite space squished into finite something. It was never spatial infinity.

These comments will also not help you Infinity isn't a hard concept to grasp, but giving it a bound when by definition there isn't one is always going to run into trouble.

First, I take it that we then agree that by randomness we are not addressing mere unpredictability but, instead, some ontic attribute of reality. — javra

Yes. God rolling dice, as Einstein put it.

You did nitpick but then agreed with the definition of randomness I provided. It is here that I'm not understanding your premises. What, to you, then is ontic randomness?

Your definition: "an event within the cosmos [...] that as event has no reason whatsoever for its so occurring."
I would perhaps have said '... occurring exactly as it does'. A neutron decays because there's a neutron there, but exactly when could be random. Under determinism (D2,3) there's no such randomness.
D4 would not say that a subsequent state can be determined from a prior state, but it is determined in the same way that the past is fixed under presentism. I'd probably not put D4 in the classification with 2&3.

To maybe clarify this question: Is it deterministic?

What, randomness? By definition of 'not random', it cannot be, but that's not to say that a completely different definition of determinism allowing randomness.

If [randomness is] not deterministic, how then does randomness's occurrence not contradict the determinism otherwise upheld.

I don't think that in such cases the determinism is otherwise upheld, at least not by definition D2 or D3.

You'll notice the SEP article on D1 nowhere mentions that the determinism therein addressed allows for ontic randomness (when understood as not deterministic).

I'll accept that, except then I'm not sure of their distinction between determinism and causal determinism.
The oxford dictionary definition was pretty clear as it made no mention of inevitable or fixed subsequent states.

Randomness is not address until section "3.3 Determinism and Chaos"

That section seems to concern epistemology and our ability to glean if determinism is the case. I personally don't see how chaos theory is relevant to that other than it being illustrative of the incalculability of even simple systems.

Nevertheless, the mathematical exploration of chaos in dynamical systems helps us to understand some of the pitfalls that may attend our efforts to know whether our world is genuinely deterministic or not.

OK. I'll buy that. If they imply that such knowledge can every be known, I have news. They're looking at a complex chaotic classical system, when a simple double-slit will do. Prove or disprove the system to be deterministic or not. Not gonna happen.

One could view D1 as equivalent to naturalism. (This being contingent on how "nature" itself is defined, but this is a different issue.) But that does not then of itself allow for ontic randomness (of a non-deterministic kind) in D1.

It allows for it, but does not necessitate it.

Just so you know, though I'm currently confident in my position, I'm of course open to the possibility of being wrong.

I'm not sure I have a position to be confident in.

1 is out since it allows randomness — noAxioms


This is the principle area where I'm losing what you're trying to say (all other differences of opinion to me follow suit): If determinism, of any variety, can be said to allow for randomness, doesn't this then imply that, since its determinism, the randomness addressed must have been itself determined by antecedent givens (things, events, etc.)? — javra

I've encountered plenty of people that use definition 1, the one in the dictionary, which yes, doesn't seem like determinism at all to me. That D1 allows it does not in any way imply that the others do. D1 just says naturalism: no magic going on. No interfering miracles or anything like that.

If so, then one gets randomness only in the sense of notions such as chaos theory

No. Chaos theory is entirely consistent with any kind of determinism, and says only that small differences in initial conditions result in large difference later on. Determinism (D2,3,4) says that a given initial condition can evolve only one way. D5 asserts this, but D5 is demonstrably wrong. D6 paradoxically says that it will evolve but the one <predicted> way, but it 'could have' evolved a different way. We could do a whole topic trying to justify that one, or have its proponents attempt the feat.

As for epistemic randomness, it is pretty trivially proven that a system cannot be predicted from inside the system, no matter the processing power of the predictor, and no matter the impossible knowledge of the initial state. As for Chaos theory, you put 3 equal Newtonian point masses stationary in a 3-4-5 triangle arrangement and let them go. We can predict that one of them will fly off at escape velocity leaving the other two in a stable orbit, but we cannot predict which mass or which speed/direction the exit takes place. Doing so requires more precision that can reasonably be achieved, but it's possible in principle since the calculation is outside the simple closed system.

Question: Can it be shown that one mass will escape under relativity theory? I think it depends on the masses, whereas the Newtonian case did not. So certainly different evolution.

Ontologically, there is no randomness. And so everything ontologically remains causally inevitable.

Correct, for D2,3,4

Edit: And so completely necessary in every respect; thereby completely fixed; and thus fully equivalent to eternalism in its ontic being.

D4 is less specific and can be single (D2) or multi-world (D3).
Is calling it 'similar in Ontic being' correct? Eternalism says that all moments in time have equal ontic status, while E2 under say presentism says that future events are inevitable, but still nonexistent, which seems to be an ontic difference.

Maybe we should better define what "randomness" is intended to here specify. I'll start by defining it as an event within the cosmos (with the cosmos here understood to be the totality of all that is, to include multiple worlds or universes where such to occur) that as event has no reason whatsoever for its so occurring.

Not 'no reason'. I mean, a neutron decay happens because there's a free neutron with a half life of say a second, but the exact moment it decays is what's random. Ditto with the photon/slits. The thing has to end up somewhere, but there's randomness to exactly where. Both are caused, but not precisely caused.

This then to me generally conforms to this definition of randomness:

I'm fine with your definition, despite my instinct to pick at it.

Do you mean something different by the word such that randomness would be something not deterministic in terms of ontology (rather than in terms of mere epistemology as just previously addressed)?

Definitely ontic since epistemic randomness is not in question.


Edit: D5 has been shown nondeterministic, hence should not be on my list at all.
Norton's dome is a demonstration of the indeterminacy of Newtonian physics.

The statement "An apple is red only if the apple exists," describes the scope of objective reality IFF the apple examples complex objectivity in the form of: a) non-locality by means of symmetry and conservation and b) temporary formal change emergent from the quintet of mass_energy_force-motion_space_time. — ucarr

None of those criteria have objective meaning, so you're saying nothing exists (E1)?
The bold part directly begs EPP. As I said, you just cannot set it aside long enough to drive its absence to contradiction.

You can't separate a sphere from the curvature of its surface area.

Not trying to. I'm trying to separate the curvature of the sphere from the existence of the sphere, to see if that breaks something.

A predication without a mind-independent dynamic system examples an attribute perceiving from the outside the encompassing perimeter that is its insuperable container.

In the specifics of an example, it's the curvature of the surface area of a sphere standing outside of the sphere

This wording seems to presume that predication has a location, which seems to make no sense. The thing predicated might not have a location to be outside of.
Maybe I'm just not getting the poetic way you word things.

My argument supporting my defense of EPP draws a parallel: a) 'has wings' modifies an object that lacks existence; b) the factor 2 multiplied by the null set. This expresses as 2 { } = 0. When there's nothing to modify, there are no modifiers because modification is attached to things that exist. — ucarr

The last bold bit begs EPP, invalidating the reasoning since the opening premise is that EPP is explicitly being denied.
As for the funny multiplication bit, 2 wings multiplied by the number of existing entities with them results in zero existing wings. I don't dispute that. The nonexistent object still has wings without contradiction. I never claimed the wings (or the object, or the predicates) have the property of existence. I only claim that the predication modifies the object.

You embrace the relativity of simultaneity?

It comes with embrace of spacetime, big bang, black holes, all of which are described only by relativity theory and denied by absolutist theories. Relativity of simultaneity directly follows from the premises of special relativity. The absolutist alternatives deny both of those premises. You are of course free to join that group.

If language cannot prove anything, then language cannot demand proof.

Language is very much used to prove or give evidence for things, but the rules of language do not in any way dictate how 'reality' (whatever that entails) works. You're crossing that line.

"Something non-existent" is a contradiction.

Still not demonstrated, only asserted.
Sherlock is one example of something (supposedly) nonexistent. No contradiction is entailed if I assert that.

As to determinism vs. fatalism, do you not find that determinism as concept entails necessitarianism. — javra

That sounds like 'hard determinism' or D2, but I notice that they use the word 'world' like there are other worlds and therefore this particular world is no more necessitated than the others.

If things are "fixed" (irrespective of why), then there will only be "exactly one way for the world to be"

Agree..#1 was causal determinism, which didn't use that word.

I ask because, as far as I can see, if necessitarianism is entailed by determinism

OK, let's compare it to my list of 6. 1 is out since it allows randomness. 3 allows (demands?) all outcomes, necessitating no particular world. 4 (eternalism) seems to fit the bill. 5 is falsifiable since the universe is not classical. 6?? Depends on how you spin it.

So sure, necessitarianism is entailed by determinism under definitions 2 and 4.

then determinism is necessarily fatalistic when contemplated in terms of events occurring over time.

No, fatalism is completely different, saying that there's one end outcome even if initial conditions are different. None of the other isms say anything like that. Fatalism says I will die eventually. This is consistent with non-determinism that allows all sorts of crazy paths to that end.

I only intend that if necessitarianism, we are then fated or else destined to do what we will do by reality at large, irrespective of how its workings get to be construed, such that the future can only be in fixed and, hence, can only take one particular course of events.

Fine. Sounds valid. I have no problem with it, and find no particular impact to the way I live if it turns out to be true or not.

How are you going to deal with the dichotomy that I presented? — MoK

Easy. By not asserting that I have the kind of free will that you define. I make decisions for reasons. You apparently assert that you don't, which I suppose explains some things, but doesn't explain how you are alive enough to post to a forum.

The decision seems random from the third perspective but not the first perspective since it is up to the person want to choose one option or another. — MoK

Making a choice based on what you want is doing it for a reason.

Are you sure you provided the correct link? — javra

Apparently not. Here is the correct one, and I fixed the prior post link. Hopefully I did it right this time.
The SEP article is here and is not linked by that post, but you seem to have found it below.
It matches the idea conveyed by just a google search of the word 'determinism', which seems to be an alternate term for naturalism, even thought there are natural interpretations that are not deterministic in the sense of subsequent specific states being inevitable.

The list of six is just something I came up with. You are free to disagree with any of them (especially #6).
Turns out that most people arguing for free will define determinism with #1 whereas I defined it by default to #2, causing us to talk past each other.

I searched SEP again, and the only entry that stands out is this one, which defines causal determinism in the same old way: in short as entailing causal inevitability. — javra

That's the one. It isn't crystal clear on its definition:
"roughly speaking, the idea that every event is necessitated by antecedent events and conditions together with the laws of nature."
The google search yielded a similar statement:
"all events in the universe are caused by prior events or natural laws "
It says that all states evolve only from prior states per the laws of nature (naturalism), but is vague about things like quantum mechanics which seems probabilistic according to said laws of nature.
Hence it seems to be a statement more about naturalism and not explicitly 'hard' determinism.

This from Oxford dictionary entry for determinism:
"the doctrine that all events, including human action, are ultimately determined by causes external to the will. Some philosophers have taken determinism to imply that individual human beings have no free will and cannot be held morally responsible for their actions."
That definition is exactly #1, just saying that the will is determined (a function entirely of) causes external to the will. No mention is made of there being one inevitable outcome from a given state.

Biological determinism, also known as genetic determinism,[1] is the belief that human behaviour is directly controlled by an individual's genes or some component of their physiology, generally at the expense of the role of the environment, whether in embryonic development or in learning — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biological_determinism — javra

I suppose I could just have looked that up. Not sure if it belongs on my list, but while my genetics may very well determine my general nature and thus choices in the long run, it is not directly consulted when making a decision. For instance, somebody was shown to have a genetic preference for cinnamon. That general nature definitely influences choices of which foods to pick, but the gene involved here is not part of that decision. If the genes of that person was suddenly to change (all cells at once), the preference would still be there. Changing the blueprint after the building is finished doesn't change the building, but it might change the way it is subsequently maintained.

Again, I read nothing in the linked post to that effect.

Again, apologies. Better proof reading next time, eh?

But then, if we agree on this, then #6 as specified in the parentheses does not apply to the issue at hand. Period.

I'm fine with that. The correct linked post also says that only the first four are important.

#3 MWI

No. You don't do otherwise. You by entailment do both in causally inevitable manners, each being done in a different world, with no ability to do otherwise to speak of. — javra

OK. Yes, each done in a different world. Is it you doing both then? Identity is not really preserved over time with MWI, so the question is ill framed. Not only can you not have chosen chocolate, but it wasn't even you that had chosen vanilla. It was somebody else. Identity becomes an abstract concept under MWI, without physical meaning, and abstractly, yes, you chose vanilla.

#1 is a synonym for naturalism, meaning that will is a function of natural physics. — noAxioms

Again, provide a link to reference this. — javra

#1 is 'causal determinism' as opposed to 'determinism', distinguished in the SEP article. It later gives a less rough definition of the former that attempts to cover as many bases as possible.
"Determinism is true of the world if and only if, given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law. "
This makes a declaration and an assumption. First, it asserts the subsequent state is fixed, which is the inevitable part, even though 'inevitable' is not used this way in the article. But it also says "given a specified way things are" at some time, and that wording is a counterfactual, something not physically verifiable. Some quantum interpretations (#2 in particular) posit the principle of counterfactual definiteness. Almost all the other ones do not, rendering statements like the one above meaningless.
SEP begins to address this when it questions the phrase "way things are". It talks about speed of light and locality (not by name), but no mention is made of counterfactuals. Locality is more important to the authors, as it is with me, but omitting something relevant is a mistake.

Almost all philosophy sites ignore (assume?) that principle, but almost no philosophers know their physics enough to realize that it's important to be explicit about it, and what the implications of positing it are (such as retro-causality). Almost all the philosophers presume a classical universe despite the fact that it has been proven to be otherwise.

Hence the lack of links in my posts. Such issues are rarely discussed, and the physics people often don't know or don't care about the philosophical implications of the prevailing views. I do care, so I had to learn the physics myself, enough that I'm a moderator on a science forum (medium fish in very small pond), but I know the science only enough to do the philosophy that wasn't being done by anybody else.

I did a internet search on "philosophical determinism" and nothing came up to this effect — javra

I called it that because it's what most forum users are referencing with the word 'determinism', but 'causal determinism' seems to be the more correct term.
Most proponents of free will seem to argue not against determinism, but rather against fatalism, which is a different thing and has no place on my list any more than does superdeterminism. Their strawman notion of determinism is actually a description of fatalism, where subsequent events are inevitable even if different choices were made.


SEP mentions a Popper definition where determinism is equated to subjective predictability. That is trivially proven false and doesn't belong on my list.


Thank you for engaging with my posts. Much of it is mine, leaving you quite free to tell me I'm full of it.


Cool comic, and leaving unclear which side to identify with since both of them seem to fail to make a distinction between choice and free choice.

By this definition, any free choice is irrational. — noAxioms

Call it whatever you like! — MoK

It's what you're saying, not me.
You assert you have free will, and then assert that will isn't free if it is based on a reason. Hence your asserted free choices are not based on any reason, which is by definition irrational.

In this example, Pegasus exists as a cognitive entity of the mind-scape. — ucarr

Fine. Then we're talking past each other because I'm not exploring nonexistence of concepts.

I'm building my arguments from E1 & E2. The pillars of my argument are: a) the quintet: mass_energy_force-motion_space_time; b) the symmetries and their conservation laws.

None of those exist under E2. Concepts of them do, but a concept of say mass does not have mass.
None of those have objective meaning since they are all but properties of objects in our universe,. So I don't see how you're going to build an argument for EPP under E1 using these empirical notions.

My main premise says, mind-independent things and cognitive things have two parts: a) local part: a mind-independent material thing measurable in its dimensions and also in its location; b) non-local part: the quintet that funds the physics of the temporary forms of emergent physical things and the cognitive things of sentience.

Your premise seems to presume that only 'material' things have objective existence, which confines them to our universe or one very much like it, pretty much an E4 definition. What if your premise is wrong? I mean, 14 is even (a predicate) and yet 14 is not material, so it doesn't exist by your premise. That seems to be a counterexample to your premise. And remember, I'm talking about 14 and not the concept of 14, the latter of which does not have the listed predicate.
14 does not have mass energy force, motion, nor location in space or time.

All modes of existence, whether mind-independent or cognitive, exist within time

The universe doesn't exist within time. Neither does 14. Both these have predicates.

Before I give a response, I need you to define the sense in which "measured" is being used in your two paragraphs above.

event A is measured by event B if the state of event B is in any way a function of the state at event A. This is a definition of 'measure' as used by E5. My paragraphs were meant as examples illustrating how it worked.

Yes, E4 is very anthropocentric, and likewise your conversation here notwithstanding your stipulation for the exclusion of E2.

The stipulation is logical. The topic is about mind independent existence, and E2 is by definition mind dependent existence. I'm not saying it's wrong, it's just not mind independent.

Fundamental to this conversation, as well as to all of the rest of the entire universe of human cognition, lies mind dependence by knowledge.

I am discussing ontology, not epistemology.

When you say, "I am asking about the existence (and the predicates) of the flying horse..."as I understand you, you refer to a flying horse defined by physics.

Not sure if physics defines Pegasus. That specific creature is, after all, in violation of our physics. Physics does allow a winged thing that in a reasonable way otherwise resembles a horse, so I'll accept the comment.

Let's suppose imaginary-impossibles inhabit an imaginary plane. Having two parts: a) real-imaginary; b) imaginary-imaginary. When you ask about “…the existence (and the predicates) of the flying horse..." you’re asking about a) the real-imaginary part. EPP, as I understand it, does not deny the existence of Pegasus part a) the real-imaginary part. Pegasus defined by physical dimensions exists as an “as if” physical horse with wings in terms of part b) the imaginary-imaginary part. This “as if” version of a mind-independent, physically real horse differs from a non “as-if” mind-independent, physically real horse because it is not directly observable, whereas the other is directly observable.

I don't understand almost any of that, but in the end you draw a distinction between something observable or not. Not sure how Pegasus can not be observable since it, being a life form, is an observer, whether it exists or not.

If Baker St doesn't exist in Moscow, then no predicates of Baker St are present in Moscow, nor are they present anywhere else. — ucarr

False, since Baker St is present in London, no mere abstraction. The example shows its nonexistence in a chosen domain, and yet still having predication. This is a counterexample to EPP for existence in a domain.

E1"Is a member of all that is part of objective reality" says there is no objective reality of things not embedded within existence defined by E1.

This seems to say that there cannot be more than one objective reality, or one OR embedded within another. With that I can agree, but tell me if I parsed it wrong, because it's obfuscated wording.

Moreover, as you say, if you try to exclude Sherlock Holmes from E1, you get a contradiction forbidding that exclusion. For Sherlock Holmes, or anything else, to exist, it must be part of E1.

Nothing is 'part of E1'. E1 is a definition. So anything that exists is part of objective reality (OR), by definition. If Sherlock Holmes is not part of OR (and I had presumed this), then I see no contradiction still. X exists. Y does not. I see no contradiction in some things being part of OR and other things not.
The only rule seems to be that if X and Y interact, they must have similar ontology. I can interact with ghosts only if ghosts are real or if I'm not real.
Anyway, you said 'get a contradiction from excluding Holmes from OR. Please spell out that contradiction since I do not see one. It is asserted, but in no way demonstrated.

Causal relationships are not temporal.

By definition they very much are.

When your parents conceived you, they became cause to your effect, and not a moment before.

I was talking about the E5 definition, and this isn't true under E5. They are not the cause to my effect until my effect measures them, and that doesn't happen for over half a century after said conception event. E5 is not a standard ontology definition. Rovelli is the only one that got close to its wording.

That my seeing the ball in the store is an epistemic change, not a physical change, is my point. The soccer ball is not an effect caused by me. — ucarr

I didn't say it was. I said that under E5 definition, its existence relative to you is due to your measurement of it. That measurement has zero to do with epistemology. Rocks measure things in this sense just as much as a biological system. E5 is a completely mind independent definition.

The inconceivability of universe without spacetime supports emergence.

Wow, I have no trouble conceiving of a universe without spacetime.

The link you provide does not provide links to philosophical references regarding the term "determinism." — javra

The SEP article on the subject is the best I can do, and it opens with using #1 as its definition, and touching on some of the others.

I got into philosophy precisely due to the lack of any articles from people that know their physics. So I learned the physics myself and payed little attention to any philosopher that wasn't aware of physics up to about a century ago.

What is 'biological determinism'? Sounds like biological things operate deterministically, but robots don't.

Maybe I should have specified "as pertains to the concept of free will as context".

All of them pertain.

(with full libertarian free will on #6) — noAxioms

How on earth do you rationally justify this claim? If omniscient X knows all that they will choose in the future (entailed by their omniscience) they can't have libertarian free will on account of all their future choices already being pre-established. No?

If you read my linked post, I ask exactly that. You have to ask those that assert the omniscient god also granting us (and only us) free will. There are articles about this one since the contradiction is so obvious. They wave hands almost as hard as the people trying to rationalize the Millennium Falcon being so fast that it "made the Kessel Run in less than twelve parsecs" which is a unit of distance, not time.

and #3 does not entail phenomenal inevitability. — noAxioms
Irrelevant to the issue of causal inevitability, which it does entail.

Sort of. If the initial state is far enough back, you choose both vanilla and chocolate. You do otherwise. Both are causally inevitable.

As for an example of something that is not obviously causally inevitable, radioactive decay comes to mind. — noAxioms
How is this in any way relevant?

It (along with double slit) are flagships of hard determinism vs randomness. The former says that the decay will happen at time X. Quantum theory gives only probabilities of when it will decay (a half life). Most interpretations consider such decay to be totally uncaused, just like where the photon gets detected after passing through the double slits.

but #1 does not entail this inevitability — noAxioms
How do you figure that?

#1 is a synonym for naturalism, meaning that will is a function of natural physics. It stands opposed to supernaturalism (dualism) where this is not the case. Most modern incompatibilist proponents of free will presume dualism. Anyway, naturalism does not necessarily imply inevitability. As I said, quantum theory (very much part of naturalism) is empirically probabilistic.

If a decision is based on a reason, then that decision is not free. — MoK

By this definition, any free choice is irrational.

Can you provide even one philosophical reference for what the term “determinism” signifies such that it does not entail causal inevitability, be it via this or similar phrasing? — javra

I had counted six kinds of determinism.
Short summary:
1 philosophical determinism
2 Bohmian (hard)
3 MWI
4 eternalism
5 classical
6 onmiscience

Of these, 2,4,5,6 can probably be pitched as entailing causal inevitability (with full libertarian free will on #6), but #1 does not entail this inevitability, and #3 does not entail phenomenal inevitability.

Decision making probably falls under class 5 for the short term.
As for an example of something that is not obviously causally inevitable, radioactive decay comes to mind. This is phenomenally inevitable only under 2,4,6

When Achilles runs the one yard, the tortoise is a tenth-of-a-yard ahead. And so on, without end. — Nemo2124

Without end? Sure, it's an infinite series, but it ends when Achilles has run 111 1/9 yards. That's a finite time and a finite distance, simply expressed as a limit of an infinite series. So where is the paradox identified.

There's all sorts of interesting ways to make it more fun, really giving Zeno's argument a run for its money.
You have a FIFO queue, a pipeline of sorts. At 1 second, you put in numbered balls 1 & 2, and take out the next ball, which is '1'. The next half second, you put in 3 & 4 and take out the 2. Each iteration puts in two balls and takes out 1. They're numbered and put in and taken out in order. After the series completes in 2 seconds, how many balls are in the queue? Answer: None since there is no ball that doesn't have a defined time at which it was inserted and another time at which it was removed.

Precisely, by mathematical summation the series gives unity, but in practice - physically - it's impossible. — Nemo2124

The physical has not been shown to be any different than the mathematical model in this scenario, especially since it's a mathematical mind-experiment, not a physical one.

We ought to remove those points, those beginnings and ends, from the representation of the movement of the thing itself — Metaphysician Undercover

The two are admittedly modeled as points, which works if you consider say their centers of gravity or their most-forward point. But by your assertion, do you mean that the tortoise is never at these intermediate points, only, the regions between?

I don't think that Achilles can ever reach the tortoise, unless it reaches some sort of Planckian limit in distance and suddenly quantum leaps to become 'the winner' — Nemo2124

You think that space being continuous is disproven by this story then. Quantum theory AFAIK has never suggested quantizing spacetime.

By relativity theory, an object is always moving, and cannot actually be at a fixed position. — Metaphysician Undercover

Sorry to find a nit in everything, even stuff irrelevant to the OP, but relativity theory doesn't say this. In the frame of Earth, Earth is stationary. There's noting invalid about this frame.

Zeno's paradoxes when interpreted mathematically, pose fundamental questions concerning the relationship between mathematics and logic, and in particular the question as to the logical foundation of calculus. — sime

:100:

How can nature have anything infinite within it? — Gregory

I don't see why it would be a problem. For instance, there doesn't seem to be a bound to space or time, making both infinite. Nothing stops working due to that model.

I read the text in bold as saying, "the predicate 'has wings' has an object (Pegasus) to modify." (So, 'has wings' makes a claim about an existing thing, Pegasus. We know that in this context, Pegasus exists because we know logically you can't make a declaration about indescribable non-existence. — ucarr

You are incapable of setting EPP aside then, are you?: You are then incapable of defending it since you cannot drive the lack of it to contradiction without being able to conceive of the lack of it.

Saying non-existence 'has wings' makes no sense.

Depends on your definition of 'exists', something you refuse to specify despite it seemingly changing from one statement to the next.. I've gone through all six, and it indeed makes no sense for some of them, and plenty of sense for others.

Since we know that mass is conserved, we also know the temporary forms of massive objects emerge from the fund of the total mass of the universe. Empirical observations that confirm the generalizations of Noether’s Theorem allow us to generalize to E1 by means of the theorem.

I don't see how mass conservation allows a generalization to E1. If you mean Pegasus cannot just pop into our universe without being built by existing mass, then I agree, but nobody is claiming that. E1 has nothing to do with our universe or its conservation laws. E4 might apply to that, but Pegasus can easily have wings while not having E4 existence by simply being in another universe.

Zero does not equal non-existence
...
In a similar manner, zero as a factor erases value including presence altogether.

Make up your mind...

in base 10

All bases are base 10, but they're not all base ten. Sorry, I digress, but I totally didn't see any point to the number base comment.

Any number, no matter how great, when multiplied by zero, evaluates to zero. Non-existence, an infinite series of negations, does something similar.

I don't see the relevance of this. Pegasus has two wings. Not contradictory. There are zero instances of an existing Pegasus, thus there are zero times 2 existing Pegasus-wings. None of this is contradictory until you drag EPP into it.

Predication implies existence because it implies the sentient being making predication possible.

So we're back to total mind-dependent everything again.

That is beyond the scope of my critique: I am merely pointing out to flannel jesus that it is not a valid rejoinder to libertarianism to stipulate one will will the same (and thusly the change in causality is from some other source if the causality is different at all the second or third time we rewind the clock). — Bob Ross

It is valid. The phrase 'rewind time' should never have been used. Free will is often described as 'could have done otherwise' and not 'would do otherwise if given the chance again'. To assert that one's will is not the same after the rewind is to assert that one has two different states of mind at that one time, not that the same physical scenario is presented to you in succession, just as going back to a saved state in a video game.

They tend to believe in a soul or immaterial mind and that reality has top-down causality to some extent; which would not be random: e.g., things ordering themselves in correspondence with an idea is not random at all. The idea is that the higher-ontological things have some sway over what exists at the lower-ontological things. — Bob Ross

Why have I never seen such a libertarian describe how/where in any way these 'higher-ontological things' exert any sway at all over something 'lower'? Where is the primitive in the lower part (the part accessible to empirical analysis) that is in any way sensitive to something other than physical cause?

so are you or are you not also rewinding the will when your rewind the physical? — flannel jesus

No, the description seems to rewind only the physical part of the state, not all of it, thus sidestepping the argument in the OP paper. It's two different initial conditions, so of course they're likely to evolve differently.

I was saying that willing, under some forms of libertarianism,generates new causality that originates from the will and the willing may differ even if the physical causality differs — Bob Ross

How does the bold part even work. Why would new causality being generated be any advantage at all? Suppose one uses this kind of free will to cross a busy street. Generating new causality seems to be pure randomness, as opposed to actually looking and using the state of the cars as the primary cause of your decision as to when to cross.

1) I was trying to unpack your symbolic notation, which is indeed paradoxical, but it doesn't reflect anything I said. — noAxioms
No. You did say, "the thing modified doesn't necessarily exist."
...
You can talk about things - which can be physical, or abstract - that exist but lack the property of existence, but this talk describes a paradox. — ucarr

But I didn't say that it also existed. That's the part that would have made it paradoxical.

You've been talking this way throughout this conversation. My sentential logic translation of your words quoted above makes clear the element of paradox in your explanation of Meinong's rejection of EPP. I suspect you embrace Meinong's rejection of EPP.

I had explicitly not posited EPP in my example. This does not mean I embrace anything, it means I am testing it. I am trying to have it driven to contradiction, but I've not seen that done yet.

You say, "Simultaneity is a coordinate concept, hence is purely a mental abstraction." I'm unsure about the purity of the truth content of your claim.

There are alternate theories where time is absolute, sure. Aether theories come to mind, but then all talk of spacetime is discarded.

If I'm in Cincinnati, I know I'm simultaneously in Ohio.

So you are. It's simultaneity at a distance that is abstract. I stand clarified.

Is EPP your language denoting Sartre’s “Existence Precedes Essence”?

No. I suppose I would abbreviate that as EPE.

Anyone can show non-existent winged Pegasus is a contradiction by establishing the definition of attribute:

noun | ˈatrəˌbyo͞ot | 1 a quality or feature regarded as a characteristic or inherent part of someone or something: flexibility and mobility are the key attributes of our army. – The Apple Dictionary

I think it likely the cited definition of “attribute” assumes EPP based on its use of the preposition “of.” — ucarr

No leverage of EPP is there. 'of' refers to Pegasus in our example. None of your cited definitions make mention of the object of predication necessarily existing.
Besides, it's a definition, and language usage is not proof of anything.

Someone might wish to argue “attribute” and “existence” are contemporaries. I argue against this by citing the symmetries and their conservation laws. Matter is neither created nor destroyed. This tells us that material things with attributes are changes of form of eternal matter.

I don't think Pegasus requires creation from nothing. Also, the reference to the necessity of matter makes this an E4 reference (part of a domain), not E1, and I already gave a solid example of something nonexistent having predicates. So I don't see the relevance of any of your 'conservation laws' at all.

At least twice you’ve made claims that suggest eternal matter prior to its temporary forms:

I don't even know what 'eternal matter' is. There was no matter shortly after the big bang, so if you think there's relevance to there not being a time when there wasn't matter, you'd be wrong. There will be none left after heat death either.

The duality copula strategy argues that an impossible object, such as a round square, has a non-physical existence. It doesn't claim it lacks all manner of existence. Does Meinong use the duality copula strategy?

Apparently not since Meinong would say that a square with a predicate of being round absists, but does not exist in any way.

Compatibilism is a related interesting side topic. I'm not even completely sure that, when I'm talking about compatibilism, what I mean when I say "free will" is the right thing to call "free will", but that's all a complete aside to the argument here, which is all about incompatibilist free will (or at least that's how I define libertarian free will). — flannel jesus

Thing is, the argument linked in the OP also works against compatibilism, but only if free will is defined the same way. A compatibilist cannot claim 'could have done otherwise', so his (your) definition of free will is one that necessarily is immune to the sort of argument put forth in that paper.

I'm all about that as well. I don't get all enamored over the free will concept, so I have no drive to define it in a way that pleases me. The typical definition sounds horrible and would not be something I'd want.
But if I did need to assert I had it, I'd define it in a sort of compatibilist way even if I don't think the kinds of determinism that are relevant are the case.

My definition then? How about "the think doing the choosing is getting what it wants". That works, and means I lack the free will to fly like superman. Physics really does constrain my choices, more evidence against idealism where physics does not so constrain you.

You make analytic declarations of the existence of a thing within the language field — ucarr

I made no mention of any existence within a language field. Your comment used words that implied usage of 'existing' within the domain of time, as opposed to your usual domain of perception, and I was noting that. I need to do this since you've been very inconsistent and unclear with your usage of the word. There are no axioms being leveraged.

When an adjective attaches to a noun as its modifier, the state of the noun changes in your perception because the adjective gives you additional information about that state of existence.

Yes, language alters E2 existence, but not the other kinds, and this topic is about the other kinds.

I don't think my example is limited to mind-dependent reality. The inference about the other person seeing the color red as I see it is based upon evidence.

You say that your example is not limited to mind-dependent reality, yet your example is one of perception. Pick an example that is not based on mind or perception.

A moon meteor strike event exists relative to an Earth state a couple seconds later because Earth measures the moon. Now consider a supernova explosion in a galaxy 3 GLY distant. That supernova event exists relative to today's Earth event because Earth measured it 100 years ago say. (Notice that at all times I am referencing events, not objects)
Our moon does not exist (at all) relative to that supernova event since that distant event has not measured any event of our moon. So same moon existing relative to one thing but not relative to the other. That's how a relational definition of existence works. It works backwards, with ontology being caused not by past events but by future ones as the future measurements get entangled with that which gets measured. There is no mind dependence whatsoever in that, but it requires causal relations between what would otherwise not be meaningful events.

I know my perception of the intruding car is not confined to my mind. — ucarr

Yes, that is the primary evidence for E4 sort of existence. Unlike E2, the car would still be there if you were not, but it's existence is still epistemologically based. You posit the mind-independent existence of the car from your mind dependent perception of it. Our tiny corner of the universe exists, but probably not other universes because we don't see those. There's incredible resistance to theories that only explain things by requiring the 'existence' of far more than what was presumed before. It started when Earth was all that existed, coupled with the domes of light show that circled overhead. The discovery of other galaxies was met with significant resistance, and you can see those. Imagine the pushback when the boundary got pushed back to nonexistence. So yes, your car example is evidence for E4, but E4 is still very anthropocentric.

Since you expect me to understand what the word "Pegasus" signs for, you must believe my mind-dependent perception of Pegasus is the same as yours.

Not sure. You seem to perceive a drawing instead of a flying horse. I am asking about the existence (and the predicates) of the flying horse, and not the existence or predicates of either a drawing (which has E4 existence) or the concept of Pegasus (E2 existence). Neither of the latter has wings, but the former does. EPP says that last statement is meaningless.

You separate predicate of perception from predicate of the sign. Since you're claiming our confinement to our mind's perceptions, aren't you unable to know the predicate of the sign? — ucarr

I am absolutely separating the two, and no, it does not mean that I cannot infer the predicates of the sign, such as its mass or location. I was just noting that being red wasn't one of those predicates. That is a deception of language. We say that 'the sign is red', and we hear that so many times that you believe it, instead of realizing that it would be far more correct to say 'the sign appears red'. Knowing the difference is a good step towards knowing the mind independent thing itself, but it's got a long way to go from there.

So, the ontic status of mind independence independent of existence is what you're examining?

'Ontic' means existence, so it seems contradictory to refer to ontic status independent of existence. But while 'ontic' refers to what is, it isn't confined to just one definition of what is, E1-E6+.

You think Sherlock Holmes non-existent but receptive to predication? — ucarr

I am trying to avoid personal opinions. If EPP is not embraced, then yes, Sherlock Holmes being non-existent but receptive to predication seems not to be contradictory. I have invited you to demonstrate otherwise, but without begging EPP. Much probably depends on which definition of existence is chosen. I've already admitted that denial of EPP is inconsistent with E2,E3 existence since it seems impossible to conceive of something not conceived.
How about existence relative to a domain? Baker St does not exist in Moscow, yet it has predicates. There's an example of a perfectly consistent predication sans existence. This covers E4 and E6 and probably E5.
So E1 is the problem. Sherlock Holmes presumably doesn't objectively exist and yet he wears a trench coat. I cannot say he just exists in some other domain, since that would violate E1. So trick is to drive that premise to contradiction without leveraging EPP.

E5 "state X exists to state Y iff X is part of the causal history of Y"

Since IFF denotes a bi-conditional relationship between the wave function and its measurement, then the two are different expressions of the same thing. Notice the possessive pronoun attaching measurement to wave function. There is no precedence in the case of equality. — ucarr

For the most part, I am willing to accept this. The measurement event and the wave function of its entire causal past (a subset of its past light cone given a presumption of locality) can be thought of as expressions of the same thing, neither being prior to the other. But all past events (the causes) are temporally prior. I was caused in part by my parents long ago, thus my parents then exist in relation to me now and not v-v.

The soccer ball is not an effect caused by me.

Under E5 it's existence relative to you is by definition caused by you. Without you, there'd be no ball relative to you.
Its existence relative to you just has nothing to do with the event of your learning about it. It has been part of your causal past long before that.

Spacetime means space and time are connected. — ucarr

Yes. Spacetime is part of the universe, not something in which the universe is contained.

Gravity and acceleration cause elapsing time to slow down relativistically.

Both wrong. Time isn't something that elapses under the spacetime model. It is a dimension. Due to deformation of otherwise flat spacetime, timelike worldlines between two events are shorter along paths near mass. Coordinate time dilation (an abstract coordinate effect, not a physical one like gravitational effects) is not a function of acceleration.

The universe has an age.

This statement presumes the universe is is something contained by time. If so, you discard the spacetime model, but adopt an nonstandard model where it is meaningful to say the universe-object-with-age exists (E4, existing in some larger container universe)

Yes, the argument still holds given the dualistic model. It just extends what currently is known as 'naturalism. Either way, Bob1 & Bob2 are only going to 'do otherwise' due to differences not in the Bobs. Under 'hard' determinism (I counted 5 other kinds), it is not possible for the Bobs to choose differently. Funny that they can under the other five.

Free will, as typically defined, sounds dreadful, like responsibility for choices only exists if there's randomness or demonic possession at work instead choices being rational. That's a crock.

The compatibilists have a better definition of free will, that the thing being held responsible actually had critical agency (and knowledge of the morality of the situation) in the making of the choice.

So an epiphenomenal mind cannot be held responsible since it lacks agency. It would be like me being held responsible for a murder because I watched a murder movie.
Similarly, a seagull is not much responsible for snatching my chips since it holds to a different moral code, one which allows me to wring its neck if I catch it in the act.

A soldier is not responsible for murder if the choice is mandated by his commander. The ultimate commander's responsibility lies with the morality of his participation in the conflict.

Bob contracts rabies and starts biting babies. Is he responsible for that or is the disease that has taken over his will? It's not like the disease is a conscious agent, and yet it takes over your mechanism for agency.

But "I'm not responsible, physics made me do it" is not an excuse. You had the agency, knew the consequences of an immoral choice, and chose anyway. Free will (by most definitions), physics, and determinism all have nothing to do with that.

In short, if you maintain that if you were to set the entire world state back to what it was before a decision (including every aspect of your mental being, your will, your agency), and then something different might happen... well, maybe something different might happen, but you can't attribute that difference to your will. — flannel jesus

I totally agree with that point. The exact same reasoning can be used against dualism, the kind they say is incompatible with determinism. The claimed agency is not from natural causes, such that one 'could do otherwise'. Sure, but doing otherwise would be attributed to quantum randomness, not to any difference to your will, unless said naturalistic physics is violated somewhere in the causal chain. No biological element has ever been shown to do this.
They have to claim not randomness (mere indeterminism) but actual intentional physical effects that do not have any physical cause. Only this will yield choices that can be attributed to a free will thus defined.

Things that either exist or don't exist simultaneously. This is a description of paradox. — ucarr

Two things here.
1) I was trying to unpack your symbolic notation, which is indeed paradoxical, but it doesn't reflect anything I said.
2) You mention 'simultaneiously', which seriously narrows down the sort of existence you're talking about. Simultaneity is a coordinate concept, hence is purely a mental abstraction. So we're once again talking about E2 existence, and we all agreed that Pegasus has exists as a human concept.

The idea is simple, "Talking about attributes implies the existence of a thing that possesses the attributes describing its nature." — ucarr

Wrong, because I explicitly stated that EPP was not one of my premises, and the implication you mention directly requires EPP, else it is a non-sequitur.
Your job is to demonstrate that "Pegausus has wings" leads to a contradiction, but without begging EPP. Yes, I realize that it is a contradiction if that principle is presumed, but I don't presume principles unless there's a logical reason to do so. Believing an unjustified principle is essentially rationalizing your beliefs, as opposed to holding rational beliefs. People are very good at the former and just terrible at the latter, perhaps for the best. We're evolved to do that, so to do otherwise is against our nature.

Since you say something exists that lacks the property of existence, you describe a paradox.

I never said it exists. Read the quote.

I think existence is fundamental to the entirety of all types of reality (subjective/objective). For this reason, I've been focusing on the definition closest to what I believe: E1. — ucarr

OK, E1. Yet all your descriptions are of E2. Pegasus doesn't exist because you do not see it. A T-Rex doesn't exist because you see it, but it isn't simultaneous with you. That's not objective existence. That's existence relative to you, or E2.
Just saying that your posts in no way reflect using 'exists' in an E1 way, so it was a surprise to see that statement. E1,5 & maybe 6 are mind independent, but your posts imply that they exist due to your perception of them.
There is no empirical test for E1 existence since it isn't defined in an empirical manner, so it is really hard to justify the existence of something if E1 is what you mean by 'existence'. It needs a rational justification, not an empirical one.

I don't think you can make predications of relations between existing things and non-existence.

Maybe. Many think that numbers don't exist except as a concept (E2). No platonic existence, yet there are 8 planets orbiting the sun, a relation between a presumably nonexistent number and a presumably existent set of planets.


As for my counter to EPP, I point out that 8 is an even number, which is a predicate of 8. The concept of 8 is not even, but the concept of 8 bears the concept of something even. Either way it is not a predicate of the concept. How is EPP consistent with that?

I can talk meaningfully about a circular triangle, "It's an imaginary geometric entity that violates the definitions of circle and triangle by combining them." The reader can understand this sentence. So, everything in this example has existence

No, presumably only the concepts have existence, especially per Meinong.

Let's imagine that a soccer ball inhabiting objective reality without being observed has a proto-color undefined. — ucarr

You know I don't consider color to be a predicate of a soccer ball, but I will allow it to have physical properties that would result in perception by some as what you call these proto-colors, yet unspecified.

The soccer ball is in motion. At some point, it enters a field of visible red light. In this zone, observers see that the soccer ball is red.

More like black and white. All colors look pretty much like grayscale under monochrome light. If the ball had two different materials (as most do), the one would be lighter than the other. Anyway, were it observed by a simple human-made digital camera, yes, you'd get a picture with only reds in it. I'm just being picky here, not disagreeing with anything. More picky: Is there such a thing as invisible red light?

Your soccer ball seems to reflect at least these two wavelengths of light, else your story would not work.

In our example it's clear the two visible light fields are existing things

Not clear under E1. Yes, clear under E2 and E4, the two anthropocentric definitions.

Let C = {D | D ∉ C}, then D ∈ C ⟺ D ∉ C. C = Existence; D = Object (that gets modified). Existence (C) is expressed as Let C = {D | D ∉ C}. The two brackets enclose the set of Existence. First there's D = Object. This is followed by the vertical line |. This is a partition indicating the set of Existence has two sections. In the first section containing only D we have a representation saying D is a part of existence. On the other side of the partition, in the second section, we have D ∉ C, which means D is not a part of existence. — ucarr

That actually seems to say that existence is things that don't exist. Your verbal description says it means that existence is things that either exist or don't exist. Neither makes sense to me.

Is this meant to be your definition of 'exists'? Because from that I have no idea what does and doesn't exist. It seems to presume that we already know, yet no definition is given.
Most of my definitions E1,2,3,4,6 seem to define existence as membership in some domain, with the domain being different with each of them.

By definition, an adjective attaches to a noun in its role as modifier of the noun. If, as you say, "The object simply lacks the property of existence." then the adjective also doesn't exist since its defined as a modifier of the object and is not defined as anything else.

Going by that, a winged horse exists because there's a noun to attach 'winged' to. Existence by language usage, which I suppose falls under E2.

Since you take the position that, "Didn't say there wasn't anything to modify." you imply that the adjective exists as a modifier

If by 'exists' here, you mean 'is a predicate of' relation, sure. If not, then you need to define how you're using 'exists' here before I can agree to taking such a position. Remember, no EPP if we're predicating nonexistent things.

you also think a modifier can modify an object that doesn't exist.

I do? Depends on definitions.
I am taking an open mind and not telling anybody how things are. Such is the nature of exploration.

I think a modifier can only modify an object that exists.

Actually, your logic in your earlier post was perhaps predicating nonexistent things when talking about winged horses. But yes, you did say that you hold to EPP.

If a modifier could modify something that doesn't exist, that would mean it could change the state of something that doesn't exist.

I don't think a modifier changes any state. It already is the state. Maybe I don't understand you here. Give an example of a state that changes due to it having a predicate.

But if something doesn't exist, then it has no state

Doesn't the lack of a state qualify as a predicate? The word 'state' implies a temporal existence, like talking about the state of an apple one day vs a different state on another day, this standing opposed to just 'the apple', the whole apple and not just one of its states. So maybe talk about modifiers or predicates and not about states.

For instance, the state of Pegasus is 'flying', and later the state changes to 'landed'. That's a change of state of a presumably nonexistent thing (very presumably because nobody has defined 'exists' when asserting that Pegasus doesn't).

Adjective, by grammar ≠ modify a word for an existing thing if no such word is in the sentence.. — ucarr

Two things wrong with this. I can talk about the homeless. The noun is not in the sentence. It's implied, but your wording doesn't allow that.
Secondly, 'existing thing' is simply not a grammatical requirement, allowing reference to a winged horse.
Be careful about using language rules as a substitute for logic.

I think the two senses of measure described above overlap. Measurement is mind dependent and measurement is entanglement.

You can measure another person's perceptions by inference. If two people independently look at a red square printed on paper, and then are asked to point to what color they saw while looking at a printed spectrum of colors that includes red, both pointing to red lets each know indirectly what the other perceives. — ucarr

OK, so we're talking E2 despite the topic not being about mind dependent reality.

Yes, there is a tiny bit of overlap between perception and quantum entanglement, but they're a world apart in my opinion.

Again, I can know pretty accurately what your mind sees

But I don't care what somebody else's mind sees. I care about what exists. Of course, if by 'exists' you mean that you have in some way perceived it, then it exists in that way by definition.

If I know what your mind sees by knowing it is the same as what my mind sees, then I know the drawing of Pegasus is mind-independent.

But nobody was questioning the existence of the drawing or of a statue (OK, I am questioning it). We're questioning the existence of Pegasus, and by E2, yes. Pegasus (and not just the drawing) exists, but that's a mind-dependent existence.

Yes, the fact that two people see and agree on a common referent (the drawing in your example) is solid evidence that it is mind independent. It is more than just a concept. Any view that isn't idealism is based on that, but it isn't in any way proof. I have better proof of mind independence.
So OK, the drawing is perhaps more than an ideal. The ideal corresponds to something mind independent. Next question: Does it exist? Depends on definition. OK, specifically, does it exist under definitions E1,3,4,5,6? Most of those are similar but with different domains. Under which domains does the drawing exist? Under which domains is EPP valid? E4 still seems anthropocentric, a form of mind dependency. Thus E4 makes for a poor definition for mind independent existence.

You're intending to show to me how a property of perceiving refutes mind-independent reality, but your argument hinges upon me agreeing with you about what a third party perceives.

My example showed the color of the stop sign to be a predicate of perception, not a predicate of the sign. I also did not mention a third part. The example was how you would see it.
What is evidence for the sign's mind independence is that we both see it, as we did with your example of a drawing above.

How could we do that, and how could your argument be sound without the assumption of a mind-independent reality pertaining to perception that we both acknowledge?

By concluding its mind independence independently of concluding its existence, which remains an defined assertion anyway.

I'm saying Sherlock Holmes is a language referent

No it isn't. You need to understand this. Had I wanted to reference the language referent, I would have said 'Sherlock Holmes' and not Sherlock Holmes. With the latter usage, I am not in any way talking about the language referent.
I was asked of what Meinong probably denies the existence, and he doesn't deny the existence of the language referent 'Sherlock Holmes'. It appears in countless places, including this post.

I didn't create my own dna, but I know it created me. Are you ascribing the same self-knowledge to AI?

Kind of off topic, no? I have neither claimed this nor denied this.

Since the wave function is measured and thus it is the object of a verb acting upon it (measurement), how can the verb be prior to it?

The measurement defined the wave function, not the other way around. So it seems that the effect (the measurement) causes the existence of the cause, at least under the E5 definition.

If I search about for a soccer ball for sale and then, after a while, I see
one on display in a store window, how am I prior to the soccer ball?

Your seeing the ball in the store is an epistemic change, not a physical wave function collapse. Try an example that isn't so classical

Presumably, the soccer ball existed even before I had a notion to seek after it.

Yes, it did (E5), because it was measured even before you had a notion to seek after it. Your current state was a function of the ball, as it is a function of a great deal of anything inside your past light cone.

f your statement, "...the universe is not itself material," includes space, then how do you explain the expansion of space? — ucarr

If space isn't material, then how is it I can walk into a room?

Most people use 'material' to mean matter. If space was matter, you could not walk into a room since it was already full. So rather than argue about this, let's clearly define 'material' before we decide if space qualifies as it or not.
Yes, current theory gives space properties. It's just that velocity isn't one of those properties despite so many trying to give it that property.

When I walk into a room, the space in the room is doing something. It's accommodating me spatially. By this reasoning, so-called emptiness is filled by space.

I would say that there is the same space in a full room. I don't consider the space to be only the empty portion. So no, i would not say the space in the room does anything by my presence since there's no more or less of it than before I entered. The room has the same dimensions and thus occupies the same space, full or empty. It is that coordinate space that is expanding, not 'volume of emptiness'.

How is it that the universe accommodates the endless changes of physics while itself remaining static?

It has a temporal dimension. What you call 'change' is a difference in cross sections at different times, just like an MRI image has different pictures of cross sections of a body at different values of some spatial axis.

I wonder if you hold with background independence?

I suppose I hold to it. I only know the relevance to general relativity.

So Roombas are the mental equals of humans? The only thing separating us is emotion? — Patterner

Ask MoK. He's the one that said that "hysical processes in general are not possible without an entity that I call the Mind", which implies that a Roomba is not possible without a mind. It's apparently how he explains the action resulting from an immaterial decision.

By options, I mean things that are real and accessible to us and we can choose one or more of them depending on the situation. — MoK

I think that pretty much matches the wording I gave. It works great for the Roomba too.

I think there's a logical issue embedded in your language: A = ¬EPP; B = Pegasus; C = Existence; D = Object; E = Winged (modifier) → Let C = {D | D ∉ C}, then D ∈ C ⟺ D ∉ C. This logic sequence says you're having it both ways when you say, "An object modified lacks existence." — ucarr

Don't follow, but that may be me. You reference only C and D, so let's say B is my mailbox and C is <stuff in my kitchen>. I don't know what " Let C = {D | D ∉ C} " means. It seems to say existence is some object where the object is not in my kitchen which seems to be a self contradictory definition of what existence meant. Existence is anything that doesn't exist. I didn't say that.
Maybe I read it wrong. E would be 'has a flag'. We can go to Pegasus after we work out the mailbox example, and also if we have a far better definition of 'existence'.

In so saying, you say that E{B} = 0{B}.

Don't know what any of that means. Sorry if I'm not up on the notation. I don't know what the zero means. Existence of Pegasus is the zero of Pegasus?

What is the chain of reasoning from EPP to "Pegasus has wings," being a contradiction?

It is assigning predication to something that doesn't exist, where EPP says existence is necessarily prior to predication.
Actually, it says that existence is conceptually prior to predication, which makes it possibly not about realism at all. Pegasus can be conceived to have wings only if one first conceives of Pegasus. It has nothing to do with if Pegasus actually is real or not. Maybe that is all the principle is about, and not about realism.
But in that case, Meinong is spouting nonsense with his examples. Sherlock Holmes has a pipe, which requires Sherlock to be conceived before we conceive of him with the pipe. Need a better example. A jabberwockey lives on Baker street. That's a predicate even if I have no concept of what a Jabberwockey is.

But if X was originally a statue of X, then a statue of X is X. No?
— Corvus
No. The Trojan Horse was arguably a mythological statue. Pegasus was never a mythological statue. — noAxioms
X is a free variable. It can take any value in it. X could have been a statue of Pegasus for its original value. — Corvus

Fine, then X is a statue of Pegasus, but that doesn't make your statement valid since a statue of X would be a statue of a statue, not a statue of Pegasus. And yes, they do make statues of statues. They sell them in gift shops.

We have had this discussion many times before, and it had been concluded that number is concept.

Only by a non-realist, and this discussion is about realism. Per my OP, if I say '14', I am discussing 14 and not the concept of 14. If you can't do that (if only to demonstrate the inconsistency of it), then as I say, you've nothing to contribute to a discussion about a stance that distinguishes the two.

Your ignorance on the fact

14 being no more than a concept is not a fact, it's an idealistic opinion.

The difference is I am aware that I have options. — Patterner

Both are. The Roomba would not be able to choose an option of which it was unaware. So maybe the left path has been visited less recently, but if it didn't know left was an option, it would just go to the one path it does know about and clean the same spot over and over. Not very good programming.

The Roomba goes one way or the other at the command of it's programming

The programming is part of the Roomba, same as your programming is part of you (maybe, opinions differ on the latter. You make it sound like a program at the factory is somehow remote controlling the device. It could work that way, but it doesn;t.

never aware of how the decision was made

Also true of both.

It has no concept of options. — Patterner

As I said, the device couldn't operate if it wasn't aware of options. It has sensory inputs. It uses them to determine options, including the option to seek the charging station, just like you do.

It does not think about the choice it made two minutes ago

Actually it does, but I do agree that some devices don't retain memory of past choices. How is that a fundamental difference? You also don't remember all choices made in the past, even 2 minutes old. The Roomba doesn't so much remember the specific choices (which come at the rate of several per second, possibly thousands), but rather remembers the consequences of them.

And it certainly doesn't regret any choice it ever made. — Patterner

Got me there. The human emotion of regret probably does not enhance its functionality, so they didn't include that. The recent chess playing machines do definitely have regret (its own kind, not the human kind), something necessary for learning, but Roombas are not learning things.

I wanted to say that determinists deny the existence of options rather than determinism. — MoK

If they do that, they're using a very different definition of 'options' than are you.

Your definition (OM): the available paths up for choice. There are usually hundreds of options, but in a simplified model, you come to a T intersection in a maze. [Left, right, back the way you came, just sit there, pause and make a mark] summarize most of the main categories. Going straight is not an option because there's a wall there.
I am putting words in your mouth, so if I'm wrong, then call it ON (Option definition, Noaxioms) and then give your own definition with clear examples of what is and is not an option.

OK, said hard determinist with the alternate definition OD: The possible subsequent states that lead from a given initial state. If determinism is true, there is indeed only one of those, both for the Roomba and for you. There is no distinction.

Thing is, there is no empirical way to figure out if determinism is the case or not. The experience is the same. If you want to go left, you go left. If you want to go right, you go right. That's true, determinism or not, and it's true regardless of which definition of 'options' is used.

Side note: Using OD:, there is one option only with types 2, 5, and 6, but 1,4 and 6 are not especially considered 'hard determinism'.

Sure, I think that the mind is separate from neural processes. — MoK

OK. Then it's going to at some point need to make a physical effect from it's choice. If you choose to punch your wife in the face, your choice needs to at some point cause your arm to move, something that cannot happen if the subsequent state is solely a function of the prior physical state. So your view is compatible only with type 6 determinism, and then only in a self-contradictory way, but self contradiction is what 6 is all about.

To me, physical processes in general are not possible without an entity that I call the Mind.

Fine. Work out the problem I identified just above. If you can't do that, then you haven't thought things through. Do you deny known natural law? If not, your beliefs fail right out of the gate. If you do deny it, where specifically is it violated?

How is the Roomba mind fundamentally different than yours? It's a physical process, and you assert above that such process is not possible without a mind. A rock cannot fall without a mind.

I suppose that works under idealism, but determinism (or lack of it) has pretty much no meaning under idealism.

How about wording it this way:
A Roomba wouldn't work if it didn't realize it has options. — Patterner

I'm fine with that.

You didn't answer the question asked "What fundamentally do you do that a Roomba doesn't?" when you imply that a Roomba doesn't realize options.

We were considering a fork in the path of a maze. Are they not a pair of options? — noAxioms

Sure they are.

Sure, one cannot choose to first go down both. Of the options, only one can be chosen, and once done, choosing otherwise cannot be done without some sort of retrocausality. They show this in time travel fictions where you go back to correct some choice that had unforeseen bad consequences. — noAxioms

The point is that both paths are real and accessible, as we can recognize them. However, the process of recognizing paths is deterministic. This is something that hard determinists deny. — MoK

How can a determinist deny that some physical process is determisitic? You have a reference for this denial by 'hard determinists'?
I mean, even in a non-deterministic universe, the process of recognizing paths (biological or machine) is deterministic. I cannot think of a non-determinstic way to to implement it.

I don't think that the decision results from the brain's neural process. The decision is due to the mind.

Ah, so you think that this 'mind' is separate from neural processes. You should probably state assumptions of magic up front, especially when discussing how neural processes do something that you deny are done by the neural processes. Or maybe the brain actually has a function after all besides just keeping the heart beating and such.

since any deterministic system halts when you present it with options.

Tell that to Roomba or the maze runner, neither of which halts at all.

A deterministic system always goes from one state to another unique state. If a deterministic system reaches a situation where there are two states available for it it cannot choose between two states therefore it halts.

No, it makes a choice between them. Determinism helps with that, not hinders it. Choosing to halt is a decision as well, but rarely made. You make a lot of strawman assumptions about deterministic systems, don't you?

In the example of the maze, the options are presented to the person's visual fields. In the case of rubbery the options are mental objects.

The maze options are also 'mental' objects, where 'mental; is defined as the state of the information processing portion of the system. A difference in how the choice comes to be known is not a fundamental difference to the choice existing.

I know you're talking about mental processing of visual data, but that's far more complex than anybody here is qualified to answer, so I am instead picking statements that seem to be falsified by a simple, understandable model.

No, you consider the existence of options granted — MoK

We were considering a fork in the path of a maze. Are they not a pair of options?
Sure, one cannot choose to first go down both. Of the options, only one can be chosen, and once done, choosing otherwise cannot be done without some sort of retrocausality. They show this in time travel fictions where you go back to correct some choice that had unforeseen bad consequences.

I guess I don't know what you consider to be options.

I am talking about available options to a thief before committing the crime.

So you do grant the existence of multiple options before choosing one of them. What part of the maze example then is different than the crime example?

But, unlike the Roomba, I realize I have options. — Patterner

A Roomba wouldn't work if it didn't realize options. If there are two paths to choose from, it needs to know that. If it always picked the left path, there would be vast swaths of floor never visited. It needs awareness of alternative places to go.

What fundamentally do you do that a Roomba doesn't? If you mean it is not remote controlled, I'll agree. It makes its own choices. The RC car on the other hand is remote controlled and has no free will of its own. That's a fundamental distinction between the Roomba and the RC car, but I ask about the Roomba and you, because I suspect you're the RC car, a puppet of another.

Does the noun need to exist for the sake of the adjective function? — ucarr

Depends on definitions.

how can it modify if there's nothing for it to modify?

Didn't say there wasn't anything to modify. I said that the thing modified doesn't necessarily exist. Pegasus has been our example. Given denial of EPP, and a definition of 'exists' which excludes Pegasus, the predicate 'has wings' has an object (Pegasus) to modify. The object simply lacks the property of existence.
If we posit EPP, then a contradiction is reached when asserting that Pegasus has wings, as you seem to be doing.

Even redness, as a noun, is a thing red.

OK, you're qualifying a perception as a 'thing', which is probably consistent with an assertion that red exists, at least by most definitions of 'exists'.

I don't think it makes sense to say a thing is in a state of being red, except under idealism where 'things' are just ideals and a red ideal is logically consistent. I don't think a stop sign is red, it just appears that way to some of us.

As for the general definition of the infinitive: to exist, I say it's the ability to be measured, and thus the ability to exhibit its presence as a measurable thing. Therefore, all existing things have a measurable presence. Let's consider something believed to exist, but not measurable. The math concept of infinity is an example. An infinite series can be parsed into segments unlimited. Now we see that the abstract concept of infinity can be measured indefinitely, so it's not completely measurable rather than unmeasurable.

The color read exists

I need more clarification of what 'measure' means. If you mean a mental act of perception, then your definition is E2: Measurement is something done by a mind, making it a mind dependent definition of existence.
If on the other hand 'measure' X means a relation where in some way a measurer gets affected by something measured (like a rock measuring water by getting wet from it, or a thermostat measuring heat by turning off current to a relay, then we're close to an E5 definition which is based on measurement and causality relation between measurer and measured.

Your example of 'red' makes me suspect the former (E2) since I don't know how a perception can be measured. I cannot for instance in any way measure somebody else's conscious perception, hence a mind-dependent definition typically leading to solipsism.

So Pegasus exists under E2 because you measure it. You can for instance count its wings. The thought of Pegasus is what makes it exist. Unfortunately, that is not realism (a mind-independent reality), which is what this topic is trying to discuss. EPP holds pretty much by definition under E2.

The color red and the taste of sweetness exist as effects of a) a segment of EM wavelengths of the visible light spectrum

Now that's a physical thing: a wavelength. But that description says nothing about how it appears to various observers.

b) an organic chemical compound including oxygen, hydrogen and carbon.

I will protest this one. A hydrocarbon is simply not sweetness. It is a molecule, and sweetness is only a perception when the molecule is contacted in just the right places by something evolved to be sensitive to it.
Ditto for redness, a perception of a specific wavelength range by some observers, but not most of them.

To illustrate: A stop sign will appear green to you if you approach it fast enough. The perception is not a property of the thing, it is a property of perceiving. The stop sign is not different, but it sure looks different.

Sherlock Holmes exists as a proper noun

No. 'Sherlock Holmes' exists as that. Sherlock Holmes is not that. The former is a proper noun with 14 letters and only the latter lives on Baker St. Had I wanted to refer to the proper noun, just like had I wished to refer to the mental concept, I would have explicitly said so.

Whether or not Sherlock Holmes exists or not depends on definitions, and by your definition above, I would say that yes, he exists since you can measure him the same way you claimed to measure the mathematical concept of infinity. To that, instead of giving examples of things that exist, give some examples of something nonexistent. Pretty tough to do since the mere act of thinking about the example is a measurement, and thus it must exist.

You know about machines that base their behavior upon their own judgment rather than mechanically and non-self-consciously responding to human-created programming?

You make it sound like the machine choices are being made by humans, sort of like a car being driven. Sure, the machine didn't write its own code, but neither did you. Sure, the machine was created in part by human activity, but so were you.
None of that detracts from the fact that it is doing its own measurement of whatever it needs to, and reacting accordingly by its choice, not being remote controlled (like so many humans claim to be). I called the measurement 'perception' since I lack a better word. I hessitated to use the word 'sentient' since the word has heavy human connotations. Nothing else is sentient since nothing non-human has human feelings. If there was a word the robot might use to describe what it feels, you would in turn not have that. But I rarely see robots use human language to communicate with each other. It's just not natural for them.

In your example with dark matter, presence precedes indirect measurement.

Under E2, yes. Oddly enough, under E5 it doesn't. Rovelli discussed that interesting bit. Under a relational view like that, measurement (not mind-specific) defines presence and therefore precedes it. This is pretty consistent with quantum mechanics where measurement is what collapses a wave function and makes some system state in the past exist where it didn't exist before the measurement.

If your statement, "...the universe is not itself material," includes space, then how do you explain the expansion of space?

Space isn't material either, at least not by any typical definition of 'material'. Space expansion over time means that (given a simplified linear expansion), a meter expands to two meters after twice the time. The universe doesn't exist in time, so it doesn't change. It is all events, all of spacetime and contents of said spacetime.

Of course there are other definitions of 'universe', some of which are contained by time. Some use the word to refer to the visible universe, which expands over time since after a longer time, light from more distant things has had enough time to reach us. The visible universe has a time-dependent size, and thus the visible universe expands, currently at a rate of about 6-7c proper distance along lines of constant cosmological time. But that would be true even without expansion of space.

But if X was originally a statue of X, then a statue of X is X. No? — Corvus

No. The Trojan Horse was arguably a mythological statue. Pegasus was never a mythological statue.

The concept of 14 is 14.

Per a very explicit statement in the OP, if I wanted to refer to the concept of 14, I would have explicitly said something like 'the concept of 14' or 'the perception of X'. Your inability to distinguish the two prevents any productive participation in a discussion about realism.

Pegasus is mythical, so any real creature claiming to be Pegasus is a con. — Banno

How can a mythical creature be real? Mythical already implies not real. — Corvus

Troy was a mythical city. Is the Troy they discovered a con then? It certainly didn't have all the embellished events happen there, but some of them are based on real events. Just saying that being mythical does not necessarily equate to not real. Hard to argue with Pegasus though.

There was likely for instance a real King Arthur, but the legend about the sword&stone is almost certainly mythology.

So Pegasus is a word without its object? Are there objects without their words / names? — Corvus

Only if you don't define object as that to which words have been assigned. If this restraint is lifted, there are (E4 say) more unnamed objects than named ones. There are waaaay more given a non-athropocentric definition like E5.

An object can be both mental and physical. If you imagined a winged horse, that winged horse is your mental object. If you saw one made of physical matter in Disney, it is a physical object of a winged horse. It is not the real Pegasus, but it is still a winged horse, and one can name it as Pegasus. No? — Corvus

It's a statue of X, not X. There's a difference, kind of the same difference between the concept of 14 and 14.

Attributes exist as characteristics that don't characterize anything? They embody the role of an adjective, but they don't attach to any existing thing playing the role of a noun or pronoun? — ucarr

Adjective yes, and for argument sake, noun, yes. Does that thing playing that role need to 'exist' to have that adjective apply to it? Depends on definition of 'exist' (nobody ever specifies it no matter how many times I ask), and it depends on if EPP applies to the kind of existence being used.

The color read exists

Only as a concept/experience, hardly as a 'thing' in itself, much like 'sweet' exists (E2). It didn't exist relative to my father, but blue did, which is why he always played the blue pieces in a game of 'Sorry' or something. When he was able to do something mean to one of the other pieces, he couldn't play favorites since he didn't know whose pieces the other colors were. There was just blue and not-blue.

What's Meinong's example of a non-existent thing that has attributes?

I think he referenced Sherlock Holmes and his attribute of having an address. This of course presumes he is using some definition of 'exists' that precludes Sherlock Holmes but does not preclude say Isaac Newton.

I differ from Meinong in that I affirm EPP and therefore think existence is what attributes emerge from.

OK, that's fine. To be honest, why did you wait this long to state this? Does a unicorn being horny make it exist then? If so, what definition of 'exists'? If not, how is that consistent with EPP?
17 is prime, so 17 exists? Same questions.

For what I know now, I think existing things have presence. Presence is a detectable part of the world that relates to its perceiver. — ucarr

So you deny mind-independent existence then? This topic was explicitly about the meaning of mind-independent existence (commonly known as 'realism'). If you don't deny it, then why the definition based on perception? — noAxioms

I don't deny mind-independence outright in accordance with a hard-edged yes/no binary. I allow my still developing thinking upon the subject to include a gray space that accommodates thoroughgoing nuancing.

Sounds like both of us actually don't know then, in which case it seems too soon to draw conclusions about how existence is dependent on perception.


The question is especially difficult from the standpoint of perspective, given that no sentient can perceive anything without its mind.[/quote]A machine can perceive stuff without what most would call a 'mind', but I suppose it would not qualify as a sentient thing.

Speculation about mind-independent reality cannot even be supported by inference because that too is mind dependent.

Agree. I have appealed to logic rather than inference, but even that doesn't supply a helpful solution. Hence I don't lay claim to realism. Mind dependent existence has pragmatic value and humans simply forget that it is a relation.

We cannot do any organized perceiving without injecting ourselves into the perceived reality per our perceptual boundaries.

I did not quote the whole but, but it sounds like you are actually exploring this area, more than most of the posters to this topic.

Since perceive means to become aware of something

I thought it meant 'not absence', and not 'perceived'. The opposite of that is unperceived.

If it's impossible to measure something not present

Not impossible. It's just a little more indirect is all. Dark matter is not perceived, but we measure it nonetheless by its effects on other more directly perceived things. Time dilation is not perceived, but it can be measured/calculated.
Sorry, just looking for counterexamples.

I'm proceeding with the belief existence is the most inclusive context than can be named.

The most inclusive context would include Pegasus, and there's not much utility to a definition that doesn't exclude anything. Not saying it's wrong, just that it lacks utility.

The distinction between a thing existing and the exact same thing not existing is that the latter thing isn't in this universe, it's in a different one. It exists in that one, but not this one. All very symmetrical. — noAxioms

Your statement raises logical issues: a) if something doesn't exist, it doesn't exist anywhere — ucarr

Mine was a relational definition. If X doesn't exist in domain D1, it might exist in domain D2, so your a) doesn't follow. It seems to be more of a rule for E1: absolute existence, a property that is had or is not had, period.

b) if two things exist outside of (A≡A) but rather as (A) = (A) then that reduces to (A), and thus they're not in separate universes; they're in one universe. Also, if (A) = (A) can't be reduced to (A), then they're not identical; they're similar as (A) ≈ (A').

Sorry, I don't follow this notation. All I see is one domain 'A', and it is unclear if these 'two things' are part of it or not.

I don't believe you live your life according to the integrity of your claims here.

1) They're not claims, they're consequences of some of the various definitions. Secondly, I live my life to a very different set of definitions and beliefs than what I rationally have concluded. I hold pragmatic beliefs for the former, even if these are demonstrably false. We all do this. I'm just more aware of it than most.

Do material things relate to each other immaterially? If distance is a relation between material things, say, Location A and Location B, then the relation of distance between the two locations is the journey across the distance separating them.

Distance is not a journey. That word implies that a separation isn't meaningful unless something travels (which drags in time and all sorts of irrelevancies).

In my view, your two examples demonstrate the impossibility of humans talking about mind-independent situations. Sans observers, the orbits of planets around suns cannot be characterized as such, nor can they be characterized by us in any way.

True, but characterization isn't necessary for the planet to orbit at that distance. The part that I find anthropocentric is where we say words like 'the universe' or 'our universe' which carries the implication that ours is the only one, that our universe has a preferred existence over the others due to us being in it. That's the sort of thinking that prompts me to label a definition as anthropocentric, not the inability to conceive of the mind-independent thing without utilizing a mind, and not just 'a mind', but 'my mind' in particular.

Given your description of an inter-relationship between material things and immaterial container, I expect you to be able to say how material and immaterial interact.

The time for a rock to hit the ground depends on a relation with the immaterial gravitational constant. That seems to be an example of material things interacting with something not material.
Greed (not a material thing) drives much of the actions of people (material things).
A shadow (not a material thing) has a length, and often relates to a material object.

Also, can you explain how an immaterial universe is expanding?

Common misconception. Space expands over time, but the universe, not being 'over' time, does not expand, and doesn't meaningfully have a size or an age. This is presuming of course the consensus model of spacetime and not something weird like aether theory under which the universe kind of is an object and very much does have an age.

A world-line is a four-dimensional manifold with three spatial dimensions and one temporal dimension.

There you go. That is not a description of travel.

In math, an interval is a set of numbers that includes all real numbers between two endpoints.

OK. Different definition of 'interval'. I was using the spacetime interval definition from physics.

I think Banno and @noAxioms both proposed compatibilist responses to your worry, — Pierre-Normand

A compatibilist says that free will and determinism are compatible with each other, but I would need both words more precisely defined were I to agree with that.

noAxioms suggests that we are counting objects. — MoK

I was showing the counting of options, not objects.

I agree that one can write code to help a robot count the number of unmoving dots in its visual field. — MoK

You are complicating a simple matter. I made no mention of the fairly complex task of interpreting a visual field. The average maze runner doesn't even have a visual field at all, but some do.
All I am doing is showing the utterly trivial task of counting options, which is a task easily performed by a determinsitic entity, answering your seeming inability to realize this when you state "So I am wondering how can deterministic processes lead to the realization of options".

The solution is to count the options (in the maze example, paths away from current location) and if there is more than one, options have been realized. If there is but one, it isn't optional. The means by which these options are counted is a needless complication that is besides the point.

But I don't think a person can write code to help a robot count the number of objects or moving dots.

I wrote code that did exactly that. It would look at a bin of parts and decide on the next one to pick up, and would determine the angle at which to best do that. This was 45 years ago when this sort of thing was still considered innovative.

Copenhagen interpretation for example suffers from the Schrodinger's cat paradox.

Nonsense. Just because you don't know how it explains a scenario doesn't mean it doesn't explain it. Copenhagen was developed as an epistemological interpretation which means the observer outside the box doesn't know (wave function describing state) the cat state and the observer inside has a more collapsed wave function state. Super easy.
Sure, off topic, so I'll leave off the delayed-choice thingy.
But your assertion that Bohmian mechanics is the only valid interpretation (a deterministic one) is on topic, and thus the falsification of the other interpretations is very much on topic.

Again, I counted six kinds of determinism, and some of those are almost certainly the case and some of them are almost certainly not the case. Bohmian mechanics was number 2.

We are morally responsible if we could do otherwise. That means that we at least have two options to choose from. — MoK

Moral responsibility is far more complicated than that, as illustrated by counterexamples, but the core is correct. There being more than one course of action available, and it is very hard to come up with an example where that is not the case. I am in a maze, but find myself embedded in the concrete walls instead of the paths between. I have no options, and thus am not responsible for anything I do there.

The options are however mental objects, like to steal or not to steal

Stealing and not stealing are physical actions, not mental objects. Bearing moral responsibility for one's mental objects is a rare thing, but they did it to Jimmy Carter, about a moral person as they come.

The fallacy seems to be in the assertion that determinism somehow takes away choice, which of course is nonsense since we'd not have evolved large (and very expensive) brains if not to make better choices. I cannot think of a single way that a choice can be made better by a non-deterministic process than by a similar but deterministic process. I invite such an example, but a deterministic algorithm implemented on a non-deterministic information processor is still a deterministic process.