Well, I reckon psychopathic behaviour can on an individual level bring a lot of success. Civil society is a bit of a collective action problem after all. We all play our parts an the person that is able to play by the rules when it suits them and not when it suits them better, has a comparative advantage. Dutch criminologist Frank Bovenkerk, a respected Dutch criminologist reckons that the same traits which make a good mafia boss also make a good CEO. Here is the lonk to the article, it is behind a pay wall though, you if you are from an institution that has access it is readable otherwise you have to live by the abstract...
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1023/A:1008381201279

Sounds like a reasonable longing to me. But would she say "to hell with your mind and your money", or just "to hell with your mind"? — Apollodorus

I do not get it, mind does not equate money. I do not think any girl fancied me because of my lack of money...

Is it not just as valid or invalid to say: "You don't love a person because you love his mind; you only start to love his mind after you start to love his person". Why is love for the body somehow seen as trivial and the mind somehow seen as exalted?
(I am longing for a woman to say, I love you for your body, to hell with your mind, but that aside ;) )

Metaphysics. Over a decade ago, influenced mostly by various thread discussions with Tobias, I'd reconsidered and thereby gradually translated my vacuous, scientistic, interpretation of 'positive metaphysics' (as useless as tits on a bull) into an intensively critical, 'negative metaphysics' (apophasis), which, among other things, has 'solved' the great jigsaw puzzle of my many disparate philosophical concerns. — 180 Proof

That is a nice compliment 180, thank! Indeed those discussions formed me too quite a bit. Under that influence and under the influence of people I met at the time I was here less I shifted perspective somewhat. I do not know if it is changing my mind, but now my central concern would be some ineluctable 'more' over and above what metaphysics has to offer. A fundamental impossibility of metaphysics or thought to reach. I think indeed you were the first one to confront me with that. It is similar to a Heideggerian 'zwischen' I guess or some other fundamental category of 'not that', a difference.

Also I focus much more strongly on the role of the body in metaphysics. I cannot be called a materialist since I still hold that the categories of thought are mental and that without this categorical ordering there 'is' nothing, but if we want to know how we think we cannot dispel the body, as that fundamentally does the talking. So I switched from 'logic' to phenomenology perhaps. that said, I am rusty nowadays, I have done more in law and in sociology which also shifted at least my approach. At the recent philosophy conference I was the only one with a methodology paragraph.... felt slightly over dressed. :D

In other words, the external world is constituted by force (different levels of force) and appearances or details do not exist there independently, it is only stimuli promoters what lead to appearances or details when mind does its job using the five human senses. — Nelson E Garcia

Why would 'force' exist independently? to me it seems you are rethinking Kant in a way. Read his trnascendental deduction. What you call 'force' he called 'ding an sich' or noumenon. To me it seems that 'existence' does indeed not exist independently, whatsoever. that does not mean existence is any less real. If I dream of a beautiful dark haired girlfriend, it is damn waste if I wake up and se turns out not to exist.

As for myself, I'm firing random shots, hoping I might hit something. A few interesting results (see my reply to 180 Proof) but nothing really substantive. As for myself, I'm firing random shots, hoping I might hit something. A few interesting results (see my reply to 180 Proof) but nothing really substantive. — TheMadFool

Alludes to "other ways" of seeing the world. I thought you had something specific in mind, that's all. — TheMadFool

Nahh now you are being too modest again. :) That was not the intention of my remark. I think you like the exploration and so do I. Let's try. Do you know the books of Orhan Pamuk, "the Black Book" and "Foucault's Pendulum" of Umberto Eco?They are both excellent and both have similar theme, the reading into the world of meanings, which somehow relate and form a story. I think irrespective of the light of reason, that we are storytelling beings. Now that you prod me a bit, that other way of seeing might relate to the meaning which we invest in the word. Those are not 'reasonable', in the sense that they are disinterested an 'objective'. As a Dutch poet once said "we are Gods in the depths of our minds", with which he means that we all have the idea that the world is 'my story'.

Maybe those are the shadows you allude to. I do not think though they will ever be eradicated by the light. The "I" is a category of thought, maybe even a necessary condition for knowledge so it will not disappear. The stars in the casino also allude to this theme, they refer to 'us', "You are the stars", they say, affirming that which we hold ourselves to be in the depth of our minds. That way of seeing is as real as the scientific way since waking up from the illusion is impossible. So maybe there is a trail and you were right...

Fine, apologies accepted, hatchett buried :) But would you care to explain what you mean? I would not mind to elaborate, but I wrote quite a lengthy post, trying to unpack the social nature of reason, so what element would you like to explore so I know where you like to spar a bit further?

I am also not sure I fully agree to what I wrote above myself. I put it in too stark terms. 'Regimes of truth' are social, as per Foucault, but I think there has to be some kind of common understanding, some laws of thought we refer to as 'reason'. I do think formal logic does not get us very far though because of its absence of any content. The challenge for me would than be to shed some light (sic) on what they are. The skeptical practice, yes, but what would that amount to, My ideas on the (post)modern demise of reason though still stands. I am not afraid of too much light, I am afraid we are burying it in rather obscurantist notions of blame and guilt.

You've picked up the scent. Magnifique! So, are you going to follow it or not or are you already on the trail? — TheMadFool

Are you a condescending prick or merely masking your own insecurity?

And I fully agree with you on this - this is why I said that "initiate and gives the situations its content or opportunity".
I think that sometimes my english fails when I try to convey a thought properly...and now I marked where the emphasis is in that line of thought... — Iris0

Ohh I think it is fine. And anyway, I should be able to look through that. What intrigues me is what you hold to be that will that "initates and gives situations if opportunity" What is the initiative and what is the kind of opportunity that is provided? How is it determined? What content does the will add to the situation? As per Nietzsche 'will to power' for instance, or Spinoza's conatus, drive, or Sarter's 'nothingness' seemingly indicating absolute freedom. On that I wonder where you stand. (Those thinkers are just examples, not that I want to draw them into the conversation or quibble about them).

yes - but without any doubt - if and only if - you actually go (an act of will) you have the chance to win or lose - if you do not go (also an act of will) you can never ever never win nor lose. — Iris0

Well I either go or not go. Where does my will come in? You seem to hold to the following image: I want to go, than by conscious movement I set my body in motion and I go to the casino. However, there is not a little me within me, there is no 'soul' inside the machine of my body.

What determines whether you go or not? We are not completely free in those choices. In fact neurology considers them by and large predetermined. So whether I go is not necessarily a product of my own complete freedom.

What I would find interesting is to what extent we see 'reason' as influencing these choices, or indeed 'will'. The Mad Fool likes to dim reason in order to make other features visible. I find it an interesting proposal and I think it is exactly what we are doing now. 180 argues forcefully that reason should not be dimmed because there what we see when it is dimmed is distorted and obscure.

so rather than luck or chance it is the human will I would say that initiate and gives the situations its content or opportunity. — Iris0

I doubt that for two reasons, at least when you mean with will the everyday conception of free will. First, human will might be directed at a certain result, but there are so many factors that interfere that you cannot oversee the consequences of your actions. When I choose to go to the casino I might win or might lose. When I might win I may become happy, but I might also be robbed of it after I leave because someone saw I won. All these events are beyond my will. Secondly, my choices are to a large extent determined. I might be a gambler who loves the casino and goes or I might be the careful type who does not. I have not chosen my character.

Philosophically though, I think the point is to what this will is directed. When you say, 'in the end it is will', than you take a turn in the history of philosophy, will is opposed to reason, as Schopenhauer was opposed to Hegel. I do not disagree with you there. However, then the question would be what motivates this 'force of will'. Is it free decision making? That I doubt for the reasons laid out above, but other than that, there are many candidates, will to power, drive, love...

The concept of stochastic variable (chance or luck) does in fact exist - but not the way we use the concepts we normally call chance or luck - because you cannot have the luck if you do not go to the casino and bet there... now can you? — Iris0

The question of how to deal with luck and necessity are rather crucial in Western philosophy. Necessity is represented by Ananke, the goddess of fate and she was generally feared by the Greeks and even by their Gods. In our language we still have the word fate which has a bad connotation (to seal one's fate). Our fate is to die, dust to dust, ashes to ashes. This has the connotation of, earth, the world below us. there is also a different concept, 'fortuna', Tyche in Greek relating to destiny. Destiny is akin to ananke or necessity but has a much more positive connotation. A destiny is a 'destination' a place to reach. This destination is generally associated with places 'higher'. You 'reach for the stars', 'the only way is up'. You are either higher or lower in the chain of command etc. What the stars in a casino do is to symbolize that through playing with fate; gambling, one may for a moment escape the clutches of necessity and acquire (a) fortune.

In this way actually reason and luck play an interesting double role. also reason is seen as a way to escape Ananke, to 'shape one's destiny'. Reason was actually man's destiny according to Aristotle, the source of its actualisation. Machiavelli thought that by using reason you could play with fate and jump from one thread of fate to another, keeping some sort of control. The difference between reason and luck is that one (reason) believes in self efficacy, the possibility of control and the other (luck) believes that one's destiny depends on outside intervention. This reason, the ability of control, or agency, is currently in twilight. Not that I think it should be though. The casino is the refuge for the unreasonable, both the man of reason and the man of luck shoot for the stars, but they believe in different weapons.

I initially misread the title of your post as an exploration about the gradual disappearance of 'reason', much like the 'twilight of the idols', the Götterdämmerung. However you do not mean it in that sense, you wonder what reason is 'forgetting' or what notions are forgotten when we embrace reason. It is rather Kantian. Kant championed reason to make room for faith. 180 objects to this idea from a rather pragmatic point of view. The times in which reason was obscured were metaphorically 'dark times', the dark ages. There is nothing that is not illuminated by reason and the bright TL light is preferable to any twilight. In both instances reason seems to be portrayed as an 'in itself', something that exists apart from us. however I would contend that reason is social. Reason is a certain way of seeing the world, but its content is socially determined.

To also interject a Nietzsche quote (who indeed seems oddly apt as a dance partner in this discussion:

“Truth is a mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, anthropomorphisms, in short a sum of human relations which have been subjected to poetic and rhetorical intensification, translation and decoration […]; truths are illusions of which we have forgotten that they are illusions, metaphors which have become worn by frequent use and have lost all sensuous vigor […]. Yet we still do not know where the drive to truth comes from, for so far we have only heard about the obligation to be truthful which society imposes in order to exist"

What we call reason is also none other than a set of rules with which we play the game of world illumination (or world construction if you will). Reason is much more than logic, logic is formal and empty, but reason is substantial. It tells us what is reasonable, which perspectives should be respected and should be denied. Now the world view that is commonly known as that of reason or 'enlightenment', is called into question thee days. Especially from the point of view of the environment, new idols and markers of reason are erected. We have discussions to give legal rights to trees for instance, we view the world as one organism and gradually we turn to the body as the locus of 'thought'. Even the argument is not safe in the age of identity politics. I am right or wrong dependent on who I am. Those notions notion soon will become 'reasonable' over time, through social change. So yes, we are in the twilight of reason, but not in the way that you intend it. Reason has become old fashioned and trite. Zarathustra is now part of the pantheon. The future men to whom he talked are alive now. They are todays millennials and they will invert all values, just like Nietzsche commanded them to do.

(I thin they finally turned me into a sociiologist instead of a philosopher :gasp: :scream:

Alright we can try our best here. I'm not saying that moral judgement is impossible in this area, only that it's more difficult and needs to be considered among other factors as well. Throughout this thread I've tried to introduce morality probably dozens of times and have tried to bring up just war theory. — BitconnectCarlos

Yes I know, but did your position do well in the debate? I think not and there might be a reason for that. I saw your jump to context and identity as an evasive maneuver in the game.

Have you considered that Palestinian authorities in the past will greatly reward the families of suicide bombers providing them with an economic incentive? Maybe bulldozing property could be considered a way of dissipating that incentive. Everything isn't about morality and a narrow focus on morality excludes other important factors. — BitconnectCarlos

Let's say that it is true, is than fair to punish them to offset and advantage that they did not ask for? You cannot play economics personally. Off course we can also bulldozer the houses down the houses of families of people who's son or daughter is into trading drugs on the basis that some of the revenues will flow to the family. We do we not do that? Why would that be? In any legal system worth its salt, reprisals are considered illegal. That is not for nothing. A state that does not punish the offender but non-offenders does not govern through law but through violence. I wonder, are the houses of settles torn down when they commit violence against Palestinians? I think not. It is actually one of the most odious violations of law.

The broader question is how the story of, say, the American civil war is told and how we come to understand it. That matters and it carries real-world repercussions. A set of facts of moral facts, say - X, Y, Z might be true and philosophically sound but this is an entirely different issue from how the bigger picture should be presented and processed and understood.

For instance, while its true that Uyghurs conducted terrorist attacks against Chinese civilians, to present overriding importance to these attacks as opposed to China's ongoing genocide is awful. — BitconnectCarlos

Ohh but I agree with you. It is very much about how the story is told. Therefore I would say we need to include as many perspectives on the story as we can. We need a number of narratives, including the confederate one, or the Israeli one. All those stories weave a tapestry.

Your last point about the Uyghurs intrigues me, because you apply the same kind of reasoning there that I would apply as well, reasoning by proportionality. You might well be right that China's strategy is reprehensible, but reasoning by proportionality is not a safe card for Israel to play. On that from too the body bags lines up on one side makes a much taller stack. You getting yourself into the waters the other posters are drawing you in.

I agree with your point, but I do still believe we need to be careful going forward. I'm perfectly content condemning certain actions or historical events, again I'm just stressing the importance of viewing certain actions and policies in a broader historical and cultural context which historically some philosophers have ignored. — BitconnectCarlos

Well, me too, but one has to be very careful to distinguish between understanding and normatively judging. The Israeli reaction can in my point of view not be seen seperable from the cataclysmic memory of the holocaust. It is an event that has changed the world at large fundamentally and probably changed the victims of it much more fundamentally. That goes a long way to understand (at least as best as you can) the position of Israel. It does not make those actions right though. I agree with you it is impossible to find som ahistorical yardstick, but whenever we judge a certain situation,, like you just id the situation of the Uyghurs, we have to as best as we can try to find some common ground. I think we can find it, that is why I love Sting's song about the Russians so much.

Who are we talking about in particular? The morality of the ground soldiers? How about NCOs or junior officers? Or maybe we could talk about the morality of senior officers like Colonels who may be the ones behind, e.g. a raid? Or are we talking about morality for the entire state of Israel? — BitconnectCarlos

I think we are talking past each other. I apologise for that. With a theory about morality I thought you meant some ethical theory, such as utilitarianism or deontology or another theory of ethics. The offiicerts, privates, civilians, they might have a position, or perspective and valid though they all are for the discussion, they do not amount to any systematic theory about right and wrong.

Just to be clear I meant to deny war crimes in this current flare-up, not across Israel's entire history. I of course acknowledge certain crimes committed by Israeli forces - Jish and Deir Yassin, for example. — BitconnectCarlos

Ok... but I do not see why having family there is important for the denial or acceptance of any war crime. It makes denial understandable, but not sound. Denial or acceptance of the claim than comes down to psychology, but not argument. The difference is that when we talk ethics we see each other as human beings with whom we have common understanding and who can judge on matters of right and wrong. When we reduce ethics to psychology we cannot. Everything becomes 'understandable' but not anymore debatable.

You're not wrong, but when I approach subjects like politics or practical action the language that I use is different from the language that a philosopher would use in a philosophy paper. If you want to you can spend time harping on this fairly irrelevant issue but I'm just going to drop it. I don't see any meaningful difference between what other posters have described Israel as and "evil. — BitconnectCarlos

Ok but would you then agree you are not talking about the same thing anymore? Here you basically say: "I am taking it personal and so I decide what words mean, irrespective of what they mean. I hold on to a similarity that I feel is such and therefore it is such irrespective of my interlocutors." You can live by that rule, but it makes discussion at least on that issue pointless. It also blunts your own arguments on this matter because you invent a meaning of a word and then you accuse others of using it. They do not ascribe to your definition of terms though and for good reason.

Who did America buy it's Land from? Who did Australia Buy it's land from? Who did Britain buy it's land from etc. — Andrew4Handel

Australia is not a person, neither is America. Technically that is not even a country.

The problem here is that lots of people want the same land for purely ideological reasons. It is an ideological conflict supported by ideologues — Andrew4Handel

Not necessarily, it is also a very real conflict about people wanting to pick olives from their own olive tree, or people being evicted from their homes. Ideology makes everything sound so nice and comfortably theoretical doesn't it?

Humans have overpopulated the world (child abuse/environmental abuse) having a child makes an unwarranted claim on resources and puts you in competition with everyone else. — Andrew4Handel

And this has to do with what exactly? By all means do not have kids if you don't want to but do not nag us with your choices.

We could just return to the the prism of survival of the fittest where nature will decide who survives and is strongest. Humans create fictional narratives to justify the claims they make such as nationality claims and ownership claims. — Andrew4Handel

Of course we could but we realized that made life nasty, poor, solitary, brutish and short. So presto we invented law and morality. Nature does not decide anything, it just is.

This conflict will not be resolved through ethical fictions rather it is either a war of attrition that will be resolved when people have had enough or the strongest will survive. — Andrew4Handel

That whole argument is circular. Who survives is by definition stronger so it does not say anything. By all means go call ethics a fiction, but do start wondering whether this forum is the place for you to be. Actually 'fictions' such as nationality, class, race, shared values and so on keep people together, whether they are 'fictions' or not.

When it comes to matters of national security, e.g. whether Israel was justified in their pre-emptive strike on Egyptian airfields in '67 applying an ethical analysis of the issue seems out of place. If an enemy mobilizes and surrounds your camp are you allowed to strike? Is that "ethical?" — BitconnectCarlos

Not at all out of place. Quite necessary I would think from the point of view of 'just war' theory. On a smaller scale it is a matter that lawyers and judges need to deal with very frequently.

There are somethings I can certainly say are wrong - massacres, for instance. Security measures such as house raids or bulldozing suicide bombers homes are not so clear. — BitconnectCarlos

Bulldozing houses seems very clear to me. A security measure is not a security measure just because it is worded so. By definition the suicide bomber is dead and the threat has dissipated. What sort of 'security' does bulldozing a family house bring? It is in fact collective punishment, reprisal on a population which runs contrary to established legal principle namely that punishment is a response to a crime. Of course security measures are allowed, but this comes down to punishment.

You could crucify any group or any country like this. Was the North in the American Civil War squeaky clean morality-wise? Of course not. Sure, we can talk about what they did wrong but to only focus on their wrongs and not the crimes of the South does seem dubious. You'd get a very slanted picture of the Civil War if that's all you were presented with. — BitconnectCarlos

Probably not, but if you want to attack Americans for their black pages in history the genocide on the Amerindians (or native Amercans whichever term you prefer) is an easier target. However, two wrongs do not make a right. So Israels actions do not suddenly become moral because those of the Americans in preceding centuries were immoral.

Part of the problem is also that philosophers like to conceive of morality as ahistorical and this results in 21st century people sitting on their nice couches or chairs behind computer screens judging individuals in an environment and historical circumstance that they just do not know and will never know. I guess this is a question of responsibility or blame which is different from morality. These issues are obviously closely related though. — BitconnectCarlos

If that argument flies no one can judge anything. However, it does not fly. If you are mugged in the subway the perpetrator will provided he is caught, be punished irrespective of his intractable historical circumstance. We punish him because we think mugging you is wrong. We recognise each other's pain and are capable of discerning suffering from pleasure. A historical situation makes behaviour understandable, maybe even excusable, but not right or justified.

And even beyond this - which morality are we to judge them by? Utilitarianism? Ethical Egoism? Whether the country is "being nice?" — BitconnectCarlos

Whatever moral theory you might like and presents a cogent argument for your position.

Could you expand on this a little? I know that I've gravitated towards a certain relativism here. I wasn't sure that I went that far but I might have so please let me know. — BitconnectCarlos

I do not think I need to expand much. When you say "well I have family in Israel and so that is why I embrace the position that Israel did not commit war crimes" you do that. You apparently hold the position that whether or not country X committed war crimes is dependent on whether the parties have relatives on country X.

There are posters who have waddled into that territory. In my mind there's no real difference between "constantly does evil" and "is evil." There are plenty of posters who have described Israel as being essentially a constantly evil force. Posters here have accused Israel of genocide constantly which is the epitome of evil in my book. Scroll back a little and you'll see plenty of these Israel-Nazi comparisons. — BitconnectCarlos

Yes of course there is a difference. Being evil is a characteristic of a person or entity and doing evil is judgment passed on an action. Now saying "Israel constantly does evil" is a bit of a silly statement, eveil to whom? Every moment of the day etc. But I do not think anyone said that. Secondly that was not what you said when quoting me, you were implying I overlooked Arab anti-semitism.

Some posters accuse Israel of genocide, and this could be true or not. There are internationally established definitions for when to call a certain action genocidal. It is a heinous war crime but it is something else than calling an entity essentially evil, because that is a metaphysical statement. I do think we are at the heart of the matter though. You feel personally offended an feel like you should defend yourself because you and your loved ones are being called evil by implication. However, I do not think that is what is at stake.

Alright, so lets let the "impartial" observers handle it then. And who would those be? Americans? Europeans? Which ones? Do Indians have a say? How about the Chinese? If Israel obeys some in the West and loosens security, who pays the price when blood is spilled? It's all very well and good to say that Israel shouldn't blockade Gaza, but who pays the price when heavy weaponry is imported from Iran? In any case I'm fine with the West stepping in to help with the process and make suggestions, but we'd like a say too. — BitconnectCarlos

Passing judgment on situation X is something different then solving situation X. In a philosophy forum the purpose is to discuss the ethical merits of a given situation or solution, not solving that situation. What I was trying to understand is what the beef was between you and the other posters and now I know, you do not enter into ethical debate at all. Perhaps you want to solve the situation, but than I would advise joining the Israeli or American diplomatic corps.

I have the self-awareness to admit that I'm partial; I just wish that that the West would realize that they approach the issue through their own biased cultural lenses as well. The Middle East geopolitically should not be treated like Europe. It is not analogous to the struggle between the British and the IRA. It is an extremely complicated issue with a very long history, intense hatreds, constantly shifting borders, and religious fundamentalism thrown in the mix. The stakes are extremely high and I don't have the luxury to take a step back from my own people. If your people were being attacked and under constant threat, I would not tell you to take a step back. — BitconnectCarlos

They do and that is why it is so important to find some common ground along the lines of ethical argumentation. I am not here actually to defend or attack Israel. I do recognize the existential threat to Israel, and of course the eternal victimization of Jewish people everywhere should also be factored in when passing judgment (however not on individual acts I daresay) but the question remains whether Israeli actions are right or wrong. That is the purpose of this thread. It is a matter of argumentation about right and wrong, but you seem bent on confusing identity with argument.

If your people were being attacked and under constant threat, I would not tell you to take a step back. — BitconnectCarlos

What you tell us to do is entirely uninteresting because you do not matter one bit. (neither do I). What might be relevant is whether you are right in your advice or not and if so why / why not. You seem to have some odd idea that the truth value of an argument is dependent on who utters it.

Israel's neighbors have used this type of language constantly since Israel's inception. It's luckily simmered down a little now and progress has been made, but historically this was a very big concern. The environment in the 40s, 50s, 60s and 70s - Israel's formative years - was different from today (but how much have things really changed? Who knows.) — BitconnectCarlos

You are misquoting me. I do not contest that Israels neighbours have such feelings. What I said was this:

"I think you misinterpret the position of your adversaries in this thread. I do not think anyone holds Israel to be 'an evil entity'. What they criticize are the actions and policies of Israel."
I said nothing about other countries. In fact I know anti-semitism among Arab nations runs high. I wonder why you actually misquote, if it is a mistake, it is silly but such things happen, if it is deliberate it is wrong and foul play to say the least.

Hey Tobias, if a gunman told to choose between saving your mother's life or the life of a complete stranger, would you pretend to be an impartial observer? How about if it was your son? Would you reason "oh well, two humans both have equal moral value etc. etc." At the end of the day you choose to save your mother/family (right??). There's nothing wrong with that. You have duties to your family. — BitconnectCarlos

No I would not, I can also make some ethical sense of familial duties, but I would not confuse ethics and affection. Let's say there is an ethical debate whether the king or my son deserves to be treated for corona first. I would obviously shout "my son my son"! But no one would debate with me because what I am talking about is affection. My opinion would actually carry no value in the debate. If such is the case for you in this conflict than we need to talk no further. Your capabilities to reason are compromised by affection, just as mine would be in the scenario you present to me.

In just the same way, the Israel-Palestine conflict isn't some abstract philosophical thought experiment to me; it's deeply personal and I have family living over there that I visit. My position isn't entirely due to my heritage and in the past I had a phase where I was anti-Israel. — BitconnectCarlos

I hope the best for your family. No it is no thought experiment it is an actual conflict. As a lawyer I would in such case advise you to withdraw and not pass judgment., because you cannot be impartial. The second part of your sentence is difficult to grasp. Your position isn't entirely due to your heritage, you were anti-Israel and now you are pro. But I'd think in a thread where a normative judgement is required one leaves their affectionate ties at the doorstep. Or one gives the caveat that the opinion presented is compromised by affective ties. I would say, lay out your pro-Israel arguments without recourse to your own personal commitments. Those arguments can be considered. For the other part, the writers will not pass judgment I would think because they realize your arguments are not ethical but personal and there is no point in arguing about one's personal commitments.

Of course we can talk about the ethics of the conflict and I'd agree that Israel has certainly fallen short some times. You'll find plenty of depravity on both sides. I don't think it's an evil entity however that deserves to be wiped out which is a common view in the Middle East — BitconnectCarlos

I think you misinterpret the position of your adversaries in this thread. I do not think anyone holds Israel to be 'an evil entity'. What they criticize are the actions and policies of Israel. Even a good entity may find itself on the wrong side of the (moral or international) law. That there is plenty of depravity on both sides I agree. the point is that superior weaponry brings superior responsibility. I rather have a depraved person opposite to me wielding a potato peeler then one wielding a smith & Wesson. I am allowed by law to use less force against the person with the potato peeler than I am against the one using a Smith & Wesson.

My one sided description of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? I've never pretended to be a neutral bystander. I'm an American Jew with family in Israel and historical ties there.

If someone wants to claim neutrality that's their own delusion. What news sources do they watch? Who do they listen to? Who's story have they heard? Do they understand the region and its history and not just imposing their own cultural attitudes on Middle Eastern people? — BitconnectCarlos

I do not get something here. I know Israeli's who actually served in the Israeli military and they do not defend the Israeli bombing raids. Not that you cannot defend Israel, but this argument above is rather silly right? Isn't the point of ethical debate that based on argument you establish a certain position and not based on heritage? If that is not possible we can do away with rational discussion or law altogether. Any defendant may come up to me and say "yeah I committed this or that crime but you do not know what it is like to be brought up in this or that neighborhood go to this or that school".

I do not see what your heritage has to do with the position you take. You basically seem to hold the position that your heritage compels you to side with the members of your community against its enemies. You just appeal to heritage as a source of community in which only friends and enemies exist. Now, who else made such a claim?

I read contradictory statements about it. Last thing I saw was an inquiry for Volkskrant newspaper. Support for Israel is at an all time low, but at the same time there is little love for the Palestinians. My sentiment is that the young and well educated in increasing number support the Palestinian cause, but I think most people actually, the biggest voter base, does not really care and see Israel at least not as a threat.

Now that you have drawn my attention to this, I think you are quite on the mark. So the question arises, why should this be so? — Banno

My sociological explanation would go somewhere along this line: there are two mutually reinforcing trends with us since the 1960's. The first is democratization / emancipation the second is a culture of authenticity. These trends mutually reinforce each other.

Democratization has given many people the chance to speak out and raise their voice. Awareness rose that by and large our western consumer culture was based on all kind of hierarchies. Increased welfare, increased schooling and increased means of communications meant hitherto marginalized groups who suffered the most from these taken for granted hierarchies such as the working class, women and ethnic minorities gained more access to the discourse (sorry Banno ;) ) Rightly so, they occupied their spot in the market place of opinions. Their was a conservative backlash against it, it becomes visible especially now, but the traditional 'left' was sensitive to this development. It led to a questioning of the approach taken by the educated to the uneducated. Many are now sensitive to the idea that what they argue for is tinged with all kinds of prejudice and become hesitant. The idea emerges that what is being said is not 'fact', but opinion, at least the people bringing forth 'facts' shun from stating them as such.

Their authority dwindles for two reason. A. they were part of the same system of marginalisation therefore lost credibility. B. they feel uneasy donning the mantle of authority because they know they were. Democratization radicalized into identity politics. Everybody, not just the 'traditionally' marginalised groups, is a victim of one thing or other. (I was a little boy with glasses, not good!). That means everyone's sensitive spot must be taken into account leading to pussyfooting in debates.

The second reason is the culture of authenticity which I would relate to 1960's youth culture as well. Enlightnement liberated us from the church. The second world war, Vietnam and the environmental crisis liberated us from the idea that tradition and science make us moral. The source of morality can therefore not be found within a community but has to reside within oneself. The result is that everyone is a unique individual who is deserving of being loved and cherished and not hurt. Everyone reaches morality his or her own way, be it through community activism, boy scouting, LSD or free love. Since there is not one path to morality and 'knowledge' but many and since each individual is 'worth it', each individual feels free to claim his or her space, wherever and whenever. Why would the seat of congress not be occupied by a shaman wearing bull horns? He is at least, authentic and less corrupted than the satanists at the top.

The traditions reinforce each other. The top (the well educated holding higher social positions) become less self assured while the bottom (those that do not, and yes I am aware of the connotations of this metaphor, but I do not know how else to tell the story, no value judgments are intended) become more self assured. Established but often tacitly accepted rules of argumentation are called into question, or worse, not taught anymore. Equal worth becomes equated with equality of each opinion. The fallaciousness of that equation gets lost. So when someone is argumentatively butt kicked we do not accept it anymore. It is not a loss to a better opponent we have to accept, according to the rules of the game, but an unwarranted attack on our individual or group identity and self worth.

As for my own normative position on this (not that it matters but anyway) I hold the first trend to be a necessary correction of systemic inequality. The second trend though I think is pernicious especially coupled with the first one, because there is a tension between the two. The legitimation of self assertion it brings might well lead to new hierarchies and undermine democratization eventually. People flee into mysticism, others, feeling threatened start clamoring for a restoration of old privileges..

I am an oldie who floated back here from the days PF and sometimes I am more active than others because my job became more demanding.
If I have to compare how it is run now from the way PF was ru, I think the standards on PF were a little higher, but maybe I am wrong, that was after all 10 years ago and you remember only the posts that impressed you.

On the whole though I feel the place is still similar in that it has the occasional very knowledgeable thread the occasional off beat but very interesting idea an the usual groping around in the sandbox to find something to latch on to. There is nothing wrong with that, I came here way back in 2003 or 20004 because of a thread about nothingness and I still see it come up sometimes. I think the place is still a good way to sharpen one's argumentative skills and acquire some basic knowledge about various philosophical arguments. I still find it helpful that hardly anything catches me completely off guard because there has been one post or other about it in PF and one of the savants of the different traditions has commented on it.

What I do notice is that the tolerance towards sharp debate has gone down. It is a society wide trend I feel so nothing different here than in reel life. The ad homs and the snide remarks were all there back in the day as much as now, but the hurt or indignation against them was less. Attacks could really be vicioius but if there was some substance behind it, no worries. It was also recognized, sure debates can get mean, but principle of charity, in the end we do not mean bad. I think people's souls have grown more tender. It is a shame because I think such an attitude is beneficial. The acceptance that we all cross the line sometimes leads to a mutual recognition of fallibility. There were some posters who I had really mean altercations with but think back of with fondness. A debate is not a safe place. that recognition I think would be useful. that does not mean a license to disrespect, but disrespect with high level of substance should be tolerated and eaten. A debate is a battle and the scars of war is what makes us veterans. Of course, plain disrespect without substance is 'crime of war' and leads to dishonorable discharge.

Most people buy their land... When you find land belonging to no one, than you may occupy it. What you may not do is occupying someone else's land and take it as your own, aka conquest.

pointless...

Ah, so, natural law is ridiculous, legal principles are indispensable. — Banno

Even natural law is not totally out of the window these days. Sure the idea of a "heaven of legal concepts in the sky" does not have many adherents, but trouble arises when we try to justify universal human rights for instance. "We hold these rights to be self evident:" is a natural law formulation. The natural law thesis in its thinnest form says that there are essential features of any legal rule or system without which this rule is not law. In other words, are there regulations thinkable that even though they are promulgated in the right way, following the right procedures should still not count as law. Now I think we would all agree that a law that tells you to open and close the door simultaneously, even if promulgated in the right way, poses certain problems because it is impossible to comply with. Hart would say this is simply bad law and he might have a point. However if you also hold the view that law is more than mere rambling because it claims obedience than this rule might well lack that claim since it is impossible to adhere to.

Now this is academic but there are legal cases, for instance the case of the grudge informer http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/upload_documents/The_Grudge_Informer_Case_Revisited.pdf
where the question whether certain rules are law or not comes to the fore.

I did not mean to be offensive Ciceronianus and never did I imply that your jurisdiction is not worthy of recognition. I practice in the Netherlands and there is no doubt in my mind that your jurisdiction holds more sway than the Amsterdam district court. I do find it odd that you did not know the case. I was sure you would since your original post displayed much knowledge on the history of positivism. Dworkin's attack against it is based on the case and this attack (not the case of course) raises very difficult questions for this doctrine. So yes... I was genuinely puzzled as I expected it to be known.

Sorry all, but I must depart this thread to actually practice law, which means dealing with laws that exist, not laws that I think exist, or should exist. It's a useful distinction for a lawyer to make. But not a philosopher, it seems. — Ciceronianus the White

And wiith legal principles... don't forget legal principles. They exist and they might well make you win a case ;)

Wel Cic, where do you practice? It is rather odd you do not know the case Riggs v. Palmer when writing on the positivism / anti-positivism debate. But anyway, the case is an old case, at the end of the 19th century. Probably the law has changed and no, there is nothing in positivism that says the law cannot change. However, in the state of New York at the time there was no law that stated that one cannot inherit in case you murdered the testator. Elmer Palmer did to prevent him to change his will. But in absence of a law stating otherwise should not normal inheritance law apply? And would that not mean the wording of the will, validly drafted, should be executed as is?

It is not a question of interpretation. The law is clear. There is no textual difficulty. So the court appealed to other, possibly higher principles of law. But when you bluntly state "law is law" you should at least clarify whether that includes legal principles or not and if so whence do they derive their legal force.

If there was nothing expressly prohibiting the court from ruling as it did, then it seems to me there was nothing prohibiting it from interpreting the law (statute) in such a fashion, e.g., that it would not have an absurd result--one in which a murderer is entitled to the estate of the one he murdered. — Ciceronianus the White

Absurd absurd? so law is law unless it leads to absurd results? Comes dangerously close to natural law Ciceronianus. It is not that judges are prohibited to rule in way x or way y. the question is, does their ruling stand up to legal scrutiny? If textual interprretation is the only method of interpretation then their position collapses, because the law on inheritance is clear. Were they allowed? Yes, but it rpoves Dworin's point that there is more to law than what positivists hold law to be.

Regardless, though I haven't maintained that morals and moral principles are never employed in making or interpreting, or enforcing laws. My only point is that doesn't make morals or moral principles law. — Ciceronianus the White

Well you will have to. There was no question of unclarity in the law that should be interpreted, there was no law to be made but only a case to be judged and there was no question of enforcement either. so according to you the courts used non law to set aside the law and still took a legally valid decision? That is definitely odd. Then non law would be law and law would in your view be non-law. That is definitely absurd. So much more consistent it is to accept that these principles are part of law. As is the usual interpretation actually.

What do you make of appeals to "our founding fathers"? For example, — Banno

It is an oddity of US law. No we never appeal to 'our founding fathers', in fact the Netherlands does not have constitutional review ;) But in the US these people are so revered that what they once wrote is considered to be crucial to interpret current situations. There are huge debates between the originalists who state that the constitution should be interpreted as in light of its original intention and the evolutionists who hold that the constitution should be interpreted as a 'living document', so in light of current times. We do have legislative historical interpretation though where we try to find out what the legislative branch intended with a certain law, but never to the degree of 'originalism'.

How to push morality into laws back door..

Ahhh a philosophy of law question and I totally missed it.... I apologise for not reading through 8 pages of text, I read the first two. So it may be that some of the points I will cover here will already been covered before, my apologies in advance

The existence of law is one thing; its merit and demerit another. Whether it be or be not is one enquiry; whether it be or be not conformable to an assumed standard, is a different enquiry.

So wrote John Austin in the 19th century, by reputation the creator of legal positivism. So thinks Ciceronianus, the author of this post.

I think any practicing lawyer, or judge, would accept the statement made by Austin quoted above without hesitation. — Ciceronianus the White

Well, not where I am from, at least not wholesale. The problem is not that simple, it turns out to be rather complex but very worthwhile to think through. A bit like Hegel's writings actually. ;)
Making the distinction is of course appealing. As Hart says, it is a mere matter of methodology. We at least know what we study when we differentiate between what is law, that which is accepted as a binding enforceable set of rules, and that which is not law. Standards of morality, aspiration, all kinds of things, but not law. So far so good but Hart and Austin also accept that a characteristic of law is that it demand compliance. From where does it gain that normative force?

Austin tried to answer it and his answer basically comes down to violence. Law gains its normative force because it is issued by the sovereign. Well Hart made short work of that and said that if that were true, the law would be no different than the command of a leader of a gang of bandits. We do not see law in that way. We do not see it as just commands, but also as a legitimate command. Now where does it gain legitimacy from According to both Kelsen and Hart it came from higher law. Law is legitimate when it is based on a higher law. So for instance the judge's conviction of a murderer rests on the model criminal code and the model criminal code in turn rests on the consitutions.... turtles all the way down!

And yes also with the turtle problem it has to end somewhere. Hart offers as the end point the 'rule of recognition'. The rule of recognition, being the putative rule that rules them all might be the constitution but if we ask on what the constitution is based, Hart points out that in the end it is based on the acceptance of the legal professionals. Lawyers recognise it as law. So in the end his explanation for laws legitimacy is sociological, it rests on the acceptance of the people. They accept a certain government and consider its edicts to be binding and therefore they come to be. When revolution comes after a time of turmoil a new rule of recognition will come to be accepted and in turn becomes the law of the land.

Now that means positivism, in last instance, says that law is what law does, better, what lawyers do. that left him open to what I consider a deadly objection for wholesale positivism. If we say that law is what lawyers do that let's see what they do, said Ronny Dworkin. When we analyse cases (the famous case Riggs v Palmer, easy to find). In Riggs v Palmer the court argued that a murderer cannot claim the inheriitance of the person he murdered. However, there was nothing in the written law that prevented him from doing so. In fact the law of inheritance was crystal clear on the issue. The courts invoked a legal principle: "one should not legally benefit from one's own crimes" and withheld the inheritance. If we hold on to the principe of ciceronianus that law is law the courts have acted unlawfully. Did they? even positivists are hard pressed here. Dworkin argued that when law is as lawyers do we have to accept legal principles as a part of law.

Then we get a number of problems back. Where do these principles come from? Dworkin was adamant in saying that they are legal rpinciples, not just any old principle some judge thought up somewhere will do. They must have a certain legal basis as a kind of foundation of our legal system. However they might well be unwritten. So there goes the principle 'law is law', at least now we have 'law is law including unwritten legal principles'. and how do we recognise those principles and what is the basis for them? It is clear that a legal principle is not a rule, if a rule is not adhered to, than it is not a rule. But the principle "one should not benefit from one's own crime" is not always adhered to, not even by law itself. The thief becomes the owner of a good at some point, legitiised by the statute of limitations, so here the law itself facilitates crime! So not, it is not a rule. Other than rules, which do not need a basis in morality, some sort of morality does gird legal principles. How do we know and recognise a legal principle? Well because we know the foundations of our law, but these are not chosen willy nilly. They have a basis... well morality and justice. And that complicates matters. If unrwitten stuff is part of law and f this unwritten stuff has its basis not in the commands of the sovereign or the rule of recognition but in morality than the boundary between law and morality is blurred and the saying the existence of law is independent of morality becomes questionable.

So, positivism does not provide a good account of where legitimacy comes from. It leaves it open to all kinds of objections. At best its origins are ineffable and at worst it derives its normative force by virtue of being law itself and than we get the famous objections against national socialist law for instance. So no, austin's position is by no means totally accepted at least not in the continental world.

Not all of those considered legal philosophers were lawyers, alas. I don't think Aristotle, Aquinas, Hobbes, Rousseau or Mill were lawyers. The mere thought of Hegel being an attorney inspires terror. Cicero, Grotius, Bentham, Montesquieu, Austin, Holmes, Hart and Dworkin were lawyers (Monty was a judge). — Ciceronianus the White

No, but all of these had their influence of the philosophical history of ideas on law and all of those should be remembered for the greatness of their contribution. Aristotle coined a fundamental definition of justice, Hegel waged debates with Von Savigny, the greatest lawyer of the 19th century, Hobbes might well have influenced Austin's command theory of law, Rousseau is still important for social contract theory and even Aquinas famous saying 'lex iniusta no est lex' has adherents. I actually might even think it is true. Has the national socialist law against calling Hitler a mass murderer ever been law? Yes says Hart, no says Radbruch. It is important because if we recognise it as law how can we ask the one that obeys that law and reports an offender to the police after which he is shot, not to obey it? Or should he have known that this rule lacks the character of law? That it has no normative force because it violates principles of justice everyone knows? I have not decided on m position yet, but it certainly is not positivism hook line and sinker...

An probably the most noteworthy inhabitant of my beloved city, but that aside :)

I very much agree. A question, I suppose, is which is the independent value and which dependent – the priority of the relation? I say "prudencia" before (with, of course, positive feedback from) "scientia". What say you? — 180 Proof

Lately I have been immersed much more in the social sciences and in law than in philosophy and you see the same dichotomy over and over again. I keep holding on to the same thing here as I have in the past. The relation is dialectical, i.e. mutually constitutive. I do not see a primacy over prudentia because it might give you the right outcome but not tell you why it is the right outcome and the same goes for scientia, it might give you rules (or structures, or whatever universal) but what is a rule if there is no-one to apply it? It is a chicken and egg question. What came first? Well the process through which chickens and eggs were created. in Hegelian terms ; the movement of the concept ;) (Incidentally I now work wihat a prof who does not allow the G.W.F.' s name to be spoken aloud...)

And what about the lived (existential) implications for e.g. 'well being' or 'agency' of those philosophical relationships? (Asking for a friend. :smirk:) — 180 Proof

It is a good question and one that I find difficult to answer, because I have a rather deductive mind. For me, understanding the assumptions (theory) might lead to increased well being in practice. Is that reasonable, I do not know, but I do think that there is some sort of equivocation at play in the word philosophy. On the one hand ones own growth spriitual growth or, maybe more apt edification and the other the first principles aka metaphysics. They are linked, but just as theory and practice are linked and they are in common parlance separated. I consider that the question of existential implications belong to 'prudentia', practical wisdom. Of course prudencia and scientia are related, but at least to me, not the same thing. I feel philosophy belngs to the realm of scientia and for instance my work as a lawyer to prudentia. even though I try to take just decisions.

The relationship between man and his or her environment is of course a philosophical question as it is a peculiar manifestation (ethics) of our relationship (ontology) to the world. Just like our relationship with science is a philosophical question (epistemology). Philosophy is the practice of interrogating (deducting in its peculiar Kantian sense) our presuppositions about these relationships. Not all explaining about 'how the world is' is philosophical explanation. For instance if I try to convince you that the world is a gift from God and that science is the way through which we unwrap that gift and hence give an explanation as to why science is beneficial, I am not doing philosophy. I am giving a theological explanation about the world. Same when I tell you that we should conceive of the world in scientific terms I am not giving you a philosophical explanation, but a scientistic one. (scientism being the claim that science is the best possible way to get information about the world - to which I agree- and that it is the normatively right way to view the world - to which I do not agree).

So philosophy is a peculiar discipline, a praxis of interrogation conducted not from a certain point of view, but of these certain points of view, while recognising that 'pure objectivity; is impossible. That discovery itself by the way is a philosophical discovery, since it pertains to our relationship with the world. A philosopher is someone who engages in those practices and, but that is purely my opinion, shows that he engages in it by writing the results of her enquiries down. The reason I think that is because I hold being to be relational. I can think of myself to be a boxing champ but if no one else recognises it, I simply am not. It is also a honorific title and therefore 180 is right when he states that it is pretentious to call yourself one, if not self contradictory as per the philosophical tradition: by doing philosophy you also learn how little you in fact know, as already pointed out by one of its founding fathers Socrates. When you call someone else a philosopher it might denote that she has a certain position for instance as an academic philosopher, or it may be a description of admiration.

Now that is not to say that although few of us are philosophers here in the above sense, we are not doing philosophy. We are doing that in many threats, at least those that deal with our presuppositions of our relationship to the world and parts of it. We do it at different levels though, just like many of us are on a cchess site and play chess but would be hard pressed to consider themselves 'chess players'.

Of course it has no basis is historical authority. It is a normative statement the kind of which citizenship classes seem to love so much. It is actually rather militaristic. There is some sort of a legal basis for it though. In international law state sovereignty is recognized if it is able to defend its borders. (I belief, but I am jo expert).

My oh My....

This sounds like you may be understanding care in a conventional sense. Tell me how you understand Heidegger’s notion of care in relation to his concept of temporality, because this ‘ equiprimordial’ relation between care, understanding, attunement and understanding is crucial to my treatment of ‘care’.

More specifically , the way the my ‘now’ projects my past into my future possibilities means that any ‘object’ in the world I experience is partially build out of my past. This is a crucial point , because it give all my experience cues the sens of a radical belonging to my past , at the same time that the ‘now’ contributes an element of absolute novelty. In this respect , Heidegger inherited Husserl’s formulation of the intentional act as a contittionbased on a dimension similarity between — Joshs

I do not know if I understand care conventionally. In Heideggerian terms, I understand care as an 'existential of Dasein' ;) . However I think there is a difference. Heidegger makes a different between the ontic and the ontological and I do not see that difference. This duality emerges because Heidegger has some sort of primordial idea of Dasein who for itself has a world. First and foremost Dasein is a self relation. I think there is Dasein is created by the world in that our self understanding is not primordial but a product of our relation to the world and how this is conceptualised. There is no authenticity, there is no primordial relation, there is just a relation and there is acting and what not.

Not at all. I'm with Banno in this because I think (though he's just another "broken cockoo clock" to Banno) Freddy was more right than not:

"It has gradually become clear to me what every great philosophy up till now has consisted of – namely, the confession of its originator, and a species of involuntary and unconscious autobiography; and moreover that the moral (or immoral) purpose in every philosophy has constituted the true vital germ out of which the entire plant has always grown."
— Beyond Good and Evil
(Emphasis is mine.) — 180 Proof

Ohhh I agree with that. I find the parallels between Heideggerian thought, ecological thought (in its small is beautiful variation) and national socialist thought fascinating. To me they share a similar sentimentality. What I would reject is the notion that because a biography shines through, the arguments made can be rejected or accepted. Most importantly, that it would be a reason to spare yourself the difficulty of trying to understand a thinker. Witty was part of the wiener Kreis, the wiener Kreis were connected to positivist science, positivist science fails to take understanding (verstehen) into account, presto: no need to try to understand Witty. I read too little Wittgenstein and I am not afraid to admit it. I have some knowledge from reading the tractatus and some secondary sources, but that is it, my problem.


Yes I concur.

But let me observe that the adjectives you use to describe this interaction defines the poles in a certain way. To be more specific, they flesh out the poles as inhering in a certain violence of polarization and arbitrariness. Corruption, force, impulse.( I would also add a host of other terms that various writers on intersubjectivity attribute to Being in the world, like introjection, conditioning , intersection of flows of power) These descriptors are intrinsic to how intersubjectivity creates and recreates subjects in many overlapping approaches in philosophy today ( Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology , social constructionism , post-structuralism , critical theory). — Joshs

Very true and I am influenced by those branches even describing myself as a social constructivist at times (in a sociological sense, not metaphysically). I indeed chose conflict associated terminology, but that is not the end of it for me. In order to conflict, or to force, or any kind of violence, 'care' is presupposed. conflict and violence indicate that there is something that 'matters', that rejects me and that I feel something about. The world inescapably matters to me and that is why I might conflict with it. So in every conflictual relation, a relation of care is presupposed, if we peel the concepts away. My connection to my world or the world however you want is characterised by care. However, there is no primordial pole somehow beyond that relation. There is no "etre de soi" and "etre pour soi" in Sartrean terminology, or better, there might be but it is a product of a way of thinking and not something over and above it.

So there is an interplay between subjectivity and objectivity. You perhaps would concur if I said these are just poles or aspects of an indissociable interaction between self and world. — Joshs

But let me now suggest that such terms of polarizing arbitrariness are only necessary because they assume as certain substantiality the the subjective and objective poles of experiencing a world. The has to be an element of resistantance and force-power implied in each pole in order for change to be a wrenching dislocation, a ‘corruption’. — Joshs

No there does not need to be any such thing. They are merely a product of some vague theories reiterated and changed in the process. A trace?

This would be on the order of variations of variations rather than a colliding of impulses. These would be variations of variations with no originating subject or generating power.
Rather than ‘Heideggerian authenticity’ being an attempt to rescue the remnants of the idealist subject from its fragmentation, it would be the opposite , an attempt to show how, functioning beneath the abstractions of ‘fat’ power relations , there is a movement that is at the same time more incessant and radically self-transformational , and more seemingly self-consistent and integral. But this thematic integrity would have to be understood
as not the work of some ghost in the machine, as you and others accuse Heidegger of , the return of idealist solipsism, but the compete opposite. The ongoing ‘self-belonging ‘ of my experience would have to be understood as what is left of moment to moment experiencing when all the abstractive baggage of ‘forceful’ interactive polarity has new deconstructed.
The problem with a Wittgensteinian or Foucualtian model, then, is that it has not gone far enough to unravel idealist assumptions. — Joshs

I think actually we are not far off. The question though is, as you state yourself, The ongoing self-belonging of my experience would have to be understood. However, that is rather ineluctable. We have no experience without the 'abstractive baggage' of our being in the world. It is all that abstratcive baggage that Heidegger likes to strip away that makes us us. The 'I' is just an interplay (knot) of conceptions beliefs, relations that is tied together in that moment at that place and time. Maybe there is only 'susceptibility', an openness to experience, a 'care locus'.

I don’t agree with Gadamer , but not because Heidegger is simply echoing Witt, it because Mitt-Dasein for Heidegger is a true being-with-others that is not simply a Witt-style sharing of language. — Joshs

Herein lies the problem I have with Heidegger. There is something like a 'true being with others', opposed to what, an untrue being with others? But if I am with others I am with others, there is no true or false. Just like Sorge, care, is not a self relation, it is a relation towards the other. that is what I mean with I as constituted by the world. It is not a self relation that lights a seinsverstehen, it is the other way around. I see that I care about things and realise that there is something like an I.

Nice posts Josh, thanks for them.

Heidegger spent the Great War reporting on the weather. Wittgenstein spent it volunteering for the most dangerous tasks to be found on the front line.

I do not get it Banno. Why the idea you need to know someone to appreciate his/her philosophy? Seems a curious example of identity politics. The thing in itself is either rational or bollocks independent of whether Kant was a virgin...

Anyway. What I understand from the posts and from Heidegger keeps me wondering why he resorts to all the doublings, a prereflective I, a reflective I... It seems he does not like the idea of the self being construed by the world in which it finds itself. He seems to hang on to some kernel of authenticity. Why cannot the self reflection and the relation to being not be established by the 'object' by a lack of a better word the world itself. I never understood what was won by the Heideggerian move to keep somekind of existential notion together with his beautiful analysis of enframing. It begets all kinds of problems, on an individual level but also on a collective level. I deal a bit with Heidegger inspired theories of law and I usually find them unnecessarily complicated. I also know a bit of the idea of language games and rule following of Wittgenstelin, but too little to readily compare it, though I feel you are correct to insist that Witty has no answer to individual deviations on the use of language. However, why should it be one of the other? No there is no authentic I, and no, there is no purely publically defined I. I am simply a unique constellation of forces through which other impulses (words, concepts) are iterated but never in exactly the same way. there is nothing authentic about it, just small 'corruptions' , which occur gradually.

The opposite can also be true, if you have only universals you cannot have freedom. By the way freedom is a universal. I do not think metaphysical theories have so much influence. No one is a pure nominalist. And what Benjamin Franklin believes... I have no idea why that is relevant.

The United States of Nominalism. The United States was founded by people like Thomas Jefferson, who was a British Empiricist. This is not a secret. And Benjamin Franklin who was an open Satanist. This is just obvious to anyone who reads. — Dharmi

Interesting how you toss British empiricism and satanism into the same boat.... lol. But even if it is true, so what and what does it say about the problem of freedom and family?

que?