There is a vast difference between the experience of a human whose brain/body is functioning typically and the same human brain/body that is either dead or anesthetized. The dead and anesthetized do not have mental processes, thinking, information processing, feedback loops... The anesthetized does have some of these things to some degree, because the autonomic systems process information and give feedback, and I suppose other things. But there are no mental processes, no thinking. — Patterner

Ok, thanks. Do you think that there is an active unitary consciousness there? If so, is it the same consciousness that has undergone some changes?

A human being is a unit. The leg is separate from the head, both are separate from the lungs, all are separate from the finger, etc. However, they are a unit. And that unit experiences as a unit. Various processes taking place in the brain are experienced as awareness and self-awareness. But stepping on a nail is also part of our consciousness. — Patterner

I agree with this. I also would say that the 'unit' is a whole that can't be reduced to its parts. This is reflected in our conscious experience, which is unitary after all. (Some might argue that the 'unitariness' is just an illusion, but, again, it seems to me an undeniable phenomenological aspect of our experience)

I'm not sure if you're asking two different questions, or if you are asking the same question in two different ways. My answer to the second, and possibly both, is that everything experiences. When I step on the nail, my foot experiences with the damage. But I, as a whole, also experience it. My foot takes the actual damage, but it is not what feels the pain. It is not what remembered a similar injury from years ago. It is not what worries about tetanus. — Patterner

Yes, I think you answered to the second question. It seems to me that, for you, all composites have some kind of consciousness, with different degrees of complexity. Both the foot (which is a composite) and the whole human being have consciousness but the consciousness of the whole human being is far more complex that the one of the foot and it's a different entity from it.

I guess that a problem with this view is that composites can be arbitrary in some cases. For instance, the 'foot' is difficult to define in a non-conventional way. Let's say that one asks to you if the 'foot minus the ankle' has consciousness. It's still a well-defined part of our body. Does the 'foot minus the anke' have a different consciousness than the 'foot with the ankle', or not?
IMO, all living beings have their own consciousness (here I am using the word in the way you use it) but non-living composite do not. If non-living composite had consciousness, we would have an explosion of the number of 'consciousnesses' due to the fact that, in the case of non-living things, we can carve the world arbitrarily.

Regarding the first question, I had in mind something like Advaita Vedanta, if you are familiar with it. In that view, there is only one consciousness and plurality is illusory. In a more qualified form, you might say that there is only one consciousness but it's complex and each 'part' of that consciousness is in some way conscious. It seems to me that you don't subscribe to that view. Rather, it seems to me you posit a plurality of different consciousnesses.

No problem! I would also like to understand my view more. :grin: — Patterner

:up: same goes for me! And discussions are helpful in this regard.

The point is that if the concept "the universe" is not representative of what we commonly refer to as the independent objective reality, then this statement of yours is rather meaningless. It takes a false premise "the universe", and derives a conclusion from it. According to this conception, the conception of "the universe", which I am saying might be a falsity, there was a time when the universe was without living beings. If the premise is false then the conclusion is unsound. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ok, but how do you explain the fact that scientific evidence seems to indicate just that?

I think that this is sort of backward thinking. We know "the good" as that which is intended, the goal, the end. As such, there is always a multitude of goods. In the manner proposed by Aristotle, we can ask of any specific good, what is it good for, and create a chain, A is for the sake of B which is for the sake of C, etc.. If we find a good which makes a final end, as he proposed happiness does, then that would be the ultimate purpose. However, "truth" really doesn't fit the criteria of the ultimate purpose. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, perhaps it's a bit off topic, but I would say that what you said about the good is also valid about the truth. When we learn things, we know some 'truths' but we aren't satisfied, we want to know more. It's possible that there is an 'ultimate truth' and if we knew that truth, we would find rest in it. Just like the case of the good.

I don't think that such speaking would be coherent. Suppose that there is true potential, such that as time passed, there was some degree of real possibility as to what happens from one moment to the next. If one possibility is actualized instead of another, then some form of agent must have chosen that possibility as the one to be actualized, and this implies teleology. The alternative would be to say that one possibility rather than another is actualized by chance, because it cannot be a determinist cause or else it would not be real possibility. But it is incoherent to think that it happens by chance, because this would mean that something happens without a cause, which is unintelligible, therefore incoherent. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, if the probabilistic interpretations of quantum mechanics are right potentialities can be actualized randomly in a way that satisfies the Born Rule, which seems intelligible to me. So, I don't think that it's impossible that potentialities can be realized by 'chance'. That said, one can still ask why the potentialites were 'there' in the first place. So, even if they are realized by chance, it doesn't totally exclude teleology IMO.

As I said, evidence of purpose is subjective. If you look at Christian theology, any sort of existent is evidence of teleology. This is because in order for us to perceive something as existent, it must be somehow organized, and organization is only produced on purpose. This is why, for them, all physical existence is evidence of teleology. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, I am sympathetic with this theistic argument, which BTW is not exclusively Christian. But, I am not sure if we can say that the evidence here is 'beyond reasonable doubt'. I actually don't think so and non-theist can rationally reject this reasoning. This doesn't mean that the theistic argument is false, just it isn't compelling even in 'beyond reasonable doubt' sense.
Perhaps you agree with that, as you characterise the evidence as 'subjective'.

What do you think qualifies as evidence of teleology? — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, I think that many different things can qualify as teleology. Of course, when we human beings act with a rationale, our actions are teleological. We act with a purpose in view which we believe it's possible but isn't realized yet. I would say there is also teleology in the actions of a bacterium, which in a rudimentary way strives for its survival and the survival for its specie (not in a conscious way, of course). Perhaps there are even more subtler kinds of teleology. But I am not sure.

Thanks for the reference, I'll read it. Anyway, I made my point about 'strong emergence' with reference to a reductionist paradigm - in fact, 'strong' emergence doesn't seem to me to sit well with a reductionist paradigm, where all properties of a whole can be explained via the properties of the parts. I admit that I went by memory but I thought that in strong emergence the mechanism of emergence is left somewhat unexplained and, in fact, I thought that, in contrast to weak emergence, strong emergence is based on the idea that some properties of the whole can't be explained with reference to the properties of the parts. But given your response, I might be wrong, so I'll avoid to comment on this for a while (at least, I'll read the article before).

Regarding 'weak emergence' and 'reductionism', I know that there is a subtle distinction between them. A strict 'reductionist' would say that weakly emergent features are mere illusions. Instead, an 'emergentist' would say that they are 'real' but everything about them can be explained in terms of the properties of the part. Honestly, I don't think that there is a meaningful difference between the two positions. Rather the difference is on the emphasis on aspect (the undeniable 'apprearance' of the features for the emergentist) or another (the fact that the feature is totally explainable in terms of its parts for the reductionist).

Some time ago, I had a discussion with apokrisis about the emergence of life. IIRC, he or she argued for a non-reductionist physicalist model of such an emergence. Such an emergence was understood as a sort of phase transition, which of course generally is a paradigmatic example of weak emergence. unfortunately, I don't recall the specifics of their model but I am sure that it wasn't understood in a mechanicistic way.

I guess that I think that I should point out that IMO even something like 'Newtonian mechanics' isn't necessarily reductionistic. Consider a very simple, isolated system of two particles interacting via a force. You can 'derive' the conservation law of the linear momentum by considering the second and the third laws of newtonian dynamics. Generally, the proof assumed those laws and derive the conservation law, after all. But, I think that, with equal reason, one can, instead, point out that one might regard the conservation law as fundamental. If one does that, the result is that the time variation of the linear momenta of the particles is of equal magnitude and opposite in verse. So, the laws of dynamics can be derived by the conservation laws. But conservation laws refer to global properties of a (closed) physical system. if they are fundamental, then, they 'influence' the behavior of the 'parts'. So, really, even Newtonian mechanics doesn't have to be understood in a mechanicistic way.
Similarly, when one introduce the 'spontaneous symmetry breaking' to explain the phase transition, arguably, a similar thing happens. After all, IIRC the lagrangian refers to the whole system.
This doesn't necessarily imply that a reductionist reading of these things is wrong. Just that it's not the only possible 'reading', IMO.

Anyway, I'll read the article before talking about strong emergence...

It's true, life can't be explained using physics. The structure, development, and behavior of living organisms operate according to a different set of "rules" than physics - the rules of biology. At the same time, all biological phenomena act consistent with our understanding of physics. — T Clark

Notice that I wasn't saying that biology is inconsistent with the known law of physics, but I admit that I was unclear. My point was that properties like goal-directed behavior/intentionality isn't understandable in terms of the known physical laws.

I think that a non-reductionist physicalist can agree with what I was saying.

The origin of life from inanimate material - abiogenesis - is not some mysterious unknowable process. It can be, and is, studied by science. It's not a question of certain chemicals happening to combine in very, very unlikely ways by the random action of molecules jiggling around. There are some who think life is inevitable given a suitable environment. I recommend "What is LIfe - How Chemistry Becomes Biology" by Addy Pross. It's definitely pop-sci, but it's interesting and thought provoking. — T Clark

Thanks for the reference! Anyway, I wasn't trying to reject abiogenesis or anything like that. But I am not sure if all the properties that we observe in living beings (i.e. behaving as a distinct 'whole', goal-directedness, striving for survival and so on) can be explained in terms of the known chemical and physical laws. I really can't see how such properties can be understood in a reductionist (or 'weakly emergentist'*) paradigm.

*BTW, I think 'weak emergence' is a form of reductionism. Nothing really 'new' arises in the case of 'weak emergence'. What 'emerges' is just a convenient abstraction that allow us to make simpler explanations.

I am saying consciousness does not cease when one is in general anesthesia. The experience is of an anesthetized person. Which is very different from the experience of a person whose brain is working normally, sensory input going where it normally goes, stored input from the past being triggered, information processing systems and feedback loops working, etc. It is not the consciousness that is different between the anesthetized and awake person. it is the level of functioning of the person's brain that is different. The key is is that the functioning of the person's brain does not create consciousness. — Patterner

I am not a physicalist myself but it's controversial to assume that an 'anesthetized person' has consciousness. Even more problematically, you also abscribed some form of consciousness to a 'dead person'. Let's concede that, indeed, in some sense there is consciousness in both cases. My question is: is the 'consciousness' of a 'dead person' the same entity of the 'consciousness' of the 'living person' before she died? Is the 'consciouesness' of the 'anesthetized person' the very same entity of the 'consciousness' of the person when she was in a normal, waking state? Do the 'dead person' and 'anesthetized person' have a unitary, private experience?
Or are different entities of the same type?

Notice that the 'privateness' of our experience, of our 'consciousness' is something to be addressed even in a panpsychist model. If all my constituents have their own 'consciousness', how does that explain the arising of 'my' consciousness, which seems separate from 'theirs'?
Going back to the 'anesthetized person', even a panpsychist might say that while in that state there is no 'consciousness' of the 'whole person' but only of its parts.

You say that 'consciousness is fundamental'. In order to have a meaningful discussion it's also IMO important to clarify what we mean by 'consciousness' and provide a clear model for it. Do you think that, for instance, there is one fundamental consciousness or that there are many distinct consciousnesses? Do you think that any composite object has its own consciousness or only some composites have consciousness?

Sorry for the many questions, but I'd like to understand more your view.

... we have no idea. — Patterner

In a way, I agree.

But we can make reasonable assertions IMO by analysing the behavior of inanimate objects and living beings. In the latter case, we do see that the behavior has charateristics that seem unique to living beings, which seem to point to the fact that, for instance, even the simplest life forms seem to behave as 'wholes' and in a purposeful way. This might be wrong, of course. But it does seem so. It seems to me a reasonable deduction.

Debates between adherents of different theories giving pros and cons of each, but not discussion about a given theory. I think it could be interesting. — Patterner

Yes, I agree. Also, theories that are presented are mostly vague.

The Bing Bang is just the conventional theory. It's just an aspect of the current model, or conception, which represents a universe. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think that it is undeniable that there was a time in the past without living being in the universe. At the same time, however, I don't think that this necessary implies physicalism, let alone a reductionistic/mecahnicistic version of it.

But this conception is just a product of purpose.
... — Metaphysician Undercover

While I would agree that truth is related to purpose - in fact, I would even say that truth (like the good) is the ultimate purpose of our rational actions - I am not sure how this answer my question.

If the universe is prior in time to life, then potency must also be prior in time to life. It is a feature of time which would be necessary for the creation of life. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, the potency was a necessary condition for the arising of life. But this doesn't imply that the arising of life is necessary for the potency being there in the first place. There is no evidence that outside life there are purposeful actions.

And yet... can we truly speak of potency without assuming some form of teleology? It isn't clear how can the intentionality which is present in life arise, in an intelligible way, 'out of' the inanimate, which seems to be without any kind of intentionality. So, either some kind of teleology was present even before the arising of life or it just 'started' with the arising of life. In the latter case, how was that possible? If the former, however, what is the evidence of that teleology?

I was going to suggest a thermostat, which performs experiments and acts upon the result of the experiment. I always reach for simple examples. But you'll move the goalpost no doubt. — noAxioms

↪noAxioms A thermostat is an instrument, designed by humans for their purposes. As such, it embodies the purposes for which it was designed, and is not an object, in the sense that naturally-occuring objects are. — Wayfarer

@noAxioms, try to think about this in this way. Let's say you see a street signal. It certainly contains meaningful information to you. This maningful information has a physical support. But does this mean that the 'meaning' of what is written in the signal is something that exist outside mind?

Perhaps the same goes for measurements. They are certainly meaningful. But meaning doesn't seem to be something that pertains to the inanimate but only to living beings or, perhaps, only to sentient beings.
The thermostat interacts with its environment in a way that produces something that is meaningful to us.
Do measurements reveal to us an intelligible structure of the world or, rather, are we that we mentally imputing an interpretation to the data we have, according to the cognitive structure of our mind?
The figure made by Wheeler IMO is quite useful here. What is being questioned here is not the existence of 'something' outside the mind. Rather, what is being questioned is the fact the existence of such an 'intrisically meaningful' structure of the 'mind independent world' that enables us to know it. Rather, perhaps, there is no such 'intrinscally meaningful' structure in the 'mind independent world' and we know it only through the filters of our interpretative mental faculties. Therefore, we can't claim knowledge of 'the world as it is'.

2) I disagree. Naturalism says that all of our phenomena have natural causes (obey natural laws of this universe) — noAxioms

Ok. But, again, what is 'natural', though? Also, we do not have a complete understanding of 'natural laws', so it is difficult to determine what might not be natural.
Also, if there was another 'universe' with different laws, would that be 'not natural'?

My example of one was a spacetime diagram which has no point of view. How is that still 1st person then, or at least not 3rd? — noAxioms

Those who interpret physical theories as 'useful models' would regard that diagram as an useful abstraction that has practical value.

Yes, it seems dualistic to assume that. — noAxioms

Ok, it makes sense. A provisional dualism.

Not directly. It having a requirement of being describable is different than having a requirement of being described, only the latter very much implying mind dependence. — noAxioms

Correct. But how can you know, from your cognitive perspective, that it's not the latter?

For instance, let's say you are on a pebble beach. It's certainly useful to us to regard different pebbles as 'different things'. But this doesn't imply that each pebble is a distinct entity. In fact, IIRC we agreed before that macroscopic inanimate objects do not seem to be 'real entities' but are more likely to be useful abstractions that help us to 'navigate' in the world. Perhaps the 'pebbles' are merely emergent features of their constituents and envinronment - so the 'pebbles' are mentally imputed and not real 'entities', and we can reasonably argue for that.

So, how do you tell the difference between something 'describable' and something that is 'of the description'?

Perhaps so. This is consistent with my supervention hierarchy that goes something like mathematics->quantum->physical->mental->ontology(reality) which implies that the physical is mind independent (mind supervenes on it, not the other way around) but reality is mind dependent since what is real is a mental designation, and an arbitrary one at that. There's no fact about it, only opinion. — noAxioms

But, again, can we reasonably speak of the 'physical' or even the 'quantum' without making ontic commitments? And what about the possibility that mathematics is conceptual?
The 'worldview' you are presenting here seems to me a sort of 'neo-pythagoreanism', where mathematics is fundamental and everything else is derivative. I prefer this worldview than physicalist ones. But as Steven Hawking asked “What breathes fire into the equations?” That is, how can mathematics 'produce' everything else?

Nit: A thing 'looking like' anything is by definition a sensation, so while a world might (by some definitions) exists sans an sort of sensations, it wouldn't go so far as to 'look like' anything. — noAxioms

Good point. Notice however that what you call 'sensation' is in fact an interpretation of the 'sense data', a model if you like. In the same way, one might say that our theories might be like perceptions (interestingly, David Bohm made this point).
If, however, 'reality' has an intelligible structure, it must 'look like' in some way...

It is related to sentient experience in that some sentient thing is conceiving it. But that isn't a causal relation. Objects in each world cannot have any causal effect on each other, and yes, I can conceive of such a thing, doing so all the time. Wayfarer apparently attempts to deny at least the ability to do so without choosing a point of view, but I deny that such a choice is necessary. Any spacetime diagram is such a concept without choice of a point of view. — noAxioms

Yes, both SR and GR taken literally imply a 'block universe', i.e. only the 4D spacetime is real and 'space and time' are abstractions. Interestingly, both Minkowski and Einstein himself read relativity in this way (Einstein even wrote a letter of condolences for the passing of his friend Michele Besso saying that physics has more or less proven that space and time are abstractions, IIRC).

But notice that the question is hardly settled. Einstein, despite taking relativity at 'face value', was deeply troubled by the 'problem of the now', that is how can we reconcile our immediate experience of the 'present' and the 'flow of time' with what relativity seemed to imply.
Personally, I don't think that QM supports the 'block universe' view. After all, if quantum events are not deterministic it doesn't seem the case that 'everything is fixed'.
If, however, the 'block universe' is not 'how things really are', it certainly make us wonder how to interpret relativity. There are operational interpretations of SR, which are quite similar to epistemic interpretations of QM, i.e. SR doesn't describe the 'how things really are' but it's an useful instrument for us to make predictions and applications. GR, however, is a different animal: it's difficult in GR to deny that spacetime isn't something 'physical'. So, yes, GR definitely supports the 'block view'. QM however doesn't. So what?

I don't consider this to be just a physicalist problem. The idealists have the same problem. It's a problem with any kind of realism, which is why lean towards a relational ontology which seems to not have this problem. — noAxioms

Ontological Idealists in the most general sense posit at least that 'the mental' is in some sense fundamental. So, it's really not surprising that the 'physical' has a structure that is analogous to the mental. Same goes for your view that mathematics is fundamental. It's not surprising that mathematics is incredibly successful in physics if it is the ultimate reality.

Anyway, do you think that everything about life can be described, in principle, by math?

This is the point I take, above. The existence of a physical world requires intentional being. This is because, as a physical world, is how things are perceived through a purpose based apparatus. Therefore it makes no sense to say that it is unlikely for intention to exist in this particular physical world, because intention is necessary for any physical world. — Metaphysician Undercover

What about the objection, though, that life and consciousness arose in the world many billions of time after the Big Bang?

I believe that in some important sense, the potency (I am using this term in more or less Aristotelian sense) to give rise to life is a fundamental aspect of the inanimate world.
I don't think that strictly speaking this means that the actual arising of life was necessary for the very existence of the inanimate. But, rather, as a potency life is an essential aspect of the world. I don't think that this 'potency' can be captured in a mathematical model, which is essential for physics. This to me suggests that life can't be explained in physical terms, precisely because the method that physics uses isn't adequate to explain the properties associated with life. So, the 'unlikeliness' might be explained by the fact that the models neglect some fundamental property of the physical world.

Ehen I die, there will still be consciousness. But there will no longer be any mental activity to experience. Just the physical body. No more interesting than a rock's consciousness. At least in my opinion. Others may think the consciousness of a dead body is more interesting than a rock's. In there timeframes of human life, there is certainly nore going on in a dead body than there is in a rock. A typical body will decompose much faster than a typical rock will erode. Both will experience their deconstruction, but neither will have any thoughts or feelings about, or awareness of, it. — Patterner

Interestingly, I have usually read that 'consciousness' is a specific kind of 'mind'. So, for instance, a bacterium has a very rudimentary 'mind' but it isn't 'conscious'. I'll try to use 'consciousness' in the way you are using it, in what follows (i.e. that 'mind' is a particular type of 'consciousness').

Let's call 'instance of consciousness' any kind of experience. So, any moment in which I am 'conscious of' something is an instance of consciousness.

I would say that, regardless the precise ontological theory one has, it's quite interesting to ask oneself if consciousness persists as instances of consciousness change. So, when I was born clearly I experienced something different than what I am experiencing now but, maybe, consciousness itself remains the same in time.
On the other hand, it might be the case that, instead, consciousness changes at every moment. That is, at each instance of experience there is a related consciousness and when experiences change so also consciousness itself changes. All these 'felt experiences' can be called 'consciousness' not because they are the same 'thing' but actually because they are different things but of the same type*.
Also, some would argue that when one is in general anesthesia consciousness temporarily ceases (I believe that those who experienced general anesthesia report a different 'feeling' when they 'wake up' than the feeling they have when they wake up from sleep. Also, even in deep sleep it seems to be that there is a level of attentiveness which is absent in that state). So, if consciousness can temporarily cease, when it 'restarts' is it the same consciousness or not?

And what about the 'privateness' of experience? I and you have, it would seem, different consciousness (or 'streams' of consciousness if the 'changing consciousness model' is right). Personally, I would believe that consciousness is, perhaps, precisely what establish an 'identity', i.e. the property of being 'an entity', which is truly distinct from other 'entities'. So, in a sense, I would say that perhaps 'consciousness' is really fundamental: it is what distinguish an entity from other entities.

*Interestingly, this problem has been discussed a lot among Indian philosophical schools. Buddhists generally take the view that consciousness is always changing like a stream (they use terms like the sanskrit 'citta-samtana' which means something like 'mental continuum'). Instead, their opponents argue that consciousness is something unchanging. The Advaita Vedanta school, in particular, argues that there is, ultimately, only one consciousness.

Thanks! I watched many of 'Closer to Truth' videos and I enjoyed a lot of those but somehow I missed that series.

Anyway, my point is that unfortunately the meaning of the term 'observer' varies between interpretations and this causes confusion when discussing QM.

Nor I, but that’s why I said that the argument is kind of a red herring - if you were looking for purpose in the abstract, what would you be looking for? But I’m interested in the idea that the beginning of life is also the most basic form of intentional (or purposive) behaviour - not *consciously* intentional, of course, but different to what is found in the inorganic realm. (The gap between them being what Terrence Deacon attempts to straddle in Incomplete Nature.) — Wayfarer

I agree. And the big question for a reductionist or emergentist model is how to explain the properties that are associated with life (and consciousness) in purely physical term.

'Weak' Emergence works very well, say, in explaining how a collection of particles can behave as a liquid or a solid. In a sense, you can say that 'liquidity' and 'solidity' are just conventional/provisional properties that are useful to us to explain things. After all, if they are completely understandable in terms of properties of the parts that constitute the solid and liquid objects, they can be rightly understood as useful abstractions that simplify the descriptions of what is going on. Even inanimate macroscopic objects themselves can be thought as 'weakly emergent' features from the microscopi world. I don't think it is particularly controversial to say that, ultimately, even the inanimate macroscopic objects themselves are useful abstractions.

The above is of course 'reductionism' and it works quite well outside life and consciousness.

The problem with life is, however, that even, say, an unicellular organism is difficult to understand as merely an emergent 'feature' of its constituents and its environment. Also, as you say, there seem to be a basic intentionality going on and yes intentionality is difficult to explain in weakly emergentist/reductionist terms. So, if physical reality is merely a 'mechanism', 'reductionistic' etc how can we explain life with all its properteis? Personally, I never encountered a satisfying explanation. So, perhaps, reductionism is false*.

Regarding the 'strong anthropic principle', I mentioned it because, after all, it's both a tautology and a profound insight IMO. Of course, physical laws must be compatible with life and consciousness - after all, living and conscious beings exist. But, again, this 'tautology' is, in fact, quite insightful. First of all, it inspires us to seek an explanation of how life and consciousness are possible in this physical universe. Secondly, it also highlights that, given what we know about physics, life is very unlikely.

Proponents of the 'multiverse' try to explain this by alluding that there might be a large (infinite?) number of (inaccessible) worlds and we happen to be in one that allows the existence of life (and consciousness BTW). There are, I admit, good scientific reasons to support that idea. But, philosophically, I find it very unpersuasive.
IIRC others also try to explain the problem by simply saying that even unlikely events 'just happen', which I guess is true. But, again, is the most satisfying explanation? I guess that if I roll 100 times a 6-sides dice and I obtain always '6' as a result, it is of course a possible result even if the dice is fair. But, perhaps, a more convincing explanation is that the dice is not fair and there is a, so to speak, 'hidden reason' to explain that very unlikely result.

A more convincing explanation might be that we know only in part our physical world and, therefore, the 'unlikeliness' is merely apparent, due to observation bias (like, say, that we are more likely to observe brighter galaxies and, therefore, we might understimate the number of less bright galaxies). So, maybe, if we study more in depth the 'arising of life' won't be as 'unlikely' as it seems. But this might imply that, indeed, a more deep study of our physical universe will eventually reveal that the reductionist/weakly emergentist paradigm is simply wrong.

It is understandable why some try to explain away the intentionality, 'holism' etc which seem to be present in life as illusions (i.e. living beings behave 'as if' they have those properties...). It is perhaps the only consistent way to account for these properties. Some, instead, try to explain these things in a 'strong emergent' model, which seems to be unintelligible. So IMO these difficulties point to the possibility that, indeed, the reductionist/emergentist models are wrong and we need something else.

1) boundless made no mention of life forms. An observing entity is indeed implied, but I personally don't consider 'observing entities' to be confined to life forms. — noAxioms

No worries about the delay! Anyway, I wanted to point out that I did in my replies use the word 'observer' in different ways and it certainly can create confusion.

Standard QM by itself is silent, I believe, on what is an 'observer'.

Of course, what is an observer is a matter of interpretations. So, in the future I'll try to qualify the word 'observer' with adjectivies when I'll make interpretation-dependent claims. Like, say, 'sentient observer' or 'conscious observer' for interpretations that need that specifications. With RQM, where every physical object can be an observer it's more difficult. Perhaps 'physical observer' - it is a bit awkward but I think in some way one must distinguish these views from standard QM which is simply silent on what an observer might be.

I'll respond to the rest in the next few days.

Good OP! I'll make some brief comments on your post.

I more or less agree with most of it. I would even say that 'purpose' is the hallmark of living beings. Also, I would add that living beings exhibit a 'holistic' character that isn't found elsewhere, i.e. they seem to be truly 'distinct entities' that aren't 'reducible' or even 'emergent' from their environment. So, other than 'having an end' they seem to be truly 'beings' in a fuller sense than inanimate objects are. And I don't believe that any of these things contradict the theory of evolution.
How can 'irreducible wholes' and 'purpose' arise from something purposeless is clearly a problem. In fact, as I said elsewhere, I think that this perhaps is an indication that the 'mental' is perhaps a fundamental aspect of reality in some way. Celarly, it is a problem for a reductionistic and mechanicist view of physical reality.

Regarding physics, I would not be so sure. I don't think there is sufficient evidence to say that there are 'purposes' outside living beings. And, in fact, even if one takes very seriously the 'observer' role - like epistemic interpretations of QM do - I believe that it at most poses a limit on 'what is knowable' rather than giving insights on how 'physical reality really is'. Perhaps one might argue that, along the lines of Anthropic principle, that the fact that physical constants have such values as to be consistent with life is something to be explained and taken seriously. I, for one, don't think that the 'multiverse' is a good response to this problem: I generally don't like explanations that assume the existence of a lot of 'unobservable worlds' in order to explain features of this world. Again, perhaps, life and 'consciousness' might be at least an essential latent potentiality in the inanimate. Certainly, even in this case the physical universe doesn't seem to be like a 'mechanism'.

Very sad news. My condolences to her family and all her loved ones.

Rest in peace, Vera!

But for the committed materialist, the shortcomings that you and I might see are not at all obvious. — Wayfarer

Yes, I agree.

In any case, I think the very best arguments against Armstrong's form of materialism is the fact that propositional content can be encoded in an endless variety of languages, symbolic forms, and material media. The same proposition can be written out in different languages, encoded as binary or morse code, carved in stone or written on paper - and yet still retain the same meaning. So it's not feasible to say that the content of an idea must be identical to a particular state of physical matter, such as a brain state, as the meaning and the form it takes can so easily be separated. — Wayfarer

Right! Also, that material data doesn't intrinsically have meaning. And that if one assumes that, in fact, forms are really a property of the material, then, the material has some intrinsic intelligible content, which would imply that it's not material in the sense that one might want it to be.

I see Armstrong's style of materialism as a direct descendant of scholastic philosophy, but with science assigned the role formerly attributed to God, and scientific laws equivalent to the Aristotelian universals. — Wayfarer

Yep! But note that scientific laws, in fact, can be considered universals, in fact. But if they are taken to be real, then, one must IMO abandon reductionism.

For instance, consider the conservation of the total momentum of a two-particle system in newtonian mechanics. If it is considered something real, it is clearly a property of the whole system. You can't derive it from the properties of the parts. The variation of the momentum of each particle is 'constrained' by this law that is about the whole system. I am not sure how a reductionist picture of the material world can accomodate this.
For a reductionist it is much more convenient to adopt a nominalist view of the law, that is a denial that is in some sense real but just an useful construct.

But the point is that the scientific study of brains doesn't care about fundamental metaphysics. We just study and describe patterns of what we observe in reality regardless of some fundamental metaphysical description. — Apustimelogist

Ok. Methodological naturalism doens't imply a metaphysical commitment of any kind. But if one is agnostic about metaphysics, let's be agnostic.

The point is that if one is able to explain our intelligibility of the world in terms of brains, it is open to anyone regardless of their metaphysical preference. Providing one can make a good argument that brains are sufficient to explain intelligibility, then it seems less compelling imo to just assert that any specific metaphysical picture precludes intelligibility unless one can give some concrete argument other than incredulity. — Apustimelogist

We prabably are talking past each other about intelligibility because we have different criteria to judge something as 'intelligible'. For me, intelligibility means that our concepts can, in principle, mirror perfectly some properties of the external world as in classical metaphysics.
If one doesn't assume that there is a correspondence between the structure of our thoughts and the structure of material reality, then, we can't really understand material reality. We might be able to predict, to make good models but we can't have real understanding in my opinion.
If there is correspondence, however, this would mean, for me, that the material is not so opposed to the 'mental' as it is commonly assumed to be. Neither that the mental can be derived from something that is purely non-mental. Unless a credible explanation can be given about the emergence of intentionality, consciousness, laes of intellect/reason from what is devoid of these things is given, I see no reason to think that these things are not fundamental.

This is meaningless imo. To say something is incorrect means that we get things wrong about it and make predictions that do not come true. But to my understanding of these viewpoints, one could in principle exhaust the correct in-principle-observable facts and still not penetrate the noumena. But then if no one can access it, then in what sense do these things actually have any influence on events in the universe? In what sense is there anything at all to learn about them? — Apustimelogist

You seem to have a pragmatic approach to truth. I respect that. Just a curiosity, though: do you think that, say, the ancient geocentrists did have 'knowledge' of the world as they were able to make correct predictions?

Regarding the noumena... well, it is a quite complex issue. I see it more as an antinomy of reason, if you like. That is, we can't go 'out' of our perspective or, at least, be sure that our knowledge is independent from it.
These days, I am more drawn to something like hylomorphism or platonism however. That is, forms are real and are really in some way instantiated in the material world. This to me implies that the material world has, ironically, a mental aspect that allows us to be able to understand via conceptual knowledge. So, I do think that our conceptual reasoning gives us a real understanding of the material world... because in a sense the material world is not so different from the mental.

So what form of idealism is being promoted? What does this form of idealism have to say about cosmology (14 billion year old universe, 5 billion year old solar system and all the time before advanced or organized minds existed?) Or even the process of evolution. I just can't see how the notion that everything is just minds and mental contents, survives the modern scientific view of the world we live in.? — prothero

The problem with 'idealism' is that there are different forms of it and under that names are included views that are incompatible with each others.

If we restrict to the 'strict' ontological idealism that I talked about before - that is everything is either 'minds' or 'mental contents' - then, of course, you have to posit something additional to what we observe 'in this world'. Berkeley, for instance, would probably respond that God's creative and sustaining activities are what guarantee the validity of scientific theories, at least from a phenomenological and practical level.

Other ontological idealists that are not so strict and affirm the existence of the material/physical world nevertheless accept the idea that the 'mental' is more independent from the 'material'. So, of course, something mental must have existed before the coming into being of life and mind as we know it.

But, anway, even if something like Democritus' atomism - i.e. reductionist materialisms - were true then scientific theories like evolution would be only provisionally true. After all, if at the ultimate level there are only the fundamental consitituents of matter and everything else - like cells, DNA, mountains, animals, humans etc - are reducible to those consituents, it seems evident to me that a theory like evolution would not be ultimately true, but only pragmatically/transactionally true. Why? Because under such reductionist models, there are, ultimately, no DNA, cells, humans, animals etc. So you can't take the theory of biological evolution as a literal picture of 'reality as it is'. You can still speak about its practical usefulness, its ability to make predictions and so on but you have to renounce to treat it as a correct depiction of 'what really happens'.
So, I guess that, ironically, the most strict forms of materialism - i.e. reductionist materialisms - actually have to treat these things in a similar way as they are treated by strict ontological idealism.

I agree with you, of course, but I've had some discussions with an advocate of Armstrong's materialist theory of mind, and he's pretty formidable. I don't think his style of materialism is much favoured any more, but it's instructive how far it can be taken. — Wayfarer

Ok. Yes, I would prefer that kind of materialism rather than others. But IMO such a materialism is hard to differentiate to either a panpsychism of sorts or something equal or close to hylomorphism.

So are you suggesting that what science understands about brains could never be true under idealism? How would you explain what we observe about brains and human cognition / behavior in that case? — Apustimelogist

Well, in some ontological forms idealism, in a sense, no. If the whole reality is exclusively 'minds' + 'mental contents' then there is no 'brain' as a 'material object' outside minds. In another sense, however, yes: the models are still good for predictions and for practical usefulness.

But not even all ontological idealists deny the existence of something non-mental.

Regarding the epistemic idealists, I would say that the answer would be that the scientific models are correct at the level of phenomena, not at the level of the things-in-themselves.

But even in a panpsychist universe, the brain would have exactly the same role and would completely explain intelligibility in either a materialist or a panpsychist universe. It seems that once you start talking about our understanding of brains, the fundamental metaphysics is irrelevant to intelligibility. The intellect and the material world have analogous structures because a brain is a model of structure that exists in the material world. — Apustimelogist

Ok, but the panpsychist postis that the 'mental' is a fundamental aspect of reality. So it's no surprise to me that the 'material' and the 'mental' share some properties if panpsychism (in some form) were true.

Rather, the materialist asserts that the 'material' is fundamental and everything else is derived from the material. But if one accepts intelligibility is something essential to the 'material' then I believe that it is reasonable to ask how is that possible. As I said in my posts I have my reservations in asserting that what makes the world intelligible ('forms', 'laws'...) is 'material' in any acceptable sense of the word 'material'.

Of course, one can adopt 'nominalism'. The price is, however, that nominalism makes the world inaccessible to conceptual knowledge. And I am not sure that materialism actually is compatible with nominalism. After all, materialist generally acknowledge that there are intelligible structures, laws etc in reality.

The materialist would say that an understanding of how brainsw work fills this gap. — Apustimelogist

The brain is also a material object. So saying that the brain works in a certain way doesn't explain why the material world has such a structure. In fact, even the very attempt to understand 'how the brain works' assumes intelligibility of the material world or the brain in this specific case.

So, I don't think that understanding how the brain works gives an explanation here. It might however give us a confirmation that 'everything fits' once the intelligibility is however assumed.

Materialist philosophy of mind would probably account for that in terms of the well-adapted brain's ability to anticipate and model the environment. Impressive indeed, he will say, but ultimately just neurochemistry. D M Armstrong, who was Professor of the department where I studied philosophy, was a firm advocate for universals, which he identified with scientific laws. But his major book was Materialist Philosophy of Mind, which is firmly based on the identity of mental contents and neural structures. There are universals—but they are nothing over and apart from the physical form they take. They are repeatable properties instantiated in space and time. You and I wouldn’t accept that, but it’s a hard argument to refute. — Wayfarer

Interesting. But note that in his model, the material world has a structure analogous to the intellect. Is this ok for a materialist? I guess that at a certain point it also depends on how much one goes with the search for explanations, so to speak. It is rather odd for me that, say, a purely 'material' world would 'follow' laws. Where do these 'laws' come from? Are they 'material'? It doesn't seem so. In fact, laws do not seem to satisfy the criteria to be considered 'material'. They are not causal. They are not detectable. And so on.

And, also, if 'forms' and 'laws' are fundamental aspects of the material world then reductionism is false. After all, forms and laws seem properties of wholes rather than the 'smallest' objects.

Well, what would any of us be talking about absent intelligibility? — SophistiCat

I believe that some would say that even if the world isn't intelligible it would still make sense to 'talk about' it and builing models about it if they were useful.

But, again, I think that such a denial of intelligibility is incompatible with 'materialism' in any acceptable sense of the term. It's mostly found in skpetical philosophies like Pyrrhonism or even Kantianism (at least in reference to the 'things-in-themselves') and so on.

As for what accounts for the intelligibility of the world, I am not convinced that there are substantive disagreements between, say, realists and nominalists - disagreements that are more than just different ways of speaking / ways of seeing. — SophistiCat

I believe, instead, that the difference is much more than that. Realists assert that 'forms' are not just constructs of our minds which have at best practical utility but are in some ways independent from us. If it is so, then, it means that even the 'material' world has a structure that is analogous to the structure of our intellect, which is able to 'grasp' these forms. Nominalists deny this and assert that the forms are just convenient constructs that are useful to us. The problem is IMO that nominalism isn't able to explain why they are useful. In fact, if nominalism were true, any conceptual model simply can't grasp the structure of the material world, which remains forever inaccessible. But nominalism, in fact, seems to ironically lead us to a denial even of materialism, due to the fact that it denies intelligibility.
If, however, some kind of realism is affirmed, then, as I said before it seems that the material world has a structure analogous to the one of the intellect. Is this acceptable under a materialist ontology? I am not sure. At least, if the materialist ontology is reductionistic.

Are you saying that materialists deny this? Can you point to anyone, at any time in history, who held this position? — SophistiCat

Actually, I'm not sure that it is even possible to a materialist to abandon the idea of intelligibility. Certainly, it has been downplayed. So, I am probably wrong here.

Well, probably Democritus who held that the most fundamental things were atoms and the void. Everything else was reducible to those (either via emergence or supervenience). I'm not sure, however, how he explained the interactions of the atoms. Did the atoms follow some 'laws'? If they did, how these laws can be explained in terms of the model he proposed?
Hume denied causation. Yes, he was probably more of a skeptic rather than a materialist but his influence is certainly immense.
More recently, some physicists accept the idea of 'superdeterminism' which, more or less says that while quantum mechanics makes wrong predictions, the universe behaves 'as if' QM makes correct predictions.

Anyway, my point was that materialism doesn't have IMO convincing ways to explain intelligibility, at least if it is based on a reductionist paradigm. After all, intelligibility implies that our intellect grasps some actual property of the material world. Since, however, what is grasped by the intellect are 'forms'/'concepts', this would imply that 'forms' are, indeed, an essential aspect of the material reality. I am not sure how this is consistent with a purely materialistic outlook.

So, perhaps I was wrong in my claim you quoted but, nevertheless, I think that my point stands.

Well, it's not that simple.

Even in the most strict forms of ontological idealism, the scenario you have to imagine is something like a shared dream, where each subject interacts with others. So, there is an 'external' world relative of each subject and the subject interacts with that external world - and this interaction can be a cause of harm.

What this kind of idealist deny is that there is something beyond minds and mental contents (thoughts, sensations and so on).

I personally don't subscribe to such a view but I think it is a disservice to say it is equivalent to solipsism (or something like that) without giving a good argument for saying that such a view actually implies solipsism.

Geat OP, I'll however comment only on mathematics.

I think that the use of mathematics in physics actually undermines the materialist project. It is based on the assumption that there is an intelligible structure in material reality which is to be discovered. And this 'structure' is not perceived by the senses but it is grasped by the intellect.
Some materialists, I believe, reject the assumption but this, IMO, leads to quite undesiderable consequences. For instance, if there is no real intelligible structure in material reality, is scientific knowledge really knowledge? One might insist that it would be so because predictions would be still valid. But, again, is the ability to predict and make applications really knowledge? Would we say, for instance, that ancient geocentric astronomers had 'knowledge' when they made correct predictions? Furthermore, if there is no intelligible structure how could predictions even be possible, especially as precise as those of science?

So, it seems that there is an intelligible structure of the 'material (or physical) reality'. If this is the case, however, it seems to me that such a structure would not be material. It lacks the characteristics of what can be thought as material and it is neither detectable by the senses nor by scientific instruments. It can be grasped through sensory and instrumental data but it cannot be detected. This is also the same as saying that meaning is something essential to material reality, as meaning is graspable by the intellect. Anyway, all of this implies IMO that materialism must either (1) allow that there is some irreducible non-material reality or aspects of reality or (2) reject altogether the existence of an intelligible structure. If one adopts (1), there is no reason to think that there aren't other 'nonmaterial' aspects of reality, irreducible to the material. If one accepts (2), however, I don't see any way to escape a radical skepticism, a transcendental idealism and so on. If there is no intelligibility, how can we claim to know?

In high scholastic terminology for instance, the idea is more "how things exist in us in the manner of an art," (i.e., our capacity for reproduction, as the form of a statue is in a sculptor before he sculpts) as opposed to being primarily objects or principles of knowledge. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Does this mean that the content of our knowledge are images of 'things' which are nevertheless intrinsic properties of things? If that is the case, 'direct' realism would be 'a middle position' between 'naive' and 'indirect' realism. That is, we can know something of external things but we can't know all their intrinsic properties. But this also means that concepts/forms are something essential even of the 'external' or even 'physical' reality.

Aristotle would say that sensation is "of" the interaction between the environmental medium (which interacts with the object perceived) and the sense organs, but that it carries the intelligible form of what is perceived. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Ok, yes. The intellect grasps the intelligible form of what is perceived. Doesn't this imply, however, that we are directly acquainted with something essential to the external things as they are (i.e. things-in-themselves)? In other words, we have a partial yet genuine knowledge of 'things as they are'.

A. "Everything is received in the mode of the receiver" (and this is as true for how salt interacts with water as for how we interact with an apple when seeing it)—this dictum becomes totalizing and absolutized in modern "critical philosophy" in a way that direct realists tend to find problematic and indirect realists tend to find unavoidable. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Ok. While the modern 'critical philosophy' says that the sensibility and intellect ordain the representation and 'dictate' how things appear to us, the 'scholastic' here says that the intellect recognizes the forms it can recognize. Is that right?

B. "Act follows on being." Only natural things' interactions with other things make them epistemically accessible (or at all interesting). Hence, the gold standard of knowledge is not knowledge of things "as they are in themselves,' (which would be sterile and useless) but rather "things as they interact with everything any anything else." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Ok but I'm not sure how this avoids to assert that we know something of the 'things in themselves'. After all, forms seem to be intrinsic to things. But on the other hand, the knowledge is partial in the sense that we can't know everything about something external.

Perhaps this is a bigger point than direct versus indirect. I am not sure if mediation really matters that much. Lots of pre-critical philosophy of perception and "metaphysics of knowledge" involves mediation. But it's a "direct" mediation in that it ties back to some determinant prior actuality (form). A thing's eidos is its form which is also its image, its interactions vis-á-vis everything else. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Ok. If, however, the 'eidos'/'forms' of physical things are the images that are 'recognizable' by the intellect, it seems that there is a 'likeness' between the 'physical' and the 'mental'. How is this explainable?

A possible explanation is that something 'mental' is the fundamental reality. If that is the case, then, the 'external reality' can be said to be both independent and dependent from 'mind'. Independent from our minds - we merely recognize 'forms'. But not independent from the 'fundamental mind' or 'fudamental mental aspect' of reality. So, as I said in my previous post, this leads to either to some form of panpsychism or of 'ontological idealism' in a broad sense.

Epistemic idealists would argue that 'forms' are something that our minds impose on the 'external world' in order to give a structure to experience. I guess that it's partially true. However, the problem of such a view is that it doesn't explain why the mind would ordain in such a way. Even if it is said that such a 'structuring' is done because it is useful, it nevertheless seems to me that it leaves the issue unresolved: why is it useful?
The epistemic idealist would retort that we can't be certain that forms 'really' exist 'out there'. But it does seem reasonable to assume that.

I agree that our perception gives us direct access to the external world but not in itself, and I reject the rest.
(On second thought….our perception is how the external world has direct access to us. The first makes it seem like we go out to it, when in fact it comes in to us.) — Mww

Ok, thanks! But both the formulations IMO are valid inside Kantianism and related epistemologies. In a sense, the 'representation' is the manifestation of the 'external world', 'how the external world has access to us'. In another way, however, it is also a 'representation' something that has an irreducible 'subjective pole', to mutuate an expression that uses @Wayfarer.

In effect, and to make a long story short….we tell things what they are. All they gotta do, is show up. — Mww

Ok! Again, a very good way to sum up transcendental idealism, thanks.

As I said in other posts, gradually I came to believe that the intelligibility is not something that is due to the ordaining faculties of sensibility and intellect. Rather, the very fact that we can't conceive an unintelligible external reality suggests to me that intelligibility is an essential feature even of physical reality, which implies that either there is a fundamental mental aspect of reality or that fundamental reality is mental.

I still think that transcendental idealism provides us some truths but, ultimately, I believe that it also fails to explain why reality appears/manifests the way it appears/manifests. Of course, I don't think that transcendental idealists ever claimed to explain this. But for me this means that TI is incomplete (I admit that this is not a decisive argument).

I would say I allow realism but in a thinner, looser, more deflationary sense of a consistent mapping or coupling to the outside world without requiring much more than that. When those mappings become systematically erroneous, we might, it then becomes possible to conceptualize them as not real. But I do not think there are systematic, tractable, context-independent nor infallible ways of deciding what is real or not real. And I think people all the time have "knowledge" which is some sense false or not real but persists in how they interact with the world due to ambiguity. — Apustimelogist

Ok. To me this confirms that you endorse a skeptical form of 'realism', i.e. you accept the existence of an independent reality but you are agnostic about its 'nature' and that you are skeptic about the possibility of knowing it except the patterns we can know via scientific investigation (which include the patterns we can know by our perceptions).

Sorry for the late reply. Unfortunately, I am quite busy right now, so I don't think that I'll be able to continue the conversation for a while. I just answer to some of your points.

How does your panspychism and idealism differ? — Apustimelogist

Well, as I understand it, ontological idealism asserts that the 'mental' is the fundamental reality. It is generally used to denote the position that only minds and mental contents are real. If the 'fundamental' is understood in a weaker sense, however it certainly tends to include some views that aren't traditionally included in 'idealism' (for instance neoplatonism, theisms and so on) because they still allow the 'material' to be real.

IMO the 'intelligibility' of reality tells us that there is a structural correspondence between the 'mental' and the 'physical' and this means at least that the 'mental' is always a 'potentiality' in the 'physical', which would strongly suggest panpsychism.

On the other hand, I do believe however that intelligibility actually tells us something more. The 'physical' has an order, a structure that can be grasped by reason because the fundamental level of reality is 'mental'. The 'hard problem' might be a hint in this direction as it seems to suggest that consciousness cannot be explained in purely 'physical' terms.

Now, of course, I don't pretend to be able to explain how the 'physical' has 'emerged' from the 'mental', but what we have said about intelligibility, meaning and so on of the physical world suggests to me that an 'idealist' is right.

IMO if one accepts that the 'mental' is fundamental, one adopts either a (broadly) 'ontological idealist' view or something like panpsychism.

Anyway, I admit that this hardly convinces, especially someone like you who says:

This would make me commit more than I wish and it seems to suggest some kind of ontology that I would like to see scientifically backed-up, which I don't think is the case. — Apustimelogist

Note that I appreciate your perspective. It is right to be skeptical in the sense that it is right to be open to revise one's thoughts. But I think that there are two things to consider here. First, maybe science isn't the only valid way of knowing 'reality'. Second, even if these speculations cannot give us knowledge, they might still be 'reasonable' and some may be better than others. Of course, if one doesn't accepts these two possibilities, then one has no motive to pursue anything else except science in the quest of knowledge.

Ok. Anti-realism about models perhaps, but it seems to me that you are pretty certain that there is an external, independent reality. — boundless

Well, as it happens often in philosophy terminology can be confusing.

If by 'realism' one means that our models do have necessarily correspondence with reality if they 'work', I guess that yes your view might be classed as 'anti-realist'.

But 'realism' and 'antirealism' have also an ontological meaning. In the most general sense, 'realism' in this context means that there is an independent reality that is in principle knowable. 'Anti-realism' is the denial of this (and I saw it used as a flat denial of any kind of independent reality).

Agreed. So what mediates between the external reality in perception, to empirical knowledge in experience, if not the intelligence directly affected by that reality. Again, that intrinsic dualism pervades the method. — Mww

To summarize the position one IMO can also say: there is an external reality but how it appears to us is shaped by the intellectual and sensible faculties of the mind. And it's impossible to 'disentangle' the contribution of the mind to the way the world appears.

But the world isn’t already modeled, insofar as the mode of our cognitive system is representational, which just is to construct a model, mentally, in conjunction with the effect an object has on the senses, physiologically. — Mww

I wonder how however this is consistent with the larger framework of the transcendental idealist philosophy. I think that causality is also a conceptual category for Kant in which we 'ordain' experience. The world in itself is not the 'cause' of the empirical world.

We perceive real things directly. What more needs to be said? — Mww

But the way we perceive them is probably not the way they are. Naive realism asserts that we perceive things as they are. Direct realist asserts that our perceptions give us direct access to the external world in itself and we can know how the world is independent on the mental representations.
So probably Kant would agree that we somehow perceive 'real things directly' but we can't know whether they really are as they appear to us.

There are three: establish the validity of synthetic a priori cognitions, which in turn establishes a non-self-contradictory method for acquiring empirical knowledge, contra Hume, which in turn defines the limits of pure reason contra Berkeley’s brand of dogmatic, re: purely subjective, idealism. — Mww

Ok, I see.

….and I am probably being overly precise. — Mww

Well, the advantage of being overly precise is clarity.

I think this is more or less an acceptable interpretation. — Apustimelogist

Good!

Hmm, I think it is compatible with realism and anti-realism, because I am just appealing to our models, claiming that our best models of reality don't point to the mental as fundamental among the things they talk about. — Apustimelogist

Ok. Anti-realism about models perhaps, but it seems to me that you are pretty certain that there is an external, independent reality.

From my perspective, saying that the mental is fundamental is about as informative as saying that structure is fundamental - I don't think these views are distinguishable, and I would rather lean to the latter rather than the former, if just to have a story to tell about things in reality. — Apustimelogist

Interesting that you too see the similarity here.

I don't think saying that the mental is fundamental really solves the hard problem either. All resulting metaphysical views have an issue with the problem that our direct experiences seem to look completely irreducible to descriptions that science says are more fundamental because they seem to occupy a higher scale of reality. Panpsychism doesn't solve that, it just reframes the problem in a different way - the combination problem - which requires also something like a strong emergence of macroscopic experiential phenomena, which imo kind of has the same properties as substance dualism. The problem is for me that there is no scientific evidence of something like this strong emergence, which would result in epiphenomenalism also. So I don't think the problems you have with certain views are not necessarily resolved by panpsychism. — Apustimelogist

I agree that panpsychism by itself doesn't solve the hard problem for the reasons you allude here. It certainly mitigates it, however. If some kind of 'rudimental' mentality is there in the more fundamental level of physical reality, we IMO have a more consciouness-friendly world than the usual 'physicalist' position. One might think that 'consciousness' exists as a 'latent potential' in panpsychist position (which is fully actualized in conscious beings).
And, in fact, I believe that some form of panpsychism are probably the most credible option for a 'naturalist' account of mind which, in turn, however renders the usage of the terminology 'physicalism' dubious, however.

Anyway, since I lean more towards the 'idealist' side of things, I do not endorse panpsychism.

Or, they may seem to have the same structure, because they do. — Mww

Agreed. I have a tendency to use 'might', 'may' far too often even in casual conversations. So, yes, sometimes even if I am sure about something I use the hypotheticals/conditionals.

Fundamental privateness of your experiences, yep; fundamental privateness of the empirical world….nahhhh. Share-sies, dude. This land is your land this land is my land and all that kinda hippie prophetizing, donchaknow. — Mww

Well, it depends on about we understand the word 'world'. Yes, Kant believed in an external reality but he did believe that we don't have an unmediated knowledge of it. In fact, to us what is 'given' it's an already pre-ordained world, the empirical world, which is already modeled in sensible and intellectual categories (like space, time, pluarality and so on). I wasn't saying that the empirical world is 'private' in the sense that is a creation of our mind. But certainly, it's not either the external reality as it is, otherwise Kant would agree with the naive idealist (a thing that I doubt). If it's not the external reality, then, you must say that it's at best partly internal (private*) and partly external.

Transcendental philosophy presupposes direct realism. There is an inescapable duality intrinsic to that method. — Mww

If that were the case, then, what's the point of transcendental idealism? You might say that it is direct realist in the sense that the empirical world is the external world as is given to us already organised by our mental faculties. But if Kant had said direct access to the external world in itself, then, why a positing a distinction between the empirical world and the world in itself?

I disagree. For empirical knowledge, the empirical world is given. To know is to know about something. The analysis and study from which knowledge follows, is of representation of the empirical world, which are constructs of the human cognitive system. A.K.A., experience. — Mww

Ok, I think I agree here.

The empirical world is a representation, the conception of the totality of real things of possible experience. But the empirical world is not a thing we know; we know only of representations of things in it. And because it is a mere conception, there is no sensibility involved, no intuition hence no phenomenon, which explains why knowledge of it is impossible. — Mww

OK, I see. But if the empirical world is a 'representation' then it can't be a 'direct realism', except in the sense that we have direct knowledge of the representation. Direct realism asserts that we have direct knowledge of the 'world in itself'.

In Kant and the Enlightenmrnt era natural philosophy, the world is a general conception, having all possible existent things subsumed under it. The ancients called such conceptions Universals. — Mww

Well, (some of) the 'ancients' believed that the world was actually mind-independent, except in the case of the Mind of God. In a sense, then, they would agree that the woruld is a 'general conception', only in the sense that it is the creation of the Divine Mind and it is an intelligible structure that reflect that.
However, they would disagree with Kant's skepticism about 'how the world is in itself'.

Pretty much what I’ve been saying all along. If this is your position as well, perhaps we’ve just been tangled up in words. And maybe a scattered misplaced principle here and there. — Mww

I am not sure if we agree. In fact, I still do not have a 'stable' view on all of this. I am tentatively leaning on something like 'some of the ancients' view' in the past paragraph.

But yes, I believe that we got some misunderestandings because we used (and use) the words differently and from your response it seems to me that we have a similar understanding of what Kant thought, which would be very good for if it is true :smile:
To be fair, probably I am using the words in an imprecise way (after all I do not read anything written by Kant from ages...)

I'm just suggesting that we innately believe (intuitively, not deductively or verbally) there is an external world. Classifying it as physical, material etc depends on some later learnings. — Relativist

And I'm suggesting that even the ontological idealist actually believes in an external world. It's just a very counterintuitive picture of that world but it's nevertheless true that there is an external world (the other minds).

I agree. That is contradicted by our basic intuitions. — Relativist

Ok!

I can accept that there is SOME relation to the world of experience. It's iterative: we start with out innate instincts, then have experiences we interpret through the lens of our instincts, creating a revised lens through which the next tier of experiences are interpretted. Rinse. Repeat. — Relativist

Yes, it seems reasonable. If one believes that there is an external physical world it must have some structural similarities with the 'world of our experience'.

Based on your description, I'd consider the strict ontological idealist irrational, because he has no rational basis to defeat his innate belief. The reasoning seems to be: I'm possibly wrong therefore I'm wrong. — Relativist

I can see why you are saying that. But I disagree that this is a real problem for the ontological idealist. As I said, the ontological idealist would retort that he's not denying the external world. Rather, he simply asserts that everything is mental and there is a plurality of interacting minds.

The epistemic idealist could be rational, but only if he applies that this skepticism consistently - which entails general extreme skepticism. — Relativist

Ok! But I would even say more... if the epistemic idealist position is strictly followed it would imply that skepticism or even an 'illusionist' position where nothing that is understandable according to, say, plurality, distinctiveness and so on is ultimately real. After all, if those concepts are valid only in the context of the 'empirical world', then, they might well be unapplicable outside of it. And if one accepts that the 'empirical world' and the associated mind are not ontologically fundamental (which would imply a negation of empirical idealism BTW), then, I see no other conclusions as saying that either fundamental, ultimate reality is a oneness or neither one nor many.

If this just means we should be willing to question everything, I'm OK with it. I'm not OK with jumping to intellectual nihilism. — Relativist

Yes, I would say the first. But, maybe, we can't know 'ultimate reality' or even 'reality as it is'. Not sure if that would be intellectual nihilism for you. I don't. Intellectual knowledge would still have its own merits.

Excellent analogy. I see your point- it makes perfect sense. — Relativist

Thanks. BTW, I believe that the 'shared dream' analogy is even better than the 'Matrix' one.
Note that if the dream is shared, then, there is still an external reality. After all, other minds are not mental contents. If you like, ontological idealism is quite similar to this scenario (with the difference of course that the 'shared dream' is not dependent on technology).

But to emphasize, all I have been talking about is this notion of structure. So there is an inherent agnosticism (or even rejection) about fundamental metaphysics, and even a skepticism about there being anything to say about it beyond what our intelligible models of reality say. These intelligible models are just the ones I have been talking about all along, with the physical at the core on which other models supervene or relate through coarse/fine-graining. — Apustimelogist

Thanks for the post. Not sure if I understood the whole of it (some parts are beyond my grasp...), but I hope to have understand the gist of what you did write.

Anyway, it seems to me that you are saying:

(1) Experience is structured and we have cognitive/perceptual structures that allow us to make intelligible models of the 'world';
(2) Experience is not self-enclosed, i.e. we need to posit something 'outside' of it, which grounds both experience itself and the structure of it;
(3) That 'external world' has its own structure, otherwise we could not get an intelligible 'world of experience';
(4) We can't have access to knowledge about the intrinsic and fundamental properties of that world.

Assuming that I am not misrepresenting you, it boils down for me to how we understand (4). The agnosticism that you refer for me is an indication that your position would be best described with a general label 'realism', rather than naturalism or physicalism (if we understand these two terms in an ontological way). That is, you posit the existence of an external, structured 'reality' about which, however, we can't know very much.

Also, you share with many physicalists the skepticism about something like some claims about consciousness, spirituality, religion and so on. I guess that, if you want to call 'physicalist' your position IMO you are fine doing that. But, again IMO, from a metaphysical 'classification', I would think that your position should be called a form of 'realism'.

Regarding the 'hard problem', I do believe, however, that it is a very profound problem and, like intelligibility, to me suggest that the 'mental' must be in some sense fundamental. I have found no explanation of the propeerites of consicousness in 'physical' terms that have been satisfying. Emergentism, for instance, at a certain point seems like saying "and somehow we get consciosness" due to the fact that there seem no physical properties in virtue of which we can 'derive' consciousness. Other models like epiphenomenalism seems to just contradict experience (consciousness does have an effect on our body). And so on.
But I guess we will have to agree to disagree.

Do you see the difference in that, and this: the world of my cognition. The empirical world you are now cognizing must be the same world I am now cognizing, else there must be as many empirical worlds are there are cognizers, which is absurd. The world of your, or my or anyone’s, cognition, on the other hand, is singular and private. If you were to say the world of your cognition did not exist before you were born you’d be correct without equivocation, but the empirical world of my cognition remains existent and unaffected. — Mww

I am not sure about this. I believe that 'our' empirical worlds are similar. They might have the same structure owing to the fact that, as humans, we share the same sensible and cognitive faculties. But there is a fundamental 'privateness' of my experience that suggests to me that my empirical world is indeed 'mine'. This doesn't imply, of course, that we can have an intersubjective agreement.

We haven’t yet agreed the world, or reality, whichever, is mind-independent? I should hope we have, in which case, if in any time your mind didn’t exist the existence of a world is irrelevant, and for the time in which your mind does exist…..it doesn’t but suffice it to say you have one…..the world was already there awaiting your perception. Or, which is the same thing, the world is given, in order for you to even have perceptions for your mind to work on. — Mww

But if the 'world' is given and is knowable I am not sure how transcendental/epistemic idealism isn't a form of direct realism.
I would say that epistemic idealists do not hold any views about what is 'given'. The empirical world is always constructed, 'given' in a secondary sense. That is, we can analyse and study our empirical world so for empirical knowledge the empirical world is given. But this doesn't negate the point that in transcendental idealism the empirical world is a representation/construct of sensible and congnitive faculties of the mind.

But perhaps I'm not grasping something about transcendental idealism.

The gist of the first Critique is, basically, one shouldn’t worry so much about the answers he can’t get, but more the questions he wouldn’t even have asked if only he’d thought about it a bit more. — Mww

But aren't these qurstions precisely those relating the world 'in-itself'? That is independent of forms of sensibility and categories (which are both mental)?

The common rejoinder is that it isn’t the exact same thing. A bug’s world is different from a fish’s world. But that’s not really the case, is it. The world from a bug’s perspective is different than the world from a fish’s perspective, but the world itself, is what it is regardless of either. Same with all other beings, I should think, or there comes mass contradictions. — Mww

Well, I guess that this is true if one assumes a transcendental idealist position.

But if one accepts that there is an intelligible external reality which can in principle be known (and we know/understand in part as it is possible to us), then, there are no different 'worlds' here but different understandings of the world, one perhaps more correct than the other.

Havin’ fun yet? — Mww

Yup :smile:

Of course, but it's rational to maintain a belief before it's disproven, and its irrational to reject something just because it's logically possible that it's false. This latter is my issue with idealism, per my understanding of it. — Relativist

OK. I see your point. But IMO, you are conflating the belief with an 'external world' in generale and a 'physical world' in particular. I would say that abandoning the second is certainly counter-intuitive and probably incorrect but not necessarily 'irrational'. I would say that if one denies the existence any kind of external reality (solipsism) or affirms that, at most, there might be something else but we do not interact in any way with that is irrational.

It wasn't an argument to show idealism is false. I was just showing that it is rational to deny idealism. I'm struggling to find a rational reason to deny mind-independent reality exists. The only reasons I've seen so far is because it's possible. That's not a good reason. There's loads of possibilities - many of which conflict with one another. Surely it's at least POSSIBLE that mind-independent reality exists - so what's the reasoning that tips the scale away from that? — Relativist

I honestly believe that you are underestimating Bradley's argument. If knowledge about the 'physical world' is empirical, it is true IMO that, in fact, what is directly known to us are sensations and perceptions (i.e. sensations organised within a conceptual framework). It seems to me that he is right that we can't conceive anything 'physical' with no relation with the 'world of experience'.

Of course, there is a stretch from this observation to flatly deny the existence of the 'physical world'. But, anyway, if you are not a naive realist, you would agree that 'the world we experience' is, in fact, a mental construction of sorts. In which case, an external 'physical' world would be somethin we haven't direct access to and we have no way to verify if it is really 'there' or not (assuming that knowledge at least comes from experience). The (strictly) 'ontological' idealist would say that the 'fact' that we imagine that the 'external physical world' in terms of the 'world of experience' is a reasonable reason to deny that there is something different from either minds and mental contents. The epistemic idealist would say that the same 'fact' leads us to the conclusion that we can't know anything about such a 'world' (note that Kant, in my understanding, rejected traditional metaphysics because he thought that it could not give us true knowledge... not sure about what he would say to someone who asserts that he doesn't claim to have certain knowledge but confident, but not certain, beliefs...).

Personally, I don't think that Bradley's argument is decisive or anything like that. But, certainly, it is not something to be overlooked.

I agree that we can't be absolutely certain. And while I also agree that pragmatism doesn't imply truth, my impression is that idealists interact with the world pragmatically (they eat, sleep, piss, work, raise kids...) - and if so, this seems like cognitive dissonance. Why get out of bed, if they truly believe mind-independent reality doesn't exist? If they aren't walking the walk, it makes me think they're just playing an intellectual game (perhaps casting a middle finger at reality, a reality that places relatively little value on a PhD in Philosophy: "F__k you! You don't even exist! Nya Nya!). — Relativist

Again, I respectfully disagree. If there is something external from us and we interact with that - even if not physical (and that's the point) - then it is still meaningful to interact with the world pragmatically.

To make a hopefully helpful analogy, let's assume that in the future we will be able to develop a technology that enables us to create a Matrix-like virtual reality or a shared dream, where pleasant and painful sensations are experienced. It would be foolish to, say, cause to oneself painful sensations for no 'higher' reason even if these sensations happpen in that virtual reality or shared dream.

What do you think about this?

(Another possible reason: in my past lucid dreams I would still experience pain even if I was aware of being in a dream. It would be foolish to me to experience pain for no higher reason even in that 'fully internal' experiences, let alone if I a know that I do interact with something and/or someone external)

The issues raised with perception and the role of our cognitive faculties are definitely worth considering. But how should influence our efforts to understand the world beyond acknowledging the role of those cognitive faculties? — Relativist

Sorry, I don't understand your question. Or how it relates of the topic of the discussion we are having.

Exploring the nature of "meaning" is a worthwhile philosophical endeavor, and it seems to me that it's entirely within the scope of the mind. That's because I see its relation to the external word as a matter for truth-theory: what accounts for "truth"? I'm a fan of truthmaker theory, which is just a formalized correspondence theory: a statement is true if it corresponds to something in reality (what it corresponds to, is the truthmaker). — Relativist

Ok! As I said in my previous post, however, to me if there is an intelligible and 'meaningful' external physical reality 'cries' for an explanation (which might 'cry' to another one). I really do understand, however, if one doesn't see that 'need for an explanation'.

Anyway, I do respect your view. But IMO assuming that universals inhere to reality lead to at least some form of panpsychism where the 'mental' is an essential aspect of the fundamental physical reality (and, hence, a fundamental, ultimate aspect of reality itself). Personally, this is because I believe that universal are best understood as concepts and I do have difficulties to understand them in other ways.

This is just going in loops I can't follow
A physicalist would say that you can describe how a brain does what it does in understanding the world virtue of physical processes by which it works and interacts with other physical processes. — Apustimelogist

I agree, we are talking about each other. But IMO this is because we start from different principles.

To you it's 'granted' that physical phenomena have 'regularities'. It's just the way it is. I understand your poisition. To me, however, it isn't granted. It's a mystery that 'cries' for an explanation (which in turn might 'cries' for another and so on).

Don't think about it as prediction then. Its just about models or maps that tells you where things are in relation to others. My use of the word "predict" is clearly an idiosyncracy that comes from its appearance in neuroscience where I would give it a slighlty more general meaning. — Apustimelogist

Ok. I am actually not sure, however, how this isn't going to the assumption that 'meaning' is something fundamental in the physical. If that is the case, it seems to me that the 'mental' is somehow fundamental (at least as a fundamental aspect of physical reality as some panpsychist affirm)