I think this is exactly the point I was making. I wouldn't say that being observed by instruments is being observed, in any unqualified sense. That is because the instruments gather information, and the information must be interpreted according to theories. So there is an extra layer of interpretation there which is dependent on the validity of the theories employed. Take your map analogy. Suppose we have instruments, satellites for example, which are observing the earth, gathering information. Then, with the use of theories, the instruments produce a map of what a human being would see on the earth. You might say that the satellites allow us to observe the earth, but the observations are only as accurate as the theories which are used to interpret the information. — Metaphysician Undercover
Ok I see. In principle you are right. We cannot have a "direct experience" of what the instruments in the labs register, i.e. we have an additional interpretative level. Or rather two... Let me explain what I mean.
What we experience is that the instruments "do some stuff" (pardon the imprecise language) and we interpret it an "observation". However it is an assumption, albeit a "very reasonable" one. We do not oberve what the satellite are observing but only how the satellite is "behaving". This is VERY similar to Heisenberg/Bohr reasoning, minus the fact that even they assumed that the observation is an interaction between the experiment apparatus and the "thing" observed by it. To me this is also the reason why science cannot "prove" itself. We need philosophy of science, i.e. we need to explain what we are observing when we analyse the experimental apparatus. But in the strictest sense this is not science, anymore. It is philosophy of science. But even if we accept that there is still a layer of interpretation, i.e. we need to use some assumptions in order to interpret the "results" of the observations. In the case of the satellites it is simple (in fact we can see the Earth...). But with an atomic microscope we cannot be so sure: we have not a direct experience of the atoms, for example (in fact this was, more or less, the objection of Mach against the atomic theory). We need a theory that can account for how the observation, i.e. the interaction of the instrument with the "thing" observed, happens. Here I think you are right, our theories actually condition how we interpret even how we interpret observations themselves. And in fact Bohr, for example, was agnostic about "the nature of the quantum world" - except the fact that the "cause" of the observation is a sort of interation of the "quatum stuff" and the experimental apparatus. In a similar way we can say that in fact we cannot really know "what the quantum world is" by performing experiments. After all it was Bohr who said:
"It is wrong to think that the task of physics is to find out how nature is. Physics concerns what we can say about nature." and "We must be clear that when it comes to atoms, language can be used only as in poetry. "
https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Niels_Bohr (however I suggest you to read
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bohr-correspondence/ and
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-copenhagen/)
Yes, I think that all observations are ultimately reducible to constructs, and the accuracy of the construct is dependent on the theories employed. So even if you sit at your window, and describe what you are seeing outside, your description is limited by your language capacity. Your language represents the theories you employ in describing the situation. — Metaphysician Undercover
Yeah, I think I can agree. Direct experience is after all in some sense both "pre-conceptual" and "beyond concepts" (Very "zen"
X-) ). We use our constructs as a map (this is not to say that they are "false" or a "misconception"...). For example a "chair" is concept we "impose" on our experience. But our experience does not tell us that there is a "chair". Yet conventionally/practically it is very useful to use those concepts. As I also said about the "world outside our experience" we can be agnostic and make some "reasonable guesses". (That's why I am very interested in many "eastern" philosophies which are interested in the "direct/non-conceptual" experience!).
I think that the standard caesium clock measures a time period much longer than a femtosecond. Regardless, I think that the clock doesn't "observe" the time duration, for the reasons discussed above. The clock gathers information which is interpreted according to theory and this produces an "observation".. — Metaphysician Undercover
Ooops sorry, you are right. Atomic clocks arrive at "picoseconds", those who arrive near the "femtoseconds" seem to be "mode-locked" lasers.
According to what we have said, yes. But still I think that our present theories are so successful that we can say that it "observes" such a small temporal duration! But in principle you are righ, I think. And in fact this objection is even more justified for smaller scales
I look at "the cause of our experience" in a different way. I think of the biological systems of the human organism as the cause of our experience. Our bodies take information from our environment, interpreting it, and constructing something which is presented to the conscious mind, which interprets this, and constructs something again. So the causation is really within, in the act of constructing. — Metaphysician Undercover
But... our "biology" is conditioned by the external environment, as you say. So causation itself IMO is also "outised" us. The problem is how we interpret it. This in fact can be said to be "within". All our experience "arises" from the "contact" of our consciousness our biological systems and "something external" (unless one is a solipsist we have to admit that "the external world" co-causes our experience... but maybe a solipsist does not even accept the existence of the body). For example when we touch something, that "something" produces signals that are interpreted by our brain and our consciousness (brain and consciousness are not identical for the emergentist - let alone dualists or other theories). So causation cannot be said to be wholly "within", but at the same time our "description" of it IS "within".
It is necessary because the nature of free will, creativity, and all that "construction" which occurs within us, that I just described, which indicates that we need to assume something more than the "causal chain of happenings" to understand reality. As a free willing being, I see possibilities in the future. I can influence the future with my decisions, such that I can start a causal chain of happenings intended to bring about what I want. This ability to start a causal chain of happenings, at any moment of the present, needs to be understood. — Metaphysician Undercover
Ok, so in our view time is in fact "within us"? I think I can agree: the "time" we "experience" is NOT the time "measured" by clocks. Are you saying this?
I agree that it is extravagant, but this argument is that it is even either more extravagant than Bell thought (i.e. there are "Many-Many" worlds) or describes a "universe" where literally nothing happens. In any case in MWI the "reality" is the wavefunction.
Of course even somehow we can "avoid" the objection raised by the article it is very "extravagant". We are in a sort of illusion, thinking that our world is "the reality". But even all "the stories" together cannot be said that are reality. The reality according to them IS the universal wavefunction which is eternally in a superposition state (the cat is always both alive and dead BUT we are inside the universe so we observe either alive or death). Interestingly both Bohm and Bell held that in PWT the wavefunction is as real as MWI, but according to them our "story" is "real" because there are also particles. This raised an objection to PWT itself (mainly by MWI-advocates) since if we hold that the universal wavefunction is real, then it never collapses and therefore there are, in fact, other stories but they are "empty" of particles. MWI-supporters see PWT as an unnecessary complication whereas PWT supporters raise the objection above and the (fatal IMO) objection that it CANNOT reproduce, without additional axioms, the Born Rule (the probabilistic predictions of QM). MWI-supporters (e.g. Tegmark, De-Witt, Deutsch...) hold that both are "resolved" or "not very important", but I never found a convincing "defense". Also some PWT no more treat the wavefunction as real, but as "nomological", i.e. a sort of physical law, because of the problem raised about the "empty stories".
Regarding your question about split... Well, no. But remember that according to MWI our world is not real as we normally think. To a well-written FAQ about MWI see
http://www.anthropic-principle.com/preprints/manyworlds.html.
Personally I find too much "extravagant". I am more in line with Bohr and in a lesser grade Rovelli (but interestingly I am fascinated by also Bohm). MWI also would be very elegant (mathematically) but thetwo objections above IMO rule it out.
By the way Everett's original interpretation was a bit different, it was called "relative state interpretation", the MWI it seems is its most famous type. But I do not rember very well these things.
See also this for a "mental" interpretation of MWI:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Many-minds_interpretation (this might of your interest!)