well, it's not difficult to translate left and right into north and south. For the rest, I'll leave you to it. — Banno

I'm afraid it doesn't really work that way, there's too many glitches. At the north pole for example, every direction is south. Adding dimensions into your representation is not a simple translation.

I believe the problem is that there is no difference between future and the past in the B-series, while the A-series presupposes a difference between future and past. Taking a point called "the present", and inserting it arbitrarily into a random position in the B-series, to artificially produce a future and past, doesn't do what is required to create that difference.

What is required is that the present is real, thereby making the difference between future and past real. But if we grant this, we rule out the possibility of the B-series. Therefore the nature of "the present" would need to be severely compromised, so as to be no longer consistent with the A-series, to make it compatible with the B-series. In other words, the A-series has a real present, and the B-series does not, and that's why they are incompatible.

I think that what says in this post, is that the truth of the B-series would render the A-series impossible, and vise versa. This means that the two are incompatible. That's why McTaggart proposed the C-series which might take some aspects of each.

So what I am offering is not too far from the Wittgensteinian suggestion that A-series and B-series are different language games. — Banno

Sure, but the question is which of the two is used to speak the truth. And if it's neither the A-series nor the B-series, then it's time for a new language game, the C-series.

Then what should he have written? — NOS4A2

Nothing, because it was not an allowable expense. That's why it's fraud, he recorded it as "legal expenses", when it was a personal payment. For example, have you ever tried claiming money you paid to a prostitute as "legal expenses" on your tax return?

There must be something that makes a table what it is, and this we will call tableness, and we will generalise this to other stuff, and say that what makes something what it is, is its essence. — Banno

I think you need to differentiate between primary substance and secondary substance.

A particular, individual thing, as a material object, is an instance of primary substance. As such, it has an "essence" within itself, as its identity, which accounts for it being the thing which it is, and not something else.

Secondary substance is the type, or species, which we assign to a thing, such as "table". This sort of 'identity' which we assign to a thing, is a tool which we use for communication, and logic. If we say that "table" as secondary substance, has an essence, then we may name the essence of a table and this may provide us with a type of necessity, logical necessity, which we can use as a tool.

So we need to be careful not to equivocate between the two types of contingency involved here. "A thing's' essence" in the sense of secondary substance, is contingent on the condition we place on being that type (what we say about the thing). From that contingency we create a logical necessity. But "a thing's essence" in the sense of primary substance, is contingent on the thing's material existence. The thing's material existence is a different sense of "necessity". Recognizing the difference between the necessity produced by what we say, and the necessity produced by material existence, allows for the reality of human fallibility.

To apply this to the quoted passage, "what makes something what it is", refers to "essence" in the sense of primary substance. "Tableness" refers to "essence" in the sense of secondary substance.

This the first time in history anyone has been convicted of this shit. — NOS4A2

It's probably the first time in history that anyone has recorded hush money as legal fees. Fraudsters are known to be very creative in their efforts to evade the law.

...his accountant wrote “legal expenses” instead of “hush money”.., — NOS4A2

Fraud, black and white. Many would go to jail for such a crime.

There is nothing to be gained procedurally speaking, by asking for a boundary, when all that’s necessary is a transformation of whatever kind, between out there and in here. — Mww

Of course there is something to be gained here, because if we assume a boundary, then knowledge would be gained by understanding the nature of that boundary. If it is a "transformation" then there must be a cause of it, and understanding the source of that cause would be very important. Even the very existence of this supposed "transformation" casts doubt on the accuracy of our intuitions of space and time, as the transformation would be prior to the a priori. It would be the condition for the condition of sensibility.

In other words, we'd have to assume an active, animated cause of sensation, the transformation occurring at that boundary, which is prior to the a priori intuitions, and this would render those tools, (the intuitions) as useless for understanding reality. We would need to obtain a full understanding of that transformation, as the a priori intuitions are already posterior to that transformation, being applied to the results of the transformation. This produces the requirement for a huge procedural difference if one's goal is to understand reality.

.

And that’s all we need to move on to the next faculty, the next procedural step on the way to determining how the appearance is to be known. There is an explanation for what intuition does pursuant to speculative metaphysics, but, again, the subject himself, being unconscious of the what, has even less need of the how. — Mww

But if the named "subject" is a metaphysician, then by the nature of a metaphysician, the subject has a need of the how. That is exactly what the metaphysician wants to know. And if it turns out that the a priori intuitions are already posterior to the transformation which occurs at the senses, then the conceptual structure is useless to the metaphysician because it places that transformation into the category of noumenal. This can only leave the metaphysician dissatisfied by what appears to be a faulty procedure.

All I need is an input to the faculty of intuition, something from which phenomenon can be constructed. This is required in order to determine which sense has been affected, and what
a posteriori material is being processed, in which form may be imagined as belonging to it, and, VOILA!!!…a very basic image is born. — Mww

The problem though, is that this "input" is already the product of an active, animated process, which you call "a transformation of whatever kind", that has occurred at the boundary between out there and in here. So the "basic image" is merely a representation of the product of that transformation. Therefore if we want to understand the true nature of the "out there", we need to recognize that the intuitions of space and time are not being applied to the "out there", they are being applied to the product of the transformation, which is already "in here". So we need to get beyond these intuitions of space and time, and understand the nature of that transformation, if we want a true understanding of the "out there".

Intelligible means necessarily cognizable by the human intellect, re: all logical criteria have been met. Unintelligible, then, merely means a cognition is impossible, even if a representation relating to a conception, is not. So what makes a conception a legitimate thought, but for which schemata representing it, is not at all possible? What’s missing? — Mww

This, I think is a key point. The philosophical mind seeks to know everything, so it is counterproductive, sort of hypocritical, to designate anything as unintelligible. So the Aristotelian approach is to designate that to be an object is to have a form, therefore to be intelligible, as the law of identity indicates. However, Aristotle also noted the reality of "potential", as a sort of possibility for an object. And "potential" violates the law of excluded middle, throwing the intelligibility of that aspect of reality into doubt. This possibility of an unintelligible aspect of reality is not pleasing to the philosophical mind.

The metaphysician has to be crafty to avoid being stymied by the prospect of an unintelligible aspect of reality, so the traditional solution is to assume the reality of an intellect with a higher capacity than the capacity of the current human intellect, that would be God. To avoid the connotations of that name, we might call this a potential intellect, a possible intellect, which could understand the reality of things which appear to be unintelligible to the human intellect. This allows us to place into the category of "intelligible" things like independent Forms, which provide for the intelligibility of the reality of potential, and which the human intellect cannot grasp, making them appear as unintelligible potential. By this little trick, your definition of "intelligible" as "necessarily cognizable by the human intellect" is rejected as unacceptable.

Furthermore, the "trick" is well supported by evolutionary evidence. Living beings are extremely varied, and they evolve to develop different capacities. So the idea of an intellect (possibly a future more evolved intellect) which can grasp things which are unintelligible to the human intellect is clearly justified. And the so-called "trick" (which was formerly known as assuming God) is really a valid way for the metaphysician to get beyond the appearance of unintelligibility, and bring what appears to be unintelligible into the category of intelligible.

But, of course, in order to establish that one has to persuade people that the phenomena (appearances, ideas, impressions, sense-data) are not a veil between us and our environment, but a window. It's not an easy or straightforward project. — Ludwig V

The issue is with the proposed analogous term, "window". The term characterizes the senses in a descriptive way. So we can ask, is the description accurate? Suppose the senses are like a window, we can apply the tinted glass analogy, and ask how is the window itself affecting our perception of what's on the other side. And when we look at the reality of being alive, we see that life is active, and then we need to allow that the supposed "window" is not a passive pane of glass, but it is actively doing something.

And if we say that the activity of the mind is to interpret the information, then why wouldn't we say that the activity of the sense organ itself is an interpretation? So the information received to the conscious mind, from the sense organ, is already a type of interpretation. And if we assume that the rational mind is a distinct and higher faculty (a difference of kind, as @Wayfarerdoes), then we ought to accept that the interpretations given to the rational mind by the senses are less reliable.

In the faculty of intuition, where that which appears acquires its representation, called phenomenon. — Mww

OK, you say that intuition provides the boundary between the senses as out there, and the appearances in the mind, as in here. But I think this produces the problem of determining where exactly the sensation is, in here, or out there. Kant, I believe, obscures the problem by talking about "sensibility", implying the potential for, or possibility of sensation, rather than talking about actual sensation. So "the faculty of intuition", may in this way, provide the mind (the internal) with the capacity to be receptive to sense activity, but this only veils the underlying problem of where exactly the sensation is, in here (in the mind), or out there (in the sense organ).

Sensations are in the senses? — Mww

It sure seems to me like sensations are in the senses. When I touch something and feel its texture, warmth, softness, etc., I feel these sensations right in my fingertips. I taste things right in my mouth, and smell things in my nose. Sounds appear to be right inside my ears, and visual images appear to be in my eyes. All of my sensations appear to me to be right in the organs which sense them.

If there were the case, why would we have both? You want the hand to tell you the thing is heavy when all it can do is tell you of the appearance of cellular compression. You want the ear to tell you there is a sound when all it can do is register the appearance of variations in pressure waves. And so on…. — Mww

"Heavy" is not properly a sensation, but if we considered it as a sensation, we would feel it in the muscles, the pain in the muscles which are lifting the weight. The pain (sensation) is felt to be right at the location where it is sensed. Likewise, sound is heard to be right in the ears. You say that ears register vibrations, but you are not talking about "sensation" any more. If we stick to sensation, we need to recognize that the sensation we call sound, appears to be right within the ears.

Furthermore, we need to acknowledge that we are talking about appearances, and the appearance is that the sensation is right in the sense organ. This is how the concept of "intuition" clouds and obscures the issue. Instead of acknowledging that the sense organ is part of "in here", because the sensation is in the sense organ, "intuition" produces a boundary. Then "sensibility", as the capacity to sense gets placed on the other side of the boundary from the sense organ, instead of putting the capacity to sense within the organ itself. And this classifies all the senses together, as activity in the same category of "sensibility".

However, we really need to look at each different sense as possibly a distinct capacity, with a distinct object. If they are distinct, then there is a difference of kind between them, and it's wrong to look at sensibility as one capacity of the mind, provided by "intuition". We need to look at each sense as a distinct capacity, afforded by the corresponding sense organ, and determine what provides the possibility for each one.

I didn’t say all the faculties couldn’t co-exist. In fact, I said the mind could be called the composite of all the faculties, which makes explicit they do co-exist. Each faculty can still be imbued with its own dedicated functionality without contradicting the notion of a unity. — Mww

The point though, is that the concepts of "intuition" and "sensibility" lead to an unsound description of sensation. So there is an unnecessary, and I would say unjustifiable boundary created between the mind, as the unity of the faculties, and the sense organs which are left outside the mind, as other than faculties.

Kant defines reality as “….Reality, in the pure conception of the understanding, is that which corresponds to a sensation in general…”. From that definition, insofar as only from the senses, and correspondingly by the sensations given from them, is any account of reality possible. This just says reality is given to us if or when the senses deliver sensations. So it is that the senses are in fact involved in both the external (input: effect of that thing which appears) and the internal (output: as affect corresponding to the appearance, which just is sensation). A completely legitimate explanatory bridge. — Mww

I wouldn't say the gap is bridged legitimately. You have conveniently left out the role of intuition here, to create the appearance of legitimacy. If we include "intuition", then we see that sensations are not delivered by the senses, they are delivered by intuition, as providing sensibility, the possibility for sensation. Then the gap remains, but it is between intuition and the senses, and there is no necessity to have "the senses deliver sensations". Intuition could deliver sensations (as in dreams), without the role of the senses at all. And so the senses are not involved in the internal at all.

So the imposition of the concept "intuition" produces the appearance that the gap has been bridged with that intermediary, intuition. However, in reality the proposed medium "intuition" is placed completely on one side of the gap, and therefore does not actually provide a bridge.

It is not itself a self-contradictory idea, but it is an unintelligible object. — Mww

"Unintelligible object" is contradictory by traditional Aristotelian principles. An object necessarily has a form, as its identity, and "form" is intelligible. If it has no identity, form, it cannot be said to be an object. Notice that "intelligible" signifies the possibility of being grasped by an intellect, so actually being apprehended by a human intellect is not required. This is how Aristotle excluded "prime matter" (matter without form) from reality, by showing that it cannot be an external, independent object, it can only be an idea in the mind. But as an idea in the mind it is self-contradicting, therefore it is excluded from the mind as well.

This is why the Christian metaphysicians assigned "Form" as the necessary aspect of the independent objects, and "matter" accounts for the accidents and contingencies, observed within the independent objects. The "logical hole" is then filled with an intelligible Form, God, which is to the highest degree intelligible, yet cannot be apprehended by the human intellect due to the human intellect's dependence on matter. The hole is filled because God is intelligible, yet unintelligible to humans, so we do not have self-contradiction within that form, or idea.

And Kant doesn’t, indeed cannot, deny the possibility of noumena, insofar as to do so is to falsify the primary ground of transcendental philosophy, re: “….I can think whatever I please, provided only that I do not contradict myself…”, which just says if I do think noumena, which is to hold a certain conception, and then prescribe to myself an object corresponding to it, then I immediately contradict the mechanisms I already authorize as that by which corresponding objects are prescribed to me at all, from which follows I have contradicted myself. The warning ends up being.…think noumena all you like; just don’t try to do anything intuitive with it. And if you can’t do anything intuitive with it, don’t bother thinking it in the first place. — Mww

This is how Kant turns things around from the traditional Christian perspective. The tradition holds that the boundary, which is "the unintelligible", is matter, and places that as external to the mind. Kant brings the boundary as "intuition" into the mind. This allows "noumena" as a sort of replacement to "matter", being the unintelligible, to creep into the mind, in that area of the mind portioned off by the boundary, intuition. The self-contradictory concept is hidden behind intuition, so to speak. Within the mind it is nothing but a useless self-contradicting concept, unintuitive. Therefore we can see the need to reject it completely. But this requires restructuring the boundary so as not to allow it in there, behind the intuitions.

On what basis did Aristotle designate man the ‘rational animal’?

The ‘faculty of reason’ is a perfectly intelligible expression, and the idea that humans alone possess it fully developed, and some animals only in very rudimentary forms, ought hardly need to be stated. Yet for some reason whenever it is stated, it provokes a good deal of argument. Which I attribute to the irrationality of modern culture! — Wayfarer

The problem I see here, is that we, in our rational thinking impose strict boundaries on species of life forms. These boundaries are produced for epistemic purposes, although they may be based in real ontological principles, such as reproductive capacity. So we tend to believe that the differences indicated by our divisions of species, are real differences of kind even though they are really just established for epistemic purposes.

The real problem which this creates is an inability to adequately understand evolution. Once we set up those differences of kind between the species, we rob ourselves of the conceptual tools required to properly understand the interspecies relations which are essential to that process called evolution. So the divisions into types are very useful for some purposes, but as Plato shows in The Sophist those purposes could include sophistry. This means that we need to call into question, to doubt the boundaries which are drawn, because they are generally drawn for a purpose which might not be representative of good metaphysics.

So for example, you say some animals possess the faculty of reason "in very rudimentary forms". Isn't this indicative to you, that this difference is a difference of degree? I think, that to assign to human beings a distinct faculty, which is a difference of kind, we need to exclude these rudimentary forms from the others. And I am not at all arguing that this is impossible. As I said, I think that some of the distinct senses we have demonstrate differences of kind. But this creates a further problem which is the need to understand how differences of kind can evolve.

This is an ancient problem, traditionally resolved by having God create the different kinds of life forms individually. Denying the reality of differences of kind altogether, allows for the reality of evolution, and emergence, but this produces a different problem, the one encountered by the ancient atomists. To avoid an infinite regress of divisibility to account for all the differences, we need to assume a first basic, universal kind, a fundamental particle, known as prime matter. But as Aristotle showed, "prime matter" is actually incoherent. This implies that differences of kind must be real, and ontological, but we just do not have the adequate principles of understanding to properly identify them. And so we continue to assign "difference of kind" by somewhat arbitrary principles, according to the purpose at hand.

You called it a “Kantian distinction”, which I think much more the case than separation. It is inescapable that the human sensory apparatuses are affected by things appearing to them, which tends to negate the premise the senses and that which is sensed are separated on all accounts. — Mww

The point though, is that if this is the case, then the Kantian distinction cannot be maintained. If the senses are affected by the things sensed, then the senses are noumenal and there will be difficulty keeping the phenomenal as separate from the noumenal.

I hesitate to admit the senses are causally affected, but rather think they are functionally affected, in accordance with the natural physiology, which makes explicit they are “out there” themselves, in relation to the cognitive system itself. That is to say, the sensory devices are just as much real objects as are basketballs and snowflakes. — Mww

If the senses are out there, and what appears to the mind is in here, then where does the boundary between these two lie? Or, more to the point, how can there even be a boundary? Sensations are just as much "in here" as ideas are "in here", but they appear to be an aspect of the sense organ. If I say that the senses are out there, then the idea of a boundary between in here and out there makes no sense, because the sensations are in here, yet also in the senses, which are out there.

It appears to me, that unless I place the boundary as between the sense and the object sensed, the idea of a separation, or even a distinction, makes not sense. The brain and the senses are all aspects of the same nervous system. Therefore the boundary must be between the mind and the whole body (leaving an interaction problem), or between the senses and the objects sensed. I prefer the latter because it provides a better way to deal with the interaction problem.

Ahhhh, but they do not; the senses do nothing but forward information in the form of sensation, again, in accordance with respective physiology. Not hard to understand the senses as merely a bridge between the real and the representation of the real. Phenomena belong to intuition, which is a whole ‘nuther deal than appearance/sensation, which might…..very loosely….be deemed the source of the internal images of the external things. — Mww

If you look closely, analyze this described scenario, you will see that you have an interaction problem here. You describe the senses as providing information, but not causing any phenomena. And, you have phenomena as belonging to intuition, a completely different thing from senses providing "internal images of the external things".

By this description, the senses are external in relation to intuition and phenomena, but they somehow create internal images. So we can ask how does that boundary between external and internal get crossed. How is it that the sensations (images) are internal yet the senses are not. And why do you place a further (internal) boundary, or distinction between these images and intuition with phenomena?

As stated above, the account does allow the senses to, maybe not partake in so much as distinguish between, the external and the internal. — Mww

This capacity, to distinguish between external and internal, which you assign to the senses is an arbitrary judgement. That, distinction is a spatial judgement, so it requires intuition. But you have already separated intuition off, far away. So it's incoherent to say that the senses can make such a distinction, unless we allow intuition to be within sensation itself, and this implies that the conceptual structure needs to be changed to allow the mind to be within the senses.

It cannot be completely inaccessible. If noumena were inaccessible to the mind there could be no conception of it. Which highlights a misconception: Kant’s is a system in which different faculties function in unison. Mind may be understood as the composite of those faculties, but it remains that each faculty does its own job, and when examining the system, to overlay all onto mind misses the entire point of the examination. — Mww

You might say, "to overlay all onto mind misses the entire point of the examination", but I would say that to overlay like this exposes the fundamental fault of the examination. If mind is assumed to be the composite of those faculties, and all the faculties cannot be shown to co-exist as a unity of "mind", then there is an incoherency within the conception.

Be advised: you lose absolutely nothing by neglecting noumena entirely when examining human knowledge. The only reason Kant brought it up was to plug an ever-so-abstract logical hole.
(Actually, some secondary literature accuses him of backing himself into a corner, from which his extrication demanded a re-invention of classic terminology, which in turn seemed to demand an apparently outlandish exposition, which really isn’t at all.) — Mww

This demonstrates the incoherency of the conception. There appears, "an ever-so-abstract logical hole". The assumption of "noumena" is required to plug the hole. But "noumena" doesn't do anything, as you admit, except create the appearance that the hole has been plugged. Really though, the hole is still there, but it now exists as an abstract object, "noumena", and that abstract object is completely unintelligible. So the whole is filled with a self-contradicting idea, an intelligible object which is unintelligible.

This is analogous to Aquinas' position on God. God is most highly intelligible, but fundamentally not intelligible to the human mind. Aquinas explains this, as God being a pure, separate immaterial Form, independent from matter. The human mind cannot grasp the separate forms due to its dependence on material existence, its unity with matter. This is an attempt to resolve the self-contradiction. Theoretically, after death when the soul leaves its dependence on matter, it can grasp the pure Forms. But the way that Kant turns things around, he appears to make matter the thing which plugs the whole, but that really leaves the hole unpluggable.

At issue in that criticism is the claim that reason makes use of another faculty, apart from sensation and imagination, and it is this faculty which distinguishes the human intellect. As Jacques Maritain, another A-T philosopher, put it, what distinguishes the human from animal minds, is the ability to grasp universals - the universal 'man' for example. — Wayfarer

This is similar to Mww's description of the Kantian conception above, a division into distinct "faculties". What is at issue, is whether the division into these supposed distinct faculties is supported by good ontology, or whether they are just arbitrarily produced for some other purpose (for example, for Kant, an epistemic purpose).

So Kant for instance, denies the relevance of any independent, external existence by designating it "noumena". By this principle, truth as correspondence, is no longer applicable, and this allows Kant to produce all the internal divisions and categories at will, so long as logical consistency, and correspondence with phenomena is maintained.

You can see, that from this perspective, we can simply designate "the ability to grasp universals" as a distinct faculty, and claim this to be a difference of kind. That is why I explained that we need to go beyond this simple stipulation of "distinct faculty", and examine the object of that faculty, in relation to the objects of other faculties. If it turns out that two supposedly "distinct faculties" (with that designation of 'distinct', supporting the claim of a difference in kind) actually have the same type of object, then the claim of a difference in kind is not supported ontologically.

This is what I think is required to support your claim of an ontological difference of kind. If you support it with epistemological categories, and the epistemology is not well grounded in good ontology (like Kant's), then the claim of an ontological difference of kind is not well supported.

In other words that h.sapiens and canids (etc) are beings of different kinds. I said that the ability to speak, count, create technology, pursue science, and the like, amounts to a difference in kind, not simply one of degree. — Wayfarer

Can I ask, what defines this difference for you, that is the difference between a difference in kind and a difference of degree. I would say, for example, that a difference in kind constitutes a complete break with no possibility of continuity between the two, where as a difference of degree implies a continuity. To exemplify, I would say that the differences between the perceptions of the different senses can be differences of kind, so that the object of sight, and the object of hearing are different kinds, while differences within one sense, like the difference between blue and red, are differences of degree. The latter implying a continuity between the two, the former a discontinuity.

My opinion is that we have to be very cautious in our judgements concerning this subject because sometimes a very large jump of degree appears like a difference of kind. So for example, nonvisual electromagnetic activity appears to be a difference of kind, because it is not visible, but it has really been shown to be a difference of degree. Conversely, assuming that differences of kind can be reduced to differences of degree produces faulty conceptions like the philosopher's stone, and prime matter. So we approach the ancient question of how many different ontological kinds are there.

I think we can see, that living beings have developed (through evolution?) capacities of different kinds. For instance, hearing detects vibrations of molecules, while taste and smell (both perhaps of the same kind) detect changes to the molecules themselves, physical or chemical interactions with the senses. We could say that these are different kinds of activities being detected. And all of this presents us with a bit of a philosophical puzzle in itself, how does a capacity of a different kind come into existence in evolving life forms.

So if we judge that intellection, the capacity to reason with abstract conceptions, is a difference of kind, I think we need to justify this judgement. Now we might refer to "the object" of this capacity, like I referred to the difference between the object of sight and the object of hearing, as what the capacity is working with. I can think of a number of possibilities. We might say abstract concepts are the object of intellection, but this is problematic because they do not really qualify as "objects" by the law of identity. Then we have signs or symbols, as the possible object, but this is equally problematic because signs get reduced to anything which carries meaning, so that all sorts of creatures can be seen to observe the meaning of signs. Another possibility is "object" in the sense of a goal, intention or final cause. Is it the case that recognizing goals, as final cause, and the whole structure of moral philosophy which developed from this, is what constitutes the object of intellection? This would be what Plato called "the good". But again, the question is can we have such an object, which satisfies the requirement of the law of identity, and if not, the whole presumed activity is invalidated as fictional. This is the issue of objective morality.

To summarize the issue, to judge the power of intellection which human beings have, as a capacity which constitutes a difference of kind, from the other capacities which other creatures have, rather than a difference of degree, requires justification. Justification requires that we describe what that capacity does, in its actuality, and this means that we look at the movements of its objects. Before we describe the movement of the objects, we need to identify those objects, because falsely identifying objects will result in a false description, and a faulty justification.

While we should certainly recognize our biological continuity with the rest of nature, we should not let that recognition obscure the radical difference that defines our cognitive and cultural life. — Wayfarer

The problem, is that claiming there is a radical difference, and that we need to recognize this difference as a radical difference, because it has serious ontological implications, does not itself, really qualify as "recognizing the difference". It is a matter of asserting a difference without actually recognizing it. Without the capacity to describe, or somehow demonstrate that difference, it's just a blind assertion. And madmen can make many such blind assertions about many crazy things, but unless they demonstrate something, we just dismiss them as crazy. Further, as Berkeley has exemplified to us, if what you demonstrate is contrary to what people already believe, the demonstration must be carried out on their terms, and that makes it even more difficult to demonstrate what you assert.

Perhaps. In Kantian metaphysics, though, the notion of appearance is merely intended to grant ontology in general, which serves to limit metaphysics to the conditions of a “logical science”, entirely internal to the human intellect. Which reduces to….whatever’s out there is whatever it is; all that remains is to expose how the human intellect of a specific dedicated form treats it. — Mww

So the problem I see, is that this assumes a sort of Cartesian separation between external and internal. But, if we are to accept this separation as real, we need to determine a boundary, and this is where the problem lies. If we assume a purely internal, "within the mind", and a purely external "out there", and this is what the Kantian distinction forces on us by making the "out there" completely separate, then we have to account for the reality of the sense organs as somewhere in between.

This is very problematic, because the boundary by Kant's description must be a complete separation, allowing nothing from "out there" to be internal. So if the senses are causally affected by activity which is external, they must be completely "out there" themselves. But if the senses are creating the phenomenal appearances in the mind, they must be completely internal. So the Kantian system is really inadequate to account for reality because it doesn't allow that the senses partake of both, the external and the internal. And the Kantian system is caught by the "interaction problem". That's the problem with naming the noumenal as completely inaccessible to the human mind.

That’s fine; I’m not going to argue with that. Myself, I prefer to think of appearance as something that happens to, rather than being a creation of, the living system. — Mww

That's a simple difference of opinion. But it's actually very significant in metaphysical implications.

What happens to the principle of entropy within the future-to-past arrow of time? — ucarr

I don't know. It's information not available to us by our current models of time. It's simply written off as a part of reality which is unintelligible. The idea is that by changing perspective it could become intelligible.

Can the anti-determinist representation be called the free will representation? If so, how does free will impact the boundary between the actual and the probable? — ucarr

It makes the boundary intelligible.

The infinite regress is the math model of the approach of the past to the present? If the present has temporal extension, does the logical model show future and past overlap the expanding present as Venn diagrams? Do Venn diagrams of a timeline of overlapped future-present or present-past represent composite time simultaneously expressing two different tenses of time? — ucarr

Perhaps it could.

Please click the link below for a quick logical argument regarding the possibility of free will. — ucarr

Right, that is why the freewill approach is incompatible with the determinist approach.

The info gap is the boundary between the actual and probable which physics cannot cover because this boundary is occupied by non-physical reality? — ucarr

You do not have the causal relation correct here. The area of the boundary is called non-physical because physics cannot cover it, not vice versa. This is when observation is impossible, and physics relies on observation, so physics cannot cover it. Therefore it is non-physical.

Does the future-to-past arrow of time make the revelation QM uncertainty is a fiction? — ucarr

The uncertainty is not fiction, it is a real aspect of the physics.

The future is a non-physical dimension of time which, in turn, contains the dimension of free will? — ucarr

I would not say that it contains freewill, or else it woud not be free.

Do you agree these questions make it clear the issues being treated here inhabit the domain of science and not philosophy? — ucarr

No, I found those questions mostly incoherent, therefore impossible to answer. I can't say what that means other than that you probably don't understand.

As I understand your timeline of future-to-past, the linkage along the channel of possibility connecting ontological possibility and logical possibility is critically important because this is the continuity wherein free will can act to change contingent things. — ucarr

As I said, the two are not linked, there is a discontinuity, and this allows for the reality of freewill acts being concealed by the discontinuity.

Part 2: Probability: the event may or may not occur. Haven't we been examining the boundary between the actual and the probable? Isn't the future-to-past arrow of time the thing that links ontological possibilities with logical possibilities via free will en route to changes in physical things actualized? Isn't your quote below a declaration of the link between the possible and the actual? — ucarr

I think I see how you misunderstand now. Let's start with two categories, ontological possibilities and ontological actualities. These two constitute our assumed reality as future and past. The boundary between the two (which is really more like an overlap) is the present. We relate to these two through logical possibility, where the three fundamental laws apply to the possibilities for past actualities, and the logic of probabilities relates to the ontological possibilities of the future.

Probabilities are just an extension of the logic of past actualities, so probabilities do not accurately represent the true nature of ontological possibility. Therefore logical possibilities, and probabilities are not linked to ontological possibility. "Probability" which is the way we understand ontological possibility, is linked to logical possibility, which is linked to the actualities of the past. Freewill is the only principle we have which links to ontological possibility.

Isn't your quote below a declaration of the link between the possible and the actual? — ucarr

The ontological actual is linked to the ontological possible, by the present. The logic, by which we represent these two, does link the possible and the actual, but in a different way. The logic is based completely in the actual (past) without a true representation of the future, or present. Therefore the logical representation contains a gap or lack of information where the past is not properly reated to the present or future..

Don't you believe that if something is a necessary pre-condition for another thing, then that necessary pre-condition is logically prior to the contingent thing? — ucarr

Yes, that is why I conclude that the future (the possibility of the thing) is logically prior to the past (actuality of the contingent thing) . However we do not commonly represent things this way. Due to false premises, we represent the past (actuality) as prior to the future (possibility).

The desires of free will change ontological possibilities such that, for example, a girl exercises her free will to receive a green scarf for Christmas instead of a red one. Towards this end, she prays every night before bed to get the green scarf on the big day. Lo and behold, the ship from China comes in at the eleventh hour with green scarves to restock the depleted supply in time, and the girl just knows her prayers made this happen. — ucarr

Was there a point to this?

Free will is the power acting upon ontological possibility so as to change its details along a timeline future-to-past? — ucarr

Sure, something like that, but I still don't understand your terminology "change its details".

By the above quote, do we know: logical possibility also inhabits the future-to-past arrow of time in the manner of: logical priority of possibility (future), being a necessary pre-condition of a contingent thing, also implies temporal ordering before a contingent thing? — ucarr

I believe that we can conclude, that in order to understand the order of time logically, we need to order it in that way, as future prior to past. When we understand the order of time the other way, as past prior to future, there is an incompatibility between temporal priority and logical priority. Since the model of temporal priority commonly used is just a representation of time, then what needs to be changed in order to establish compatibility, is that representation.

Do we know that actual things were possible before becoming actual as, for example, the possibility of a building eventually standing upon a previously vacant lot? — ucarr

Yes we do know this. We know it through the way that we know the planning and construction of the building. Since we can plan for something, and produce it, we know that the possibility of the thing is there before the thing itself. Then as time passes, we act to ensure that all the required actualities (efficient causes) are produced from the possibilities as they emerge out of the future, during the passing of time, so that the project can be successful

Conversely, do we know in advance that things logically impossible don't actualize as real in the world as, for example, a failed attempt to create a statue made of circular triangles? — ucarr

I don't know how this is relevant.

The only way your dialogue works, is to correlate appearance with “looks like”, while Kantian phenomenal correlation is with respect to “presence of”. In order for your arguments to hold, therefore, re: mistakes are inherent in appearances, you have to allow the mere presence of a perceived thing a form of cognitive power, or, grant to appearance more content than the space and time Kantian doctrine permits. — Mww

I don't strictly adhere to Kantian principles, so I left Kant on the last post or two. I grant to appearance, more content.

Not to curtail your dialogue, but as stated it’s not consistent with the reference upon which it is, at least initially, premised. — Mww

I referred to Kant more as an example, than as a premise.

Thing is….I’m sure both of you are fully aware mistakes in empirical cognitions inhere in judgement, not in appearances. And mental illness is not the rule, but the exception to it. — Mww

I believe that since appearances are the creation of the living system (sense apparatus, I think I said), there is nothing wrong with asserting that mistakes inhere within appearance. This is the position Plato took, the senses deceive us. And, good evidence of this is hallucinations and mental illness.

We know ontological possibility and logical possibility are linked. — ucarr

The principal point of my last post was to demonstrate that these two are not linked. There is what I called a gap of information between them. This is due to "logical possibility" having been fundamentally designed to be compatible with observation (laws of noncontradiction etc.), which is of the past, and ontological possibility being of the future.

We know that the free will by which the details of ontological possibility change is active in the future. — ucarr

I don't understand what you're trying to say here. "the details of ontological possibility change".

We know logical possibility pertains to the past, so these things we know tell us, logically, that the arrow of time, from future to past, has free will changing ontological possibility as desired, and then ontological possibility created by free will shapes logical possibility because the two types of possibility must match for the sake of realization in the world. — ucarr

This appears very confused. Consider "ontological possibility" as possibility which exists independently from whether it is actualized, or even apprehended by a mind, in a way similar to the way we would say that actual things exist independently of being apprehended by a mind.

Now, ontological possibility provides the means by which free will may change the world. "Logical possibility" remains distinct as unable to apprehend ontological possibility due to the information gap. So creative forms of logic, such as modal logic, are produced in an attempt to bridge the gap.

Out of all his pie-in-the-skies this is Trump’s worst idea ever... — NOS4A2

What? You would actually judge some of Trumps actions on a scale of evil rather than on a scale of greatness?

The only way he can redeem himself is if this turns out to be some negotiating tactic. — NOS4A2

Isn't everything a negotiating tactic for him? His MO, inflict as much pain as possible, or the threat of pain, until the opponent give in and gives you what you want. The thing left unknown in many cases, is "what the hell does he want?", and this produces the appearance that he's going around inflicting pain, and threatening pain for absolutely no reason.

In the case of physical things, the arrow of time moves from ontological possibility (the future) towards logical possibility (the past) and from logical possibility towards realization of a definite and contingent outcome (the more distant past)? Moreover, the fundamental laws of logic (identity, noncontradiction, excluded middle) apply to this contingent outcome? — ucarr

I don't quite understand this. The arrow of time, in this representation, moves from ontological possibility (future) to ontological actuality (past). Logical possibility, in its basic form, is an epistemic principle, describing how we relate to past occurrences, actualities, when we are not sure exactly what actually occurred. But "logical possibility" gets more complicated when we look toward future events, predictions.

"Logical possibility" when applied to the past, recognizes that there must be "an actual", what actually occurred. When applying "logical possibility" to the future (ontological possibility), there is no such thing as "the actual", and this requires a different form of "logical possibility", known as modal logic. To mix these two senses of "logical possibility" is to equivocate, because one assumes an "actual", seeking to determine the actual, the other does not assume an actual, so it seeks to determine probabilities ony.

That's a gap between the two, which can only be bridged by applying some principles which are required as the criteria to determine the "actual". For example, in physics there is a need for "real time", and in cosmology "world line", to determine what is supposed to be the actual, when relativity principles are used.

Logical possibility, being rooted in definitive identity and the binaries of noncontradiction and the excluded middle, cannot apply to the arrow of time from present to future because no true/false binary attaches to events that may or may not occur? — ucarr

Yes, this may be adequately representative. There is "an actual" in the past, but no "actual" in the future. So if we draw a line of continuity from what has been determined as the actual, in the past, through the present, we have to account for this difference, that we cannot continue in this way, into the future, because there is no actual.

If we represent that boundary as a crossing from what is necessary (what actually happened), to what is probable (what most likely will happen), we need principles to account for this difference. If we cannot account for this difference, it means that we are lacking in information. Something happens at this boundary which manifests as a change between necessary and probable, and we do not have the information required to explain this change.

n the future-to-past arrow of time, QM uncertainty is ontological possibility? — ucarr

QM uncertainty is the result of applying the past-to-future arrow of time. That's the representation used by physics, the one which produces the need for entropy as a principle to account for the reality that time actively passes. There is a lack of information, a gap, because this determinist representation is not a true representation. It does not account for the boundary between the actual and probable.

Instead the mathematical principles employed produce an infinite regress at the approach to the boundary. The lack of information manifests as uncertainty. And this is a representation produced from approaching the boundary from the past side. Therefore it does not represent ontological possibility which is on the future side of the boundary.

This is why the future-to-past arrow of time allows the ontological possibility (causation) of free will to change things? — ucarr

The freewill acts within that informational gap, so it escapes the determinist understanding. By the determinist understanding, the continuity of past actuality, extends through the boundary of the present, into the future, so that there is no informational gap. Future events are apprehended as a necessary continuity of the past actuality, such that there is no possibility of a freewill act.

But if we maintain the boundary, then when we extend the past-present-future timeline through the present, we see that is passes from actual to probable. This provides for the lack of necessity, where the freewill acts. However, to be understood this lack of necessity, and the boundary itself, has to be accounted for by real principles. This may incline one to adopt the future-present-past representation, to incorporate the boundary into the representation. Then the possibility of an action is prior to the act itself, and the passing of time is itself an activity.

I understand my world to be everything that I interact with, together with myself. I interact with many different kinds of thing, some of which don't have a location in any normal sense. Perceptions are one example of this. So I'm not clear what the question is asking for. — Ludwig V

The issue, is that we tend to extend "the world" beyond the limits of our interactions. That is what makes us want to say "I am in the world", in stead of "I am the world". The world is larger than me, so I am in some sense a part of the world, and that's what inclines me to say that I am "in" the word. The problem is that this extension of "the world", to include things beyond the limits of my interactions, requires principles, and the principles cannot be directly derived from the interactions, as they are principles of extrapolation.

But I don't see how accepting one solution to the problem is evading it. — Ludwig V

Given what I said above, to deny the distinction between the world as directly perceived through sensation (one's interactions), and the extended world (the world which consists of more than one's interactions), would be to eliminate the need for principles derived from other than direct sense perception. Therefore it is an evasion of the issue.

I agree with that. But consider - if all you have to go on is appearances, how do you know when you have made a mistake? — Ludwig V

This is a very good question, and it points to the reason why ontology, or metaphysics in general, is a very difficult subject of study. The question ought not be taken lightly, as many do. The issue can be represented by example as:
"How do we know when empirical science is mistaken, if empirical science is consistent with sense observation?".

The common approach is to evade the problem (explained above), deny that science utilizes principles of extrapolation which are derived from somewhere other than empirical observation, and insist that pure, well-principled science cannot be mistaken. Hume demonstrated this problem of extrapolation as the problem of induction. And when we recognize that such nonempirical principles must be applied, then we can broaden that category, of nonempirical knowledge to include the principles by which we interpret sensations. And then it becomes apparent that such principles are necessarily prior to any coherent sensation, as what makes sensations intelligible in the first place.

So this is revealed as the fundamental, basic, or foundational mistake, the idea that knowledge follows from sensation, instead of the reality that sensation follows from knowledge. Then empirical knowledge is understood as an enhancement, or branch of a larger underlying body of knowledge. These are the levels of distinct potentiality described by Aristotle. Prior to being educated in science, a person has the potential to be educated in this way, and after being educated the person has developed to a new level, a different potential.

To answer your question then, "to know when you have made a mistake", requires being educated in fields which are distinct from those fields which focus on analyzing sense appearances. The most inclusive (broad) field here is morality. In morality we learn about what we ought to do, and ought not do, and the basic precepts of what it means to make a mistake. This is the base level for "acquired knowledge".

Some appearances are mistakes. Some appearances aren't mistakes. It would be a mistake to think otherwise. The question is how to tell one from the other. — Ludwig V

The basic point to understand, which can be derived from what I called the "foundational mistake", is that all appearances have inherent within them, mistakes. This is the difference between how the thing is in itself, and how it appears to a person. To recognize, and enforce this differentiation, Aristotle imposed the law of identity. This law recognizes that the identity of a thing is within the thing itself, rather than what we say about the thing. This principle recognizes the separation between the thing and how the thing appears, and acknowledges mistakes within the appearance, through the difference between essences and accidents.

My world is what I interact with. Your world is what you interact with. It follows that if I interact with you, you are a part of my world, and that if you interact with me, I am part of your world. I don't say those two worlds are identical. I do say that they overlap. — Ludwig V

In this way, we have a multitude of worlds. We could produce a model, a representation in which we have up to an infinity of worlds overlapping, but that becomes extremely complex. However, it is intuitive to believe that there is one independent world, and all these worlds are really just part of one united world. Producing this model, or representation, requires that we adopt principles which are derived from somewhere other than our own personal interactions. We have an example of these principles, as the basic inherited knowledge, or potential, which we are born with, and then the basic moral knowledge which builds from this instinct, producing that conception of unity which is so intuitive to us. Hume dwelled on these differences, between distinct sensations or ideas, and the continuity of a united experience.

I think the point is to convince these governments to help tackle the problem, which is apparent in all countries involved. — NOS4A2

"War on Drugs", Nixon. Been there, done that. We now know, without a doubt. that the real way to address drug abuse is from the demand side, not the supply side.

In June 2011, the Global Commission on Drug Policy released a critical report, declaring: "The global war on drugs has failed, with devastating consequences for individuals and societies around the world."[5] In 2023, the UN high commissioner for Human Rights stated that "decades of punitive, 'war on drugs' strategies had failed to prevent an increasing range and quantity of substances from being produced and consumed."[13] That year, the annual US federal drug war budget reached $39 billion, with cumulative spending since 1971 estimated at $1 trillion.[14] — Wikipedia

War on Drugs is just an excuse for Trump, he sees money there to access toward building a wall or whatever the fuck his plan is. He doesn't give a shit about the people who die from fentanyl overdose.

...an attitude that does not pretend that one can exhaust reality but nevertheless recognizes that reality can be truly known. — Leontiskos

Why would you make "reality can be truly known" a condition of the preferred attitude? What principles would support this?

It is that Berkeley collapses the distinction between sensation, imagination, and intellectual abstraction (for example in this post by Feser). — Wayfarer

I believe this is what Hume does as well, so it must have been a trend at that time. Hume seems to reduce ideas, to sense impressions as the fundamental base of an idea. Then all ideas, even complex ideas, become like a compilation of sense impressions. This effectively evades the issue of universals.

I think this needs to be put somewhat differently. For me, "the world has changed for that person" suggests that person is living in one world, which has changed. I would suggest something like "then that person has changed from one world to another. But perhaps that would perhaps raise questions about whether that person is the same person. — Ludwig V

The issue here is the conclusion that the person is living "in" the world. Why do you conclude that the person is in the world rather than concluding that the world is in the person? The changes in "the world" which we were talking about are changes which are caused by the person changing from being happy to unhappy. The unhappy person perceives the world in a different way from when that same person was happy. If these are changes to "the world" for a person, don't we have to conclude that the world is the perception, and the world is within the person, not vise versa?

I'm not quarrelling with the point that happiness and unhappiness affect how we see everything. So these moods are not simply conditioned by the way the world is. But it is complicated, because sometimes the way the world is can change our mood. I would suggest that it is a question of interaction with the world, not a one-way street. — Ludwig V

The issue is where do we position "the world", in this interaction. Like Kant shows, the world is better positioned as phenomenal, how things appear through sensation, rather than as the separate thing itself. The reason for this separation is that mistakes inhere within the appearance, as mental illness demonstrates. If we do not allow for this separation then there is no way to account for the mistakes which the sense apparatus makes, in presenting its representation to the conscious mind. And since the mind only has the appearance to base its judgement on, it must allow for the logical possibility that the sense apparatus is completely mistaken, in an absolute way, as the skeptical starting point. This necessitates, as a starting point, that "the world" refers to the appearance, not the independent thing itself.

But if a non-psychotic person can treat a psychotic person, doesn't that suggest that, at some level, they are both living in the same world? — Ludwig V

I don't see how that conclusion would follow. We must allow that "world" is a defined term. Your example shows interaction between two people. Therefore we need a definition of "world" which implies that if two people interact they share a world. But by the principles above, my world is how things appear to me, and yours is how things appear to you, so interaction appears to be simply a matter of two worlds interacting. By what principles do you reduce two distinct worlds interacting into one united world? You can define "world" as that unity, for that very purpose, but that's a matter of begging the question. Furthermore, it puts all those mistakes discussed above into some sort of limbo, where in one sense they have to be part of the world, but in another sense they have to be excluded from the world. Therefore that sort of begging the question, with a definition designed to evade the issue, only produces more problems.

He sure did. — NOS4A2

So, what's the plan, the drug traffickers will be discouraged by the prospect of tariffs?

My use of "logical possibility" is based on your use of it in the quote immediately below: — ucarr

There is a number of different senses of "possibility" recognized by philosophers, the principle distinction being between logical and ontological (metaphysical) possibility. In the first quote, in the context of contingent things, the sense is ontological possibility. In the second quote, in the sense of "possible paths", this is logical possibility. If you read them both as having the same meaning, that is an equivocal interpretation, not intended by me. I apologize for not being clear, but I expected that the difference did not need to be explained.

Logical possibility is basic to epistemology. If, for example, we say that X,Y, and Z, are all possibilities as to what happened, these are logical possibilities. We assume that one of these possibilities, or an unmentioned one, is what actually occurred. If, on the other hand, I say that a future event is contingent, or possible, this requires an ontological possibility. It is implied that there is something real, within the world, which accounts for this condition, that a specified future event may or may not occur. That is ontological possibility.



The important difference, in common usage, is that in relation to logical possibility we commonly assume that there is an actual "truth" to the matter. In relation to ontological possibility, contingent events, there is no truth or falsity, because the referent is a future event which may or may not occur. As Aristotle showed, we must allow for a violation of the law of excluded middle to provide for the reality of ontological possibility. There is neither truth nor falsity in relation to a future event which may or may not occur.

Here's the link my quote is based on: — ucarr

In QM, in the case of the possible paths, or trajectories, this is a construct of logical possibility. Therefore the "superposition" is a construct of logical possibility. However, there is incompatibility between logical possibility, and ontological possibility, (as described above) because one is derived from past observation, and the other describes future contingent events.

Simply put, the method of logical possibility is not applicable to the possibility of future events which have no truth or falsity, and cannot be represented as such. This is the "gap" referred to in your linked video, and what I called an "informational gap". The informational gap produces a false representation, "superposition". Ontological possibility is represented as logical possibility, with "superposition", and this is a false representation.

What I propose is that ontological possibility is better represented as nonphysical, because it violates the fundamental laws of logic (identity, noncontradiction, excluded middle) which apply to physical things.

At face value, that's nonsense, of course. The same person living in the same world may be happy at some times and not happy at other times. Neither is necessarily a permanent state. But I think the meaning is that happiness and unhappiness affect how one interprets everything in the one world. "Glass half full" and "Glass half empty" are not about different glasses, but different perspectives on the same glass. Happiness and unhappiness affect how one interprets everything. — Ludwig V

I think you misunderstand, "the world" is as interpreted. Therefore the world of the happy person is a completely different world from from the world of the unhappy person, and a difference of interpretation is irrelevant because interpretation is already integral to "the world". That difference is therefore a difference in the world. This is due to the role of the subconscious in interpretation.

If the happy person and the unhappy person are the very same person at a different time, then the world has changed for that person. If you review some of the psychological approaches to depression you'll probably understand this better. Happiness and unhappiness are the result of how one interprets things, so the movement of one to the other is a change of interpretation, the mode of interpretation being logically prior to "the world", as interpreted. Psychological disorders in general, must be understood in this way, because "the real world" is always as it appears to the person, not something separate and independent. Psychosis is not treated by getting the person to understand that what they experience is not the real world.

Didn't Trump say that the tariffs were imposed in an effort to cut down the flow of fentanyl?

Here's a couple things to consider.

Logical possibility extends beyond physics into the realm of non-physics

Physical things, in order to emerge into existence in the present, must be pre-determined by
logical possibility as sufficient reason

Logical possibility causes physics — ucarr

I don't understand your use of "logical possibility".

The present tense of time is best represented as an area of parallel lines: — ucarr

I would not say it is best represented this way. That was just "the best" proposal I could think of at the time..

Although observation resolves the trajectory of an elementary particle into one measurable event, math can only calculate from super-position to a probability distribution of possible trajectories, so logic allows the supposition from uncertainty that an elementary particle trajectory is the non-physical motion of information — ucarr

As I explained, observation does not resolve "the trajectory" of an elementary particle. That's why it's commonly said that the particle takes every possible path. You are still talking about the particle as if it has a trajectory. It does not.

It's logically possible that the "matter hypothesis" is false, but why would we abandon it - unless we had a superior hypothesis? — Relativist

In yor mid, what is the "matter hypothesis"?

I was responding to your contradictory claim ... — Harry Hindu

No wonder I didn't understand. There was no contradictory claim.

So, IS the brain itself a material thing, or is science that reveals the nature of material things misleading us? — Harry Hindu

Both.

The distinction between lying and misleading does not take away from the main point I was making:
Seeing a bent straw in a glass of water is exactly what you would expect to see given the nature of light and that we see light, not objects. Our senses are not misleading us. Our interpretations of what our senses are telling us is misleading us. — Harry Hindu

I have no idea how your example is supposed to demonstrate the point you claim.

You get at the external world by inspecting yourself? — Harry Hindu

Yes, it's the only true way, due to the fact that the senses are misleading.

If we use our ideas to accomplish some task successfully, then it can be safely said that the way we perceived the world at that time was accurate (I'm not really sure the term, "true" is useful here). — Harry Hindu

Again, I don't see how your conclusion follows from your premise. Premise: I can be successful at some task. Conclusion: therefore the way I perceived the world at that time was accurate. Do you see the problem? I set a task for myself, and I make the judgement myself, that I was successful at that task. Then I conclude that because I was successful, the way I perceived the world was accurate.

Unless the task was exclusively designed to be, (and realistically representative in that design), an accurate representation of the world, the conclusion is invalid. If that conclusion was valid, I could define "accurate perception of the world" in any way I wanted, so long as I could complete the designated task which represents this. Obviously, the task represents a very small aspect of the world, and being successful at that task doesn't indicate that my perception of "the world is accurate". Success at self-designated tasks really just demonstrates that I have some degree of understanding of my capabilities, not that I accurately perceive the world. Success at a task doesn't even prove that I know what I am doing. Socrates demonstrated this principle thousands of years ago, and the principle hasn't changed.

Things moving is what causes time to pass. — Arne

I don't think so. I think time passing is what causes things to move.

Time is the measure of change/motion. — Arne

I'm talking about time as the thing which is measured. A clock for example, consists of change/motion, and it is used to measure the passing of time.

Then the very foundation of science is called into question as science relies on observations. Science has pulled the rug out from under itself and doesn't have any ground to stand on. — Harry Hindu

Yes, I think that is the endeavour of skepticism, to call into question the very foundation of science. And, the skeptic will reveal that science does pull the rug out from under itself. It always proceeds from some fundamental assumptions, and progresses as far as it can go based on those assumptions. At this time problems are revealed, and skepticism is required to demonstrate how these problems show how science has pulled the rug out from under itself. This is what is revealed by Kuhn's conception of paradigm shift. The paradigm shift is an essential feature of science, and it is exemplative of knowledge itself. Knowledge proceeds according to a designed method (science in this case), and progresses to the point where it reveals that the method has exhausted itself, and must be replaced.

The fact is that science has not shown that our senses mislead us. It is our interpretations that mislead us. In providing a more accurate explanation of mirages and "bent" straws in a glass of water given the nature of light, we find that mirages and bent straws are exactly what we would expect to see. Our senses aren't lying. Light is bent when it travels through different mediums and is why we experience these things the way we do. It wasn't our senses that were lying, it was our interpretation of our experience without the understanding of how light behaves, and it is light we see, not "material" objects. — Harry Hindu

As I said, our senses don't lie to us, they mislead us. Lying implies that it is done intentionally, the senses do not intentionally mislead us. It's simply the case that the sense organs are product of evolution, and so they are organized toward specific forms of utility. Human beings have now developed a mind which is inclined toward knowledge and truth, but the senses evolved before this inclination of human beings. So the utility of the senses is not knowledge and truth. That is why they mislead us.

Is there any type of perception, either human or not (animals, mad scientists, advanced life forms that create simulations, etc.) that gets at the world directly? — Harry Hindu

I would say introspection does this. But it is not really a type of perception.

It seems to me that the answers lie somewhere between extreme skepticism and extreme (naïve) realism, in that we can trust what our senses tell us given an accurate interpretation, which takes more than one observation and reason integrating these multiple observations into a consistent explanation. — Harry Hindu

I don't think so. The senses were not designed to provide us with truth, so why should we think that they do.

It only seems to question whether we can trust our senses in a material world of brains in vats. The thought experiment still implies that brains requires sensory input from outside of itself. The brain in a vat needs to receive input through its sensory interfaces and would still be connect to the outside world in some way. — Harry Hindu

Well, if you want to get fussy, a brain itself is a material thing, so by that premise alone, it doesn't make sense to think of a brain in a nonmaterial world, whether or not it is in a vat.

I don't believe that our senses lie. They provide information about the world and it is our interpretation of what the senses are telling us that is either accurate or not. — Harry Hindu

I think it's obvious from what science has revealed, that our senses grossly mislead us concerning the nature of reality. I wouldn't say that senses lie though.

If we were brains in vats, what would be the purpose of us experiencing illusions, hallucinations or dreams? What would be the purpose of the experiment, or the reason why our brain is in a vat? Who put the brain in a vat - some entities that do see the world as it is? How would they know that they are not brains in vats? In the same way the "this is a simulation" thought experiment creates an infinite regress of how the simulators don't know they are in a simulation, etc., how do the mad scientists that put our brains in vats know that they are not themselves brains in vats? Why would the mad scientists allow us to even conceive that we might be brains in vats if the point was to fool us? — Harry Hindu

I don't see that this sort of questioning is at all useful. It's like asking if God created the world, who created God. How is this type of question useful? Unless we identify and understand God, we have no way of knowing what created God. Likewise, until we locate the "mad scientists", and interrogate them, we have no way of knowing what their intentions were. So how can a question like this be useful?

So I don't see how the thought experiment is useful. It seems simpler to just say that we interpret our sensory input incorrectly when we make knee-jerk assumptions about what it is we are experiencing, but when we use both observation and reason over time (scientific method) we are able to get at the world with more accuracy. — Harry Hindu

I think the thought experiment demonstrates that the scientific method may be incapable of giving us an accurate understanding. Since it can only validate through sense observation, it cannot validate any part of reality which is inherently unobservable.

Unfettered skepticism that leads to questioning how, or even if, we experience an external world would create all sorts of problems for the brain in a vat idea. Brains and vats are material objects that are experienced, so if you're questioning the reality of your experience then that would include the ontological existence of brains and vats. It makes no sense to question the existence of the material world using a thought experiment involving material objects. By invoking the idea of the existence of the material objects of brains and vats, you're automatically implying that material objects exist and we can perceive them as they are - as brains and vats. — Harry Hindu

That's true, but I think the issue of skepticism is better represented as questioning whether things are as they seem to be. The conception of "matter" involves specific spatiotemporal references in relation to our perceptions. The "brain in a vat" scenario is just an example of how reality could be radically different from the way that we perceive it. So the example serves its purpose regardless of whether we conceive the "brain in a vat" as material, it still demonstrates that this entire conception of "material world", along with the brain in a vat aspect, could be completely wrong.

I don’t find the justification for the given “alters position with time”, with your “fourth dimension of space”. — Mww

To be more specific, it is Einstein's principle of the "relativity of simultaneity", which allows time to be the fourth dimension of space. This provides for "spacetime" where time is the fourth dimension of space.

By conceiving "temporal position" as relative rather than absolute, the conceived flow of time is dependent on spatial references. This allows an equivalence between spatial distance and temporal distance enabling transformations. The need, or purpose, of the "relativity of simultaneity" is to establish light speed as a constant within the conceptual framework of relativity.

My spidey sense is tingling, something evil is underway here.

Your senses don't tell you "I'm picking up a cat", that is a form of interpretation, done by your mind or your brain, something other than the sense organs.

The "brain in a vat", or other explanations appear like alternative explanations, but they all involve problems. For instance, if it's a brain in a vat, where do the senses fit in? They are not part of the brain, and not part of the thing sensed, how do they fit into the brain in a vat scenario? There is a type of interaction problem which occurs if we try to make the brain the sole source of the sensations. In other words, we still have to account for how sensations are caused to appear to that brain. If the brain was creating its own sensations, wouldn't it know that it was doing this? Self deception appears impossible from this perspective, because there is only a brain and nothing else, therefore an evil demon is require. But how does the evil demon get the sensations into the brain without any senses?

So the issue I pointed to, is that there is an "interaction" between the person (self, mind, consciousness, or whatever), and the proposed separate world. Placing "the cause" as completely on one side or the other, solely outside the self, or solely inside the self, are both, each in its own way, deficient ways of looking at things.

We see and hear what we believe is occurring on, say, a loading dock. But we are not allowed to leave the monitoring room, so we have no way of verifying the sights and sounds are coming from an actual, real, existing loading dock. — Art48

This is why we do scientific experiments. We poke and prod the thing and see how it responds. But this raises the following question. If it is true that "we are not allowed to leave the monitoring room", then what gives us the capacity to poke and prod the thing?

So I think that premise, that we are not allowed to leave the monitoring room is not true. We do interact with that world which is explained by "matter". And from our interactions we produce the explanations. But this raises a number of further questions, like how do we judge our explanations, and what inclined you to separate yourself from what you experience, in the first place. Why do you believe that your self is something more than your experience, so that the explanation is proper to your self, and what you experience is something other? What happens if the explanation itself is part of the experience?

So what happened to spatial movements making the concept of time necessary, rather than merely secondary? — Mww

Spatial movements are what make 'the concept' of time necessary. But don't you believe that there is something real which the concept represents? This would be what we know as "the passing of time". Aristotle distinguished two senses of "time". The primary sense is "time" as a measurement, a number assigned to a motion in measurement. This would be 'the concept' of time. But he also explained how in another sense, "time" refers to the thing measured.

So for example, "it took an hour for me to drive to work today" would indicate the primary sense, a measurement. But "an hour past while I was driving to work today" indicates the secondary. Notice the difference? In the first there is a measurement and this measurement assigns "an hour" as the duration of that act. In the second, there is a chunk of time which passed, measured, and this is called "an hour". In the first, the thing measured completely drops out of the picture as irrelevant, because all that matters is the measurement.

Where can I read about the reducing of time to an aspect of space? — Mww

This is relativity theory. It's known as spacetime, in which time becomes the fourth dimension of space.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spacetime

Where does Berkeley lay out an alternative theory of matter? I mostly recall him being fairly adamant about wholly eliminating matter ("immaterialism"), even for non-representationalists (in the Dialogues).

In any event, I was thinking of the "matter" of those he spends most of his time criticizing (e.g. Locke). — Count Timothy von Icarus

I didn't say that he lays out a new theory. I said that by adhering to the Aristotelian (traditional) principles, for understanding "matter", he shows how the divergent conception of matter, what you called "subsistent substrate", is misdirected. "Matter" in this sense is conceived as necessary, while the traditional conception classed it as potential. Hume, I believe had a similar approach. "Matter" in his philosophy would be an inductive concept, therefore lacking in necessity.

Maybe Wayfarer is more accurate, and Berkeley was showing problems with that 'new' concept of matter without any understanding of the Aristotelian concept, but he seems to have at least a fundamental grasp on the classical understanding of contingency which is Aristotelian based.

I believe the shift away from Aristotelianism, in the way that "matter" is conceived, is derived from the physicists. They were the first to drop Aristotle as a principal source for higher education, while his logic was still taught in schools, and philosophers would still study Aristotle.

Newton assigned to bodies, the fundamental property of inertia, with his first law of motion. This effectively replaced Aristotelian "matter", as what provides for the substance of a body. The logical consequence of this, which is unseen without critical analysis, is that "inertia" is a property, while "matter" in the traditional sense is in a separate category, properties being formal. So "inertia" cannot really replace "matter". Therefore it was assumed to be implicit within that conception of inertia, that inertia is a property of matter. But that leaves matter as something itself, subsistent. I believe that this is how the divergent concept of matter, as "subsistent substrate".

A similar, but more substantial issue has developed with the concept of "energy". Strictly speaking, "energy" refers to a property. However, when it comes to things like electromagnetic energy, radiation, people often speak of "energy" as if it is a thing itself. This leaves energy as a property without a substance. We cannot assign "matter" as the subsistent substrate which energy is a property of, so that logically, this concept is left unsubstantiated. This is the result of moving from Aristotelian "substance" which is the fundamental property of individuals, particulars, to allowing that "movement" is what is fundamental to particulars. Movement is allowed to replace substance, but in doing so the need for something which is moving is lost.

Yes, I'll concede that, but there's nothing in Berkeley's philosophy that corresponds with the 'morphe' of Aristotle's hylomorphism. — Wayfarer

I think, that at Berkeley's time, modern philosophy was extremely underdeveloped. There was Cartesian "mind", and Hume was discussing "ideas", but very little in the way of extensive understanding of metaphysics and ontology as there was with the Scholastics. The reason I believe is that popular focus had turned to physics, and a rapidly evolving understanding of motion. Attention was turned in this direction, so the primary focus of philosophy was actually the mathematics required to support the new physics.

Berkeley, I believe noticed that physicists were doing strange things with the conception of "matter", and he wanted to bring attention to this. However, he does not appear to have had any extensive training in classical philosophy.

Hmmm….dammit, you’re right, I forgot about that. In the strictest possible sense of spatial continuity, yours is the stronger for being deferred to the temporal, but for the common understanding of the ordinary man…of which there are decidedly many more than philosophers per se….that a thing is in his way is very much more apparent than the notion that if he waits long enough, it won’t be. — Mww

It's more than just the ordinary man who believes in the priority of spatial relations over temporal. Modern physics has reduced time to being an aspect (dimension) of space. This is due to the fact that with empirical science we assign importance to sense observation in understanding the reality of substance. Sense observation is of the external, therefore producing principles of spatial separations and movements. "Time" as being understood through internal reflection, and logical comparisons, is secondary.

I agree with Count Timothy von Icarus. As I put it in an earlier post: — Wayfarer

The quote you provided seems to agree with me. Berkeley was criticizing the 'new' conception of matter. And he did this by falling back onto a more Aristotelian conception which allows him to disassociate substance from matter. He showed that substance does not require matter. This is what i said:

I believe that Berkeley is actually demonstrating the incorrectness of this 'new' way of conceiving of "matter" by showing how these ideas that people have about "matter" do not hold up if we adhere to principles. — Metaphysician Undercover

Kinda agreed. I’d be more inclined to grant to the concept of matter the underpinning for spatial continuity allowing a body to have an identity. — Mww

This is an interesting perspective. But I tend to apprehend spatial features of a body as formal rather than material. Spatial features tend to be the traditional properties, which are formal.

In his Physics, Aristotle describes the material cause as what persists through change. This idea of persistence from one time to another, is why I interpret "matter" as temporal continuity. Zeno's paradoxes, and the idea of infinite divisibility, had cast doubt toward the reality of spatial continuity. So Aristotle moved to assign identity to the thing itself, and the essence of being a thing is to have temporal extension, as a continuous duration of being.

While it's true that for Aristotle "matter is what stays the same," when there is change, the "matter" and "substance" of Berkeley's era had changed dramatically from their ancient or medieval usages. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I do not agree. Berkeley takes "matter" in very much the way of Aristotle. That's how he manages to conceive of substance without matter.

The entire idea of "materialism" makes no sense from an Aristotelian framework. It would amount to claiming the whole world is just potency, with no actuality, and so nothing at all. But the term "matter" by Berkeley's era is more often conceived as a sort of subsistent substrate (often atomic) of which spatial, corporeal bodies are composed, such that their properties are a function of their matter (which would make no sense under the older conception of matter as potential). — Count Timothy von Icarus

I believe that Berkeley is actually demonstrating the incorrectness of this 'new' way of conceiving of "matter" by showing how these ideas that people have about "matter" do not hold up if we adhere to principles.

The reason why I mentioned Marx, is because he also maintained the Aristotelian conception of matter. But Marx demonstrated how, contrary to what you say here, a true materialism is possible. It just develops some odd features like violation of the law of non-contradiction in dialectical materialism. But Marxist materialism is actually well structured conceptually.

"Idealism" ("eidos-ism") would also make no sense in the Aristotelian frame. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This is why Marx was so easily able to invert Hegelian idealism, and transform it into materialism. Aristotle refuted traditional (Pythagorean) idealism by putting human ideas, and matter, both in the same category as potential, then applying the cosmological argument. So when Hegel proposed "the Idea" as fundamental, Marx was able to apply Aristotelian principles to replace "the Idea" with "matter", thereby hijacking Hegelian dialectics and turning that idealism into materialism. And then it turns out that Hegelian principles are better suited to materialism than idealism.