Do you really want me to explain why stealing my car prevents me from being able to make choices about what to do with my stuff, but beating me in a competition does not, or are you just being facetious? — Dan

That is not the issue. "One's own choice" is defined as a choice concerning what to do with one's own mind, body, and property. It is not defined as a choice which does not prevent someone else from making one's own choice. The latter is not a definition, it is a fallacy of a "circular definition", a self-referential definition. And I've already explained to you why the choice to steal your car is just as much a choice concerning my own mind, body, and property, as are the choices which lead to beating another in a competition.

Anyway, I explained to you how hurting another emotionally may lead to anger, or other feelings which could result in an attack on the person, or some other vengeful activity. So I do not think you have any argument there.

But just like when you said this the first time, you're just wrong that habits and education reduces someone's ability to understand and make their own choices (though miseducation of the kind that leads to people not understanding their own choices would obviously be morally relevant). — Dan

Again, you misrepresent the issue. It is not a matter of whether teaching a person "reduces someone's ability to understand and make their own choices", it is a question of whether the decision to teach a person is a choice about one's own mind, body, and property. Clearly, the choice to teach a person is just as much a choice concerning someone else's mind, as the choice to steal a car is a choice concerning someone else's property.

You aren't simply applying it in a consistent way, you are insisting on applying it either in such a way that our own choices can't affect others at all or in which any choice that you make with your own mind (which is presumably all of them) are your own choices. These are not the only options, and neither is one I would endorse. — Dan

Sure, there are other options, like making an arbitrary distinction like you have, which as I explained, has principles weighted by your personal preferences. You think for example, that stealing a person's car has more moral significance than educating a person does. I think it is very clear that the opposite is true. Stealing a person's car has a one time, flash-in-the-pan effect on the person, which is very minimal in the scale of a person's lifetime, but educating a person has a lifelong effect on the person.

There's a few issues here. First, what choices one has access to and what choices one ought to have access to are not the same thing. Second, the choice is taken from me in the moment of arm breaking. It's no use saying that I don't have the choice once you've taken it from me, that is precisely the problem. — Dan

I spent a long time, at the beginning of this thread, trying to explain to you how any choice which a person makes limits that person's options, therefore restricting the person's freedom. Now you seem to be starting to understand, expressing how another person's choice may limit one's freedom. To fully understand this principle you need to recognize that a person's own choice limits one's freedom even more than the choice of another does.

Again, we are getting into trouble because I am saying that the emotional distress is not morally relevant in the sense that it does not have moral value or disvalue that contributes to the consequences of an action being good or bad, are you are reading that as saying something else. Hopefully I have cleared up that misunderstanding. — Dan

Oh sure, earlier you refused to distinguish between the choice, and the action which follows from the choice. Now, when it serves your purpose, you separate the act from the choice, to say that emotional distress does not contribute to the goodness or badness of the consequences of an "act". However, it is simply trickery, sophistry, to dismiss emotional distress in this way. Anger clearly contributes to the choices a person makes, producing consequences which are bad, bad actions. Therefore it has moral value in relation to choices. I am surprised that a person of your intelligence level would resort to such a sneaky trick, just to try and support a failing theory.

I have explained why the choices to be protected should be restricted to one's own choices. I don't think it is vague to say you get to decide what to do with your own mind, body, and property. I think the limits of that (eg, your mind, body and property, not mine) are pretty clear. — Dan

That is overwhelmingly false. As we've discussed, every choice which an individual makes concerns what to do with one's own mind, body, or property. There is no limit intrinsic to that definition of "one's own choices". However, since our world is a communal world, what one does with one's own mind, body, and property, often has significant effect on the mind, body, and property of others.

As the examples we've discussed demonstrate, your goal is to impose a very arbitrary, and not at all well defined distinction between different types of "effects on others". Based on this ill-define distinction, you say that some types of choices belong to a person (are one's own), and other types of choices do not belong to the person (are not one's own). Your claim, that these "limits" are "pretty clear", is blatantly false. As evident from the examples, the proposed limit is arbitrary and weighted to your personal preferences. For example, when I damage your property (steal your car) this is weighted towards "not a choice which belongs to me", but when you damage my ego (beat me in a competition), this is weighted towards "a choice which belongs to you".

Please refer back to our earlier discussions about how education, and the establishing of habits of thinking, is a means by which people exercise considerable influence over the minds of others. The effects which education has are very significant, therefore choices made to educate others ought not be classed as one's own choice. Furthermore, any time that a person asks another for assistance, this would not be based in one's own choice.

The issue is, that since we live in a communal world, then once we start to apply your proposed principle of distinction in a consistent way, we end up with very few choices which are actually "one's own". This leaves the question of why do you want to protect the ability to make such choices. How are such choices at all valuable?

You breaking my bone very much affects my ability to understand and make choices about my own body, such as whether I want my bones broken. — Dan

You appear to be totally neglectful, and ignorant of the temporal nature of choices, which was discussed earlier. Choices relate to future possibilities, we must consider the past as determined. After you've had a bone broken, you cannot choose not to have it broken. You can wish that it did not happen, but such wishes must be separated out from, and dismissed as irrelevant to, the decision making process of a healthy mind. In Christian ethics, the separating of the past, from decisions toward the future, is very important, and this manifests in the confession/forgiveness process. "Jesus died for our sins" is a proposition which allows us to separate ourselves from the mistakes of the past, and move forward with a clear conscience.

Emotional distress, on the other hand, just isn't in itself morally relevant. If someone is made sad, or happy, it doesn't matter morally. — Dan

Like the beginning of your post, this at the end, is also blatantly false. Emotional distress is of immense moral importance. Anger for example is a contributing factor to a vast array of immoral acts. The angry person may act in a vengeful way, and this would mark a turning from making "one's own choices", toward choices which do not belong to the person ( even by your standards). Therefore it would be very foolish to dismiss emotional distress as not morally relevant. For example, if I injured you (broke a bone in the other example) this may send you into a condition of emotional distress (anger), and even though you maintain the ability to understand and make your own choices, you start to make choices which do not belong to you (revenge).

The issue being that choices are freely made, and a turning away from making one's own choices toward making choices which do not belong to oneself (by your proposed distinction), does not indicate that the ability to understand and make one's own choices is impaired. It simply means that the person has decided on other choices at that particular time.

However, the perspective which I am coming from is that of not viewing evolution as having been reached ultimately. — Jack Cummins

I would say that the idea that evolution has reached some kind of end, would be very foolish.

The issue is how to determine which choices belong to a person and which do not. The ability to make "one's own choices" is what you desire to protect. Your criteria of concerning what to do with "one's own mind, body, and property" is very doubtful as to applicability, because most actual choices in practise, concern activities in the public sphere, and so choices concerning one's own mind, body, or property, have varying degrees of influence over the mind, body, and property of others.

You seem to have some sort of arbitrary guideline in your mind, as to the degree that a person's actions will affect others, which is supposed to act as a divisor between the categories of choices which belong to the person, and those which do not. If I understand correctly, the divisor itself, is the degree to which an act effects another person's ability to make one's own choice. So, if I choose to use my own body and my own property, and the effect is to crush your body, to the extent that your own capacity to make your own choices is restricted, then this is not a choice which belongs to me. However, if my choice simply makes you emotional, unhappy because I beat you in a competition, then this is a choice which belongs to me, because I have not robbed you of your ability to make your own choices.

Dear Dan, I think you ought to see this as extremely problematic. I could perform an act which injures you in a bodily way, cuts you, or breaks a bone, and this would not impair your ability to make your own decisions any more (perhaps even less) than causing you emotional distress would. Furthermore, since all choices concern doing something with one's own mind, body, or property, and there is almost always effects on others, then the determining factor, as to what qualifies as one's own choice, amounts to a decision based on the application of the arbitrary divisor you have in mind. The arbitrary divisor seems to be the degree to which other peoples' ability to make one's own choice is affected. But there is no clear definition of what constitutes "one's own choice", so there is an infinite regress of vagueness. To determine whether a choice is "one's own to make", we must refer to whether it affects the ability of another to make one's own choice, but we haven't yet determined how to know what "one's own choice" actually is.

Because of these problems with defining "one's own choice", I suggest that you drop this requirement, that the type of choice you want to protect the ability to make, is "one's own". Why not just start with the principle that you want to protect the ability to make choices? This would be a much better representation of "freedom", the capacity to make any choice whatsoever without restriction, and so you could start with this as your fundamental principle. Then you could apply your structure of necessary restrictions, due to moral relevance, to this freedom to make choices, in the most general sense.

We just use those things to change the way an object’s surface reflects light. That does not suggest that colour is a mind-independent property of the object’s surface. — Michael

In quantum physics reflection is actually an interaction between light and electrons, explained as simultaneous absorption and emission of photons. Each photon of light interacts with all the electrons at the surface of the reflecting object, but there is a time difference depending on how far away the part of the surface is from the source of the photon. The frequency of photon emitted from the electron depends on the energy level of the electron. It's very complex, but something like that.

The argument from Aristotle is that a body is an organized existence, and an agent is required for any type of organization, as the organizer. Therefore the agent as organizer, is prior in time to the existence of the body. Of course abiogenesis is the basis for a denial of the secondary premise, but as the op points out, it's not a justified denial.

That's cool, the way to fight fascism is through sexual freedom, and the pure unadulterated enjoyment of it, "harmonious channelling of libido and orgastic potency". Why would anyone ban something so pleasantly childish?

My opinion is the opposite: that the dog is less-equipped to see the world, not only because it has only a fraction of the cones we do, but because it sees less of the world as a result. — NOS4A2

But dogs can see in the dark. They forfeit one advantage for the sake of another.

Consequentialism is all about judging the consequences of actions by their moral value in order to determine if that action is right/wrong/permissible/etc. — Dan

Well, I do not agree with this, I think consequentialism is all about judging the moral value of actions through an assessment of the consequences. Moral value is attributed to the actions not the consequences.

Nevertheless, if we uphold this principle, that moral value is attributed to consequences, then your inconsistency becomes even more clear. The following is what you said about a person's own choice:

There are lots of intentional acts one could make that affect others but are entirely that person's own choice. If I beat you in a contest, I have affected you with my choices, and in ways you would presumably prefer I didn't, but I haven't restricted your ability to understand and make your own decisions. It wasn't your choice whether you won the contest or not, so my denying you that opportunity doesn't affect you in a morally relevant way. These restrictions you are worried about are of your own invention. — Dan

If moral value is attributed to the consequences of an action, then it is very clear that if a choice affects others, it affects them in a morally relevant way, whether the person intends to have an effect on others or not, and so this cannot be said to be one's own choice. If the person understands it as one's own choice, then that person misunderstands, not realizing the affects it will have on others.

So if you think that the choices which you make in that contest, are your own choices (concerning your own mind, body, or property) to make, then you misunderstand what your choice is really about. In reality the choice you make affects my mind as much as yours, so it is not really a choice which belongs to you. This is no different from if I decided to smash my car into yours, or even if I decided to drive over people. You would say that it was a choice that did not belong to me because I am destroying your car, or the ability of others to make their own choices, if I run people over. In reality, I just misunderstood, thinking that the choice did belong to me, because it is something I am doing with my car, and I am not considering the consequences which my actions have on others. This means I am inconsiderate. Likewise, when you beat me in a contest, and you think that that was the result of choices which belong to you, you simply misunderstand. Those choices do not belong to you. because it was me who you beat, and my mind, and the ability to make my own choices, which you are imposing suffering on, not your own, even though you are doing it with your own mind. Just like I am being inconsiderate when I impose suffering with my own car, you are being inconsiderate when you impose suffering through the contest.

In both of these cases the words 'naive' and 'scientific' are used metaphorically (or rethorically), not literally. — jkop

I guess I just don't see the metaphor here, and the use appears to me to be literal.

I mean yeah, those consequences can still be judged for moral value in the sense that they can be consequences that are morally good. It doesn't make sense to say the tornado "acted" rightly, but the consequences that occur, the situation which results, has higher moral value than what would have occurred in the situation where the tornado destroyed your house. — Dan

I really do not understand what you could possibly mean by "higher moral value" here. Perhaps you could explain. Suppose I\m watching the approach of a tornado. I see that it misses all the houses in the neighbourhood, and rips through a forest instead. You say that there is moral value in this situation. Can you explain what you mean? Is it because the tornado could have killed people, but didn't? I could have got hit by a bus yesterday, but didn't. Does that mean there is moral value in the consequences of the bus not hitting me? Does any situation which can be judged as either negative or positive have moral value?

That doesn't follow at all from what I said. My ability to understand and make my own decisions isn't restricted by me freely making a decision to allow you to use my car. Rather, it is exercised. — Dan

But the example does not concern your ability to make your own decisions, it concerns the question of whether deciding to use your car in this situation is a choice which belongs to me or not.

Or, are you now distinguishing whether a choice belongs to me or not, by how it affects others' ability to make their own choices? That's what it appears like. If my choice doesn't restrict your ability to make your own choices, then the choice belongs to me. That would be very problematic.

That is neither what I said nor what I meant. Consenting to sex is a choice that belongs to you, but having it is not (in the sense that if no one is keen to participate in that activity with you, your ability to understand and make your choices has not been restricted. — Dan

Again, it appears like you are defining "one's own choice" in relation to whether the choice restricts the ability of others to make their own choices. This would lead to an infinite regress without ever determining what it means to make one's own choice.

It is a theory of what choices are morally permissible, but that all flows from whether those choices protect or violate the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices. Making their own choices is (usually) morally permissible, but not all morally permissible choices are choices which belong to the person making them. — Dan

Sure, but in order for this principle to have any meaning, and to be able to be brought to bear on any real situations, we need to know what "their own choices" means. First you said that these are choices which concern one's own mind, body, and property. Then you allowed that in some situations, such as consent or agreement, choices concerning another's mind. body, or property also belong to the person. Now you seem to be saying that so long as the choice doesn't restrict another's capacity to make one's own choice, then the choice is one's own choice. This gets me no closer toward understanding what you mean by one's own choice.

For example, I haven't said that choices concerning the mind, body, and property of others belong to the person at all. — Dan

OK, so we've gone around a big circle. Let me get back to the issue as it was then. In general, choices which are judged as morally good, are not choices which belong to the person at all, if this means concerning one's own mind, body, or property. This is because morally good choices are about the mind, body, and property of others. So, how do you justify wanting to protect choices which belong to the person? And please, don't go off on a tangent again, speaking about how choices which belong to the person may affect the body or property of another in an accidental way, because the morally good acts, which we want to consider, are when we intentionally act in a good way. Why have a principle which promotes protecting the ability to make one's own choices, when a much better principle would be to protect the ability to make morally good choices. Neither of these principles is about protecting freedom of choice, so that idea is just a ruse anyway.

I think 'naive' is fine, because in the philosophy of perception it does not refer to ignorance. — jkop

What does it refer to then?

In the philosophy of perception, 'naive realism' is the name for the idea that the relation between observer and object is direct. — jkop

What are you saying, that "direct realism" is better terminology? I suppose it's better because the word "direct" clearly exposes the faults. Obviously, there is a medium between the supposed "thing" which is seen, and the perception of it. People here are describing that medium in terms of wavelengths, so we might imagine that the visual aspect of "the real" consists of waves.

A realist account of perception will have to consider what the agent themselves brings to the encounter in terms of subjectivity, context, history, affordance, cultural sediment etc. — Bodhy

Yes, this is a much better starting point. Instead of thinking of the subject as being passively subjected to a world of activity, therefore producing an effect from that causation, it is much better to think of the agent as actively causing the world, as perceived. Then we can look at the way that the supposed external world of activity affects, or has an effect on, the perceived world which the agent creates for itself.

No, the moral value in the consequences does not require intent. This is very much the point of consequentialism. Whether you meant to push the kid out of the way of the bus or whether you just thought it would be funny to push a child over, the consequences are just as good. I've already explained why I think we should use the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices as the measure of value, and that reason wasn't because intent is necessary to result in good consequences. — Dan

This example is not comparable. Pushing the kid is an intentional act, whether or not the intent is to kill the kid. Since it is an intentional act, the perpetrator is held accountable. If it was done as a joke, and the possibility of death was completely unforeseen, then the punishment would likely be less than if it was a planned murder. Regardless, the joke and the murder are both intentional acts. In you other example, the tornado does not act intentionally, so the consequences of its activities are not judged for moral value.

If this is what you really believe, that the consequences of inanimate activities can be judged for moral value, then it constitutes a significant difference of opinion between you and I.

That being said, if you did obtain my consent to use my car, then that would make the use of my car morally permissible because I have made the choice that you can use it and it is my car, so you haven't taken my ability to understand and make those choices which belong to me away from me through your use of it (which you would have in the case where you stole it) — Dan

See, your principle of "a choice which belongs to the person" is exactly as I say, based in moral judgement. When the choice is to do something "morally permissible" with another's body or property, then it qualifies as "my own choice". When the choice is to do something not "morally permissible with another's body or property, then it does not qualify as "my own choice". Therefore, just like I told you earlier, your goal to protect persons' ability to understand and make their own choices, is not a goal of protecting freedom at all, it is a goal of protecting moral restraint, i.e., to choose only what is "morally permissible".

The choices which belong to you are the choices of what to do with your mind, body, and property. — Dan

This is not true. You now admit to allowing that choices of what to do with another's body or property also qualify as choices which belong to you. This consists of things like a shared game, consensual sex, using borrowed property, etc.. It seems like so long as the choice is to do something morally permissible, it is one's own choice. So it is becoming more and more clear that your principle is not to protect the ability of people to understand and make their own choices (to protect some sort of freedom), but to protect the ability to understand and make choices which are morally acceptable (some sort of moral restraint).

Sorry, are you really surprised that in a theory that focuses on the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices, that what those persons agree or consent to is relevant to what it is morally acceptable to do to them? — Dan

No, I was a little surprised that a theory which claims to protect one's freedom of choice, is really a theory which only supports morally permissible choices. I'm not too surprised now, because I brought this to your attention, at the beginning of our engagement. I thought I'd give you a chance to explain yourself though, but we're not getting anywhere.

Without wanting to sound like too much of a jerk, I think if you look over our previous conversations with the assumption that I have been saying the same thing the whole time, they would make more sense to you. — Dan

You aren't saying the same thing though. Before, you said that choices which belong to a person are choices concerning one's own mind body and property. You continue to assert that, but your examples show clearly that choices concerning the mind, body, and property of others are also choices which belong to the person. This appears like inconsistency, but it's not necessarily. If we surmise that your principle is really "the ability to understand and make choices which are morally permissible", rather that "the ability to understand and make one's own choices", then the appearance of inconsistency is resolved.

There is a reason why the word "naïve" is used to describe naïve realism. The person holding this view is like an ignorant child rejecting higher education. The attitude is that the knowledge which I have is adequate and sufficient for me to live comfortably, and I do not want this to change. The problem though is that the rejection of higher education requires justification and that's when the naïve realist gets emotional.

This is also in line with compatabilism, which sees determined and determining aspects of human consciousness. — Jack Cummins

The issue with determinism is that what has happened in the past determines what will happen in the future. A determinist and a free willist may both agree that the past has been determined, but where they would disagree is on how the past relates to the future, the free willist denying that the past determines the future in the way of necessity. The two cannot be made compatible. Distinguishing a determined part from a determining part denies determinism because under determinism the determined part (past) is the determining part. And for the free willist the distinction only recognizes the difference between the past-looking and future-looking aspects of consciousness.

When judging the consequences of an action, you can say they are good or bad in a moral sense there something morally valuable being increased/decreased/promoted/protected/restricted/violated. The tornado wasn't "right" to turn away, but the outcome was good. — Dan

We have a deep difference as to what constitutes "morally valuable" In my understanding, what provides moral value to the consequences of an act is the intent of the conscious agent. If you remove the necessity of intent, then choice is only relevant in an accidental way. This would make it very difficult to justify your principle that choice is the best measure of value. If we can produce morally good results without making choices, why should we protect the ability to make choices?

All of these choices are choices about what to do with the mind, body, and property of the person making them, not that of others. — Dan

As I said, all decisions to act, or do anything at all, are choices about what to do with one's own mind, body, or property. That someone else's property might also be involved is accidental. This includes my decision to steal your car, as an example you said was not a choice which belongs to me. It now appears to be a choice which belongs to me because I am using my own body and tools. However, now you insist that stealing is not a choice which belongs to me because there is no consent. You really have provided absolutely no principles to distinguish between a choice which belongs to a person, and one which does not.

That was not my definition, that was how you incorrectly interpretted my definition. The choice to steal a car isn't yours because the car isn't yours. The choice of what to do with my car is mine because the car is mine. The choice to play a game with me isn't per se yours, but the choice to agree to play a game with me, to play games with those who will play them with you, is yours because it is a choice of what to do with your own mind and body (maybe property depending on the game). If I don't want to play, like in the case of you taking my car, you don't get to make that choice for me. But if we are both choosing to participate in the game, we are both making choices about what we do with our own minds and bodies, and that's no problem. — Dan

You simply introduce these terms, "consent", "agree", and you act as if whatever it is which is referred to by them magically converts a choice which appears to be one which does not belong to a person into one which does. We are talking about the ability of a person to understand and make one's own decisions. How does you giving me consent to borrow your car, affect that ability of mine, in relation to my choice to use your car without your consent? You are making no sense.

Again, it's always been the same definition. You just seem to be having trouble grasping it. I feel like I've been pretty clear, so I must wonder if it is in some way intentional. — Dan

You have not been clear at all. First, you insisted that "one's own choice" was a very special sort of choice, such that if I chose to steal your car this is not my own choice because it was a choice which involves your property. Now you insist that all choices I make which involve my own mind, body and property are my own, even if they involve your body or property as well. This implies that any choice I make, to do anything at all, including stealing your car, is my own choice, because it involves doing something with my own body and mind. But now you've arbitrarily added a constraint, "consent", or "agree", as if this makes a difference. How many other arbitrary constraints are you going to add, to mold and shape this concept "one's own choice", to suit your purposes? Will you make a new exception every time a situation comes up which your principles cannot deal with?

No, it is a good outcome in the sense of a morally good outcome. One we should aim to acheive. If we could have turned the tornado, we should have. — Dan

You are still not making any sense. If people intentionally turned the tornado, then that act could be judged as morally good or bad, perhaps based on the outcome of the act, or perhaps based on the intention, or a combination of both, depending on one's ethical principles. In my understanding of morality, what the tornado itself does, or the consequences of what it does, is never judged as morally bad or good. It appears like we may have an unsurpassable difference as to what "morality" implies. You allow that morality can be assigned to the consequences of the activities of inanimate things, whereas I believe that when inanimate things are judged to have caused good or bad outcomes this is a completely different sense of good and bad.

Okay, I understand what you are taking issue with now, but you're just wrong. My choosing to enter those contests that will have me is a choice that belongs to me. There are a bunch of choices like this, such as choosing to have sexual intercourse with someone. — Dan

OK, but now you need to go back and redefine "one's own choice", and the outcome of weeks of discussion has been to change your mind about what "one's own choice" means. You now allow that making a choice which belongs to a person can be a choice concerning the mind, body, or property of others. So what is left for "one's own choice", other than a choice which a person understands and makes. Then why is my choice to steal your car not my own choice? How does consent from you, that I may borrow your car, change the nature of my choice to use your car? They are both freely willed choices which I understand. Why does one belong to me, and the other does not? How do you now define "one's own choice", and what distinguishes it from a morally good choice? Why not just say that one's own choice is one which is morally acceptable?

Your claim that choices that belong to a person can't affect others is just wrong from the off. — Dan

That was your definition. A choice which belongs to a person is one which concerns only that person's mind, body or property. If you now allow that a choice which belongs to a person may also concern the mind, body, or property of others, then this means the decision to do anything is one's own choice. If I decide to steal your car, it's a choice which involves my own body and my own tools which I will use, and also your property. How is this fundamentally different from deciding to play a game with you, other than that it is morally bad, and against the law? Why not just say that a choice which belongs to a person is one which is morally acceptable?

I mean, I think we are likely to get tied in knots with this since you still seem unclear on what I am saying, but fine, I'll say something about why the ability to understand and make our own choices is the best candidate for moral value. I'm not going to go over everything, but I'll give what I think is the best reason: — Dan

Going by the new sense of "the ability to understand and make our own choices" which you have now presented me with, I will simplify this with "the ability to make choices", as all decisions to act now appear to be one's own choices. And I will assume that this is what you are arguing is the best candidate for moral value, the ability to make choices.

If we assume that morality applies to all free, rational agents, then it seems that what we want is a measure of moral value that applies to all free, rational agents. The ability to understand and make choices fits this bill, as it essentially the ability to exercise one's free will, rationality, and, in a sense, agency. If we don't include measures which make up part of this one (such as just being able to understand choices), then it is essentially the only measure of value which applies to all moral agents, possible as well as actual. — Dan

But how do we get moral value out of this? As I've been telling you, the freedom to choose is just as likely to produce bad acts as it is to produce good acts. You can say that the freedom to choose ought to be protected, but why, if it's just as likely to produce bad acts as good acts? It's like you are saying that the tornado ought to be free to go wherever it goes, and no one ought to attempt to interfere. So it misses this house and destroys that house, and it's all "good" because the principle is that it is best to allow it to wonder freely without restrictions. And if you want to apply restrictions to human choices, then you are not protecting freedom. And if you qualify "choices" with "one's own choices", such that it means nothing other than choices which are morally acceptable, then all you are preaching is moral restraint.

As for why it should be constrained to their own choices, rather than any choices, this is more of a modus tollens. If we considered all possible choices, then this would lead to constant moral conflict and may render the moral theory unable to be action-guiding. Given that that is rather that moral theories are for, where the ability to understand and make choices should be protected is limited to choices over things that a person owns, specifically their mind, their body, and their property. — Dan

Now you finally admit it. What you are arguing for is moral restraint, and this is not a matter of protecting freedom at all. What you really mean by "their own choices" is choices which are morally acceptable according to principles like "consent", and what you are arguing for is not freedom of choice, but restriction of choice according to some moral principles. Why don't you just accept that this is what your principles are all about, instead of trying to create the illusion that you are trying to produce principles for protecting freedom?

Believing that human beings can be understood in the terms of scientific materialism, they reject any idea of free will. — Jack Cummins

There is inconsistency in the belief that all reality is governed by the laws of physics, and the belief in free will. The fundamental discrepancy in its base, is derived from the way that we interpret Newton's first law of motion. This law indicates that for a body's motion to be altered there is required an external force. If we interpret this law as applicable to all bodies then a belief in determinism is the outcome. On the other hand, if we allow that some special bodies, living bodies, may be moved by an internal force such as "spirit" or "soul", then we provide for ourselves the principle required to believe in free will.

Gray argues that the illusion of lack of freedom and free will enables people to be 'like fairground puppets', escaping the 'burden of choice'. In that respect, determinism is an ideology. — Jack Cummins

This appears to be an oversimplification of a very complex situation. My opinion is that belief in science, and confidence in science's capacity to provide for us a very powerful understanding of the world, is well supported by experience. This produces a complacency in the majority of human beings, in relation to aspects of the world which science does not provide an adequate understanding of, like freewill. The underlying current is, science will figure it out, and this feeds the illusion of lack of freedom (if it is in fact an illusion). So the majority of human beings just go with the flow, allowing the external forces of the world to move them this way and that way, and in many contrary, conflicting, and confusing ways, believing that this is their fate. That creates what the spiritual would call tormented souls. The conflicted soul does not give proper attention to the capacity of will power.

To say the outcome, that of not having your house destroyed, is morally good, in the sense of having high moral value, is entirely sensible. — Dan

I disagree. The moral value is in the act itself. Consequentialism measures the act by the outcome, but it does not place the moral value in the results of the act. The outcome is judged as an indication of the intent. The tornado has no intent, there is no moral value in the outcome of its activities. The "good" in not having the house destroyed is a different sense of good, like "good fortune". This sense of "good" is judged by a scale other than a moral scale.

I'm not sure what you are saying here. You said that protecting only those choices that belong to a person means that any choice that affects others must be restricted. I am pointing out that this isn't the case and giving an example where this is clearly not the case. — Dan

We were not talking about restricting choices, we were talking about the type of choice, the ability to make which, deserves protection; one's own choices. I asked you why the ability to make these choices merits protection. If the choices concern only what belongs to the person, then what good are they? The tornado example is clearly not relevant. Also, in your other example, choices concerning a contest are not one's own choices, by your definition. A contest concerns others, so this means that the choices are not one's own, and that example is no good either.

I was objecting to this statement you made:

There are lots of intentional acts one could make that affect others but are entirely that person's own choice. — Dan

A person's own choice concerns only what belongs to that person, by your definition. Therefore when the choice effects others, like your example of the contest, the choice cannot be said to be one's own choice. So I am still waiting for you to justify this standard of moral value, your ideal, "the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices".

The problem being, that "good", "right", and "correct", when used in the moral sense, are applied to actions which are generally not the result of one's own choices. These are the result of choices which intentionally affect others. This leaves us with the problem I have presented to you. Why does the ability to make this type of choice deserve to be protected? That they may be good in an accidental way, like the tornado's acts are, does not merit protection, because the acts would be just as likely to be accidentally bad. Isn't it a far better principle to protect intentionally good moral acts, than to protect the possibility of an accidentally good act? But then we must completely rid ourselves of the misleading idea that this is some sort of freedom which is being protected. This is really moral restraint through the application of restrictions.

I don't know Dan, we're not making progress. In fact, what you write now, is making less and less sense to me.

A good candidate for a measure of value is one that is likely to be correct. In order to consider what is most likely to be correct, we make some assumptions, or theory selection criteria. — Dan

For instance, this appears to be totally backward to me. When you say "correct", wouldn't it be better to say "true"? The thing about correctness, is that it is theory dependent, so that "correct" is relative to the theory, therefore determined by the criteria set out by the theory. This leaves no principles for comparing one theory to another. So, your specific theory places "the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices", as the principle which sets the criteria, but we still need a way to judge that principle. That is what I am asking you for. Justify that principle, give me the reason why it is the one you have chosen, why you think it is the best measure, the ideal. "True" implies corresponding with reality, and since you claim to believe in objective morality, then we ought to be able to look for some form of truth to serve as judgement for that principle. Can you tell me why you think it is true that "the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices" makes a good candidate for a measure of value.

For example, utilitarianism selects happiness based on the assumption that whatever humans pursue for themselves they should also pursue for others based on the additional assumptions that not doing so would be irrationally making an exception of yourself and doing that would be immoral, and that humans all pursue their own happiness. As I've pointed out before, — Dan

The key aspect of this utilitarian principle is "the additional assumptions that not doing so would be irrationally making an exception of yourself". Happiness is a personal thing, just like making choices is a personal thing. That it is irrational to place one's own happiness as more important than that of another, is a principle which needs to be justified, just like a claim that it is irrational to place one's own choices as more important than the choices of another, would need to be justified. It seems to me that the opposite is really the case. Only I can do the things most required to make me happy, eat, sleep, etc., so I think it would be irrational to think that I should place other persons' happiness as just as important as mine, when another cannot give a person what is most required for happiness. If everyone had that attitude, that the happiness of others is just as important as one's own happiness, we'd end up with no one being happy, because no one would properly look after themselves, us all sinking into misery not be able to give oneself more than we are capable of giving to others. In reality (truth), happiness is a deeply personal thing. brought about by a person's relationship with oneself. It is not provided by others. And it is irrational not to make an exception of oneself.

When a tornado changes course and doesn't destroy someone's house, that is morally good, but the tornado isn't morally praiseworthy. — Dan

This makes no sense. Morality is associated exclusively with the intentional behaviour of human beings. It makes no sense to say that the behaviour of a tornado is "morally good". That's a terrible category mistake.

...but it is reasonable to assume consent to this.. — Dan

We haven't discussed "consent" at all. But, by your definition of what constitutes a choice which belongs to a person, consent from another would not suffice to convert a choice which is not one's own into one which is one's own.

There are lots of intentional acts one could make that affect others but are entirely that person's own choice. If I beat you in a contest, I have affected you with my choices, and in ways you would presumably prefer I didn't, but I haven't restricted your ability to understand and make your own decisions. — Dan

This is contrary to your definition of "one's own choice". You defined this as a choice concerning only what belongs to the person, one's mind, body, and property. A contest is something public, so choices concerning a contest are not one's own choices. Whether or not your choice restricts my ability to understand and make my own choices, is not an accurate indication as to whether or not your choice is your own choice. There are many choices which are not one's own choice, and so they have an effect on others, but the effect is not to restrict another's ability to make one's own choices.

This poses the problem that humans have lack of capability to change, at the level of thoughts and neurochemistry.

...

I am interested in research and also the nature of personal change and self mastery? Do you think that self-mastery is possible? — Jack Cummins

Hi Jack, I think that your op, and the title, show an inadequate approach to the issue. The questions you ask imply a separation between what we call "self", and what we call "thoughts", so that you ask "can we change our thoughts", and "do you think that self-mastery is possible". The latter even suggests a separation between "self", and something further which masters the self. Notice that "mastery" implies a master and something which is mastered, and the two are distinct.

So I believe questions like this are somewhat mistakenly expressed, and are therefore ill-fated to being forever discussed without being resolved. The problem is with what is assumed as implied, by the question, a separation between the thing directing and the thing being directed. The implied separation is not a true representation, so the question is doomed by the implicit falsity. The common example I've seen is "have you quit beating your wife?". Notice that the assumption implied by the question can make the question impossible to answer.

Instead, I suggest that you approach the issue with the attitude that thoughts are an inseparable part of one's self. Thoughts are not separable from the self, in a way that would allow the self to control the thoughts, rather the thoughts are an integral part of the self. And, we can look at the self, itself, as a changing being. From this perspective we can ask to what degree does the self, as the changing being, have control over its own changes. Then we ask about "self-control". Notice that "self-control" implies one unified being, rather than "self-mastery" which implies a master/slave separation.

Proceeding in this way, we see that thinking, and thoughts, are a means of self-control. Therefore we do not have to ask the ill-fated question, "does the self control the thoughts", we can accept as an observed fact, that the self has some degree of control, over itself, through the use of thoughts. Then we can proceed to investigate the nature of this self-control, and what it consists of.

The fact that these choices are not the ones which are often not the ones which are morally praiseworthy has nothing to do with whether it is a good measure of value. — Dan

You need to justify this. We are talking about moral value here, moral praiseworthiness. If these choices are not necessarily morally praiseworthy, then what makes the ability to make them a "good" measure of value? See, "good" here must have a meaning other than morally good, and this other meaning causes ambiguity and invites equivocation. This is what I mean when I say that your principles imply two distinct scales of value. One value system judges acts for moral praiseworthiness, and the other scale of value places the ability to make one's own choices" as "a good measure of value", therefore implying that which 'ought' to be protected. The latter, as the measure of value for the former, serves as the ideal for that scale.

The problem I apprehend is the issue of establishing compatibility, commensurability, between the two systems of value, the one which assigns moral value, and the other which assigns value to the ability to make one's own choice. You appear to have created a dichotomy between making one's own choices, the ability to do which, serves as the measure of moral value, and making morally good choices, which are inherently not one's own choices. Such a dichotomy would leave the two scales of value as incompatible.

I would agree that the freedom to choose X includes the freedom not to choose X, but that isn't an issue here because that is entirely consistent with the idea that only freedom over those things which belong to a person ought to be protected. — Dan

Sure, but we literally have no place to go from here. Making only choices which belong to the person would lock one into one's own self=created solipsist world of private property. As soon as we enter the public sphere, even just to open our mouths to speak, we have an effect on the property, or minds, of others. Therefore the freedom to make one's own choices is not any type of freedom at all, it refers to a severe restriction. Because of this restrictive nature of "making one's own choices", I don't see how it could ever be something valuable.

When we take into account the fact that anytime an intentional act has an effect on others then it is not properly called "one's own choice", there is significant doubt as to whether this type of choice has any value at all. So to give "freedom" any value we need to release the restrictions beyond that of the self-imposed solipsism of "making one's own choices". However, when we move into the public sphere of making choices which affect others, we need to respect the fact that the freedom to make a good choice is also the freedom to make a bad choice. The freedom to say something good is also the freedom to say something bad. The freedom to take what is necessary for my subsistence may be the freedom to rob you of what is necessary for your subsistence. Consequently, the inability to assign value to "freedom" is extended accordingly.

No, I would say that we should judge the morality of choices by reference to their consequences and that the measure of goodness/badness of those consequences is how ability of persons to understand and make their own choices is protected/violated. I feel like I've said this many times, and you are still attempting to interpret what I'm saying to mean anything other than what I am saying. — Dan

Ok, so we're back to where we were a few posts ago. The goodness or badness of an intentional act is judged according to how the "ability of persons to understand and make their own choices is protected/violated" by that act. Now I will ask again, the question you refused to answer. Why do you believe that the moral value of all intentional acts can be based int this principle, "the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices", when you have explicitly said that good acts come from choices which are not one's own choices? How do you justify the value of this type of choice, "one's own choice", when this is not even the type of choice which produces good acts?

It sounds like you are saying that it is not coherent to say that a person is free to choose X but not free to choose Y. Or free to do what you like with X (in this case, your own mind, body and property) but not with Y (other people's). — Dan

As I said, the issue is that freedom to choose X is also freedom to not choose X, or to choose not X. If a person is free to do something, then the person is also free not to do that. If X signifies a good act, and good implies moral value, then it is incoherent to say that there is moral value in freedom. Good and not good are equally the consequences of freedom.

Maybe it would help me if you told me what you think it is I am claiming as simply as possible. Then maybe we can get to the bottom of where this misunderstanding is coming from. — Dan

That's what I'm doing, trying to understand what you are claiming. I indicated a long time ago, that your entire system makes very little sense to me. To begin with, I could not at all understand how you used "freedom", and "types of freedom". When I got beyond that, I found the key to understanding the entire system was in your principle "one's own choices", or choices which belong to the person, Now that I am beginning to understand, I am beginning to see the reasons for your strange representation of "freedom". I've come a long way, but I still cannot tell you what I think you are claiming. I think I need to know why you place such high value on "the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices". To me, this is not valuing freedom at all, because freedom is equally the ability to make choices which are not one's own.

In your temperature analogy, the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices is not like the boiling point of water or the freezing point of water. — Dan

Yes, that is the point I am making, the two are dissimilar, because in the case of your ethical example, the ideal is not something which relates to the scale.

It would be more like the average amount of kinetic motion per atom (not a perfect analogy here, but certainly closer). Which is to say, it's the thing we are using as the measure of value. — Dan

OK, so you are saying that the things to be judged (in this case choices), have a specific property, and we can measure the quantity of that property. The specified property is "the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices". So, it appears like what you are saying is that we must look at choices made by people, and evaluate these choices as to the quantity of this property which they display.

The problem which I've been trying to bring your attention to, is that the choices being judged, or evaluated, are explicitly not "their own choices". So you are asking to evaluate choices for a property which they have been stated as not having. We cannot get anywhere like this.

Therefore, you need to propose a different way that the ideal, "the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices", is related to the things being judged. But as I pointed out already, the two are dichotomous. The things being judged are "choices which are not their own". So you'll find, that the two are only related as opposing ends of the scale, like hot and cold.

To your second point, that doesn't answer my question. Is you issue that your don't think freedom can be valuable because you don't think it is coherent to talk about being free to do something but not free to do something else? — Dan

I'm saying that it is not coherent to say that a person is free to choose X, but not free to not choose X. Further, I am saying that if freedom is supposed to be valuable, some reasons must be given which respect this fact, that freedom means both, the possibility that X will be chosen, and also that X will not be chosen. That is to say that if you want to assign moral value to freedom, you must respect the fact that freedom provides the possibility of bad acts, just as much as good acts. So if we say X represents something which is good, freedom allows for the possibility of bad. Because of this it is impossible to say that "freedom" is valuable, from the perspective of "value" assigned by a system of morality. That's why I suggested earlier, that "freedom" must transcend the moral system, as something taken for granted, which makes the moral system both possible and necessary (in the sense of needed).

What I mean by "ideal", is a thing upon which a standard is based. For example in the temperature scale, the freezing point and boiling point of water, serve as ideals

The issue I am trying to point out to you, is that in scales like temperature, the ideals have a position within the scale, so that the scale is properly related to the ideal. In the case of your moral principle, the scale, good and bad is related to choices which are not one's own, but the ideal (the thing which serves as the standard of measurement) is choices which are one's own. So the ideal is outside of, and not properly related to the scale.

Now, you assign a value to the ideal, as that which ought to be protected, but this value is extrinsic to the values expressed by good and bad, and the value is not within the scale. So, unlike the scale of temperature, where the ideals are values within the scale, and other values are related, the value assigned to "the ability to make one's own choices" is not part of the scale of bad and good. Therefore you need to refer to another type of value, other than moral value (bad and good), to justify that this is something which ought to be protected, i.e., has value.

Also, as to your post replying to Punshhh: Are you suggesting that the freedom to do absolutely anything is valuable? Your freedom to, for example, torture a child to death? — Dan

The freedom to be evil, is equally the freedom to be good. That's the nature of free choice. So the freedom to torture a child to death, is the very same freedom as the freedom to save a child from being tortured. That's the point with free choice, it is the ability to choose freely from a vast variety of possibilities. Plato said that the man who is capable of doing the most evil is also capable of doing the most good. So when we look at knowledge as power, it can be used for bad or good. These are not distinct types of knowledge, the same knowledge might be put toward good actions, or it might be put toward bad actions. Likewise with "freedom". The same freedom allows a person to be good or to be bad.

Good luck trying to get Dan to understand that. He seems to think that by representing "relative to the agent" as "types of freedom", he can get around that issue. So he ends up with types of restrictions, and then proceeds with a compromised "freedom". I' am now trying to show him that even with his compromised sense of freedom, the problem still cannot be resolved because the compromised freedom cannot be justified as something valuable.

The whole idea of these choices being "the ideal type" is an invention of yours. It is not reflected in anything I have said. — Dan

You said:

The thing which makes any action good or bad is the extent to which is protects or violates the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices. — Dan

If you cannot understand that this means that this type of choice ("their own choices") is the ideal in relation to what makes any action bad or good, then I don't know what else to say.

Again, I'm happy to, but I'm not moving off of this topic while you are still misunderstanding the measure of value under discussion. If you don't understand the measure of value, then I think any conversation about why it is our best candidate for a measure of value is likely to be doomed from the off. — Dan

I'm afraid it's you who is having difficulty understanding "the measure of value under discussion". The principle by which value is scaled is "the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices". This implies that "ones own choices" is the ideal which the scale for valuation, is modeled on. You very clearly said that the extent to which the ability to make their own choices is protected or violated is the thing which makes an action bad or good. "The thing" here refers to an ideal, the ability to make their own choices. Therefore their own choices is an ideal.

This discussion has strayed too far off topic.

We shouldn't have added much at all (without uploads) since the last clear out. It's just text, right? So, I don't get why it's filling up so quickly. — Baden

Obviously, size is measured by the importance of the content, and my posts are larger than anyone else. (Give me a Trump role.)

One's own choices often aren't really good or bad. If I choose to key my own car, that isn't good or bad, it just is. These choices certainly aren't "the ideal". What is important is the ABILITY of persons to understand and make their own choices. Their freedom. That is what needs protecting. Since most choices of my own choices don't protect that freedom or violate it, they are generally fairly neutral actions. — Dan

If such choices, "one's own" are generally not good choices, then why seek to protect that ability. I think it's incorrect to say that these choices are not the ideal, according to your principles. If protecting the ability to make such choices is the standard whereby other choices are judged as good or bad, than this type of choice is named as the ideal choice, the one which all others are measured against in relation to their capacity to enable that type. If this wasn't the case, then you could simply posit as your principle, "to protect the ability to make good choices". But you didn't propose "good choices" as your ideal, you proposed "choices which are one's own". So you talk about protecting the ability to make that type of choice, rather than the ability to make good choices

This is where the inconsistency lies hidden. You want to protect freedom, because you think that it has some value. However, freedom allows for both good and bad acts, and what you really want out of personal freedom is good acts. So valuing freedom is inherently inconsistent with valuing good acts because freedom allows bad acts As a sort of compromise to "freedom" you posit a "type of freedom", which is the freedom to make one's own choices. This is a type of choice which is generally neutral, removed from good and bad. But, like I already explained, this is not a type of freedom at all.

It's a highly compromised, restricted sense of "freedom", specifically formulated so as to make it appear like there is a type of freedom, which the protection of, would be consistent with the desire for good acts. In other words, if true freedom was what your principle sought to protect, this would not be consistent with cultivating good acts, because freedom allows for bad acts. So you posit a false freedom, the freedom to make one's own choices, which is not any type of freedom at all, because it consists of a very restricted, narrow and limited, range of choices. Then you state that one's own choices are neutral choices, to ensure that protecting one's own choices would not result in bad choices, in which case this ability ought not be protected. Therefore you end up with an extremely contrived sense of "freedom" which you are seeking to protect, the freedom to make choices which are neither bad nor good, i.e. choices which are morally irrelevant.

To support your enterprise, you need to produce some solid principles as to why the ability to make morally neutral choices ought to be protected at all. And, if this is supposed to be a form of freedom, what kind of freedom is it really. Is it the freedom from moral principles? If we all made only this type of choice, then we wouldn't have to concern ourselves with good or bad anymore. Is this the ideal?

Again, I'm very happy to discuss why I think the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices is the best measure of value we have available, but I really want to make sure you have understood what that is first. — Dan

Go right ahead, I really want to know how you justify what I believe to be a false freedom. This is what it's all about. You have specifically designed what you call a "type of freedom", the freedom to make choices which belong to oneself, in an effort to make the value of "freedom" consistent with the value of morality. Now I would like to see you justify the value which you assign to this "type of freedom"

...which is what I was doing in suggesting that we look at how other animals make decisions. If how animals make decisions is similar to how humans make decisions then that can shed some light on the human condition. This is why we use animals as test subjects to get at some aspect of the human condition without harming humans. — Harry Hindu

But we still don't know how animals make choices. And, it's doubtful that selections made by other animals can even qualify as decisions. To choose, and to decide, have very different meanings.

It is you that is ignoring my request for you to explain what you mean by free will. — Harry Hindu

I answered this. It's the capacity to make choices. Some say it's free will, others do not. That there is not agreement on this indicates that we do not understand it.

If free will simply entails making decisions and I have shown that computers can make decisions does that mean computers have free will? You either agree that it does and we can then settle the case as one of where you use different words than I do to explain the same process, or disagree and you would have to come up with a better explanation as to what free will is. The ball is in your court. — Harry Hindu

Computers do not make decisions. To decide is to come to a resolution as the result of consideration. Computers are incapable of consideration. Computers do not even choose, they simply follow algorithms. To choose is to select from a multitude of options. There are no options for a computer, it must follow its rules. Even a so-called random number generator is a case of following a set of rules, and not a true choice

It appears like you just like to throw words around willy nilly, pretending that you can argue logically by giving the same word different meanings. That's known as equivocation. You can say that a computer "decides" if you want, and we say that a human being "decides", but obviously what is referred to by that word in each of these two cases, is completely different. So to say that the computer's activity is relevant to what we are discussing, would be equivocation.

The capacity to choose isn't just a human condition. Other animals make choices too. — Harry Hindu

You're still make irrelevant comments. The fact that human beings are animals is an essential aspect of the human condition. So, presenting the fact that other animals make choices, as do human beings, does nothing to suggest that this is not a part of the human condition. Neither does the fact that human beings make machines which also appear to be making choices.

Logically, you will always make the same choice given the same set of circumstances and the same set of options, just like a computer. And just like a computer, you choices can become predictable. — Harry Hindu

I believe this proposition is fundamentally flawed. There is no such thing as two distinct instances of "the same set of circumstances". That is a fundamental aspect of reality, and also of the human condition, ensured by the nature of time. Any set of circumstance is unique, and not repeatable as "the same". Do you disagree with this?

So the question isn't, "do we have the capacity to choose". It's "do we have the capacity to choose freely", whatever that means. Hopefully you can enlighten me. — Harry Hindu

You seem to be willfully ignoring what I am saying. We do not understand the capacity to choose. Therefore we do not understand the human condition. In order to understand the human condition we need to first understand the capacity to choose. "We" includes I. Therefore I cannot "enlighten" you on this matter.

There isn't two scales or value systems. The thing which makes any action good or bad is the extent to which is protects or violates the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices.

...

I'm happy to answer why this is the best measure of moral value (though I think it is covered in the primer), but I'd like to make sure we have pinned down the misunderstanding you seem to be having with the measure of value first. — Dan

Take this principle, "the extent to which it protects or violates the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices". We have to justify it by saying why understanding and making there own choices is something which ought to be protected. This means that we need to place that principle "the ability to understand and make their own choices" in relation to other potential first principles, and scale it as the most valuable, in order to justify it as "the best measure of moral value".

Now the problem is that "the good acts", which are acts that protect another's or a multitude of others' ability to make their own choices, are not derived from a person's own choices. Since these good acts are ones which come from choices which are not one's own choices, it appears like this is contrary to the chosen principle, that protecting the ability to make their own choices is "the best measure of moral value".

So this is the way that it looks to me. You have two distinct types of choices, those which are one's own, and those which are not. The two produce a dichotomy. There is a scale for evaluating the one type, those which are not, as to bad or good. That scale is based in the assumption that the other type is valuable. The problem is that the two are dichotomous, "one's own", and "not one's own". And, since the primary category labeled "one's own" is the basis for scaling the acts of the other category as to bad or good, then no matter how good an act which is not one's own gets on the scale, it can never reach the level of one's own act. We will always have to say that one's own choice will trump any moral value of good or bad, assigned to an act which is not one's own.

The important thing to acknowledge is that there is a dichotomy produced by the principle "the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices". This principle turns making one's own choices into an ideal, in relation to the other category which is judged for good and bad. "One's own choices" is the highest goal, a sort of perfection, and it is set off from the other choices which are not one's own, in a special ideal category, as distinct, and incompatible with, the other choices, not one's own, which are judged for degrees of goodness.

It is my opinion, that you need to dissolve this dichotomy. The principle which sets the high (good) or low (bad) of the scale needs to relate to something within the scale, instead of something which the scale cannot provide for, because the dichotomy. For example, in a temperature scale, the boiling point of water, the freezing point of water, are "ideals" which the scale is modeled on, but they relate to points within the scale. So for instance, suppose we class all free choices together, including one's own and not one's own, in one class, as free choices, and scale them as to bad or good. Notice, we cannot say that as the choices get closer and closer to being totally one's own, they get better and better. This indicates that "the ability to make their own choices" is not an acceptable principle to scale good and bad. It is not a valid ideal. Therefore, I can conclude that you have arbitrarily placed that principle as an ideal, and the dichotomy which it creates between the acts which fulfill the criteria of that principle, and the acts which are judged for goodness, are incompatible. And, unless you dissolve this dichotomy you will always have inconsistency in your ethics.

You're still not making any sense. Let's assume that there is a whole lot of people, and each one has the capacity to make one's own choices, and so we value each such capacity as one. The capacity to make a choice which does not belong to the person is given a value of zero. Doesn't this imply that making a choice which does not belong to you, has no value? The capacity to make such a choice is not at all something to be protected, it has no value.

Now, you say that making a choice which does not belong to you can be good. How do you value this designation of "good"? It cannot be that it is valuable because it protects the capacity of others to make their own choices, because no matter how many things with the value of one that you add up, it still cannot remove the value of zero from the choice which does not belong to the person. So you base that value of good in some supposedly objective moral principles.

This is why Amadeus and I have both told you that you have two distinct value scales. And I believe that the two are incompatible. The primary scale of value, as stated by you, is the value of one's ability to make one's own choices. The secondary scale of value is the scale which we assign to choices that do not belong to the person. This is the scale of good and bad, and it's based on moral principles.

If the secondary scale, the one that applies to choices which do not belong to the person, is the one for good and bad, then what is the primary scale based in? What is the reason for protecting one's capacity to make one's own choices? "Good choices" are in the category of choices which do not belong to the person, so how is there any reason to protect choices which do belong to the person? Do you see what I mean? There appears to be no reason why the capacity to make one's own choices ought to be protected. This appears to be just an arbitrary designation by you. You could have chosen the capacity to eat, or the capacity to breathe, or to walk, or to sleep, or to grow, etc.. Why choose "the ability to understand and make their own choices" as the thing which needs to be protected. What value system do you apply, to give this type of activity the highest position?

You're assuming that free will is part of the human condition. I'm saying that it likely isn't. — Harry Hindu

What you believe about "free will" is irrelevant. We do have the capacity to choose, and we all know and accept this. Some call this 'free will", if you want to just call it "the capacity to choose", that's fine. Whatever, way that you describe it, or try to understand it, it's part of the human condition which we need to understand in order to adequately understand the human condition. The fact that some people say we have free will, and others do not, is very strong evidence that the human condition is not understood, and we need to know the truth about this matter before it will be understood.

The fact that something is commonly said does not necessarily imply that what is said is a fact. — Harry Hindu

That is exactly the point I am making. We need to know the truth about these things before we can claim to have an understanding of the human condition. If we knew the truth about free will, then we'd have a much better basis for a claim about understanding the human condition. Since we do not know the truth about this, we cannot claim to have an understanding of the human condition.

I doubt it's possible. We communicate much more than mathematical ideas. If we tried using math to talk about any of those things, it would no longer be math. It would be numbers, equations, etc., representing things. Just another language. 1 stands for me. 27 stands for eat. 4,534 stands for apple.
1 + 27 + 4,534 = I eat apple.
There's no math in that. Yeah, I just did that in five minutes. But would we find a solution if we spent a thousand years trying? I doubt it. And I assume it's been tried by plenty of mathematicians over the centuries. I can't imagine a way of actually doing math that also means things we want to discuss. — Patterner

I think this is where the op goes astray. Information is what is represented by symbols, and "mathematical" is a type of information. Mathematical symbols have corresponding with them, mathematical information. But not all symbols are mathematical symbols, nor is all information mathematical information.

"Identity" is what a particular (individual) thing is said to have. So when a symbol represents a particular thing, this is a special type of information in which identity is assumed. So the information represented with "that apple is mine", is not mathematical information.

The principal difference between these two types of information seems to be that the same mathematical information is freely applied in a wide variety of situations, in a universal way, and to a multitude of different things, while identity information is by its nature restricted in application, to particular things.

Dreams and hallucinations are existentially dependent upon veridical perception. — creativesoul

That is an unwarranted assumption. It is quite possible, and even likely I would say, that dreams are prior to sense perception.

It is the measure of moral value, the goodness or badness of this choice is precisely because of how it affects persons' ability to understand and make their own choices. Just like if the person shot a lion that was about to eat someone, it isn't that shooting lions is intrinsically valuable it is good because it protects the ability to understand and make their own decisions of the person who is about to be eaten. This isn't contradictory, it's consequentialism. — Dan

The problem is that the choice being made does not belong to the person making it. It is not one's own choice. It is a choice concerning the life of another. Therefore, by your principle, goodness or badness is irrelevant because these are concerned with the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices, and this is a different type of choice. It is a choice which is not one's own.

Having a true understanding of the human condition would come first and from that extrapolate whether our actions are free or determined. — Harry Hindu

No, that doesn't make any sense. Obviously, having a true understanding of the human condition requires knowing about free will, as a part of the human condition.

I don't want to steer to far off-topic but what is meant by "free" in "free will"? — Harry Hindu

What is meant by it, is irrelevant to this point. Since it is commonly said that human beings have free will, then we need to know what is being referred to in order to understand the human condition, of which free will is said to be a part of.

Color experience requires both, colorful things(things capable of being seen as colorful by a creature so capable) and a creature so capable. — creativesoul

This doesn't affect the point I made. "Things capable of being seen as colourful by a creature so capable" is really a meaningless statement. Different creatures could see different things as colourful. And when you consider that absolutely anything could be seen as colourful, you will start to understand that the "thing capable of being seen" is not even necessary for the experience of colour. That's what Descartes demonstrated in his "evil demon" thought experiment, which is now commonly presented as "brain in a vat". The reality of dreams and hallucinations demonstrates that your stated condition is really not required.

Things capable of being seen as red are those with physical surfaces reflecting the appropriate wavelengths of the visible spectrum. A capable creature is one capable of detecting and/or distinguishing those wavelengths. — creativesoul

That's only by your definition of "seeing red". But that definition is clearly debatable, so who knows what range of experiences could be known by other creatures as "seeing red".