We frequently (in the context of sf fiction, for example, imagine faster-than-light travel between the stars. — Ludwig V

I would not call that "imagining". Like the "round square" it's simply a case of saying without imagining. An author can say that the space ship moves from here to there in a time which implies faster than the speed of light, but to imagine faster than the speed of light motion requires imagining a material body moving that fast. That body moving that fast, could not be seen, and therefore cannot be imagined.

Or consider Michael's two-dimensional sensors? — Ludwig V

Much of what is said in this thread, and supertasks in general, involve this problem, saying things which cannot be imagined. It's easy to say things which cannot be imagined, and we justify these things through logical possibility, but when logical possibility conflicts with empirical principles, then we have a problem.

The problem for me, then, is that I do not see a relevant difference between "+1" and "<divide by>2" or "divide by>10". (The latter is embedded in our number system, just as "+1" is embedded in our number system). — Ludwig V

They are completely different principles. You're comparing apples and oranges, and saying 'my comparison is relevant because they are both fruit'. We are not talking about "our number system" in general, because that is not the problem. We are talking about a very specific problem which is infinite divisibility, not the general "fruit" (number system) but the specific apple (infinite divisibility).

I agree with you that the problem arises in applying mathematics to the physical world, specifically to space and time. — Ludwig V

The problem is exactly what @Michael has been insisting on, the assumption that space and time are continuous. This supports the principle of infinite divisibility. The problem though is that space and time are conceptions abstracted from empirical observation, how material things exist and move, and the (unimaginable) mathematical conception of an infinitely divisible continuum is not consistent with the empirical data. Hence the Zeno type paradoxes.

But if that's your problem, you ought to have a difficulty with "+1", because there are an infinite number of non-dimensional points between my left foot and my right foot whenever I take a step. Or are you thinking that "+1" involves adding a physical object to a set of physical objects? — Ludwig V

Why does "+1" need to imply anything other than counting? There is nothing between one and two in the act of counting, yet they are distinct. We need to account for that distinction. What separates one from two? When we describe this principle of separation we also provide ourselves with the basis for division.

If you don't have a problem with that, I can't see why you have a problem with a infinite convergent series. — Ludwig V

The problem is not "infinite convergent series". That is a misrepresentation which has occurred over and over again on this thread. The "infinite convergent series" is a particular mathematical idea which has emerged from a proposed solution to the problem of infinite divisibility. The problem arises when people believe that the infinite convergent series is the necessary outcome of the problem of infinite divisibility instead of seeing it as one possible representation.

If you don't have a problem with that, I can't see why you have a problem with a infinite convergent series.
There are real practical difficulties with the idea that a cheese can be cut up into an infinite number of pieces (which could then be distributed to an infinitely large crowd of people). I don't deny that. But dividing the space that the cheese occupies into an infinite number of pieces is a completely different kettle of fish. — Ludwig V

Why do you say this? The cheese is an imaginable, sensible object. The conception of "the space that the cheese occupies" is completely dependent on, and therefore abstracted from that empirically observed cheese. Why therefore, do you conclude that we can do something more with the space than we can do with the cheese?

My most memorable trip was with amanita muscaria, the fly agaric. I did much research into this mushroom before trying it, but probably took a little too much. I lost consciousness and through some kind of dreaming, took a trip to the edge of the world. Afterwards, I actually thought I almost died. Anyway it was an eye-opening experience.

Amanita muscaria is a very interesting mushroom. The deep red ones have the best psychoactive effect over the paler orange, and it seems best to dry them thoroughly in the sun. Fly agaric differs significantly from psilocybin because the trip ends with a heaviness in the head which tends to cause a few hours of sleep. Extensive research into the use of fly agaric was carried out by Gordon Wasson, who argued strongly that it is the mythical "Soma".

Another interesting intoxicant, for those who like the more risky 'road less traveled', is datura, the infamous "jimson weed". This one causes all sorts of far out dreams, but is actually quite dangerous, because the flower buds have the toxin, but it's quite strong. It derives the name "jimson" from an incident in the seventeenth century in Jamestown Virginia. At that time, British soldiers were fed the weed and went hilariously delirious for a number of days. Reference to the use of this weed is found in the books of Carlos Castaneda, especially "The Teachings of Don Juan". For those interested in the constructive use of hallucinogens, Castaneda has some very good material. Peyote remains my favourite, but overuse might be leading to endangerment of the species.

While I agree that there are definitely 'doors of perception' that can be opened, they don't all lead upwards. — Wayfarer

It's a chance, a risk to take. An experienced guide lessens the risk.

Dr. Albert Hofmann invented LSD25 in 1938. He was studying organic isolates, especially those from rye ergot. Ingestion of rye, contaminated with the ergot fungus had long been known, to cause poisoning with a delirious* condition called St Anthony's Fire.

According to Wikipedia, Dr Hofmann described his interest in chemistry, in a speech at a conference in 1996, this way:
"Moreover, an artistic career was tempting. In the end, however, it was a problem of theoretical knowledge which induced me to study chemistry, which was a great surprise to all who knew me. Mystical experiences in childhood, in which Nature was altered in magical ways, had provoked questions concerning the essence of the external, material world, and chemistry was the scientific field which might afford insights into this."

*Edit: removed "delusional", replaced with "delirious" as a better word in the context.

Some authors have speculated that, given complete automation, a large share of workers will become obsolete / redundant / unemployed / unnecessary / a nuisance. Then what? — BC

We hang out and do philosophy. As need is the mother of invention, leisure is the mother of philosophy.

I mean, it was about peace, love, and political activism; but, why the popularity arose to drugs? — Shawn

Do you think perhaps you might have inverted this? It was about the drugs, then peace, love, and political activism was the result of the drug taking.

Since that time I have been acutely aware that everything I perceive, everything within and around me, is a creation of my own consciousness.

This is an excellent philosophical intuition, and it's amazing how psychedelics reveal this so clearly.

An interesting question is why humans evolved in a way that enabled alterations of consciousness through chemical substances. That is, what did our earliest ancestors gain by getting drunk that resulted in their increased survival? — Hanover

The thing is, that the human body, and brain particularly, is such a finely tuned, delicately balanced, piece of equipment, that even a microdose of the right (or wrong) chemicals will throw off that balance. And when one finds that this tiny bit of chemicals can make me perceive the whole world in a completely different way, it is revealed what T.L. says above, "everything I perceive, everything within and around me, is a creation of my own consciousness".

That insight is what is gained. Whether or not this produces an increased survival is another question. "Survival" in the context of evolutionary theory is reproductive, not personal. Maybe sex drugs and rock and roll, is a by-product of the resulting euphoria.

That seems reasonable. But the question arises whether we can imagine something that is logically impossible. Philosophical practice says no, we can't (thought experiments) and yes, we can (reductio arguments). I suppose if two contradictory statements follow from a single premiss, we can conclude that the premiss is self-contradictory. But then, that's not always obvious, as in this case. — Ludwig V

I believe this involves the distinction between imagining and saying. We can say contradictory things like "square circle", but can we imagine such things? Imagining involves a sense image, and this is where the difficulty arises because imagination defers to empirical data. So mathematics uses a technique where terms are defined, and the sense image is not necessary. For instance, a nondimensional point, infinite divisibility, etc.. These things cannot be imagined.

So the issue is not whether things can be imagined, but whether they can be defined so as to coherently fit into a conceptual structure without contradiction. In this way mathematics removes itself from imagination, and the empirical world associated with it.

I'm not convinced of that. I think that the confusion develops from not distinguishing between "+1" as a criterion for membership of the set of natural numbers and as a technique that enables to generate them in the empirical world.
When we consider the first use, we think of the entire set as "always already" in existence; when we consider the second, we get trapped by the constrictions of time and space in the world we live it. The difficulties arise because it seems on the one hand that we can never specify the entire set by means of applying the algorithm and yet we can prove statements that are true of the entire set. This oscillation between the abstract and timeless and the concrete and time/space bound is very confusing, and, what's worse, it (the oscillation) encourages us to think that an infinite series can be applied to the physical world in just the same way as an ordinary measurement.
I'm channelling Wittgenstein here. I don't think finitism can make sense of this, but I'm deeply sympathetic to his approach to philosophy.
That's all wrong, of course. It's only an attempt to point towards an approach. — Ludwig V

I don't see the relevance of "+1". The supertasks described here involve an endless division, not adding one in an endless process. These two are completely different. The formula for "+1" involves no limitations of space or time, so there are no restrictions and it can simply continue forever, without any inconsistency with empirical observation. The supertasks however, start with a defined space and time, and start dividing that specified section.

It is this, the idea of dividing a definite section of space and time, indefinitely, which creates the problem. What i think, is that the assumptions which provide for a definite section, also deny the possibility of indefiniteness. So for example, assume "one hour". To validate this measurement a beginning and end point is required. The assumed beginning and end point allow for the specified "one hour" and these points cannot be arbitrary because "one hour" is an empirically defined period of time. If the points are not arbitrary, they must inhere within time itself, therefore possible division would be dependent on those points, and could not be indefinite. In other words, a "definite section" relies on nonarbitrary points, but this is incompatible with infinite divisibility.

In spite of that, in spite of the resentment most middle-class people felt, many of them did a conscientious job - even when the new job was a demotion from their previous position (In the early days, the class of one's birth could be a serious handicap to work opportunities. I knew a former history professor who worked on a collective farm and took great pride in his straight furrows. ) — Vera Mont

Having pride in one's work is a feeling which is difficult to qualify. It's what provides one with a sense of belonging, and it really doesn't matter what that work is.

This goes into the old topic, about how communism was vastly less efficient and productive than other capitalist societies, which is a separate topic, which I think is also true, given the lack of focus on having a good managerial class. — Shawn

I wouldn't really say that this is a separate topic, it's a subtopic, and a very relevant one at that. The issue is the motivation to work, to be productive, and the question of the need for production. This points to what @BC said about the industrial revolution. If basic human needs for all human beings in a given society can be fulfilled from very little human work, the work being taken over by machines, then what drives the need for further work from those human beings? Now we have the goal of economic growth, but what supports this goal, giving it true value? "Failure" is judged in relation to a specific goal, but there is still a need to judge the merit of the goal.

We can assume that they simply exist in their places or we can assume that they are placed just before the runner reaches the next designated distance. — Michael

As Fire Olo pointed out, if they are placed, you never get finished placing them, if it were the case that you could carry out what is prescribed. So the runner can never get past them all. And if they already exist in their places, there is the problem I pointed to, the sensors, being material objects cannot physically fit in the space as prescribed.

I agree. I am trying to prove this by accepting the assumptions of those who believe in supertasks and then showing that their assumptions entail a contradiction. This is how refutation by contradiction works, and is going to be more convincing than an argument that denies their assumptions outright. — Michael

I know that's what you're trying to do, but you haven't succeeded in that way. And I think you misunderstand where the true contradiction lies, and that's what misleads you into thinking that you ought to be able to prove some other contradiction.

The contradiction is actually within the assumptions which you accept. As I've said since the beginning, the contradiction is between the premises of the prescribed supertask, and your assumption, that the amount of time which serves as the limit which the supertask approaches, will actually pass. In other words, if you accept that the prescribed supertask can carried out, than you must deny the possibility that the limiting amount of time will ever pass. The supertask makes it impossible for that amount of time to pass. And, vise versa, if you accept that the limiting amount of time will pass, then you deny the possibility of carrying out the supertask. It's actually quite simple, and Fire Ologist demonstrates a very clear understanding of this situation, where the two conceptual frameworks ( the conditions of the supertask, and the condition of the limiting amount of time passing) are simply incompatible.

I think there's another bugbear at issue here - the idea that whatever can be imagined is at least logically possible. — Ludwig V

It's better stated that distinct things which are logically possible, may be mutually exclusive. So we might allow that whatever is not self-contradicting is logically possible, but one logical possibility might be incompatible with another. When logical possibilities are incompatible, there is not necessarily one specific method which we would use to choose one over the other. For example, we might choose the most useful one, or we might choose the one which is most consistent with empirical observation. The two are not always the same, and that appears to be the issue here. Infinite divisibility is probably the most useful, but it is incompatible with empirical observation, as these paradoxes show.

They can if they are infinitely small. Is it possible that you can imagine that? Is there any argument that will settle the issue either way? — Ludwig V

Obviously, a sensor cannot be infinitely small. It consists of components.

If spacetime is continuous and infinitely divisible, as is assumed, then an infinite number of two dimensional sensors can fit within finite space. — Michael

That is not necessarily the case. A sensor is a material object, space and time are not material objects. There is no necessity that the limitations of a material object are the same as the limitations of space and time. In the end, it's all conceptual, and the problem is in making the conception of an object consistent with the conceptions of space and time.

What these "supertasks" show us is that there is a disconnect between the conceptual structures of mathematics and the concepts of the empirical, natural philosophy, (science). The problem is compounded when mathematicians assume that their conceptions are objects, and these supposed objects get integrated into the work of scientists so that the boundary between the two incompatible conceptual structures is lost. This is the case in quantum physics, where the influence of mathematics allows for a non-dimensional object in the physical world, virtual particles. The purely imaginary concepts of mathematical objects is allowed to penetrate the theories of physics to the point where physicists themselves cannot distinguish between the real and the imaginary.

But if you prefer then we can stipulate that only one sensor exists at a time, the next placed only when the previous has been passed. — Michael

Come on Michael. Fire Ologist explained the problem with "placing", and you said, we could assume that they are already placed. Now I show you the problem with "already placed", and you say we can assume placing. What's the point in switching back and forth, when both are shown to be problematic? Move along now.

A thought experiment like this is perfectly appropriate in philosophy. — Michael

Sure, and the purpose of such thought experiments is to determine the underlying conceptual problems. If someone denies that the exposed conceptual problems are problems, then the purpose of the thought experiment is defeated.

For the sake of the argument the sensors just exist at their locations. — Michael

To avoid the problem , you just assume the impossible. There is a limit to the number of sensors which can exist in that space, depending on the size of the sensors, Because a sensor takes up space. Or, are you assuming that an infinite number of sensors can fit in a finite space?

The way Aristotle dealt with the good indicates that he was a true Platonist.

But is this not essentially cultivation of certain states that are not natural? These jhanas are not normal everyday experiences, rather they are only possible during the practice of deep meditation. As soon as one gets back to daily life, work, stress, family... *poof* meditative states (of heightened awareness, or blissful jhanas) are gone. My question is: why would a cultivated state be considered as basis for the true nature of reality? Especially a state that most people cannot experience. — Heracloitus

To answer this the way that Plato does, the natural way of apprehending reality is not the best way, because the natural human body with its senses misleads and deceives us. So the world, as presented to us through the sensing activities of our body, is not reality, its an illusion. The cave allegory presents the illusion as a sort of reflection of reality. The "cultivated state" you refer to is necessary to get one beyond the natural inclination toward complete reliance on, and faith in, the empirical illusion. The vast majority of human beings do not provide what is necessary for their minds to ascend from the prison of the body, with the punishment and rewards of sensation.

I think we have to distinguish between the means and the end. The end is the goal itself, and that is final cause. What happens with the plans, is that they consist of individual ends subordinate to the final end, parts required for the whole. So each aspect of the plan is an end in itself, but in carrying out that particular aspect it is actually a means to the final end. In Aristotelian philosophy there is a distinction between the end as final cause, and the formula, or formal cause, as designated means to the end.

And ideas as existing, even fictions, just not in any usual material sense. — tim wood

Ideas exist, sure. But the idea of a house does not imply that there is a corresponding existing material object. In other words, the idea of a house, exists as an idea, not as a house.

Very simply the distinction between a "logical" and a material subject. — tim wood

The distinction is between a logical subject, and a material object. A material object necessarily exists, as an essential aspect of what it means to be a material object, is to have existence. The logical subject on the other hand has no necessity of existence, and this is what allows us to talk about fictional things. So when someone talks about "the house" they may be talking about a material object which stands over there, or they may be using "the house" as a logical subject, in which case it doesn't necessarily correspond with a material object. When we judge for truth, in the sense of correspondence, we look for correspondence between the subject and the object.

Now to stir the ashes and perhaps add new fuel, with respect to Aristotelian action and passion, I'll amend my claim. That is, that corresponding to the activity, the action, of the builder building, is the passivity, the passion, of the logical house's being built. Or, that is, the builder is doing something and it must be to something, the one active, the other passive, and that the exact meaning of Aristotle's action and passion, passion here having nothing to do with anything affective. — tim wood

The builder is doing something with the raw materials, wood, concrete, whatever. That is the action of the builder, working with materials, and the passive aspect is the materials which are being worked with.

In Aristotle's teleological ontology, "the house", as subject, is the end, the goal, therefore final cause. As the final cause it is active, not passive. The goal, or end, represented as "the house", moves the builder to act, to build, as an active cause, the final cause. "The good" represented by Aristotle as "that for the sake of which", is the desired end, and it acts as final cause to move the person to act in a way apprehended as the means to the end. These actions of the person are efficient causation. Efficient cause is the immediate cause of the effect, and final cause is prior, as the cause of the efficient cause.

As I explained, Aristotle's description is like this. At t1 there is not-being of the house. At t2 there is being of the house. The time in between involves change, becoming. Becoming is incompatible with being, and cannot be described in the same logical terms, (subject/predicate). This is because we need to allow that the thing which is becoming either violates the law of non-contradiction (both is and is not at the same time), or it violates the law of excluded middle (neither is nor is not). Aristotle opted for the latter, becoming violates the law of excluded middle, and proposed that the concept of "potential" could account for the reality of that which neither is nor is not.

We could proceed to discuss the relationship between Aristotle's proposal of a violation of the law of excluded middle, and some modern day metaphysics like dialetheism and dialectical materialism, which following Hegel, propose a violation of the law of non-contradiction, if you could obtain an adequate grasp of this problem.

And this is plain language. And plain language is what I find in Aristotle, Doesn't mean he leaves it unquestioned, but I am not aware of any instance where he overthrows plain language. — tim wood

Wow, I don't think you've read Aristotle, if you think his writings are "plain language". Why do you think there has been endless discussions as to what he meant, for thousands of years, if his writing is "plain language?

There's no miracle. Motion isn't continuous; it's discrete. — Michael

Yes there is a miracle. The miracle is the start, the initial act, or force, which breaks the previous inertia, causing the new motion toward its end (in this case the beer in the (fridge).

In the case of the op, and also the lamp, the defined start is a rate of acceleration which will continue without an end. This is why it confuses it is acceleration without end. That is not an unusual way to define the effect of a force though, gravity is defined in this way (9.8 metres per second squared). The universal law of gravity describes an acceleration without end.

The commonplace nature of such a description, acceleration without end, makes it appear like there is no miracle involved with acceleration. But this is only because, in these commonplace activities, there is always contrary forces which negate the acceleration before the speed becomes infinite. There is commonly an end to acceleration. So this only serves to confirm our belief that there is no miracle involved with acceleration. However, the unintelligibility of examples like the op and the lamp, where no contrary forces are invoked, demonstrate to us, that acceleration truly is miraculous.

You made that conclusion that a house cannot be being built, not I, and you did so because you misunderstood me. I said that when we say "a house is being built", we refer to a project, not to a particular house. And the subject "house" is a goal, objective, or end, not a material object. You appear to be fooled by the deficiencies of human language, into believing that "house" in this context refers to a material object when it really does not. It refers to an idea.

The way to reveal your mistake is to distinguish between the particular and the general, or universal. "A house" refers to something general, a universal concept, not a particular which has material existence. So "a house is being built" clearly does not refer to any particular material object. Furthermore, if in an attempt to refer to a particular house, we say "the house" is being built, or "my house" is being built, then we see very quickly that the particular house referred to, which is being built, exists only as an idea, a plan, or goal, not as a material object.

the lamp cannot be either on or off after two minutes. — Michael

That's what I've been arguing since the beginning of the thread. And the reason why it can't be on or off is that in the described 'possible world' two minutes cannot pass. So the possible world in which "after two minutes" makes sense is incompatible with the possible world of that lamp.

I don’t understand. How do you ever arrive at the two minute mark?
1 minute, half a minute later, quarter minute later than that, etc., infinitely…you never arrive at the two minute mark. — Fire Ologist

You are exactly correct. In the described scenario, the stipulated possible world, the two minute mark cannot be reached. It's a Zeno-type argument. Michael insists that two minutes will pass, but that's a reference to a different, incompatible, possible world, the one designed around our empirical experience.

Two minutes just pass. That's how the world works. — Michael

See, you are referring to a different possible world here, the one derived from empirical experience. But this possible world is inconsistent with the one that the lamp is in.

Then stop talking about at two minutes or after two minutes. That’s some other scenario.

Don’t you see that? — Fire Ologist

Believe me Fire Ologist, I tried my best. Two months later Michael is still stuck in the same infinite loop.

So what is true? The absurd conclusions of tortured language? Or language that accurately describes/represents the world? (This not to say that description/representation is always problem-free, but instead to say that absurdities are not solutions - and at best signal that the thinking that has led to them has to be re-thought.) — tim wood

You are the one who used language to come to the absurd conclusion, that houses cannot be built. So it's your thinking which needs to be rethought. I believe that houses are being built all the time. However, much of the process remains unintelligible and indescribable to us, because it consists of things we do not adequately understand, namely the relationship between final cause and material cause.

And as pointed out quite a while ago, the consequence of all of this is that a house cannot be built. — tim wood

That is a deficiency of language, not a deficiency of action. And Aristotle has much respect for that type of sophistry which issues forth from this deficiency. Consider the following problem which Aristotle pointed out.

If at t1 the sate of being is describable as A, and change (becoming) occurs, so at t2 the state of being is describable as B, then there must be something which occurs between t1 and t2 which is signified by the term "change". If we propose another describable state of being, C, as the middle, between A and B, then change must occur between A and C, and C and B. Therefore we'd have two more describable states of being, D between A and C, and E between C and B. This leads to an infinite regress of distinct describable states of being, where the actual change between the states never gets described.

Aristotle used this argument to show how we must allow for either a violation of the law of non-contradiction, or a violation of the law of excluded middle, in order to account for the reality of change, becoming. The issue is that becoming is distinctly incompatible with being, and if we adhere to those formal laws of logic, the sophists (like Zeno, and you), can prove absurdities. Aristotle insisted that we maintain the law of non-contradiction, and allow for a violation of the law of excluded middle, with the concept of "matter". Matter, being potential, allows for the reality of what may or may not be. And this is why dualism is required to understand the nature of reality. "Form" refers to the intelligible aspect of reality, while "matter" refers to the unintelligible aspect.

So it is not the case that it is impossible for a house, or anything else, to come to be (be built), as your sophistry concludes. It is simply the case that there are aspects of this process which we cannot describe, as they are unintelligible to us. And you seize on the reality of this failure of the human intellect and the language which enables it, to conclude that because we cannot describe it, it cannot occur.

I take your point that generation is the counter example of the productive arts. — Paine

By art is one type of generation, by nature is another type.

But you were making a claim about when beings actually existed 'materially'. — Paine

Yes I was. "Being" for Aristotle implies having both matter and form. We cannot attribute properties of "a house" to matter which is does not yet have the properties of a house. The house is not being acted on because the matter being acted on does not have the form of a house when the matter does not yet have the properties required for it to be a house. When the house is being built, what is acted on is matter in the form of something else, stones, cement, boards, etc. A house is not being acted on at this stage, because the matter does not have the form of a house. And when the matter does have the form of a house, the house is no longer being built, it is already built.

Can you point to some place in the text where this is claimed? Where do beings move from the not-material to the material? — Paine

That is called "generation", or "coming to be", when a thing changes from not being to being. It's discussed at length by Aristotle in a number of different places. A good discussion of the principles of generation can be found in Metaphysics Bk 7, principally Ch 6-8. He distinguishes coming to be by nature, by art, and spontaneously, and discusses how the matter receives the form which it gets, in each of these circumstances.

In school we learned that something/someone can act and that someone/something can be acted on. — tim wood

And did you learn that something which doesn't exist yet can be acted on? Or, did you learn that it is really a project (goal or intention) which was being acted on, and not the non-existent thing which is being acted on? I learned the latter, when the mentioned object has no material existence, and is being built, it is a project which is being acted on.

That can only mean that for you, it is meaningless to say that anything is (ever) acted upon. — tim wood

For me, no object which does not yet have material existence is ever acted on. You cannot act on a thing unless it exists materially. However, a project, goal, or final cause, is acted on. But this is a case of an individual being moved by the project (having passion for it), not a case of the project being moved by the individual.

The window is broken by Bob absent any intention on his part - not that that makes any difference - an accident, Bob need not even be aware the window is broken. — tim wood

Then this example is irrelevant to what we are discussing, the intentional activity of building. Also, the noun "passion" is related to this activity, only as the emotion of the one carrying out the activity. There is no coherent meaning for "the passion of being built".

But then the pendulum swung too far the other way. From everything being 'informed by purpose', modern science declared that nothing is. In the physicalist view, all biological processes, including those that seem goal-directed, are ultimately reducible to physical interactions and can be fully explained by the laws of physics and chemistry. — Wayfarer

Plato's "tripartite soul", as described in The Republic, allows for causation in both directions, mind ruling the body, and body influencing the mind. The intermediary between mind and body is commonly translated as spirit, or passion. By Plato's description, virtue occurs when the passion or spirit is allied with the mind, in ruling over the body. However, poor disposition allows that the spirit may ally with the body, to overwhelm the mind, when the person is overcome by emotion or sensation. So the well-tempered individual rules the body with the mind through the medium of spirit or passion, while the ill-tempered has a mind which is often overwhelmed by passion, thereby having one's mind improperly moved by the appetites and sensations of the body.

Plato extends this principle by analogy to the existence of the State. The State is healthy when the relations between the three classes. rulers, guardians, and working class, is ordered such that rulers rule with good philosophical principles. The guardians, in honour, are subordinate to the rulers, and the trades and activities of the workers are governed by the guardians. There is a principle associated with each of the three classes, rulers-intellectual, guardians-honour, workers-material goods. In the corruption of the State described by Plato, the honour of the guardians becomes tainted, and they turn toward the money of the class associated with material goods, rather than staying true to the intellectual principles of the ruling class.

How this relates to the difference between "the physicalist view", and the "informed by purpose" view, is the reversal of causation which the physicalist view has imposed on us. Ever since Newton's first law was established as the base for understanding cause and effect, the cause of change has been understood as necessarily external to the body which is changed. This principle, which sets the foundation for determinism, excludes the possibility of the source of change being internal to the human body, in the way that free will, intention, and final causation, was traditionally understood. The role of "purpose" is thereby excluded from this view.

The modern scientific view holds that causation is always sourced externally. The acts of human sensation are described as the external world having an effect on the body. the body then has an effect on the mind, in a chain of efficient cause. You can see how this perspective allows only for the existence of the ill-tempered soul (by Plato's principles). The virtuous, well-tempered soul is described by causation in the other direction, final cause, with the mind ruling the body, and causing it to do what is good, rather than being caused to do whatever the external world forces it to do through efficient causation.

Please ignore claims that I am identifying causes and effects. I am not. What is identical is the action of A actualizing the potential of B and the passion of B's potential being actualized by A. Clearly, a builder building is not a house being built. Still, they are inseparable because there is no builder building without something being built, and vice versa . — Dfpolis

You are ignoring the middle term, C. Aristotle uses a middle term, and if you include it, it becomes evident that you have reversed the representation to make final cause appear as efficient cause. The action of A is caused by the goal, C, the intended end, "a house". A is the means to the end. And, B, "the house being built", is nothing other than the end being actualized by the activity A.

In the particular instance in which a house is being built, the builder building is a house being built. The two are exactly the same. This is why we need the third term, "the house", which refers to the intended end of the activity. Otherwise you are simply insisting that the more general statement "a builder building" is different from the more specific "a house being built". But this is just a semantic difference which provides no information relative to causation.

Bob had been affected by the window and had a passion to break it? — tim wood

The important aspect to recognize in understanding Aristotle's teleological metaphysics, is that the goal, end, or objective, is intermediary between the human being and the material world. The human being only affects the material world through the means of intentions, goals, ends or objectives, and likewise, material world only affects the human consciousness through the intermediary which is the person's intention.

The idea of an intermediary is derived from Plato who solved the interaction problem of idealism through the introduction of a third aspect "passion", which is the intermediary between the mind and body. The well disposed, tempered individual, has control over one's body, directing it toward the good, through the medium of passion. However, in the the ill-tempered individual the role of passion is reversed, such that the body influences the mind's goals and objectives in a bad way, through the means of passion. The latter is the case in your example, when Bob's mind is affected by his passion he desires to break the window, and this is an ill-tempered act.

The nature of the intermediary is what Aristotle addresses in that part of Posterior Analytics which Df referred to 94-95. In the case of final causation the role of the intermediary is reversed from that of efficient causation.

Incidentally, here the order of coming to be is the reverse of what it is in proof through efficient cause: in the efficient order the middle term must come to be first, whereas in the teleological order, the minor, C, must first take place, and the end in view comes last in time.

94b 22-25

The efficient cause is his skills as a builder, the skills themselves and the skills as he possesses them, so yes, informally, he is. — tim wood

"Efficient cause" refers to the particular action which leads to the existence of the item. But "the skills" refers to something general. Therefore the skills are not the efficient cause.

So the efficient cause of the house is the property, or art or skill, of the builder as a builder. Material cause not the material itself, but the property or capacity - or passion - of the material to be worked in an appropriate way. Formal, not the plans, but the quality of the plans which makes it possible to build from them. Final, the property, or capacity, of the thing built to be used as intended. — tim wood

Sorry tim, I just can't understand this at all. It's not the Aristotle that I know.

Let's try this: In as much as you say the house is the goal, the final cause, and you imply that before it is, it isn't, what then is the builder building? — tim wood

The builder is building a house. But a material thing in the condition of becoming, being created or produced, has no material existence until after it is produced. These are some of the issues which Aristotle dealt with in his discussions of "change", the difference between the prior condition and the posterior condition.

And there a regression here, because the implication - your implication - is that anything built as a final cause, not existing before it exists, cannot be built. — tim wood

The final cause is the house as a goal, an end, the intent, that is how Aristotle describes final cause, as "the end", and this signifies what we call the goal or objective. Take a look at Aristotle's example, the final cause of the person walking is the goal of health.

The goal, or end is the cause of the person's activities. The activities themselves are the efficient causes, as the means to that end. The person has choice, not only in the decision as to which ends are desired, but also in the determination of the means (efficient causes) required to produce the end. However, since the specified means are often seen as the only way to produce the desired end, there is often a logical necessity linking the means with the end.

So if (from above) the window was broken by Bob, Bob had been affected by the window and had a passion to break it? — tim wood

In the case of an intentional act, that is almost what I said, but not quite. Bob is affect by the goal, or end, which is to have the window broken. So he breaks it. His action is a passion caused by that goal or end (not by the window itself, but the goal of breaking it), as his action is the effect of that final cause. Why is this so hard for you to understand? Are you not affected by your goals? And does this affection not cause passion within you? Do you have any understanding of the concept of "affection" at all?

it occurs to me to ask you just what exactly you think a cause is for Aristotle. — tim wood

I will answer this one. Aristotle describe four principal ways "cause" is used, material, formal, efficient, and final. Also he outlined two accidental uses, which are not to be understood as proper causes. These are luck and chance.

Again, the point is that we are discussing efficient, not final, causality and digressing into final causality only leads to confusion. — Dfpolis

The problem though, is that "house", referring to something not yet built, is a final cause. You refuse to acknowledge this, and keep trying to portray this final cause, the goal of building a house, a house being built, as an efficient cause. So your attempt to simplify the intentional action of building, to describe it as consisting solely of efficient causation, when final causation is obviously involved, produces a false representation of the activity.

"A house being built" refers to a project, an end, a final cause. The builder is affected by that project and has the passion to build. Therefore the builder building is the effect of that final cause which is the project of "the house" which is being built.

Since you apparently don't like this question, it occurs to me to ask you just what exactly you think a cause is for Aristotle. While I suppose you must know, it's not clear in your usage. And I think maybe you get it mixed up with a modern understanding of the word. Give it a try; doesn't have to be a treatise; a paragraph or two should be adequate for present purpose. — tim wood

I've grown accustomed to ignoring your questions which appear to be completely irrelevant. If you would explain to me why you are asking something which looks really stupid, like do I believe it is possible to build a house, and why you think this is relevant, I might see the need to answer it.

I think what Plato was showing is that persuasive discourse produces friends, and friends are a multitude united as one. The power of the unity of the multitude is stronger than the might of one individual. Therefore the power of argument is actually the strongest might.

It seems to me that Thrasymachus, with respect to what history can tell us, isn't entirely 'wrong.' — Shawn

This may be true, but only in the sense that "might" turns out to be a chameleon with a number of different presentations. True strength or "might", turns out to be hidden within the power of language, as demonstrated by argumentation and rhetoric. Therefore to understand what gives language this might, this power, to determine what is "right", we need to understand how people are persuaded.

If you acknowledge intention as causal, in the sense of final cause, then you would see that "house being built", as referring to the intention of the project (the end), is the (final) cause of "builder building". Therefore you have things reversed when you say "builder building" is the cause of "being built" which is the effect.

This is very consistent with what Aristotle says in the context of your reference, Posterior Analytics 94b 7-26. "E.G. why does one take a walk after dinner? For the sake of one's health." Your example is comparable. Why is the builder building? Because there is a house being built.

Do you agree, if we adhere to Aristotelian principles (regardless of what Duns Scotus says), "house being built" is the cause, as referring to the intentional project, the end, and "builder building" is the effect?

If I say that Hesperus is Phosphorus, I am saying that they are the same object. — Ludwig V

That's not the case. "Object" is not implied. You are simply saying that whatever it is that the two names refer to, it is one and the same.

The issue with "=" in mathematics is that the meaning of, or what is referred to by, "2+2" is not the same as what is referred to by "4". Someone might stipulate by axiom, that these two do refer to the exact same thing, but that does not reflect the way that the symbols are commonly used in the application of mathematics. In this way the axiom would be false, in the sense of a false definition. That's why such an axiom is misleading. This is also the problem with formalism, what is stipulated by the formalist is not consistent with the way that logic is applied, therefore it is a false description of logic.

If I say that Ringo Starr is Richard Starkey, I am saying that Ringo Starr is the same person as Richard Starkey. — Ludwig V

Again, this is not true. When you say Ringo Starr is Richard Starkey, all you are saying is that these two names have the same referent. It is only upon analysis, if one seeks to determine whether it is true or not, or something like that, that one would determine that the two names both refer to a person.

I ran across these references just now.

Posterior Analytics II, 12, 95a14-35 discusses simultaneous and time ordered causality.

Cf. “In an essentially ordered series of causes, both the existence and causal function of the effect are caused and preserved by the simultaneous coexistence of the cause.” Juan Carlos Flores, “Accidental and essential causality in John Duns Scotus’ treatise ‘On the first principle,’” Recherches de Théologie et de Philosophie Médiévale 67, no. 1 (2000): 97f. — Dfpolis

Hey, thanks for the reference Dfpolis. I checked it out, and I think you are vindicated to an extent. Aristotle does discuss this simultaneity of cause and effect, but I still think this concept is misapplied by you in your example.

Aristotle gives two examples of the way in which the cause is simultaneous with the effect in this way. The first is an eclipse of the moon. The moon was eclipsed because the earth intervened. It becomes eclipsed when the earth intervenes. It is eclipsed when the earth is intervening, and it will be eclipsed when the earth will intervene. The other example is the freezing of water. Ice forms when a failure of heat is occurring, it has formed when there was a failure of heat, and it will form if a failure of heat occurs.

The reason why I still think you misapply this concept, is because "the builder building", and "the house being built" both refer to the very same activity, as you agree. In both of Aristotle's examples, there are two distinct things, one the cause of the other. The earth intervenes with the light from the sun, and the effect is the eclipse of the moon. Two distinct things. There is a lack of heat, and the effect is that the water freezes. Two distinct things. And careful scientific analysis reveals that Aristotle was wrong, there is a time difference for each of these, as the effect does not actually occur instantaneously. Your example however, is not even similar because there is not two distinct things, only one activity described in two ways.

Again, you spout nonsense. See my "Evolution: Mind or Randomness?" Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies 22 (1-2):32-66 (2010) — Dfpolis

Well then, why don't you accept what I've been telling you, that "being built" is a predication which implies the thing being built, "the house" as its subject. And, the house exists only as a goal or intention (final cause) at this time of being built. The house is not an existing thing affected by the activity of being built, it is created intentionally by being built..

The answer is he's building a house. And Aristotle makes explicit an observation that most folks wouldn't bother with: if someone is building, then something is being built. If someone or something is acting, something is being acted on. And he calls that πάσχειν, translated as passion, or being-affected. — tim wood

Yes, something is being acted on, and that is the raw materials. The form of the materials changes due to the activity called "building". That is how Aristotle described change. The problem with Df's representation is that he portrays the house as that which suffers the passion, by saying "the passion of being built". And this is incoherent because there is no house in existence, to undergo a change of form, only the raw materials undergo that change, as described above. But the raw materials are not "being built", the house is. But the house does not yet exist. It exists only as a goal or end, and as such it is the final cause of the builders activity. So in this way, Df represents what Aristotle would name as the final cause, as some sort of "necessary efficient cause".

Not so. Aristotle did not rule out the concept of “prime matter” as incoherent with his cosmological argument. In fact, “prime matter” is a fundamental concept in his metaphysics. — Wayfarer

This has been a subject of debate for some. But a thorough reading of the "Metaphysics" ought to display to you that he actually does rule out prime matter. He discusses it thoroughly, treating it as if it might possibly be a viable concept, because it was accepted by many, only to reveal in the end, that such a thing is impossible. To put it simply, prime matter would be pure, absolute potential. And any potential requires an actuality to act as cause to bring about anything actual from it. The concept of pure, absolute potential, does not allow for any actuality, and therefore could not actualize itself. So if there ever was pure absolute potential (prime matter), this would always be the case, and there would never be anything actual. But observational information reveals to us that there is something actual. Therefore "prime matter" is ruled out.

This is basically the argument against being coming from nothing. Pure potential, prime matter, is actually nothing. It is assumed as an original chaos or some absolute disorder, what some called apeiron. From this complete and absolute randomness, organized actual existence (form), is supposed to come into being by some chance occurrence. Apokrisis presents this as symmetry-breaking. You can see how this is illogical, to assume that formed being springs spontaneously from absolute potential, prime matter.

Aristotle’s concept of prime matter (hylē) refers to the underlying substratum that has no form or qualities of its own but can receive various forms. — Wayfarer

Actually, what Aristotle reveals in his Metaphysics, is that the true underlying substratum is actually formal. That it is material is just an illusion produced from the assumptions of empirical sciences. This is why Aristotle is truly idealist rather than materialist, as "form", being what is actual, becomes the first principle. You'll see this principle taken up by Christian theologists like Aquinas, choosing actuality as the first principle over the "pure potential" of the Neo-Platonists.

In his cosmological argument, particularly in the “Physics” and “Metaphysics,” Aristotle posits the existence of an unmoved mover, a necessary being that causes motion* without itself being moved. This unmoved mover is pure actuality**, having no potentiality. The concept of prime matter, in contrast, is pure potentiality and plays a different role in his metaphysical framework. — Wayfarer

This is good, but if you look closely you'll see that the concept of "pure actuality" excludes the possibility of "pure potentiality", and vise versa, because "pure" excludes the other category. So, when you see that the assumed unmoved mover is pure actuality, you know that pure potentiality is ruled out. Therefore, "pure potentiality" is the ontology which he is refuting. This is the position of the Pythagoreans, and those that Aristotle refers to as "some Platonists", those who adopt pure potentiality as a first principle.

*’Motion’ in Aristotle means something different than modern physics ‘velocity’. Aristotle’s notion of motion is broader and more encompassing, dealing with the transition from potentiality to actuality in various aspects, not limited to spatial movement. This understanding of motion as a change of state is a fundamental difference from the modern physics definition, which typically focuses on the change in an object’s position over time (velocity). — Wayfarer

Yes, Aristotle distinguish two types of change, change of place (locomotion), and internal change, which is change of a thing's form. Modern science, with its propensity toward dividing objects into smaller parts, reduces all change to change of place. What was internal change, or change of form, is now change of place of the parts. However, as we get to smaller and smaller parts, we reapproach the problem of the ancient atomists, which Aristotle had to deal with.

We cannot assume infinite divisibility of the parts, because this leaves us with nothing, no substratum at the base of things. So the atomists proposed fundamental parts, and these fundamental parts must be unchangeable or else they'd be divisible into further parts. The fundamental parts would be prime matter, that which all things are composed of. However, this creates the need for a completely different perspective. There is a requirement for a 'force' of actuality which organizes the fundamental parts, and this 'force' must be internal to the objects we know. The 'force' becomes the principle for actual existence, organized being. Then by Aristotle's refutation, the cosmological argument, the fundamental parts (atoms) as prime matter, get ruled out, and we are left with this 'force' as the fundamental substratum of all being. Aristotle's primitive representation is the divine activity, the thinking, thinking on thinking.

Clearly, you know much less about Aristotle than you would like to believe. Further, you are not open to learning. So, once again, I leave you to your own beliefs. — Dfpolis

You, Dfpolis, are unable, or simply unwilling to engage with teleology, the foundational aspect of Aristotle's ontology. Instead you incessantly attempt to represent the intentional activity of final causation as some sort of necessary efficient cause, refusing to engage with the true Aristotelian principles.

Substantial form actualizes its prime matter here and now. — Johnnie

Aristotle ruled out "prime matter" as an incoherent concept with his cosmological argument.

The immediate effect is progress toward completion = the house being built. If there were no immediate effect, the house would never come to be. — Dfpolis

"Progress" is a judgement in relation to the final cause. So you continue to conflate final cause with efficient cause.

I never made such a stipulation and I deny any such separation. They are not physically separate, but logically distinct. — Dfpolis

If "the builder building", and "the house being built" are not physically separate, then they are one and the same, as I've been saying. So we agree here. You say they are logically distinct, and I've said that the distinction is that "the builder building" is more general than "the house being built". This is because the builder building is not necessarily building a house. Would you agree with this logical distinction?

Suppose we say "the builder is building a house", and "a house is being built". Would you agree that the logical distinction is that in one case, "the builder" is the subject, and in the other case, "the house" is the subject. But now there is a problem, the house, as the subject does not yet exist, it's existence is, as you say, predicted. Do you agree, that "the house" as the goal or end, is the final cause, just like in Aristotle's example, the goal of health is the final cause of the man walking? So when we say "a house is being built", we are talking about final causation, because what indicates that "a house" is being built, is reference to the intended goal of the project, the end.

Therefore the logical difference between "the builder building", and "a house being built", is that the former is a description of efficient causation, and the latter is a description of final causation. "The builder building" refers only to the physical activities of the person putting things together, while " a house being built" refers to the goal, end, or intention of the person putting things together.

What is different is that the builder (not the house) builds and so is the cause of building, and the house (not the builder) is being built and so is the effect of building. — Dfpolis

I would disagree with this because the house is not yet built. Therefore it cannot be the effect described as "a house being built". It is only the effect after the house is built. Only after the house has been built can we say that the house is the effect.

Prior to the project being completed, the house is an idea, a plan, or goal, and as the goal or end, it is the cause of the builder building, in the sense of final cause. So, to explain what I am saying, consider that the material house comes from potentially existing, to actually existing, through the the activity of building (the means to the end). When the material house potentially exists, it is actually an idea, or goal in the builders mind, and therefore acts to inspire the builder to build, as final cause.

Therefore the builder is the cause of building, as you say, but only as final cause, not efficient cause. Building, itself, is an efficient cause, but if we say the builder is the cause of building, we are referring to the freely willed choice of the builder, to build, and this is final cause.

In that process, one element (the boulder building) is source of actualization of the materials' potential to be a house and so the cause, and the other element (the house being built) is the result of the actualization, and so the effect. — Dfpolis

I completely agree with this, and I believe that you and I both have a good understanding of Aristotle on this point. However, where we seem to disagree is that I think that under Aristotelian principles, what you describe as "source of actualization of the materials' potential to be a house" is final cause, while you seem to argue that it is a type of efficient cause.

Essential causality looks at the process, not the end result, and sees that that process (building) involves two concurrent aspects (the builder building as cause, and the house being build as effect). — Dfpolis

This still makes no sense to me. All you are saying is that there is two different ways to describe the same physical activity, There is no logical reason given to conclude that one is cause and the other effect. In fact, the affirmation that they are concurrent seems to negate the possibility of a cause/effect relation.

"Being done to" means an on-going activity. — Dfpolis

Sure, but the point is that there is no house in existence to be having anything done to it. And if we look at the raw material as having something done to them. there is no "effect" in this description, just something being done.

I have already addressed this. When my houses were being built, my wife and I went to see our "house," and spoke of it. No one was confused by the term, because they knew it could refer to a house under construction. Please do not quibble about this again. It is unbecoming. — Dfpolis

Of course no one is confused when we speak of the things which only exist as goals, because final causation is an integral part of our lives, and influences all sorts of conversations.

You ask me not to quibble about this, but it is key to understanding Aristotle's thesis on causation. To understand the reality of change we must recognize the difference between "the house" as a goal in people's minds, and "the house" as a completed material object. Do you agree that "the house as a goal in the minds of people, is a cause of action, and "the house" as a completed material object is the effect of that same action?

The words in question are ποιεῖν poiein and πάσχειν paskein. Boiled down, the first means to make or to do - active/action, and the second, "to be affected by anything whether good or bad, opposite to acting of oneself," (A Lexicon, Liddell and Scott, 1977, p. 536) - passive/passion. — tim wood

I know what passive means, it's Df's usage which makes no sense. If you think it does make sense, then explain how Df's expression "the passion of being built" makes any sense to you.

And this, Metaphysics, 1066a:
"That motion is in the movable is evident; for it is the complete realization of the movable by that which is capable of causing motion, and the actualization of that which is capable of causing motion is identical with that of the movable. For it must be a complete realization of them both; since a thing is capable of moving because it has the potentiality, but it moves only when it is active; but it is upon the movable that it is capable of acting. Thus the actuality of both alike is one; just as there is the same interval from one to two as from two to one, and the hill up and the hill down are one, although their being is not one; the case of the mover and the thing moved is similar." italics added. — tim wood

As I said, the two are one and the same, "identical", when it is the actualization which is being discussed. It is Df who wants to cast one part of the actualization as cause, and another part of the actualization as effect, and say that these two, the causal part and effectual part of the actualization are concurrent. But that is not Aristotle at all.

Temporal priority is not logical priority. — Ludwig V

I know, but if there is an existing law, and someone does something that is contrary to that law, then that person violates the law. That is a simple fact.

There is no unqualified sense of "same". — Ludwig V

I believe that what is attempted with the law of identity is to express an unqualified sense of "same". You seem to think it fails. Why?

Now you are claiming that builders are houses. — Dfpolis

You continue to be ridiculous. In the hypothesized scenario there is a builder building a house and there is a house being built. A proper description refers to both, but this obviously does not imply that builders are houses. In that hypothesized scenario, the description of a builder building refers to the very same situation as the description of a house being built.

Again, that is the point. Actions are identically passions from a different perspective. That does not make causes (builders building) the same as effects (houses being built). — Dfpolis

The effect of the builder building is a house, and the house is posterior in time to the builder building. The effect of the builder building is not a house being built, as these are one and the same thing. The effect is the house.

You are stipulating a separation between the "builder building" and the "house being built", in order to claim that there are causes and effects which are simultaneous and not chronologically ordered. I disagree, and so I am demonstrating that your argument is simple sophistry. Your argument amounts to employing two distinct descriptive styles to describe the very same activity, and then claim that one description is of the cause, and the other is of the effect, when both descriptions are really descriptions of the very same thing.

The house has some existence = a partial existence as a work in progress. Once building has begun, the house has a partial existence. If you do not like the term "house," substitute "house in progress." The logic works as well as it depends on the facts. — Dfpolis

Perhaps we can make some progress here, by breaking down the coming into being of the house, into parts. Do you agree, that when each part comes into existence, it does so as an effect, from the prior activity of the builder which is a cause of it, and the activity of the builder is always prior in time to the existence of the part? So, for instance, the foundation comes into existence, and it only exists after specific activities of the builder. There is no simultaneity of cause and effect here, the effect, which is the existence of the part, is always posterior in time to the cause, which is the activity of the builder. Can you agree to this simple principle?

Doing is causing and being done to is being effected. — Dfpolis

Right, but "being done" implies finished, complete, the end. And "being built" implies unfinished, and this is completely incompatible with "being done". Further the concept of, "being done to", "being effected", as is your claimed meaning of "passion", which is really "passive", requires an object which the action is being done to. In the hypothesize scenario, this object is supposed to be the house. But the house does not exist, and this is why your proposal is nonsensical and impossible to understand. If you would propose a passive object which the action is being done to, then we'd have a place to start. However, you insist that the passive object which supposedly suffers the passion, is the activity of "being built", and this is nonsense.

All the rest of us are able to distinguish builders building from houses being built even though they are inseparable. — Dfpolis

That's unabashed bullshit. Provide for me an accurate description of a house being built which does not involve builders building. The only difference is as I explained earlier. Since "builders building" is more general, there is no necessity that the builders building are building houses, yet there is necessity that houses being built involves builders building. This, as I explained to you, is the nature of final cause, the free willing agent has choice, which is most general, and decision moves toward the more specific without necessity. So there is no necessity between cause and effect in this direction. But when we look from the direction of the more specific, "houses being built", there is the necessity of builders building.

If we were discussing causation completely, yes. However, you asked about efficient causes and that is what I am explaining here. — Dfpolis

There is no such thing as efficient causation in which the cause and effect are simultaneous, concurrent. You simply use a sophistic trick of description in an attempt to prove that there is.

"House" is being analogically predicated. It does not mean the completed house, but the work in progress, which does exist. — Dfpolis

So the object which suffers the passion is a predicted object? How can it suffer the effects of the activity it doesn't even exist, and is only predicted to exist?

https://www.jstor.org/stable/26170042 — Dfpolis

If you believe that this text is consistent with your claims, then provide some references from it. I think you and Duns Scotus are talking about two different things, but using the same terms. You have an odd way with terms, as is evident from your use of "passion".

So why don't you conclude that the use in the context of the law of identity violates the use in the context of set theory? It seems to be an arbitrary choice. — Ludwig V

I'd agree except that the law of identity was first, set theory came along after. So set theory violated the law of identity, which was already established. If it was the other way around, then we'd want to look at the reasons why someone would be trying to enforce the law of identity, which seems like a useless, obvious, self-evident tautology, in violation of how set theorists were defining "same".

Well, if the law of identity is an obvious self-evident tautology, then it appears like there must be something wrong with set theory if it's in contradiction with what is obvious. We can see something like this in Aristotle's work to establish the law of identity. He claimed that the law of identity was necessary to battle against sophists who could logically demonstrate absurdities. If the base axioms of a logical system are contrary to what is self-evident tautology, then that system will be able to prove things which are contrary to what is obvious, one can prove the absurd.

The meaning of "same" depends on its context. — Ludwig V

Very true, but we need to pay attention to subtleties to avoid deception. Suppose you and I both drive the same make and model of car, and same year and colour as well. Notice, that "same" is being used in a qualified sense, referring to different properties "same make", "same model", "same year", "same colour". Now, suppose I say that I drive the same car as you. This would be incorrect. But why is it incorrect, because everything about it seems to be the same? The thing is that everything about it is not the same, only those named qualities are the same, and that's why it's incorrect to say that it is "the same" in that unqualified sense.

Now, when we say that "two sets are the same", this is incorrect for the same reason. Not everything about the two is necessarily the same, only the stipulated required qualities. So it is incorrect to say that the two sets are the same, in the unqualified sense, because some features like the ordering of the elements may be different.

The builder building is the cause. The house being built is the effect. Of course they are concurrent. That is the whole point. — Dfpolis

As I explained, "the builder building", and "the house being built" are just two different ways of describing the exact same thing. There is no distinction of cause and effect here, and that is why there is concurrency, there is not separation. They are the same.

But, building is not being built. so the cause is not the effect. — Dfpolis

Yes, "building" is "being built". Why can't you comprehend this? The two are the very same, identical activity, described in two different ways. As I said in my reply to Tim, "building" has the builder as the subject, and "being built" has the house as the subject. So the two are just different ways of describing the exact same activity. One way is to describe a builder building, and the other way is to describe a house being built. But both are descriptions of the exact same activity. There is no separation of cause and effect because there is only one activity being described.

Further, since "the house", as subject does not yet have any existence, it cannot suffer any passion, or have any properties at all. And that's why your claims make no sense. At the time of "being built", the house exists only as a plan, a goal or end. This is why "the house" which is implied as the subject of "being built, can only be referred to as a final cause at this time, not an efficient cause. The house exists in the mind of the builder only, as a goal or end, and the cause of the builder building. This is just like Aristotle's example of final causation, where "health" exists in the mind of the man walking, as the cause of him walking.

You do. I don't. In essential causality they are inseparable. In accidental causality (time-sequence by rule) they are separate. That is why there are two kinds of efficient causality. The first is necessary, the second is not. — Dfpolis

Now you are just being ridiculous. If the cause is inseparable from the effect, then how do you know that "being built" is not the cause, and "building" is not the effect? And maybe it constantly switches back and forth, with the two continually changing places, each being sometimes the cause and other times the effect. If the cause is inseparable from the effect, then there is no principle by which you can say one is cause and the other effect.

Do you see why I say that your claim is ridiculous? You claim to be able to distinguish "building" from "being built", one the cause the other the effect. Yet you also claim that the two are concurrent and the cause is inseparable from the effect. Therefore whenever you describe the scenario, there is no way to know whether the description is of the builder building, or the house being built. In reality though, it is just one activity, and you've devised this elaborate way to say that it is two distinct activities, one cause and the other effect. And when it comes to telling me how to distinguish one from the other, you admit that the cause cannot be distinguished from the effect, "they are inseparable".

By referring to a good dictionary when you see a term used in a way that is new to you. — Dfpolis

I referred to my OED, and "passion" is said to be a noun. The nearest definition to fitting your usage was: "4a strong enthusiasm (has a passion for football). b an object arousing this." There is nothing anywhere similar to your usage in my OED. However, there are definitions of "passive" which are similar. For example: "1 suffering action; acted upon." I think maybe you confused words, and meant "passive". However, if you tried to talk about the passiveness of the house being built, this would more clearly reveal the nonsense of your expressions. So you try to hide it behind a strange use of "passion".

Yes, I am but I am not saying it is a completed house, but a house under construction. — Dfpolis

OK, let's ignore all our differences, and start here, where we agree. Do you agree that at the construction site, there is not a house, there is activity which we can call "the construction of a house", or, "a house under construction". Both these phrases refer to the exact same thing, and "the house" only exists as a plan, a goal, or the end of that construction project. Do you agree that to talk about causation here, we need to include "final cause"?

And continuing, corresponding to the action of the builder building, is the passion of the thing being built. And all of this makes perfect sense. — tim wood

How does this "make perfect sense to you"? The passion is in the builder, not the thing being built. And even if we take "passive", which means "suffering action; acted upon", instead of "passion", the passivity is in the materials which the builder works with. The "thing being built" doesn't even exist, it is an idea, a goal in the builder's mind.

The substance, then, is the house. The accident applied to it in this case is passion. Not that the house is doing anything, but rather something is being done to the house: it is being built. — tim wood

You're missing the point tim. The house does not exist, it is a goal in the builder's mind, existing as a formula. The accidental properties of the house only come into being after each part of the house is built.