We're both right. In that passage Adorno describes the retreat into the subject as a danger or temptation faced by thinking, one that can be resisted with critical self-reflection, which is characteristic of intellectual experience. Thus in the end intellectual experience is the avoidance of retreating into the subject, even if it has to go through it (or successfully resist the temptation) first. — Jamal

Well perhaps, but I do not see any mention of "danger" or "temptation". Nor do I see that the retreat is "resisted". I see that it is a special reaction to the consumption of ideology.

The point being made earlier, is that theory is related to experience like the roast to the diner. Only after theory disappears into experience (is consumed by the subject), "would there be philosophy". Intellectual experience therefore, as a special type of experience which requires the consumption of theory, produces that retreat. Perhaps the retreat isn't necessary, but recognition of the reality of falsity within the ideology, the non-identical forces that retreat, as a response. So if the theory had no falsity there would be no retreat, but then there would be no need for philosophy either.

To resist, or avoid that retreat would be to deny the possibility of philosophy, and I believe it would be to resist "intellectual experience" in general, thereby falling into the idealist trap which I mentioned above. The idealist trap is to maintain the independent existence of ideas and theory in general, as eternal independent truth. To resist the retreat into oneself, would be to refuse or resist intellectual consumption, which is to understand, by simply taking the principles for granted, as given, posited as "the truth". When principles are taken for granted as eternal fact, there is no need to understand them, and this is a denial of intellectual experience.

The response to the consumption of theory, is the subjective retreat. It is the reaction to a world which is false to its innermost core. I believe that Adorno thinks the reaction is unavoidable, it is intuitive, reflex, and negative dialectics, as the proper form of philosophy is only possible after this retreat, whereby the subject comes to grips with its own limitations. If Adorno described the experience of consuming theory in a different way, he might describe a resistance to that retreat.

This provides an approach to your questions:

QUESTION: Is Adorno recommending a mode of thinking---he often says so---or is he just describing his way of thinking? Do all philosophers necessarily conflate these? — Jamal

I think he is describing a mode of thinking which is what he believes is the only adequate response to the existence of non-identity in identity ideology

But he also describes it as a stage that thinking has to go through. This is intellectual experience as a dialectical process, which has as one of its moments a retreat from the non-identical back into itself, step 1 below:

1. Negation: when confronted with the non-identical, the subject negates it by retreating into itself in its "fullness", i.e., its preformed, comprehensive, comfortable systems of concepts, ideologies, etc.
2. Negation of the negation: critical self-reflection says no to this, bringing the subject's thinking back out again.

Neat huh? — Jamal

I don't really agree with #2. Where does he imply a negation of the negation? Critical self-reflection brings out the limitations to the subject's fullness, and this avoids solipsism. If a subject were complete this would entail solipsism. But there is no negation of the subject's retreat. After recognizing its own limitations, the subject moves toward freedom.

So, he then proceeds to talk about "unregimented thought", and this I believe is negative dialectics. It is only a negation of the negation in the sense that it is a resistance to the non-identical, as the negative aspect of positivist idealism. So it is not a case of the subject saying no to the retreat into itself, it's a case of the subject saying no to the non-identity, falsity, of the ideology. The world is false to its innermost core, and freedom for the subject can only be produced through resistance to the ideology. After retreating, and acknowledging its own limitations, the subject seeks its own means for freedom, and this is described in the following passage:

Theory and intellectual
experience require their reciprocal effect. The former does not contain
answers for everything, but reacts to a world which is false to its
innermost core. Theory would have no jurisdiction over what would be
free of the bane of such. The ability to move is essential to
consciousness, not an accidental characteristic. It signifies a double
procedure: that of the inside out, the immanent process, the
authentically dialectical, and a free one, something unfettered which
steps out of dialectics, as it were. Neither of them are however
disparate. The unregimented thought has an elective affinity to
dialectics, which as critique of the system recalls to mind what would
be outside of the system; and the energy which dialectical movement in
cognition unleashes is that which rebels against the system. Both
positions of consciousness are connected to one another through each
other’s critique, not through compromise.

Im confused... How is this different from what I said?? — Pussycat

It's not an equality relation, which is purely ideal, i.e. this concept is equal to that concept. It is an identity relation which is more like correspondence, truth.



I read somewhere that dogs have very special genetics, genes which are abnormally conducive to mutation. This is why they were very successful in domestication, and readily provide all sorts of different breeds for different purposes.

I haven't seen any argument for that conclusion. Can you briefly state what " inconsistencies, problems, failures" are to be found with empiricism? Be concise, no hand-waving. — Janus

I mentioned what I called the "primary" example:

So, as I mentioned earlier, the nature of time can be taken as an example, or even the primary specific or "particular intuition". The empirical model is based solely on the past. Only the past has been sensed or experienced in any way. From this, we project toward the future, and conclude that we can predict the future, and this capacity to predict validates the determinist perspective. However, the intuitive perspective knows that we have a freedom of choice to select from possibilities, and this negates the determinist perspective. Unless we deny the intuitive knowledge, that we have the capacity to choose, the difference between these two perspectives indicates that the relationship between the past and the future is not the way that the supposed "empirical reality" supposes that it is. — Metaphysician Undercover

No clue what you're taking about — Apustimelogist

I conclude that it was someone other than you then.

Let's grant for the sake of argument that (intellectual) intuition sometimes might give us an accurate picture of the nature of reality ("reality" here meaning something more than mere empirical reality, that is things as they appear to us, rather some "deeper" truth metaphysically speaking). How do we tell when a particular intuition has given us such knowledge? — Janus

It's not a matter of intuition giving us an accurate picture of reality. That's not what I have been arguing. I have been arguing that the picture given by empiricism, the supposed "empirical reality", is incorrect, false and misleading. When we can point out inconsistencies, problems, failures, in the "empirical reality", as I do repeated throughout this forum, then intuition provides us with the conclusion that there is a deeper metaphysical truth which is not provided by the "empirical reality".

So, as I mentioned earlier, the nature of time can be taken as an example, or even the primary specific or "particular intuition". The empirical model is based solely on the past. Only the past has been sensed or experienced in any way. From this, we project toward the future, and conclude that we can predict the future, and this capacity to predict validates the determinist perspective. However, the intuitive perspective knows that we have a freedom of choice to select from possibilities, and this negates the determinist perspective. Unless we deny the intuitive knowledge, that we have the capacity to choose, the difference between these two perspectives indicates that the relationship between the past and the future is not the way that the supposed "empirical reality" supposes that it is.

No, you and Wayfarer share an idiosyncratic definition, and surprise, surprise! you are both idealists. — Janus

Idealism is the predominant metaphysics in western society. Surprise, surprise!

This can be framed in terms of prediction, inference, model construction. It is called active inference, a corollary of the free energy. — Apustimelogist

Did I discuss this with you before, or was that with someone else who referenced the same woefully inadequate model?

Hold on, I was under the impression that "object" means anything that can be known or cognized, the philosopher's subject-matter, like justice, beauty, science, etc, basically everything that is not subject (ourselves). — Pussycat

I don't think that this is the case for Adorno. He clearly distinguishes between the object, and the subject along with theory, and concepts, which are in some relation to the objects. We cannot say that there is a relation between concepts and objects unless we allow a difference between them. Otherwise we'd be talking about the relation between one object and another object, not the relation between concept and object.

For example, I want to know what justice is. I take it as object, camel case, then Justice. And then try to conceptualize it, using the concept of justice (lowercase). Then identity thinking is the equality, justice = Justice: my subjective conception of Justice (justice) equals to Justice - the object (of conceptualization).

I'm way off, you think? — Pussycat

This is not how I understand Adorno's reference to identity thinking. I understand that he is talking about an identity relation between concept and object. Jamal seems to have a slightly different understanding which allows object to object relations. I see no reason at this point, to think of internal aspects of concepts, theories, or even conceptual systems, as understood by Adorno to be object to object relations.

Thus we can see negative dialectics, and especially the idea of intellectual experience, as the philosophical elaboration of this instinct: resisting the reduction of experience to its empiricist concept, while insisting that such resistance is not a retreat into irrationalism, nor even a retreat into the subject, but rather a materialist critique of rationality itself. — Jamal

I would not agree with this. Intellectual experience, as described by Adorno in this section, is explicitly "a retreat into the subject".

By no means does the difference between the so-called
subjective share of intellectual experience and its object vanish; the
necessary and painful exertion of the cognizing subject testifies to it. In
the unreconciled condition, non-identity is experienced as that which
is negative. The subject shrinks away from this, back onto itself and the
fullness of its modes of reaction. Only critical self-reflection protects it
from the limitations of its fullness and from building a wall [Wand:
interior wall] between itself and the object, indeed from presupposing
its being-for-itself as the in-itself and for-itself.

You see, the subject does retreat into itself, in this way, recoiling from the "negative" effects of non-identity (a world which is false to its innermost core). Only "critical self-reflection" saves it from building a wall of isolation, solipsism. It appears to me that you are completely ignoring what Adorno says about "intellectual experience" in this section, along with my apt interpretation of it presented above, to present your own understanding of "intellectual experience". But what you present does not appear to be consistent with what Adorno says here, in this section. I recommend that you read the last two paragraphs thoroughly.

All that we do is predict what happens next. All that we have to be able to do is know how to navigate. — Apustimelogist

This is not really the case. In most instances the goal is to create what happens next, i.e. we want to shape the future, not predict it. The ability to predict is just a means to that further end.

The noumenal world does exist independently. — J

This is exactly the wrong attitude. By giving the name "world" to the noumenal, you imply that what exists independently is in some way similar to our conception of "the world".

There is no need to assume that what exists independently is in anyway at all, similar to how we represent it. For example, the word "world" is in no way similar to the concept we have of the world, yet in some way, that word signifies that concept. Likewise, our conception of the world might be in no way similar to the independent reality, yet it could still in some way signify it. There is no reason to believe that the signifier is in any way similar to the thing represented by it. This means that if the concept "world" represents an independent reality, there is no reason to believe that the independent reality is similar to that concept which signifies it.

Wayfarer wants to insist that his own idiosyncratic definition of 'existence' is the correct one, which is absurd given that the meanings of terms are determined by (predominant) use. — Janus

Hmm, seems like the same accusation was leveled against me. That indicates that the person making the accusation is really the one with the idiosyncratic definition.

The relevant idealism is the view that reality is mental (in Hegel, rational-spiritual). It's the reduction of objects to correlates of thought. — Jamal

This I see as self-contradicting. "Correlates" implies a duality, so "the reduction of objects to correlates of thought", is inherently incompatible with "reality is mental". "Reality is mental" implies all objects are thoughts.

As to what identity-thinking is, I refer back to my post on page 2: — Jamal

There's a lot of ambiguity in that post. What you call "subject-object identity" is the identity which I've been addressing. However, you also propose "object-object identity", and this would be the only possible form of identity if the phrase "reality is mental", is the position being addressed. However, objects as "correlates of thought" implies subject-object identity. These two types of "identity" are very distinct, and if mixed would constitute equivocation.

To avoid these problems of ambiguity, Aristotle proposed the law of identity, which puts identity in the object itself, as distinct from thought. Adorno does not seem to address the law of identity.

We certainly do have the faculty of being able to experience. — Janus

Here's the problem. You describe the unity of the five senses as the faculty of experience, defined as "being able to experience". And, you attribute knowledge to this faculty. But the ability for something does not necessitate its actual existence. Therefore your descriptive terms "the faculty of experience" cannot account for, or describe, the actual existence of experience, nor can it account for the actual existence of knowledge.

So you propose an "ability to experience", which supports the ability to sense, but all this amounts to is a meaningless, nonsensical, interaction problem. By your terms, human beings have the capacity to experience. That in no way accounts for the reality of actual experience. I, as a human being have 'the capacity' to do a whole lot of different things, but having 'the capacity' does not account for why I do some and not others. Therefore your proposition makes no sense as a proposal to account for the existence of knowledge. Knowledge is active in the world. It blows very hard, regardless of whether it gets anywhere or not.

So-called intellectual intuition does not give us reliable knowledge, it consists mostly of imagination applied to ideas derived from experience. — Janus

The question was " By what faculty other than experience could we know anything (apart from what is logically necessary) ?". "Intuition" answers that question. It's "reliability" is relative, and context dependent, so your dismissal is just an attempt to avoid the reality that it answers your question, regardless of whether answering your question gets us anywhere or not.

You are simply leading our discussion in a meaningless, nonsensical direction, so that my replies to your questions can be met with "just blowing hard, and getting nowhere".

If you want to get somewhere, then let's go!

Quit limiting the discussion to the ability to do something, and address actually doing something, if you want to get somewhere. Obviously though, you don't want to get anywhere, because that would require breaking free from your nonsensical presuppositions, which produce an interaction problem.

What makes you say that? — Jamal

The argument for Platonic realism, is that ideas have existence independent from human minds, as "objects". This is produced from the assumption that different people have the same ideas. So you and I are supposed to each have the same idea of "two" for example. Since the notion of two in my mind is thought to be the same as the notion of two in your mind, it is concluded that each of our minds partakes of an independent idea, "Two". In Platonic realism the independent idea is supposed to be an object.

The problem is that something needs to support the existence of these independent ideas. It might be God, or the existence of these independent objects might somehow be thought to be supported by an objective State, as a part of the State, ideology. In one case the independent (objective) ideas are attributed to God, in the other they are attributed to the State. In each case they have existence independent from individual subjects, hence they are "objects", or "objective" and this is idealism.

So, when theory (ideas), are consumed by the individual subject, becoming a part of that subject's "intellectual experience", as described by Adorno, the theories (ideas) necessarily become subjective, regardless of whether or not they had independent objective existence. They are a part of the subject's intellectual experience, and are therefore subjective. This is what enables philosophy, theories and ideas being a part of the subject, i.e. subjective. However, this necessarily negates any notion of ideas as objects, the objectivity of ideas in general, and idealism overall. The philosopher cannot do philosophy and also assume idealism, because philosophy is only possible when ideas are subjective, within the subject. The division between subject and object is annihilated when the subject consumes the object.

Each of the five senses are perceptual faculties, as well as interoception and proprioception. All together they constitute the faculty of experience, not of particular experiences, but of being able to experience. — Janus

As I said, you have presuppositions which make no sense. How do you propose that the senses are united into a single faculty called "experience", or "being able to experience"? Your proposal, that we have a single faculty known as "being able to experience" is nonsense.

That's idealism. — Jamal

Not really, Idealism involves a belief that concepts are objects, but not all objects are concepts. So that is not the identity relation referred to by Adorno.

And didn't you, yourself, say that society was no more than a concept? — Jamal

I think society is a concept, but I do not think it is an object. So I don't assume any identity relation between "society" as a concept, and any object, because there is no object which bears that name.

Those who believe that there is an object called "society" might assume that there is an identity relation between our concept "society", and the object which bears this name. The identity relation is what constitutes "truth" in the sense of correspondence. This idea of "truth", as a relation between subject and object when theory (therefore concept) has become a part of the subject in post-consumption, is very important at the end of this section.

Only critical self-reflection protects it from the limitations of its fullness and from building a wall [Wand: interior wall] between itself and the object, indeed from presupposing its being-for-itself as the in-itself and for-itself. The less the identity between the subject and object can be ascertained, the more contradictory what is presumed to cognize such, the unfettered strength and open-minded self-consciousness. Theory and intellectual experience require their reciprocal effect. The former does not contain answers for everything, but reacts to a world which is false to its innermost core.

The very act of consumption, when theory disappears into experience, is what denies the reality of idealism. In this act (which in general is education), theory is brought from the external, where it may be perceived as consisting of Platonic objects, and internalized by the subject. That is intellectual experience. In this post-consumption position it enables philosophy, but as part of the subject, therefore subjective. Therefore philosophy must reject idealism, or else it denies its own ground.

You contradict yourself. — Janus

Clearly then, you misunderstand me.

By what faculty other than experience could we know anything (apart from what is logically necessary) ? — Janus

Experience is not a faculty. And, we are born with knowledge, it's known as intuition. This is why you can't understand me, and you think that I contradict myself, you have presuppositions which make no sense. Those nonsense presumptions make it impossible for you to understand some things, rendering some statements in the appearance of contradiction.

It is the assumption that objects are identical to their concepts. — Pussycat

I don't think anyone believes that objects are identical to concepts. I think the idea is more that concepts identify objects in a sort of relation of correspondence. There is a relation of identity between subject and object which is conducive to truth.

Adorno offers a better image of intellectual experience, a transforming rather than a spectating one: the diner to the roast. It's about digging in, not merely observing from a distance. In eating, neither the diner nor the roast remain unchanged. — Jamal

But, I think the point was that one of them is actually consumed by the other. So theory, being what is referred to as "the latter", disappears into the former, experience, and this I conclude, is what produces "intellectual experience".

Now there is a very significant issue, and that is what happens to "theory" in general, after it is consumed and becomes integral within intellectual experience. And this I believe, is why the prior/posterior distinction is important here. Notice, that "only when the latter disappears into the former", is "philosophy" possible.

Now, in post-consumption, theory confronts ideology as philosophy. It corrects the naiveté of Spirit's self-confidence. Only in this posterior condition do we get the subject/object division. Theory, having been consumed, now inheres within the subject, and the failures of theory, "a world which is false to its innermost core" are what constitutes non-identity.

So, I believe that the posterior position of theory is important to negative dialectics. It is only in this condition of "philosophy", when the theory has been consumed, that the separation between subject and object is produced. Theory is within the subject, therefore subjective, it is not out there as objective property of God, or the State. The separation is known by ideology as a form of unity between subject and object, identity, but that's an illusion which only veils the falsity. The philosophizing subject, which already apprehends the subject/object division as a result of the theory having been consumed, apprehends it as a division of untruth, even as a wall between subject and object, which prevents intellectual freedom, incapacitating the ability to move in general.

At least I recognize that there is a problem, and I'm acting toward resolution. That's a lot better than you, doing nothing, thinking that everything's fine. Eventually I'll find the way out, through my trial and error, while you'd be still sitting there thinking everything's fine, until your dying day.

The following references are an attempt to explore the question of the grounding of reason, in something other than formal logic or scientific rationalism. — Wayfarer

The grounding of reason is necessarily something outside the bounds of reason. This makes it unreasonable or even irrational. The grounding feature, the irrational, will always be a part of any instance of human reasoning, and this is what makes human reasoning impossible to be imitated by AI. In a broad sense, this feature is known to philosophers as intuition.

'Universe' just means 'the sum of what exists', so it refers to everything that exists, and is thus not a fiction at all. — Janus

That looks very naive to me. If reality includes more than just what exists, then this part of reality is not part of the universe. How would we establish a relationship between the universe, and that part of reality which does not exist?

For example, you seem to imply a separation between what exists and what is fiction. The fictional cannot be part of the universe, by your definition, but we still must afford it some kind of reality which i assume would be somehow outside the universe. What kind of reality does the fictional have, when it is outside the universe?

What are you disputing? — Janus

As I said, I am disputing the concept of "the universe". By that concept, it is correct and coherent to say that the universe existed before there was human life. However, I believe that concept is faulty, and does not provide an accurate representation of reality. Therefore the conclusion that the universe existed before there was human life is unsound, because it is derived from a false premise, that "the universe" provides an accurate representation of reality.

On what basis do you claim that spatial expansion and dark matter indicate that the idea of a universe is a "failed concept". What do you mean by "failed concept"? — Janus

There is much evidence that reality extends beyond what is known as "the universe". If "the universe" is intended to refer to all that is, then the evidence indicates that it is a failed concept.

Again, it can obviously be said that every concept is derived from experience, in which case noting that is pointless. All our concepts "may be completely misleading in relation to the way reality actually is", but then what could that mean? — Janus

It means that we must go beyond experience if we desire to understand the nature of reality. Since many people believe that truth is limited to what can be known from experience (empiricism), but others do not believe this, then it is very important, and not pointless to note this distinction.

So, if you insist that "every concept is derived from experience", then we need to look beyond conceptualization to understand why those people do not believe in empiricism. The reality though, is that not everyone believes that all concepts are derived from experience. Therefore, the fact that "it can obviously be said" that every concept is derived from experience is what is pointless, because people can say whatever they want.

Yet you have failed to give any argument for why we should agree with you. What's your argument? So far you are just looking like a blowhard. — Janus

Yes, I'm blowing very hard, just like the wind. Be careful, the wind can be dangerous. But I'm still waiting for a definition of "existence" which would prove that I am wrong. Unless you can provide me with one, I think that's a good argument for why you should agree with me.

Wouldn't you think that equating thinking with pleasure, is identity-thinking? — Pussycat

Clearly not a case of "equating". But what exactly do you think "identity-thinking" is?

I haven't said it is necessarily true that a Universe of things existed prior to humans existing. I've said that all the available evidence points to its having existed. You seem to be conflating logical necessity with empirical evidence. — Janus

Well sure, but my point is that the thing referred to here as "it" is a fiction. Therefore all that evidence does nothing for you. It's like pointing to a whole lot of bumps in the night, and telling me that all the evidence points to there being a ghost in the other room. And you can go right ahead and dismiss any logical arguments which go against what you've concluded through the "available evidence", because you prefer evidence over logical necessity.

What I dispute is the concept of "the universe", I think it's a fiction, like the ghost in the other room. Of course the narrative which supports "the universe" is going to make it look like all the evidence points to the truth of "the universe". And if you neatly ignore all the logical arguments against "the universe", insisting that empirical evidence is more important then logical necessity, you'll be restricted to believing in your fictitious story because all the available evidence points that way.

To exist is to be real, actual as opposed to imaginary. — Janus

This definition is based in human experience. You define "exist" as what is not imaginary. So you base the definition in imagination, and say whatever is not imagination, exists. But that's self-refuting, because your definition is itself imaginary, you are imagining something which is not imaginary, i.e. exists, but by that very definition, it cannot exist. So what you say "exists" cannot exist, by your own definition, because you are just imagining something which is not imaginary. The proposed not-imaginary thing is nothing other than something imagined. This gets you nowhere fast.

There are two logical possibilities―either the Universe existed prior to humans or it didn't. — Janus

You haven't paid attention to what I've said. What I dispute is the truth of "the universe". So your two logical possibilities are irrelevant. It's like saying either you've stopped beating your wife or you haven't. Well, obviously we have to validated the initial proposition first. I readily agree, that under the conception of "the universe", it existed prior to humans. What I disagree with is the truth of "the universe".

So, what we need to determine is whether that conception is an adequate representation of reality. And, I've argued that it clearly is not. There is much evidence like spatial expansion, and dark matter, to indicate that "the universe" is a failure as a concept.

This is why the subject of the thread is very helpful. It can help us to understand that all these concepts like "existence", and "universe", are just constructs derived from our experience. They may be completely misleading in relation to the way reality actually is.

That is not, in my experience, how 'existence' is generally understood, and it is certainly not how I understand it―it is merely your own idiosyncratic, tendentiously stipulated meaning. There is no reason why others should share your prejudices. If you want to live in your own little echo chamber that's up to you. — Janus

Well, I am waiting for someone to explain how "existence" could be understood in any other way. I've provided no "idiosyncratic, tendentiously stipulated meaning" so that charge is false. I've just challenged anyone to provide a description or definition which isn't based in human experience, or simply begging the question, because i strongly believe that is impossible. Your proposal above obviously fails miserably. It provides no basis for any sort of understanding whatsoever, of what "existence" means, only self-contradiction, which is incoherency. So it narrowly avoids begging the question, but only by being incoherent.

All our science is consistent in indicating that there was a universe, galaxies, star systems, planets and on Earth many organisms, plants, creatures long before there were humans. I see no reason to doubt the veracity of that conclusion. — Janus

Consistency doesn't imply truth. We can make very consistent fictions. And even when the story is consistent with empirical sensations, truth is not necessitated. "There is a ghost in the other room" is consistent with something going bump in the night.

Given that we all and some animals manifestly perceive the same environments and things in those environments there is no reason to consider that the concept applies only to what humans have experienced. — Janus

Well then, give me an explanation of what it means to exist, which is not based in human experience, or simply begging the question.

You seem to be conflating two different things―that 'existence' can be understood to be a linguistically generated concept and the range of the application of that concept. — Janus

Sorry, I don't understand what you are accusing me of.

My point is very clear. Human beings have experience. Whether or not other animals have similar experience is irrelevant. Human beings have produced a concept "existence", which is based on their experiences. Any attempt to explain accurately what "existence" means will necessarily reference human experience. That is why I said it is highly doubtful that what it means for something to exist does not depend on human existence. It's very clear to me, and it ought to be for you as well, that "existence" refers to the specific way that we perceive our environment, and nothing else. "Existence" is defined by experience.

I'm sorry I annoyed you so much. There's little I can do about, except to refuse to engage in order to avoid escalating your annoyance. — Ludwig V

No apology required, I wasn't annoyed at all. How did you get that idea? I was just alluding to lesson #1 in reply to the request you made:

OK. Enlighten me. — Ludwig V

First lesson in learning about the true nature of time, do not accept determinist, fatalist bullshit like 'wait and see', 'que sera sera'. You can cause real change.

I'm waiting. In the mean time, life goes on. — Ludwig V

Yes. I suspect that the suggestion that one can just simply sit and wait for something to happen is unhelpful. — Ludwig V

But you are missing my point. Take your analogy. Suppose someone had said to us just before Copernicus published that everything that we think we know about the sun, moon and stars is wrong. No reaction. Compare someone saying to us in 1690, after Newton's Principia was published, that everything had changed. I would pay attention. Same here. Give me answers that I can get my head around in language that I speak, then I'll pay attention. — Ludwig V

Here's the difference between you and I then. You won't go anywhere unless someone, who has already been there, points the way to you, (and gives you answers that you can get your head around). I'll find my own new direction without anyone showing me the way, simply because I apprehend the conventional as wrong. Someone has to be first or no one will ever go. It will not be you.

If you take a bit of time to consider the true nature of time, you'll come to realize that current conceptions of "the universe" have it all wrong.

You aren't telling me anything. You are promising that you will be telling me something at some point in the future. — Ludwig V

You are not paying attention. I'm not promising to provide for you something new, in the future. I am telling you that what others are providing for you today, and in the past, is wrong. That's it, that's all, no promise concerning the future. I expected that you are capable of crafting your own future. But now you demonstrate that you'll only go where someone else has already been, and this casts doubt on that expectation.

So I understand it will be quite something. I'm waiting. In the mean time, life goes on. — Ludwig V

I see, you like to wait and let life go on. You are not prepared to take the bull by the horns are you?

The expansion of space and dark matter are indeed among the many issues that seem likely to change what we know about the universe. — Ludwig V

It's not a matter of changing what we know about the universe, it's a matter of "the universe" being a false conception. There is no such thing. For analogy, consider ancient people who saw the sun, moon, and planets orbiting the earth. What you say here, is like if someone back then said "indeed, retrogrades are among the many issues that seem likely to change what we know about the way that these bodies orbit the earth". Do you see how this is the wrong attitude? It is not the case that we "need to change what we know about the universe". The whole conception needs to be changed from the bottom up, like a Kuhnian paradigm shift, but even more radical.

I don't see how the idea that there was a universe prior to observers is a misrepresentation of reality. — Ludwig V

What I said is that the concept "universe" is a misrepresentation of reality. There is much evidence to support this claim, things like spatial expansion, and dark matter, demonstrate that what we think of as "the universe" is not an acceptable representation.

Under that representation, there was necessarily "a universe" prior to observers, and so that is a valid conclusion. However, "universe" is clearly a false concept, in the sense of correspondence, so the conclusion ought to be dismissed as unsound.

It's obvious what it means to say there was a universe prior to observers...it means, if true, that there was a universe prior to observers. — Janus

According to the concept "universe", there was a universe prior to observers. But many aspects of that concept indicate to us that it is a misrepresentation of reality. It's really a false premise. So it doesn't mean a whole lot, that the implication of that false premise, is that there was a universe prior to observers.

Similarly we know what it means for something to exist, and it doesn't depend on the existence of humans. — Janus

This is highly doubtful. "To exist" is very clearly a concept structured around human experience. If you think otherwise, I'd be interested to see a good explanation of "existence" which wasn't based in human experience. And a simple definition which begs the question would not qualify as a good explanation.

Experience is what is gained from action, and intellectual experience appears to be sort of like knowledge in general. Theory appears to be something which is prior to intellectual experience, as necessary for action, but also a sort of response to it, as a corrective to the consequent self-confidence.

I would say that we could theoretically distinguish two types of theory, that which is prior to action and intellectual experience, and that which is posterior. But, since it's all a reciprocating process, all theory would in reality consist of both types, as prior to this experience, and posterior to that experience.

But what is the connection between the former passage, about thought-models, with the latter passage, about philosophy more generally. I think it's that the only way of achieving the latter is by the former. The only way of directing the power of system unsystematically to allow objects to speak is using thought-models, which do not reduce objects to instances and specimens. — Jamal

I see that there is a lot said about "theory" in this section. You\ll notice theory mentioned in the latter passage you quoted above.

The section ends with what I interpret as a discussion of the importance of theory. There is a relation between theory and intellectual experience which is referred to. I find "intellectual experience" to be a vague concept.

The scientific consensus would probably concede that even
experience would imply theory. It is however a “standpoint”, at best
hypothetical. Conciliatory representatives of scientivism demand what
they call proper or clean science, which is supposed to account for these
sorts of presuppositions. Exactly this demand is incompatible with
intellectual experience. If a standpoint is demanded of the latter, then
it would be that of the diner to the roast. It lives by ingesting such; only
when the latter disappears into the former, would there be philosophy.
Until this point theory embodies that discipline in intellectual
experience which already embarrassed Goethe in relation to Kant. If
experience relied solely on its dynamic and good fortune, there would
be no stopping.

Ideology lurks in the Spirit which, dazzled with itself like
Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, irresistibly becomes well-nigh absolute.
Theory prevents this. It corrects the naiveté of its self-confidence,
without forcing it to sacrifice the spontaneity which theory for its part
wishes to get at. By no means does the difference between the so-called
subjective share of intellectual experience and its object vanish; the
necessary and painful exertion of the cognizing subject testifies to it. In
the unreconciled condition, non-identity is experienced as that which
is negative. The subject shrinks away from this, back onto itself and the
fullness of its modes of reaction. Only critical self-reflection protects it
from the limitations of its fullness and from building a wall [Wand:
interior wall] between itself and the object, indeed from presupposing
its being-for-itself as the in-itself and for-itself. The less the identity
between the subject and object can be ascertained, the more
contradictory what is presumed to cognize such, the unfettered
strength and open-minded self-consciousness. Theory and intellectual
experience require their reciprocal effect. The former does not contain
answers for everything, but reacts to a world which is false to its
innermost core. Theory would have no jurisdiction over what would be
free of the bane of such. The ability to move is essential to
consciousness, not an accidental characteristic. It signifies a double
procedure: that of the inside out, the immanent process, the
authentically dialectical, and a free one, something unfettered which
steps out of dialectics, as it were. Neither of them are however
disparate. The unregimented thought has an elective affinity to
dialectics, which as critique of the system recalls to mind what would
be outside of the system; and the energy which dialectical movement in
cognition unleashes is that which rebels against the system. Both
positions of consciousness are connected to one another through each
other’s critique, not through compromise.

I think that what is implied in the first paragraph, is that intellectual experience is a type of experience which does not require theory. To the contrary, theory requires intellectual experience. But is this really the case?

In the next paragraph "Theory and intellectual experience require their reciprocal effect."

Then, "the ability to move" is brought into the relation, and a "double procedure" referred to..

And, I assume that "both", In the ending sentence refers to the two parts of that double procedure, though it may refer to both theory and intellectual experience.

"Both positions of consciousness are connected to one another through each other’s critique, not through compromise."

Interesting.

I'd like to propose another thread, where we can stage ideas which we may or may not want to bring into this thread to discuss whether we want to create another thread for them? Do you think that someone would start another thread after that, to discuss whether certain ideas ought to be entered into my thread?

Genes are generally understood to provide the information that governs the growth, development and functions of organisms. So, it seems you are right that it is not "the whole of the organism" (whatever we might take that to be) that governs its own growth and development. Should genes be considered "external" though? — Janus

The proposal that "the whole of the organism" is causal in an active sense does not make any sense at all. The concept of "the whole" is just a vague inapplicable idea, if the organism is actively changing in the process of growing, (becoming), without reference to a final goal, the end. Unless we assume an outside designer, who holds "the whole" in mind, and who is putting the parts together toward that end, the idea of top-down causation is inapplicable. The case of the outside designer is what O'Callaghan calls external telos.

In the case of living organisms, O'Callaghan says that they have internal telos, they act with purpose. When an organism acts with purpose this is an instance of selective intentional action. Since it is caused from within the agent, and the agent selects or chooses its action, an action which may or may not be conducive to a larger whole, the existence of any larger whole produced is created through bottom-up causation. A good example of selective (intentional) action, which may or may not be conducive to a larger whole, is sexual intercourse, which may or may not be reproductive. The fact that the selective act only possibly, or potentially, leads to the production of the whole, excludes the possibility that the whole is acting in a top-down causal way.

This I believe, is the key to understanding selective, purposeful acts. The effect is not caused by any determinist necessity, and so the act is selected by a completely different form of "necessity", which cannot be explained as the end causing the means, top-down). That the end causes the occurrence of the means in a top-down way ('the man walks for the sake of heath' in Aristotle's example), is an ancient, outdated, misunderstanding of telos, which is applicable only to consciously reasoned choices where the relation between means and end is understood as a logical necessity. Most selective acts of telos are not reasoned, therefore we have to consider a different form of "necessity" as the cause of those acts.

I feel that we are going to have to agree to disagree here. Perhaps there are no isolated systems but the law of conservation of energy had been incredibly useful and, in fact, you can deduce the deviations and confirm them experimentally. — boundless

The ability to predict how everything will deviate from the proposition doesn't make the proposition true. That everything deviates from the proposition indicates that it is false. The usefulness of it, I do not deny.

Because I believe that even if there are no isolated systems, the usefulness of the laws prove to me that they do tell something true about the 'order of nature'. — boundless

The truth they say is 'I am false'.

I think you're misunderstanding what is meant by "top-down." Can you give an example of what you believe top-down explanation would be? — Leontiskos

There is some ambiguity in usage of the term, but in general, "top-down" refers to a hierarchical system where action or information, derives from the higher level and moves toward the lower. In O'Callaghan's article, he distinctly describes it as an explanation which understands the parts, by their functions in relation to the whole. The whole being the top, the parts being the bottom.

The basic problem with this proposed top-down explanation, is as I explained, logically, it cannot explain causation of the whole. It is logically impossible that the whole organism could cause the parts to perform the functions required for the existence of that organism, because those functions must be carried out in order for that whole to exist. In other words, this would mean that the whole causes its own existence. Clearly, the top-down explanation cannot describe the cause of any living organisms which come into being from seeds or eggs. The organism does not cause its own being.

Furthermore, the top-down explanation is shown by O'Callaghan to only be an acceptable causal explanation , in the case of external telos. But this requires an external force, which acts as the "top". In the case of internal telos, he explains the the being is given a nature which is not a presupposed nature at all, i.e. no nature, therefore there is no proper "whole" at this time, which could act in a top-down way.

Why think that? You won't find that claim anywhere in O'Callaghan's article. — Leontiskos

We do find that, in his description of external telos.

Starting with external teleology, it occurs when something distinct from an object imposes upon an object an intelligible order that is in some sense foreign to it. The object does not have that teleology but nonetheless behaves in a certain way because of the teleology imposed upon it.

This is the only way that "top-down" could be causal. The other way, which relates the parts to the whole by means of their roles, or function, is purely a descriptive explanation, and it requires either an external telos or an internal telos to account for causation. The external telos operates in a top-down way. The internal telos must operate in a bottom-up way because it could not operate in a top-down way for the following reasons.

The internal telos could not act causally in a top-down way, (whole ordering the parts) or else the organism would cause its own existence, which is illogical and inconsistent with evidence. And if God imposed the organism's existence upon it, that would be external telos. But O'Callaghan is clear to distinguish another form of purposeful causation, which is internal telos. There is no top-down option available for internal telos, one being excluded as illogical (self-causation), the other, "external telos", being excluded as insufficient to account for the capacity of intentional acts.

And, the evidence I've described to you is very clear, that internal telos must act in a bottom-up way. It is only through bottom-up causation that life on earth could have begun as a simple organism, and evolved into complex human beings. Otherwise, we are left with random chance, rather than telos as the cause. External telos has been rejected, and it is impossible that the internal telos of the human being could act causally, retroactively, to cause the simple life forms to evolve in that way, to create the complex human being. Therefore we are left with bottom-up causation as the only explanation for internal telos.

Rather, when God gives a being a nature then that being has a nature. Sort of like when I give you a shoe you have a shoe. The second part of your quote has to do with the idea that there is no pre-existent thing which receives a nature, and that the substance receives both its nature and its existence simultaneously (both logically and temporally). It doesn't mean that the substance has no nature. — Leontiskos

I think you need to reread that section. It clearly says that the created being has no presupposed nature at all, the creator "presupposes nothing about them at all". This is basic, and crucial to the distinction between external and internal telos. If, the creator presupposes some specific nature, then that creator creates something according to the prescribed nature, and this would be a case of external telos, putting parts together to make something. However, the creator is described as presupposing "nothing about them". This means that the creator gives to the created, no specific nature at all. All that is given is existence as telos. The telos then creates its own natural being, according to what is required within its environment. And this is the bottom-up process of causation which we know as evolution.

Why is everyone afraid to admit the obvious reality that evolution is a bottom-up causal process? It is impossible that it could be a top-down process unless the hand of God acts at each instance of variance. So, O'Callaghan proposes internal telos, as a means of reconciling the obvious scientific truth of bottom-up causation, with the obvious philosophical truth of purpose within the acts of living organisms. Now we have bottom-up causation through the means of internal telos.

On the contrary, the whole is what gives unity and function to the parts — Wayfarer

That's the physicalist misconception of telos. Notice that in O'Callaghan's external telos, it is not the whole itself which gives unity and function to the parts, it is the telos of an external agent. The physicalist does not like to portray telos as agential, therefore assigns agency to the whole. However, as I explained , it is logically impossible that the whole causes the unity and function of the parts, because the existence of the whole is posterior in time, to that unity.

In living systems, it is the organism that organizes the parts, not the other way around. — Wayfarer

Living systems are instances of internal telos, therefore thee is no external agent acting to give unity and function to the parts, as there is in the case of external telos. And what we understand, through the example of human intention, free will, is that each particular, individual human being is a free willing agent which chooses to be a part of a larger collective, (the army example), and this is the way that the whole gains existence through the agency of the parts.

Living organism, and evolution in general, cannot be understood as having their unity caused by telos which is external to the parts, acting in a top-down way, such that the whole organizes the parts, because the causal activity of the telos must be accounted for. If we try to assign the causal action to the form of the whole, we are stymied by the interaction problem. However, known principles of physics, chemistry, and biology, allow that selection of telos may be involved in the activities of the fundamental parts. But that would be bottom-up causation.

Reductionism typically assumes bottom-up causation: that component parts determine the behavior of the system. But top-down causation recognizes that the formative influence of the whole — the organism, the ecosystem, the developmental system — constrains and governs the activity of its components. — Wayfarer

There is definitely a feedback relation between the teleological activity of the part, and its environment, what physicalists see as the whole, but ultimately final causation must be assigned to the parts. This conclusion is forced logically due to the nature of final causation, as selective. The environment may be portrayed as constraint to the free agent, but teleological agency which is an activity of selection from possibility must be assigned to the parts.

Simply put, governance is not teleological agency. Teleological agency is found within the thing which is governed. Constraints, as a form of governance, cannot provide us with the source of teleological agency. This is found in the free agent which is governed. And, if any type of "self-organization" is proposed, this fact must be respected. What we observe, is that the constraints of the self-organizing system, are actually created by the agency of the parts. There is an appearance of top-down causation, as the constraints seem to restrict the activity of the parts, but the constraint is ultimately self-willed, as will power. That the constraint must be self-willed is evident every time that a part outsteps the boundary of the constraint, which is very common in living organism, as genetic mutations etc..

Take the acorn: yes, its DNA encodes the blueprint for the oak tree. But that blueprint is itself a product of evolutionary history — not just a list of parts, but a living record of how the whole organism has been shaped to grow, reproduce, and interact with its environment. — Wayfarer

If you take O'Callaghan's internal telos as the model, you can understand that the acorn has internal telos. This is a freedom of selection which inheres within the activities which are carried out by it. We look at the DNA as a blueprint, a code of constraints. However, inherent within whatever agency is active in that process, is the selective capacity of telos. This is what allows for variation in what grows from the acorn. The purposeful activity occurs within, and is inherent to the individual active parts. That numerous different parts must have the selective capacity of agential telos is evident from the fact that variation can occur in a number of different ways.

The blueprint of evolutionary history is a self-produced code of constraint. This is analogous with habitual activity. Notice that will power allows the free willing agent to break a habit. Likewise, genetic mutation is a similar breaking of the habit. Notice that the causal agency, the telos which is responsible for breaking the habit, inheres within the part, so this is a form of bottom-up causation, even though we, in our observational analysis, observe it through top down constraint. The true agential telos acts in a bottom-up way.

This has been pointed out to you again and again, but you keep reciting the same basic error to anyone who challenges you. There’s something fundamentally amiss in your grasp of this issue... — Wayfarer

It's very obvious, that I would level the same charge against you. And, since you started this thread, I am offering my assistance to help you get it right. Together we can come up with a better understanding of the reality of the situation.

And I think that's probably the key to unlocking the puzzle. Even though Adorno wants to focus on particulars, and in a fragmented way, it doesn't mean he thinks these particulars are themselves fragmented or necessarily lie, isolated, within a fragmented world. In other words, he does not want to treat objects as self-contained or atomistic. Rather, objects are always already mediated, connected to other objects in a web of history and society. And this mediation or connectivity is constitutive of the objects. Objects are nodes in networks. I think Adorno thereby avoids your dualism. — Jamal

This would be a subject requiring much discussion and debate. In my understanding, to assume "particulars" is to assume a world already divided. To assume "a universe" (system thinking), is to assume something already united, and potentially divisible in analysis. This dichotomy cannot really be avoided, because the way we speak, and the words we use, has to prioritize one or the other, or we end up speaking nonsense. We can go back and forth, but that's ambiguous and it even becomes equivocal and unintelligible.

So Adorno chooses to begin with particulars, and it's not a matter of oscillating back and forth, he is clear with this choice. From this perspective we look toward principles which might cause unity between distinct particulars. Relations are the cause of unity not the effect of unity. Notice Adorno's choice of words, "affinity", which describes a positive, unifying relation. The other perspective, where we assume a united universe to begin with, induces us to look for principles of division, for analysis, so we look for weaknesses and faults, negative aspects, within the existing structure. Adorno has become positive in this sense.

If we were to say that "the true way" would be to describe both perspectives, being careful not to be ambiguous, and maintaining clear separation between the positive way and the negative way, this divisive approach would be to adopt that one perspective, from the outset. So it's sort of unavoidable, that one or the other will be chosen as the presupposed.

I see what you mean. But suppose that a theory tells you that if the conditions are perfect you get 10 and if they aren't you get 9. You never get perfect conditions and you always get 9. This doesn't refute the theory, far from it! — boundless

It would just mean that the theory is completely useless. If a necessary condition of the theory is perfect conditions, and it is demonstrated that perfect conditions are impossible, then the theory can be dismissed as useless, because that premise can never be fulfilled.

So, if there is no 'isolated system' and you observe that energy isn't perfectly conserved it is hardly an objection of the law of conservation of energy if it gives consistent predictions also in the cases where it is expected that energy isn't conserved. — boundless

It's not the law of conservation which produces consistent predictions, as is obvious from the fact that it is inaccurate. Predictions can be produced from statistics, and the statistics might concern deviations form the conservation law. Then the conservation law would not state anything true about the world, it would just be a useful tool for gathering statistics.

I disagree. What your objection actually point to is that there are no perfectly isolated systems, except perhaps the universe as a whole. Which is BTW interesting, but it doesn't refute the laws of conservation.

Your objection however does raise the problem of how to interpet the fact that idealizations seem never to find a 'realization' in nature. That's a perfectly fine area of inquiry but is different from what we were debating. — boundless

Well, I disagree with what you've presented here. If the law of conservation is an idealization, and idealizations are never realized in nature, then we can conclude deductively that it is impossible that the law of conservation is true. It is necessarily false.

Isn't that exactly what we are debating, whether the conservation law is true or false? You've already decided that it is merely approximate, why not take the next step, and accept that it is false?

Honestly, I am not sure of what you are saying here. When you measure temperature (or internal energy) you don't tranform it to work. — boundless

That's exactly what measuring the temperature is, work being done. The energy acts on the thermometer, and this is an instance of work being done. Therefore taking the temperature is an instance of work being done.

This is why I argue that the idea of energy which is not available to do work, is an incoherent idea. Energy is defined as the capacity to do work. So if we take something like the universe, and assume that it is a closed system, and claim that there is energy within this system which has no capacity to do work, then we must conclude that this energy could not be detected in any way. If it were detected, that would be a case of it doing work, which is contrary to the stipulation. Then what sense does this conception make, energy which cannot be detected as energy?

Although O'Callaghan does not state it explicitly, I believe he holds that internal teleology is top-down. It is the internal natura of a living substance in which all of its parts participate. — Leontiskos

Perhaps, but he doesn't state it, and maybe that's because he recognizes, like me, that the idea of internal teleology being top-down is incoherent. He distinguishes top-down causation from bottom-up, and he also distinguishes external teleology from internal. Then he leaves it to the reader to conclude whether internal teleology could be top-down.

Do you think you could explain how internal teleology could be top-down? What is the so-called internal nature of living substance which could act in a top-down way to keep the parts united? Top-down implies a force acting from the outside inward, yet the term is "internal nature". How could one's internal natur be produced from a top-down force?

If we propose a distinction of separate parts within an individual being, then the teleology must be pervasive to, i.e. internal to all parts. How could this telos get internal to the most basic, fundamental parts, genes, DNA, etc., through a top-down process? And if we take mind and intention as our example, then we see that each individual human being must willfully take part in human cooperation. And clearly this willful, intentional participation is bottom-up causation.

Furthermore, we have the problem which I explained to wayfarer. The whole has no existence, until after the parts unite in cooperation. Therefore the whole cannot be the cause of such cooperation. The cooperation is prior to the whole's existence. It is very telling the way O'Callaghan describes how internal teleology is a case of something coming from nothing. Since a material object always consists of parts, as having a form, the form itself, as intent, or 'internal' teleology, must actually create the parts. Surely this is bottom-up causation, as the whole itself has no existence yet, and all there is is intent. And the intent is internal, therefore it must be within, and this is bottom-up.

Where do you find that in the passage? — Leontiskos

The passage is difficult, so read it carefully. Pay particular attention to the conclusion "And he presupposes nothing about them at all, since without him, they are strictly speaking, nothing at all." What the creator gives to the being is "its nature", but this nature which is given, is the nature of a being without a nature.

Here:

So even when an external agent imposes external teleology upon some object, it presupposes some internal principle of active or passive response. However, the intelligence that is responsible for the internal teleology of natural causes cannot presuppose their existence, because in giving to some being its internal principle of teleological movement, it is giving to that object its nature. Even as an external agent responsible for the internal teleology of the object, it does not presuppose the nature of the object by which it could passively or actively respond. On the contrary, it gives to the object its nature by which it passively or actively responds to other external but natural agents.

However, a being cannot exist without some presupposed nature by which it actively or passively responds to its environment. So, this intelligent external agent in causing beings to have internal teleology gives to those beings their existence. And he presupposes nothing about them at all, since without him, they are strictly speaking, nothing at all. If you think there can be beings without presupposed natures, describe one for me in a way that does not tacitly appeal to an intelligible account of what they are.

Top-down sees the whole as primary the parts as secondary, whereas bottom-up sees the parts as primary and the whole as secondary. — Leontiskos

The clear, logical problem with "the whole as primary", is as I describe, the whole has no existence until the parts are united in its creation. Therefore the whole cannot be causal in its own creation. We can assume that something external puts the parts together, creating the whole, in a top-down fashion, but this would be nothing but what is called "external telos".

In the case of living beings we are dealing with internal telos, individual beings who act intentionally. Experience and knowledge indicate to us that intentional acts are based in a capacity to choose. This is what characterizes "purpose" that possibilities are selected. And we also know that the unity produced from the intentional acts of individual beings, is a result of that freedom of choice. When the parts freely choose, by the means of internal telos, to cooperate, unite, and produce a larger whole, this can only be described as bottom-up causation.

QUESTION: I said that the following is a dialectical image of the collapse of Hegelian dialectics: "The thought which may positively hypostasize nothing outside of the dialectical consummation overshoots the object with which it no longer has the illusion of being one with." But since this collapse produces negative dialectics, which is supposedly the better philosophy, how is this dialectical movement not a positive synthesis? — Jamal

I think this relates directly to what he says about system thinking. The idea of negative dialectics is not to reject systems thinking, but to determine its true form. And this displays how Adorno thinks of criticism. To criticize is not to reject, but a way of bettering the thing being criticized.

There's been some back and forth between you and I in this thread, concerning this issue. First there was the question of whether Adorno accepts or rejects Hegelian principles. Also we had the question of whether what Adorno presents is properly called "dialectics" in the context of Hegelian "dialectics". It's becoming apparent to me, that the process is to neither accept nor reject a given principle, but to criticize it. This leaves synthesis as unnecessary, because acceptance of principles, adoption of belief is not the intended end. The process may or may not enable synthesis, and having synthesis as a goal from the outcome would prejudice the procedure.

QUESTION: How does he propose to focus only on particulars, doing philosophy in fragment form, and at the same time uncover a coherent, meaningful reality and the affinity between objects? — Jamal

I think that this is the real issue with the idea of the concept going beyond, or overshooting the object. Relations between objects "affinity" is something categorically distinct from objects themselves. So conceptualization which focuses on objects, and representing objects (identity thinking), really cannot grasp this very significant aspect of reality which is the affinity between objects.

The issue appears to be the difference between the relations between concept and object, and the relations between object and object. When the concept overshoots the object it may establish a scientific relation of prediction. Notice though that this relation is a subject/object relation because that overshooting is directed by intention toward producing an extended conception of the object. What Adorno is interested in is the true object/object relation. This must take as its primary assumption, a separation which produces a multitude, rather than the primary assumption of unity which conceptualizes "the object". The difference being that the primary postulate is separation rather than unity.

Yes, it seems that there are no perfectly isolated systems, except perhaps the whole universe, but our experiments tell us that when the approximation is reasonable, the results are coherent with conservation laws. — boundless

I do not think that your claim is reasonable. No experiment has provided 100% conservation, so it is actually unreasonable to say that results are consistent with conservation laws. For some reason, you think that stating that the law is an "approximation" makes the law reasonable. What if I told you that 9 is approximately 10, and so I proposed a law that stated 9 is always 10? Would it be reasonable to claim that this approximation justifies the truth of my law? I don't think so. Why would you think that approximation in the case of the law of conservation of energy justifies a claim that the law is true?

Also, when we know the deviations that we expect from a non-isolated system (i.e. when we know 'how much' the system is not isolated), we find a coherent result.
This certainly points to the fact that, at least, conservation laws do point to something true about the physical universe, even if the conditions where they hold without errors are never actualized. Or maybe they are valid when you take the entire physical universe all together. — boundless

What this indicates is that we always expect deviation from the law/. So we find that consistency in the deviation is coherent. Isn't that just evidence that we all actually know that the law is false? Why would people want to deceive themselves, by trying to believe that the law is true, when they always, in fact, expect deviation? How is that in any way reasonable?

Yes, the use of conservation laws does "point to something true about the physical universe". The evidence indicates overwhelmingly, that conservation laws are false. That is the single most important truth that we can abstract from the ongoing use of conservation laws.

Nope, you can measure the increase of temperature (and hence, internal energy) due to friction. But you can't recover it to use it again as work. — boundless

You misunderstand. The very act of measuring the temperature is in fact an instance of using that energy as work.

MU, this is going to be my last word on the topic. You're confusing distinct Aristotelian categories by treating formal and final cause as though they must be opposed. In Aristotle’s account—especially as taken up by Aquinas—the form of a thing is its principle of organization and development, and it is inherently purposive. That’s why formal cause and final cause are not separate domains in living beings: a plant’s form includes its telos to grow, reproduce, and flourish. — Wayfarer

It appears like you are not well familiar with Aristotle's "Physics" within which he draws the distinction between formal cause and final cause. Nor, it seems are you familiar with the two distinct senses of "form", and "actual", which he explains in the "Metaphysics". "Actual" may refer to what is, in the sense of being, having existence, and in this sense it is consistent with formal cause. But "actual" may also refer to what is active, changing, becoming, and in this sense it is consistent with final cause.

With logic, Aristotle demonstrates that what is actual, i.e. being, or form in the sense of formal cause, is incompatible with what is actual, i.e. becoming, or form in the sense of final cause. Therefore final cause and formal cause are necessarily separate domains in living beings. The two are incompatible. Also, Aquinas maintains this distinction. And this is why the form of a material body, as 'what is actual', is distinct from the form which is known as the immaterial soul, as 'what is active'. Therefore dualism is propagated through the Aristotelian/Thomistic metaphysical tradition. Notice that O'Callaghan upholds this dualism with his distinction between external and internal teleology.

You however, are denying the dualism which is clearly a fundamental aspect of this metaphysical tradition, by affirming that formal cause and final cause are not separate domains in the study of living beings. But obviously, what a being is, in the sense of its material form, is a very distinct study from the study of the purpose of a being's activities. By classing them both into the criteria of 'formal cause', it appears to me like you are persisting in your conversion to physicalism.

As for O’Callaghan, his description of internal teleology clearly includes non-conscious natural purposiveness—such as organs functioning for the sake of the organism—not just the deliberate intention of agents. That’s why Aquinas can say even non-rational beings “act for an end.” He’s not talking about conscious volition, but about nature acting according to its form, which is exactly what top-down causation refers to in this context. — Wayfarer

The key point is that purposeful action requires agency. Agency is the internal teleology. So if we describe the activities of organs as purposeful, then we need to assign an agent. Traditionally, from Aristotelian biology, the agent is the soul, and this supports vitalism. In Aristotelian principles, the soul is necessary as the source of activity, which actualizes the potentials of the living being, as the powers of the soul. Since the powers of the soul are not always active, they are therefore classed as potentials, requiring actualization, which is a selective process carried out by the agent, the soul. Purposeful action is defined by the selective process which is essential to it.

So no, what I’m describing is not determinist, nor external imposition, nor a confusion of causes. It’s classical metaphysics. — Wayfarer

What you are describing is a confusion of causes. You are conflating formal cause with final cause, and not recognizing the very significant difference between the two which is essential to classical metaphysics, and conducive to dualism. "Formal cause" refers to the constraints of what is. "Final cause" refers to the purposeful actions of an agent, which to be purposeful must be selective. Surely you recognize that these are distinct domains. However you seem intent on conflating the two. Under this conflation you represent final cause as a feature or type of formal cause, in the way that metaphysics of modern physicalism does.

My view, following O’Callaghan (and by extension, Aquinas and Aristotle), is that top-down causation refers to the way the form or structure of a whole gives meaning and function to its parts—not as external coercion, but as internal teleology. — Wayfarer

What you refer to here, as top-down causation, is what is known in Aristotelian principles as formal cause. Teleology studies final cause which is distinctly different from formal cause.

"Internal teleology", under O'Callaghan's description, which I posted above, refers to an agent which acts with intent, and that is final cause. "Internal teleology" is distinguished from "external teleology", the latter being the process by which intent is imposed onto things, giving them order as parts in the form of a whole.

Aquinas does however think that the intelligibility of teleology internal to agents intending and acting for an end requires an explanation involving an intelligent agent, but a very different kind of intelligent agent than the kind that imposes external teleology on otherwise inert things.

I think you misunderstand what is meant by "internal teleology". It clearly refers to final cause, not formal cause which you describe with "the way the form or structure of a whole gives meaning and function to its parts". Final cause refers to an agent acting for an end, which is what O'Callaghan classes as "internal teleology". And he claims that God is required to account for the existence of internal teleology, because the existence of the teleological movement is prior to the very thing which bears it internally.

Yes, quite a positive outlook on translation he has. Which is curious why subsequently he'd write: — Pussycat

Well, he is the translator. You wouldn't expect him to be saying that it's impossible for the translator to translate, would you? So what he does is elucidate the difference between the original and the translation, with the analogy. Then, the part you find "curious" is simply him reminding us of that difference.

But then, if the experience has been enhanced, why should we be wary of the false-color bitmap surface image? — Pussycat

What he describes with the bitmap analogy, is a difference. As I explained, that difference may enhance, or it may degrade the experience, in relation to the original. Further, it may enhance some aspects, and degrade others, and all sorts of different possibilities for "difference". In other words, the translator knows that there are good translations and bad, and might also even know that his translation is lacking in some areas, if he knew that he didn't adequately understand some areas. Therefore he is warning us to be wary of all translations, even his.

Whether languages adapted so that to represent and match the dominating ideologies of the times. — Pussycat

Such a relation would be reciprocal, over lengthy time. Ideology gets shaped by language as much as language gets shaped by ideology. In my reply to Jamal above, the use of profanity in language is described as a rejection of ideology. And, as the profundity of ideology is renounced in the manner described by Adorno, new ideology will fill the void, and this will be shaped by language. Some ideology will severely restrict language use, as was evident with Catholicism and The Inquisition. But ultimately such restriction of freedom induces rejection, then the new ideology which evolves is restricted by the limits of language.

There are situations, however, where the model of a closed system is a very good approximation. — boundless

I have no disagreement with the idea that the law of conservation of energy is "a very good approximation. But the point is that it is not what is the case. Therefore it is not the truth.

Consider the following example. When Copernicus first modeled the heliocentric solar system, the model failed, because it modeled perfect circles, and this produced inaccuracies which were accounted for by unacceptable descriptions.

The point being that "a very good approximation", which leaves aspects of the concept of energy, such as "entropy", accounted for by unacceptable descriptions, is misleading, regardless of whether it is a good approximation.

One explanation is that. Yes, there are no perfectly closed system. But the other one, the one that takes into account 'entropy' isn't based on that. It tells us that a certain quantity of energy can't be controlled.
Friction is a good example of the increase of entropy, in fact. — boundless

The point is that if some energy cannot be controlled, then it cannot be detected, because detection is a type of control. And if it cannot be detected it cannot be called "energy". So "entropy" serves as a concept which consists of some energy which is not energy, and that is contradiction.

I don't understand here your point. Are you claiming that the absence of perfectly closed systems is the reason of irreversibility? — boundless

No, I am saying that a perfectly closed system is impossible and the law of conservation of energy is demonstrated as false because it requires a perfectly closed system for its truth. And, this is due to the nature of time, what is known as the irreversibility of time.

Top-down causation doesn't mean external coercion or denial of agency—quite the opposite. It refers to the way the organization or unity of a system constrains and enables the behaviour of its parts from within (hence organism, organic, and organisation.) — Wayfarer

Enabling is not causation. If, top-down causation "enables" behaviour, then this is not properly called "causation". Further, this is not consistent with what is known as final cause, intention, and free will, because these are known as agential causes, not instances of enabling. If top-down causation simply enables intentional acts, it is not a proper description of those acts, and therefore does not serve us as a representation of teleology, which is the study of those acts explicitly, not what enables them.

In O’Callaghan’s essay, it’s the Humpty Dumpty model: the organism is not built out of self-standing parts that can function on their own and just happen to join up; rather, the parts are what they are because of their roles in the whole. — Wayfarer

The issue though, the philosophical problem which we are addressing, is what causes the parts to have a role in the whole. If we follow the model of final cause, intention, and free will, we must allow that each part purposefully, and freely accepts its role within the whole, without being caused to do so by the whole itself.

The issue can be understood like this. The whole does not have existence until after the parts have taken up their respective positions, to produce the whole. Therefore it is impossible that the whole can cause the parts to each have the role that it has. It is true, as you say, that the parts are what they are, because of the roles that they play in the whole, that is how they are defined, as those parts. However, it is impossible that the whole causes the parts (top-down causation) to have the roles that they have, because the whole has no existence until after the parts have taken their roles. This is why we look to final cause, as a type of bottom-up causation, whereby each individual, which will be a part of that future whole, voluntarily takes up a role toward the creation of the whole.

This is the difference between O'Callaghan's external teleology, and internal teleology. In the case of external teleology, the parts are ordered towards the creation of a whole, by an external cause, which acts in a top-down way. In the case of internal teleology, God creates intention, and each part creates itself (seemingly from nothing but its own intention), such that each part has intention inherent within, as the cause of it producing what it is. Notice that "what it is" is determined by its role in the whole which comes to be from its intentional acts along with those of the other intentional agents.

You can’t reassemble life from pieces. The individual’s capacity for intentional action—say, to enlist in an army—is already shaped by the larger context: language, culture, history, embodiment. — Wayfarer

This model does not work out, because it dictates that you always have to seek a larger perspective as you look backward in time. And that is contrary to the reality of life. When we look backward in time we see that the multitude of variety in current life evolved from a narrower and narrower source. In reality, the individual's capacity for intentional action is derived from biological sources, and that demonstrates a narrower and narrower context. All those aspects you mention, "language, culture, history, embodiment" are the products of individual intentional actions.

Bottom-up causation, by contrast, is the Frankenstein model: assemble a bunch of pieces, energise them with a force, and voila! a system emerges from their interactions. — Wayfarer

This is an example of external teleology. But O'Callaghan is very explicit in distinguishing between external and internal teleology.

So invoking top-down causation isn’t a denial of free will—it’s an attempt to explain how form, meaning, and function arise in organisms, including human beings. You don’t have to be a physicalist to see that. — Wayfarer

I agree, that when you portray "top-down causation" as enabling, or as conditions, or as constraints, it isn't a denial of free will. However, it does not provide proper "causation", which must come from the act initialized by the individual agent. Then the proper representation of "causation" would be bottom-up agency. But if you portray "top-down causation" as properly causal, then free will is denied by that form of causation, and we have determinism. The ambiguity between these two ways of portraying "top-down causation" allows metaphysicians like apokrisis to slip back and forth, in ambiguity and equivocation. You'll notice that sometimes apokrisis claims that the whole provides merely global constraints, to local freedom, which could then have local parts which act freely as intentional agents. But then apokrisis will assign intentionality to the constraints, as if the constraints are the actual cause of what the agent's actions actually are, being fundamentally random chance activity which is constrained externally,.

One of the strengths of Aquinas’ philosophy, and a point O’Callaghan emphasizes, is that God doesn't need to control or micromanage natural beings in order for their actions to be meaningful or purposeful. Instead, God creates beings with their own natures—internal principles of motion, action, and teleology. This means that organisms act from within themselves; they are genuine agents, not mere instruments or puppets. Their purposes are real and intelligible because they arise from their God-given form or nature, not from external control. — Wayfarer

Don't you see that this form of causation you describe here, whereby individual beings are agents, is necessarily bottom-up causation?

The teleology is internal, not imposed from the outside. — Wayfarer

If the teleology is not imposed from outside, but is derived from within, then this is bottom-up causation.

But you've cherry-picked that quote. O'Callaghan then distinguishes between 'creating' and 'making'. He says making 'presupposes something already existing upon which the maker acts'. That is the model for human artifacts. By contrast, 'God in creating all that is in every aspect in which it is, including the causal powers and efficacy of agents that respond actively or passively to other created agents, presupposes nothing other than God’s own being, power, knowledge, and goodness.' And that is nothing if not top-down! — Wayfarer

Yes, I cherry-picked the part where the difference between external and internal teleology is described, because I believe this is a very important distinction to understand. This is the difference I was trying to get Dfpolis to expound on earlier. In the case of living beings, where individual beings, are each observed to have one's own internal purpose (obvious in human intent), the causation here can only be accounted for as a bottom-up form of causation.

That is the point I made in reply to apokrisis' army example. To properly represent intentionality, each member of the army must, by one's own free will, have the desire to act the role. The whole, which is the army, is not caused to be, by some top-down form of causation, by which "the army" causes, through some force external to the individual participants, the unity of the parts. The thing called "the army" is caused to exist through a bottom-up process by which each individual apprehends the need, and willfully takes a role. Simply put, in order to represent the freeness of the free will, which is essential to intentionality, the causal process must be bottom-up. Otherwise, each individual part is portrayed as being forced by an external cause, to play a role in the whole, and free will is denied.

This representation of top-down teleology is the effect of determinist physicalism. By Newton's first law of motion, a body, which is any massive part, cannot be caused to move except by an external force. That is the premise of determinism, which denies that a body could be caused to change its motion through an internal cause, what we know as will. This determinist, physicalist perspective, induces the idea that intentional actions, such as the will to join the army, are caused by some sort of top-down form of causation which is external to the individual agent, because all causation is stipulated to be externally sourced. You can see how this is a misconception. Freely willed, intentional actions must be represented as derived from within the agent, internally sourced, and not be portrayed as caused by some external top-down force of constraint. Like @Punshhh pointed out, constraints are passive, they are not agential causes.

The fundamental problem, as I see it, is the pervasiveness of systems thinking, and the inability of systems theory to portray free bottom-up causation. In systems thinking, there is a separation between internal to the system, and external to the system. There is one proposed boundary which separates the two. What is not a part of the system is external to it, outside it. What is missing is a proper spatial representation which would distinguish what is not a part of the system to the inside. Systems theory has no proposal for a distinction between a boundary to the outside of the system, and a boundary to the inside of the system. This means that there is no epistemological principles describing a way to separate causation which comes form something which is not a part of the system, across the boundary to the internal, from causation which comes from something which is not a part of the system, across the boundary to the external. And because the determinist, physicalist way, is to represent all causation as external, then any causation which is not part of the system but across the boundary to the inside, must be represented as "external" causation. Conflating these two very distinct forms of causation is a misconception.

Here's a passage from your link distinguishing internal teleology from external:

Aquinas does however think that the intelligibility of teleology internal to agents intending and acting for an end requires an explanation involving an intelligent agent, but a very different kind of intelligent agent than the kind that imposes external teleology on otherwise inert things. The external agents of this world can only impose external teleology upon other beings within the world because they presuppose the existence of those other beings, presuppose what they are and seek to modify them by imposing external teleology upon them. External agents imposing external teleology upon objects presuppose the already existing natures of what they act upon, and that those objects they act upon will respond actively or passively according to their own natures. An electron will respond differently to an artificially produced magnetic field than will a neutron, because of the natural difference between an electron and a neutron. A lion will respond differently to being pulled on by a human being than will a dandelion, because of the natural difference between a lion and a dandelion.

So even when an external agent imposes external teleology upon some object, it presupposes some internal principle of active or passive response. However, the intelligence that is responsible for the internal teleology of natural causes cannot presuppose their existence, because in giving to some being its internal principle of teleological movement, it is giving to that object its nature. Even as an external agent responsible for the internal teleology of the object, it does not presuppose the nature of the object by which it could passively or actively respond. On the contrary, it gives to the object its nature by which it passively or actively responds to other external but natural agents.

However, a being cannot exist without some presupposed nature by which it actively or passively responds to its environment. So, this intelligent external agent in causing beings to have internal teleology gives to those beings their existence. And he presupposes nothing about them at all, since without him, they are strictly speaking, nothing at all. If you think there can be beings without presupposed natures, describe one for me in a way that does not tacitly appeal to an intelligible account of what they are.

I believe that when we consider the way that internal teleology is 'given' to beings, it is necessary to conclude that this is a bottom-up process of creation rather than top-down. Top-down suffices to describe external teleology, but internal teleology, by which teleology is internal to each member, or part, of the whole, is necessarily bottom-up. According to the passage, what is given, is no specific nature whatsoever, but simply the will, or teleology to produce one's own nature. This would be a bottom-up process.