The question is a serious one, but I wish it to be considered imaginatively, such as whether the end of time suggests 'nothingness' for eternity. — Jack Cummins

Nothing suggests "nothingness for eternity" like "death" does. The "death of the universe" is an anthropomorphism.

But then I realised your strawman is actually quite useful: Of course some pain is useful, it is how our bodies tells us that there might be a problem, a danger, something bad. So, if I transpose this strawman back to my statement it would read: strife, civil disobedience, revolution and war is good because it tells us that there is a problem, a danger, something bad; not so? — Pieter R van Wyk

Right, this is what I meant by "something deeper". Now, how do you conclude that there is "a problem, a danger, something bad"?

Consider my example of "no gain without pain", and the athletes who subject themselves to pain for the sake of a further goal. There is not a problem here, not a danger, nor something bad. It is just a matter of a person who wants to better oneself with respect to a specific goal, and this requires pain. Therefore the pain is good under these circumstances Why couldn't this be the case in some instances of strife, civil disobedience, revolution, and war? Then it wouldn't necessarily be the case that these are telling us that there is a problem, a danger, or something bad, it could just as likely be the case that these are indicating to us that there is something good, a specific goal, and these 'pains' are required to achieve that end.

Also, I never suggested that philosophy should put an end to these bad things - this is exactly my point: after 2,600 years of philosophical endeavour, we humans has not been able to put an end to these bad things and because of THAT I do not expect any useful solution to these bad things from philosophy. So, thank you for your agreement that my question is a valid one. — Pieter R van Wyk

Again, I reject your premise that these things are necessarily "bad" things, by the reasoning presented. Philosophy may be useful in helping us to understand the difference between bad things and good things. A little bit of philosophy could help you to understand that your premise that these things are necessarily bad is false. I suggest that you read some Plato, he's very educational toward understanding the difference between, as well as the various relations between, good, bad, pleasure, and pain.

Again, I defined it as something which contributes to the whole but is not identical to it. Nothing about a part in this sense is restricted to something with tangible parts. — Bob Ross

That's not a very good definition. People contribute to things without being a part of the thing which they contribute to. The contribution itself becomes the part of the whole, not the thing which contributes it, as the person who contributes may remain separate. Furthermore "contribution" is about giving, and it is not even necessary that a part is given, as a thing may take its parts.

Here's the first definition from my OED: "some but not all of a thing, or number of things". Notice that what you call "the whole", is here called "a thing", or "number of things". To me, this implies a material object, or a group of material objects.

Because two ontologically simple things are ontologically indistinguishable from each other. — Bob Ross

How do you support this claim? Why can't two ontologically simple things be distinguishable from each other through time and space, like one simple thing here, and another simple thing over there, at the same time? What would make these two things which are clearly distinguishable from each other, by being at different locations at the very same time, necessarily not ontologically simple?

Dear Metaphysician Undercover, I would like to ask you a big favour: please explain your understanding of "something deeper" to the more than 1,400 Israelis that was killed and abducted on 7 October 2023 and the 56,000 Palestinians killed as a consequence of this. Also, please explain this "something deeper" to the thousands that die every day due to hunger and preventable diseases. Please explain to all of them that their deaths are, in fact, "for the sake of a higher good." — Pieter R van Wyk

Did you not understand what I wrote? I suggested that you need to separate good pain from bad pain, and not class all different forms of suffering together as bad.

I don't care how many examples of pain you provide, and insist that the pain in your examples is bad pain, that still does not prove that there is no such thing as pain which is good. As the saying "no gain without pain" suggests, many athletes subject themselves to pain, in their training exercises, for the sake of a higher goal. That pain is good pain. In other words, we often understand that we must put ourselves through pain and sometimes even suffer, to get to where we want to be.

So, I suggested that the things of your examples "civil disobedience, revolution and war" are sometimes like this, good. Sometimes we must put ourselves through the pain and suffering of civil disobedience, revolution, or war, intentionally, for the sake of getting where we want to be. One form of suffering for what is good is known as martyrdom.

I admit that I have not read your book, but you seem to class all pain and suffering together as bad. Therefore you imply that philosophy ought to be trying to put an end to it, and has not been able to do this. I think that this is a faulty premise which amounts to a fatal flaw in your reasoning, making that reasoning unsound. As the saying "no gain without pain" indicates, pain is necessary for us to achieve what we believe is good.

, most definitely, do not blame philosophy or philosophers for the woes of the world - merely pointing out the 'fact' that these problems have not been solved. — Pieter R van Wyk

I think you need to justify your assumption that "strife, civil disobedience, revolution and war" are "problems". These may also be understood as the means of overcoming problems. From this perspective, the real problems are something deeper, more significant, and these activities which you name as problems, are actually the way in which we free ourselves from those deeper problems.

Accordingly, I believe the "fatal flaw in your thinking" is a faulty generalization, and categorization. You place all "suffering" in the same category as "bad", not recognizing that some suffering is good, according to the saying "no gain without pain". Then you fault philosophers for not eradicating suffering, when in fact the good and proper goal of many philosophers, and philosophies, is to encourage us to endure some form of suffering for the sake of a higher good.

Aquinas has it that angels and demons are composed in a sense. They have both essence (what they are) and an existence given by God (that they are). — Count Timothy von Icarus

If I remember correctly, God is eternal, and angels are aeviternal. I believe that this means God's existence is completely outside of time, whereas angels have a beginning in time (being created by God), but no end in time.

Another step toward "The Disunited States of America".

My answer is simple: the world is as it is because that is how the world and we humans evolved. Which then begs the question, how did this evolution took place? — Pieter R van Wyk

This seems to be your real question. You see fault in human nature, and you are inclined to ask how (or why) is it the case that evolution produced this.

I believe that one can take two very distinct approaches toward answering this, and they are distinguished by the way that one understands "intention". One is to position intention as pre-evolution, and the other positions it as post-evolution.

The latter restricts "intention" to a property of human beings, and something which was produced, or emerged from evolutionary processes. If this is the case, then we cannot place blame or fault on the evolutionary process which produced human beings. Human beings were produced by some random process and it is inappropriate to judge that activity as good or bad, which are properties of intentional acts. This renders 'there is fault in human nature' as a categorical mistake. We cannot direct any blame toward the evolutionary actions which produced human nature, we simply make subjective, fallible human judgements about that nature.

On the other hand, if intention is apprehended as prior to evolution, then it may be involved in evolution, and we have the premise required for judging these acts which have led to the current state of human nature as good or bad. This produces the common question about how good could God be, if He allows evil in the world.

I always play nice. In my mind, if it's not nice, it's not play.

How many of you are willing to share and post in this thread the initial email you sent to Jamal, the very message or part of it at least, that granted you passage into this “invite only” collective? — Kizzy

As javi2541997 has indicated, in the olden days we didn't need an invite. I think Jamal initiated that invitation only practice to keep out malicious bots and things like that.

I see that I have the lucky number "7" beside my name. I take that as a good sign.

Are you prepared to go into the deep end? — Kizzy

Personally, I think maybe you've gone off the deep end. Have you got nothing better to do with your life?
Hmmm, I guess that could be asked of any of us who hang around here.

So the response to such a question is abuse? — J

I don't see why you call my response "abuse". I merely pointed out a common personality trait which was indicated to me by the op's claimed use of PM. That trait was identified as "insecurity". Do you generally interpret constructive criticism as abuse?

So let me see how this works. I say, "In my opinion, that's a beautiful painting." And you are "bound to reply", "You aren't very smart"? — J

I don't see the analogy. You provide no indication as to how you draw this conclusion. I very clearly explained how I came to the conclusion of "insecurity". Further, I did not state that I believe the conclusion to be necessary. I asked, (with a question mark in case you missed it) if it was a sound conclusion.

Therefore, I was suggesting it as a topic for discussion. And, judging by the replies, it appears like more people agree with me than disagree.

Some people appear to be missing the bigger picture. What would be the point in having TPF if we all decided that it is better to discuss our philosophical ideas through private messages? I mean, this suggestion that we use PM to discuss philosophy instead of the public forum is absolutely contrary to the very reason for being of TPF. Why does it upset you when the suggestion is scoffed at?

That is, after all, the purpose of a place like this. — Hanover

Patience is a virtue which I do not have. If someone joined the chess tournament, and recommended that we play by special rules crafted by that individual, I'd literally lose it. Then @J would see what constitutes "abuse".

I believe the point of this thread is not to be philosophical but to ask us if we use private messages to interact privately with other members. — javi2541997

Good morning javi. I don't mean to be overly pedantic, but I think it's important to note that the op is clearly and specifically concerned with "discussing philosophical ideas in Private Messages".

Your response shows exactly why Banno might prefer a PM discussion. He poses a perfectly reasonable question to the members, and you slam into him. Why? What are you hoping that will achieve? If you think his ideas about PMs are open to some concerns, can't that be said civilly and respectfully? Sigh . . . I guess it's the world we live in today. — J

The op lacks any real philosophy. It states a personal opinion. The replies are bound to be opinions about the person, because the person stated something personal. I simply met the op's invitation.

This thread ought to be in The Lounge.

It's much easier to follow a deep discussion without interjection.

It's also easier for practical reasons. I don't have to flick back and forth between pages, and scroll up or down through irrelevant or even counterproductive material.

It cuts down quite dramatically on the bullshit. Quite a relief, actually. — Banno

In other words, by using PM it's easier to avoid the masses who disagree with you, allowing you to escape into a fabricated world of illusion, with a close buddy. Avoid the distractions which reality forces upon you, and really build your own little dream scene.

When I want to escape into my own little world of creativity, I just pm myself. It's all done in the privacy and secrecy of my own mind, commonly known as thinking.

What's with the need for a buddy in your private and secret world of creativity? Do I detect a little insecurity?

I'm pretty sure that every day there are more discoveries that do not defy science. But they are not so newsworthy. Your sample may be a bit biased. — Ludwig V

Well, we still have the unpredictability of human actions to account for.

But isn't it fair to say that this is, precisely, the "world doing as advertised", including the unpredictability of people? I don't mean this just as a smart comeback, but something deeply true. Our scientific view of the world allows us to predict with confidence that our views will be regularly upended by new insights and discoveries! We didn't use to know that, but now we do, and that is now "how the world works." — J

You can interpret unpredictability as a form of predictability if that makes you feel good. I'd prefer not to enter that world where contradiction is the norm.

Folk want the world to be unpredictable in order to suit their heroic philosophical narrative, but predictably go to the shop to buy their sausages. — Banno

Not me.

They type on their device fully expecting a reply from Banno, and sometimes get one. — Banno

Wrong again.

Zero out of two is not very good.

Do we want to discuss these things, or make drive-by shots on each other? — AmadeusD

Drive -by shots are likely the best way to deal with someone like Banno who never listens. The more noise those shots make, the better. Maybe that would wake him up. Banno's certitude has dulled his senses to the point that he's now just daydreaming about how it is impossible for him to be wrong.

Sure, the world is sometimes not as expected. But we can see this only becasue overwhelmingly it is coherent. Chairs do not turn into cats, chalk is not democracy and so on. — Banno

The vast majority of what you observe tomorrow, will be totally unexpected from today's perspective. The fact that you can provide a few general examples of what you can expect tomorrow, means very little when there will be thousands, maybe millions, of particular occurrences which you will observe, and will be completely unexpected.

The point being made is that doubt takes place against a background of certainty. — Banno

It's very obvious that you have this backward. We tend to be certain of a very few things, generalities, which are correct, against a background of a vast multitude of particularities which we are uncertain about. If you believe that the passing of time, provides for you, a background of certainty, then you are well practiced in the art of self-deception.

That no disaster has occurred yet is luck, not justification. — Benkei

It is evidence that the nuclear facilities are not as significant as claimed, kind of like Saddam's WMD. If you bomb the facility before it's a danger to bomb it, it's a lot safer, but justification is a lot more difficult. If it isn't justifiable, it's oppression.

Overwhelmingly, the world appears to do much as advertised. — Banno

Not according to the pop-up headlines I get on the internet. Every day there's new discoveries which defy science. Furthermore, there's a whole range of human activities which are completely unpredictable.

I wouldn't say that this constitutes miracles, only that science doesn't really have the capacity to predict what the world will do.

Even if you accept that there can be a being of pure form, they would have immaterial parts — Bob Ross

Parts are what a material object is composed of. I don't think it makes any sense to talk of the parts of an immaterial form. Neither does your argument make any sense.

3. Two or more beings without parts cannot exist. — Bob Ross

Why not?

Now we can see what the section title means. The disenchantment of the concept intentionally mirrors Weber's disenchantment of the world. Where the latter described the demystification of the world through the erosion of religious worldviews and sacred hierarchical bonds, the disenchantment of the concept means to erode its sacred power, to root it in material reality without casting it aside completely---bringing the concept down to Earth. — Jamal

The interpretation I offered above is quite convoluted, and you may not understand it properly, but it is very consistent with yours. So here's a sort of paraphrase. The identity thinking, which Adorno criticizes is a movement of the concept attempting to become consistent with the object (such as representationalism). But this produces a division between concept and object (classic dualism), requiring a mediator between the two. (Plato's tripartite soul posits spirit as mediator between body and mind.)

As explained above, any proposed mediator must always be on the side of the concept, because that is what appears as immediate to the subject as actively manipulating the concepts. But this is a sort of bias which prevents a true representation of mediation. So the project is ill-fated as trying to do what its bias prevents. In this ill-fated project, the object, as well as concept, are in essence static, while an agent (Spirit) is required for the activity which moves the concepts shaping them to be consistent with the objects.

Adorno's proposal puts the foundational activity in the object itself, as the cause of concepts. This assigns to the object the position of mediator between the contraries of the concept. That might make the object, as active, immediate to the intellect, (which is Adorno goal, the priority of the object). This effectively replaces Spirit as the immediate active agent of mediation with the object as the immediate active agent of mediation.

That would be the form. But form is complex (not in the sense of having material parts though), and not simple. If you do not accept the categorical difference between matter and form you'll be forever stuck in the same rut.

He counters that "in truth," all concepts are produced by and point back to material reality (whether they do the latter well or badly is a different matter). That is part of what a concept is. This flat assertion of materialism is similar to that in the earlier paragraph. — Jamal

I see this as the key point to the section. And, there are two key words to Adorno's description of this, which I am trying to get a handle on. The words are "moment" and "mediation". The following are the passages with that usage:

In truth all concepts,
even philosophical ones, move towards what is non-conceptual,
because they are for their part moments of the reality, which
necessitated – primarily for the purpose of controlling nature – their
formation. That which appears as the conceptual mediation from the
inside, the pre-eminence of its sphere, without which nothing could be
known, may not be confused with what it is in itself. Such an
appearance [Schein] of the existent-in-itself lends it the movement
which exempts it from the reality, within which it is for its part
harnessed. — p 22

Meanwhile, the insight that its conceptual essence would not be its
absolute in spite of its inseparability is again mediated through the
constitution of the concept; it is no dogmatic or even naively realistic
thesis. — p23

The concept is a moment like any
other in dialectical logic. Its mediated nature through the non
conceptual survives in it by means of its significance, which for its part
founds its conceptual nature. It is characterized as much by its relation
to the non-conceptual – as in keeping with traditional epistemology,
where every definition of concepts ultimately requires non-conceptual,
deictic moments – as the contrary, that the abstract unity of the onta
subsumed under it are to be separated from the ontical. To change this
direction of conceptuality, to turn it towards the non-identical, is the
hinge of negative dialectics. — p 23

Now, "mediation" implies a medium or mediator, and this is something in between the two features which are distinct, and may be opposites, or two extremes. So we have three aspects, the two distinct features which we can say are mediated, and the medium/mediator. As far as I can tell, Adorno keeps the medium/mediator not well described or defined, and somewhat ambiguous. And, since I cannot understand "mediated" without some understanding of the medium/mediator, I am left to speculate.

Generally, a medium is understood to be passive, and a mediator is understood to be active, so I think we can eliminate the former as unlikely to be what Adorno talks of as mediation. This means that "moment" is used not as a passive instant, or point in time, but more like the use in physics, where the moment is an active force of causation. Following this exclusion, I see two principal possibilities for the meaning of mediator. The first is that the two opposing features are concept and object, and the mediator mediates between these two. The second is that the two opposing features are both conceptual, (contradictories such as is and is not), and the mediator between these two is the object.

I'll start with the first possibility. Since Adorno speaks of a separation between concept and object, it appears like the mediator lies between these two as a mediation of both. However, this leads to the problem outlined. Any description of the mediator is necessarily conceptual, such that the mediator is not a proper mediator, but is actually on the side of the concept and therefore not a proper mediator. For example, we might say that in general, the mediator between concept and object is the human being, but this is purely conceptual. And if we get more specific, we could say that the mediator is human activities, knowledge, or philosophy, but this is still conceptual. In the attempt to avoid this, we might think of the individual philosopher as the mediator, and the philosopher's actions under one's material conditions (historical context), as mediation between concept and object. But an important aspect of the material conditions is ideology, and again, the conceptual side takes priority.

So we ought to proceed to the second possibility. And since Adorno explicitly speaks of the mediation of conception, I believe that this is how he wants us to understand mediation. The object acts as mediator in the formation of concepts. Conception deals with opposing terms, contraries, and the objects act to mediate the conception of these contraries. So this, I believe is what he proposes as the "hinge of negative dialectics", to turn one's attention onto the particular objects which mediate the concept, instead of turning one's attention toward the identity relation, which is actually purely conceptual.

I have one problem with what Adorno says in this section, and that is how he distances himself from Hegel. He states the following:

Concepts such as that of being in the beginning of Hegel’s Logic
indicate first of all that which is emphatically non-conceptual; they
signify, as per Lask’s expression, beyond themselves. — p 23

I believe that this is a misrepresentation of Hegel. In his logic, "being" is a concept, which along with the opposing "not being" represents a logical form. "Being" does not represent the non-conceptual, it represents the opposite of not being. That's what supports its identity in that logical form. However, "becoming" in its classical form is a representation of the material world. So Hegel's dialectics can be interpreted as showing the (conceptual) logical contraries as being subsumed by the material world of changing objects (becoming) in a process known as synthesis.

This puts Hegel's dialectics as very similar to Adorno's. The difference I see is that Adorno's "mediation" is active in the production of the concept, which consists of contraries, whereas Hegel's "synthesis" is the result or effect of conception. Furthermore, Hegel's "synthesis" is a bit problematic in comparison to Adorno's "mediation", because it requires an active agent, which ends up being Spirit. Adorno can assign causal activity to the mediator, which is the active, objective reality of the material world, thereby avoiding the need for an active agent as cause of the concepts, while Hegel needs an agent to cause synthesis.

That could be the change of direction, the turn around that he speaks of for negative dialectics.

This isn't a direct counter to my point. If you have finite divisibility, then you will end up with multiple absolutely simple beings (even if they are just 'atoms') and this is impossible. To hold your view, you have to accept that two absolutely simple beings are not ontologically indistinguishable from each other. — Bob Ross

That's a faulty conclusion. All we need to do is accept that form is categorically different from matter, therefore formal causes are categorically different from material causes. No being is simple, as each is a composition of matter and form. And, the priority of form (such as God, and the soul, who are not properly "beings" but Forms) allows that matter is created (not from nothing, but from form) according to the specific purpose intended.

All right. I think you got carried away in your previous post, when you said that the meaning of "negative dialectics" was "against dialectics", when obviously it just means dialectics of the negative variety. — Jamal

OK, but there is a little trick at play here. If we define "dialectics" as founded by Hegel, then anything which qualifies for the criteria of being named by the term, must fulfil the conditions. So, if synthesis is an essential aspect of Hegelian dialectics, and Adorno removes this from his philosophy, then we ought not call his philosophy "dialectics" at all, but come up a new term which distances it from dialectics, like "post-dialectics", or something like that would work. But then, I see that "negative dialectics" really could do that task, of distancing itself from dialectics, by being "against dialectics". And, I interpret Adorno's philosophy as actually being against dialectics (in the Hegelian sense), so this leaves the question of why he tries to characterize it as a type of dialectics.

This points back to that time when you called me scurrilous. What I said at that time was this:

The trickery is this. He implies that he and the thoughts he presents, originate from, or have been greatly influenced by ("contained") by Hegel, suggesting that he is Hegelian. In reality, he is not, but he knows that Hegel is understood as a powerful authority, and he desires to gain support for his project by appearing to be consistent with Hegel. — Metaphysician Undercover

There is no reason for him to mention "The enormous power of Hegel", and speak as if he's awed by this mysterious force of ideology. How is that consistent with his project of negative dialectics? And he did this right after claiming we need to critique the hypostasis of mind. Instead, he's sucking up to it when he says that all his ideas are contained in Hegel. — Metaphysician Undercover

But he is still quite a lot closer to Hegel in method than he is to Plato, even using Hegel's terms and categories, e.g., mediation, determinate negation, moment, etc. — Jamal

I reserve judgement on that statement

I see how "determinate negation" may establish a relation (other than a critical, negative relation) between him and Hegel, but I really do not yet fully understand his use of "mediation". So far it seems a but ambiguous to me. If mediation turns out to be a sort of synthesis, then he would be Hegelian, but then he'd be reintroducing the synthesis he claims to avoid.

However, his rejection of synthesis, if true, really separates him. The question might be, is an attempt at synthesis necessary for dialectics. But again, it's just semantics, and we should focus on what he's actually doing, rather than trying to name it.

I had not realized until now that you actually believe Adorno is arguing against dialectics as such. That's an eccentric interpretation, to say the least. — Jamal

I wouldn't say that he's arguing against "dialectics" in the complete range of possible uses of this word, rather he is arguing against "dialectics" in the sense of Hegelian dialectics. And, since he positions Hegel as the founder of dialectics, then all conventional forms of dialectics are Hegelian dialectics, so he is arguing against dialectics as such. I would say that Adorno's "negative dialectics" is closely related to Hegelian dialectics, but he is very critical of Hegelian dialectics. And, since "dialectics" is defined in relation to Hegel, we ought to admit that Adorno is arguing against dialectics.

Here, let me explain using the following reference point, how we are really not far apart in our respective interpretations.

The false condition is wrong society, and it is not (only) wrong because a nefarious group of gangsters and psychos is oppressing and impoverishing everyone else, but (also) because all people, from top to bottom, are under the spell of ideology and coerced by the system, their individuality stunted. This is true even of those who do not suffer direct oppression and poverty. — Jamal

That very ideology, which you say constitutes "wrong society", is firmly based in the philosophy which Adorno calls identity-thinking, and it is a manifestation of Hegel's dialectics. So we are really not very far apart, we both see Adorno in the same way, fundamentally. However, I think that I see the philosophical implications more clearly than you do, so I extend "wrong society" to imply "wrong ideology", to imply wrong philosophy (Hegelian dialectics). Therefore I see Adorno as arguing against dialectics, as defined in relation to Hegel, and that amounts to all modern dialectics.

EDIT: I suggest you have a look at lecture 1 again. Now that you have some Adorno under your belt, it'll make more sense, and you'll get a better idea of his intentions. — Jamal

So, at your suggestion I did this, took a look at lecture 1. What I see is that Adorno is proposing a philosophy which is completely distinct from Hegelian dialectics and the consequent identity philosophy . He is clear to explain the difference. He calls it "negative dialectics" and a philosophy of non-identity. I am arguing that since "dialectics" is commonly understood under the terms of Hegelian dialectics, and Adorno dismantles Hegelian dialectics, his philosophy ought not be called "dialectics" under such a definition.

However, if we look at "dialectics" in a broader sense, and consider "Platonic dialectics", which is a completely different style of philosophy from Hegelian dialectics, so much so that they ought not be classed under the same word, "dialectics", then we have the premise for calling Adorno's philosophy "dialectics". The principal issue is "synthesis". Some would argue that the method of looking at opposing principles without the goal of synthesis, cannot be called dialectics.

Here's what I said at the beginning of the thread:

t's interesting that he positions Hegel as the founder of dialectics rather than Plato. It appears to me, like what Adorno is offering is a dialectics more closely related to Plato's than Hegel's. He dismisses "synthesis" completely, and focuses on a deconstruction of the concept. It may be characterized as deconstructionist. This is very similar to the Platonic dialectical method. Plato took varying definitions of the same term to break down the assumed concept, and expose contradiction within the supposed "concept", demonstrating its weaknesses. it is a skeptical method. — Metaphysician Undercover

Here's Adorno in the first lecture:

We are concerned here
with a philosophical project that does not presuppose the identity of
being and thought, nor does it culminate in that identity. Instead it
will attempt to articulate the very opposite, namely the divergence of
concept and thing, subject and object, and their unreconciled state.
When I make use of the term ‘dialectics’ I would ask you not to think
of the famous triadic scheme of θε′σις [thesis], αντι ′θεσις [antithesis]
and συ′νθεσις [synthesis] in the usual sense, as you encounter it in
the most superficial account of school dialectics. — LND, p 6

The question now. When Adorno makes use of the term 'dialectics', in his proposed "negative dialectics", does it even qualify as "dialectics" at all? Well, I think it's just semantics, and it really doesn't matter, so long as we can grasp what he is doing.

From my so far, brief introduction to Adorno, I have some difficulty accepting what you say here.

I think that in his theory of negative dialectics he is presenting philosophy, and is approaching sociology from a philosophical perspective. So we must respect that this is a philosophical work. And the philosophical perspective he has taken is decidedly not dialectical. "Dialectical" for Adorno is Hegelian, and by taking the position of negative dialectics (anti-dialectical) he is working to expose mistakes within the dialectical approach. Because of this, when he provides a description of specific conditions, we have to be careful to differentiate between what he is demonstrating to be wrongful thinking, concerning these conditions, from what is rightful thinking concerning these conditions. Furthermore, since Marx and Marxist thinkers mostly follow Hegelian principles, we must be very careful to distinguish the aspects of Marxist thinking which Adorno demonstrates to be mistaken, from those which might be acceptable.

As he says, "dialectics is the ontology of the false condition." The false condition is wrong society, and it is not (only) wrong because a nefarious group of gangsters and psychos is oppressing and impoverishing everyone else, but (also) because all people, from top to bottom, are under the spell of ideology and coerced by the system, their individuality stunted. This is true even of those who do not suffer direct oppression and poverty. — Jamal

I think, you are completely misinterpreting "dialectics is the ontology of the false condition". And, I believe you ought to reread the section assuming the following interpretation. What he is saying is that dialectics works from a false representation of "the condition". That is the representation derived from the dialectical approach, it is a false condition. It is a faulty ontology, the manifestation of an idealism which holds as a primary principle, a faulty generalization "Spirit". Notice what is said after that phrase, "a true one [ontology] would be emancipated from it [dialectics]".

I believe that in this closing passage he offers a little bit of (positive) guidance toward the possible utopia he is alluding to, with the following phrase "...so that life can continue to exist even under the ruling relations of production...". Notice that he has removed, abstracted "relations of production" from any particular circumstances, to stand alone, independent of all subjects, therefore all subjectivity, as an objective base for the ruling of all subjects. So we have, in this principle, the foundation for a society which is not ruled by any particular people (subjects), because this inevitably succumbs to particular interests, but tis society would be ruled by objective "relations of production".

As I mentioned earlier, the only true way to objectify "society" is to determine something beyond all individual subjects, as the guiding force of "society". This is something which transcends the collective of subjects, and stands for the unity of them, as validating that unity as an object, with the ensuing objectivity. Traditionally, in Christian society, this was God. Hegel proposed "the Idea", or "the Spirit", but this conception is inherently tied to God in its idealism. Marx attempted to remove the spirituality, replacing it with the material conditions of human existence. But this manifested in subjectivity, particular interests. Adorno wants to remove all that ungrounded idealism of Hegel, and avoid the mistakes of Marxism, to found an objective society in the material substance of human existence. It appears like he believes that "relations of production" will provide that base.

I think it's clear that he is, and that you're reading it wrong. It's a dialectical point: those most determined by the system also produce it, and those dominated by the system do not know how much they themselves constitute and maintain it. — Jamal

He's not talking about being dominated by the system, he is talking about those who are "most conditioned", and therefore have it at their disposal. Having something at your disposal is the opposite of being dominated by it, it is a case of dominating that thing. Therefore, as he says, they "own" the system, even if they do not fully grasp that.

But in the context in which he discusses the status of subjects and subjectivity in general, he would not suddenly restrict his referent to a particular class, so that's why I'm inclined to think he meant anyone of whatever class. — Jamal

This is his way of exposing the problem, which is the faulty generalization that reduces every subject "to the same common denominator". The very existence of that class, those who own the system, demonstrates that this generalization is faulty. He demonstrates how "subjects and subjectivity in general" is a faulty generalization in the context of social structures, due to this class difference. If "subject", in the classical sense of the word, refers to those who are ruled, then all the people in the social structure cannot be subjects, because we need to account for those who are the rulers, as other than subjects .

On the other hand, the ruling class are also dominated by the system, so…either way, I win :grin: — Jamal

I don't think so, he clearly says that these people have the system at their disposal, and they own it. If being "most conditioned" means conditioned by the system, this does not imply that they are dominated by the system, just like being conditioned by your parents and teachers as a child does not mean that as an adult you are dominated by them. It only means that these people are trained, or groomed to be in that position, to have the system at their disposal, and own it. Even in a monarchist system, in which the rulers are born into that circumstance, they still need to be conditioned through education to properly play that role.

I am not claiming it is Aristotelian, and I demonstrated it to you here in a former post:

The infinite divisibility of an object is not only possible but necessary. God is the only absolutely simple being (i.e., divine simplicity) and if God is the first member of the causal regress of the composition of an object (which would be the case if the composition is finite in parts) then there would have to be at least one part which is also absolutely simple which is impossible; therefore an objects composition must be equally indivisible and subsistent being of each member is derivative of God as the first cause outside of the infinite regress.

In short, if we have a causal series with God as the beginning for composition like [G, [P1], [P2], [P3], …, O] (where God is ‘G’, the ‘P’s refer to parts, and ‘O’ refers to the object/whole in question), then the immediate subsequent member of the causal chain from God must also be absolutely simple (which in this case is the set of parts containing one element/part, P1); for that part would be composed of either (1) God (which is an absolutely simple being so He would provide no parts to this part, P1) or (2) it’s own self-subsisting being (since nothing comes prior to it that has parts and is not from God). Either way, e.g., the set [P1] contains parts which have no parts. This is impossible because there would, then, be at least two beings that are absolutely simple; and two absolutely simple beings are indistinguishable ontologically. I am pretty sure you would disagree with the idea that ontological simplicity entails one such kind of being (as a possibility); but you get the point. — Bob Ross

What I deny is your premise, that God is absolutely simple. This mistake I attribute to Neo-Platonists who wanted to make God "the One". Christian theologists rejected this for the Trinity. And Aristotle refuted that conception of divinity as "the One" in his discussion on the meaning of "unity" and "one". To make God absolutely simple is to make God "One" in the sense of a mathematical Ideal, and mathematical ideals are potencies rather than actualities. So the Neo-Platonist's divinity turns out to be an absolute potency. But this infinite potential, by Aristotelian principles (cosmological argument) is actually in a sense, impotent, not having any actuality to be able to actualize anything, even itself. That is why Neo-Platonism has difficulty explaining emanation, it must be explained by principles other than causation. Then this is a sort of incoherent concept, which has things emanating from "the One", but not through causation.

He is referring not to an elite but to any and all members of society, particularly those dominated by it. — Jamal

Clearly he is noy referring to those dominated by it, but those who dominate it, having it "at their disposal", as "their own". He says:

"The system is not that of the absolute Spirit, but of the most
conditioned of those who have it at their disposal, and cannot even
know how much it is their own."

I believe, "the most conditioned" refers to the special few who have and use the system (as their own) for their own purposes.

Notice at the end of my quoted passage, the generality which Hegel called "the Spirit" is "the product of particular interests". This is why I believe that Aorndo thinks that the unity referred to by "the Spirit" is what I called a false object, the antagonistic whole.

I disagree. — Jamal

If that is not the point we disagree on then what do you think we disagree on?

However, I don't understand why one cannot equally say "therefore it's time cannot be arbitrarily chosen, there are real temporal parameters which limit the truth, and restrict the designation of time". When observed, as this particle can only exist at one time, its time has not been arbitrarily chosen. — RussellA

What would those real temporal parameters consist of? If you think about it, they are all reducible to relative positions. So your starting point, t1, is completely arbitrary. You choose a specific position, and begin. The time itself has nothing within it to indicate to you what position is the starting position.

I still don't see the difference you are trying to explain, in that distance is not arbitrary yet duration is arbitrary. — RussellA

I don't know, maybe I'm the one who is wrong, who misunderstands. But you haven't been able to explain to me why what I'm saying doesn't jive with your belief, so we're both just not making sense to the other.

Neither are arbitrarily chosen. The position is the position I observe it to be at, and the time is the time I observe it to be at. — RussellA

I don't believe this, you choose (arbitrarily) what time to observe it. What, do you believe, restricts your choice of when to observe?

Thanks for that quite explicit and exquisite interpretation of a very short section. I think this section will be pivotal in guiding us toward an understanding of the difference in perspective between you and I.

Let me go back to the disagreement we had right from the beginning of our reading, concerning the objectivity of society. I cannot apprehend "society" as an object in the normal sense of "object", as a material thing. You have said that society is "objective" in a different sense, and this sense appears to me to be nothing other than some form of intersubjectivity.

I think we agree that in the previous section Adorno has laid down the principle that contradiction, and consequently non-identity is proper to the subject. I interpreted him as saying that the law of non-contradiction applies to objects, but the subject along with its concepts does not necessarily adhere to this law, such that contradiction is proper to the subject. I also argued that Adorno implies that Hegel's dialectics allows contradiction into objects by making the primacy of the subject, a primary premise. I believe that Adorno treats this as a mistake, and believes that we ought to maintain the principle that contradiction is excluded from objects.

In this section, I believe we can see how Hegel's dialectics allows contradiction, which is proper to the subject, to come to be within the object. This is the mistake of idealism which assumes the "Spirit", or "the Idea" as the foundation of the State, or society. This makes "absolute Spirit", or "the Idea", an object with its material manifestation as the State, or society. In my opinion, this is a false object, and since it is simply a compilation of subjects, contradiction inheres within this supposed object. The false object here is the "antagonistic whole". So this is the means by which Hegelian dialectics allows contradiction within object, by falsely assuming that absolute Spirit, which has contradiction within what is referred to as "Spirit", is an object, the antagonistic whole.

The subjective constitution of reality must be retranslated as belonging to reality itself, which in effect means that contradiction belongs not only to the subject but to the object, i.e., the real world, or society. — Jamal

So this is a representation of our disagreement in a nutshell. I do not think that Adorno is so quick to turn contradiction over to the object, as you do. I believe that he is highly critical of Hegelian dialectics for doing this very deed, and he thinks that it is a mistake which needs to be avoid. I think he believes that real objects obey the law of noncontradiction. Therefore, if we have any desire to resolve this disagreement between you and I, we need to pay very close attention to how Adorno describes subject-to-subject relations, and how he concludes the section.

The system is not that of the absolute Spirit, but of the most
conditioned of those who have it at their disposal, and cannot even
know how much it is their own. The subjective pre-formation of the
material social production-process, entirely separate from its
theoretical constitution, is that which is unresolved, irreconcilable to
subjects. Their own reason which produces identity through exchange,
as unconsciously as the transcendental subject, remains
incommensurable to the subjects which it reduces to the same common
denominator: the subject as the enemy of the subject. The preceding
generality is true so much as untrue: true, because it forms that “ether”,
which Hegel called the Spirit; untrue, because its reason is nothing of
the sort, its generality the product of particular interests. — p21-22

Notice, the system is not absolute Spirit, but it is the property of an elite few who cannot even know to what extent it is their own. Further, the actual, "subjective pre-formation" of production process is completely separate from what it is in theory (objective in theory, I assume). There, in theory, each subject is reduced to the same common denominator, in some cases equality (in order to construct this theoretical whole), and this form of generality leaves "the subject as the enemy of the subject". [This is how contradiction inheres within this antagonistic whole, it is a faulty generalization.] Now, it is true [more appropriately, valid] in the context of Hegel's "Spirit", but in reality Hegel's "Spirit" is a faulty concept, so it is "nothing of the sort", only a generalization which is the product of particular interests.

Let's proceed to the conclusion, where he firmly rejects Hegelian dialectics:

In view of the concrete possibility of utopia, dialectics is the ontology of
the false condition. A true one would be emancipated from it, as little
system as contradiction. — p 22

The "condition" referred to here is the environment, the object. The false object is the one proposed by Hegelian dialectics, the faulty generalization which produces concepts like "forces of production", "use-value" concludes that they are objective principles relative to that false object, which is the false condition.

For analogy sake, consider Plato's criticism of Protagorean relativity, with its principle "man is the measure of all things". We can ask which man is the measure, and see that different men, with different perspectives, may provide contradictory measurements of the same thing. So we assume that "man is the measure" uses "man" in a general sense. But since there is contradictions within this generalization, it is implied that the generalization is faulty. So the generalization of "man" is faulty when used in this context.

We can also see a very similar thing with Wittgenstein's "meaning is use". Since every time a word is used, much of the meaning is dependent on the unique particularities of the context, then "use" must refer to particular instances. In this sense, the same word would have a different meaning in each instance of use, because its meaning is dependent on the particularities of context, so there would be no generalized meaning for any word. Because of this, people tend to interpret "use" in a general sense, such that the word would have an 'objective' meaning, dependent on this generalized sense of "use". However, due to the extent of difference between particular instances, even to the point of contradictory, this is a faulty generalization.

Now, we can consider Marx's "use-value" in the same way, it is a faulty generalization which assumes a specific use, without considering the uniqueness and differences between different possible uses. All such faulty generalizations relate back to Protagorean relativity, in the sense that they are an attempt to assign an absolute (objective generalization) to something which is conceived as subjective and relative. The conception is of something relative and subjective, 'man's measure', 'the use of a word'. 'use-value', yet that it is an absolute, objective generalization is assumed. This is also a problem in modern sciences which employ relativity theory. Sometimes, the scientists in speculation attempt to find something absolute in the physical world, when they've already excluded that possibility by using relativity theory to understand the physical world. When relativity theory is the principle tool used for understanding, it is impossible to conclude absolutes. Conclusions must be consistent with the premises.

Anyway, I'm really digressing now. The point where we disagree is concerning Adorno's attitude toward contradiction within particular objects. I think he rejects this, and all the examples he gives of such, are examples of mistakes induced by Hegelian dialectics which he is rejecting as the wrong approach.

There is a temporal duration between C and D. This temporal duration is also real, and therefore also not arbitrary. — RussellA

As I explain, that duration is arbitrary, because C and D are arbitrary points in time. You assume moments in time, but there are no real moments. Therefore, you could have chosen the duration between C and E or C and F or an infinity of other choices. That makes the choice, which determines th e length of duration, arbitrary in an absolute sense.

The supposed object, the particle, is a real empirically observable object, therefore it's position cannot be arbitrarily chosen, there are real spatial parameters which limit the truth, and restrict the designation of location.

Do you see the difference? The length of the duration is the product of choice in an absolute sense, because the supposed "moments" which constitute C, when the object is at A, and also D, when the object is at B, are inserted by choice (seemingly randomly). On the other hand, the supposed position of the object is restricted by real observations, i.e. truth.

(ignoring any debate in quantum mechanics) — RussellA

Quantum mechanics is actually very relevant because your chosen object was "a particle". Notice, that in quantum physics, the position of the particle is restricted by the truth of observation (where it is emitted and where it is detected). However, there is time between emission and detection when the particle cannot be said to have a location. This is because spatial location is restricted in the way I described. However, since temporal duration is not restricted in this way, we can still affirm that there is temporal duration during which the particle cannot be located. The arbitrariness of the temporal duration allows that there is a time period when the particle has no location, or every possible location, or however you want to interpret the consequence of this arbitrariness.

I think you're missing the point. It's not an issue of whether distance can escape from time. It obviously cannot, as things move therefore distances change, with the passing of time. Nevertheless, things in space have definable position, even if moving, and that provides the basis for spatial measurement. On the other hand, the points in time which serve as the boundaries for measurement are totally arbitrary. So, for example, 1/299 792 458 of a second is completely arbitrary.

A substance, in hylomorphism, is the form (act) and matter (parts) conjoined. — Bob Ross

Despite the fact that substance is the individual, which is a composite of matter and form, when you read his Metaphysics, you'll find that Aristotle determines that "substance" is properly assigned to form. This is because n the case of self-subsisting things, the substance of the thing cannot be separated from the thing's form. Therefore the thing's form and the thing's substance are one and the same.

however, as I noted before, it is equally necessary that an object is infinitely divisible. — Bob Ross

Why do you say this? It is definitely not Aristotelian, as he clearly demonstrates why it s incoherent to assume infinite divisibility of anything substantial. This is the reason you yourself stated " if each object gets its being from its parts and those parts from its parts ad infinitum then none of them would exist; for none of them have being in-itself".

So I'll ask you again, why do you insist that it is necessary that an object is infinitely divisible. I think this is incoherent, because such an object cannot exist, therefore it is contradictory to say that such a thing (anything which might be infinitely divisible) is an object.

Hyle (matter) + morphe (form) = substance. Neither are a substance themselves. — Bob Ross

This is incorrect. In the case of self-subsisting things, the form is the substance. For reference, this is discussed in Metaphysics Bk 7.

They both exist intertwined together. — Bob Ross

They are not intertwined together, that is a misunderstanding. This is discussed in his description of generation in Bk 7.

That doesn’t refute what I said: in principle, hypothetically, a being could exist which is never affected by anything and yet is not incapable of change. — Bob Ross

It does refute your hypothesis. With an infinite amount of time, which is what you allow, that being would necessarily affect and be affected, or else it would be false to say that it is capable of affecting or being affected.

The spatial measurement is not arbitrary because it must be determined relative to two empirical boundaries, as the distance between them, although the choice of things to measure from may be arbitrary, making the determination arbitrary in a relative sense.

The temporal measurement is completely arbitrary because there are no boundaries within time, so the choice, which designates a spatial positioning as starting and ending point is arbitrary in an absolute sense.

Your example doesn't show that, because "1.2 metres" requires two boundaries which are determined empirically, and "75 seconds" is designated arbitrarily.

The spatial boundaries are determined by empirical principles, while the temporal boundaries are stipulated arbitrarily.

And the point?

The most obvious objection here would be to say that there is no such thing as a conservation principle, but that objection does not seem overly plausible. — Leontiskos

Conservation principles, like the conservation of mass, and the conservation of energy, are ideals which are put to use in practice. However, in reality, the real physical world does not obey them. There is always energy lost as time passes, and the discrepancy is written off as energy which is lost to the system, or sometimes as entropy. So this is not an argument that there is no such thing as conservation principles, there clearly is, and they are very useful. However, the real world doesn't actually obey them, and to understand the secrets of the real world is to understand why it doesn't live up to these ideals.

This is similar to the ideal which the ancients held, and Aristotle discussed, eternal circular motion. The orbiting of the sun, moon, and planets, was thought to be eternal circles. However, the circles were later demonstrated to be other than perfect circles, therefore the logic which made these circles eternal (and the universe would be eternal if conservation laws ere true) was effectively refuted. And the true nature of the solar system was revealed by understanding how the orbits did not actually live up to those ideals.

So we can make the same argument against "prime matter". It's an ideal, which is not consistent with reality. We can employ it in theories etc., where it is useful, but we need to recognize that it is not an accurate representation of truth. And the path of metaphysics will lead us into these areas where such concepts fail, thereby guiding us toward understanding the secrets of the real world.

The infinite divisibility of an object is not only possible but necessary. — Bob Ross

Such an infinite regress is incoherent and therefore logically impossible.

Yes, but this does seem to posit that there is a real kind of being or substance, distinct ontologically from the parts of a thing, which has the capacity to receive form. — Bob Ross

We are talking about hylomorphism aren't we? The form of a thing is distinct ontologically from the matter of the thing. And, if we divide a thing into parts each part will have form and matter. Infinite regress in such division is incoherent because it implies that there is no substratum, therefore no substance, allowing for infinite possibility, but this is contrary to empirical evidence.

But this could be the stuff which is the parts of a thing—no? It fits the definition of “that out of which a thing comes to be and which persists”. The parts persist when the whole perishes and the parts are out of which the whole is birthed. — Bob Ross

You do not seem to understand what "parts of a thing" means. To be "the parts of a thing", the existence of the thing is necessary. Therefore the parts of a thing cannot preexist the thing. If certain things are used in the creation of a thing, and therefore become parts of that thing, they are something other than parts of that thing prior to becoming parts of that thing. And after the thing perishes they are no longer parts of that thing, but something else.

This distinction is very important in understanding the nature of "form". The things, which may through some creative act, become the parts of something, have a distinct form, which is completely distinct from the form of that possible whole. When they become the parts of that whole their forms are different than they were, now being parts of that whole.

This is why considering the priority of matter always leads to an infinite regress. Each time we say that a thing has been made by putting parts together, those parts cannot be pure matter, they must themselves, have forms, as prime matter is unintelligible. So as much as matter is prior to the thing which is composed of it, it cannot be prior in an absolute sense. The incoherent infinite regress is avoided by understanding the priority of form in the creative act, and positing form rather than matter, as substance. Then "matter" as a concept just stands in as a substitute, a place holder, for forms which the human intellect cannot grasp. Those are the independent, separate forms, which are prior to material existence itself.

I don’t see how this is necessarily the case. A thing could be made of some substance which is capable of receiving form, exist as the whole between the form and its imposition on that substance, have the potential to be affected by other things, and yet no other thing affects it; thereby remaining unchanged. It is metaphysically possible for a thing that is perishable to be in an environment where it will not perish. — Bob Ross

I think that your argument is refuted by what is known as the principle of plenitude. If given enough time, every possibility will necessarily be actualized. This is exactly the problem with your attitude of allowing for infinite regress. If we allow infinite time then we must allow the reality of all sorts of absurdities, like the infinite monkey theorem. That's one reason why infinite regress must be rejected as fundamentally repugnant to reason, therefore incoherent.

This is the same problem with space as there may be with time. — RussellA

I don't think these two are similar at all. When we look at things in space, we see all sorts of boundaries, the edges to objects, etc., but we do not find any such boundaries in time. All boundaries in time, except the boundary between future and past, are completely arbitrary. And the boundary between future and past is very indefinite because it's always changing.

I imagine Trump is pissed at Netanyahu. Hopefully this episode will further disentangle the US from that government. — NOS4A2

Trump distance himself from Israel? I sure as hell hope that happens, because it would mean that he's in the grave.