No, I am saying that particular collections are made up of particular collections, not constructed from universals. I take particular collections as granted because I see them all around me and because for any particulars there necesarily seems to be a collection of them, and universals don't seem necessary to explain the existence of particulars. — litewave

That's an irrational, infinite regress, which we already discussed when you said that an object is a collection of objects. The problem is that you've created a vicious circle by saying that a collection is made of collections, and you have no indication of what a particular is. A "collection" is a universal, a group of many. Now you want to deny that a collection is a universal, and claim that is a particular.

You claim to see collections existing as particulars all around you. Please explain to me how you think that you are seeing a collection as a particular when you haven't even said what a particular is. Perhaps an example or two?

For most people, for most concepts, acquaintance with instances of the concept precede, in time, the possession of the concept, and exposure to those particulars is instrumental in acquiring the universal they fall under. That's the argument from ontogeny: you are acquainted with moving, barking, licking particulars before you know that they are dogs. And there is a related argument from phylogeny: modern humans have a great many concepts that they were taught, often through the use of exemplars, but it stands to reason that not every human being was taught: there must have been at least one person who passed from not having to having a concept unaided. In essence, we imagine that person somehow teaching themselves a concept through the use of exemplars, and we imagine that process proceeding as we do when analyzing a population of objects, looking for commonalities. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, this is the effect of teaching, learning. From the perspective of learning, we see the particular as essential to learning the universal, because this is the process which taught us. However, the particular is a tool of the teacher, who already understands the universal to be taught. So from the learner's perspective, the particular appears to be essential to the learning process, as necessary for it, but it is really a weak sense of "necessary", as what has been determined by the teacher as needed, required for the process. It is not a true logical necessity because it might be possible that the student could learn the universal in another way.

This is what Plato looked at in The Meno, with what is referred to as the theory of recollection. The student is induced to produce the universal without the use of a demonstration with particulars, and the observers conclude that the student must have already somehow had the universal in his mind. So they propose, as a solution, that the student must have somehow had the universal in his mind, from a past life, and recollected it. You can see that the proposed solution is inadequate, but it gives us a good representation of the problem. Aristotle gave a better solution, by saying that the student has within the mind, the potential for the universal, prior to actually formulating it.

But use of the particular, as a teaching tool necessitates in a stronger way, that the existence of the universal to be taught preexists the use of the particular through the concept of causation. And if the potential for the universal, which precedes the actual existence of it in the mind, does not necessarily require particulars for its actualization, then what does constitute the actual existence of the universal?

hat's of interest here is that resemblance is not only relative, but comparative: resemblance is a three-way relation, a given object resembles another more, or less, than it resembles a third. — Srap Tasmaner

I agree, there always must be a third in this form of comparison, because two will always be other than each other. But this only demonstrates that "resemblance" is not the true principle by which we categorize. In reality, we produce the category, like "dog" in your example, and judge the thing directly as to whether it fits the category, without comparing it to others within our minds So you see an animal and call it a dog, without performing mental comparisons. And learning the category is a matter of developing the capacity to do this, not a matter of learning how to compare. That's why learning the category is the important aspect, and it consists of seeing examples, not of comparing three things.

The material of the Sesame Street skit is only used to demonstrate that the category has been learned. That's why it gets sort of controversial, because to demonstrate that one knows the group, a person is asked to say what is not part of the group, as a simple form of confirmation. In reality an act of exclusion is not necessary if one has learned the category. We simply need to judge and include members as a part of the group without indicating what is not a member. This is like determining what pleases you without any reference to what displeases. And the commonly touted principle, that one must know "what X is not", in order to know "what X is" is a false principle. It seems to be based in the faulty idea that one must demonstrate one's knowledge, to have it.

I have, twice. But here it is again with the relevant parts bolded:

In mathematics, the additive inverse of a number a is the number that, when added to a, yields zero. This number is also known as the opposite (number),[1] sign change,[2] and negation.[3] For a real number, it reverses its sign: the additive inverse (opposite number) of a positive number is negative, and the additive inverse of a negative number is positive. Zero is the additive inverse of itself.
— Additive inverse - Wikipedia — Andrew M

That's not a definition of opposite, just a use of "opposite" which clearly demonstrates what I said. Your definition of "inverse", as "additive inverse" renders the meaning of "opposite" as inconsistent with common usage. You've demonstrated that by using this definition of inverse, zero is opposite to itself. But a thing being opposite to itself is contrary to common usage of "opposite".

You should try that. What happens if you have a -0 unequal to 0? — Srap Tasmaner

A better thing to try is to consider what happens if a thing is allowed to be opposite to itself. Opposites are commonly the two defining extremes of a measurement scale, hot and cold, big and small, etc.. If we stipulate that the two extremes are the very same thing (like zero relative to the scale), then we have no way to distinguish whether some thing which we're trying to measure, but is off the end of our scale, is off the top of the scale, or off the bottom of the scale, because we have set the conditions whereby the two are the very same (zero relative to the scale).

I really don't think you've provided any "mathematical definition of opposite". But if the mathematical definition of "opposite" allows that a thing is the opposite of itself (as zero is the opposite of zero), then yes, I would say that my preferred definition of "opposite" (the common use of the term) precludes the mathematical definition.

Even though the subject we are discussing is mathematics. — Andrew M

I suppose you ought to produce this mathematical definition of "opposite" so that we can judge whether zero is truly opposite to itself, by that definition. Or whether it is really the case that your preferred definition of "inverse" renders the common definition of "opposite" as inconsistent.

Here's a brief demonstration to help you understand what I am saying. Assume the smallest possible positive number is directly opposed, or inverse, to the largest possible negative number. In other words, we get as close to zero as possible on both sides, and maintain a balance of opposition between the two sides.

Now, let's assume that the quantity represented on each side is so near to nothing (zero) that we might be inclined to round it off. If we do such a thing, then the two quantities on each side become equal to each other, and the same as each other, as zero, instead of opposed to or inverse of one another.

Clearly, two inversely opposed and balancing quantities is not the same thing as one quantity, because that would mean that the positive number closest to zero is exactly the same as the negative number closest to zero, rather than having the two opposed to each other.

zero is its own opposite — Andrew M

Sorry Andrew, but "opposites" don't work that way. A thing is the same as itself, it cannot be opposite to itself. "Opposite" requires two.

As I said, that's a fictional, imaginary, representation of what an object is. And if you look back at where I first engaged you in this thread, you'll see that my principal objection to your proposal is that you take the existence of particulars for granted. Then you claim that people construct universals from these particulars which are taken for granted. So the problem here, is that what you have taken for granted is a fiction, and this undermines your entire proposal as completely unsound.

In reality, you have shown that you construct a representation of a particular, an object, from some preconceived universals, set theory, but then you've tried to claim that universals are derived from particulars. However, you have just demonstrated the opposite of what you claim. The notion of "an object" or a particular, is actually derived from preconceived universals, so the conception of universals is prior to the apprehension of particulars.

Reality only makes sense in comparison to what humans see, hear, feel, taste, and smell in their homes, at work, hunting Mastodons, playing jai alai, or sitting on their butts drinking wine and writing about reality. Example - an apple is real — T Clark

If reality only makes sense in relation to human sensations, then why wouldn't you be concerned with the sensations themselves, hearing, feeling, tasting, and smelling? If the sensations are what are real, then we have two conditions, that which is sensing, and that which is sensed. Why do you proceed only toward that which is sensed, the apple? If we start from human sensations, shouldn't that which is sensing be just as real as the thing sensed?

In set theory, ordered sets/collections (which have members arranged in a particular order) can be defined out of unordered sets. — litewave

But mathematics doesn't give us a true representation of what an object is. Math is composed of axioms which are produced from the imagination. That's what I told you earlier, why the relation between two things, described by a universal, need not be a "resemblance" relation, if universals are constructed by the mind. The relation might be completely arbitrary, as demonstrated by set theory, which allows an ordered set to be constructed from an unordered set. This means arbitrary relations can be assigned to a group of things with no relations.

An "unordered set", a group of things which have no order, is really an incoherent fiction, an impossible situation, because things must have position. So mathematics clearly does not give us a true representation of the reality of objects.

Such as reflecting the positive number line over the origin and reversing the sign of the reflected numbers. In other words, positive and negative numbers are opposite numbers. — Andrew M

As I explained, this is an incorrect description because zero is a part of the number line. If zero was not a part of the line, we could say there is two distinct lines, as you seem to be implying, negative and positive lines, one the reflection of the other. But that is not the case. What we have is one line, of which zero is a part. The existence of zero, as a number, means that numbers do not have an opposite number. If numbers have an opposite, what is the opposite of zero?

This user has been deleted and all their posts removed. — Deleted User

That's an excellent username. And what better way to admit that you were wrong, then to delete all your posts.

A particular apple is a collection of its parts. Is the apple not an object? What is an object then? — litewave

An object is much more than a collection of parts. Each different object has its parts ordered in a particular way. It is the order of the parts which creates the unity which you seem to want to call a collection. A collection with no parts (if this could be in some way coherent) has no order, therefore cannot be an object.

Do you have a link to a definition? — Andrew M

OED: invert: reverse the position, order or place of.

but he knows what he knows. — Real Gone Cat

Thank you.

Obviously, negatives are not treated as the direct inverse of positives, because two positives multiplied together produce a positive number, and the two negatives multiplied together also produce the same positive number.

An empty collection is a collection of no parts. A non-composite object. — litewave

Litewave, a collection is not an object. Therefore an empty collection is not a non-composite object.

They are particulars located in space and time. — litewave

They have no location, that's the issue with quantum uncertainty.

Because the recipe describes relations between particular circles, like translation, rotation, scaling. — litewave

No, the recipe for making a circle, which you produced, does not describe relations between particular circles.

Resemblance comes in various degrees and you can understand sameness as maximum or exact resemblance. So the meaning of resemblance also covers sameness. — litewave

Exact resemblance is incoherent, for the reasons you described. If there is supposed to be no difference between two things, they cannot be assumed to be two things, they must be one and the same thing.

See the mathematical definition below. — Andrew M

That's the "additive inverse". It does not mean that negative numbers are the inverse of positive numbers in a general sense, only in the operation of addition. Without that qualification it wouldn't make sense to say that a thing (zero) could be the inverse of itself, because there would be no inversion involved there.

There are also two distinct conventions for natural numbers and integers (which include negative numbers). With integers, a larger number can be subtracted from a smaller number. With natural numbers, it can't. — Andrew M

Yes, distinct conventions for numbers is a real issue, which I take as evidence against Platonism. How could a number be a single object, if there are different conventions for meaning?

With complex numbers, the negative is still the inverse of the positive. — Andrew M

But negatives are not the inverse of positives, that's the point, and it's what the fact that there is not a square root of a negative number indicates. The problem is that zero occupies a position on the number line. If it was a simple inversion, the count would go from one to negative one, as the two directions would be the inverse of each other. But there are two spaces between one and negative one. So zero occupies a place in the count, it plays a real role, and this is why the negatives are not a simple inversion of the positives, because that would rule out a position for zero. And it is also the way that we conceive of zero, as a divisor between the haves (positive) and the have nots (negatives), that makes us say that two negatives multiplied together must make a positive, but we do not say that two positives multiplied together must make a negative.

I don't think so. It remains true that negatives do not have *real* square roots, and that's the same as saying that if your domain is discourse is restricted to real numbers they have *no* square roots. The complex plane is a perfectly natural extension of the real line. — Srap Tasmaner

I don't follow this. If, within the domain of real numbers, negatives do not have square roots, then the complex plane, within which negatives do have a square root, is outside the real line, something different from it, and not an extension of it.

It would be a concrete entity without parts. — litewave

No, it would not. It would be a collection of parts without any parts. That's what your statement was, "empty collections". Your assumption that this could constitute a concrete entity is unfounded, because concrete entities as we know them actually have parts. The appeal to fundamental particles does not help you because they are obviously not known as concrete entities.

Mathematics is full of infinities and it doesn't mean that it is unsound although infinities can be pretty mind-boggling. — litewave

I've argued in numerous places on this forum that such mathematics actually is unsound. Soundness consists of truthfulness, and pure mathematics has no respect for truthfulness. So...

They are two different particulars that are the same in the way that they are red. — litewave

But "same" is the relationship which a thing has with itself. So if two distinct things are "the same" with respect to being red, then the concept of "red" cannot be a resemblance relation, which is a relationship of similarity, it would be that the two things both partake in one and the same thing, the concept "red".

When two objects are the same it means that they are also different in some way because if they were the same in every way then they would be one object and not two. — litewave

You are not respecting the law of identity. Two distinct things cannot be said to be the same, as you suppose here. If they are said to be "the same", then they are said to be one object not two. "Same" is reserved for the relationship a thing has with itself. So you are talking about being the same, in one specific way.

They are two different particulars that are the same in the way that they are red. — litewave

As I explained above, if they are the same with respect to being red, then being red means the very same thing for each of them, and this cannot be construed as a resemblance relation, which would imply that they are similar with respect to being red, not the same. If they are the same with respect to being red, then we might say that they both partake in one and the same thing, the concept red.

Ok but for example, what is the underlying thing that underlies all circles? One thing is clear: it does not look like a circle at all because if it looked like a circle it would be a particular circle and not a universal one. A particular circle is continuous in space but a universal circle would not be because it is not supposed to be located in some continuous area of space. A universal circle looks more like a recipe how to create all possible circles from an arbitrary particular circle: first define a particular circle by specifying all points on a plane that are the same particular distance from a particular point and then create additional objects by translating, rotating or scaling (enlarging/shrinking without deformation) this particular circle and you can call all those additional objects "circle" too. And they all resemble each other in the way of being a circle because any of them can be mapped onto any other via the relation of translation, rotation or scaling, and no other object can. — litewave

If it is the case, that "A universal circle looks more like a recipe how to create all possible circles", then I do not see why you want to describe this as a resemblance relation. A recipe, blueprint, or whatever you want to call it, in no way states a resemblance relation. And even if the blueprint, or production instructions end up producing similar things, this does not imply that the production instructions state a resemblance relation. The instructions make one set of statements, which if followed in action numerous times, will produce a number of similar things.

Yes, that's how I think each particular is constructed. Except that there may be empty collections (non-composite particulars) at the bottom instead of infinite regress. But even if there was infinite regress I am not sure that would be a problem, as long as the whole (infinite) structure was logically consistent. — litewave

How could there be a concrete entity which is an empty collection of parts? That makes no sense logically, an infinite number of zeros does not make one. The issue with infinite regress, is not that it is not logically consistent, because maintaining logical consistency with unsound premises is what produces infinite regress. So the appearance of infinite regress is an indication of unsound premises. This is because the result of infinite regress is that it renders the thing described by the unsound premises as unintelligible due to the infinite regress. Therefore such premises must be considered irrational because they presuppose that the thing to be understood cannot be understood because an infinite regress (therefore unintelligibility) is accepted as the truth, instead.

Yes, they have a different location and thus different relations to the rest of reality, which makes them two different particulars which however resemble in the sense that they are red. — litewave

That they are both the same, with the same name "red" is an unjustified conclusion under this description. As you yourself say the instance of colour here is a distinct particular from the instance of colour over there. So the proper logical conclusion is that it is incorrect to say that they are both the same colour, you have stipulated that they are different. The idea that there is a resemblance relation between them just comes about from your refusal to accept the true conclusion that they are completely distinct. You deny the reality of the logic, that if they are not the same, they must be different, and so you propose some sort of compromised sameness "resemblance" instead. But this principle is not supported by empirical evidence, nor logic, it's just a product of your denial, a sort of rationalizing, which is really irrational.

There is an underlying sameness but I am not sure that there would need to be a single object (universal) to "produce" the resembling particulars. — litewave

I think you need to respect the meaning of "same" as described by the law of identity. "Same" means one and the same, "a single object". "Similar" has a completely different meaning, as it implies distinct things, rather than one thing, as "same" does. So if there is an "underlying sameness", this means that there is one and the same thing which underlies the two distinct instances, such that they are multiple occurrences of the same thing, just like two distinct occurrences of "now" could be said to have the same underlying thing, time. But two similar things do not require any underlying sameness, just a judgement of "similar", which could be based in any sort of assumption. If we say that two instances of "now" are similar, rather than having an underlying "time" which makes them two instances of the same thing, then we might employ any arbitrary principle whereby we would say that they are "similar". But this judgement of "similar" is completely arbitrary.

The math was entirely adequate but there was no natural picture, hence a lack of understanding. However, if negative numbers are thought of as the inverse of positive numbers, then they can be visualized. For example, credits and debits in banking. Or walking forwards and backwards. — Andrew M

The issue of imaginary numbers is different though. It is an issue of there being two distinct conventions, yet each convention is correct in its own field of application. In the one case there is no square root of a negative number, in the other case there is. This means that there is two completely distinct ways of conceiving negative numbers, and not a simple matter of negative being the inverse of positive. It is how the negative are conceived to relate to the positive, that creates the problem, i.e. it is not a straight forward inversion due to the role that zero plays.

Odd that it needed saying, but well said. — Banno

The speaker might know that the book is in the car but still be literally honest and correct, in saying "The book might be in the car". — TonesInDeepFreeze

If that's what you call "honest" communication, and "well said", then it's no wonder that I have an aversion toward communion with you two. Your principles for sharing with me are not up to the level of my principles for sharing with you. Sad but true. What a shame.

Ok, but I am saying that these "universal principles" are just resemblance relations between particulars rather than additional entities (universals) that instantiate in the particulars. — litewave

But in saying that, you are already assuming the existence of particulars. And by taking the existence of particulars for granted, you do not consider the process whereby we individuate particulars from the universe, in your representation, and this skews your perspective.

If you step back and take a better look, you'll see that the real problem is the question of individuation, by what principle do we say that this is a separate entity from that, as a particular, or individual. If you do this, then you'll see what was evident to the ancients whom I mentioned, that the universal is necessarily prior to the particular. Therefore your whole question, or starting point, as the issue of how we produce universals from particulars is based in a complete misunderstanding of reality.

How? — litewave

You don't see how this produces an infinite regress? If a concrete particular is a collection of concrete particulars, then each concrete particular in that collection is itself a collection of concrete particulars, and each concrete particular in that collection is itself a collection of concrete particulars, ad infinitum.

t seems that I could in principle define a part of the ball that constitutes the ball's particular red color. — litewave

See, look what you are doing here. You are individuating, separating out "a part of the ball", and passing judgement, to make it into a particular thing which you can refer to. But at the same time, you want to take it for granted that particulars have already been individuated, and we proceed from those particulars to produce universals.

Once you accept that a particular is produced from this sort of individuation, then you must see that the way that a human being produces universals is completely dependent on the way that one produces individuals. So we cannot proceed toward understanding how one produces universals, unless we first produce an understanding of how one produces individuals. If we take the existence of individuals for granted we cannot get anywhere.

So, for example there is a resemblance relation between two red particulars in the sense that they are both red. — litewave

So, let me explain, using this example. If the two supposed "particulars" are both the same in the sense of red, then why would you say that they are two, and not one instance of "red". If they are different shades of red, or something like that, then there is nothing to support saying that they are both the same colour, red. If they appear to be the exact same colour, then whatever it is which separates them as two distinct particulars, must be something other than colour. But how could it be that two exactly the same instances of colour could come to exist under completely distinct circumstance? Wouldn't they have been originally one thing which got divided? Any way you look at it, we would have to conclude that there is something "the same" about the circumstances, something underlying, which is truly the same, which could produce the exact same colour in two completely different situations. And if we say that the colour is not really exactly the same, it is only similar, then we have no reason to say that they are both the same colour, "red". Therefore we must conclude an underlying sameness as the reason why they are both red, or else saying that they are both the same colour, "red", is completely unjustified.

(Thanks for the notes on the ancients, btw.) — Srap Tasmaner

I appreciate someone who is receptive to different perspectives. I think that's what philosophy is made of.

Now we might think — identity of indiscernibles to the rescue! And now that we come to it, how did we imagine the sort of partial particular I described being a numerically distinct entity? It's not, after all; it's only an aspect of a 'genuine' concrete entity. Not even a part of it, but something that, obviously it seems, cannot exist on its own, but only as an aspect of something concrete.

No problem; we knew that as soon as we said we were creating an abstract object (the red of this ball) from a concrete object (this ball). But if it's no real objection that these things can't exist on their own, then we can't rely on their individual existence to underwrite their being numerically distinct. Maybe abstract objects can be numerically distinct, but if they can it's not the way regular concrete objects are. — Srap Tasmaner

Actually, I would say that the partial particular, for example the particular redness of this ball, is a concrete part of the concrete whole (this ball). A concrete object is structurally a collection of other concrete objects and there are various overlapping collections inside this collection. In the case of this ball, one of those overlapping collections is a particular red color because the structure of that collection is such that it reflects certain wavelengths of incoming light. — litewave

The problem with litewave's representation here is that the existence of the particular "concrete whole" is taken for granted. Srap demonstrates how this is not an acceptable starting place. The idea that we build universals through observation and abstraction from particulars, is just not consistent with what we really do. Abstract, "pure mathematics" shows that we dream up universal principles (axioms) first, from the imagination, or they come to us intuitively, then we try to force the particulars of specific circumstances to be consistent with the universals. If we cannot produce such consistency, the universals get rejected and replaced. What is neglected, or left out from litewave's representation, is that whenever we proceed toward comparing particulars, we do so with a preconceived standard, or rule, for comparison. A comparison without such a standard is impossible, therefore the standard must be prior to the comparison and cannot be properly represented as being produced from it.

This is the problem which Plato faced with Pythagorean Idealism, the question of how the reality of the particular individual, the "concrete object" is supported, justified, or substantiated. Litewave's suggestion, that a concrete particular is a collection of concrete particulars had already been demonstrated to be faulty because it was known to produce an infinite regress. The Idealists proposed that the existence of the particular is supported by the universal, the Idea, and this was seen to be necessary from the reality of the concept of "generation". When a particular being comes into existence, it is necessarily the type of being which it is, therefore the universal, or Idea, must precede in time, as a cause of existence of the particular. The universal must precede in time, the particular, in order for the particular to be caused to be the type of thing which it is.

The problem which Plato exposed is that the Pythagoreans supported their Idealism with the theory of participation, and this could not account for a causal relationship between the universal and the particular. A particular concrete entity is supposed to be the type of thing which it is, through the means of participating in the Idea. So Plato showed how, in this representation, the Idea is passive, while the particular thing is active, by actually participating in the Idea, and this cannot account for causation. Then, in "The Timaeus" he proposed an alternative whereby the Idea is actual, and acts to cause the reality of a particular concrete entity being the type of thing which it is, therefore the Idea acts to cause the existence of the particular thing.

I think that a general property without particular instances is an oxymoron because it is inherent in the meaning of "general" property that it is instantiated in "particular" instances. — litewave

Again, this is an example of your misrepresentation. We can and do imagine many general properties without any particular instances. That's obvious in mathematics.

The beauty, if I could call it that, is this: if the potential energy of a rock is 6 Joules, what it does/can do is fully accounted for by these 6 Joules it reportedly possesses. — Agent Smith

As I said, there is no equivalence, due to entropy, which is the supposed "energy" which is unavailable, neither potential nor kinetic.

Potential energy is simply stored energy we can tap. The word "potential" isn't to be understood philosophically, as antipodal to actual (vide Aristotle). What sayest thou? Just a poor choice of words, a misnomer, or a clue that something's not quite right? — Agent Smith

Potential energy is energy relative to a thing's position. Kinetic energy is energy relative to a thing's activity. Clearly there is a very substantial difference between kinetic energy and potential energy.

Usually the concept of work relates to a change of energy, kinetic or potential. When an object follows a path through a force field, if that field is conservative, the path the object takes from point A to point B is immaterial regarding work; all such paths produce the same work. This idea aligns with Cauchy's Theorem in complex analysis. — jgill

This may be true of potential energy, but since kinetic energy relates to the specific activity itself, we cannot say that the path the object takes is immaterial. And this is why potential energy and kinetic energy are essentially non-convertible, due to unaccountable losses like friction, etc., what is called entropy, so we have no perpetual motion. But the law of conservation might pretend that they are convertible.

I don't know if I agree with this. If I had a mechanical clock with a spring windup mechanism and it was fully wound, I would say the potential energy was within the clock, and in particular, within the wound spring. I wouldn't suggest it was floating within the clock or that it was somehow extractable from the spring so that it could exist separate and apart from the spring. — Hanover

If you followed what Frank said, you might start to see why I said "potential energy" really doesn't make any sense logically.

Consider, the definition of energy stated by , "the capacity to do work". As a "capacity", this means energy is fundamentally a type of potential. Now we qualify that with "potential", and we have the potential for a potential. Of course two potentials don't make something actual, but what does it make? What sense can you make of 'the potential for a capacity (potential)'? Is it the possibility of a possibility? But let's start simple, what type of existence can a potential be said to have, in the first place?

It's gravity, but gravity is understood as the property of another object. If you remove the other object which the gravity is the property of, then you have energy as an independent entity, existing as a property of space.

As per my high school physics sutra, energy is the capacity to do work. — Agent Smith

Now consider the difference between kinetic energy and potential energy. The former would be actually having the capacity to do work, and the latter would be having the potential to have the capacity to do work. The concept of "potential enrgy" really doesn't make any sense logically, but the use of it is what gives rise to the issue points us toward, where energy is seen as an entity in itself, rather than the property of an active object. When a thing has potential energy, that energy can only be understood as the property of something else. But it's easier just to ignore the requirement of something else, allowing the energy to exist as an abstract entity.

Anyway, I thought your argument was about accidental properties, not essential properties; that we might be wrong about the ball being red, not that we might be wrong about the ball being a ball. I don't see how the community could be wrong about what we call a "ball". Then again, I don't see how the community could be wrong about what we call "red". — Luke

I was talking about the reasons why we say that the ball is a "red ball", and we assume that it cannot not be red. because it is a red ball I think this is analogous to the reasons why we used to say that Pluto is a planet, and we would have been inclined, at that time, to say that it cannot not be a planet.

What object are you talking about here? — Luke

I don't see the relevance.

Yes, there is reasoning involved in teaching language. My point was that in teaching the meaning of the word "red" to someone, the teacher doesn't arrive at the meaning through "reasoning". The teacher knows how to use the word; they must, otherwise they couldn't teach it to someone. Recall that this was in response to your statement: — Luke

I don't see the relevance.

The teacher does not "impose on the ball that it cannot not be red, just because our reasoning says so." The teacher and other English speakers call it "red" because that's what we call it. — Luke

That's not what the issue was though. The issue was whether this particular ball which we classified as "red ball", because we thought it was that type of ball which could not be other than red, would still be the same object, this ball, if somehow it became apprehended as not red. We called it "red ball" because we thought it is necessarily red. But if it is demonstrated not to be a red ball, like Pluto was demonstrated not to be a planet, then we ought to accept that the reasoning by which we identified it that way was wrong, and not try to impose on the ball that it must be a red ball.

Teachers, and other English speakers called Pluto a planet, because that's what we called it. When the reasoning was demonstrated as faulty, these English speakers had to adjust. They did not insist that Pluto must be a planet because that's what we call it.

I just don't think that makes our purpose constitutive of the objects we interact with. I think they have to be there, as they are, for us to have the options we do, among which we select the one that aligns with our purpose. If you can sometimes sort papers by author and sometimes by keyword, depending on your purpose at the moment, it's because they have authors and keywords. If they didn't, these wouldn't be options for you. — Srap Tasmaner

It might be useful for you to reconsider this to some degree. We, as living human beings, have sensory systems which have evolved from nothing. That means that over the millions or billions of years of evolution which have produced our sensory systems, the sensory systems have been shaped and formed by what has proven to be useful. So the way that we perceive things, as objects, is a product of that usefulness. The important thing to note, is that unlike your example, alternative options for how we perceive things, are not there for us.

We have been forced into this mode of perceiving because it served some evolutionary purpose, and now it is a fixed part of our being, which we cannot opt out of. And as you mentioned in the other post, we just keep getting pesky scientific refutations. Science has provided us the means to get beyond the limitations of our sensory equipment. Plato's principal message was that the senses deceive us in our quest for truth, follow the intellect not the senses. And I suppose, through the presupposition of free will, we've managed to develop the intellect as an alternative option, under the notion that it can operate independently from the senses. In Aristotle's ethics, contemplation is the highest virtue.

So now we're back to Isaac's teapot and the missing screw. In that discussion, the question was only about successfully referring to a particular that (might or) might not possess a property you believe (or don't believe) it does. I think it's plain that you can; for some cases, I'm leaning on the causal theory of names, and for others on how demonstratives work: you can clearly demand someone get "that" off your kitchen table even when you know very little about what "that" is. Exactly how that works may be unclear; that it works, I believe, is not. (We may come back to the double-bind theory of reference eventually.) — Srap Tasmaner

I have no problem with referring to particular things, and this is because I accept the law of identity. The real problem is with change to a thing. How can the same thing at one time have a property which it does not have at a later time? Shouldn't this make it not the same thing? So Aristotle proposed the law of identity to say that a thing has an identity proper to itself, regardless of changes to it. It's just an assumption which we must make to allow for the observed temporal continuity of existence. There is said to be a relationship between what a thing actually is (provided for by form) and what it potentially is (provided for by matter). The thing itself is understood as a temporal continuity of this relationship. So issues like Theseus' ship become irrelevant because they propose a problem which is created by failing to properly respect the difference.

Also, I think that we need to respect the difference between an object and a subject. Predication is of a subject, not an object. So when you speak of an object for the purpose of predication, like "my kitchen table", you represent a perceived object as a subject "my kitchen table", and you proceed in predication. We talk as if we are referring directly to the object, but for the purpose of logical clarity it is best to maintain a separation between the subject with predications, and the object which is supposed to be represented. Then if problems arise, with temporal continuity for example, we can always inquire as to how well the name (subject) represents the object.

Here, we might start with the question of whether "being on my kitchen table" is a property of the object in question. It can be expressed as a predicate, as I've just done, but we could just as well express the situation as my kitchen table having the property of "having that on it," assuming again that "that" will manage to refer to the object. Or we could define a two-place predicate "on" such that "on" is true of an ordered pair <that, my kitchen table>. For either of the one-place predicates (of that, or of the table), I would be asking you to make something that is true of one of them false; for the two-place predicate, I would be asking you to make something that is true of the two of them false. — Srap Tasmaner

I would say that logically, you have two subjects, "my kitchen table", and "that", each assumed to be representing an object. And, you are not predicating anything of either of these two, but describing a relationship between them. The relationship you call "an order".

Do we say that "on" takes three objects, the two from before and a third that specifies the order? If so, the third would look something like this: "1 = thing, 2 = table". Such a list can be presented in any order, so we don't have a regress, only a rule about each natural number up to the arity of the predicate being used, so this is a genuine option. But our new on/3 takes two concrete objects and a third which, whatever it is, is not like that. I say "whatever it is," because the semantics of the ordering list are unclear at this point: are those objects in the list, or expressions referring to objects? I guess either would do, but we're still building in a lot of other stuff, some of which looks suspiciously abstract, so we could just give in and have "on" take a single abstract object which is the ordered pair <thing, table>. — Srap Tasmaner

I would say that the "order", or relationship is definitely not a type of object, being completely different from an object, as something inferred through logic and definiions rather than perceived through sensation. "On" is not used to refer to an object, so if we make a subject called "on", this subject does not represent an object, it represents a relationship between objects. And that relationship is defined in spatial terms, or mathematics, or something like that.

Can we do something similar with other cases? For instance, if my bike tire is flat, is it a different object once it's inflated, or is it just a different arrangement of tire and air, the tire itself never changing? (In this case, we may or may not have any specific batch of air in mind.) But then what would we say about the shape of the tire, that surely changes when it's inflated? If anything is a property of an object, surely its shape is. But I make different shapes when I sit and when I stand — does that make me a different person? What all of these examples have in common is that there are at least two different times considered: the tire is never flat and inflated at the same time, I am never sitting and standing at the same time, and so on. So a first attempt at distinguishing what is essential to an object from what is accidental is, naturally, distinguishing what is constant or invariant about it, what does not change from one time to another, and what does or can change from one time to another. Essential is what is time-less, and accidental is what is time-dependent. The same dog barks at one time and not at another. — Srap Tasmaner

i think you've touched on a completely different issue here, a more complex issue. This is the relation of parts to a whole. When we name an object it is composed of parts, and the object is considered to be a whole, consisting of parts. However, as Aristotle described, we speak of privations, and perfection in respect to the whole. So this is a sort of ideal which we impose, on the object. Your bike is more perfect when the tire is filled with air, even though it is still the same object, as having the same identity, regardless.

One solution offered, in a sort of conventionalist spirit, is that this is all a collective fiction: there are no things with identities that we come along afterward and refer to; rather, our various acts of reference, intended and accepted by us as such, and our deeming these acts successful, is all there really is here. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, I think I see this in the same way. The law of identity is a useful fiction, like mathematical axioms are. It allows us to talk about a thing's temporal extension, as a thing, thus making it into a subject. We could say that everything changes from one moment to the next, as time passes, therefore there is no such thing as an object with temporal extension. However, we notice that certain aspects appear to remain unchanged for durations, so we want to be able to talk about these things with duration as existent things. So we posit a law of identity which allows that there is something real which remains unchanged as time passes, this provides us with the basis for accounting for the reality of consistency, which is what scientific laws are built on.

That means there are two overlapping arguments here: one the one hand, the conventionalist can keep poking holes in whatever theory of object identity the other side comes up, because he needs no such theory anyway, and may even think no such theory is possible; on the other hand, the object-identitarian has to come up with a theory that works and show that it is needed, which means he also has to find some flaw in the conventionalist account of our referential speech acts — not for the sake of his theory but to show that some theory is even needed. What's not clear in any of this is how the evidence is to be handled: I'll venture that most people's pre-theoretical intuition is that we talk the way we do because things are the way they are, and that our talking the way we do is in fact evidence that things are the way we say they are.

But we have those pesky scientific refutations of how we talk: sunrise, solidity, and so on. That doesn't show that how we talk is never evidence of how things are, but it does show that it isn't always such evidence. On the other hand, the conventionalist can shift from the claim that how we talk is only evidence of how we talk, and nothing more only for methodological reasons, to a claim that how we talk is only we how talk — now meaning our agreement is precisely evidence that there is nothing more. — Srap Tasmaner

The way we talk is really not reflective of the way things are, that should be obvious. Talking is purpose driven, like a tool which conforms itself to what we are doing, so it's really more reflective of our intentions. That's why "meaning" might commonly be defined as "what is meant". But intention stands before us as a dark philosophical unknown, so people are often not inclined to look that way. This is why it takes a special way of talking, the scientific method, based in a special intention, to move toward an understanding of the way things really are, rather than simply following where natural language leads us. In other words, language needs to be disciplined if we desire to develop an understanding of reality.

If that were true, it would not only deny the object-identitarian what was counted pre-theoretically as evidence but change the character of what's to be explained by any such theory. If the mean girls call you a loser, that's just a thing they say: the truth-value of their statement matters to you, but not to them; what matters to them is producing some effect, of hurting your feelings. That's the sense in which it is "just something they say." But not only can you not conclude from someone saying something that it must not have a truth-value, in this case the effect is only produced if you assume that it does, and they assume that you will assume that it does. If they know you will discount what they say as being just mean-girl noise, or just noise period, there's no reason for them to say it. The conventionalist can retreat again and say that the hurt feelings are known inductively to follow utterances of "loser," and that's all the mean girls need. That might actually be true! But you have to show that such an account really will extend to cover all language use. This situation is so simple than I think what we're really seeing is not exactly language at all but something more like dominance signaling that happens to use language because, well, there it is; we tend to use words even when what we're doing is really nothing more than growling articulately. — Srap Tasmaner

Now, it should become clear that the concept of "truth" needs to be based in honesty, the use of language to honestly reflect one's intentions, rather than the notion of an objective truth value. There is no objective truth value, just like there is no thing with its own identity, even though I believe in that law of identity. I believe in it because it has proved very useful in helping us to communicate, and ultimately to help us understand the nature of reality, but I do not believe that it is very accurate, or a perfect representation, or 'true' in the sense of correspondence.

If the entire linguistic community agrees that this ball is "red", then how might our "reasoning" be wrong? What "reasoning" is involved when we teach someone how to use the word "red"? — Luke

There is actually many examples if you look for them. Someone, I believe it was Srap, earlier gave the example of Pluto being a planet. The linguistic community agreed to this, but it turned out to be wrong. We can also say for example that "the sun rises", and "sunrise" are misleading usage, and wrong, because the sun doesn't rise, the earth spins. There is clearly "reasoning" involved in teaching how to use words. One must decide how to approach the task. And the required technique differs depending on whether the student is beginner or advanced. Learning how to use "red" would generally be more toward the beginner level, prior to the complex logical concepts required for science and mathematics. I've never really taught language use, but I think the reasoning involved in teaching the use of "red", might involve deciding how to demonstrate the concept of colour, and deciding how to properly demonstrate a specific colour, "red". There are judgements which must be made.

Is this ball *this ball* if it is a different color? Is redness essential to it? For comparison, if this ball is flat, we can inflate it, and we will not usually say that being flat is essential to what the ball is, just its temporary state. — Srap Tasmaner

I think this is where things get sticky. In the case of a particular object, such as "this ball", each and every property is an essential property, that's what makes it the unique thing which it is, by the law of identity. That is the identity of the ball itself. But when we move to question "what the ball is", as " a ball", or "a red ball", we are assigning an identity to the object, which is distinct from the identity which the ball has, in and of itself, by the law of identity.

When talking about particulars, like this specific ball, we can't make modal claims, I think, without considering what is essential and what accidental about that particular. — Srap Tasmaner

I think it is important to note that there is no such distinction in the case of a particular. Each and every property of a particular must be understood as essential to that particular, that's what makes a particular a unique individual, distinct from every other particular. This is what the law of identity recognizes.

But it is nevertheless true that if it is flat, it is not fully inflated, and that's just the law of noncontradiction. When we say this red ball cannot not be red, are we even saying anything about the ball? Or are we only saying that at this world, as at all others, the law of noncontradiction holds? — Srap Tasmaner

So, let's maintain this distinction, between the identity the ball has, by the law of identity, and the identity which we assign to the ball, through a differentiation between essential and accidental properties. We've assigned essential properties, and have named the ball "red ball", with very good reasons, and we maintain that the ball cannot not be red, for those reasons. However, we need to maintain that the ball in itself might still turn out to be not red, if our reasoning turns out to be wrong. We can't just conclude that the ball cannot not be red because it would be contradictory, because we just have some reasons why the ball must be red, and those reasons might end up being wrong. We cannot impose on the ball that it cannot not be red, just because our reasoning says so, because our reasoning might be wrong.

So it's not even a case of asking whether the law of non-contradiction holds in this world, it's a case of asking do the reasons for calling the ball "a red ball" hold in this world. Then the question is whether the world described in which the ball must be red, corresponds correctly with the real world. But I would say that we must maintain always, the possibility that it does not. Therefore we ought to allow that the thing itself, with the identity it has within itself, could always be other than the identity we give it. So this would not be a case of violating the law of non-contradiction, it would be a case of us having a misunderstanding of the world.

Where this becomes difficult is with the assumption that everything must have an identity within itself. That is what Aristotle proposed, but Hegel for instance saw no necessity even for this principle. But if we relinquish the law of identity, then contradiction could inhere right within the world. It would not be necessary that the object has an identity within itself, and it could actually consist of opposing properties.

To say that there are no worlds at which this ball is both red and not red is to say almost nothing at all. There simply are no such worlds, no worlds at which any ball, this one or another, is both red and not red. If we deem the redness of this ball essential to it, there are no worlds at which this ball is not red, on pain of simply being a different object. If it is inessential that it is red, like being flat, then there are worlds at which it is blue, is green, is white, and so on. And that's what we mean when we say this ball 'might have been' some other color. — Srap Tasmaner

If we let go of the law of identity, then we allow for the possibility of a world in which the ball is both red and not red. Our logic dictates "there simply are no such worlds", but the real world does not conform to our logic, our logic must conform to the world. Therefore we must allow for the possibility that the law of identity is incorrect, and consequently the law of non-contradiction is irrelevant in some circumstances, and it is not accurate to say "there simply are no such worlds".

See, you say that if this were the case, it would be "a different object". But without the law of identity, there is no reason to believe that the real world even consists of objects. The real world might be 'a different world', outside all of the logically possible worlds, which rely on the law of identity. That's what the law of identity tells us, that the world consists of objects. But if the law of identity is wrong, and the world doesn't consist of objects, then we need a new principle by which we name things as objects, and insist that the law of non-contradiction must hold for these supposed objects.

We're in very different territory if there's a bin of red playground balls and you're grabbing one of those. In such a case, it's perfectly clear what we mean when we say you cannot pick a ball that is not red: there is no such a ball to pick. To say that you might get the one with "Zeppelin rules" scrawled on it in Sharpie, is to say there is a ball in the bin so adorned, and this inscription makes it unique; to say you might get one bearing those words, is to say this is a thing someone might have done, that it is possible someone has done it. — Srap Tasmaner

The point for you to recognize, I think, is that when we accept the law of identity, then we accept that any ball might be other than the way we name it. In fact, the object is designated as necessarily other than how we name it. That's what the law of identity recognizes, that we name it by essentials, not by accidentals, while accidentals are what gives identity to the individual. So any particular object, by the law identity, is necessarily inconsistent with how we identify it.

Now I have moved from the claim that we must accept the possibility that the world is other from how we describe it (above), to the claim that it is necessarily other than how we describe it. We do not identify the accidentals, but the accidentals are what are essential to the particulars. And since we do not acknowledge the accidentals, we cannot even name them as possibilities. They are unknown possibilities. And once we see the reality of unknown possibilities, then we must allow for possible worlds which are outside the realm of "logically possible", such as a world with no objects and no law of identity. "Possible worlds" is a restriction imposed by logic which is necessarily inconsistent with reality.

But how do we get necessity out of the law of noncontradiction? That if something is red, it cannot not be red? Since the law of noncontradiction holds at each world, restricting to worlds at which "The ball is red" is true automatically embodies the necessity we were looking for: for any world w in that set, the ball is red at every world accessible (under this restriction) from w. That's our definition of necessity. No world at which it is not red, or also not red, can sneak in. — Srap Tasmaner

The law of non-contradiction, in this sense, is just an artificial restriction imposed on possibility, by us. It only applies to produce a set of possible worlds which is created by our minds. But what the law of identity indicates to us, is that the real world is a world which is necessarily outside this set of possible worlds. The true identity of the particular is within the aspects (accidentals) which we ignore when we assign an identity to the object. Therefore the real world is necessarily inconsistent with the "possible worlds".

You say a lot of things I agree with, but apparently thinking that I don't, because there's still some confusion about the handling of "not." One point I think I clarified somewhere else is that in something like "The book is not red," we place the "not" before "red" purely as a matter of English convention, and because, with no other scope in play, there's no ambiguity. But that's still a proposition-level "not" and a more verbose way to say the same thing is "It is not the case that ball is red." It's sometimes convenient to pretend that "not red" is something we might predicate of an object, but it isn't really. "Not red" is not a syntactical element of the proposition at all, and therefore not a semantic unit either. "Red" is, as a predicate, and "not" is, as an operator on the entire proposition. "Not" doesn't apply to predicates or objects. As long as we keep in mind the logical form of what we're saying, I see no harm in using ordinary English, but I'll switch to "philosophical English" when there's ambiguity to be avoided. — Srap Tasmaner

Right, I think I follow this. Now let me tell you the issue I'm talking about, taking this simple example of "the book is not red". As it stands "not" is an operator which negates "the book is red". There is one necessity implied, i.e. it is impossible that the book is red. It is necessary that the book is not red.

Now, we want to move into a logical mode of possibility, and allow for a possibility that the book is red. So we relate "it is possible that the book is red", with "it is necessary that the book is red" in the ways that you describe. But what happens to the original, "the book is not red", or |
" it is impossible that the book is red" with this move? Because the new mode is the possibility that the book is red, we must exclude this option (it is impossible that the book is red), as not a possibility.

The question is whether it is a valid move to exclude the possibility that it is impossible that the book is red. Isn't this a real possibility which ought to be allowed for in discussing the possibility that the book is red? It is possible that it is impossible that the book is red. According to what you describe, it appears to me like the logical schema denies this possibility by saying that it opens a new category, the category of "not-red", and then we'd have to discuss the possibility of this. In this case "the book is not red" would mean "it is necessary that the book is not red", which would be an instance of predicating "not-red" of the book.

So the issue as I see it, is that I want to allow "it is impossible that the book is red" as a valid possibility, when we are talking about the possibility of whether or not the book is red. But the logical schema disallows this possibility. And, it is the logical schema which makes "not-red" into a distinct category of predication, thereby blocking this possibility. Therefore you cannot use that as an argument for why we ought to accept the logical schema, that if we allow "it is impossible that the book is red" as a valid possibility, it makes "not-red" into a category of its own, distinct from "red", rather than the negation of red, because that's just begging the question. From my perspective, that's just evidence that the logical schema is flawed. Instead of having "red" and "not-red" as the two extremes of one category, with all the possibilities lying between, it treats "red" and "not-red" as distinct categories of possibility, with no proper way of establishing a relationship between the possibility of each of these two.

You are making what I would consider a scope error. — Srap Tasmaner

It can't be me making the scope error, because it's your examples only, not mine. Am I making an interpretive scope error? Here's the example again:

(1) It is necessary that the book falls if and only if it is not possible that the book does not fall.

(2) It is possible that the book falls if and only if it is not necessary that the book does not fall.

"Not" seems to be used in two ways, but it really isn't; under this scheme it is always a proposition-level operator, just like "possibly" and "necessarily". You build necessary this way:

(1) The book is falling.
(2) It is not the case that (1), the book is falling.
(3) It is possible that (2), that it is not the case that (1), the book is falling.
(4) It is not the case that (3), that it is possible that (2), that it is not the case that (1), the book is falling.
(5) It is necessary that (1), the book is falling.

(5) is here just shorthand for (4). There is a single complete proposition (1), and three operators applied to that proposition, which we can abbreviate as a single operator.

This simplified usage of "not" avoids many confusions: you never predicate "not falling" of an object, you deny that it is falling; you never predicate "not possible" of a proposition, you deny that it is possible. By maintaining discipline in the treatment of "not", you avoid any possibility of confusing, say, "I know it's not Tuesday" and "I don't know it's Tuesday". We can be clear about the scope of the operators we apply to sentences, and we can be clear about the order in which we apply them, and we need not abide ambiguity. This is how we win. — Srap Tasmaner

Can you give me a simple explanation as to why you switch from talking about whether or not "the book falls" (future, or perhaps tenseless)), to "the book is falling" (present)?

The issue I pointed out with the dual use of "not" is that "it is not necessary that the book does not fall", the first (2), uses two senses of "not". "Does not fall" does not negate "fall", like "not necessary" negates "necessary". What "not" does in this case is stipulate that there is no real world activity of falling.

You assign a scope error to me, saying the following: "This simplified usage of "not" avoids many confusions: you never predicate "not falling" of an object, you deny that it is falling; you never predicate "not possible" of a proposition, you deny that it is possible." But it was you yourself who predicated "not" of "fall" in your statement: " (2) It is possible that the book falls if and only if it is not necessary that the book does not fall."

It appears to me, like you have created an illusion, by changing the temporal scope of the example. In the explanation you've switched from whether or not the book falls (indefinite temporal scope), to whether or not the book is falling (present time). This allows you to talk about the book not falling without directly predicating "not falling" of the object. But in the other case, there is no temporal scope, so what is at issue is never falling, the possibility that it is impossible for the book to fall, and this requires the denied predication.

Notice that with the restricted scope (present only) it is possible to talk about whether or not the book is falling, without predicating "not falling" of the object. But in the original example we cannot get to the possibility that "the book does not fall" without predicating "not falling" of the object.

This is the meaning of "impossible" which I am trying to bring to your attention, which your schema excludes. "It is impossible that the book is falling", or more properly said, "it is necessary that the book is not falling".

What happens in your explanation, is that by refusing to predicate "not falling" of the object, you put "not falling" outside the scope of what you are talking about, so that you are only talking about the book falling. By doing this you exclude the possibility of "it is necessary that the book is not falling". In other words, you exclude the impossible from your schema. Then "not falling" becomes something completely distinct from "falling", rather than the opposite of it.

Metaphysically speaking, I take these terms to mean:

1. Impossible = cannot occur
2. Possible = can occur
3. Necessary = must occur

This does not make "necessary" and "possible" the same. It opposes the concepts of 1 and 2 to each other, and the concepts of 2 and 3 to each other. This does not require "possible" to be in a distinct category. — Luke

Yes, that's exactly the problem. If (1) is defined as opposed to (2), and (3) is defined as opposed to (2), then (1) and (3) must have the very same meaning, by definition. Obviously though, "impossible" and "necessary" do not have the same meaning. Therefore we need a fix for this problem. My proposal was to put "possible" in a different category from "necessary" and "impossible" which are properly opposed, because "possible" I believe cannot be properly opposed to "necessary" due to our conception of "impossible"

You are making what I would consider a scope error. — Srap Tasmaner

I really do not think that this explains the issue. Allow me to describe the problem more clearly if you will. The issue is with the definition of "necessary". If we propose to define "necessary" in relation to possible, as you did in the last post, then we also have to allow that it has a relation to impossible. The same sense of "necessary", in common usage has a relation with possible and also a relation with impossible (not possible). So if we simply define "necessary" as opposed to possible then we do not provide an accurate (truthful) representation of "necessary" because we do not provide a position for impossible. "Impossible" has been excluded from having a position in the schema because necessary has been opposed to possible.

(2) It is possible that the book falls if and only if it is not necessary that the book does not fall. — Srap Tasmaner

So, look at this rendition of "possible", produced from your (1) where necessary was defined as opposed to possible. We can pinpoint the inaccuracy here. The phrase "it is not necessary that the book falls" is actually ambiguous because it implies (a) it is impossible that the book falls, and (b) it is possible that the book falls. I think you'll agree that (a) is very different from (b). However, your proposal excludes (b) by saying that we must allow (a) only, through definition.

What this proposal does is that it removes "impossible" from the schema through a faulty definition of "possible", induced by the prior definition of "necessary". Everything is either necessary or possible. There is no such thing as impossible. And this is very evident in what we refer to as "logical possibility", anything is possible. So "logical possibility", produced by this means, provides no real defined sense of "impossible", and this is why it does not provide us with a truthful or accurate representation of reality.

Now, we might account for this by saying that impossible is a form of necessary. This appears to be the most accurate way to go. But then we need to distinguish within our definition of "necessary", the difference between what necessarily is, and what necessarily is not. And, the real issue is that when we proceed from here to establish a relationship between each of these two and possibility, we have to respect the fact that one is the inverse of the other, so they cannot have the exact same relation. This inversion becomes very evident in probabilities. The more precise, or particular, the individual specific identified thing is, i.e. that which we want to relate to "necessary" (in its two senses of is and is not), the more certain we can be in the sense of is not, and the less certain we can be in the sense of is. This is why philosophical skepticism concerning claims about "what is", cannot be eradicated, while we can readily dismiss claims about "what is not", nothingness.

There are only two feelings, pain and pleasure, each with varying degree. — Mww

You start off with a false premise. "Feelings" are sensations and there is many different sorts of them, often involving neither pleasure nor pain. Consider sight, sound, or even taste which is a tactile sensation. Many tastes, like spices for example are neither pleasant nor painful. The same is the case for all the different senses, there are many different sensations which are neither pleasurable nor painful. The sense of touch for example, you can feel around, looking for something with your hand, or feeling your way in the dark, and these feelings are neither pleasurable nor painful, though they are informative. That a particular feeling is peasant, or painful, is a judgement.

Whether or not all that is granted, it nonetheless authorizes us to say judgements are limited as constituents of our moral disposition, in that because we are this kind of moral agent we will judge good and bad in this way. — Mww

Sure one's judgements are based on one's disposition, but generally speaking we judge good and bad according to how we were taught, not according to what we feel. That is what constitutes our moral disposition, how we've been trained, not how we feel. I don't know why you deny this. And this is how our moral judgements extend far beyond our personal feelings. We make moral judgements concerning principles which have no feeling about at all.

Now, again, best to keep in mind this kind of judgement is aesthetic, representing a feeling, as opposed to discursive, which represents a cognition. We often do good things that feel bad, as well as do bad things that feel good. From that it follows that the judgement of how it feels subjectively to do something, is very different than the judgement for what objectively is to be done. — Mww

I don't understand this. It seems to be completely inconsistent with what you've been saying. Perhaps you could explain. If "good" and "bad" are solely determined by what feels good, and what feels bad, how is it possible that one could do a good thing which feels bad, or a bad thing that feels good? And what do you mean by "the judgement for what objectively is to be done"? How does objectivity enter morality in your mind?

Simple example of how we do this, instead of all this concept juggling:

(1) It is necessary that the book falls if and only if it is not possible that the book does not fall.

(2) It is possible that the book falls if and only if it is not necessary that the book does not fall.

"Not" seems to be used in two ways, but it really isn't; under this scheme it is always a proposition-level operator, just like "possibly" and "necessarily". You build necessary this way: — Srap Tasmaner

You are just stating the same thing as the last post, in a different way, so the result is the same question i brought up at the end of the last post.

But "not" is definitely used in two different ways. When you say in (1), "not possible", "not" negates "possible" in the sense of proposing an opposite to "necessary". But when you say "does not fall", here "not" does not negate "fall" as an opposite to "fall" it simply says that the action does not happen. To say in particular, "a fall does not happen", and to say in general, "a fall is not possible", is to use "not" in two distinct ways. "Fall" is a verb, "possible" is an adjective. But the use of "not" is beside the point.

All you have here is the meaningless, circular definition, which I objected to earlier. "Necessary" is defined as "not possible", and "possible" is defined as "not necessary". But this is not truthful for the reasons I've given. "Necessary" is properly opposed to "impossible", as I've explained. And "impossible" cannot be opposed to "possible" because this would make "necessary" and "possible" the same. So we need to put "possible" in a place distinct from the category which contains those opposites, necessary and impossible.

I agree. — creativesoul

I know we've discussed this before. You believe self-deception is a nonsense concept.

If it isn't clear, the interdefinability of such operators means you only need one of them, but using the pair is way more convenient, and foregrounds how common and important two particular ways of using such an operator are. In other words, we could get by with just ▢ for a modal operator, and we would find ourselves writing formulas with ▢~, and ~▢, as well as unadorned ▢, but we would also find that we were writing one particular little phrase all the time: ~▢~. Same is true for ∀ and ∃: if we just used ∀, we'd have to write ~∀~ all the time. — Srap Tasmaner

What I see here, is that if we start with "necessary" under the definition provided by Luke, as "must be", then we need an opposing term which would be "not necessary", and this would provide a rendition of "possible" by Luke's reckoning. However, we also have "necessarily not", and this is a rendition of "impossible". And, we can oppose "impossible" (as necessarily not) with "not necessarily not", and we now have an alternative rendition of "possible", which is opposed to "impossible". So we have here two very distinct renditions of "possible", Luke's is opposed to necessary, as not necessary, and the other is opposed to necessarily not (impossible) as not impossible.

Notice though, that "necessary" and "necessarily not" (impossible), are both forms of necessity. That's why I class them together (like hot and cold), as the two extremes of necessity, under the category "necessary". In the terms of ancient logic, these opposing terms are being and not being, is and is not. Then I propose another name, "possible" which we use to refer to all things outside this category. We can say that the things within the category are things known with certainty, what is and is not, while the things outside this category are the unknowns. Possibilities, whether logical possibilities (could be), or ontological possibilities (may be, as becoming), are the unknowns.

In my representation, the negative sandwich is exposed as a sort of misnomer. The first "not" in "not necessarily not", and "not possibly not", is not used in the same senses as the last "not". This is because the second "not" has been given an elusive referent. What does "necessarily not" or "possibly not" really mean? They are both predications, requiring a subject to give them real meaning. And when we allow for the subject we see that "necessarily not" is just a form of "necessary", and "possibly not" is just a form of "possible". So the negative sandwich is just an unnecessary obfuscation which distracts from the reality that what we are talking about has lost the assurance of certainty, because we have removed ourselves from the realm of the necessary, to talk about the possible. The form of "necessary" employed, now called "necessarily not", is opposed to "possible", as "possibly not", just like Luke's rendition, and is no longer opposed to "necessarily so".

This is done by taking the opposite of necessary, necessarily not (impossible), and proposing it as an independent form of necessary independent from its opposite. So the question is whether this is a valid move, to take the opposite of necessary, i.e. what is not (necessarily not, or impossible), and separate it from what is (necessary), and place it into the category of "possible", as a valid form of certainty. Can we import certainty into the category of the unknown in this way? So let me ask you this, can we determine what is not, without reference to what is? We can in principle describe what is, without reference to what is not, but can we describe what is not, without reference to what is? That I think is what is required to separate "necessarily not" from its true opposite, "necessary", and produce a new category in which it is opposed to "not necessarily not".

We have to be able to say that what is cannot not be without falling into a modal fallacy of treating all truths as necessary. — Srap Tasmaner

I’m pretty sure I’m not committing that fallacy, but I can see how MU most likely is. — Luke

We start by opposing necessary with impossible. Fine, no problem. But then we need to give "possible" a position, because "possible" provides a truthful description. It appears like "possible" ought to be opposed to "impossible". But it also appears like "possible" ought to be opposed to "necessary". And those two are already opposed to each other, so the real problem begins.

Best to recognize that I cannot reject that this is a bus when I already have experience of busses, which manifests as a blatant self-contradiction, in just the same way I cannot reject the feeling of moral reprehensibility, but without ever having the experience of an object by which a self-contradiction would arise. This is sufficient to prove feelings are not cognitions, from which follows that moral knowledge is a misnomer. Further support resides in the fact that I may know this is true now yet find later this is no longer known as true, a function of experience in which I must cognize something, but that for which I feel as moral will always be what I feel is moral, as a function of personality, for which no cognitions are necessary. — Mww

We're too far apart on this issue to even start discussion. There's too much I disagree with here. To begin with, I believe that morality consists of judgements of good and bad, not feelings, as you seem to think. There is some merit to your position though, because some feelings are naturally desirable and others we naturally desire to avoid. So it appears at first glance like morality might just be based in whether a feeling is desirable or not. But on a closer look at what morality really consists of, we can see that it involves knowing when and where to seek desirable feelings, and knowing when and where to put up with undesirable feelings. Therefore morality cannot be based solely in feelings, it must also involve knowing when and where specific feelings are appropriate. The problem is that morality is not one or the other, feelings or knowledge, it's complex, and both.

we should find that it is impossible to be dishonest with oneself. — Mww

I do not agree with this. There are many forms of dishonesty, and some of them are applicable to oneself. The common example, lying might appear to be impossible to do to oneself, but there are many subtle forms of dishonesty, like withholding information. And we do this to ourselves often. I might tell myself that I can proceed with a project without proper research first. That's a type of laziness, and laziness is often a case of being dishonest with oneself. Sometimes we know what needs to be done, safety precautions, or something like that, but we dishonestly tell ourselves that it's not required this time. The desire for simplicity, in what is a complex situation, can produce dishonesty. We are dishonest with ourselves in many subtle ways when we follow our feelings and proceed into doing what we know is morally wrong. Sometimes this amounts to what is called rationalizing. But you probably won't agree to these examples because you don't think morality involves knowledge anyway.

Nobody but you uses "necessary" to mean "no longer possible". — Luke

It is actually the common philosophical definition of "necessary", the opposite of impossible. This is why I strongly objected to your proposal to oppose necessary with possible. It is completely inconsistent with conventional philosophy which opposes necessary to impossible. When necessary is opposed to impossible, then possible is completely outside this category. So I said, whatever is necessary or impossible, as dictated by past time, can no longer be considered possible.

This fails to answer whether the original event was necessary or merely possible in the first place. — Luke

Well of course it does not answer that question. No one was trying to answer that question, it's an assumption we make, as part of a world view. What I was doing was attempting to define terms, and under those definitions, it makes no sense to speak about a future event as "necessary".

There is however another use of "necessary" a completely distinct meaning, which we do apply to future events. This is "necessary" in the sense of what is judged as needed as a necessity, for the sake of fulfilling a goal. These necessities are the means to the end. The means are determined as necessary in relation to the end, then the act is carried out. So we judge the possibilities, determine which possibilities are required for our goals, and we say that these things are "necessary". We then act on these possibilities which have been designated as "necessary", and the acts come into existence and become "necessary" in the other sense, as the opposite of impossible.

Whoa! Do I get some sort of prize for bringing this about? — Srap Tasmaner

I'll hand it to you. What do you want for a trophy?

And that's not crazy: counterfactual reasoning is famously dicey; but it is just as famously indispensable — Srap Tasmaner

I think the reason why counterfactual reasoning has become so successful is that we have a very good capacity to control and replicate precise circumstances in scientific experimentation. When we replicate an experiment, it's very similar to going back in time to the same situation over again. Then we can change one particular thing and look at the difference in outcome. And we can repeat, changing something else. After we get familiar with how the particular changes affect the outcome, we can simply apply the counterfactual logic instead, without actually redoing the experiment.

Or, consider this: we don't actually act upon the future directly either; that too, we are incapable of doing. We can only act in the present to select which possible future is realized. But every time we do that, we are also, immediately, filling the past with events of our choosing. The past is what we have some say-so in, never the future. — Srap Tasmaner

I believe this is the most accurate description you've provided. We don't act on the future, nor do we act on the past, we act at the present. The past is filled with events which we've 'had some say in'. Notice the difference between this and what you said, "the past is what we have some say-so in". This is the main contention with Luke. Once it's in the past, we can no longer have an influence on it, so we cannot truthfully say we have some say in it, it's necessary. And, since as you say "We can only act in the present to select which possible future is realized", the present is the most significant aspect of time for us.

Now you also agree that it's only events of the past that are immutable in this way, right? Events in the future are not only not immutable, they're not even fully determined; and the present, well, the present is presumably the moment of an event being fully determined and thereby becoming immutable. — Srap Tasmaner

So we have this issue, the present, which you call "the moment of an event being fully determined and thereby becoming immutable". At this supposed "moment" of the present, events are neither possible (future), nor are they necessary (past), they are "becoming". And this is where logical categories tend to fail us. If we are categorizing past as necessary, and future as possible, then we have to name the intermediate. We could for example use "actual" here, meaning "of the act". But how do we deal logically with things which are of the act itself? If, as you say, the act is when things are being "fully determined",

The glaring problem is that acts always require time, and some parts of the same act are determined prior to other parts of that act. And the length of an act depends on how we identify the particular act. We might divide it in two for example, saying the beginning is the cause, and the end is the effect. So the result is that any identified act consists of aspects which are necessary, and aspects which are possible, and we might find that there is always at the fringes, at the boundaries of what is necessary, always some possibilities which are not "fully determined", such that an act can never be properly said to be "fully determined" in the absolute sense. Conversely, we have the similar argument against free will, that since the human being's capacity to act is very restricted, we do not have "free" will in any absolute sense. This would be because any act identified as a possibility, already has some necessary features. Now events which are occurring at the present contain both necessity and possibility.

Since there is always some degree of possibility intermingled with what we want to say is fully determined, and some degree of necessity intermingled with what we want to say is possible, this implies that the present, what is "actual", really exists as an intermingling of the future and the past. We might call this an overlap. At any precise time in which we make an observation, some aspects of reality are already in the past, necessary, and some are in the future, possible. So the difficulty we have in understanding the nature of reality, is in establishing that relationship between what is necessary, and what is possible. And if some logical axioms deal with possibilities, and others deal with necessities, how could we truthfully relate these two?

And all of this is still circling around the problem of truth, because the past is the paradigmatic realm of truth, eternal and unchanging, while there is no truth about the future and for that reason no knowledge but only belief. — Srap Tasmaner

I do not think that this is a correct representation of "truth". That is what Aristotle proposed, there is not truth concerning things not yet decided, like the sea battle tomorrow, and we ought not attempt to apply truth here, applying it only to things of the past. But we can see that this proposal was firmly rejected by the monotheist community, who associate Truth with God. And God in the Old Testament was associated with the present, "I am that I am".

So it may be more productive to associate truth with the present, what is now, at the current time. And here we have the much more difficult and complex issue of understanding how the past is related to the future.

Seems an awful lot like the same thing, doesn’t it? — Mww

It's not really the same thing, because you describe all decision making as based in some sort of "logic". But I describe "logic" as a specialized form of decision making, which shares in something which all forms of decision making have, but we do not really know what it is. So instead of claiming that all decision making uses logic, I say it uses something else, which logic also uses, but we do not really understand what it is.

Same point as just the innate capacity for empirical knowledge doesn’t contain any. — Mww

But then you are not saying that empirical knowledge is innate, you are saying that the capacity for empirical knowledge is innate. But in the case of morality, you seem to think that moral knowledge is itself innate, what one feels is right, is right. Which do you really believe, is the capacity for moral knowledge innate, or is moral knowledge itself innate?

Truth, as such, is every bit as subjective as one’s moral disposition and experiences. — Mww

That's what I've been trying to get at since the binging of the thread. The idea that truth is some sort of objective independent thing is really just a ruse. That idea leads us down the garden path, you might say, leaving us lost, and with nowhere to turn for guidance concerning what truth really is. So to understand truth we must proceed in the other direction, into the subject, and I see the starting point as honesty, because this is a common use of "truth". And this begins with ridding oneself of self-deception concerning faulty notions of truth.

That does not explain why present/past situations are necessary; or why it is necessary that I had to have toast instead of cereal for breakfast this morning. — Luke

You are simply misrepresenting what I said (as is your usual habit) to continue with a strawman argument. I didn't say that it was necessary that you had to have toast instead of cereal. To the contrary, I said that was a choice you made from real possibilities. What I say, is that now, after you've had toast, it is impossible to change that fact, so it is necessary. So I'll repeat, though I doubt it will affect your strawman, before the act, it is possible, after the act, it is necessary.

I am resisting your "proposal" because if we have a real choice in the matter, like you say we do, then it was not necessary that I had toast instead of cereal for breakfast this morning. I had a real choice to have had cereal instead of toast. That is, the past situation of me having toast for breakfast this morning was not necessary. I am using "necessary" here in the sense of "inevitable" or "predetermined", as opposed to having a "real choice" in the matter — Luke

I agree with all this. You had real choice in that act. What I am saying is that after the act, after you had toast for breakfast, you no longer have that choice. It is impossible, at this time, after you had toast, to decide not to eat the toast you already ate. Since it is impossible for you to change this, it is a necessity, i.e. it is necessary.

We believe we can make a distinction between events that were bound to happen, and events that were not; in which case, there must be a difference between (1) saying, at a time B or later, that nothing can happen that will make it so that the coffee has not fallen, and (2) saying at a time A or earlier, nothing can happen that will make it so that the coffee does not fall. To say that an event in the past was not inevitable, is to say that (1) is true of it but (2) false. — Srap Tasmaner

Right, this would be my position, (1) is true but not (2).

Is there any non-question-begging way to deny this is possible? We cannot, ex hypothesi, object that an event in the past at time X is in the past for any time after X; the hypothesis is exactly that this is not so. In what, then, does the immutability of the past consist? Is it brute fact? Could it conceivably not be? — Srap Tasmaner

The immutability of the past is just a brute fact, which is upheld by empirical evidence, like gravity, the freezing point of water, etc.. Sure we can say that it is logically possible to change the past, just like we can say that it is logically possible to defy gravity, and we simply ignore all empirical evidence when proposing such "logical possibilities". These might even have purpose like hypotheticals or counterfactuals. But that's why there is potentially an infinite number of possible worlds, we can propose any sort of logically possible world, so long as it's not inconsistent or contradictory. Where this might become a problem is if we give priority of importance to what is logical possible over what is physical possible. Then a person might be inclined to say that because something is logically possible it must be true, without regard to whether it is physically possible.

f it was ever possible to prevent the cup of coffee from falling off the car, then at no time is it, was it, or will it be necessary or inevitable that it did fall. — Luke

As I've explained, this response indicates that you do not respect the reality of time. You say, what was once a possibility will always be a possibility. But that ignores the fact that things change as time passes, including possibilities. So it is very often the case that an event which was a possibility at time A, is not a possibility at time B. I think it is really inconsistent with our lived temporal experience to insist as you do, that an event which is truthfully described as "possible" at one time cannot be truthfully described as "necessary" at another time. You do not have to be a rocket scientist to know that possibilities have a window of opportunity.

That being said, I agree moral rules are much more important than conventional rules, but that alone says nothing with respect to their logical ground..... — Mww

Right, now the issue is how are logical rules grounded.

If it should be the case that the human intellectual system, in whichever metaphysical form deemed sufficient for it, is entirely predicated on relations, it should then be tacitly understands that system is a logically grounded system, insofar as logic itself is the fundamental procedure for the determination of relations. Hence it follows, it being given that all rules are schemata of the human intellectual system, and the human intellect is relational, then all rules are relational constructs. From there, it’s a short hop to the truth that, if all rules are relational, and all relations are logically constructed, and all logical constructs themselves are determinations of a fundamental procedure, then all rules are logical rules. — Mww

As I said in the last post, I think you have this backward. Logic is a highly specialized, formal way of thinking. So using rules is the more general category, and logic is a specific type of this broader category of activity. Therefore I think not all rules are logical. There are many rules which are not logical at all.

The question now is, if we break rule behaviour into subgroups, like the categories you did, conventional rules and moral rules, which does logic fall into? Or is it a distinct group on its own?

Logical principles are neither moral nor immoral. Morality is an innate human condition, determinable by logical principles which relate a purely subjective desire to an equally subjective inclination. In other words, this feels right, therefore it is the right thing to do and I shall will an act in accordance with it. — Mww

I don't at all agree with this. What would be the point of moral training if morality is innate? I agree that the capacity to be moral is innate, but this must be cultured to produce a moral character. I believe it is very clear that morality is not based in what feels right. I suppose these opinions are outside the scope of this thread.

For example, if I had a real choice of whether to have toast or cereal for breakfast this morning, then it was not necessary that I had toast (as I did) because I could have had cereal instead. — Luke

Right, at that prior time it was not necessary. However, at this posterior time it is necessary. Human beings have a completely different attitude toward acts in the past, in comparison to their attitude toward acts in the future. You seem to be refusing to account for the reality of time in the human attitude, and the difference between prior and posterior. Here is an explicit example from your earlier post.

If the former, then what is actual is/was not necessary. — Luke

See, you explicitly conflate "is" and "was". There is a reason why we have different tenses for verbs, if you insist on ignoring this, then this discussion is pointless.

You refuse to acknowledge this argument against the necessity of actuality. — Luke

How so? I've responded to your supposed argument. It is simply based in a failure to recognize the difference in temporal perspectives. Looking ahead in time at future acts, is not the same as looking backward in time at past acts. Therefore, within the minds of human beings, future acts have a different status from past acts.

If you are ready to accept this difference then we might be able to proceed by applying some names to describe the difference. I propose that we look at future acts as "possible", and past acts as "necessary". You are resisting this. Can you explain why? Your argument so far seems to be that if we name past acts as "necessary", then future acts must also be called "necessary". But as I've explained, that is to ignore the difference between how we look at the past and how we look at the future.