You should probably familiarize yourself with those arguments, since they are becoming more and more
prevalent. — Joshs
Dennett is a good example of someone who has been strongly influenced by Wittgenstein. I dont think his view of rationality is what you think it is. Certainly it isnt compatible with your direct realism. — Joshs
But his approach to the rational simply doesnt grasp how it is that the rational is embedded with a frame of interpretation that gets turned on its head when paradigms shift. — Joshs
Think of an empirical theory as being like one of those optical illusions where you can either see the young woman or the old woman but not both at the same time. A gestalt shift is required to make one or the other appear. Now think of the individual facts comprising the body of an empirical theory as akin to the points within the picture. Notice that as one shifts from the old woman to the young woman, the role that all of the features of the picture play change their meaning. What was a line in one image becomes something else in the other image. — Joshs
In the same way, when a paradigm undergoes a gestalt shift , all of the subordinate facts it contains change their meaning in the new paradigm. The choice of which paradigm to pick becomes one of aesthetic and pragmatic preference rather than ‘rationality’ since each paradigm is describing different facts. — Joshs
That's a rational progression of events, predicated on inductive data gathering. Again, hinge propositions are rationally developed, and rationally changed. — Garrett Travers
I’m not trying to insult you , just get you to realize that dismissing out of hand the ideas of a thinker like Wittgenstein as ‘mystical’ and ‘out of touch with reality’ shows not just a complete lack of familiarity with his work but a poor grasp of where cognitive psychology and cognitivr neuroscience is heading. — Joshs
Tell me, could you use the article for your argument while at the same time doubting that it was in English? — Banno
Or we might take the fallibalist approach, and claim that we are working on the assumption that the article is in English in order to make the argument, and that we will do so until there is sufficient evidence that the article is not in English... At which point I will probably reach for the poker. — Banno
I simply do not like the mystic's conclusions. — Garrett Travers
Again, actually assess what I am saying, so that we don't waste time on debating phantoms. — Garrett Travers
But, the idea that they cannot be challenged or put under rational scrutiny is bizarre. — Garrett Travers
155. In certain circumstance a man cannot make a mistake. ("Can" is here used logically, and the proposition does not mean that a man cannot say anything false in those circumstances.) If Moore were to pronounce the opposite of those propositions which he declares certain, we should not just not share his opinion: we should regard him as demented.
Your model of rationality seems to revolve around the notion that you can peel data and evidence apart from
the theoretical edifice that makes sense of them. — Joshs
But Kuhn’s argument is that what constitutes evidence and data is dependent on the larger framework of interpretation. For someone without a background in modern or Newtonian physics, what constitutes
data for the later will be utterly invisible to them. — Joshs
There is no empirical object apart from
some account or other , no fact of the matter independent of a value system. — Joshs
interpretationism provides a penetrating critique of objectivism that is worth pursuing in some detail. To be objective, the interpretationist points out, one would have to have some set of mind-independent objects to be designated by language or known by science. But can we find any such objects? Let us look at an extended example from the philosopher Nelson Goodman. — Joshs
The objectivist, however, demands, "What are points really?" Goodman's response to this demand is worth quoting at length: — Joshs
But what is it that is so organized? When we strip off as layers of convention all differences among ways of describing it, what is left? The onion is peeled down to its empty core. — Joshs
The accusation of mysticism might be a result of a misguided reading of the notion of silence, or of Wittgenstein's scantly articulated thoughts on religion and ethics. — Banno
155. In certain circumstance a man cannot make a mistake. ("Can" is here used logically, and the proposition does not mean that a man cannot say anything false in those circumstances.) If Moore were to pronounce the opposite of those propositions which he declares certain, we should not just not share his opinion: we should regard him as demented.
You might do the same. In the interest of avoiding mere acrimony, might we not agree that it would be odd to call into question such things as that we are here using English and the internet? — Banno
Every single proposition, not matter how coherent, is sibject to valid argumentation and scrutiny. The paper I sent you is excellent on this subject. — Garrett Travers
Yes, in the paper you referred, the author argues, as I do, that there is no reality to "hinge propositions" as described by Wittgenstein. A real "hinge proposition" would have to be something completely different from what Wittgenstein describes. — Metaphysician Undercover
157. Suppose a man could not remember whether he had always had five fingers or two hands? Should we understand him? Could we be sure of understanding him?
158. Can I be making a mistake, for example, in thinking that the words of which this sentence is composed are English words whose meaning I know?
Here's the point I'm making with his next statement: the conformity with mankind bit, is mankind's creation. Not the other way around. If I make a mistake in conformity with MY standards, I am still making a mistake, and have now added MY standard to the "conformity" of which Wittgentein spoke. — Garrett Travers
I'd say that such would be correct, if we were to accept Wittgenstein's assertion that hinges are not open to rational confirmation, or falsifiability. From that perspective, there is no such thing as a hinge proposition. And such is logically valid because there aren't any propositions that are not up for either. All are subject to both. Or else, logic simply has no point at all. — Garrett Travers
SO where do you think mysticism enters into this discussion?
I'm not following your argument. — Banno
Wittgenstein's notion of "hinge proposition" is really useless. All propositions are "hinges"; "hinge" describes the use of a proposition. Some propositions just have a bigger weight hanging on them than others do. As time passes, and they hang around for a while, more and more stuff gets hung on them. — Metaphysician Undercover
I don't understand what you are saying here. Perhaps you can bring in more of Wittgenstein's language that you object to for the purposes of clarification. Or maybe you could show how the article you linked to relates to passages in Wittgenstein's text. — Paine
Now what you have said does not mesh with what I understand of what Witti is describing.
He is quite explicit in saying that what counts as a hinge changes over time - the riverbed analogue.
Further, they are not mere observation. Hinge propositions are inherent in actions. They are the things taken as true in order to engage in a given activity. Hence the two quotes cited by myself above...
So the link to neuroscience, at the least, would need considerable explanation. Neuroscience is doing a very different thing to Wittgenstein. That's not to say there could be no overlap, but that would be a grand enterprise. — Banno
Hinge propositions are predicated on facts accrued by humans through data gathering and analysis — Garrett Travers
The presupposition of belief is not necessarily a factor. — Garrett Travers
I am radically skeptical about everything for which there is no, or little evidence of. — Garrett Travers
Wittgenstein said as much. — Paine
A factor of what? People more or less agreeing that some things happen but others don't? Common sense versus some other kind? Wittgenstein seems to be militating against a set of propositions being the last word on why propositions are used. The propositions in question are not like the many used to convince people of something despite good reasons to doubt them. — Paine
Wittgenstein is asking what evidence is or looks like in this text. He may be more skeptical than you are. — Paine
Is this what the beliefs are propositional debate is in relation to, by the by? — Garrett Travers
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.