Designating the intellect as the part of the human being nearest the divine, rather than assuming the soul as nearest the divine, is a very good example of the mistake described by the classic saying of "putting the cart before the horse".

Not really. There are many things in a medium that can be redundant, distracting (e.g., as I mentioned, drums and vocals in metal music), or not an essential part of the narrative ("essential" here is subjective, dictated by the appreciation of the reconstructionist). — thaumasnot

I wouldn't agree with your interpretation of metal music. Drums are essential to all rock music, setting the intricacies of the rhythm. And in metal music, drums not only set the rhythm but they fill the space for the effect of varying volume densities, which is essential to that genre. That's why compression is not a simple tool for the engineer, and is often avoided. "Loudness" is actually a tricky concept. And vocals are essential to set the attitude. Why concentrate on the guitar, when it all sounds the same from one piece to the next? But that's just personal taste.

Undoubtedly, music. Then, on par, I'd go with text, movies, comics. Then groups of paintings (triptychs). Last would be standalone paintings. So you can guess that the main criterion is the ability to lay out a narrative temporally. Music is first because it's a focused and still very malleable medium. In theory, movies should be first, but in practice they are not (the medium is comically under-exploited IMO). — thaumasnot

I can see why music suits the style, because it is the classic temporal art form, and your interpretation is based in narrative. Narrative is a temporal expression.

I think we already are at a higher level than most other creatures. If you seriously believe that man can elevate himself to higher levels of consciousness by identifying with earthworms and snails, then perhaps your real difficulty is not metaphysics but psychology. — Apollodorus

The goal of "higher levels of consciousness" is your principle, not mine. It's the one I dismissed as unacceptable. So this statement is not at all relevant. I do not seriously belief that man can, or ought to try, to elevate himself to higher levels of consciousness.

Essentially, what Plato is saying is that the embodied person is an image of its own disembodied self, and the disembodied self is an image of Creative Intelligence or Creator-God. — Apollodorus

I really don't see how an embodied person be can an image of a disembodied self. Embodied and disembodied do not at all resemble each other, so one cannot be an "image" of the other. Think of a physical sign, like a word, or a numeral "2'' for example. The physical symbol is in no way an image of the immaterial idea. That the material is an image of the immaterial is a misunderstanding. Yes there is a relation between the material and the immaterial, and we may say it's a type of representation, but it is not a relation of imaging. This is just a continuation of your backward way of looking at things.

I have already given lucid dreams as a clear illustration of how man can consciously ascend to higher cognitive states by transcending lower ones. And in exactly the same way the subject can stay awake and conscious during a lucid dream, it can also do so during deep, dreamless sleep, the result being pure unaffected awareness. — Apollodorus

Your phrase was "pure unaffected intelligence". Lucid dreaming is simply a matter of a person having some conscious control over one's dreams. How is this even related to "intelligence"?

Awareness is always there, that’s why we are conscious, intelligent living beings. — Apollodorus

There's a big difference between being conscious and being intelligent. Not all cases of being conscious involve being intelligent. That's the difference between other animals and human beings, which Wayfarer refers to. I don't deny the reality of this difference, I just deny the significance which Wayfarer assigns to the difference. If you want to make being conscious the same as being intelligent, then on what basis would you even start to talk about different levels of consciousness?

What we need is not to experience the consciousness of a mollusc but a consciousness that is higher than the one we already have. As I said, consciousness is always there. — Apollodorus

This doesn't make any sense to me. If consciousness is always there, as a property, how can you assume a higher consciousness and a lower consciousness? Suppose green is always there, there are things which are always green. What would constitute a higher green and a lower green?

It's having consciousness plus something else, intelligence for example, which produces something higher. So if we want something higher than consciousness plus intelligence, it's not a higher level of either one of these that we are looking for, but another power, a new power, to add on to these.

It is thanks to this unifying property of consciousness that man seeks to unify, organize, and expand his knowledge of himself and of the world around him. Self-knowledge or self-awareness is the core around which consciousness establishes its entire field or sphere of awareness and knowledge. This applies to human consciousness as much as to divine consciousness. — Apollodorus

It appears like you do not even distinguish between consciousness and self-consciousness. Perhaps if you did, you would see that these two are not different "levels of consciousness", but self-consciousness is just a special type of consciousness. You have stated no value principle to show that self-consciousness (being conscious of oneself) is higher than consciousness of any other type of object. A bird is conscious of the twigs it builds a nest out of, a beaver is conscious of the logs it builds a dam of. Why would being conscious of oneself be a higher type of consciousness? What purpose does this serve?

Aristotle’s logic is as follows:

(A). God is thinking what is best.
(B). God is best.
(C). Therefore God is thinking himself.

And, as above, so below. Substitute "higher consciousness" for "God" and you get the idea. — Apollodorus

Obviously, that's a vicious circle created by begging the question. The higher consciousness only thinks about what is best. The higher consciousness is best. Therefore the higher consciousness only thinks about itself. Notice the premise which begs the question "the higher consciousness is best". You've presented selfishness as if it were good.

My personal view is that every philosophical work can be, and should be, interpreted on more than one level according to each reader’s intellectual and spiritual capacity.

However, as I said before, those who choose to see nothing in Aristotle aside from superficial and irrelevant things like “circular motion” are free to do so. — Apollodorus

The problem with your position is, that you reject the volumes of intelligent, logical, scientific, and philosophical principles Aristotle put forward, because they are inconsistent with the principles you accept, principles derived from the irrelevant and faulty intuitions of circular motion and circular thinking.

There's no room in your rambling account for what Aristotle would call the 'prime mover' or first cause, later understood to be God. In other words, your account is entirely naturalist. It is utterly devoid of metaphysics. — Wayfarer

As I explained, Aristotle's "prime mover", as eternal circular motions, is a faulty intuition. And my account is not devoid of metaphysics, it is a naturalist metaphysics, just like Aristotle's is if you dismiss the nonsense of the unmoved movers. Since the natural is prior to the artificial, and the artificial is dependent on the natural, as a feature of it, (according to what has been already explained), then any good metaphysics must be based in the natural rather than the artificial. But this does not mean that we cannot take principles learned from the nature of the artificial, like final cause, free will, and intention, and apply then toward understanding the natural. Afterall, the artificial is a feature of the natural.

It's all hot air to you, ain't it? — Wayfarer

Yes it is all hot air, because there is a faulty premise in this passage, and that is that the intellect is the divinest part of us. It's not, the soul is the divinest part. And, as I've argued in this thread, by Aristotle\s own principles there is a material separation between the soul and the intellect. The soul is prior to the material body, the intellect posterior. Once we recognize that this premise is faulty, then we cannot say that the virtue proper to the divinest part is contemplation, because the intellect is not the divinest part. And when we look at the soul as the divinest part, we see that the virtue proper to it is the creation of potential, as the vast array of possibilities which we observe to inhere in all the different life forms as their various powers.

So when we look at the human being, we see that contemplation contributes to the creation of potential, but it does not fulfill this on its own. The human being must act on its thoughts, through the means of its material body, to actual produce any potentials which are thought about. Therefore contemplation itself, cannot be the highest virtue.

These are both types of relationships. A couple can be married (unites) and then divorced (separates) and both are types of relationships between them. You could be sitting right next to me or across the country and that is a relationship between you and I. — Harry Hindu

The divorce does not separate them, it still describes a unity, but it also puts a temporal constraint on that unity by saying that it has ended.

In measuring the space between individuals are you not establishing a relationship between them? That's what a measurement is - a relationship. — Harry Hindu

People do not 'measure the space' between things, they measure the distance between them. So yes, by measuring the distance between them you are establishing a relationship, and this is inherently a unity between them. You are making them both one predicate of the same subject (which is the unity of the two) by saying that the two exist with such a distance between them. Measuring the distance between them is not to posit a space between them which is being measured, it is to posit a principle of unity between them, the act of measurement unites them.

The problem I find is that in many cases the whole narrative might be arbitrary, imaginary, fictional, simply made up. Like in my analogy of a photograph, or still painting, there is absolutely no objective narrative in that medium, because there is no temporal extension, regardless of whether it's a snap shot of an action scene, as a narrative requires temporal extension. So whatever narrative which one comes up with, it would be imaginary, fictional or made up.

This is why I suggested that reconstructionism might be better suited to some forms of art than others. If there is already some form of narrative within the content then a narrative in the reconstruction is justified. But then I don't understand the point, because to be true you'd just want to copy the original as close as possible, and I don't see the purpose to intentionally making a different narrative from the one proposed by the artist, because you might as well just make your own piece of art. This would just be like a disguised plagiarism.

What type of art do you consider is more suited to reconstruction? One with temporal extension, and a real narrative, or one without temporal extension, therefore no inherent narrative?

or example? Do you mean other primates? Other animals? Fish? And that would put us the top of the hierarchy would it not? — Wayfarer

Yes, all other life forms, because "soul" refers to the first principle of life in general, and as Aristotle explains it is an active principle. That active principle has caused the existence of a vast array of different individual things. To me, the ability to create a seemingly endless quantity of different things, each one active in its own way, is incredibly awesome. Consider the beauty in a garden of different coloured flowers on a summer day. Just the number of different colours which living beings can create is phenomenal.

But within this example, we have also the influence of artificial (human) manipulation (domestication). That human beings have the capacity to, and freely do, manipulate the differences, and have been doing this for thousands of years, is evidence that we may be at the top of the hierarchy. But here's the problem I see with constructing such a hierarchy. And notice that I say "constructing", because any such hierarchical structure will be based in values, and is going to be created on values which we impose, from our human minds.

This is the problem we cannot get beyond. Any proposed value principle, from which we might create a hierarchy, is going to be derived from an individual person who proposes it, and so it will be as unique and idiosyncratic as a colour is to a flower. And just like we gather flowers of the same type, and say that their colour is "the same", we gather a bunch of humans with the same value principle, and say that their value system is "the same". What we really do is say that human beings are equal. Now, since we have agreement amongst a sect of human beings who say that they are each equal, they can proceed to say that they have an "objective" value principle. The problem is, that in doing this, they place the conformity which is created by "the agreement", and is therefore artificial, as higher than the fundamental and most base capacity of the soul, which is difference, as mentioned above.

So, we have to look at this artificial, created value structure, which is produced through agreement, and which we tend to call "objective", as actually backwards, upside down. It holds agreement and conformity as the highest principle, because that's what it sees as required for our release from the subjective idiosyncrasies of the individual, allowing us to obtain an independent objectivity. But this "objectivity" is not a true objectivity because the independence is not a true independence, it is still a feature of the subjects. So we're forced right back to the observed highest principle of the soul itself, in a search of true objectivity, and this is the capacity for variance, variation, which is a feature of true independence. I'll note that this is consistent with Plato's description of "just" in The Republic, where each an every individual has a unique role to play in society.

So the question of whether we are highest or not, has nothing to do with whether we have rational intellectual capacity or not. That's just outer fluff, a general feature, like the chaff which blows to the wind. The significant thing is the unique individual seed, which lies within. This is why Aristotle places "intuition" as the highest feature of intellect, because this is where we find individuality. So a society which forces human beings to conform to some so-called 'objective principles of rationality' does not put them higher in the hierarchy, it lowers them by restricting what is the natural highest principle, variation. While a society which allows freedom of individuality provides a higher place in the hierarchy for human beings.

Therefore we cannot say that "human beings" as a whole, or a species in general, is highest, because what is highest is a principle which negates the value of a "species" in general, making species themselves as something lower, which we need not consider.in producing the hierarchy. Providing for the capacity of freedom, variation, and difference within the unique capacities of individual beings is the highest principle. So a group of human beings may either be high in the hierarchy, or low on the hierarchy, depending on how they restrict themselves. That this is true is evident from the very real possibility that if human beings attempt to restrict themselves (the entire species) to rigorous rules of conformity, dictated by some supposed principle of "rationality", they are likely to bring extinction upon themselves. So that cannot be how we base our value structure, allowing that a species which is likely to go extinct to be high in the hierarchy.

You said “there is no such thing as "pure, unaffected intelligence" in human beings.”

But I have demonstrated to you that your claim is contradicted by Aristotle and by observable facts. — Apollodorus

I've addressed this. I think Aristotle is wrong on this point, for the reasons I've already expressed. And I don't believe you've provided any observational evidence of "pure unaffected intelligence".

Yet you are now trying to dismiss Plato and Aristotle by claiming that they “don’t understand the word divine” whilst you of course do. — Apollodorus

Did I say I know what the divine is? Just because I claim to know what the divine is not, i.e. eternal circular motions, because such a thing is known to be impossible, doesn't mean that I claim to know what the divine is.

What Aristotle is trying to convey by his description of “God” or highest reality is eternity, perfection, etc. — Apollodorus

Obviously, eternal circular motion, and a thinking, which is thinking on thinking, serves as a very poor description of "eternity and perfection", if that's what "divine" is supposed to mean. So if one might be inclined to accept eternal and perfect as the features of divinity, they also ought to be inclined to reject Aristotle's proposal, as a failure to properly represent "eternal and perfect".

Man approaches the divine by first approaching the divine in himself and by self-identifying with it. In other words, by elevating himself to a higher mode of experience or state of consciousness. It is only from that higher state that an even higher state can be approached. — Apollodorus

I don't believe this at all. The closest we can get to the divine within ourselves, is the soul itself, as the first principle of activity of a living body. But we cannot "self-identify with it" by elevating to a higher mode of existence, because it is at the base, providing for the lowest mode of living. Therefore the closest we can get to self-identifying with it would be to lower ourselves to the most basic, most humble form of living. And you have this all backward.

My own position is that humans cannot know what a higher reality is unless and until they have actually experienced it or at least they have had an inkling of it. If humans are conscious, intelligent beings, then it makes sense to try to find out if there is a higher intelligence “out there” or, indeed, within us. — Apollodorus

It's actually very easy to understand the concept of a higher reality. All one has to do is look at lower beings, to understand the principles of hierarchy. When we know those steps well, (where we came from), then we might be able to figure out how to construct the steps to go higher. But this implies that we do not get knowledge of any higher reality simply by imagining it with the mind (thinking on thinking), we get it by understanding the different levels of the lower being. And to grasp these lower realities we must allow our minds to unite with, and become one with the lower beings, in order that we might understand them, and the levels. Until we unite ourselves with the lower beings, as the source of our own being, any talk about a higher reality is just pie in the sky.

If Philosophy (in the Ancient Greek sense) is love of and quest for truth, and the truth is a higher form of consciousness, intelligence, or knowledge, then this is what man ought to assimilate himself to. — Apollodorus

Again, you have this backward. The closest the human intellect can get to the divine is through understanding the soul itself, which is the source of our being. And the way toward understanding the soul is to accept the reality that we are all dependent on all those lesser beings who are responsible for bringing us into existence. Therefore we must assimilate ourselves with them, not with some imaginary pie in the sky "higher form of consciousness".

I think that the division implicit/explicit might be too academic for what reconstruction is trying to achieve. It's not so much implicit/explicit that matters here, than the ability to match the reconstruction to the content. So if I say "The music starts with a motif M (0:2 to 0:8) that gets repeated in the next phrase (0:10 to 0:18)", it doesn't matter that what I observe is explicit or implicit. — thaumasnot

The point was that the content isn't necessarily explicit. So if you take what appears to be explicit content, when the true content is implicit, then you have a false start. You are not really starting with the content at all. Are you familiar with Wittgenstein's rabbit-duck? Suppose you see an explicit duck, in a scenario like this, and you state "duck" as the content. Someone else might call the same content "rabbit". If you do not see it as both a duck and a rabbit, as that is what is intended by the author, and describe it as both, you have not correctly represented the content. So when the content is open to interpretation, i.e. there is nothing explicit, it is all implicit, how do you know that you are describing it correctly? Maybe your technique is only good for certain types of work?

So the real problem is not determining what is explicit versus implicit, but determining what I choose to focus on while experiencing the content (implicit or explicit). Since the motivation is hedonistic, this is an empirical problem. In reconstructionism, the choice is to focus on things like melodic motifs. As you noted, motifs can be looked at from different perspectives, in practice it's not too much of a problem because the way the music is, motifs will often jump at you without you spending much effort. In addition, in your example of looking at a larger structure, you can do it at the same time as keeping in mind the repetition of M (that's the attention span I talk about). Networks of correlation are difficult to keep in mind (many data), and a compromise must typically be struck, where you'll ignore certain parts of the medium. For example, when I listen to listen to metal music, I will focus on the guitar riffs and not pay too much attention to the drums or vocals. There is a certain sensuality in the medium of music that helps filter "useless" correlations (it's empirical of course, and not always the best choice, which is why we share reconstructions, so that others may improve on them or improve theirs). Why would someone do this exercise, which sounds like tedious work ? Because there's sometimes a big payoff at the end, in the form of "beautiful" resolutions (that only narratives can bring). Triumph can only be attained through great adversity. — thaumasnot

To me, this sems to contradict what you said, that the value of the reconstruction is as a helper. If you just pick and choose from the content, to decide how you want to represent it, how can this help anyone else? Any other person might just pick and choose in one's own way, so why would they want to be influenced by someone else, who might actually ruin one's own experience of the piece. It would be like study notes where the author of the Notes just arbitrarily decided which parts of the work to focus on. That would not be a help.

Is not space a relationship between individuals? — Harry Hindu

No, as the op defines, space is what separates individuals. Relationships, as we generally use this term are what unites individuals. "Separates" and "unites" are somewhat opposed.

It has value only relative to the reader/listener, as a helper. — thaumasnot

OK, I understand now, it is intended to add to the experience. It's not just something that the interpreter takes from the piece for one's own pleasure, it's also intended to give something to others. I'd say it's sort of like the traditional "Coles Notes" or "Cliffs Notes". These were published as study guides for common high school, college, and even university readings. The idea is to read them as a companion to the original, to assist in understanding the original. You couldn't write your assignment just from reading the Notes though, because it would be evident to the teachers who generally knew the contents of the Notes, resulting in a low mark.

Now that I've got the general idea, I want to understand your approach to the medium, what I call content. You seem to call the whole piece "the content", I like to break the piece into form and content, in a more traditional way. So let me start with what you call the narrative to produce an example.

A narrative is like a story, so it is necessarily extended in time. Time is built in to a narrative, but the narrative need not proceed chronologically so long as the proper indications are made to avoid confusion which would lose the narrative. A static piece, like a painting or a photograph cannot show a narrative, however, a narrative may be implied. So a photograph or painting of activity has an implied narrative, but no real narrative. The implied narrative is open to the imagination of the mind of the interpreter, such that the further you get from the snapshot of the picture, in your interpretation of what is going on, the more imaginary the interpreter's narrative is. There is really no narrative offered by the artist, just a snapshot.

Can you accept this division for me, between what is shown right there, explicit, in the content (the piece) and what is left to the imagination, or implied? And would you agree that the artist's mode of operation is often to stimulate the imagination, this being fundamental to the aesthetic experience? So we might find a sacrifice of the explicit, the artist presenting a vague or unclear content, (metaphor for example), for the sake of the implicit, leaving as much as possible to the imagination of the audience. Perhaps "implicit" is not the right word because it connotes a logical working of the imagination, and here I am talking about a more base form of correlative or associative meaning. Of course there is a fine balance between the two, for the artist to maintain, otherwise one would hand the audience a blank piece of paper and say 'use your imagination'.

How would you personally deal with this gap which exists only in principle? I say it exists only in principle because we generally can't look at a piece and divide it cleanly, saying this is what is explicit and this is what is implicit. From the very top, or the very bottom, everything must be considered as implicit to begin with. What is explicit is a sort of arbitrary judgement. Everything is open to interpretation. In your example, "The music starts with a motif M (0:2 to 0:8) that gets repeated in the next phrase (0:10 to 0:18)", these two might be better expressed as one part of a larger whole. A 6/8 time might be expressed as a 3/4 time if the bars are halved and the eigths are turned into quarters.

So it appears like your goal is to start with what is what I called "explicit", and build upon this, to produce an approach to the implicit. But a good artist knows how to intertwine the implicit with the explicit to the extent that what is explicit is only implicit, meaning that the way to judge what is explicit is only implied. So if an interpreter latched on to certain aspects saying this is what is explicit, and produces an interpretation based on that assumption, it would be fundamentally incorrect from the base up, because what is explicit is only implied. The artist might have created something in which everything is implied (such as abstract art), but it appears as if certain things are explicit, or even the things which appear to be explicit are meant to be metaphoric, etc..

That's long and drawn out, but I'll get to the point now. In the case of producing study Notes for textbook learning, it's pretty much non-controversial as to what is explicit, and "said" by the piece of work, so there's not much of a problem here, though there is enough variance for the teacher to determine what is Notes based. But in the case of much artwork, what is "said" by the piece, (what I call "content") is often the most controversial aspect. What this means is that there is disagreement as to what is explicit. So if you propose to start with what is explicit, and build on that, how do you get beyond this problem of determining what is explicit? A simple mistake in this primary judgement would turn the project into a hinderance for understanding rather than a helper, by pointing the reader in the wrong direction.

Of course both Plato and Aristotle say that the philosopher ought to try to approach the divine as much as humanly possible, this is precisely why I quoted Aristotle on it! — Apollodorus

OK, now approaching the divine is quite distinct from being the divine. Do you agree that before we can say how a philosopher might "approach the divine", we need an idea as to what the divine is. Otherwise we could send the philosopher in any random direction, and claim that is the way "to approach the divine".

How do you reckon the philosopher is supposed to "approach the divine"? Surely, not with the body or mind that according to Aristotle perish at death? He can approach the divine only with the intellect or nous which Aristotle clearly says is immortal, eternal, and divine. — Apollodorus

Such a statement is completely unsupported. In order to say how we are supposed to approach the divine, we must first determine what the divine is. And that's where Aristotle's intuition fails us. He had an incorrect idea of what it means to be divine, and this is obvious. So he sent us in the wrong direction. His divinity was an eternal circular motion. So he proposed a type of circular thinking, a thinking on thinking, as the way for human beings to approach the divine. This type of thinking would be an eternal circular thinking activity. But circular thinking is vicious.

So, I would suggest you stop "dismissing" passage after passage that contradicts your interpretation and try to look at the contradictions in your own statements. — Apollodorus

Sorry Apollodorus, I do not mean to offend you, but if the principle expressed is based in some ridiculous nonsense like eternal circular motion, I will dismiss it. That is how Aristotle described the "divine", and it is clearly mistaken. Likewise, his circular thinking, as the way human beings might engage in an activity which would approach the divine eternal circular motion, possibly providing the basis for an immortal intellect, is also mistaken. Therefore you, and every other rational human being ought to dismiss it as well.

Pretty simple and easy to understand IMO. And it doesn't require dismissing any passages either from Aristotle or Plato .... — Apollodorus

You can't be saying this in seriousness. You've spent this whole discussion with me trying to find ways to dismiss the principal part of On the Soul, the dependencies of the powers of the soul, because this is not consistent with what you preach.

The mortgage is an agreement. — Banno

An agreement is in no way an object or an entity, so it's not even worth your while arguing that an agreement is a non-spatial "object" or "entity". And since it is a relation between a plurality of individuals, it is in no way an "individual".

It might be worthwhile to investigate whether relations can be non-spatial. But the op defines space as that which separates objects. Relations do the exact opposite, they unite separate objects. So it appears like all relations, under that definition of space, are non-spatial. But this just tells us that we have a poor definition of space.

A big problem with technology is that we put it to use right away, but we often don't figure out the side effects until much later. There is a lot of talk about the use of lead in ancient Rome for example. And last century we had DDT, and all sorts of cancer causing agents, like asbestos, which were not discovered as cancer causing until after they caused a lot of cancer. Then we had the cfc's blow out the ozone layer. Who knows what unforeseen side effects today's technology might be producing right now.

I meet many older folk who can't operate a smart phone — Tom Storm

Why would anyone even want to carry such a radiation emitting device on their person?

Well, that's where you are wrong again. The intellect is the divine element in man as Aristotle clearly says! And what is divine has divine thoughts. — Apollodorus

I won't bother with this, it's so blatantly inaccurate. Plato clearly held a distinction between the earthly, and the divine, and so did Aristotle. And they both said that we ought to try to approach the divine as much as humanly possible, as evidenced by the quote I just gave you, from your own reference: " but we ought, so far as in us lies, to put on immortality, and do all that we can to live in conformity with the highest that is in us".

If you think about it, if you make for yourself a pair of shoes and use them for walking, you might be right in saying that you depend on your shoes for walking, but it would be wrong to say that you depend on them in an absolute sense. — Apollodorus

This is an unacceptable analogy. Aristotle is talking about how one power, for its actual existence as a power, depends on another, more base, or lower power. So if the higher power of walking depends on the lower power of muscles, it would be wrong to say that one could walk without muscles.

The same goes for the “intellect” or “nous”. It may partly depend on the body-mind or body-soul compound in everyday life. For example, the soul’s sense-faculties will depend on the physical sense-organs for sensory input from the surrounding environment, and the soul’s reasoning faculty will depend on the data supplied by the sense-faculties. — Apollodorus

It's not a matter of "partly depend on". That doesn't even make sense. You are not considering the difference between contingent and sufficient. If A, B, and C are all required for X, then X is fully dependent on A. There is no X without A. And X is not partly dependent on A, it is fully dependent on A, as it is fully dependent on B, and fully dependent on C. Notice that "partly" and "fully" are qualifiers of "dependent", and there is no such thing as "partly dependent", that is incoherent. Either A is required (X is dependent on A) or it is not. You appear to be trying to give "depend" an incoherent meaning.

Clearly, these statements and many others are not isolated “mistakes” or “inconsistencies”, they form a consistent and coherent whole with the rest of the book - and with Plato's own position. — Apollodorus

Thanks for all the quotes, I see now where the problem lies. Aristotle proposed a first principle of physical (material) existence. This was the eternal circular motion. Motion in a perfect circle can have no beginning nor end. And the orbits of the planets were supposed to be those eternal circular motions.

But this fundamental "first principle" of actual physical existence, the eternal circular motions, is demonstrably wrong. The orbits of the planets are not eternal circles. And there is no such thing as a perfect circular motion which would continue in perpetuity forever. Also, the divine thinking which is a thinking on thinking, which Aristotle proposed as the immaterial support for the eternal circular motions, is equally wrong, being derived from that faulty principle. So the idea of a divine intellectual activity, as a thinking, thinking on thinking, which was devised by Aristotle to support the eternal circular motions of the planets, is fundamentally flawed.

The divine thinking on thinking, was an intuitive principle which Aristotle came up with, because he was under the false impression that the orbits of the planets were eternal and perfect circles, and this was proposed as a matching circular thinking. The passages you have quoted are derived from these faulty descriptions of "eternal activity", the circular motion, and the thinking on thinking.

The logical necessity for the existence of "eternal activity" is derived from his cosmological argument. But these descriptions demonstrate a misunderstanding of what is implied by the cosmological argument. What is implied is an actuality which is "outside time", as is consistent with the Christian understanding of "eternal", and this is very distinct from "eternal" in the sense of infinite extension of time. So Aristotle's intuition as to how to describe something which is actually eternal, was wrong. And some statements he made which are related directly to this intuition are also wrong. Therefore these passages you have quoted, which were derived from that intuition, ought to be dismissed as misguided.

I\m trying to grasp what the point to this style of interpretation is. It's a complex system without any real value scheme. Doesn't that leave it worthless? See if you can answer this question for me. What is the overarching goal behind this reconstruction system? Is the goal to produce good quality interpretations, as reconstructions, or is the goal to produce a complex formal system of interpretation?

Take a look at it this way for example. There is a relationship between any particular reconstruction and the original piece which is chosen. Is that a relationship of value? So we might say that if an interpretation adds something to the original it is a good interpretation, and if it takes something away from the original, it is a bad interpretation. And we could judge the interpretation as good or bad because it has some value for the person trying to experience the full affect of the original.

If there is no value in this relationship, then the reconstruction just exists in some parallel relation, and we have to ask what is the purpose in producing it. Then it might turn out that this is just a meaningless practice of following some principles, as a hedonistic self-indulgence, with no real purpose except to be the recipient of the gratification derived from having followed the principles. If this is the case, then the challenge is to build the system, creating a more and more complex system, making it increasingly difficult to follow, thereby increasing the gratification received from having followed it.

I was putting forth an alternative view. — Paine

It doesn't really seem to be an alternative, because it's completely consistent with what I was saying. You simply proceeded to turn around, looking ahead at the possibilities, rather than looking backward at the actuality, as I was. But this opens a completely different subject not addressed by Aristotle, and that is the question of how possibility is directed by the soul.

Consider these points. The higher power is dependent on the lower power. Each power is a development of potential, which opens possibilities to the soul, as the principle of activity. So the question is, what does it mean to develop potential. We don't want to say that it means to give oneself possibilities, because then we go in a circle. So we must answer by looking in the other direction. What does the soul do to develop potential? And here, we must turn to the material body, matter being the principle of potential for Aristotle.

Then the question becomes how does the soul use matter to open up possibilities for itself, and this is how we can approach the reality of the vast variety in living beings which we observe, and evolutionary theory in general. The beauty of life is not found in the sameness which constitutes "a species", but in the difference which constitutes an individual. Each material difference constitutes a difference in possibilities.

Neither of us should apologize for saying what we think. — Paine

The apology was not for saying what I think, but for what this caused, confusion. That was not the intended consequence, so there must have been a mistake made.

The music is “quoted” and a correlation (the repetititon) is noted. What is not objective for you here ? — thaumasnot

As I said, the content, and the medium itself, is inherently subjective, as it is chosen by the artist. This choice is the very base of a subjective expression which is the artistic expression. The choice of medium is the subjective base.

To quote the piece is simply to copy it. When you copy it, it is not your creation but someone else's, so you can create the impression of objectivity, by showing that it's something which can be copied, i.e. it has objective existence. The piece itself remains inherently subjective, freely created by a subject. To have an objective copy would be to copy it exactly as it was composed. But you choose not to copy, you choose to reconstruct. So you do not end up with an objective copy, you end up with a subjective reconstruction, which you claim is based in some kind of objectivity. It isn't though, because you do not copy the piece you only choose which parts you want to copy. So I don't think you should represent this style of interpretation as any more objective than any other style. It is a different style, but there appears to be nothing in your principles which would make it objective.

Your account of what Aristotle says the intellect depends upon confuses this question. Yes, a living creature who has the capacity to know is only possible because they also have other capacities needed by other living creatures. Yes, the more advanced forms of life depend upon the structure of the more basic forms. But this is not to say that what is possible for the more advanced form is framed only by the possibilities available to the less advanced. Otherwise, there would be no point in distinguishing between them. — Paine

Yes, I completely agree with this. And if you think that what I said confuses the issue, I apologize for that, it was not my intention.

There is a relationship between the types of soul that conditions what is possible and Aristotle describes this in a manner that addresses your question regarding 'immediate intuition'. From Posterior Analytics: — Paine

Thanks for the reference Paine. He also addresses the issue of intuitive knowledge in Nichomachean Ethics. He places it at the highest level, then questions whether it is innate or acquired. There appears to be intuition which is proper to theoretical knowledge, and also intuition in practical knowledge. His conclusion here is consistent with what you've quoted. He seems to say it is a combination of both innate and learned.

I must admit that I do not agree with how Aristotle has characterized this type of knowledge. Notice that he says this is how "man knows the primary immediate premises". And he assigns to this the highest form of knowledge. So he will later claim that the logical process leads us from the more certain, to the less certain. But I think that he has this backward. The primary immediate premises, grasped by intuition only, are not proven, and cannot adequately be proven. So this inability to know with certainty, the truth or falsity of primary premises, is what really brings uncertainty into our knowledge. It is not the source of certainty. The logical process provides us with a very high degree of certainty, and we can know without a doubt, the validity of the conclusion. So uncertainty in the conclusion is primarily the result of uncertainty in the premises.

Therefore I believe that Aristotle has this all backward. Direct intuition does not give us the highest level of knowledge, with the highest degree of certainty, it gives us the base for our knowledge, the lowest level, and the base has the lowest level of certainty. To understand this, all you need to do is look at the hypotheses of modern science. These are derived from intuition. However, they are unproven, therefore the hypotheses, as hypotheses, have a very low degree of certainty. Then we take the hypotheses and find practical ways to test them. If an hypothesis proves useful we keep using it, because nothing has falsified it, and it has passed the test of usefulness. As we use it more and more, we build logical structures on it, and it becomes a "primary premise". But just because it has not yet been falsified, doesn't necessarily mean that its status, as having a relatively low degree of certainty, has changed significantly. Then it becomes built into our structure of knowledge, and since it is a base premise for all sorts of different procedures, we suffer from the illusion that it has a high degree of certainty, when actually the opposite is the case. Because of this deficiency at the base, problems arise. Only when the problems from unsound conclusions become so unbearable, that people are inclined to revisit the base premises, is the uncertainty exposed, and the primary "intuitive" premises are dismissed. Kuhn described this phenomenon as the paradigm shift.

The active intellect's immateriality, immortality, and independence in relation to the body-soul is not refuted at all, it is affirmed as the passages I quoted clearly show, and as acknowledged by scholars like — Apollodorus

Right, it is "affirmed" in those specific passages, but it is refuted by the principles and the logic laid out in the rest of the book. This is common in philosophy, that what is proven in a particular piece of work, differs from what is asserted in it. As part of the discipline, we learn to differentiate between these two.

The very definition of intellect according to Aristotle is “that which thinks itself” as stated at Meta. 12.1074b and as quoted earlier. — Apollodorus

This is wrong. That is not the definition of "intellect", it is the definition of "divine thought". And your earlier quote says " but we ought, so far as in us lies, to put on immortality, and do all that we can to live in conformity with the highest that is in us". The whole point of this discussion between Wayfarer and I, for me, was to stress the difference between the human intellect, and the divine. Such misquotes, and misrepresentation of what the quoted passage actually says, and your conflating of the divine and the human, do nothing for your purpose .

I can't agree with it, because I think it's mistaken. Ideas such as mathematical ideas and scientific principles are not the possession of the human mind, but are discoverable by any rational intellect. — Wayfarer

Would you argue that I am not human and I do not have a rational intellect? I could not proceed beyond basic arithmetic and geometry in high school math. I tried algebra and trigonometry because other members in my family were very competent in mathematics. However, my mind seems to understand by using a type of imaging system which left me incapable of understanding these abstractions. The abstract correlations were beyond my capacity to imagine, and I could not understand. Rather than taking for granted the principles which the teachers fed me, memorizing them, and moving along with the rest of the class, I tried my best to understand the principles. I could not rapidly make sense of them, I got left behind, and I dropped out of abstract math.

This is the problem with your stated principle. It's just a matter of defining terms in a way which is simply begging the question, and completely ignoring the actual evidence. The evidence is that all sorts of different animals think, and therefore have some type of mind, But these animals do not seem to apprehend mathematical ideas, therefore you would say that they do not have a rational mind. However, the classification "mathematical ideas" encompasses a huge expanse of conceptual structures, and the majority of human beings are not capable of "discovering" the majority of them.

So your stated principle "mathematical principles... are discoverable by any rational intellect", requires that we draw an arbitrary boundary (drawn only for the purpose of supporting your principle) between simple math and complicated math, the latter being unintelligible and undiscoverable to many human beings, who appear to be otherwise rational. But then we need to draw another arbitrary boundary at the other end, to ensure that other animals which seem to comprehend the difference between two objects and three objects are excluded from the category of "rational". In other words, we need to completely distort the concept of "rational intellect", as well as completely distort the concept of "mathematical ideas", in a way designed to support your principle, which ends up being nothing other than contriving definitions for the purpose of begging the question.

You're speaking from your own perspective, not that of others. I've previously referred to the passage on Augustine on Intelligible Objects. Note this comment:

In the Confessions Augustine reports that his inability to conceive of anything incorporeal was the “most important and virtually the only cause” of his errors. The argument from De libero arbitrio shows how Augustine managed, with the aid of Platonist direction and argument, to overcome this cognitive limitation. By focusing on objects perceptible by the mind alone and by observing their nature, in particular their eternity and immutability, Augustine came to see that certain things that clearly exist, namely, the objects of the intelligible realm, cannot be corporeal. When he cries out in the midst of his vision of the divine nature, “Is truth nothing just because it is not diffused through space, either finite or infinite?” (FVP 13–14), he is acknowledging that it is the discovery of intelligible truth that first frees him to comprehend incorporeal reality.

That’s pretty well what happened in my case when I realised the truth of mathematical Platonism. — Wayfarer

I do not deny that we can "see" the reality of the incorporeal, or immaterial. What I deny is that we can grasp the essence of it, "the whatness", of the immaterial. Do you see the way it's described in this passage? "By focusing on... eternity and immutability" "Augustine came to see that certain things... cannot be corporeal." Eternal and immutable refer to things outside of time; time and change being categorized together, as the corporeal.

The reality of what is outside of time and change, outside of material existence, is what Aristotle's cosmological argument brings our attention to. It shows by logical necessity, that we must conclude an "actual" reality which is outside of material reality, as prior to it. The reason why I say that we are incapable of understanding the essence or "whatness" of the immaterial, is because it appears to us as incomprehensible or unintelligible by way of contradiction. We can "see" it as a logical necessity, but we cannot understand it. The priority described by Aristotle is a temporal priority defined by causation; it is necessary to conclude the immaterial as the cause of the material. The logical demonstration shows an "actuality", as a cause, which is temporally prior to the material realm of time and change. So this appears incoherent to us, because we are now talking about an actuality, as cause (a temporal term) which is temporally prior to time itself. There lies contradiction.

But when we accept the deficiency of human conception, we see that what this really reveals is the deficiency in the human conception of time. We fix time to material change. Material change is what defines and measures the passing of time for us. When the logic of the cosmological argument shows us an 'actual' cause which is outside of time (by this conception of time), we have no capacity to understand this logically necessary 'activity'. It is impossible for us to say "what" it is, because it is already contradictory to talk about an activity with no time. The only way which I see to rectify this problem is to rebuild the conception of time, such that the passing of time is represented as occurring outside the realm of material existence, rather than as dependent on it. Then we bring that realm of activity, which is outside the realm of material existence, the actual immaterial, into the realm of intelligibility by resolving that contradiction.

I find it ironic that we have essentially reversed our positions from the last time we approached this issue. Then, I argued that God is fundamentally intelligible, and you said that human beings cannot understand God. Now you are arguing that the immaterial is intelligible to us, and I am arguing that we haven't the capacity to understand it.

Well, you are saying that you "do not deny it" but you are also saying that it is an "idea which is actually being refuted". What exactly is being "refuted" and how? — Apollodorus

The idea that the active intellect (or mind) is completely immaterial, and directly united with the soul, is what is actually refuted by Aristotle's principles. The active intellect is a higher power of the soul, and the higher powers are dependent on the lower powers, therefore, the lower powers and the material being, are a medium between the active intellect and the soul, and the contrary idea, that the active intellect is completely immaterial and directly united to the soul, is refuted.

Aquinas actually demonstrates this very well with reference to free will, and the power of self-movement. The active intellect with its power of discernment using immaterial principles cannot ultimately control the will. We often do what we know is wrong. That was an issue for Socrates and Plato, who used this argument to defeat the sophists who claimed virtue is knowledge and therefore could be taught. It was also a significant point of interest for Augustine, the soul's capacity to act contrary the intellect, to do wrong when it was known to be wrong. What is shown is that the soul's power of self-movement, which is a most base power, comes between the soul and the active intellect.

We must bear in mind that the immortality of the nous was central to Plato’s teachings and that Aristotle was Plato’s long-time pupil. If Aristotle had disagreed with Plato on such an important point, he would have made this clear in no uncertain terms. But nowhere does he do so. — Apollodorus

That disagreement is made clear in Metaphysics Bk9, what is called the cosmological argument.

Aristotle asserts the immortality of intellect again later on: — Apollodorus

As I said already, these statements of immortality of the intellect are inconsistent with the logic of Aristotle's overall conceptual structure, and ought to be dismissed as oversight, or mistake.

Clearly, the active intellect is an uninterrupted contemplative activity that is immortal and eternal and that endows the passive or thinking intellect (a.k.a. reasoning faculty or logos) with the power to think when in the embodied state. In contrast, when separated from the body, it reverts to its essential, contemplative state. — Apollodorus

The problem is that we can use Aristotle's own conceptual structure to refute this idea, as Aquinas demonstrated. So the validity of that idea is highly doubtful. And since we cannot perform the reverse, to take this disputed statement and overthrow Aristotle's conceptual structure, because the conceptual structure is well supported by evidence, we ought to dismiss this disputed idea as inconsistent with reality.

These are not some obscure and random remarks that we can lightly dismiss. On the contrary, the more we look into it, the more we see that they are consistent with Aristotle’s overall framework. — Apollodorus

So far, all that I've seen in this thread, to support the notion that this idea is consistent with Aristotle's overall framework is some quotes by Wayfarer, of secondary sources, bearing extremely poor representations of Aristotle's "overall framework", like Brennan's discussion of "the proper knowledge of the senses".

In any case, since the intellect according to Aristotle is capable of existence in separation from the body, I don't think it can be argued that it is dependent on the body in an Aristotelian context. — Apollodorus

Have you not read "On the Soul"? It's made very clear in the first half of BK2 that the higher powers of the soul are dependent on the lower, despite the fact that he says "...the mind that knows with an immediate intuition presents a different problem." Read it, because I will not explain it again.

The relevant question is not whether it can be argued that the intellect is dependent on the lower powers. The hierarchy of powers is well described, so the argument is inevitable. The relevant question is whether a mind can know with "an immediate intuition". This is what supports the opposing idea which you hold.

But you repudiate that: — Wayfarer

Yes I repudiate it. It's a nonsensical passage. It starts with ""if the proper knowledge of the senses is...". Knowledge is not proper to the senses. The senses have no knowledge so there is no knowledge proper to the senses. This is described in Bk3 On the Soul, where he discusses whether there is a sixth sense. Knowledge is proper to the thinking part of the being, not the sense-organs. The phrase "sense knowledge" is used numerous times in the passage, and it really has no intelligible meaning. That's what I mean about textbook type quotes. They tend to be of the lowest level of reliability.

So, you're saying that Brennan and therefore Aquinas are 'mistaken' in this analysis, are you not? — Wayfarer

No, I am just saying Brennan is mistaken. The passage shows a complete lack of understanding.

Anyway, I don't see how that passage relates to hylomorphism.

Your basic conflict is that you adopt the modern (for most here, the superior) point of view, that the mind is the product of evolution. There is no way in your view to understand how 'ideas' or anything of that nature could pre-exist evolutionary development. So ideas are 'a product of' that evolutionary process - which is where we started this debate. You can't see (quite logically, I suppose) how there could be ideas before there were any people around to have them. — Wayfarer

Right, human ideas are a product of human minds, which are a product of evolution. But this is a very small part of reality remember. We still have the soul, which is prior to evolution, and prior to the material body as cause of it, therefore immaterial, to try to understand. And, we still have what some refer to as Divine Ideas, or separate Forms, or God and the angels, which are the cause of all material existence in general, therefore prior to it, and just like the soul, immaterial, to try to understand. So life on earth, evolution, human minds, and the ideas which they have, is just a small part of reality .

So, all I request is that you respect this separation, between the ideas produced by human minds which are posterior to, and dependent on the material body of the human being (therefore imperfect), and the truly immaterial things, (separate Forms, God and the angels), which are prior to material existence, as cause of it. Is this too much to ask for? Can you apprehend the truth of this principle, that if there was some sort of Divine Ideas, which were here before there were any people to have them, they were most likely radically different from the ideas which people have? The ideas that people have are a feature of the human condition, just like the ideas that other animals have are a feature of their conditions.

Plato demonstrated this to us. Think of The Republic where he asked for the definition of "just". The different human beings asked, each have a different idea of what "just" means, but it is implied that there ought to be a divine idea, the true idea of "just". But no human being knows it. You are quite fond of numbers, and you probably think there is a difference between ideas like "just" and ideas like "2". But how many different types of numbering systems do you know of? Natural, rational, real, imaginary, complex, how many more are there? If there are so many different ways to conceptualize numbers, what is the true, divine way?

So Aristotle and Aquinas just built upon this basic fact which Plato exposed. We approach ideas as if they are some sort of immaterial entities. But when we examine them very closely we see that they fail in bringing to us the true immaterial existence which we seek. However, they do demonstrate to us, through the use of logical reasoning (cosmological argument for example) the reality of the true immaterial existence. The problem is that being only human, we haven't determined a way to get our minds into that true immaterial existence.

It is not clear at all to me that the higher powers of the soul are dependent on the lower. — Apollodorus

This is what Wayfarer and I discussed to some length in this thread already. It's fundamental to Aristotle's treatise On the Soul. The power of sensation is dependent on the power of self-nutrition, and the power of intellection is dependent on the power of sensation.

If the soul or any other part of man preexists the body then it can equally well postexist it. — Apollodorus

I do not deny that, I haven't discussed the soul after the body, at all.

n this particular case, I can see no reason why he would have suddenly decided to “contradict” himself. So I think it would be better to ignore the “it seems” bit and take the rest of the sentence as it stands. — Apollodorus

The problem is that taking the sentence as it stands is what is inconsistent with the conceptual structure he has laid out in the book. That's why It's better to recognize the "it seems", and notice that this might be an idea which is actually being refuted.

As you said, the reconstructionist is guided by values, and reconstructionism is essentially hedonistic, it makes no claim of being right. On the contrary, even though it sticks to the content like a dog to his bone, it isn’t at all about being right (cf. Manifesto). To summarize, what’s subjective is the choice of these correlations. What’s objective is the quoted content and the correlations. These are formal correlations by the way: transpositions, inversion, repetition, scaling, and so on. — thaumasnot

I don't see that you have any claim to objectivity. Content is inherently subjective, the subject matter. The artist chooses the medium so the medium is subjective. The only way that art approaches objectivity is through the form, the correlations which the artist employs. A semblance of objectivity is obtained if the artist can use these correlations to achieve some sort of meaning or aesthetic value in a universal way.

If you strip the piece down to its most subjective level, and reconstruct, then all you are doing is creating a new level of subjectivity by removing any semblance of objectivity which the piece might have had in the first place. Even if you leave in place some of the "formal correlations", by changing others you are allowing your own subjectivity to invade the objective aspect.

If it is an “illusion”, then Aristotle himself contributes to it in no small measure by making frequent references to the mind being controlled by the intellect which is the “divine” and “guiding” principle in man. — Apollodorus

I agree that Aristotle is inconsistent on this point, as he sometimes is. This is probably why the Scholastics had so much disagreement concerning the active and passive intellect. However, I find that Aristotle is for the most part very consistent and logical. So I think the best way to understand him is to adhere to the principles and logic which he has laid down in an overarching structure, and when points arise which are inconsistent with the overall logical structure, to simply dismiss them as oversight on his part.

So we have one aspect of man, the “active intellect”, that is immortal and survives the death of the body-soul compound. — Apollodorus

So I would dismiss this point as inconsistent with his overall logical structure. Clearly, the higher powers of the soul are dependent on the lower, and the active intellect is described as a higher power than the passive intellect. So if he happened to mention at a couple places that the active intellect might exist separately from the body, I would simply dismiss these mentions as inconsistent, and therefore mistaken. Notice his use of "it seems" at your referenced paragraph: "The case of mind is different; it seems to be an independent substance implanted within the soul and to be incapable of being destroyed. If it could be destroyed at all it would be under the blunting influence of old age." 408b 18.

So in one sentence you're basically dismissing Aquinas' hylomorphism. — Wayfarer

Aristotelian "hylomorphism" refers to the duality of matter and form in a material object. Each particular material object consists of matter (the potential to be or not be what it is), and form (what the particular object actually is). In the existence of a material object, as present, the two are not separable. But the form of the object is necessarily prior to its material existence, just like the soul is prior to the material body. So I do not see why you think my statement denies hylomorphism.

By Aristotelean principles, when a human mind abstracts the form of a material object, it does not take the very same form which exists in the object. The form in the object has inherent accidents and the form in the mind does not grasp those accidents. This marks the separation between two senses of "form". First, the sense of what exists within the human mind, as formula and essence, and "form' in the sense of independent Forms, which are responsible, as cause, for 'what the particular, material, object is'. The latter being the form of the particular. Since the mind doesn't actually receive the forms of the material objects, we can conclude that the forms which the mind has are created by the mind. This leaves an open question of what exactly do the senses and mind receive from the material object, when these powers are "acted on". That's the passive part of the intellect, being acted on, and the active part is the creation of the forms, formulae and essences.

But, the ability of the intellect to discern the forms is a separate faculty to the sensory. In the Aristotelian scheme, nous is the basic understanding or awareness that allows human beings to think rationally. For Aristotle, this was distinct from the processing of sensory perception, including the use of imagination and memory, which animals possess. Nous is what grasps the universals, which is what endows the human with rationality and what enables them to grasp philosophy. But this has also been already denied by you. In fact you're dismissing the tenets of hylomorphic dualism whenever you mention it. — Wayfarer

Grasping universals, by the active intellect, is what Aristotle calls "actualizing" them. This is the process whereby the formulae and essences receive actual existence. Prior to this they only exist potentially. We might say that the intellect creates them, Aristotle calls them "constructions". This is very clear in Metaphysics Bk9. And, it is here, where Aristotle distances himself from the Pythagoreans and Platonists.

I really don't understand why you think I deny hylomorphism. It seems like you might not have a clear understanding of it.

Notice that is the opposite of what is stated in that textbook I quoted. — Wayfarer

I'm not fond of philosophy textbooks. They are generally the lowest level of secondary source, very unreliable.

I think I finally understand you, but I think you're mistaken. — Wayfarer

Take your time. Continue with your studies. It took me probably twenty years of studying philosophy before this reality set in. The biggest piece for me was understanding Aristotle's so-called cosmological argument. This really put the actual/potential relation in perspective, revealing the need for two completely distinct types of actualities (forms). Consequently I'm a true dualist.

Thanks.

Even though it’s not interesting, it’s different from analysis in that reconstruction transcribes variations almost transparently. It makes no effort to add value to the content (except try to be readable and not too tedious). — thaumasnot

Isn't that exactly what analysis is though, to break something down into its parts, in an objective way? This is to make the divisions in accordance with what is inherent within the piece, rather than according to some values. It is synthesis, when we put the parts back together (reconstruction), which is necessarily guided by values. We cannot "reconstruct" in a manner which is not value-driven because the end, or goal, of the reconstruction must be chosen, and it acts as a guide in the reconstructing activity.

It won’t even try to categorize the piece. In practice, it will rather apply to melody (not harmony), more precisely the motifs. It will transcribe how patterns arise from correlating melodic structures. This is already unusual (not unique, of course), but it will take that approach further by looking at piece-wide networks of correlations. — thaumasnot

So I think the issue is these "correlations". This is how the parts are supposed to be related to each other. An artist will proceed with a very unique, peculiar, or even mysterious idiolect, or way of correlating parts in general. Let's say that the reconstructionist breaks down the parts, and starts to describe a correlation of parts, attributing this correlation to the artist. How does the reconstructionist know that these correlations are the ones produced by the artist, rather than ones created by the synthesis (complete with inherent intention and values) of the reconstructionist?

So despite your voluminous posts about metaphysics, you're actually materialist? — Wayfarer

Haha. How many times have I said, that the soul is immaterial, in this thread? I simply recognize the reality of a material separation between the soul and the intellect. It's what Aquinas taught, and fundamental to most reasonable philosophies of the mind. Otherwise we]d have no way to account for material existence prior to the human mind, and we get mired in panpsychism.

if the proper knowledge of the senses is of accidents, through forms that are individualized, the proper knowledge of intellect is of essences, through forms that are universalized. Intellectual knowledge is analogous to sense knowledge inasmuch as it demands the reception of the form of the thing which is known. But it differs from sense knowledge so far forth as it consists in the apprehension of things, not in their individuality, but in their universality.

It's a mistake to separate "intellectual knowledge" from "sense knowledge" in this way. As Aristotle explained, intellectual knowledge requires images received from the senses. And the images received from the senses are already distinct and fundamentally different from the form of the thing itself (as per Kant). The "accidents" inhere within the material thing. So the separation is properly represented as existing between the senses and the objects sensed, while the intellect and the senses are united in the activity of producing knowledge, as described by Aristotle.

I'm interested in the view in ancient and medieval philosophy of reason as both a faculty of the mind, and an ordering principle of the cosmos. — Wayfarer

This is an ancient idea which was outdated and archaic any time posterior to Plato. Plato laid the foundation for the proper separation between "the mind" as a feature of the human being, and "the ordering principle of the cosmos", as the reason why there is inherent order within all material existence. Understanding this separation is crucial to understanding the full extent, and incredible magnitude, of the fallibility of the human mind, and human knowledge in general, that is including the so-called objective sciences. This is why many follows of Plato appropriately turned to skepticism.

Yes, we look for patterns, patterns that have been ignored. While this yields a formal kind of review, it's not like an AI though, because in the last instance we're guided by personal inclinations when choosing the patterns. In fact, if anyone publishes a reconstruction, it’s probably because they found patterns they deemed remarkable. An essential difference from traditional reviews is that this personal inclination is implicit and not a focus, and the patterns are content that can be shared objectively and can ultimately lead to emotions (but this is not talked of, because it's something best left to the discretion of the reader IMO). My hope is to show patterns that are worth your while, but whether they are is yours to decide. — thaumasnot

So I don't really understand where the "reconstruction" comes from. Let's take a simple pattern for example. Suppose a piece of music has a rhythm, a beat, and this you choose as a medium-specific narrative. So you might go through the whole piece and determine what parts are the fundamental rhythm, and what parts are variations, or maybe some parts are even completely different. That's an analysis, but where does the reconstruction come into play? How would a reconstruction differ from an analysis? What am I missing?

But I think the main problem with Aristotle is the vague language he is using. — Apollodorus

I don't think his language is very vague. It just requires a very thorough reading of much material, to get a good grasp of how he is using the words. He was very careful in his attempt to maintain an interdisciplinary consistency through all the fields he discussed. This is a type of consistency which is quite lacking in modern science.

The answer seems to be that Aristotle posits a “material intellect” and an “active intellect”. The material intellect is the soul’s faculty of thinking. It is capable of being affected and perishable. In contrast, the active intellect is not a part or faculty of the soul but is independent of it. As such it is immaterial, eternal, imperishable, and self-existent, and it makes thinking possible. Aristotle also calls this intellect “divine” and “impassible” (De Anima 408b13, 430b5). — Apollodorus

The active intellect, for Aristotle, is not separable in the way you describe, from the passive intellect. The active and passive parts are united as one intellect, both being required for intellection. The two parts are described in Bk3, On the Soul, as being active, and being act on. The human intellect requires both, to be active in discernment and judgement, and also to be acted upon by sense images.

So there are two parts to the human intellect, and if we were to separate a lower power from a higher power, the lower part would be the passive, in its relation with the senses. By the principles already stated, a higher power (the active intellect) cannot be separated from a lower one (the passive intellect) which it depends on. So for instance, if the active is portrayed as top-down causation, and the passive is portrayed as being acted on from the bottom-up, the top-down activity is fundamentally dependent on the bottom-up, and cannot be separated from it. However, the bottom-up is separable because the soul is positioned at the bottom. It's counter-intuitive because we want to believe that the conscious mind has control over the material body, in the Platonic way, because that is the illusion we get from the perspective of the conscious mind. But in reality the material body has a fundamental grip on the mind. This is evident in certain chemical imbalances which affect one's capacity for rational thought.

That does not seem very correct, or at least it seems only a way to imagine something. such as numbers. 2 and 2 is 4 independent of there being 2 things and 2 other things. — Tobias

Sure, but "2+2=4" is rather useless accept when applied to actual things, just like "if P, then Q" is rather useless without any things that P and Q refer to. Arne was saying the opposite, that numerals are especially useful when there is no spatial thing which they refer to.

The way I read Aristotle, he believes that the soul depends on the body, belongs to the body, and therefore it perishes with the death of the body (De Anima 414a20ff.) — Apollodorus

The problem with this interpretation is that you are not accounting for the order of dependence of "the parts" which Aristotle clearly explains.

From this it indubitably follows that the soul is inseparable from its body, or at any rate certain parts of it are (if it has parts) --- for the actuality of some of them is nothing but the actualities of their bodily parts. Yet some may be separable because they are not the actualities of any body at all. — Aristotle On the Soul 413a,3-6

The higher powers, sensitive and intellectual, are very clearly not separable from the material body, being dependent on it. But when we get down to the very basic powers, self-nutrition, and self-movement, these may be separable. And the soul itself is clearly separable, in the way I described. As cause of the material body it is prior to the material body, therefore it existed independently from the material body at that time.

The soul is the cause or source of the living body. The terms cause and source have many senses. But the soul is the cause of its body alike in all three senses which we explicitly recognize. It is (a) the source or origin of movement, it is (b) the end, it is (c) the essence of the whole living body. — 415b, 7-12

It appears to me like you are not respecting the temporal order, and priority explained by Aristotle. So you say, that a soul cannot exist after the death of a living body, therefore a soul has no existence independent from the body. However, Aristotle clearly explains how the soul has existence independent from the body prior in time to the body. Therefore we cannot conclude that "the soul depends on the body". The "parts" of the living being which are prior are not dependent on the parts which are posterior. The soul itself, is the first in temporal priority, and as the cause of the material body, its existence is temporally prior to the material body, so it is separate and immaterial. However, the parts which are posterior are dependent on the parts which are prior, so no posterior part can have independent existence.

If we are saying that the intellect depends on the soul, then there can be no intellect after the death of the body-soul compound. — Apollodorus

Correct, and this is why I disagreed with you in the other thread, when you discussed independent intelligence. I believe that independent immaterial existences, such as God and the angels in Aquinas, which account for the necessity of assuming immaterial and separate Forms, ought not be called "intellects" or "intelligences". These immaterial existences are prior to material existence whereas the human intellect is posterior to material existence. That is why there is a huge separation (the medium of matter) between human intelligible objects (concepts and ideas) and independent Forms. So I conclude that referring to these independent Forms as intelligences is very misleading because the immaterial Forms are temporally prior to matter while intelligible objects are posterior to, and dependent on matter.

If Aquinas accepts everything Aristotle says, he may find himself in conflict with his own Christian views. — Apollodorus

That's what I said already:

So Aquinas had a fine line to walk here, between two completely incompatible doctrines, personal immortality, as a traditional tenet of the Church, and the immateriality of the soul according to Aristotelian principles (science?). Aristotelian immateriality is based in the concept of "prior to matter", and assigns particular, individual, and personal identity to an object's material presence, posteriority. This directly conflicts with the classic Christian teaching of personal resurrection. What is prior, the immaterial soul, cannot be postulated as posterior, to support personal resurrection.

If you look closely into Aquinas' metaphysics and theology, you'll see that ultimately he chooses the Aristotelian doctrine, as it is more scientific, and consistent with the evidence. Take a look at the first line from your quoted passage. "I answer that, It must necessarily be allowed that the principle of intellectual operation which we call the soul, is a principle both incorporeal and subsistent." This is consistent with Aristotle. The soul, as the source of activity, actuality, is the first principle of intellectual operation. This is the very same for all the powers of the soul. The soul is the first principle, as the source of activity, for self-nutrition, sensation, and self-movement, each and every power of a living being. — Metaphysician Undercover

The point being that the Aristotelian view was more scientific, and consistent with the evidence. So Aquinas lead his church in that direction, with his metaphysics, saying just enough concerning personal resurrection and immortality, to appease those with the ancient religious views, and maintain good standing relative to the authorities of the Church. His work of thoroughly analyzing the metaphysical perspective of Aristotle did very much to lead western society out of the dark ages of ancient tenets, into the scientific era.

I think it would be more consistent to see reality as a hierarchy of intelligences and both soul and body as created by a higher intelligence, as in Platonism and similar systems. — Apollodorus

The problem though is that this is not scientific, i.e. not consistent with the evidence. Which do you think is better for metaphysics, to try and twist around the meaning of words like "intelligence" and "soul", to produce consistency with advancements in science, or to change fundamental principles of metaphysics to maintain consistency with new collections of evidence?

Plato laid out, exposed and explained all sorts of ancient (ancient to him) metaphysical principles concerning soul and mind and their relations with matter and human intentions. Many of these were inconsistent with the science of the time. So there was a great project to determine the fallacies of the ancient metaphysics, as well as the fallacies of the contemporary science. When there is such incompatibility, it is not a matter of choosing one side or the other. So we need to take the evidence from the scientific side and the theories from the metaphysical side, which make a match.

The evidence shows that intelligence is a product of the living body, dependent on it, therefore posterior to the body, while the theory shows that the immaterial soul is prior to the living body. So we have that temporal separation between soul and intellect. It makes no sense to bring the posterior (intellect) around to the prior (soul), and start talking about prior immaterial existences as if they are intellects, just for the sake of appeasing some ancient ideas. This only creates an inability for proper education of the subject matter, and consequently confusion. Therefore we must establish new, distinct terms for the immaterial existences, Forms, which are prior to matter, rather than calling them intelligences.

Here, I am afraid, I shall require once more the assistance of the giraffe...How did he come by his long neck? Lamarck would have said, by wanting to get at the tender leaves high up on the tree, and trying until he succeeded in wishing the necessary length of neck into existence... Darwin pointed out—and this and no more was Darwin's famous discovery—that [another] explanation, involving neither will nor purpose nor design either in the animal or anyone else, was on the cards. If your neck is too short to reach your food, you die. That may be the simple explanation of the fact that all the surviving animals that feed on foliage have necks or trunks long enough to reach it...Consider the effect on the giraffes of the natural multiplication of their numbers, as insisted on by Malthus. Suppose the average height of the foliage-eating animals is four feet, and that they increase in numbers until a time comes when all the trees are eaten away to within four feet of the ground. Then the animals who happen to be an inch or two short of the average will die of starvation. All the animals who happen to be an inch or so above the average will be better fed and stronger than the others. They will secure the strongest and tallest mates; and their progeny will survive whilst the average ones and the sub-average ones will die out. This process, by which the species gains, say, an inch in reach, will repeat itself until the giraffe's neck is so long that he can always find food enough within his reach, at which point, of course, the selective process stops and the length of the giraffe's neck stops with it. Otherwise, he would grow until he could browse off the trees in the moon. And this, mark you, without the intervention of any stockbreeder, human or divine...

Darwin's so-called "explanation" is incomplete. It is explained here how the animals which survive are the ones which happen to have longer necks, but it does not explain why they happen to have longer necks. Therefore it does not account for the "cause" of giraffes having longer necks. Lamarck's theory on the other hand addresses the issue of "causation". He says that a being's inclination to repeatedly act in a specific way affects its material body in a way which may be passed on to its offspring. Here, we can see that Lamarck accounts for the cause of existence of "animals who happen to be an inch or so above the average". Darwin simply takes this condition for granted, and produces an evolutionary theory based on the evidence of this reality.

So there is no fundamental and significant incompatibility between Lamarck's theory, and Darwin's theory, until we get to the idea of "chance", "accidental", or "spontaneous variations". Lamarck attributed such variations to the desires of the individual beings (notice that "desire" also includes sexual orientation).

But I think we ought to consider that Darwin has posited the cause of variation as unknown, not as "chance", or "random". This idea of chance or random variation might be an interpretive fallacy. The problem with Lamarck's view, which Darwin exposed, is that variations appear to be as likely to have a negative affect as they are to have a positive effect.

Under domestication we see much variability, caused, or at least excited, by changed conditions of life; but often in so obscure a manner, that we are tempted to consider the variations as spontaneous.
...Variability is not actually caused by man; he only unintentionally exposes organic beings to new conditions of life, and then nature acts on the organisation and causes it to vary.
... As geology plainly proclaims that each land has undergone great physical changes, we might have expected to find that organic beings have varied under nature, in the same way as they have varied under domestication. And if there has been any variability under nature, it would be an unaccountable fact if natural selection had not come into play. It has often been asserted, but the assertion is incapable of proof, that the amount of variation under nature is a strictly limited quantity. Man, though acting on external characters alone and often capriciously, can produce within a short period a great result by adding up mere individual differences in his domestic productions; and every one admits that species present individual differences.
...Variability from the indirect and direct action of the conditions of life and from use and disuse: a Ratio of Increase so high as to lead to a Struggle for Life, and as a consequence to Natural Selection, entailing Divergence of Character and the Extinction of less-improved forms. — Charles Darwin, The Origin of Species, Chapter XV: Recapitulation and Conclusion

https://infidels.org/library/historical/charles-darwin-origin-of-species-chapter15/

I'm not saying anything new here. — Agent Smith

If you say that color is a property, then when something changes from being green to being red, it still has the same property, color. So you assert change is a property, because for you a property is something which changes. But if green and red are distinct properties, then when something changes from green to red, the change is not a part of either of these properties, and change is not a property.

You are saying that "it is not necessary that the intellect be a part of the soul". But some souls apparently do have an intellect. In their case, the intellect is part of the soul. The intellect cannot be at once part of the soul and separate from the soul.

This means that the parts of the soul have no separate existence from each other . The "separation" is only hypothetical. — Apollodorus

Sure, but if we go in this way, then as Aristotle shows, the separation of the soul from the body is only hypothetical.

However, the hypothetical separation is shown to be consistent with the evidence of temporal priority. The sensitive power is prior to the intellectual power, in time, therefore it exists independently of the intellectual power, at that time, so the hypothetical separation is scientifically proven by evidence. Likewise, the hypothetical separation between the nutritive and the sensitive power are proven by evidence.

There is no evidence though, to support the reverse separation. At no time does the intellectual power exist separately from the sensitive. And at no time does the sensitive power exist separately from the nutritive.

Therefore the hypothetical separation is very real, proven and true, when taken in one direction, but it is disproven in the other direction. The separation is evidently time dependent, and only the base powers exist separately from the higher powers, not vise versa.

It doesn't exclude the possibility, though. Who decides that "humans cannot obtain pure unaffected intelligence" and on what basis? — Apollodorus

This is the exact point of the discussion I was having with Wayfarer. This is what Aquinas explains, through reference to Aristotle's principles. The fact that the human intellect is dependent on the material body (by the principles described above) renders the human intellect as deficient. Human beings will never obtain pure unaffected intelligence because their intellectual power is dependent on the material body.

The theory of evolution states that intelligence evolved from physical matter. Yet you are saying that "the soul constructs the physical body". How does the soul do that? — Apollodorus

No one knows how the soul produces the living body. But the same principle which is derived from the hierarchy of powers, along with the principle of the cosmological argument, demonstrate that the soul is necessarily prior to the material body (being an organized body), as cause of it.

The powers are demonstrated by Aristotle, to be potentials, because they are not always active and potential is the feature of matter. Since there must be an actuality which gives actual existence to any potential which is actualized(the cosmological argument), there must be an actuality which is prior to the material living body, giving it existence as an actual organized body with powers. This actuality is the soul. So the cause of the material body having actual organized existence with powers, is the soul. Since it is prior to the material body as cause of it, (therefore separable by the principles above), it is immaterial.

Asfar as I'm concerned change happens to properties (colors, shapes, temperature, weight, etc.) — Agent Smith

"Color" does not refer to a property, nor does "shape", "temperature", or "weight". Otherwise red and green would be the same property, round and square would be the same property, hot and cold would be the same property, and 5 kg and 100 kg would also be the same property. Surely you've got something confused AS.

Numerals are symbols and as such they are especially useful when that for which they stand has no spatial existence. — Arne

Call me daft if you want Arne, but you'll have to explain this to me. In my usage 2 stands for two distinct things with spatial separation between them, and 3 stands for three spatially separated things, etc.. Therefore, contrary to what you say, numerals seem especially useful when they refer to things with spatial existence. And I really don't see how they would be at all useful (except for the purpose of deception) to refer to things without spatial existence, i.e. fictitious things.

If you would have spent a tad more time reading the last full paragraph of the comment you clearly spent a significant amount of time criticizing, you would see that I already addressed the possibility that even if we accept for sake of discussion that there are non-spatial entities, wouldn't they necessarily have to refer to an entity that is or was a spatial entity. — Arne

As I said, I see no point in accepting for the sake of discussion that "there are non-spatial entities", until someone can explain in a reasonable way exactly what a "non-spatial entity" could be. It's one thing to accept the possibility of non-spatial entities, and then move to discuss what a non-spatial entity might be, but it's a completely different thing to accept that there are non-spatial entities, when no one has made it clear how an "entity" could be non-spatial.

To be quite honest, the idea of the higher depending on the lower sounds a bit strange to me. Either the soul has powers or it has not. If it has, then it has them by virtue of being a soul, i.e., a living intelligent being endowed with powers. — Apollodorus

I don't see why this is difficult for you, it is simply a statement by Aristotle of what has been observed. We cannot think without some kind of images which are derived from sensation. And without nutrition we lose the capacity to sense. Therefore the intellectual power is dependent on the sensitive power which is dependent on the nutritive. It's very consistent with the evidence of evolutionary development, so unless you reject evolution I don't see why it sounds strange to you.

n that case, humans can never attain higher states of consciousness either through Philosophy or by any other means.

Moreover, if the “intellect” continues to be affected even after being separated from the soul, what is the difference between an “intellect” with and an “intellect” without soul?

What is the purpose of Philosophy or spiritual practice? — Apollodorus

The fact that people can obtain different levels of consciousness does not imply that a person can obtain "pure unaffected intelligence". It's like you are arguing that if a person cannot obtain the status of 'the biggest thing possible', people cannot differ in size. That there is a limit to the human intellect which makes it impossible for a human being to obtain pure unaffected intelligence, does not imply that there is not different levels of intelligence within human beings.

The point is that it is impossible for an intellect to exist without a soul, but not impossible for a soul to exist without an intellect. So the intellect is dependent on the soul but the soul is not dependent on the intellect. The mode of dependency is what is described above; intellectual capacity is dependent on sense capacity which is dependent on the nutritive capacity which is dependent on soul. Therefore there is a medium of separation between the intellect and the soul, i.e. the intellect is not directly dependent on the soul, it is dependent on what lies between it and the soul, and this in turn is dependent on the soul.

.

Change is what happens to properties. Yes, that's what I wanted to say from the very beginning. As far as I can see, change isn't a property. — Agent Smith

That's not really true AS. Change is what happens to the thing. The thing either has or does not have the property, and in the time between it is changing. The property cannot change, or it would not be that property. It is, by definition, the stated property and there is no possibility of a changing property. Change is what happens to the thing in between having, and not having, the stated property.

It appears like your project is to remove all human feeling and emotion from the review of an artistic piece, and analyze it as an AI would. You would look for patterns in the content, specific to the piece itself, limiting the meaning of "content" in that way, by disallowing that the content be related to anything external to the piece itself, in the production of interpretive "meaning". Is this a fair summary of what you are promoting?

Someone other than I postulated a mortgage as an example of an entity that is not in space. — Arne

The mortgage example is not good, it's just a ruse. Numerals have spatial presence, along with the other stated conditions of a mortgage. If we couldn't refer to the numerals and the conditions somewhere, no one would ever know how much anyone owed, and we wouldn't have to pay our mortgages. So that's just wishful thinking, but not reality.

And it occurred to me that if we accept for the sake of discussion that mortgages are not in space, we can differentiate them by the order in which they are created, i.e., we could differentiate them by time. — Arne

If there is not any spatial difference between them, they would all appear to be exactly the same. So how would you be able to say when one or another got created? If there was one in existence, it would just seem like there was still one in existence, because you'd never be able to observe any change, no matter how many, and how often new ones were supposedly created.

Simply put, if we accept for the sake of discussion that there are entities not in space, then time is one method by which we can differentiate them. — Arne

I don't think we should accept such a proposal without some sort of demonstration as to how such proposed entities could exist. Banno is prone to making assertions, then refusing to justify them, so you ought to take this suggestion with a grain of salt.

But this raises an additional and perhaps more fundamental issue, i.e., even if we accept for the sake of discussion that there are entities not in space, do they not necessarily refer to an entity that is or once was in space? — Arne

I don't think it's very useful to "accept for the sake of discussion" a phrase which no one has any real understand of what it means. "Entities not in space" is such a phrase. Banno's examples refer to things whose spatial presence is difficult to describe, being very complex, not things which do not occupy some space. It is the approach of a lazy, unphilosophical mind, to simply assume that these things have no spatial presence, just because their spatial existence is difficult to understand.

The difficulty arises when we separate the intellect or intelligent spirit (nous) from the soul (psyche). — Apollodorus

Clearly, this separation is possible, warranted and not a difficulty, because plants have a soul, but no intellect. Therefore intellect is not an essential part of the soul, and it is not necessary that the intellect be a part of the soul. So we must allow a separation between the intellect and the soul. This is explained by the hierarchy of powers. The intellectual power is dependent on the sensitive power, which is dependent on the nutritive power. The nutritive power is not dependent on anything but the soul itself. Therefore those other lower powers can be seen as a medium between the intellect and the soul.

We can see a similar description in Kant. Knowledge is dependent on the a priori intuitions of space and time. Those intuitions are a medium between the soul, as knower, and knowledge, as property of the mind. The soul knows through the medium of those intuitions, it does not have direct access to the thing known.

If, pure, unaffected intelligence (nous) is separable from the soul (psyche) on the death of the physical body, then there is no possibility of divine judgement. — Apollodorus

The point being, that there is no such thing as "pure, unaffected intelligence" in human beings. Human beings do not make divine judgements. The evidence is clear, intelligence is "affected". So setting up a model in which human intelligence is not separable from the soul, for the purpose of supporting the concept of "pure, unaffected intelligence" in human beings, is a mistaken intention, therefore a mistaken representation.

by time. — Arne

Why would this not be the same individual, extended in time?

As with any company, the balance sheet is what is important. That only sick people use pharmaceuticals is a long outdated idea. But it may be the case that a lot of fancy names are given to the conditions of non-sick people, to help ease them into the pharmaceutical market, in case that old idea might still persist. In many cases though, pharmaceuticals are used just to make one feel better, and so they are often not intended to cure.

Geez MU, who in the world ever said there was a norm of use with regard to a private language? — Sam26

You criticized me for interpretations of Wittgenstein which are "far from the norm". Aren't we discussing private language? As you say here, in regard to a private language, there is no norm. So, how is 'far from the norm" something to be critical of, rather than what is intended by Wittgenstein in his discussion of "private language"? And if it is what was intended by Wittgenstein, I would say that it is "the true" interpretation which is far better than any 'normal' interpretation.

We are only able to talk about the false assumption of having a private language, in light of the social nature of meaning, namely, it's a necessary feature of a concept that its meaning happens socially within forms of life, both linguistically and non-linguistically. — Sam26

It really doesn't matter if private language is a true or false assumption. Mathematics is full of axioms which are neither true nor false, yet we must adhere to the principles if applying the mathematics. Now we are discussing "private language". So we must adhere to the principles of that premise. Therefore there can be no such thing as "the norm" for interpreting Wittgenstein's conception of "private language". If there was a norm, then it would not be "private language".

So, the proposition is a language which is not based in norms. We cannot just dismiss the proposition as impossible, or false, because that would just circumvent the intent behind Wittgenstein's discussion of "private language", leaving Wittgenstein's whole discussion as pointless. Therefore we must accept the proposition, a language which is not based in norms, rather than rejecting it as false, in order to engage with his discussion.