How is it ambiguous to define green as a colour? — Luke

Red is a colour. Pink is a colour, so are brown and blue, and many more. The definition is very ambiguous because there are many colours and it provides nothing to distinguish the colour green from the others.

What is in question is whether the phrase "a certain sensation" refers to a one-off particular instance of a sensation or to a recurrent particular type of sensation. I have given you all the quotes about "recurrent" and "every time" to support that he means the latter. — Luke

After discussing this issue for a month or two, with no consensus between us, I came to the conclusion that "a certain sensation" is ambiguous. Further, I gave some reasons why I believe that Wittgenstein practiced a technique of creative writing which employs the intentional use of ambiguity.

I thought we were making some progress. But obviously you just want to go back and argue the same thing, all over again, so that we can establish once again, that "sensation" is ambiguous.

You might have an argument for your interpretation of "type", if Wittgenstein hadn't used the definite article "the", four times at 258, when referring to "the sensation". Do you understand the grammar of this definite article?

It appears to me, that we have established beyond any reasonable doubt, that "a certain sensation" is ambiguous. The question which remains is whether that ambiguity is intentional or not. If it's not intentional, then one or the other interpretation might be the correct one. But if it is intentional, then neither interpretation is the correct one.

Recall that for Parmenides, it doesn't really make sense to say a thing is not, because if X is not, then how were you just talking about it? — frank

But this is the point which Parmenides makes at the end of 135, when he speaks about visible things, and "their wandering between opposites". He says to Socrates, who he views as young and full of potential, yet untrained: "...If you want to be trained more thoroughly, you must not only hypothesize, if each thing is, and examine the consequences of that hypothesis, you must also hypothesize, if that same thing is not."

He says this because visible things come into being and go out of being, they pass through opposites. We can say of the same thing that "it is X" at one time, and "not X" at another time. And so, "among visible things, it's not at all hard to show that things are both like and unlike and anything else you please."

Very simple. Take the example of the five fingers of one hand. They are different extensions of the same one hand. Different intelligences are products of One Supreme Intelligence as Plato says in the Timaeus. — Apollodorus

The analogy doesn't work because a hand is something different from a finger. Five fingers does not make one finger, it makes something different, one hand. So by your analogy a multitude of intelligences would not make One Supreme Intelligence, it would make something different.

Of course seeing oneself in the other requires more than one. But this is just a metaphor. — Apollodorus

Well, if "seeing oneself in the other" is metaphorical for something which involves only one, that would be very very strange.

The point Plato is making is that by seeing itself reflected in a being that is similar to itself, the soul becomes aware of its own identity. — Apollodorus

So, do you not agree that this, "seeing itself reflected in a being that is similar to itself", requires more than one being? And if this, "seeing oneself in the other", is, as you said, the source of all knowledge, then knowledge cannot be derived from One, it requires more than one.

Wittgenstein uses the word "sensation" to refer to an "inner experience" such as pain. There is no ambiguity about it and none has coherently been pointed out. — Luke

There is no question that defining "sensation" as "an inner experience" is extremely ambiguous, just like defining "green" as "a colour" is extremely ambiguous. And it doesn't help to say "such as pain", just like it wouldn't help to say "such as red".

But that is not the issue here. The issue concerns what Wittgenstein refers to with "the sensation", at 258, what he has called "a certain sensation". You have consistently ignored Wittgenstein's use of the definite article "the" at 258, when referring to "the sensation", since we engaged in this thread. And it appears, you will continue to do so.

Do you think that it's possible to argue against the idea of "the one" as presented by Parmenides? — Manuel

I would ask how is it possible to not argue against such an idea. "The One" appears to me, to be presented by Parmenides as being self-contradicting in every possible way. It is a demonstration of the problem which arises from the assumption of independent Forms.

Parmenides describes to Socrates how we see in visible things the existence of opposites. Visible things change, therefore they pass from 'is..." to "is not..." in different ways. The Form itself, if we assume such a thing, must contain both of these opposites. But how is that possible for a thing (the Form) to both be and not be) in the same sense at the same time.

So I believe that the One is presented by Parmenides as an example, of how opposites can coexist in one Form. So the question we ought to ask would be whether this is an acceptable presentation or not. Does Parmenides provide a good demonstration of the Idea of One, one which cannot be argued against.

That's interesting. If I understand you correctly you are saying that what a person derives from a sign, is dependent on what they want to derive from the sign. But what role does the intent of the author play in this act? Does the intent of the author enter into the act, or is it only through pretense, as the reader pretends to want to derive the intent of the author?

Where does he say at 261 that "sensation" has no referent or that we cannot say what it refers to? — Luke

I've quoted it numerous times already.

Let's say that what I meant by the statement "I am going to the bank" is "I am going to the financial establishment". How does my intention remove the ambiguity from the statement? It could still mean either the financial establishment or the side of the river. — Luke

I didn't say intention removes ambiguity, I distinguished between intentionally creating ambiguity, and unintentionally creating ambiguity.

But if we define "meaning" as what is meant, then what you say here would be contradiction. If, what you meant was "I am going to the financial establishment", then it is impossible that what you meant was " I am going to the side of the river. So we cannot say that it could mean either.

And, in the example, you are the one saying both, "I am going to the bank", and "it could mean 'financial establishment' or 'side of river'". Being the person who made the statement, you would know whether it means the former or the latter, in that instance of use. So for you to say that it could mean either, indicates that it really means neither, because you would know which of the two is the case, if it meant one of them, so you could not say that it could be either one. If one of the two is the case, you cannot truthfully say that it could be either, because you know which one it is. Therefore you are intentionally being ambiguous.

You have a lot of work to do to demonstrate that Wittgenstein intentionally uses the word "sensation" ambiguously (or at all ambiguously). And I know you're wrong about it, but you cannot be reasoned with, so I'm out. — Luke

I don't intend to make any such demonstration. I don't know how such a thing could be demonstrated. I am simply stating my opinion, and demonstrating the reality of, and the effects of, intentional ambiguity. But I know that you are very set in your ways, and could never be convinced of something you refuse to even try to understand.

What reason do you have for thinking that Wittgenstein intends multiple interpretations of the word "sensation"? This might seem like a silly question, but what makes you think Wittgenstein is not using the word "sensation" to mean a sensation such as pain? — Luke

I answered this:

Plato teaches us very well, how to recognize the intentional use of ambiguity, through multiple examples including ancient poetry. Then he proceeds to attack the intentional use of ambiguity by the sophists, to produce fallacious logic, in the form of what we now call "equivocation".

There are key signifiers of intentional ambiguity. One is an absurd logical conclusion, which signifies a likelihood of equivocation, and the need to carefully consider the use of terms. Another is the author's alluding to one's own use of ambiguity. This is what Wittgenstein does throughout the PI, and especially at the passage I quoted from, at 261. What he is saying at 261 is that "sensation" has no referent (or, we cannot say what it refers to), and this is very consistent with intentional ambiguity, as I've described. — Metaphysician Undercover

You have still failed to explain how having more than one possible meaning implies having less than one possible meaning. Or, that is, how either implies neither. — Luke

I didn't say "less than". And, I explained very clearly how the appearance of either, implies neither, when the appearance of either is intentionally created. You just seem to be incapable of apprehended the intentional use of ambiguity. That's your failure, not mine

Go back to your "bank" example and reread my reply carefully. Remember, you, as the author said both, "I am going to the bank", and, "the word 'bank' which could mean either the side of a river or a financial establishment". In saying that the word could mean either of the two, you are admitting to intentional ambiguity, and you are saying that neither one is the correct one, because if there was a correct one you would have to say which one is the one which is meant, thereby negating the possibility of either.

Here, I'll repost, and don't get distracted by the question of whether "I am going to the bank", and "'bank' which could mean either... or..." is two distinct statements. Just accept the reality of the example, that you are saying both, I am going to the bank", and "bank" in this phrase has an indeterminate meaning. This implies that you are intentionally creating ambiguity with the word.

If the first statement means that you are going to a financial establishment, then you would not allow that it possibly means the side of a river, and vise versa. You know where you are going, and you know what you mean by the statement, one or the other. If you meant that you are going to a financial establishment then it is not possible that you meant that you are going to the side of a river, However, you do say that this is a possibility. On the basis of this statement, your statement, that "bank" in this expression could mean either the side of a river, or a financial establishment, we can come to the conclusion that "bank" means neither. — Metaphysician Undercover

See, if a person intentionally uses a word ambiguously, the appearance is that the word has numerous possibilities for meaning. However, since the use of ambiguity is intentional, we can conclude that the author cannot possibly mean any single one of these possibilities. Furthermore, it is impossible that the author means all of the possibilities because that would be contradictory. Therefore we can conclude that the author means none of the possibilities.

Ad so I continued the explanation with this:

Further to this, we cannot say that "bank" in this context has no meaning. It definitely has meaning, because it definitely serves a purpose in your example of ambiguity. And since you are not telling us where you are going at all, as you are creating ambiguity with the word instead, we wouldn't say that you have said "I am going to the ambiguity", the word "bank" simply makes the entire statement an expression of ambiguity. And of course it is very reasonable to say that the meaning of "bank" here is ambiguous. — Metaphysician Undercover

If you are still having difficulty understanding, that if an author intentionally uses a word to create the appearance of numerous possibilities, then not any one of .these numerous possibilities is what is meant by the author, then please let me know what aspects of the explanation are insufficient

Is a trail with a fork ( ---< ) vague or ambiguous?

If one intends to use the trail as a path to a destination in mind, then the trail is ambiguous. If one merely intends to use the trail without a destination in mind, then the trail is vague. And if one doesn't intend to use the trail for walking, then the trail is neither vague nor ambiguous. — sime

The issue is the intent behind the creation of the thing. So the trail with a fork is not analogous, because each fork may have been created and intended to lead you somewhere different. Instead, we could talk about a sign which is intended to lead you in two distinct and incompatible directions. Such a sign is really not intended to lead you anywhere. However, this does not mean that it is not intended to do something, i.e. it does not mean that the sign is meaningless.

I don’t find that “awareness and consciousness is more compatible with Many than with One” at all. On the contrary, my common sense and intuition is that awareness and consciousness is one, not many. So, unfortunately, this is where we will have to disagree. — Apollodorus

How do you account for the fact that there are many different people with consciousness and awareness, when you say that consciousness and awareness is more compatible with One?? And each of these different people is a distinct instance of consciousness and awareness, making Many rather than One. Clearly, consciousness is Many, and not One.

What I am talking about when I say “the One”, is the Divine Awareness or Consciousness prior to the creation of the universe, i.e., in its role as First Cause of all, when no world full of distinct instances of awareness or consciousness existed. — Apollodorus

You never did demonstrate why the "First Cause" ought to be consider to be some sort of awareness or consciousness. All we have to go on, is that the so-called First Cause, is a movement toward a good, a final cause. But we see that all sorts of living creatures, with or without consciousness and awareness, engage in this type of movement toward a good.

Not knowledge, but that which knows, the subject of the known objects (whatever and however many they happen to be, including Forms), is the highest reality which is One. This is the true focus of Plato’s philosophical quest and the true meaning of “source and cause of knowledge”.

The cleansing or purification process (katharsis) is nothing but the elimination of everything that is not “us”. This is the only way to discover our true self. If we mentally strip or chisel away all the accretions of sense-perceptions, emotions, and thoughts, we arrive at a new type of non-discursive, image- and concept-free, intuitive knowledge.

But it is important to understand that this knowledge itself must be transcended. And as we transcend it, we get to the consciousness we have of this knowledge, and beyond that, to pure awareness itself. It is this awareness that is the ultimate self, not the knowledge. The knowledge belongs to the self but is not the self. It is at the most an extension of the self in the same way thoughts, emotions, and sense-perceptions are extensions or “accretions” of the nous.

The key to the correct understanding of this is provided in the First Alcibiades.

Already in the Charmides (164d ff.) Socrates discusses the Delphic inscription “Know thyself” and the possibility of there being any such thing as knowledge of knowledge (episteme epistemes).

The discussion is carried on in the First Alcibiades (132c ff.) where Socrates proposes substituting “see” for “know” and gives the example of seeing oneself in a mirror.

He next compares this with seeing oneself in the eye of another, the only part of another person in which one can see oneself. The same is true of the soul: if it wishes to see itself in another soul, it must look at that part of it that most resembles it, namely the seat of wisdom (sophia).

Socrates and Alcibiades agree that the seat of wisdom (the nous) is the most divine part of the soul, and that a soul can truly know itself only by looking at God himself: — Apollodorus

Look at the inconsistency you have presented here. You start off saying, "Not knowledge, but that which knows, the subject of the known objects", and you call this "One". Then you proceed to talk about "us". But "us" does not refer to one, it refers to many. Further, you talk about a soul seeing itself in another soul. Obviously this is not a feature of one soul, but of a number of souls.

So you start with an assumption of One, but everything which follows concerns Many, rather than One. Your assumption of One is totally out of place here.

As Awareness, the supreme Intelligence is “the Same”. As its own reflection in the mirror of itself, it is “the Other”. Seeing oneself in the other is “the best knowledge of oneself”. And that self-knowledge is the source and cause of all knowledge and all things. — Apollodorus

Again, this "seeing oneself in the other" requires more than one. So if this is "the source and cause of all knowledge", then knowledge cannot be derived from One, it must be derived from Many.

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Note that it says differential/different (i.e. more than one) interpretations. — Luke

Right. Now do you see that if the author intends multiple interpretations, there is no such thing as the correct interpretation of the word? So if meaning is rule dependent, as you think it is, then the word has no meaning in these situations.

You may claim that W uses the word “sensation” to be ambiguous (not to mean ambiguous), but then you will need to say what (more than one) meanings the word “sensation” could possibly have in the text. — Luke

Didn't I already give you three possible meanings for the word "sensation" in that context?

You can’t have it both ways by saying that the word has more than one possible meaning but also no meaning. — Luke

As I said, the third is not really "no meaning". In the third possibility the meaning is "ambiguous": It's just your refusal to acknowledge the reality of this sort of meaning, and your insistence that meaning is given by following a rule, which creates the appearance that ambiguous meaning is no meaning.

You either don't understand my argument or you are purposefully ignoring it. It was your claim that the word "sensation" is ambiguous (having a "multitude of possible meanings") and that "ambiguous" is one of its possible meanings. It is the latter half of this conjunction that I find ridiculous. — Luke

You do not seem to be recognizing the difference between using a word with a specific intended meaning, but which could be wrongly interpreted because it is ambiguous, and intentionally using a word to create ambiguity. In the latter case there is no such thing as what the word means (or we can simply say as I did, its meaning is ambiguous). You do not seem to acknowledge the reality of intentional ambiguity, as a tool in creative writing.

This intentional ambiguity, I explained to you with reference to your example "bank". Your use of "bank" was meant as an example of ambiguity. Therefore there is no correct interpretation of "bank". It does not mean "financial establishment" nor does it mean "side of a river", because it was intended by you, the author, to signify the possibility of either one.

If you so desire, you can continue to refuse to acknowledge the reality of the intentional use of ambiguity. I suppose, then you will not have to address the issue of whether or not Wittgenstein is engaged in this activity. But, if he is, then you will have an incorrect interpretation, a misreading. So I really see no point in that approach, especially since you gave a clear example of intentional use of ambiguity in your post concerning "the bank". So it is hypocritical of you to deny the reality of the intentional use of ambiguity.

It is one thing to describe the meaning of the word "sensation" as ambiguous, which is to say that the word "sensation" has more than one possible meaning. It is quite another thing to say that the word "sensation" itself has the possible meaning of, or is possibly synonymous with, the word "ambiguous". — Luke

The first :"thing" here, is to unintentionally create ambiguity. In this case, the person attempting to interpret would have to choose between "possible meanings". However, one of the possible meanings is the correct interpretation; "correct" here means what was intended by the author. The ambiguity is not intentional, and there is a true meaning intended.

The "quite another thing", is the intentional creation of ambiguity, by the author. In this case none of the possible meanings which the interpreter might come up with is the "correct" meaning (the one intended by the author), because what the author intended was to write something ambiguous.

You somehow make the leap from describing the use/meaning of the word “sensation”as ambiguous to giving the word “sensation” a use/meaning which is synonymous with "ambiguous". That's ridiculous. — Luke

What is ridiculous, is your refusal to acknowledge the reality of intentional ambiguity. And, when someone uses a word to intentionally create ambiguity, the person does not intend that any of the apparently "possible meanings" is the correct meaning, because what was meant by the author (the intent), is that the meaning would be ambiguous.

What makes you think that Wittgenstein is using the word "sensation" to mean "ambiguous"? Please do not repeat your spurious reasoning that if the word "sensation" has an ambiguous (more than one) meaning, then the word "sensation" means "ambiguous". Look up the word "sensation" in the dictionary if you want to know its common meanings/synonyms. — Luke

I've read much philosophy in my life, and I am very well acquainted with the intentional use of ambiguity. It is a technique derived from poetry.

Poetry uses forms and conventions to suggest differential interpretations of words, or to evoke emotive responses. Devices such as assonance, alliteration, onomatopoeia, and rhythm may convey musical or incantatory effects. The use of ambiguity, symbolism, irony, and other stylistic elements of poetic diction often leaves a poem open to multiple interpretations. — Wikipedia: Poetry

Plato teaches us very well, how to recognize the intentional use of ambiguity, through multiple examples including ancient poetry. Then he proceeds to attack the intentional use of ambiguity by the sophists, to produce fallacious logic, in the form of what we now call "equivocation".

There are key signifiers of intentional ambiguity. One is an absurd logical conclusion, which signifies a likelihood of equivocation, and the need to carefully consider the use of terms. Another is the author's alluding to one's own use of ambiguity. This is what Wittgenstein does throughout the PI, and especially at the passage I quoted from, at 261. What he is saying at 261 is that "sensation" has no referent (or, we cannot say what it refers to), and this is very consistent with intentional ambiguity, as I've described.

Moreover, how is it sophistry to say that the One and the Good are identical? — Apollodorus

I might agree that the One is the same as the Good, in the sense of "the first" principle. This provides a clear defining feature of the One, as meaning the first. But Plato has Parmenides attributing all sorts of ridiculous properties to the One in the Parmenides. That's what happens if we just choose a name "the One" without any definition, and allow ourselves absolute freedom in describing it. We end up with a completely contradictory description. However, if we start with a limiting feature, such as "the first", or "the good", then we come up with a completely different description than the one which Plato represents Parmenides as providing.

Certainly, the Stranger’s claims in the Sophist are not refuted. — Apollodorus

Direct logical refutation was not Plato's method. His way was to provide a very clear and accurate description of different perspectives, revealing the flaws, and allowing the reader to determine the parts of the perspective which were inconsistent and problematic, thereby requiring replacement or revision. So it is definitely as you say, that we are not advised by Plato to reject everything a particular individual is saying, absolutely, but we are to analyze critically, and reject the parts which produce unresolvable logical problems, while accepting the parts which are reasonable.

But the fact of the matter is that, though on the whole correct, Plato’s original Theory of Forms (as presented in the Phaedo) that defines particulars as things that participate in the properties of the Forms, is not sufficient to explain the exact nature of particulars. Plato, therefore, introduces new concepts like Limit, Matter, and Receptacle (Philebus, Timaeus). — Apollodorus

Yes, that's what I said earlier in the thread. Plato reveals through the method described above, that the theory of participation, as presented, is deficient, flawed, and needs to be revised or rejected.

There is no denying that Forms do have some common characteristics such as One and Being. So, it is not incorrect to say that the One is the cause of the essence in all Forms and, therefore, above both essence and Forms. — Apollodorus

If One is defined as the first, then it can be the cause of others. But there is a problem here with a difference between logical priority and temporal priority, as the defining feature of "the first". Temporal priority is required for cause, as "cause" is a temporal concept. However, logical priority does not necessitate temporal priority. And the Forms are related through logical priority. So if "the One" is related to other Forms as "first" in the sense of logical priority, we cannot necessarily conclude that it is first in the temporal sense, therefore we cannot conclude necessarily that it is the cause of the others.

This also leads to the question of how the first principle of all can be both One and Many. The problem of One and Many is a key issue discussed in the Philebus. And the whole purpose of it is to explain how the Good, which is one, or undifferentiated unity, can generate multiplicity. — Apollodorus

Here, One is defined as distinct from Many, and that is a completely different definition from "first". To make the two consistent it is necessary to show how One is logically prior to Many. But the demonstration that One is logically prior to Many, does not show that One is temporally prior to Many, It is only through the introduction of "the Good", as a causal principle, in the sense of final cause, that we derive the temporal priority which is required for causation.

Now it is required to show whether the Good is more compatible with One or with Many. And as I explained earlier in the thread, I believe that The Good is better described as a multiplicity than as a single, the good being complicated and complex. Therefore Many appears to be temporally prior to One, when One is defined in relation to Many. So temporally, Many is first rather than One. But when we define Many logically, it must consist of individuals, so One is logically prior to Many. This implies that "Many" is not a good defining term for One, as that which One is distinct from or opposed to. We would be better to define One with unity, and the opposing term would be ununified, as this does not necessarily imply distinct particulars like Many does, making the Many dependent on One. It makes Many dependent on ununified instead, and the ununified are not necessarily distinct individuals, or ones.

This is explained by introducing the Dyad of Limit and Unlimited that is at once “One and Many” and, through its interaction with the One, brings forth multiplicity. Limit being that which imposes form on what is unlimited, is the principle of Form. Unlimited is the principle of Matter. The two are used by Creative Intelligence (which is a manifestation of the One or the Good) to impose Form on Matter and thereby generate the Physical Universe. — Apollodorus

Limit and Unlimited is another proposed way to deal with the difference between logical priority and temporal priority. But the mathematical conception of unlimited is distinct from the philosophical conception, and this method gets lost in sophisticated confusion. That's why Plato moved to "the Good" instead. And Aristotle demonstrated that "infinite" in the mathematical sense has the nature of "potential", while anything eternal must by "actual" which is a distinct category from "potential". This drives a wedge between "infinite" (unlimited), and "eternal" (the principle of temporal priority), making it impossible to speak of "unlimited" or "infinite" in a causal application.

So, it is clear that when Plato takes up a theory that appears to be inconsistent with his own, he does not necessarily do so in order to eliminate one of those two theories. On the contrary, his tendency is to combine them into a new or improved theory that is superior to both and serves to provide additional support to the general Platonic framework. — Apollodorus

Right, this is the matter of critically analyzing the theories, and accepting the good, while rejecting the bad.

The fact is that one is prior to many. When we reduce a multiplicity to the absolute minimum, we reduce it to one, not to “good”. — Apollodorus

This, what you call a "fact" provides a clear demonstration of what I described above, the division between logically prior and temporally prior. One is logically prior to many, as you say, a multiplicity is defined as consisting of ones. One is a defining feature of many, and is therefore logically prior. But this does not give us what is required to make any statements about causation, because of the gap between logically prior and temporally prior. If we want to make statements about causation we need principles of temporal priority rather than logical priority. This is where the principles derived from mathematics, one and many, limited and unlimited, fail us. They do not provide temporal principles.

So, to get a principle of temporal priority Plato turned to "good", as a motivating feature, the cause of activity. here we have the basis for a temporal priority. But now we have a problem of establishing compatibility, or commensurability, between temporal priority and logical priority. If, the real "fact" is, as it appears to me, that good is more compatible with many than with one, we have a reversal between temporal priority and logical priority.

This is why Plotinus says that the One (or the Good) has (or is) a kind of awareness or consciousness. For the same reason, Plato calls it the source and cause of all knowledge: knowledge presupposes awareness or consciousness. This ultimate Awareness or Consciousness that is the source and cause of all knowledge, is the One or the Good. — Apollodorus

Using your own common sense and intuition, don't you find that awareness and consciousness is more compatible with Many than with One? Isn't the world full of distinct instances of awareness and consciousness? Why would we say that the many consciousnesses which make up the reality of human existence is One, when it is very clear that it is Many?

The desire to return to the One is the root of “love”. We love things that make us feel one with them and with ourselves. This is why we call them “beautiful” and “good”. But their beauty and goodness come from the Forms which in turn come from the One. Therefore, our love must be redirected to its true object. Love of the beautiful and the good, when practiced as indicated in the Symposium, takes us to the direct vision or experience of the Good or the One that is the Higher Self of all. — Apollodorus

See, you have this backward. each of us is a one, an individual, a self. The desire is not to return to the One, because we already are, each one of us, the One. The desire is to return to the many. This is the problem with the theory of participation, as exposed by Plato. It is backward. It portrays the Many as actively participating in the One, which is a reversal of the active/passive reality. This is caused by the inversion between logical priority and temporal priority. When we turn this around, to give us the clearer perspective of reality, provided by giving the Good priority, we find that the One participates in the Many. Now the One is causally active within the Many, as participating in the Many, because the One is defined by temporal priority, (Good), rather than logical priority (mathematically One is prior to Many).

To use an example off the top of my head, if I say "I am going to the bank", then there is potential ambiguity in the word "bank" which could mean either the side of a river or a financial establishment. What the word "bank" does not mean here is "ambiguous" because "I am going to the ambiguous" makes no apparent sense. Although the meaning of the word "bank" may be ambiguous - because it has more than one possible interpretation - it does not seem that the word "bank" could possibly mean "ambiguous" or could be one of the possible interpretations. — Luke

I do not understand why this is so difficult for you Luke. Let me provide a very clear explanation by referring to your example. You say "I am going to the bank". You also say "the word 'bank' which could mean either the side of a river or a financial establishment". Since you are the one making both these statements we can see the two as inconsistent with each other. If the first statement means that you are going to a financial establishment, then you would not allow that it possibly means the side of a river, and vise versa. You know where you are going, and you know what you mean by the statement, one or the other. If you meant that you are going to a financial establishment then it is not possible that you meant that you are going to the side of a river, However, you do say that this is a possibility. On the basis of this statement, your statement, that "bank" in this expression could mean either the side of a river, or a financial establishment, we can come to the conclusion that "bank" means neither.

Do you understand this so far? By saying that "bank" could mean either one, you are implying that it means neither one. This is because if it meant the former, it could not mean the latter, and if it meant the latter it could not mean the former. And if you were in fact telling me where you are going, you would mean one or the other. So by saying that it could mean either, you are saying that it does not mean the former, and you are saying that it does not mean the latter. Therefore, you are giving "bank" a third and very distinct meaning. You are saying that "bank" in this context does not mean a financial establishment, nor does it mean the side of a river.

To know what "bank" means we have to look and see what purpose the word serves in this context, what you are doing with it. And, here we can see that you are giving an example of ambiguity. You are using the word to create ambiguity for your example. The meaning of the word is ambiguous, and you have inserted into the sentence to create an ambiguous statement. Now, we can see that "I am going to the..." is irrelevant because you are not telling me where you are going at all. Your intention was never to tell me where you are going, it was simply to make an example of ambiguity. All that "bank" is doing for you is allowing you to make a statement of indeterminate meaning.

Further to this, we cannot say that "bank" in this context has no meaning. It definitely has meaning, because it definitely serves a purpose in your example of ambiguity. And since you are not telling us where you are going at all, as you are creating ambiguity with the word instead, we wouldn't say that you have said "I am going to the ambiguity", the word "bank" simply makes the entire statement an expression of ambiguity. And of course it is very reasonable to say that the meaning of "bank" here is ambiguous.

That is what I propose Wittgenstein is doing with "the sensation" at 258. He is making a statement of ambiguity. He is intentionally using it in a way which you might interpret as referring to a type, and someone else might interpret as referring to a particular token. And, since this way of using it is intentional, I can conclude that it refers to neither, as in your example of "bank". This is a third and distinct meaning for "the sensation". Its meaning is ambiguous.

Furthermore, when Wittgenstein says "S is the name of...", he is not at all saying what S is the name of (as indicated by 261), just like when you say "I am going to the..." you are not at all saying where you are going. "S is the name of..." is completely irrelevant in Wittgenstein's example, just like "I am going to the..." is completely irrelevant in your example. In each case, the word "sensation" and the word "bank" are simply being used to create an expression of ambiguity. Wittgenstein is not telling us what S names, he is simply creating ambiguity with "the sensation", just like you are not telling us where you are going, you are simply creating ambiguity with "the bank".

Since any word could be used in an ambiguous way, then all words mean "ambiguous". Right? You're an idiot. — Luke

The meaning of a word is only ambiguous when it is used in an ambiguous way. I agree that any word can be used in an ambiguous way, and therefore have "ambiguous" as its meaning. But do you not understand that the meaning of a word is dependent on how it is used? Often words are not used ambiguously, so in those situations we cannot say that their meaning is ambiguous. You seem to be especially thick on the subject of ambiguity.

Wittgenstein's private language is private in principle: "The words of this language are to refer to what only the speaker can know — to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language." (PI 243) That is, it's not possible for others to ever come to understand a private language, or for a private language to ever be translated into a public language (or vice versa). — Luke

As I explained, the example of 258 is not supposed to be an example of a private language as described at 243. So this is not relevant to our discussion.

The third is not a possible meaning of "sensation". Additionally, you later said: — Luke

A word's meaning is a function of the way the word is used. If it is used in a way so as to be ambiguous, then its meaning is ambiguous. Therefore the third option, "ambiguous", is a possible meaning.

See PI 243:

But is it also conceivable that there be a language in which a person could write down or give voice to his inner experiences — his feelings, moods, and so on — for his own use? —– Well, can’t we do so in our ordinary language? — But that is not what I mean. The words of this language are to refer to what only the speaker can know — to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language.
— PI 243 — Luke

Obviously, the example at 258 is not such a private language, because the terms are given to us in a way which we can potentially understand. I explained this to you already, 258 provides an example of naming a sensation, it does not provide an example of a private language, as described at 243. The fact that you do not understand the example at 258 does not mean that "another person cannot understand" it.

If a person speaks a public language, why would their private language be unintelligible to them? Why does the private sign "always need to exist within" the context of a public language? — Luke

I didn't say "speaks" a public language, I said "understands through the means of" a public language. That's the example of 258, we as observers understand the use of "S", through public language, "S" is the sign of "a sensation". Further, it is written by Wittgenstein, so that the diarist is also recognizing what is signified by S as "the sensation". Therefore the meaning of "S" is within the context of a public language, as "sensation" is part of a public language. However, that whatever "S" refers to is actually what ought to be called "a sensation" is what needs to be justified.

In theory, a private sign does not necessarily exist within the context of a public language. That's why a private language is not impossible in theory. But since we as human beings learn language at a very young age, and language rapidly becomes a fundamental feature of how we understand things, it is impossible for a person to create a private language, because any attempt would be within the structured understanding provided by public language use, within one's own mind. Therefore it would not be a private language as described at 243.

How would that work? Or are you unable to tell me? If you can't justify the possibility of a private language, or provide anything more than a mere assertion that it is possible, then why should I believe you? — Luke

I could tell you how it would work, just like Wittgenstein does at 243. The person would have unique signs and symbols referring to one's own experiences. That might happen if a person grew up in complete isolation from other human beings or something like that. If the person meets up later with other people speaking public language, the person's private language would need to be altered to become consistent with the others', to understand them, and would no longer be a "private language", even though it was a "private language" prior to this alteration.

That's similar to if an individual person travels to an isolated part of the world. The natives there speak a public language, and the stranger arrives with what is in relation to their language, a private language. The private language, as the context for understanding, must be altered to become consistent with the native language, in order for the person to learn the language. This alteration to the private language renders it as something other than a "private language", it's been affected by the public. But the fact that the new language, produced by the alteration is not a private language, does not mean that it wasn't a private language prior to alteration.

You say there is no reason that there cannot be a private sign or private language, but there also seems to be no reason that there can be a private sign or private language. — Luke

Clearly, there is no obvious reason for a "private language" as described at 243. We learn in the context of public language. Wittgenstein is producing these thought experiments as an aid toward understanding the nature of language. As for a private sign, one could think of many reasons for that. It could be used as a memory aid. You write something down, so that you do not forget it, and if it's a secret, you don't want anyone else to be able to understand it. And of course private meaning plays a big role in deception. Therefore we cannot exclude the "private" aspects of language as being irrelevant to language use. Hence Wittgenstein's discussion.

What examples? Where? Quote them. — Luke

So I've used it to distinguish two possible meanings, you took type, I took token. These are two of the "multitude of possible meanings". A third, is what I really believe, and that is that "the sensation" is left ambiguous, having no real referent, only indeterminate meaning, inviting as many different interpretations as possible. — Metaphysician Undercover

He refers to "S" here twice, which undermines your assertion that he is not talking about "S" here. — Luke

He calls "S" a sign, and "sensation" a word. Then he says the use of this word stands in need of justification. You really can't read.

The point is that the use of the word "sensation" stands in need of a justification which everybody understands because it is a word of our common language. If the word "sensation" has a public use then how can we be talking about a private language? "S" is meant to be a private word with a private meaning, but this cannot be if it refers to a sensation, where the word "sensation" has a public meaning. For the same reason, "S" cannot refer to "Something" which is also a word of our public language. In the end, the private language advocate has no recourse but to emit an inarticulate sound in defence of their claims. But that won't do either. — Luke

This makes no sense at all.

"S", the private sign, is supposed to represent something which has been called "a sensation", public word. That "sensation" is the appropriate word to call whatever it is which the sign "S" represents is what needs to be justified

It is not the case that "S" cannot refer to a sensation, because S is part of a private language. What is the case is that if "S" is to be said to refer to "a sensation", this must be justified. There is nothing mentioned about "private meaning", or "private word".

But if we assume that "S' starts out as a private sign, then to be understood, even by the private person using the sign, it must be placed into the context of a language (justified). So a private language will always be unintelligible from the perspective of a person who understands through the means of a public language, because the private sign will always need to exist within that context, making it a part of a language which is not private.

However, there is no reason why there cannot be a private sign, and other private signs, and even a private language, which has no part of any public language.

So you still have no examples to support your claim that the word "sensation" in Wittgenstein's scenario has a "multitude of possible meanings"? — Luke

I'm really sorry that your inability to read English has left you incapable of understanding the examples I presented. You seem to be having a similar problem with Wittgenstein's example of the private language. No matter how many times and different ways I try to explain it to you, you just don't get it.

At 253, Wittgenstein asks us to "consider what makes it possible in the case of physical objects to speak of “two exactly the same”. So what makes it possible? When might we say that two physical objects are "exactly the same"? — Luke

There is no specific criterion which tells us when to say that two things are exactly the same, that's the point Wittgenstein makes.

If you're correct, then address my argument that sensations don't have referents or meanings. — Luke

The issue I've been talking about is Wittgenstein's use of the word "sensation". I thought we were both talking about that, because you asked me why I thought the word's meaning was intentionally made ambiguous. He even explicitly states at 261 "the use of this word stand in need of a justification which everyone understands" ,indicating that his use has not been in a conventional way.

But now I really don't know what you're talking about.

I believe that what is demonstrated by Parmenides, in the Parmenides, is that the concept of, "the One" is logically incoherent. No matter how it is presented the result is contradiction. That is why I say Parmenides is represented as a sophist, providing a logical demonstration which makes the Form of "the One" appear to be full of contradictions. It makes no sense that you assign "the One" a "pivotal position" in Platonic ontology.

I think Plato reject this nonsensical sophistry concerning "the One" and moved on to a much more intuitive principle, "the good".

You claimed that the word "sensation" has a "multitude of possible meanings" in Wittgenstein's scenario. When I asked you to name some of this "multitude", you could only name "type" and "token" as two possible meanings. In your previous post, you attempted to include "no determinate meaning" as a third possible option. Now you claim to have never said that the word "sensation" means both a type and a token. So where is this "multitude of possible meanings"? You cannot even name one. — Luke

There you have three now, and the means for deriving many more, ask other people. — Metaphysician Undercover

Why do you want to argue that "S" denotes neither a type of sensation nor a token of that type? — Luke

Because the interpretation of Wittgenstein's example which you gave me was based in the type/token distinction, and I've been trying to tell you, to no avail, that the type/token distinction is not applicable here

So do I. I never said that this is what Wittgenstein meant. Once again, I introduced it to clarify two possible meanings of "the same". I did this because it seemed to me from other discussions that, for you, "the same" can only mean the same token, as per the law of identity. That is, that you allowed only for the same token, but not the same type (nor of two things that looked the same, for that matter).

I am quite surprised to hear you recently stating that two distinct but similar things can be the same. You were previously adamant that they were not the same, only similar. — Luke

If meaning is given by the way a word is used, then very clearly, two distinct things can be the same. Whether or not this is a proper, "rule abiding" use of "same", is not the question here. But then the question is what exactly is meant when we say that two things are the same.. But you seem to think that all word use must be "rule abiding" to be meaningful. And that appears to be why you do not understand Wittgenstein's example, the so-called "private language argument", where the individual person names two occurrences as the same without a criterion of identity (rule).

Yes, but this does not imply what you said earlier: "that "the sensation" is left ambiguous, having no real referent, only indeterminate meaning, inviting as many different interpretations as possible." At best, 261 implies this about the word/sign "S", not about the sensation(s) had by the diarist. Sensations don't have referents or meanings; sensations are not words. — Luke

Wow, your misreading never ceases to amaze me. Wittgenstein is explicitly talking about the use of the word "sensation" here, not the use of "S". "

For "sensation" is a word of our common language, not of one intelligible to me alone. So the use of this word stands in need of a justification which everybody understands.——And it would not help either to say that it need not be a sensation; that when he writes "S", he has something—and that is all that can be said.

Now, you said earlier: "That two things are of the same type, does not make the two things the same." I replied, by the same logic, that two things look the same does not make the two things the same. Wittgenstein never says that if two things look the same then they necessarily are the same. He only talks about what makes it possible that we might speak of "two exactly the same"; and he appears to be saying that what makes it possible for us to say this is if they look or seem the same. — Luke

Right. Now notice that whether or not they are the same, or "exactly the same" is not at question. We say that they are "two exactly the same", or in my example, "that hat is the same as mine", meaning "exactly the same", but whether or not they actually are, doesn't matter. As Banno pointed to at 148, it doesn't matter so long as misunderstanding is avoided.

But I do not know whether to say that the figure described by our
sentence consists of four or of nine elements! Well, does the sentence
consist of four letters or of nine?—And which are its elements, the
types of letter, or the letters? Does it matter which we say, so long as
we avoid misunderstandings in any particular case? — PI 148

But I think, as I said to Banno, that Wittgenstein proceeds to demonstrate that misunderstanding cannot be avoided, as is evident from your misunderstanding, and the common misunderstanding in general, of the so-called private language argument

I find the so-called "cosmological argument" to be compelling and significant, as refuting both Platonic Realism and Materialism.

I don't see how you can answer question (i) without knowing the meaning of "sensation". Either you have greatly misunderstood this whole time, or else you are now pretending that we have been discussing question (ii) instead of question (i). — Luke

Question #1 was never answered. I gave an opinion and you gave an opinion, they differed, so the question was left as unanswered, inconclusive, and we moved on. Now I'm trying to explain to you what that inconclusiveness entails.

You have insisted this entire time that you understand the type-token distinction, yet you now claim that the word "sensation" is being used by Wittgenstein at PI 258 to mean "a type" and "a token"? I find this difficult to believe. — Luke

No, I never said it means both a type and a token. I am saying that both of those, though they are possible interpretations, are incorrect interpretations, because they do not reflect what Wittgenstein intended, what he was actually doing. They each assign a determinate meaning to "the sensation" which is signified by "S", when he intended that the named sensation has an indeterminate referent.

I'm still saying that "the sensation" refers to neither a type nor a token. That's what I've been arguing since the beginning. The type/token distinction is inapplicable in this scenario because it makes a false dichotomy, rendering "neither" as impossible by the nature of a "dichotomy", and the law of excluded middle.

But I find it obvious that neither is what is intended by Wittgenstein. That's why I keep requoting 261 "he has something—and that is all that can be said". At this point he makes it very clear that we cannot say whether it is a type or a token. I suggest you reread this passage very carefully. He even states that what the diarist has, need not even be "a sensation", according to our use of "sensation" in our public language. He says: " And it would not help either to say that it need not be a sensation; ".

By the same logic, you are saying that the two things look the same, you are not saying that the two things are the same. — Luke

This is false. What is said, is that the two things are the same. "His hat is the same as mine". That is how we speak. But you have a very bad habit of thinking that if it doesn't make sense to me, then the person cannot mean what they say. So, in your mind you change what the person has said, into something which makes sense to you, so that you now think that what the person said is "the two things look the same", when the person actually said "are the same".

This justifies my accusation that you misread Wittgenstein. When Wittgenstein explicitly says at 261, that we cannot say anything about whatever it is that "S" refers to, you have already concluded that it must refer to a type, because this is the only thing which makes sense to you. So you completely ignore what Wittgenstein actually said, opting for what you think he must have meant instead. Then you present what you think he must have meant, as what he said, like in this clear example above.

You hid behind the type/token distinction when I originally asked you this question, and now you're doing it again. Let me get this straight: the "multitude of possible meanings" that the word "sensation" has in Wittgenstein's scenario are that "sensation" means "type" or "sensation" means "token"? — Luke

There is no hiding behind the type/token distinction here, you have made it front and centre, as the standard for interpretation. So I've used it to distinguish two possible meanings, you took type, I took token. These are two of the "multitude of possible meanings". A third, is what I really believe, and that is that "the sensation" is left ambiguous, having no real referent, only indeterminate meaning, inviting as many different interpretations as possible. But you refuse to even accept this as a possibility because it is unintelligible from your perspective of the model of a type/token dichotomy. But the referent is neither a type nor a token. That's what Wittgenstein indicates at 261 when he says " he has something—and that is all that can be said". I am quite confident that there are other possible meanings as well, but to find more, we'd have to look at the interpretations made by others.

Again: what are the multitude of meanings that the word "sensation" has in the scenario? Name two possible meanings, at least. — Luke

There you have three now, and the means for deriving many more, ask other people. It seems the evidence of two was insufficient to convince you of the possibility of more. Of course this insufficiency is just a function of your type/token dichotomy. If it's not one, then it's the other, and there is no reason to believe in the real possibility of a multitude. But the possibility of a multitude is already a third option, and denying it doesn't make it unreal.

I think you would prefer to talk about "similar" instead of "the same" (or attempt to conflate the two) because you have no reason to judge two things as being the same except that they are of they same type. It's much easier to argue that you don't need a reason or principle to judge two things as being similar than it is to judge them as being the same. There must be a reason why you judge two things as the same and not merely similar. — Luke

I think that you are spluttering nonsense here. I gave you the reason why I would judge two things as the same, it's just what Wittgenstein mentions at 253, they are perceived as being exactly the same as each other. And I gave you an example, when I see someone with a hat exactly like mine. This does not mean that I judge it as the same type, a fedora or something like that, I might not even know what type my hat is. I simply see all the features as being the same, and judge it as exactly the same. Imagine seeing two cars on the street which look exactly the same. You do not need to know the type (make, model etc.), to judge the two as being exactly the same.

I brought up "similar" because it is a comparable judgement, and I thought it might help you to understand. We judge two things as similar without classifying them by type, in the same way that we would judge two things as exactly the same (identical), without classifying then by type. Judging two things as exactly the same is just a stronger form of judging two things as similar.

There you go again. They're not similar; they're the same. What makes them the same is that they are both of the same type; they're both dogs. — Luke

You're really spluttering nonsense now, saying that two very different dogs are "the same". That two things are of the same type, does not make the two things the same. It is the type which is the same, not the two things. Can't you see that? You are saying the type which they are is the same, they are of the same type. You are not saying that the two things are the same.

Notice the difference between "these two things are the same type" which means in this case that they are both dogs, and "those two hats are the same". In the latter case, we are not saying that the type is the same, that's already given by calling them both hats. Saying "these two hats" tells us that the type is the same. So "the same" would just be redundant if it referred to type. However, "the same" is not redundant, it means that beyond them being the same type, they are also judged as being exactly the same, identical. And it makes no sense to say that it refers to a further type, fedora, because then we would just say "these two fedoras are the same". And if you say the type is "black fedora", so we now say "these two black fedoras are the same", it is still implied that other features are the same. "Same" in this context always refers to something further than the type.

Yes. Seen to be good, brought into existence, caused to be, etc. by the same one Reality that acts as efficient, material, formal, and final causes. There is nothing else apart from that one Reality. Referring to the One as “formal cause” does not preclude the possibility of its being the other causes, including the ultimate cause. — Apollodorus

But these are different things. These distinct causes are described, and named, as distinct and different things, To say that different things are one, requires a principle of unity. It's like if you say the One is a house, but being a house doesn't preclude the possibility of it being a car as well.

You create that unity with "Reality". You claim there is one reality, and all these different causes are unity within that one reality. But I don't see how this claim, that reality is one, and not itself a multitude, is supported.

The journey has six stages:

1. Love of one beautiful body.
2. Love of all beautiful bodies.
3. Love of beauty in souls.
4. Love of beauty in institutions and laws.
5. Love of beauty in sciences.
6. Love of beauty in one single knowledge. — Apollodorus

I would differ with #6. I would say: Love of one single Beauty (the Form), rather than "one single knowledge". But this just shows that "one" is ambiguous, and it's not clear what its role is. Then Beauty is one of many Forms. Now if we are to unite this multitude of Forms within one Knowledge, we would be inclined to make Knowledge itself a Form. But if Knowledge is a Form, then it is just one of the many. Therefore the thing which unites the Forms as one, must be something other than a Form.

However, it is important to understand that the Greek word “beautiful” (kalos) also means “good”. The Greek ideal of human perfection is “good and beautiful” or, rather “beautiful and good” (kaloskagathos). Beauty is inseparably connected with Good and Good is inseparably connected with Knowledge. Beauty leads to the Good and the Good is Knowledge or Truth. — Apollodorus

I don't agree. I believe Plato recognized a distinction between good and beautiful, even if they were sometimes expressed by the same word. This is why you say "good and beautiful", which wouldn't make sense if they were both the same word with the same meaning.

There is an old metaphysical division between aesthetics and ethics, which I believe Plato had some understanding of. In one way, we place beauty at the top of the hierarchy, in another, we place good at the top. Beauty can be given a higher place than the good because it is desired simply for the sake of itself, whereas, as Aristotle demonstrated, we always find that the good is desired for the sake of something else, until we reach the final end, which is simply stipulated. He stipulated happiness as the final good.

I think that Plato worked more to create a separation between the two than to dissolve the separation. He clearly worked toward a separation between pleasure and good, but it may be the case that good is a special type of pleasure. Then good might be a special type of beauty. But this would divide the unity of Beauty.

And Knowledge has the Good as its source (as has Beauty). — Apollodorus

Knowledge has the Good as its source, but I don't think that we can say that Beauty has the Good as its source. If pleasure is derived from the actuality of beauty, and there are pleasures which are not good, then Beauty cannot be sourced from the Good. This is why some metaphysicians place beauty as higher than the good, it's desired for its own sake, as pleasure is, whereas Good must be supported by reason.

But this points to an ambiguity, division, in the Good. If knowledge is derived from the Good, then the Good must be higher than knowledge and to say that the Good must be supported by reason would be contrary to that. So the Good, which serves as the source for all knowledge cannot be supported by any knowledge, or reason, and it becomes more like a simple desire for Beauty, or pleasure. The other sense of Good, the one supported by knowledge and reason cannot be the source of knowledge. This is the distinction between the apparent good, and the real good first formulated by Aristotle.. The real good is supported by reason and knowledge, whereas the apparent good is what actually inclines us to act, being what moves the will. The separation between the two is the reason why we can, and often do, what we know is bad.

We can say that the goal of moral philosophy is to create consistency between the two forms of "Good". We are taught that the Good which is supported by knowledge and reason, the real good, is the highest principle, and the apparent good, which moves the will must be shaped to conform with the real good. However, we can see from Plato's principles, that the truly highest Good, the one which is the source of knowledge, must be what is called "the apparent good", being what is prior to knowledge. So the true goal of the moral philosopher is to shape and conform the real good, so that it conforms with the higher, apparent good.

This inversion is the result of the fact that the will truly is free. So the free will cannot be made to conform to principles of "good" which it does not agree with. So the individual will continue to do what one knows is wrong, or incorrect according to the laws and rules of the community, when one believes oneself to hold higher principles. Therefore we must structure the hierarchy to reflect this reality, that what we call "the apparent good", supported by beauty, pleasure, and desire, as sought for the sake of itself, is truly higher than what we call "the real good", as supported by reason and knowledge.

Contemplation or knowledge of Beauty itself enables the accomplished philosopher to know the Good. And knowing the Good itself in the absolute sense means being the Good. By being good as much as humanly possible, the philosopher “touches” or “grasps” the truth (cf. Timaeus 90c). He becomes good, real, and true, and everything he does from now on is by participation in the truth which is the Good. — Apollodorus

I think that this "knowing the Good" which you refer to is an understanding of the reality of the free will. It is to recognize that what moves the individual self, person, or soul, to act is what one believes to be good, not what is said by others to be good. So the true Good is found within, not in the conventions of the culture. As you say:

This happiness that derives from our own goodness is more direct, more powerful, and more real than happiness that is derived from any external things (i.e. things other than ourselves) such as material possessions. — Apollodorus

When Plato says that the Good is the “source of all knowledge”, or “above essence”, etc., this cannot be taken to mean that the Good is above the One, given that the One is not knowledge but pure, objectless Awareness, and as we have seen, the One is unlimited, without beginning or end, and without it nothing can exist (Parm. 137d, 166c). — Apollodorus

Here is where you and I have disagreement, as to Plato's positioning of "the One". I believe Plato rejects the One as a true first principle, subjugating it to mathematics (as Aristotle described Met. 987b), being a first principle of epistemology, not metaphysics. The quotes you bring up represent the position of sophists who are trying raise the logically necessary "One", to metaphysical relevance. However, you can see that with Beauty and Good, we are dealing with principles prior to any knowledge, as the source of knowledge, whereas the need to assume "One", is derived from the imperfections of knowledge. So "the One" is not basic, fundamental, or foundational to knowledge, as there is knowledge which necessarily precedes it, the knowledge required for the individuation of particulars.

This is also evident from the fact that One and Being are inseparable and that everything that has being participates in both Being and One, which includes all the Forms, even the Form of the Good. — Apollodorus

See, Being and not-Being, from which the One is derived, is a Parmenidean logical structure. If One and Being are inseparable as you say, then One is also inseparable from not-One, as Being is inseparable from not-Being, being defined one by the other in that logical structure. To proceed from here to the Good, which is supposed to be prior to any logic, therefore prior to such logical structures, we must see all as unindividuated, therefore no such thing as One. You might insist that this means seeing all as "One", but that is not true. "One" comes about from individuation, and does not exist prior to that individuation, which might be a sort of first act of intellection. But One does not exist prior to that first act of intellection, though Beauty and Good are relevant here.

That infinite mass of luminous awareness must first become aware of itself. This is what produces the first subject-object dichotomy, or the One and the Dyad, where subject and object are experienced as one yet “distinct”. — Apollodorus

Do you see that Beauty and Good, as the motivation for action, exist prior to this first becoming aware of itself? And this is why Beauty and Good are prior to One.

I'll ask you a third time: name the "multitude of possible meanings" that you think the word "sensation" has in Wittgenstein's scenario. — Luke

We've been through this for weeks with your type/token distinction. You argued "the sensation" refers to a type, I argued it refers to a token. You simply refuse to accept that it could possibly refer to anything other than a type, so you do not see the ambiguity. But you ignore the obvious, "the..." almost always refers to a particular, and rarely, if ever, is used to refer to a type. That's why I say, you just don't get it.

Since you have a thing for principles, perhaps you could explain by what principle you judge two things to be the same? — Luke

I don't think it is by "a principle". You are the one who insists that language requires rules, I do not agree. I agree with what Wittgenstein says at 258, there is no criterion of identity here. I think that I look at two things and see that they appear to be the same, so I say that they are the same. Likewise with "similar". I look at two things and see that they appear similar, so I say that they are similar. This is clearly not a matter of classing things by type. But if you were to ask me why I think they are "similar", or "the same", I could find reasons for you, to justify my judgement. But I don't look for, nor find those reasons, before you ask me. I just make the judgement.

Conversely, if you show me two things of the same type, and I know that they are of the same type, two dogs for example, then even if I see them as very different, I would judge then as similar, because of that principle, I know they are of the same type.

You are claiming both that the meaning of "sensation" is ambiguous and "may be interpreted in numerous different ways", but also that "there is no such thing as what the word means in that context". — Luke

Right "what the word means" implies that it has a determinate meaning. What I am claiming is ambiguity, and therefore that there is a multitude of possible meanings. A multitude of possible meanings is not compatible with one determinate meaning. Therefore, if there is a multitude of possible meanings in this context, there is no such thing as what the word means in that context..

You do not seem to understand what ambiguity is. Can you not see that if an author intentionally uses a word in an ambiguous way, there is no such thing as what the word means in that context? It is not the case that the phrase in which the word is uttered will be devoid of meaning, or nonsensical, the phrase may be very rich in meaning, as metaphors are commonly like this. But it is the case that there is no such things as what the word means. This indicates that "what the word means" is a faulty way of looking at language.

Do you appreciate abstract art? Or do you think that art can only be meaningful if it depicts or represents something? If you accept that the meaning which a piece of art has, is distinct from what is supposedly represented by the individual aspects of the piece of art, then you will see that a phrase can have meaning without the particular words being used, having any specific meaning.

You just don't seem to get this, insisting that each word must have a specific meaning

It cannot be both that "sensation" has more than one possible meaning in context and that it has no possible meaning in context. — Luke

I didn't say "it has no possible meaning", I said "there is no such thing as what the word means". Do you not see a difference between the possibility which is explicitly stated with "possible meaning", and the actuality implied by "what the word means". You seem to jump across the logical gap between 'there is the possibility of meaning' to 'there is an actual meaning'.

We are not discussing "similar"; we are discussing "the same" — Luke

Right, but your example, of the same type of hat, demonstrates that you just don't get it.

Gotta hand it to you, too, Meta, your grasp of logic is quite disconcerting. — Banno

Your grasp of the English language is a bit disconcerting (but nothing unusual there, it's common place in our society). It seems you've taken principles of logic and attempted to apply them to language use in general, exactly what Wittgenstein warns against. And you accuse me of adhering to principles of essentialism! You say possible is what is not necessary, and necessary is what is not possible, concluding that you have said something about "necessary" and something about "possible", by saying what each is not, therefore nothing about each of them. Saying what something is not, says nothing about what it is, because that does not qualify as a description.



Your question of the relationship between God and time demonstrates that we have a faulty conception of time. We tend to associate time with physical change. Furthermore, some even equate the two. But really, the relationship between time and physical change can be proposed in numerous ways. We can say that physical change is required for time, which puts physical change as prior to time, we can say that the two are equivalent, which is to assign no priority, or we can say that time is required for physical change.

The latter, that time is required for physical change, is unacceptable in modern physics, because it allows that time could be passing without any physical change (no way to measure it), but it is the most intuitively coherent proposal. This proposition allows that observable physical change is the result of time passing, and that there could be time passing, prior to physical change (at which time God creates the physical world). But in relation to our conventional conception of time, which ties time to physical change, this would put the activities of God outside of "time" (eternal), rendering such "activities" as unintelligible.

This is why we ought to reject that conception of time, because it makes activity outside the realm of physical activity impossible, as unintelligibly incoherent. Activity is temporal, so if we want to understand the activity which is the cause of physical existence, we need to allow that whatever exists when there is no physical existence, which could act as the cause of physical existence, is really temporal, and therefore not eternal.

I didn't realize this until now of course but I think we need to dig deeper into irrational numbers. What are they? Does it have to do with the continuous as opposed to discrete nature of reality? Geometry seems, in a certain sense, more physical than arithmetic. I'm not as certain about this as I'd like to be. — TheMadFool

I believe that what is the case is that there is always an incommensurability between two dimensions. This is demonstrated by the irrationality of the square root of two, and of pi. What it indicates, is that as dimensions, is a faulty way of representing space. Space being represented by distinct dimensions is a convenient fiction.

Now that means that necessity and possibility are different ways of saying the very same thing. — Banno

That looks like a very bad conclusion. You've just separated necessity and possibility such that they are completely distinct, one having no part of the other. Necessarily means "not possibly...". And possibly means "not necessarily...". Now you say that they are different ways of saying the same thing. I don't think so.

I'm not asking about "the same" sensation or types and tokens here. I asked you what you think "sensation" means in Wittgenstein's scenario. How do you think the word "sensation" is being used there? — Luke

I told you, I believe it is used in an ambiguous way. Do you understand that? It is a common tool in creative writing to leave the meaning of a word unclear so that it may be interpreted in numerous different ways. Therefore I think there is no such thing as what the word means in that context, because the meaning is intentionally ambiguous.

This is only to repeat that you don't know how he is using the word. — Luke

No, I think I know how he is using the word, he is intentionally creating ambiguity with it.

You claim to understand the point of the scenario yet you don't understand his use of words? — Luke

No, again that's not the case. I do understand his use of words; It's you who doesn't understand what he is doing with the words, if you do not recognize that he is intentionally using them ambiguously.

The same in what respect? — Luke

Why must "same". be qualified with "in what respect" for you? When we say that two things are the same, we simply say that they are the same (e.g. I know someone who has the same hat as me). if we qualified that with some respect, we would not be saying they are the same, we'd be saying they are the same in that respect.

I'm not claiming that when we learn a language we are explicitly taught about types and tokens. — Luke

Why did you say that then? You said that we learn types, and now you say that's not what you meant, then what did you mean?

No, that's exactly what I don't understand: how two distinct things can be classed as "the same" without being the same type. — Luke

They are not "classed" as the same, they are just judged to be the same. Whether or not they are the same type, is irrelevant, because they are not judged to be the same type. They are judged to be the same. When I saw the guy wearing the same hat as mine, I saw it, and judge it as "the same". I didn't make any judgement of type. And many other things I judge as the same in this way. I make judgements of "similar" in the same way, without even thinking about types.

On the other hand, if I learn what an oak tree looks like, I learn that type or classification, I might see a tree and judge it as that type. Do you see the difference between judging things as "the same", or even as "similar", and judging things as being of the same type? These are two distinctly different forms of judgement.

How do you know, when you claim not to know what the word "sensation" means here? — Luke

Because I know how "sensation" is being used. This is why "use" is a better way of understanding words than "meaning". There are ways of using words which do not give the word a meaning.

What different possible meanings do you think "sensation" has in the context of Wittgenstein's scenario? — Luke

To use your type/token distinction, It could refer to what you call a type, or it could refer to what you call a token of a type, as we've discussed.

How can you possibly understand the scenario if you don't know what he means by "sensation"? — Luke

Easily, he means to create ambiguity with the use of the word. He demonstrates that words do not necessarily have what you call "a meaning", that meaning is complex, and not a simple thing.

No two tokens are the same token, but they can be considered as (tokens of) the same type/class. — Luke

You have given me no principle by which we can determine whether two instances, such as what Wittgenstein is talking about at 258, are of two different tokens, or of one and the same token. You simply insist that two instances are necessarily two distinct tokens. But of course you are wrong, as Wittgenstein demonstrates with the example of a chair, the same token of a chair can occur as two distinct instances of sensation. And you readily admit this but you change the meaning of "instance" to say that they are not the same "instance" of chair.

What does it refer to then? — Luke

I explained that. In this case, "same" refers to two distinct things which have been judged to be identical, they appear to be exactly the same as each other. They are not judged as being the same token, nor are they judged as being of the same type, they are judged as being the same

We learn the names of types and we learn what tokens (typically) belong to those types by means of examples and repetition. — Luke

This is exactly the idea which Wittgenstein is dispelling with the so-called private language argument. We do not "learn the names of types, and we learn what tokens( typically) belong to those types". That is a misrepresentation, it is false. We learn the names of particular things, and we judge others as being "the same" in the sense described above, and so we call them by the same name. A "type" is a complicated concept, which we do not learn until after we get proficient at using words, so it is impossible that we learn how to use words by learning the names of types. We learn to use words by judging things as "the same", in the sense demonstrated by Wittgenstein, which means something other than the same token, and other than the same type.

When learning to use words we learn to judge things as "the same" in this sense, having common features, without learning anything about types. Nor are we learning to judge things by type. Learning types is a complex feature of abstract thought which a child learning language is incapable of.

If it's not by type, then how else can two distinct tokens be the same? Try to answer without simply repeating that they're the same (or some other synonym). — Luke

OK, I'll use other terms like "common features". Do you understand that we can, and commonly do, judge two things to be similar, and even "the same as each other", without judging them to be the same type? That they are "the same type" is a logical conclusion drawn from the judgement that they are the same, or similar, along with another premise stating that having the same, or similar features constitutes a type.

When all the features of the two things appear to match each other, we say that the two things are "the same". We are not saying they are the same type, simply that they are the same. We do not refer to criteria. This is what Wittgenstein is describing at 253. when he uses "exactly the same as". In this sense, two chairs are the same as each other (not being said to be the sane type, but being said to be "the same"), and two people might be said to have "the same pain". And Wittgenstein proceeds at 258 to discuss the same sensation. "The sensation" which is referred to at 258 is not meant to be a token nor is it meant to be a type, It is two occurrences which are simply judged to be "the same" as each other.

That's why he proceeds at 261 to ask what reason do we have for calling S the sign of a "sensation". The person judging the two occurrences as 'the same" has not produced a "type classification" he has simply judged them as 'the same".

"Final cause" simply means the purpose for which something is caused. — Apollodorus

No, it's distinctly called "a cause". So a purpose acts as a cause, through intention and free will. Do you understand, and believe in, the reality of free will? If so, you'll see that purpose, as intention is, a cause. This is what Plato meant by "the good", what Aristotle called final cause, the reason why things are brought into being, from not-being. Some potential is seen to be good, so it is brought into existence, caused to be. And this applies not only to material things, but Forms as well. This is why the good is prior to all Forms, as their cause, including One, and Dyad.

I think the easiest way to understand Plato and Platonism is to look at Creation as a diversification or “multiplification” of what is absolutely one. — Apollodorus

We obviously have very different understandings of Plato.

The literal meaning of arche is “beginning” or “origin”. To obtain true knowledge of anything, the philosopher must rise above assumptions or hypotheses to the first principle itself. In relation to knowledge, the philosopher must rise to its very origin or source.

Hence we are told that the Good is the source of all knowledge: — Apollodorus

Right, we are in agreement here. and "the Good" is not only the source of all knowledge, but of all being, and beings, Forms and everything, as the cause, final cause of their existence. Things have been caused to exits because their existence is good.

According to your translation, what comes after the question? — Luke

The answer to the question is negative. "That is not agreement in opinions but in form of life."

My explanation obviously didn't take. Try this: First, establish the particular sense/use/meaning of the word. Second, apply the type/token distinction. — Luke

Obviously, the example I made would be analogous only to a case where the particular sense cannot be conclusively determined. That is the situation we have with Wittgenstein's use of "a sensation". We disagree on the particular sense/use/meaning of the word. We cannot establish the particular sense/use/meaning of the word, so how do we proceed toward applying the type/token distinction?

In this case, we are talking about a "sensation". Do you need any help with the meaning of that word? — Luke

I don't need any help with the meaning of "sensation". I see it very clearly as ambiguous. You seem to see a particular sense/use/meaning, and so you proceed toward applying a type/token distinction. Of course that is a misreading, because Wittgenstein intended that the meaning of "sensation" be left as ambiguous.

It's not me, either. Where did I ever say "two instances of the same word are not the same word"? — Luke

Are the two of these, two distinct instances of the same token?
— Metaphysician Undercover

No. An instance is a token, so they are two distinct instances or two distinct tokens. — Luke

I asked whether two distinct instances of the same word are the same token. You answered they are not the same token. However, they are clearly not the same type, because as I said, one might be a noun, and one might be a verb. You continue to insist that they are "the same word", but you haven't explained by what principle you use "same". You say they are not the same token, and I say they are not the same type, so what makes them "the same"?

I have introduced the type/token distinction to try and create clarity about the meaning of "the same". You have done nothing but try to maintain opacity. — Luke

The issue is very clear to me. There is a use of "same" which refers to neither a type nor a token. You apply a type/token dichotomy, and refuse to grasp the fact that many times when we use the word "same", such as "the same word" exemplified above, there is neither a type nor a token implied by "same". So your introduction of the type/token dichotomy does not produce clarity, because if it's adhered to, it produces misunderstanding.

You have not answered my question: What do you mean by "the same"? — Luke

I mean exactly as I said, what Wittgenstein explains at 253. There is a use of "same" which we commonly call "identical". Wittgenstein calls it "exactly the same as". It does not mean the same token because it clearly refers to two distinct things. It does not mean the same type, because there is no classing the things within a type, just a judgement of "same". There is no type mentioned, only the very strong assertion that they are "exactly the same".

ntil you can clarify what you mean by "the same", then I don't understand what this means. — Luke

I don't think you will ever understand, because you refuse to release yourself from the grips of that type/token dichotomy. To me it's like you are adhering to the law of excluded middle, to say, it must mean one or the other, and cannot be both, nor can it be neither. But you seem to refuse to accept the reality of ambiguity, and that an author can intentionally mean both, and you refuse to accept the reality of a meaning of "the same" which is neither.

It’s a direct quote. Explain how it’s a misreading. — Luke

My translation gives what you present as the statement: "What is true or false is what human beings say", as a question: "So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?"' There's a big difference between a question and a statement.

No. An instance is a token, so they are two distinct instances or two distinct tokens. — Luke

OK, so let's say that there are two distinct instance of what we commonly call "the same word". In one instance the word is used as a noun, and in the other instance, the word is used as a verb. They are two distinct tokens, as you say here. By what principle do we call these two tokens "the same"? They are not tokens of the same type, because one is a token of the type of word called "noun", and the other is a token of the type of word called "verb".

What do you mean by “the very same thing”?

You don’t allow that two instances of “word” can be the same but you allow that two instances of a sensation can be the same?

What do you think “recurrence” means? — Luke

It's not me who said that two instances of the same word are not the same word. I asked you that question, and you gave me that answer. That's not my answer. I would say that if we adhere to the principle stated by Wittgenstein at 253, it is "the same word". In so much as the two instances are "exactly the same as" each other, we can say that it is "the same word".

So, "recurrence", in the context of 258, means a repeated instance of the very same thing. Likewise, a person might have a repeated instance of the very same word, within one's mind. Don't you agree?

The way I see it, in Plato’s metaphysics everything is secondary to intelligence and knowledge which presupposes a subject. Starting with the dictum “Know thyself”, Plato proceeds from the philosopher’s own individual intelligence to that intelligence which encompasses everything and is the cause and source of all knowledge and all intelligence. And this ultimate source and cause must be one. If it isn’t one, the philosopher must carry on his quest until he discovers that which is the ultimate one. — Apollodorus

In The Republic, the good is compared to the sun, in the sense that the good makes intelligible objects intelligible, in the same way that the sun makes visible objects visible. Since intelligence is dependent on intelligible objects, and the intelligibility of intelligible objects, we ought to conclude that in Plato's metaphysics, intelligence and knowledge are secondary to the good.

I think that recognizing this is key to understanding Socrates' and Plato's approach to the sophists who claimed to teach virtue. Plato demonstrated that knowing what is good or right, will not ensure that a person will do it, as people commonly choose to do what they know is bad, or wrong. So the old adage, "virtue is knowledge", along with the claims of the sophists, to teach virtue, are proven wrong. This problem was dealt with in great depth by St. Augustine, but the reality of it, demonstrates that the good is higher than, and distinct from, knowledge. I believe that this is the most important lesson to be learned from Plato, and it is central to a number of the dialogues. How is it that knowing what is good, is insufficient to inspire one to actually do what is good? But Plato's recognition of this reality means that he placed knowledge and intelligence as secondary to the good.

Socrates (Plato):
You are to say that the objects of knowledge not only receive from the presence of the Good their being known, but their very existence and essence is derived to them from it, though the Good itself is not essence but still transcends essence in dignity and surpassing power (Rep. 6.509b) — Apollodorus

See, the subject here, is "the Good", not "the One". And "the Good" transcends both essence and existence. The One is always reducible to an essence.

Further evidence is provided by the Parmenides:

“Then the One, if it has neither beginning nor end, is unlimited.”
“Yes, it is unlimited” (Parm. 137d) — Apollodorus

See, it is proposed here that the One is the essence of "unlimited".

The discussion eventually turns to the One and comes to the following conclusion:

It is impossible to conceive of many without one.”
“True, it is impossible.”
“Then if One does not exist, the Others neither are nor are conceived to be either one or many.”
“No so it seems.”
“The Others neither are nor appear to be any of these, if the One does not exist.”
“True.”
“Then if we were to say in a word, 'if the One is not, nothing is,' should we be right?”
“Most assuredly.” (Parm. 166b)

So Plato, through Parmenides, is saying that nothing can exist without the One. — Apollodorus

Please reread the quoted passage and pay extra attention to the first line: "It is impossible to conceive of many with one". So what is shown is that "One" is first in conception, it is the first "form", but this does not demonstrate that it is the first in existence. "The Good", as required for, and cause of, conception, is prior to "the One" which is the result of conception.

As stated by Aristotle, the One is the essence and formal cause and “the Others” are the material cause. — Apollodorus

"The good" is the final cause in Aristotle, and is prior to all the other causes. That you relate "the One" to formal cause is further evidence that the One is distinct from the Good. The good is the final cause.

At PI 241, W states that "What is true or false is what human beings say". — Luke

Another example of your misreading.

How can you maintain both that "The English language consists of a multitude of language-games", and also that "There is nothing which "the English language" actually refers to"? — Luke

A multitude of things is not a thing. Sorry, I should have wrote "no thing", instead of "nothing" which is a bit ambiguous. But it should have been obvious because we were talking about the existence of things, and what I was claiming is that types have no real existence because they are not things and are imaginary. Your misreading appears intentional.

I'm saying consider the type as a word, a noun, a concept, or a class, because that might help you to distinguish types from tokens, which are concrete instances or objects of that type. Or forget the type-token distinction altogether and look at Wittgenstein's use of the word "recurrence" at PI 258 instead. — Luke

It makes no sense at all to me to see a word as a concept. It's a physical thing, written on a page, or screen, or spoken. If you want me to be able to see a word as a concept, you'll really need to elaborate on this idea.

Do you think that the "word" written here is the same thing as the "word" written here? Are the two of these, two distinct instances of the same token? Or would you say that each is a different token of the same type, the type being a type of word expressed by "word"? This demonstrates the problem with saying that a word is itself a noun. What we call "the same word", could be either a noun or a verb depending on the instance of use. Therefore we have to refer to the context of the instance of use to see "the type" (verb or noun) which the word is a token of. Then each instance of use must be a different token. And therefore it is incorrect to say the "word" written here is the same word as the "word" written here. Each instance of use must be a different word, if we adhere to your proposed type-token distinction.

The alternative, to forget the type-token distinction is what I've been trying to get you to do since you introduced it. So, let's start, as you suggest with Wittgenstein's use of "the recurrence of a certain sensation". If we put that in context, we see that he is talking about naming a particular sensation, which occurs on numerous occasions (recurrence of the very same thing), which is referred to as "the sensation". Further, he talks about the possibility of pointing to this thing, "the sensation" to give it an ostensive definition, but declares that this is not possible.

That is, it is your position that all naming (naming anything) is a mistake. — Luke

Utter nonsense, as is your habit. You've fallen back into that habit of intentionally misreading to create a straw man.

The way I see it, not just Platonism but philosophy in general as inquiry into truth, must lead to an ultimate first principle or arche which, by definition, is one. Therefore, it is not incorrect to call the first principle “the One”, in the same way it is not incorrect to call the Good “one” or “the One”. — Apollodorus

Aristotle says philosophy is an inquiry into first principles. And if there is an equality in principles of a hierarchy then it might not be possible to give priority to one "first principle".

I think it might be incorrect to call the good "one", because the good is defined by what is sought, desired, and this is always a complexity rather than something simple. So the good is complex rather than simple.

"[With respect to ethics and religion] we cannot express what we want to express and that all we say about the absolute miraculous remains nonsense. ... My whole tendency and I believe the tendency of all men who ever tried to write or talk ethics or religion was to run against the boundaries of language. This running against the walls of our cage is perfectly, absolutely, hopeless. – Ethics, so far as it springs from the desire to say something about the ultimate meaning of life, the absolute good, the absolute valuable can be no science. What it says does not add to our knowledge in any sense. But it is a document of a tendency in the human mind which I personally cannot help respecting deeply and I would not for my life ridicule it".

This appears to be distinctly inconsistent with what Wittgenstein says about language and boundaries at PI 68-70, though he does seem self-contradicting within this passage here. He says that he deeply respects, and would not ridicule such "nonsense". It makes one wonder what is meant by "nonsense".

The boundaries of language are created for specific purposes, like when we create a definition for a logical proceeding. But language use, and consequently meaning, is not restricted by such boundaries. Therefore going outside "the boundaries of language" does not leave one in a world of meaningless nonsense.

Understanding this principle is key to understanding the role of freewill, and 'private language', in the creation and evolution of language in general. Claiming that the boundaries of language are "the walls of our cage", is a misrepresentation which leaves one within Plato's cave, looking at the reflections and believing them to be the reality. .

I think the resolution to our disagreement is to see that "the good" as described by Plato, chiefly in The Republic, is not a Form. This places it in another category from the One, which is a Form. If we make the good a Form, we are talking about the Form of Good, and this is something distinctly different from the good itself. But the One cannot be anything other than a Form.

Let's be clear. Everyone else reads the sections around §48 as showing something like that there are no ultimate simples, that the standards we use for defining complexity are in a sense arbitrary. — Banno

Yes I see that, but if you read carefully you'll see the reason for the conclusion, that there are no ultimate simples. The idea is logically incoherent. What 48 shows is that what you call an "ultimate simple" exists as a part of a proposal, a proposition, as a feature of a description. Therefore it could not be a thing named, because it would only exist as a proposed part of a complex. It's existence is relative to the proposal. So there would be a description of the complex, which includes "ultimate simples", but there could be no real name for the proposed simples which compose the complex, because they are only proposed, not observed and named. There is only a description of the role, or function which they are supposed to play in the complex.

Then the problem of differentiating between one proposed ultimate simple and another is exposed at the end of 48. Is each element named by the same letter the same element, or are they different elements of the same type, bearing the same name by being of the same type? Well, as Wittgenstein says, and Banno says, it doesn't matter, so long as we can avoid misunderstandings. So, we'd say "no problem", they are different elements of the same type.

Well, at 49 it is shown that misunderstanding cannot be avoided. Those who propose ultimate simples, propose them as elements which can only be named, and cannot be described. To be describable would imply that they are themselves composed of parts, and therefore could not be ultimate simples. If they are not describable, we cannot judge them as the same type. So the idea of an ultimate simple turns out to be logically incoherent, because they can only be named, not described, but each and every one would all have the very same name, because they are supposed to be of the same type. But they really cannot be of the same type, because they cannot be described as such, nor can they be distinguished one from another. So they cannot be named, nor can they be described, and it's an incoherent proposal.

To perhaps get a clearer picture of my interpretation of this, refer to the PI reading group, p12 in my pagination, (I'd provide a link but I don't know how). There I describe how Wittgenstein demonstrates that the idea of "primary elements" is self-refuting, because it is as I describe there, simply an attempt to circumvent the law of identity, the proposal of a thing which cannot have any sort of identity.

I think the belief in one ultimate first principle followed by Forms followed by sensible particulars is compatible with Plato. — Apollodorus

The belief in one ultimate first principle, is distinct from the belief that the One is the ultimate first principle. I think the former is compatible with Plato, the latter is not. This is because Plato believed in "the good" as the ultimate first principle, and in his writings he treated "the One" as something other than "the good".

As we have seen, Plato taught that particulars have no existence (or essence) of their own. They depend for their existence on “copies” of Forms whose properties they instantiate.

He later developed this idea, introducing the view that sensibles result from the interaction of “form-copies” (homoiotes) and the “receptacle” (hypodoche), which is a form of all-pervading space that serves as a medium for the elements out of which material objects are fashioned. So the objects are made of primary elements shaped by form-copies. — Apollodorus

To say that particulars result from an interaction between forms and a receptacle is not the same as saying that particulars have no existence. "Existence" and "essence" are Latin terms, and there is a clear distinction between them. To say that a particular could have no essence is not to say that it would have no existence, and vise versa.
.

But as Aristotle demonstrated it makes no sense to talk of a being (existent) without a form (essence). so if Plato thought of particulars as beings (existence) without form or essence, Aristotle cleared this up. Matter without form is unintelligible, but form without matter is logically coherent.