I agree that in order to experience change there has to be something that stays the same in relation to what is changing, for instance a thought, because if everything was changing randomly including our thoughts we wouldn’t even have a static thought that would tell us we are experiencing randomness, we wouldn’t have any memory and so on. But even though some things temporarily don’t change in relation to some other change, we don’t have to assume that it is necessary that some thing never changes. We have no evidence that something can never change forever, while we have evidence of change. — leo
Right, I agree with this. But I'd say it's more like this, something unchanging is necessary for experience itself, it's fundamental to experience. And, as you conclude, it is not necessary for this unchanging thing to be never changing. This is why causation becomes paramount. How is it that a thing can be the same for a while, then not be the same. A cause of change is necessary.
The idea of a thing which never changes comes from the necessity of ending the infinite regress. So both ideas, that there is something unchanging, and that there is something which never changes, are produced by logical necessity. To ground experience, and give it reality, we need to assert an underlying consistency, sameness,and also to give reality to the thing which we experience, the sensible world, we assume the existence of an underlying "matter" the fundamental element which never changes.
We are certain of change but not of being. — leo
This is why it appears like we are more certain of change than of being. Change is fundamentally evident to us, while the idea of being is produced by logical necessity. Change is the premise, and that there is something "the same" is the conclusion produced by the fact that not everything changes. Logic proceeds from the more certain to the less certain. But as you'll see below, we can turn around and face those premises, as potentially uncertain themselves, and look for the most certain of all premises.
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What we interpret as not changing might be simply change that is not perceived, for instance something might seem unchanging and yet by looking more closely we see change. Also, if one part of experience is not changing while another part is changing, the whole experience is changing as a whole, so again change appears as more fundamental than being. For these reasons I think it will be more fruitful to see change as fundamental rather than being. — leo
I don't think it is possible that everything is changing. This would mean that from one moment to the next, absolutely everything changes. Then there would be no consistency whatsoever, and the entire world would be complete chaos and randomness. It would be completely impossible for us to understand the world at all, because we could make no principles about how things would be from one moment to the next, because such a principle is based in assuming that something stays the same from one moment to the next.
That is why, despite the fact that we experience things as changing, the most certain of all premises is the premise that something stays the same. This is basically the principle which Plato impressed on us. We must get beyond the illusory world which the senses are handing us, to look at the reality of intelligible principles. All the premises concerning change, which we derive from our sensations of the world, have fundamental uncertainties inherent within. So we must look beyond sensation, toward what makes sensation possible in the first place, to derive the most certain of all premises, from which to build any structure of knowledge.
Would you agree with the idea that fundamentally what we call a “relation” is a thought, an experience? The idea that “change occurs” follows from experiences that are seen to change. Where does the idea of a “relation” come from? Doesn’t it come from seeing that some part of experience is correlated with some other, that the two parts change not independently from one another, but together in some way? — leo
This is exactly why we must place sameness, or being, as the most fundamental principle. If we do not, we cannot get a true perspective of what a "relation" is. You have brought "relation" into the experience, as if it is something which is part of the experience, when in reality we see a "relation" as a part of the thing experienced. Consider the map and the territory analogy. A relation is part of the territory, and we map it using principles. So within the experience, there are principles not relations, and we use the principles to map the relations which are outside the experience as part of the world being sensed.
Now consider principles themselves. We could say that there are relations between principles, but that would imply the principle is an independent thing existing by itself, relative to other principles. However, principles don't really exist like that, they are inherently connected to one another, supporting each other and dependent on each other, so it is somewhat incorrect to portray them as independent objects existing in relations to each other.
Now, see that you and I come to agreement about the nature of our experience. As you say "the two parts change not independently from one another, but together in some way". This is because the "two parts", which I portrayed as "principles" above, do not exist separately from one another, as independent things. There is dependency. So let's say that "parts" do not exist as independent objects, and they do not exist in relations with each other. Let's say that there is a "whole", and the part exists as a part of the whole, and being part of a whole is something other than a relation, it's some sort of dependency.
Where I’m going with this is that you were saying that a thing without parts cannot change on its own, but if you agree that a relation is fundamentally an experience, a thought, a thing, then again why would that experience or thought or thing change on its own? If you say that this relation is made of parts, and that this is why the relation can change, then we’re back to asking why do the parts of that relation change in the first place? — leo
So this is a very good question, and I'll show you how I can resolve it. A relation is now something outside of the thing. There is not "relations" within the thing, but dependency between parts. Within a thing there are parts, but the parts don't exist by relations. The parts are like principles which exist more like in a hierarchy of dependency. Now the question is what causes a thing to change, so we must look to the structure of this hierarchy of principles to understand this.
What is implied here is that we pay attention to Aristotle's distinction between the two ways of depicting change, locomotion (change of place), and internal change. Now we are focused on internal change, and the question is how does a thing change. To understand this we need to understand how a hierarchy of principles exists and changes. Changing a fundamental principle will have a huge effect, while changing a fringe principle will have a minor effect. But the question is what causes a principle to change in the first place.
Basically it seems to me that you can’t escape the fact that a thing without parts can change, that it can become something different than it was, which again leads to the idea that change is more fundamental than being. It seems to me that it is a circular reasoning to say that “a thing with parts can change because the relation between the parts can change”, because in saying that you’re essentially saying that the relation can change on its own, or that the parts of the relation which are themselves not made of parts are changing on their own. Do you see what I mean? — leo
I see what you're saying, but the answer is that there is no such thing as a thing without parts. A thing only exists as such a hierarchy of parts, and without that there is no thing. So you've taken an impossibility "a thing without parts", and asserted that this thing can change. But without parts, there is nothing there, no thing.
The issue is the "circular reasoning", which appears from the hierarchical thinking. The hierarchy of parts implies a top position, or base position depending on your perspective, so let's just call it #1 position. Also, there is no hierarchy unless there is something which follows #1. So "hierarchy" implies more than one, yet #1 implies priority. The circularity is avoided by assigning priority to #1. But there is no hierarchy unless there is more than one, and if there is more than one, how does a specific part acquire the position of #1. Therefore we must look to something other than the parts to assign #1 to, and again we meet with causation. There is a balance between the parts in the hierarchy, which allows them to exist as a unity, and the balance is caused. This cause is what we can assign #1 to. So #1 exists not as a part of the hierarchy, but as the cause of it.
To answer the question we can look to the nature of "cause". "Cause" is a temporal concept, and the cause is always in the past. The past cannot be changed. Therefore the #1, being the thing without parts, and the cause of parts existing in a hierarchical balance, necessarily cannot change or be changed, being in the past. The cause does not exist as a relation to the thing, because it is within the thing, like part of the thing yet still not the same as a part of the thing, because of the priority we must assign to it.
f we see change as more fundamental than being then a thing is simply an absence of change in relation to some other change. And then we don’t have to explain how a thing changes, change is what’s fundamental, a partial absence of change is what has to be explained, and we can explain it simply by seeing it as two opposite changes that cancel one another (or as several changes in equilibrium). Would you agree with that? — leo
As explained above, any premise based in change is less reliable, more uncertain than a premise based in being, or sameness. So your suggested approach cannot give us the required degree of certainty.