When you write "a" and "a" as two distinct things, and ask about the difference between these two things, you have given us the premise that they are two distinct things. The need here would be to support, justify that premise, that they are distinct. We can see that they are distinct things because they occupy different places. So despite the fact that they look the same, the claim that they are distinct things is justified by that fact, that they occupy different places.

Things are directed to certain outcomes, precisely because they're driven by a goal, which is (i.e. the goal) characteristic of intelligence. — Πετροκότσυφας

The inanimate thing is not driven toward a goal, by desire, spirit, or ambition within it, as human beings are, It is "directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence".

Things are driven to certain outcomes. That's the significance of intelligence and knowledge here. It has intentions, it can set goals and these goals act as causes. — Πετροκότσυφας

I don't thing this is correct. Inanimate things are not "driven" in the sense of setting their own goals, or having their own intentions, they are "directed" by the Will of God.

But instead, I just put one line from each of you to highlight what I see as irreconcilable differences. — ZhouBoTong

I don't see how these differences are irreconcilable. I said there is order, and there must be a cause of order. Aaron says the "end", which is the final cause, the goal, desired outcome, or intention, is that very cause. The one whose name I don't know how to pronounce, says that intelligence is required for end-directedness (intention). Each statement seems consistent with the others, but whether or not they are true, or acceptable to you, is another issue.

Anyway, from what I can see of your response I don’t see any clear differentiation between “use” and “meaning”. You can be perched on a tree-stump and I may say “Get out of my chair!” and be perfectly understood. — I like sushi

I think there is a problem with "meaning" is "use". "Use" does not seem to capture all of what meaning is. When someone is sitting on the stump, and you say to them "get out of my chair", it may in some cases serve the purpose of getting the person off the stump. But there is many other phrases which could have the same effect, and we can't really say that if each of them would get the person off the stump, it has the same meaning. Furthermore, there are nuances in the way that we say things. If you said that to me, I'd ask what the hell are you talking about, why is that stump your chair? Perhaps you'd do better to throw in the word "please". I say to my dog "want to go out?", and she runs for the door. The phrase serves the purpose, but I could have taught my dog to do that with any phrase. Doesn't "use" miss something, as a description of what meaning is?

I don't get it. Why does that "then" follow from the "if"? The same laws of physics that suggest order would also be the cause of that order. — ZhouBoTong

Laws of physics are the way we describe order, they are not the cause of that order. The idea is that if there is order, which we can describe with laws, then there must be a cause of that order.

I thought plenty of experiments have been done that show ("show" may be too strong, but certainly "suggest") that order can emerge from chaos (absent intent or interference of any kind - obviously QM might say just observing is interfering). Why does order require intent? — ZhouBoTong

There is logic which shows that order cannot emerge from chaos. it's basically the cosmological argument. If there ever was a time without actual existence (actual existence being an intelligible order), at that time there would only be the potential for actual existence. But a potential requires an actuality to be actualized, it cannot actualize itself. So if there was ever only the potential for actual existence, there would always only be the potential for actual existence. However, we observe now, that there is actual existence, therefore there was never only the potential for actual existence without any actuality. I've heard of people suggest that order could emerge from chaos, but it doesn't make any sense to me, and I don't see how one could set up such an experiment, because such a set up would be an actual order.

Wouldn't perfect chaos be a type of order? My point being, no reality can be conceived that does not include some type of order. Why would I then assume intention? — ZhouBoTong

I think you get the point here. No reality can be conceived of which does not include some type of order. Therefore the idea that order can emerge from chaos is unrealistic. The question of why intention is assumed is much more complex. A physical object is an orderly, or ordered existence, it is something apprehensible, intelligible. We notice that physical objects have a beginning in time, they come into existence, and are necessarily caused (actualized as explained above). We conclude by inductive reasoning that all physical objects have a beginning, and are caused. By the principle of plenitude, and the temporal nature of "cause", there must be a time before any physical object. Therefore there must be a non-physical cause of physical existence. We also notice that intention is the cause of existence of many physical objects. And, intention is non-physical. Since intention is a non-physical cause of physical objects, and no one has demonstrated any other type of non-physical cause of physical objects, we assume that intention is the only non-physical cause of physical objects.

I am not sure if you entirely buy Aquinas' argument, but I appreciate your attempt to explain it to me either way — ZhouBoTong

What I think is that there is a hole in our understanding of the non-physical. We know that the non-physical is very real in two distinct ways, one being in human thought and intention, the other being as required to account for the cause of physical existence. The hole in understanding is the relationship between these two, and this is where God has been posited to fill that gap.

You have it backwards. It is the ideal which we are not striving after at 98. — Luke

Right, this is the point. If we are not striving after an ideal, then what are we striving after? If any vague, unclear, or ambiguous sentence is in itself perfect, then why would we ever strive to produce better, more clear sentences, which would better facilitate understanding?

There is an inconsistency between saying that vague and ambiguous sentences are perfect, and also saying that there is a goal of avoiding misunderstanding. A vague or ambiguous sentence supports misunderstanding, and therefore cannot be perfect in relation to this goal. Some metaphysicians, such as Aristotle and Aquinas have resolved this issue by referring to degrees of perfection. In this way, even the most vague or ambiguous sentence would have some degree of perfection, by the very fact that it exists in an ordered way, but it does not obtain the highest degree of perfection which is only afforded by the ideal. This allows two senses of "perfect", "perfect" in the sense of having been given order, and also "perfect" in the sense of the best possible order (ideal). But as you pointed out earlier, Wittgenstein does not mention "degrees" and so he seems to be unfamiliar with this potential resolution to that problem. Therefore he is left with the inconsistency which stems from the difference between the perfection of the ideal, and the perfection which things have by the very fact of having an ordered existence. And, he seems to be critical of associating "perfect" with "ideal". But this is simply how we use those words, and it cannot be denied. Nor does it make sense to say that it is misguided, or a misunderstanding of any sort to associate "ideal" with "perfect".

This makes no sense. You state that W distinctly says that the work of philosophy is not to criticise the use of language, but you then appear to imply that W criticises language use. Where does he do so? Your abstract bombast is tiring. — Luke

I was replying to your statement:

This does not help to support your claim, however, since he uses "ideal" only in a critical sense. This is consistent with W's other critical references to "the ideal" which are made to denounce common preconceptions regarding the once lofty aims of traditional philosophy, such as that it should seek to make new discoveries, to invent new languages, to provide a final analysis, to reveal hidden essences, etc. — Luke

It is you who has stated that W was being critical of others' use of "ideal" (aims of traditional philosophy). So there is no need for me to point you to where he criticizes the language use of others, you must already know, because you are the one whose made that assertion.

I actually do not think that he is being critical in the way that you claim. And I was only pointing out that if he is being critical in the way that you claim, it is a case of being hypocritical.

However, even if he is not being critical of others, as you claim he is, and not being hypocritical in that way, there is still the matter of inconsistency in his use of "ideal" and its relationship with "perfect".

On a personal note, I will be undergoing extensive medical treatment for a few months so I possibly might not be around for a while. — Luke

All the best, and take good care of yourself.

If we say ends are goals or purposes then I am fairly comfortable saying I have seen zero evidence that "all inanimate objects are directed toward ends" (or even a reason to begin making the assumption). — ZhouBoTong

I think the argument would be something like this. If inanimate things behave in an orderly way (a way describable by laws of physics for example), then they must have been ordered to behave in such a way. If inanimate things have been ordered to behave in a particular way, then they must have been ordered with intent, towards some end.

Wittgenstein references "the ideal" in regard to the ideal language, the ideal sentence, the ideal exactness, the ideal (purity of) logic, the ideal game, the ideal application of the word "game", and the ideal order between sentences, words and signs. — Luke

OK, so do you recognize that these instances do not refer to different types of ideals? There are different types of things referred to here, language, sentence, exactness, but "ideal" is used in the same way, so it is not a different type of ideal. Like when I say there's a red book and a red piece of cloth I am not referring to different types of red. The question is, why does he say it's misleading to associate "perfection" with "ideal" at 81. And also, at 98 he implies that there is a perfection which is something other than ideal. How is it possible that there is a perfection which is not ideal?

The non-ideal perfection of which he is not critical is found where he says that "there must be perfect order even in the vaguest sentence" (§98). Here, the "order" of the vague sentence is already "perfect" as it is. This is contrasted (in the same section) with the ideal meaning of "perfect" where he says: "we are not striving after an ideal, as if...a perfect language still had to be constructed by us." — Luke

The problem here, is that he is saying that we are not striving after an ideal, we are not trying to construct a perfect language. If he is calling logic an ideal language, as at 81, it is "ideal" in some sense other than striving after perfection. So "ideal' has a meaning here other than as a perfection which we strive after. Now at 98 he gives "perfect" a meaning such that if a thing has been ordered, it is perfect simply by the fact that it has been ordered, regardless of how well ordered it is. The result is that "ideal" means something other than a perfection which we strive after, and anything we say is perfectly stated because it has been ordered by the act of saying it.

How is this a realistic description of how we use language? Do we not always recognize the possibility of a better, more perfect way of saying things? Do we not use "ideal" to indicate the belief that there is a better way? You might insist that Wittgenstein is simply describing these two distinct ways of using "ideal", and "perfect", but the way that he describes them excludes the possibility of accepting both ways. One contradicts the other, and to use them both would result in a very messy equivocation. So it is quite clear that he is opting for one over the other.

This does not help to support your claim, however, since he uses "ideal" only in a critical sense. This is consistent with W's other critical references to "the ideal" which are made to denounce common preconceptions regarding the once lofty aims of traditional philosophy, such as that it should seek to make new discoveries, to invent new languages, to provide a final analysis, to reveal hidden essences, etc. — Luke

For Wittgenstein to be critical in this way is hypocrisy. He is distinctly saying that the work of philosophy is to describe the use of language, not to criticize it. To criticize it is to pass judgement, and this implies that one ought, or ought not use language in a particular way. Where does Wittgenstein show any principles to give this criticism any repute? Such hypocritical criticism is nothing more than a potential for ridicule.

The issue is that Wittgenstein is discussing other particular types of ideal that you are failing to acknowledge. — Luke

No, he's not talking about different types of ideals. He is talking about striving after "the idea". If he talks about ideal this, or ideal that, ideal exactness, ideal languages, or ideal logic, "ideal" is the adjective. These are not different types of ideals. They are different types of things described by the same adjective, "ideal", and therefore we ought not assume that "ideal" refers to a different type of ideal in each case. Read 100 -110 and tell me how many times he mentions "the ideal".

But the only clear step he has taken to define "ideal" is to call for a separation between "ideal" and "perfect", at 81 and 98. And this is inconsistent with the way that "ideal" is commonly used.

It is very simple. Wittgenstein is attempting to dispel misconceptions; he is not attempting to dictate any changes to the use of the word "ideal". — Luke

Then why is he calling for a separation between "ideal" and "perfect" at 81 and 98? Such a separation is completely inconsistent with the way that "ideal" is commonly used.

The problem is that you make sweeping abstract generalisations about the word "ideal", without regard for how Wittgenstein is using this term or to what he is referring. — Luke

To the contrary, I have paid very close attention to the way that he has used "ideal". That's how I've noticed this odd separation between "ideal" and "perfect" which is inconsistent with common usage. You, clearly have not paid any attention, claiming that he is talking about different types of ideals, and not "the ideal". He wants to investigate what role "ideal " plays in our language, and we clearly talk about "the ideal this", or "the ideal that". For some strange reason though, he also wants to separate "ideal" from "perfect", which is inconsistent with the role that "ideal" plays in our language.

Wittgenstein offers no positive determination or definition of "the ideal" (especially outside of any particular language game), yet you are hellbent on trying to find one. — Luke

"Ideal" is an important term in this part of the book. In order to understand what Wittgenstein is saying here, we need to understand how he is using this term. I'm trying to understand what he is saying. If to you, being hell bent on trying to understand what he is saying appears like being hell bent on trying to find a definition of "the ideal", then so be it. Can you offer an explanation for why he drives a wedge between "ideal" and "perfect"? It's clearly not a case of describing how we use language.

I made a distinction between "ideal exactness" and "the ideal", and referenced other types of ideal than ideal exactness. — Luke

I don't see your distinction. How is ideal exactness any different from any other ideal, qua 'ideal"? So how is "ideal" in the sense of ideal exactness any different from "ideal" in "the ideal"? I suppose you're trying to make the same distinction as we did with "red". There are red objects, and also an imaginary red, the latter being only in the mind. The problem here is that there is no such thing as an ideal object, so the ideal, whatever it is, ideal exactness, ideal explanation, or ideal certainty, is always in the mind. Therefore there is no such distinction to be made.

This has already been addressed: "an explanation serves to remove or to prevent a misunderstanding —– one, that is, that would arise if not for the explanation, but not every misunderstanding that I can imagine." You have in your mind some ideal explanation that accounts for every imaginable doubt, but this is not Wittgenstein's idea. Then you accuse him of being inconsistent based on your own ideal. — Luke

The problem, is that doubt is in the mind, it is imaginary. What is called for at 85, is to leave no room for doubt, and this implies removing every misunderstanding which I can imagine, because its this recognition of the possibility of misunderstanding, by the mind, which is doubt. Therefore, if he moves on to say, "but not every misunderstanding I can imagine", he is being inconsistent with "it sometimes leaves room for doubt, and sometimes not". Either there is no room for doubt, and this implies every misunderstanding I can imagine, or we accept "not every misunderstanding that I can imagine", and allow that there is room for doubt. But we can't have both because that's contradictory.

Where do you get the idea that Wittgenstein is trying to reject any form of language use? As I stressed earlier, it is about particular assumptions, presumptions, preconceptions, misconceptions, or misguided ways of thinking. Wittgenstein diagnoses particular forms of wayward thought in philosophy, including those listed by Baker and Hacker: — Luke

This is actually very simple and straight forward, so I can't understand why you don't see it. In philosophy, if we diagnose a particular form of thought as "wayward", we are rejecting the way that the philosopher is using language. This is common, and called disagreement.

Nowhere does Wittgenstein advocate that we ought not to use the word "ideal", or any other word. Wittgenstein is trying to dispel particular philosophical dead ends of thinking. — Luke

Yes, this is exactly the point, to dispel a philosophy as a "dead end", is to reject the way that the philosopher uses language, demonstrating that this is a dead end usage of language. Then that material gets tossed aside as unproductive, and may disappear forever. The problem, in this particular instance, as I described in my last post, is that the role of "ideal" is the very opposite of the dead end. Accepting that there is an ideal, which has not yet been obtained, is what leaves us open to continually bettering ourselves. If, instead of "ideal" we accept "fulfils its purpose", as our goal, then we have no inspiration to find a better or more efficient way to do what we are doing. Therefore, rejecting "the ideal", in favour of "fulfils its purpose" is really what is the dead end, because the end, or goal, is already reached when the purpose is fulfilled, and there is nothing further, no ideal, to strive for.

at this stage I'm sick of you holding the thread up. There's a whole book here. Move on. — Banno

As you might know by now, I don't take orders very well, I tend to misunderstand them. So what exactly are you telling me? Am I preventing you from reading or talking about other parts of the book? Or are you telling me that I ought to read faster, and get on with it? Tell the slowpoke to hurry along, the herd's getting ahead, you might get lost to the wolves. If it's the latter, you're wasting your effort trying to change the way that I read. At my age if the wolves haven't gotten me yet, I'm not too worried about it.

Aristotle did not draw and maintain the crucial distinction between thought/belief and thinking about thought/belief. — creativesoul

Of course he did, that's why the divine act is thinking about thinking, not just plain old thinking. Thinking requires an object, what is thought about, subject matter. In his Nichomachean Ethics, contemplation (thinking) is described as the most virtuous activity, but thinking about thinking is the highest form of thinking. This follows Plato's divisions of knowledge, which places knowledge about ideas as the highest form of knowledge.

He is not referring to "the ideal" at §88; he is referring to ideal exactness. Furthermore, he is criticising, not defining, the unspecified notion of ideal exactness. He says "we don't know what we are to make of this idea". He goes on to talk about other kinds of ideals (other than ideal exactness) from section §89 onwards. — Luke

Whether you call it "ideal exactness", or "the ideal exactness" is not relevant, we are talking about the same thing. And yes, he is criticising this notion, we agree on that. But if we look back and apply the term in retrospect, at 87, the final explanation, the one which requires no further explanation to avoid misunderstanding would be the ideal explanation. At 85, the sign-post which leaves no room for doubt would be the ideal sign-post.

but that is where I found some inconsistency. He is criticising this notion of "ideal", as if it is misguided, and we ought not use it, but he does not seem to be capable of restraining himself from using it. In On Certainty he seeks that very ideal certainty, which is described as no room for doubt.

Now, at this section which Banno was referring to, around 108, 109, I am starting to notice a very similar inconsistency. He is critical of this use of "ideal", but at the same time he is telling us as philosophers our task is to describe language usage, not to tell people how to use language. So to adhere to the principle he is stating, he ought to describe this role which "ideal" has in our language, without being critical of it, as if he thinks it is wrong.

The point being that this sense of "ideal" which Wittgenstein is critical of actually plays a very important role for us. When we keep in mind the ideal, as a perfection which can never actually be achieved, we are inspired to always better ourselves. This is an acknowledgement that if I am doing something in a particular way, it is never the best way. The way I am proceeding is never the ideal way. Despite the fact that my method serves the purpose, I ought to always be open to the possibility that someone will come and show me a better way. This what the notion of "ideal", as a perfection which is unobtainable, gives us, the attitude that there is always a better way possible. This is the principle by which we better ourselves, rather than settling for what serves the purpose. It is what musicians do in practise, and what athletes do, accept that there is always a better, and this allows them to continually better themselves.

These are not all about 'serving a purpose' or 'achieving a goal'. — Luke

The point I was making is that Wittgenstein appears to be trying to replace the notion of "ideal", in the sense that he is critical of, the perfection, best, crystalline purity, with the notion of "serves the purpose". He introduces this notion of "serves the purpose" at 87-88. Now notice at 105, he says that if we are always thinking that we must find the ideal, we get dissatisfied. I would call this a frustration, like the athlete who for a period of time is working hard but doesn't see any improvement. So he proceeds at 106-107, looking into this problem, of seeking the ideal when it is actually impossible to achieve the ideal. The more we understand the nature of "ideal", the more we recognize that by its very nature, it is what is impossible to achieve, so this is the slippery slope at 107. We must get our feet back on solid ground But if we let go of the ideal (108), where does this leave logic, which appears to have derived its rigour from assuming the ideal? What Wittgenstein suggests (108) is that we rotate our investigation around our "real needs". So this brings us back to that earlier principle (87), "fulfils its purpose". This is why I say that he is replacing the sense of "ideal" as that impossible to obtain perfection, with another sense of "ideal", which is more like "fulfils the purpose". Notice at 81, and 98, he drives a wedge between "ideal", and "perfect".

,

This paragraph helped a little (thanks MU), but all I can do is substitute "purpose" or "goal" for "end", and that doesn't seem like the intended meaning? — ZhouBoTong

I agree, "purpose", and "goal' are reasonably synonymous with "end". I don't think I'd agree with Aaron in the following quote, because I think Aquinas believed that the reason why we need to assume God, outlined in the fifth way, is because inanimate things are directed by intention toward their ends.

But I think Aquinas specifically chose to focus his argument on inanimate things because he wanted to avoid the whole question of intentionality. — Aaron R

In the phrase, "the ends justify the means", "ends" would mean results (I think). — ZhouBoTong

You ought to be careful here because the end really is the goal, the intention, and the results are not necessarily consistent with the intention. That's why good intentions sometimes have bad results, especially in the case of mistake.

1. All inanimate things are directed towards ends. — Aaron R

I think we need to get a good understanding of what is meant by this. It is only to the extent that anything, (animate or inanimate), is engaged in activity, that it can be said to be directed towards an end. It is by the fact that it is active, that a thing becomes a means to an end. We might say that it has a function, it acts for a purpose. So I think we need to keep in mind when discussing the fifth way, as expressed in the op, that we are talking about the activities of things. Things act in an orderly way, as if they are ordered towards an end.

Didn't what?

You keep coming back to §98. But it is only a small part. Read §99, which has one of his alternate voices; he sets up the case you are arguing! The in §100, rejects it. — Banno

98 is important because it is a clear and unambiguous separation between "ideal" and "perfect". This separation was started at 81, where he discussed logic as an "ideal language" following fixed rules of calculi. Notice that he says here, that following these fixed rules does not make logic a "better", or "more perfect" language.

In the meantime, in the sections between these two passages, he has associated "ideal" with the idea of achieving the goal. At 88, we look for the exactness which is appropriate to the goal, we do not look for "the ideal" exactness. "There is no single ideal of exactness". It is implied that the "ideal" is that which achieves the goal. At 87, the sign-post is in order if under normal circumstance it serves the purpose. Serving the purpose is the real ideal, as expressed at 88.

The point being, that if we remove the notion of "ideal" as meaning the perfect, best, most exact, etc., as useless and misguided, as Wittgenstein is doing, yet we continue to use the word "ideal", as Wittgenstein does, then "ideal" must still have meaning, according to that usage. So he is not deny the reality of the ideal, in the sense that would leave the word "ideal" as totally useless, he is still allowing it to be a useful term, but misunderstood by those who use it to signify that crystalline purity, or absolute exactness, which he talks about. At 100, "But I want to say: we misunderstand the role of the ideal in our language.".

Accordingly, I maintain what I said in the last post, as 100 is clear support of it. he doesn't dismiss "ideal" he says we misunderstand it. So he has positioned the word "ideal" (defined it you might say), such that it does not refer to some sort of perfect exactness, or crystalline purity, which we might seek after with "ideal languages" like logic, "ideal" refers to whatever serves the purpose. And if logic is an ideal language, it is because it serves the purpose, not because it seeks some absolute exactness. Whatever suffices to achieve the goal, is the ideal. And those who seek some form of absolute perfection as "the ideal" really misunderstand the role of "the ideal", within language, which is just to fulfill the goal. Consider the game analogy. To win the game is the goal, therefore whatever brings this about is the ideal. It makes no sense to say that it is better, or more ideal, to win by a score of 10-0, than a score of 1-0. To win is the goal and it makes no sense to think of one as a more perfect win than another.

The ideal we are now discussing is an assumption which can result from the sublime nature of logic. — Luke

Right, this sense of "ideal" is what he is dismissing as "misunderstanding the role of the ideal in our language", at 100. To think that logic seeks after some pure crystal, perfect exactness, as "the ideal", is to misunderstand "the ideal". This preconceived idea is what bewitches us (109). It is the glasses which distort the view at 103. However, he does not reject "ideal" as a totally useless word which people are going around using when it really has no use. He calls it a misunderstanding of "the ideal". He still allows that "ideal" has a role in language. But it really means, as described at 87-88, that which serves the purpose. At 87, there is no room for doubt, whenever the sign-post serves the purpose. We can take this as the true understanding of "ideal", the goal being fulfilled, not that absolute exactness, which the example of time demonstrates is completely unreal. The "ideal", what we are striving for, is what serves the purpose, it is not an absolute.

This principle, if you bear it in mind, will become more and more evident as we proceed from this point in the book.

132. We want to establish an order in our knowledge of the use
of language: an order with a particular end in view; one out of many
possible orders; not the order. To this end we shall constantly be
giving prominence to distinctions which our ordinary forms of
language easily make us overlook. This may make it look as if we
saw it as our task to reform language.
Such a reform for particular practical purposes, an improvement in
our terminology designed to prevent misunderstandings in practice,
is perfectly possible. But these are not the cases we have to do with.
The confusions which occupy us arise when language is like an engine
idling, not when it is doing work.
133. It is not our aim to refine or complete the system of rules for
the use of our words in unheard-of ways.
For the clarity that we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. But
this simply means that the philosophical problems should completely
disappear.
The real discovery is the one that makes me capable of stopping
doing philosophy when I want to.—The one that gives philosophy
peace, so that it is no longer tormented by questions which bring itself
in question.—Instead, we now demonstrate a method, by examples;
and the series of examples can be broken off.—Problems are solved
(difficulties eliminated), not a single problem.
There is not a philosophical method, though there are indeed
methods, like different therapies.

A goal implies an ideal, obtaining that goal is the ideal. Anytime there is a goal, an ideal is assumed. So unless we can get to a description of language such that language is not goal oriented we cannot have a description of language which does not describe language as assuming ideals. It is the natural outcome of describing language use as an intentional activity that the assumption of ideals will be inherent within language use. Only if we can remove the intentional aspect of this activity (language) in our description, can we remove the assumption of ideals from our description.

But I really do not know how this would leave our description of language use if we completely removed intentionality from this activity.

69. How should we explain to someone what a game is? I imagine
that we should describe games to him, and we might add: "This and
similar things are called 'games' ". And do we know any more about
it ourselves? Is it only other people whom we cannot tell exactly what
a game is?—But this is not. ignorance. We do not know the boundaries
because none have been drawn. To repeat, we can draw a boundary—
for a special purpose. Does it take that to make the concept usable?
Not at alll (Except for that special purpose.) No more than it took
the definition: i pace = 75 cm. to make the measure of length 'one
pace' usable. And if you want to say "But still, before that it wasn't
an exact measure", then I reply: very well, it was an inexact one.—
Though you still owe me a definition of exactness. — PI

Consider the reference to "special purpose" here. A word like "game" could have meaning with absolutely no boundaries to that meaning. That would be like infinite possibilities for the potential use of the word. However, what if each and every time that the word is used, it is used for a "special purpose"? Then, each and every time that the word is used, a boundary is produced by that act of usage (context), and the word has meaning which is specific to that particular purpose of that context. Each instance of usage is using the word for a special purpose.

Now consider the "perfect order" referred to at 98. The sentence only has a perfect order because it has been created intentionally, for that "special purpose", in that context. The very principle by which Wittgenstein removes the ideal, here at 98, claiming that the sentence may be "perfect" without striving after an ideal, already assumes intentionality within the sentence, as creator of the perfect order which is the existence of the sentence itself. The "ideal", or "goal", is already assumed to exist within the very utterance of the sentence. Therefore the ideal is not to be sought after at all, it is already there, as evidenced by the existence of the sentence, as a perfect order..

The assumption of the ideal is not excluded. Instead of assuming that the ideal as something which we seek, and strive after in logic and such linguistic enterprises, the ideal is assumed by Wittgenstein to already inhere within language use. Each instance of language use is for a special purpose, and this gives the sentence a perfect order for that special purpose. So the ideal is right there, within each instance of use, as each instance of use is the ideal representation of that specific purpose. Maybe this is the rotation referred to at 108, the ideal is already there within, and not something we seek after.

.

So I disagree that we have "two fundamentally different ways of using language". We have a view of language derived from looking at its use, and a game of finding ideal meanings that, like Antigonish, does not mesh with the world. — Banno

As I explained in the post, if it is all just one way of using language, that way assumes ideals. So if all forms of language use are reducible to one fundamental way, that way has inherent within it an assumption of ideals, whether or not the ideals are real. And, whether or not the ideals are sought, or found, is not relevant. What is relevant is that they are assumed to exist, and so we must respect this in our description of language.

Not really, because the (non-common) "usage" which assumes an ideal is only found in philosophy. — Luke

This depends on your definition of philosophy, but the so-called non-common usage exists throughout logic, science, and is fundamental in educational institutions. So its status as "non-common" is questionable.

Keep in mind that it is the assumption (of an ideal) - the thinking - that is misguided. — Luke

You may insist that this assumption of an ideal is misguided, but the effort here is to describe the way that language is, not to dictate how language ought to be. To say that our goal is to produce a real description of language as it is, but also say that we ought to leave out of the description all language use which assumes ideals, because this is misguided language use, is self-defeating. So if the assumption of ideals is fundamental to a large part of language use, we cannot neglect this in our description of language. Nor ought we neglect this part of our language use from our description simply because we think that this is misguided language use. And, as I explained to Banno above, it's quite possible that the assumption of ideals underlies all language use. The question would be whether all language use is goal oriented, and whether a goal can exist without the assumption of an ideal. If a person has a goal, then obtaining that goal is the assumed ideal. Notice that even to have the goal of describing language implies the assumption of an ideal, if a goal implies an ideal.

Total US food exports last year were expected to be about $144 billion. — Bitter Crank

That sounds more like the big business which farming really is in North America.

Based on this stuff I feel we need to return to a smaller farm model. — Nasir Shuja

Is this practical?

Here's another issue which has since come to my mind. If we have these two fundamentally different ways of using language, the one assumes an ideal, and proceeds in that way, in logic and explanation, and the other, common usage, assumes no such ideal, and does not proceed according to theoretical rules of essentialism, but by practise, then doesn't an accurate description of language require considering both of these branches of language use?

It wouldn't suffice as a description of language use, to simply reject the one form of language use, the one which assumes an ideal, as a form of deception and therefore not true language use, when it really is a form of language use actually in practise. At issue is the accuracy of Wittgenstein's description. And, to "describe" is an intentional act, with a goal, so even description as a way of using language, is reducible to the way of using language which assumes an ideal. If this is the case, then the division is annihilated as inaccurate, the assumption of an ideal has not be removed from any language use, and it has not been demonstrated that it is possible that there is any language use which does not assume an ideal. Then all language use is of the sort which assumes an ideal, so that Wittgenstein's enterprise here is undermined.

Interesting... He did?

Have a link? — creativesoul

Refer to the last book of "Nichomachean Ethics". The entire NE is an extremely good read, which all human beings would benefit from reading. The highest pleasure, most perfect happiness is found in contemplation. Also you'll find the same principle in Metaphysics Bk.12 Ch.7. Here, the principle looses credibility as he uses this idea to support his notion of eternal circular motion, as unmoved mover, which is really untenable. The act of thinking is in contact with itself, as the best thing to think about. And so the act of thinking, and the object of thought become one and the same in God, so that God is always in this most virtuous condition, which human beings are only sometimes in. In God, the act of thinking and possession of the object of thinking, are one and the same thing, in this eternal circular motion. His mistake is that he has taken what he has determined as the highest human activity, contemplation, and tried to describe God's activity based on this description of the highest human activity. But hat's a huge gap he jumps across without providing a bridge to support the assumed relation, as human beings are temporal, mortal beings, while God is non-temporal, eternal.

Well if you don't understand, you're not sharing, and you're not playing the game properly. But sharing a pizza does not require sharing a stomach, we each have some. And likewise we can share thoughts, rules, meanings, in separate minds. Let's not make it a problem because it isn't one. Maybe your slice of pizza is bigger and has more salami, maybe your understanding is sharper. Still, we share... — unenlightened

It's easy to say that if you misunderstand, then you're not playing the game right, but who determines which interpretation of the rules qualifies as understanding, and which interpretation of the rules qualifies as misunderstanding? Is there a referee in this game scenario to make that judgement? And if the referee does not have the status of God, what would make the referee's judgement more authoritative than yours or mine?

It denies that there is any fact of the matter about where a particle is between observations. — andrewk

That seems to be fundamental, there cannot be any fact of the matter about where a particle is between observations. To me that says that the particle, as a particle, is a product of the observation process. Maybe we shouldn't think of the particle as a particle, if it doesn't exist as we would think that a particle exists. Actually, I've heard that from physicists, that they just call it a particle, but it isn't really a particle in any normal sense of the word. That's my in depth understanding of "particle" physics.

My suspicion is that there is an implication here that might be dangerous for a certain philosophical convention - that ethics cannot be discussed? — unenlightened

If we're talking about rules for getting things done, then I think ethics is unavoidable. If there are rules for getting things done, which are incompatible with ethical rules, this would be a problem.

So contra Banno above, I want to say that meaning is being able to play the game, or in this case, stopping playing the game when the whistle blows, and restarting when the whistle blows again. Exactly as one says that a dog understands 'sit' just in case it sits when the trainer says 'sit'. We don't require that the beast can explain itself. I suppose I would say something like that meaning is how the rules play out in the form of life. — unenlightened

Wouldn't this put meaning into the minds of the individuals then, and not something shared? The rules are shared, but the meaning of the rules is what is in the individual's mind. So if one person misunderstood what the whistle is supposed to mean, that person might keep playing, having assigned a different meaning to the whistle.

Sure it is, and we do it with language, but it's secondary, and parasitic on the practical uses of language to coordinate social action. First we hunt, then we tell hunting stories, and then we theorise hunting. — unenlightened

Yes, I think that's the point which puts practise ahead of theory in Aristotle's ethics. First, he was moved to assign a theoretical thing as the ultimate end, "happiness". But a further analysis of human nature revealed that we are fundamentally active, involved in activity first and foremost, and the highest good must be an activity because an inactivity is inconsistent with what it means to be human. So the so-called ultimate end is overruled, as incompatible with human nature, which is to be active, and therefore the new ultimate end would have to be an activity.

Notice in your example, "then we theorize hunting". You might have said we theorize ways to make hunting more efficient, or to avoid having to hunt altogether, in order to do more important things. But if you said that we theorize ways to spend less time having to hunt, so that we could sit around and do nothing, this would outstep the boundaries of this sort of ethics which dictates that good is found in activity. Practise is given a higher priority to theory. This provides the principles to judge theory through practise (empirical method). And theory is not coming from the truth of eternal forms, rather it comes from the activity of thinking.

If most interpretations reject objective reality, then how is the article referred to in the op saying anything new?

I would like to see a thread called "What is a door?". — Banno

This question assumes essentialism. If there is such a thing as what a door is, that is the essence of "door". For Aristotle this essence becomes the basis for deductive logic. There is for example, a specific definition or formula, which is correct, and therefore forms the essence of "man". If the thing we call Socrates fulfils that essence, then by deductive logic, Socrates is a man. Deductive logic requires such essences to be applicable.

What Wittgenstein is arguing is that this representation of language is false, created with some sort of ideal in mind, an ideal which cannot be upheld in practise, and is not evident in common usage. So as much as we might use language in this way, as though there is such a thing as what a door is (essence), it is a fundamental deception, because there really is no such essence. Therefore in our inquiry as to what language is, we must put aside this type of language use, the deception based in the illusion of an ideal, to describe how language really is.

I don't believe in objective reality so this is a bit moot for me. — andrewk

The wording of the paper seems to be a argument against counterfactual definiteness (an objective reality). I'm all for that since I don't think there is such a thing, and Bell's theorem demonstrated long ago that you can't have both that and locality. — noAxioms

If you reject "objective reality", is there any interpretation other than Many Worlds which is acceptable?

If I understand correctly, you are saying that there is an understanding which is shared (mutual), and this understanding concerns some rules about actions. What do you think is the relationship between meaning and rules? Are they the same thing, meaning is rules, and rules are meaning? Or, are rules a type of meaning, or is meaning a type of rule? Or is there some other relationship?

This is annoying for philosophers, to find that words are not really for arguing the toss, or exploring the mind, but for getting stuff done. — unenlightened

Isn't exploring the mind an instance of doing something? Here's a little problem that Aristotle uncovered. A goal, the end, is an object, the thing desired. Activity is the means to the end. So getting to the end constitutes "getting stuff done". But Aristotle found that it is the activity itself which is judged as virtuous or vicious, so the highest goal, the final end, as the most virtuous thing desired, must itself be an activity, rather than an object, as thing desired. This is why he posited thinking about thinking, as the most virtuous, divine activity. But this is an instance of doing something without ever getting anything done.

There is no such thing as the middle ground between these two because they are two distinct forms of art which cannot be united into one. One is static, the other active. Any attempt to cross the boundary, to make something which is supposed to be static, active, or vise versa, just makes a mess.

When the builder says "slab" and the assistant passes a slab, they are both using the language in the same way to do the same thing together. And meaning is use, so meaning is co-operation, and cooperation is sharing. — unenlightened

Let me see if I can understand this. The builder and the assistant are doing something together, building something. This is cooperation. I would say that the act of building, in this instance, is something which is shared. So "cooperation" refers to a sharing, and in this case what is shared is the act of building.

Let's suppose that "meaning" refers to an act of cooperation, so it is also a type of sharing. What is the act which it is a sharing of? In the example above, the act of building is shared. In the case of meaning, is it communication which is the act that is shared? If we share in the act of communicating, then I think that the question of the thread is whether meaning is a property of the act of communication (and therefore shared), or is "meaning" something particular, something which each individual who shares in the act of communicating contributes.

So back to the example. Each builder adds something to the act of building, and also each assistant adds something to the act. However, each of these individual acts only has significance in relation to the overall, cooperative act of building. Does "meaning" refer to something like this, something that each individual adds to the act, but only has importance in relation to the overall cooperative act of communicating? Or, does each individual act contain meaning within itself, regardless of the act's relation to the overall, shared act of communicating?

You mean so that one wouldn't hold both (1) and (2)? Sure. They're different options about what one might have in mind with "shared." The idea isn't that someone would have all three options in mind about the same thing. — Terrapin Station

Each one is contradictory in its own right. The first, I assume one thing "multiply present" means one thing that is a multiplicity of itself, which is contradictory, and the second, multiple things which are the same thing, is just a different way of stating the same contradiction.

I'm a nominalist, so I have issues with someone having in mind my (1) or (2) above. — Terrapin Station

I think your (1) and (2) are expressed in a way so as to be contradictory.

So, what is it that is being shared between language users? — creativesoul

You'll find it hard to get agreement on this, so let's start with something simple. Words are shared. Are they not? Anyone disagree?

Consider the inquiry at 88. It appears like there might be a distinction between an exact explanation and an inexact explanation, as two distinct types of explanation. In reality though, "exact" and "inexact" are judgements (reproach and praise) concerning the relationship between the explanation and the goal. The "final explanation" is not a different type of explanation, it simply has a different relationship to the particular goal, being the "ideal" for that particular goal. If you could choose the ideal explanation for a particular purpose, from all possible explanations, this would not make the one designated as "the ideal" into a different type of explanation.

Consider 98. Every sentence has perfection proper to itself on account of being a sentence. If you judge one sentence as the ideal, or "the final explanation" for a particular purpose, that judgement does not place the sentence into a different category of type. That judgement is determined in relation to the goal, so any sentence may be "the ideal", depending on what the goal is..

Sorry MU but I found Luke's explanation of different kinds of explanation clear and correct. — Fooloso4

The point though, is that Wittgenstein is making no such distinction between types of explanation at 87. Luke is making this distinction. So that distinction is misleading, and ought not be considered in the context of this text.

Ideal. A word no so much encumbered by baggage as buried in it. Your use of it makes your point obscure. — Banno

The term "ideal" has gotten a lot of use in this section, and we need to grasp the way that Wittgenstein is using it. That's what I'm trying to do. Remember at 98, he created a separation between "ideal" and "perfect". And there was a similar reference at 81 There is a related metaphysical separation between "good" and "beauty", which also manifests sometimes in the division between ethics and aesthetics. It seems to me, that at this point in the text, the separation between "ideal" and "perfect" corresponds roughly to the separation he has now made between "explanation" and "description". An explanation is related to an ideal, following definite rules like logic. But a description, being other than an explanation, may be unclear, and vague (which is not permitted of an explanation), yet the description still has a perfection about it, just by being a description, as 98.

Do you agree with Wittgenstein here? — Banno

For me, the principal point for judgement is consistency. A point of inconsistency would be a point to disagree with. I don't think I see anything to disagree with here. But if we assume that he is trying to describe something here at this part of the text, I haven't quite put my finger on it, because I don't think he's done a good job of pointing out what it is that he is describing. He seems to be pointing to a fork in the road, or something like that, two distinct ways in which language is used. One way is to assume ideals, and proceed in the manner of using language in relation to the ideals (explanation). This, I think, amounts to "the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language". The other way, is the way of true philosophy, which is to use language in description, to describe what is. Until I get a firm grasp of what he is trying to describe here, I cannot say whether I agree description.

Yeah, they'll panic, as they sit there stuffing their faces, while the hordes prepare to attack. Wall building is itself already an act of panic.

Consider it this way: The type of explanation that Wittgenstein says must disappear at §109 is the same sort of "complete" and "final" (i.e. philosophical) explanation that he mentions at §87. — Luke

He said we must do away with "all explanation", to be replaced with "description". The point being that explanation is always intended to clarify some meaning, so it is always to some extent, clouded by an ideal. It's intentionality is grounded in the ideal. Only by opting for description instead of explanation can we free ourselves of the ideal, and get a true understanding of language as based in our "real needs" (108), rather than the false description as based in an ideal (notice the influence of Karl Marx). Language is derived from real material needs, not from some ideal.

SO, could it be done? — Banno

Wittgenstein is saying that it cannot be done, and implying that we're fools for trying. That's the point about the ideal, we cannot make language into something which it is not. Our description of what language is, tells us that it is not idealistic like that. The very nature of language disallows the possibility that it could be ideal. No degree of explanation can take away that fundamental aspect, that it is not ideal, because such explanation would only be carried out in language which is not ideal.

See how he is distinguishing between what we require of language (it must be like this) through the lens of the ideal, and what language is really like ( the description: it is like this). The point being that what we want language to be like (the ideal) clouds our vision with respect to our description as to what language really is like. So we must discard that ideal, and produce a true description of what language really is like.

This subject of an ideal, faultless language, is related to the point Aristotle made about logic, it can only lead us from the more certain to the less certain. Adhering to this principle, we can conclude that if there is some degree of uncertainty in the fundamental aspects of language, and language is what is used to express logic, then we cannot produce a logic with an ideal (faultless) certainty. Since such an ideal, faultless language, would be produced from existing language which is not faultless, such an effort is impossible and therefore useless.

Sorry Luke, I can't even begin to understand what you're saying about "explanation". It's completely out of line with what's in the text. And the rest of your post makes no sense either. Here's some examples:

A description of how our language actually works is not necessarily an explanation of this type (i.e. an hypothesis or theory). However, it is another way of removing misunderstanding, which can therefore be considered as a more general type of explanation. — Luke

Do you not see, that he has made a distinction between explanation and description? That was the purpose of my quote above. "We must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its place." Notice he says "all explanation", not this or that type of explanation, and recommends replacing explanation with description. It is incorrect for you to characterize description as a type of explanation.

think you have misread. He says at §31 that we can imagine someone who has learnt the rules without ever having been shown a chess piece (therefore, not by observation); or we can imagine someone having learnt the game "without ever learning or formulating the rules". The purpose of this example is to support what he says at §30, that an ostensive definition can only explain the meaning of a word "if the role the word is supposed to play in the language is already clear". — Luke

He clearly states at 31: "One can also imagine someone's having learnt the game without
ever learning or formulating rules. He might have learnt quite simple board-games first, by watching, and have progressed to more and more complicated ones." It is incorrect for you to say that this is "not by observation".

You appear to assume, along with Augustine, that a child can reason before it has been taught language; that it can already think, only not yet speak. Your attribution of this "possibility" to Wittgenstein is antithetical to the text. — Luke

This is an incorrect interpretation of what I said. It isn't even close.

think it is important to note that Wittgenstein is not trying to do any such thing, assuming that by "bottom" or "foundations" you mean something like the "essence" of language; something beneath the surface or hidden from view. As Wittgenstein states at §97: "We are under the illusion that what is peculiar, profound and essential to us in our investigation resides in its trying to grasp the incomparable essence of language." — Luke

It is incorrect to say that the foundation of a thing and the essence of a thing are the same.

It appears to me like you are just disagreeing with whatever I say, for the sake of disagreeing. You've shown nonsensically incorrect interpretations of what I've wrote, combined with nonsensically incorrect interpretations of passages from Wittgenstein's Philosophical investigations to support your disagreement with me. If you prefer to disagree rather than to understand, then my efforts
are pointless.

Would you agree that confidence is required for activity, and doubt being an activity therefore requires confidence, but certainty is a special type of confidence which is not required for doubt?

He is not rejecting explanation. He is only rejecting the philosophical misconception of a complete and final explanation. — Luke

I think that explanation in general, as the means by which we remove doubt, is being rejected, for the reason that explanation cannot remove doubt unless it is the final explanation. Consider the section we've moved up to now, at 109 he says "We must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its place."

Signposts also require explanation or training in their use. What did you make of Fooloso4's example of the male/female bathroom signs? — Luke

There's two different approaches to how one might learn a rule, which Wittgenstein has been stressing almost from the beginning of the text. One is that the rule is told to us (explanation), and the other is that we might learn simply by observation. I think that this is first mentioned at 31, where he says one might learn the rules of a game just by watching. Explanation is not required to learn signposts, because we might learn simply by observation, and this is the case with bathroom signs. I don't think that anyone has every explained to me the meaning of bathroom signs.

I think it is important to note that Wittgenstein is trying to get to the bottom of language, the foundations. We can't simply assume that we learn rules through explanation because explanation requires language, and so the language by which we learn the fundamental rules, could have no rules at all. But how could there be such a language without rules? So he is pointing us toward the possibility that we might learn rules simply through observation, without any explanation required, as his effort to avoid this problem. I think that this would be like a basic form of inductive reasoning. Only females are observed to go through the door with this sign, and only males are observed to go through the door with that sign, so what is meant by the sign-posts, may be produced with inductive reasoning without any explanation.

Perhaps he is being inconsistent with your idea of certainty, but he is not contradicting himself. — Luke

I am not claiming explicitly that he contradicts himself, only that there is some inconsistency evident, which may produce ambiguity, or confusion as to which way he is pointing with his words. At 85 he says the sign-post "sometimes leaves room for doubt and sometimes not". I find this to be misleading because inductive reasoning, it has been argued, always leaves some room for doubt because it is based in probability. So Wittgenstein's description would be more accurate if he said that sometimes the probability of mistake appears to be so low, that we do not doubt. However, there is always room for doubt, in every instance of inductive reasoning, but sometimes we do not doubt, for reasons such as those described by unenlightened.



I see no reason to disagree with you. If, to proceed into an activity, confidence is required, and this confidence is by definition "certainty", and doubt is by definition an activity, then it follows logically that certainty is required for doubt.

You also want to pigeonhole the term “certainty” to in all cases signify “the property of being indubitable”—which is not how the term is commonly used: e.g., I’m very certain (rather than somewhat certain) that the term holds the synonyms of sureness and certitude. — javra

I am trying to deal with Wittgenstein's expression at 85, in which he implies that sometimes there is no room for doubt, which I find misleading. So I'm not trying to pigeonhole the term "certainty", but I find your definition (certainty as defined by confidence) insufficient to account for the situation described by Wittgenstein, when there is no room for doubt.

The problem specifically is that I often have the confidence required to proceed with an action, while I am actively doubting whether I will be successful in that procedure. This confidence I would not call certainty, because I am doubtful. So I am really calling into question your definition of certainty. If certainty is a type of confidence, as you claim, then it must be a type of confidence in which doubt is excluded, because it makes no sense to say that I proceed with certainty and with doubt concerning the same action. But as described, I can proceed with confidence and with doubt concerning the same action. Therefore I find your definition of "certainty" unacceptable. We must disassociate "certainty" from "confidence", to allow that I have confidence in relation to an action which I am doubtful about (this is courage), yet I do not have certainty concerning that action.

Deficient in what respect? — Luke

I've described that so many times now, in so many different ways, at least three, so if you still don't understand, then I guess that's the way it will stay.

As far as I can tell, so far W has made only a few remarks on doubt from §84-§87. You are placing a lot of emphasis on these few sections. — Luke

That's right, because the section has made me doubt. When I understand what he is doing, and everything appears consistent, I can breeze through the section without discussing it, confident that I understand. But in this section, he brought up the possibility of misunderstanding, and doubt, along with the apparent need for explanation, along with the notion of removing doubt. He seems to be rejecting explanation as the means by which we remove doubt as to what the sign-post is telling us, because explanation is not grounded, it would produce infinite regress (87). He is replacing explanation with the observation that the sign-post fulfils its purpose. When we observe that the sign-post fulfils its purpose, doubt is remove. However, I see this as insufficient because doubt is prior to the action, while observation is posterior.

This problem makes me wonder why he is even concerned about removing doubt. I think that "On Certainty" is a good example of when being obsessed by an ideal obscures one's perception of reality.

That's funny, because you appear to talk about doubt and certainty in ideal terms. — Luke

Doubt is clearly not an ideal. Certainty, in the sense of "leave no room for doubt", is an ideal. That is why I am arguing that it is inconsistent for Wittgenstein to be seeking certainty, in "On Certainty", when he is telling us here, that there is something wrong with this approach of seeking the ideal, it clouds our perception of reality. This attitude, the one which seeks "the ideal" explanation, which removes the possibility of misunderstanding and doubt, distorts the way we see things. It's like looking through glasses (103). We need to take off the glasses and describe the way that we really perceive things, as they are, instead of trying to explaining things through the lens of the ideal (what we want).