Could you expand upon this (or anyone else who happens to agree)? I'm genuinely curious. I have no philisophical knowledge of Witty at all. — emancipate

I think the later Wittgenstein is great too, though he may only be especially important for those with a tendency to get lost in form on their way to content. While some perhaps understand him to offer theories about language, I like to understand him as destroying theories about language that get in the way of just using it effectively. These bad theories are destroyed by paying attention to what we actually say and do all the time --comparing the theories to what's actually going on and finding them wanting.
It's maybe not that simple, because some of us really want to be masters of reality without having to get off the couch. While this quote oversimplifies the situation, I like the spirit of it:

The real lesson here is that the concepts we use in everyday life are fuzzy, and break down if pushed too hard. Even a concept as dear to us as 'I.' It took me a while to grasp this, but when I did it was fairly sudden, like someone in the nineteenth century grasping evolution and realizing the story of creation they'd been told as a child was all wrong. [2] Outside of math there's a limit to how far you can push words; in fact, it would not be a bad definition of math to call it the study of terms that have precise meanings. Everyday words are inherently imprecise. They work well enough in everyday life that you don't notice. Words seem to work, just as Newtonian physics seems to. But you can always make them break if you push them far enough.

I would say that this has been, unfortunately for philosophy, the central fact of philosophy. Most philosophical debates are not merely afflicted by but driven by confusions over words. Do we have free will? Depends what you mean by "free." Do abstract ideas exist? Depends what you mean by "exist."

Wittgenstein is popularly credited with the idea that most philosophical controversies are due to confusions over language. I'm not sure how much credit to give him. I suspect a lot of people realized this, but reacted simply by not studying philosophy, rather than becoming philosophy professors.. — Graham

http://paulgraham.com/philosophy.html

I'd personally change 'most philosophical debates' to 'most bad philosophical debates.' It also responds to what you said:

Perhaps it's because I read mostly continental stuff, yet this doesn't seem like a unique vision. — emancipate

Personally I don't think it's a terribly unique vision either. He's just clearing out some cobwebs. Taoism comes to mind. We are mostly on the way without trying to be. Wittgenstein offers some tips and reminders for keeping on the way. Not the righteous or holy or true way, just a somewhat less annoying and more efficient way.

What might offend some in the Graham quote above is the idea that those who reacted 'by simply not studying philosophy' might have had the gist of the later Wittgenstein without having read him or conferred with the professional Wittgenstein scholars. In any case, Wittgenstein is often inflated so that experts are needed to decode his profundities, which is not to say that some of those experts don't enrich a reading of the book, but only that there's a danger in turning a quality anti-guru into a guru all over again. Yet if he wasn't such an interesting personality, he might have just been ignored. Is he some theorist to be debated or ultimately offering koans? Or something else?

What do you think about (81 & 98), old? Is a fuzzy, imprecise, vague concept, which readily gives misunderstanding, just as "perfect" as a precisely defined mathematical concept? if so, how would you understand "perfect" in this context?

If you believe that we use language for the purpose of understanding each other, i.e. language is used to help us to understand one another, then you ought to reject the principle stated at 98 as false, and unsupportive of this premise.

But if we accept the principle at 98, then we ought to accept what is implied by it, and that is that language may be used for any goals whatsoever, including cheating and deceit.

The issue is whether or not language use is an activity which may be governed by principles of good and bad, morality. If it is, then there is a moral basis for the judgement of better (more perfect) or worse (less perfect) language use. If it is not, then any way of using language is just as good (perfect) as any other way.

If you believe that we use language for the purpose of understanding each other, i.e. language is used to help us to understand one another, then you ought to reject the principle stated at 98 as false, and unsupportive of this premise. — Metaphysician Undercover

Which "principle"?

You have a perverse way of reading the text. It is pointless to take the words "ideal" and "perfect" as being used in a contradictory manner while giving scant consideration to the context. At §98, Wittgenstein is talking about the sense of sentences being in perfect order, yet you continually disregard the "order" part and focus only on the "perfect" or "perfection" part.

Perhaps Wittgenstein's use of "On the one hand" and "On the other hand" at §98 confuses you, since he really only continues one line of thought rather than comparing two.

To paraphrase §98, he says "it is clear that every sentence in our language ‘is in order as it is’." That is, we do not require the construction of a perfect language with an exceptional sense that our ordinary language is lacking; i.e. we are not striving after this ideal. Moreover, "it seems clear that where there is sense, there must be perfect order. —– So there must be perfect order even in the vaguest sentence."

He continues this thought at §99, where he says that a sentence must have a determinate sense, because an indeterminate sense "would really not be a sense at all". In other words, no matter how vague the sentence, it must have a determinate sense or else it wouldn't have a sense. As such, it is in perfect order.

If you disagree, then explain in context, rather than speaking in abstract terms about "ideal" and "perfect".

But if we accept the principle at 98, then we ought to accept what is implied by it, and that is that language may be used for any goals whatsoever, including cheating and deceit. — Metaphysician Undercover

Still unsure of the "principle" here, but it is uncontroversial that language may be used for cheating and deceit.

The issue is whether or not language use is an activity which may be governed by principles of good and bad, morality. If it is, then there is a moral basis for the judgement of better (more perfect) or worse (less perfect) language use. If it is not, then any way of using language is just as good (perfect) as any other way. — Metaphysician Undercover

Wittgenstein makes no mention of morality in the text. Why are you?

Well the thread doesn’t seemed to have moved too far forward so hopefully I’ll be able to catch up now that I’m back from my being away. Gonna post something I half wrote up previously and just completed:

§1-§88, Summary

Before moving on, I want to do a quick structural summary of what’s been covered so far between §1-§88. In it’s broadest sense, this large section can itself be broken up into two parts: §1-§45, and §45-§88. To put it all very roughly, §1-§45 covers issues of what I would call differentials, while §45-§88 covers issues of roles. The two ‘parts' compliment each other, with the second section on roles ‘answering’ certain questions opened up by the first section on differentials.

Anyway, what do I mean by all this? This: that what I’m calling the first part (§1-§45) deals with issues of words (the ’same’ words) that may mean many different things in different circumstances. This is what makes them ‘differentials’, the most obvious being ostensive words like ‘this’ or ‘that’, which are about as general as you can get when it comes to words with differential meaning. A big focus here is on types of words: the fact that words differ not only by ‘degree’, but by kind, if I may put it that way.

Part of the motive here is to get us to understand the heterogeneity of language, of the very many different kinds of words and of all the different things we do with them. This is turn is done in order to show just how deeply connected - unthinkable without understanding how - language is with our lives: that a word has 'this’ meaning meaning rather than ‘that’ meaning is deeply bound up with the role that word plays in the context of our actions, of our concrete lived situation(s) at the time at which we employ that word (what Witty calls ‘language-games’, which really should be called something like, the ‘life-games' instead in order to emphasise just how big a part ‘non-linguistic’ elements play in it).

The second most important thing that the focus on kinds does is to get us to attend to the errors which arise when we mix up kinds of words: when we take different kinds of words to be the same, and all the issues and false which result from our not paying enough attention to kinds of words.

-

What I’m calling the ‘second section’ on roles (§45-§88), tries to bring this out even further and develop some implications of the first section. Basically, the idea is something like this: if there really is such a rich heterogeneity to language so that the same words can mean different things, how is it possible that language has any ‘structure’ as all? Why it is not just one big chaotic mess where the meaning of words swap and change all the time? How is it that we can understand each other at all?

Part of Witty’s answer here is through recourse to roles. Language may be rich in many and various kinds of words, but what helps us navigate this bristling field of word-kinds are the roles these various kinds of words play. The most important of these roles are those which are paradigmatic (examples): paradigmatic words (or even paradigmatic things) serve as points of orientation, which ‘fix’ (temporarily) our way of proceeding with language. For once we have examples in place, and we agree that such and such are examples of such and such, (such agreement is always open to reassessment), we can begin to develop shared language-games.

One important issue that this all serves to bring out (for me anyway), is the relation between necessity and arbitrariness: in some sense, the ‘fixing’ of an example is purely contingent: that a meter is ‘this’ long and not ‘that’ long could very easily be otherwise. On the other hand, given a certain use, such fixing is also absolutely necessary: the fixing of our paradigms is driven or motivated by the use to which they are put. One might even invoke here the way in which evolution among species occurs by way of 'random-walks’ though an evolutionary landscape, before settling on ‘local minima’ determined by developmental constraints: such is the case also with words and meanings, with Witty’s ‘forms-of-life’ occupying an analogous conceptual position to ‘environments’ in evolution.

The biggest import of all of this for Wittgenstein is that, if we recognise that such fixing of paradigms is ultimately governed by our life-contexts, then this renders all attempts at ‘analysis’ - in the sense of breaking-apart meanings into simples out of which complexes are built’ - utterly useless. Meaning is not ‘vertically’ structured, which elemental bases on the bottom and complex meanings on top; rather meaning is always ‘horizontally’ structured: the meaning of things is always appropriate to their use in a certain life-context, and attempts to break meaning down into pieces out of which they are constituted is always doomed to failure. Meaning is always irreducibly ‘synthetic’. Hence the very important closing of §: "The signpost is in order a if, under normal circumstances, it fulfil its purpose.”

The next few sections will attempt to ‘apply’ these insights to what Wittgenstein calls ‘philosophy’.

What do you think about (81 & 98), old? Is a fuzzy, imprecise, vague concept, which readily gives misunderstanding, just as "perfect" as a precisely defined mathematical concept? if so, how would you understand "perfect" in this context? — Metaphysician Undercover

I read those passages as us being cautioned against projecting some kind of exact, quasi-mathematical meaning 'behind' language. The fact that we can ask Joe to elaborate on his 'feeling shitty' doesn't imply that his feeling-shittiness has some exact nature that we can approximate with arbitrary precision by talking about it long enough. Joe doesn't even know exactly (ideally, perfectly) what he means. He doesn't need to. Maybe he's explaining why he wants or does not want to walk in the park.

As far as your question goes, I'd say that ideal languages like math are better for certain purposes. Still, we have to construct them using vague concepts. For instance, we have a vague sense of what an algorithm is. Various people have defined the concept precisely (in terms of Turing machines, for instance.) But whether Turing machines conform to our intuitive sense of what an algorithm is ...is not a mathematical question. What formal/ideal languages 'mean' in the context of our existence as a whole is not a formal question. In short, our fuzzy language is something like our basic situation. It's what we build everything on, despite its fuzziness. A distaste for this fuzziness encourages the questionable notion that maybe it has some exact skeleton beneath the fuzz that can serve as a foundation for a superscience. Such a superscience would allow us to say exactly what science is or whether a statement is meaninglessness or not, restoring the philosopher to a position above all others. This philosopher would know what others were trying or failing to say better than they do.

Which "principle"? — Luke

The one stated at 98: "So there must be perfect order even in the vaguest sentence."

To paraphrase §98, he says "it is clear that every sentence in our language ‘is in order as it is’." — Luke

You left out the word "perfect", he says that it has "perfect order". And he's very clear about this, he uses "perfect order" twice in that short section. This is the way he denies that we are striving after an "ideal language", by saying that even the vaguest sentence already obtains a "perfect order". We do not have to strive for an ideal language, because perfection is already there, in even the vaguest use of language. So "perfect" plays a very important role here. It is only by saying that language is already "perfect", as it is, even in the vaguest sentences, that he gets away from the notion that we are striving after some ideal perfection in language.

If he simply said that every sentence has order, we might still strive for a better order, and therefore still be striving for an ideal language. But this is not what he said, he said that even the vaguest sentence already has a perfect order. And it is only by this assumption, that perfection is already within even the vaguest of sentences, that he supports the notion that we are not striving after an ideal.

Wittgenstein makes no mention of morality in the text. Why are you? — Luke

Morality concerns the goodness and badness of human actions. Using language is a human action. "Perfect" implies without deficiency, faultless, so morality is implied anytime "perfect" is used in relation to human actions. A human act cannot be perfect if it is morally deficient. To say that a human act creates something perfect (a perfect order), is to judge that act as morally good, because it creates something which is without deficiency. Therefore morality is implied at 98. The order which is created could not be said to be perfect if it was created by a morally deficient act. The order of the vague sentence cannot be said to be a "perfect order" if the sentence is created as part of an immoral act.

I read those passages as us being cautioned against projecting some kind of exact, quasi-mathematical meaning 'behind' language. The fact that we can ask Joe to elaborate on his 'feeling shitty' doesn't imply that his feeling-shittiness has some exact nature that we can approximate with arbitrary precision by talking about it long enough. Joe doesn't even know exactly (ideally, perfectly) what he means. He doesn't need to. Maybe he's explaining why he wants or does not want to walk in the park. — old

But when he says, at 98, that even the vaguest sentence has "perfect" order, isn't he saying exactly what you are saying that he is cautioning against? But instead of saying that the perfect order is something we seek with ideal languages such as mathematics and logic, he is saying that perfect order is already right there, in even the vaguest sentence.

.

But when he says, at 98, that even the vaguest sentence has "perfect" order, isn't he saying exactly what you are saying that he is cautioning against? But instead of saying that the perfect order is something we seek with ideal languages such as mathematics and logic, he is saying that perfect order is already right there, in even the vaguest sentence. — Metaphysician Undercover

Here's the passage in context.

Thought is surrounded by a halo.—Its essence, logic, presents
an order, in fact the a priori order of the world: that is, the order of
possibilities, which must be common to both world and thought.
But this order, it seems, must be utterly simple. It is prior to all
experience, must run through all experience; no empirical cloudiness
or uncertainty can be allowed to affect it——It must rather be of the
purest crystal. But this crystal does not appear as an abstraction;
but as something concrete, indeed, as the most concrete, as it were the
hardest thing there is (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus No. 5.5563).
We are under the illusion that what is peculiar, profound, essential,
in our investigation, resides in its trying to grasp the incomparable
essence of language. That is, the order existing between the concepts
of proposition, word, proof, truth, experience, and so on. This order
is a super-order between—so to speak—super-concepts. Whereas, of
course, if the words "language", "experience", "world", have a use, it
must be as humble a one as that of the words "table", "lamp", "door".

98. On the one hand it is clear that every sentence in our language
'is in order as it is'. That is to say, we are not striving after an ideal,
as if our ordinary vague sentences had not yet got a quite unexceptionable sense, and a perfect language awaited construction by us.—On the
other hand it seems clear that where there is sense there must be perfect
order.——So there must be perfect order even in the vaguest sentence.
99. The sense of a sentence—one would like to say—may, of
course, leave this or that open, but the sentence must nevertheless
have a definite sense. An indefinite sense—that would really not be a
sense at all.—This is like: An indefinite boundary is not really a
boundary at all. Here one thinks perhaps: if I say "I have locked the
man up fast in the room—there is only one door left open"—then I
simply haven't locked him in at all; his being locked in is a sham.
One would be inclined to say here: "You haven't done anything at all".
An enclosure with a hole in it is as good as none.—But is that true?

100. "But still, it isn't a game, if there is some vagueness in the
rules".—But does this prevent its being a game?—"Perhaps you'll call
it a game, but at any rate it certainly isn't a perfect game." This means:
it has impurities, and what I am interested in at present is the pure
article.—But I want to say: we misunderstand the role of the ideal
in our language. That is to say: we too should call it a game, only we
are dazzled by the ideal and therefore fail to see the actual use of the
word "game" clearly. — Wittgenstein

I wouldn't make too much of 'perfect order.' Making too much of that little choice is perhaps to be 'dazzled by the ideal.' If you zoom in on this or that phrase looking for awkwardness, you will indeed find it. I don't see how writing a perfect PI is possible. Anyone who gets the gist could do their own imperfect version. As I see it, it's a fuzzy insight communicated fuzzily. I'd caution against losing the spirit in the letter. Most people don't need the book in the first place. It's aimed at those with a peculiar itch that drives them to talk about their talking when they might be better served by talking about the wide world outside of talk where the less itchy get things done, somehow doing so without a profound theory of language.

Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither
explains nor deduces anything.—Since everything lies open to view
there is nothing to explain. For what is hidden, for example, is of no
interest to us.
One might also give the name "philosophy" to what is possible
before all new discoveries and inventions.
127. The work of the philosopher consists in assembling reminders
for a particular purpose.
128. If one tried to advance theses in philosophy, it would never
be possible to debate them, because everyone would agree to them.
129. The aspects of things that are most important for us are
hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to
notice something—because it is always before one's eyes.) The real
foundations of his enquiry do not strike a man at all. Unless that fact
has at some time struck him.—And this means: we fail to be struck
by what, once seen, is most striking and most powerful. — W

For 'philosophy,' I think we can substitute 'what I'm about.' There is an important tension here. On the one hand, nothing is hidden. And yet aspects of important things are hidden after all because of their familiarity. They are too close to our eyes for us to see them clearly. So nothing is hidden...except the fact that nothing is hidden. As an aphorism out of context, it's just mystification. Fortunately the cumulative effect of the reminders and some grasp of who Wittgenstein is trying to be in the text can give that mystification some anti-profound content. To be fair, getting the anti-profound message can feel pretty profound at first. Other good books are the same way. Then it wears off and becomes taken for granted, leaving us perhaps with better habits.

You left out the word "perfect", he says that it has "perfect order". — Metaphysician Undercover

Actually, it was a direct quote; the first line of §98.

So "perfect" plays a very important role here. It is only by saying that language is already "perfect", as it is, even in the vaguest sentences, that he gets away from the notion that we are striving after some ideal perfection in language. — Metaphysician Undercover

Exactly. You get it now?

"Perfect" implies without deficiency, faultless, — Metaphysician Undercover

Not necessarily. The "perfect" order Wittgenstein speaks of here has the sense of 'suitable', 'apt' or 'appropriate', rather than 'faultless', 'flawless' or 'ideal'. The same distinction that you made above.

I wouldn't make too much of 'perfect order.' Making too much of that little choice is perhaps to be 'dazzled by the ideal.' — old

The point is that he uses "perfect". And, as I explained to Luke, it is only by employing this concept, (the order in common language is perfect), that he has reason to dismiss the notion that we are seeking the ideal. It is only if this order is "perfect", that we may reasonably dismiss 'striving after the ideal'. If the order were less than perfect, then we might still strive after a better order, the ideal. Clearly, "perfect" plays a very important, pivotal role here.

If anyone is dazzled by the ideal, it is Wittgenstein himself. This is analogous to Plato's cave allegory. But when Wittgenstein comes out of the cave to see the sun, ("the good" in the cave allegory), he's dazzled by it, and wants to retreat back into the cave without apprehending its significance. Wittgenstein is trying to reason away the significance of the ideal, by claiming that the order in common language is already perfect. It's a case of "rationalizing". He doesn't want to face the ideal, so he thinks up a reason to turn away from it. By saying that the order in common language is already "perfect", he asserts that seeking the ideal is misguided. But if it is really the case that the order in common language is less than perfect, then seeking the ideal is justified.

if seeking the ideal is justified, then Wittgenstein's premise "meaning is use" is overruled. This would mean that the ideal itself has significance, meaning, as that which is sought after. But the ideal is something outside of actual use, something which actual use never obtains. Then, meaning would be derived from something above and beyond actual use, such as "the good" in Plato's analogy.

Not necessarily. The "perfect" order Wittgenstein speaks of here has the sense of 'suitable', 'apt' or 'appropriate', rather than 'faultless', 'flawless' or 'ideal'. The same distinction that you made above — Luke

That is very clearly untrue. The terms you have proposed allow for the possibility of something better, or more complete, which "perfect" does not allow for. If Wittgenstein was using "perfect" in the way you suggest, it would not serve his purpose. His purpose is to demonstrate that we are not striving after an ideal language, perfection is already there, within our common, ordinary language. So if "perfect" here is anything less than the ideal, it does not serve the purpose because then we could still be striving after the ideal. It is crucial that "perfect" is equivalent (in value) to "ideal", in order to dismiss as unjustified, 'striving after the ideal'.

The terms you have proposed allow for the possibility of something better, or more complete, which "perfect" does not allow for. — Metaphysician Undercover

Why should I accept your assertion that there is only one possible meaning of the word "perfect"?

If Wittgenstein was using "perfect" in the way you suggest, it would not serve his purpose. His purpose is to demonstrate that we are not striving after an ideal language, perfection is already there, within our common, ordinary language. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's right: the kind of perfection under discussion is already there within our ordinary language, but it is "perfect" in the sense of 'suitable', 'apt', or 'appropriate', rather than the ideal sense that you are attempting to stipulate.

So if "perfect" here is anything less than the ideal, it does not serve the purpose because then we could still be striving after the ideal. It is crucial that "perfect" is equivalent (in value) to "ideal", in order to dismiss as unjustified, 'striving after the ideal'. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is true only if you stipulate that "perfect" must have the one (ideal) meaning. Whereas Wittgenstein is counselling the reader to abandon such a philosophical pursuit of sublime chimeras (§94).

Why should I accept your assertion that there is only one possible meaning of the word "perfect"? — Luke

As I explained, it doesn't matter how many possible meanings of "perfect" there are, it is the only one that serves Wittgenstein's purpose, of dismissing 'striving for the ideal'.

That's right: the kind of perfection under discussion is already there within our ordinary language, but it is "perfect" in the sense of 'suitable', 'apt', or 'appropriate', rather than the ideal sense that you are attempting to stipulate. — Luke

If that perfection is suitable to render 'striving for the ideal' as unwarranted, it must be of equivalent value to the ideal perfection.

This is true only if you stipulate that "perfect" must have the one (ideal) meaning. Whereas Wittgenstein is counselling the reader to abandon such a philosophical pursuit of sublime chimeras (§94). — Luke

Unless he can show how 'striving for the ideal' is unwarranted, then his "counselling" is rather pointless. He would be counselling against something which may be very appropriate. That is why "perfect" must be used at 98 in a sense which is equivalent in value to "the ideal". If that perfection does not have a value equivalent to "the ideal", then any assertions that 'striving after the ideal' is misguided, are unjustified.

As I explained, it doesn't matter how many possible meanings of "perfect" there are — Metaphysician Undercover

It does matter, because your whole argument hangs on the fallacious assumption that the word "perfect" must always mean "ideal".

it is the only one that serves Wittgenstein's purpose, of dismissing 'striving for the ideal'. — Metaphysician Undercover

Then I'll leave it to you to explain why you apparently believe that our ordinary vague sentences have not yet got a quite unexceptionable sense, and a perfect language still has to be constructed by us.

It does matter, because your whole argument hangs on the fallacious assumption that the word "perfect" must always mean "ideal". — Luke

You've misunderstood the argument then. "Perfect" here doesn't have to mean "ideal". In fact, it clearly is other than ideal. However, as I've explained, to serve Wittgentein's purpose of demonstrating that there is no need to strive for the ideal, "perfect" here must have equal value to "ideal". We have no need to strive for the ideal because we already have perfect order in what comes without that effort.

Then I'll leave it to you to explain why you apparently believe that our ordinary vague sentences have not yet got a quite unexceptionable sense, and a perfect language still has to be constructed by us. — Luke

Quite obviously, misunderstanding is still possible, as Fooloso4 wisely pointed out above. Therefore the ideal language, where misunderstanding is avoided, still has not yet been constructed by us. To say, forget about that ideal language because even the most vague sentence (which is very easily misunderstood) is already in its own way perfect", is nothing but fool's play.

You might think that we can either play the language-game for fun or play for keeps, and it would be better if we would all just play for fun and forget about playing for keeps. It doesn't matter who wins or loses, we're playing for fun. The problem though, is that in reality we all play for keeps, and that's why we continually strive to better ourselves (strive for the ideal). Ever see a chess player who says it doesn't matter which move I make, because any move is going to create a perfect order? The chess player strives for the ideal move.

You might think that we can either play the language-game for fun or play for keeps, and it would be better if we would all just play for fun and forget about playing for keeps. It doesn't matter who wins or loses, we're playing for fun. The problem though, is that in reality we all play for keeps, and that's why we continually strive to better ourselves (strive for the ideal). — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't understand what you mean by "playing for keeps" in the context of language games.

Ever see a chess player who says it doesn't matter which move I make, because any move is going to create a perfect order? The chess player strives for the ideal move. — Metaphysician Undercover

If I understand your analogy, are you saying that everyone is somehow trying to win the language game?

The point is that he uses "perfect". — Metaphysician Undercover

I hear you, but I don't think anything is going to be proved in either direction. It seems like you want to knock Wittgenstein down, which is fine. But isn't it also valuable to understand his appeal? Gellner's attack seems related to yours.

One might say that G.E. Moore is the one and only known example of Wittgensteinian man: unpuzzled by the world or science, puzzled only by the oddity of the sayings of philosophers, and sensibly reacting to that alleged oddity by very carefully, painstakingly and interminably examining their use of words. . . The philosophical job is to persuade us of the adequacy of ordinary conceptualisations. It is the story of Plato over again–only this time it is the philosopher’s job to lead us back into the cave. — Gellner

An exaggerated/profound reading of the underlined phrase is suspiciously easy to criticize. Give the people that like W some credit, after all. It's unlikely that they're all dummies. It's not that the fuzziness of our talk should never be improved. Wittgenstein was doing that himself. What he criticized was the leap from often possible improvement to the postulation of some non-fuzzy kernel of meaning, an idea that tempts philosophers away from better uses of their time.

Better for whom? It's a value judgment, a matter of character. Those wrapped up in a game that depends on the non-fuzzy kernel (who think that some kind of superscience of meaning is possible) are naturally going to resist his project. Others who want philosophy to hurry on to the good stuff might agree and stop pretending that they can't hear one another. I think you're getting hung up on a single word and missing the big picture. For me Wittgenstein is useful for helping one not do that. Arguments probably won't resolve much though, no more than those between theists and atheists. There's a certain amount of boo/hooray on a gut level in play with a writer like Wittgenstein.

If I understand your analogy, are you saying that everyone is somehow trying to win the language game? — Luke

Not necessarily everyone is trying to win, but there are varying goals which people have behind their use of language. This is why it's a moral issue, because language serves as a means to achieving various goals. If it were an organized game, we'd all have the same goal, trying to win.

But if we can look at language and say that language serves a purpose, whether it's to understand each other, or for communion, unity, or communication, whatever then we impose that ideal onto language, just like we impose ethical principles on other human actions. That ideal allows us to make judgements as to good or bad, in relation to that supposed purpose. So for instance, if we say that the purpose of language is for us to understand each other, then we can judge the vague or ambiguous sentence as a bad sentence because it is not conducive to understanding, and therefore not consistent with the designated purpose of language.

But if we allow that language is sometimes for this purpose, sometimes for that purpose, and sometimes for another purpose, then we have no ideal by which to judge language use, and the goodness or badness of each instance of language use must be judged in relation to that particular purpose. The problem is that the particular purpose may itself be morally wrong. Now we have an instance where the language use is good, because it serves that particular purpose, but the purpose is morally wrong. So that instance of language use is both good and bad at the same time, and this is contradictory. The contradiction points to an inconsistency within the structure of the governing ideals. What is good or bad in language use is judged by an ideal which is inconsistent with what is good and bad in morality.

It seems like you want to knock Wittgenstein down, which is fine. But isn't it also valuable to understand his appeal? — old

I might be trying to knock him down a few notches, but that's my approach to every philosopher, look for weaknesses as well as strengths, to me that's what philosophy is. And when it's a philosopher with high esteem, much appeal, the challenge is just as much to find the weaknesses as it is to understand the strengths. The two become one and the same, understanding the strengths reveals the weaknesses. The real challenge though is to understand what the person is saying, not simply knock down everything the person says because you're jealous that the person gets all the attention. Wittgenstein says very much which is very interesting, with very deep insight into the activity of conceptualization. But like with every philosopher, you reach a point where deficiencies become evident, because the entirety of reality has not been revealed, and then it's time to move along and see how others might deal with that problem.

What he criticized was the leap from often possible improvement to the postulation of some non-fuzzy kernel of meaning, an idea that tempts philosophers away from better uses of their time. — old

I agree, and I think that this is where his insight is deep. The philosopher seeking the kernel of meaning is like the physicist seeking the particle of matter. In reality, meaning is produced by the context, like in QM the particle is produced by the environment. The inevitable conclusion is that there is no kernel of meaning, there is no particle of matter. The materialist has been mislead by this assumption. The problem though is that this insight leaves a giant question mark where that assumption stands. If we drop that assumption, then there is no substance. Uh oh, better get our feet back on solid ground (107). But this turning back is the philosopher's mistake, it's a lack of courage, fear of the unknown. Notice that he's not looking for solid ground at 107, he's looking for traction. Why the need to go somewhere? There's no empirical necessity here, a philosopher might just contemplate that lack of substance, as described by Aristotle in his ethics, not going anywhere, interrupted only by the earthly needs of subsistence. Contemplating the kernel of meaning reveals its non-existence. Why warn other philosophers to stay away from this revelation? He's guarding the door to the secret, saying there's no need to look in there because everything's outside of there. Aren't you inclined to ask, why are you guarding the door then, show me that there's nothing there?

Those wrapped up in a game that depends on the non-fuzzy kernel (who think that some kind of superscience of meaning is possible) are naturally going to resist his project. — old

That the kernel is a fuzzy kernel is a cop-out, a refusal to acknowledge the reality of the situation, that there is no such thing as the kernel, and seeking the kernel is a lost enterprise. Assuming a fuzzy kernel only leads one into the contradictions of dialectical materialism, or Peircean vagueness. That's why you need to push Wittgenstein aside, look behind that door yourself, contemplate the kernel of meaning for yourself, and truly realize that there is no such thing. If you hearken back to Aristotelian metaphysics, the idea of prime matter is simply unintelligible, and needs to be relinquished. Together we can muster up the courage to proceed into the unknown, what can fill that gaping hole where the assumption of the kernel used to stand.

That the kernel is a fuzzy kernel is a cop-out, a refusal to acknowledge the reality of the situation, that there is no such thing as the kernel, and seeking the kernel is a lost enterprise. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree (with reservations below), yet you write as if I'm purveying some theory of the non-fuzzy kernel. My position is roughly that it's not worth the trouble to try to create or appeal to a superscience of meaning. This is not to say that such a thing is impossible, for that would be to fall right back into linguistic metaphysics. Instead one can just market a different approach which is not justified in terms of the old approach. Just as a certain kind of atheist doesn't take the God issue seriously enough to debate about it, so an anti-profound 'Wittgensteinian' might no longer bother engaging in a stripe of theorizing.

That's why you need to push Wittgenstein aside, look behind that door yourself, contemplate the kernel of meaning for yourself, and truly realize that there is no such thing. — Metaphysician Undercover

I tend to agree, especially with pushing Wittgenstein aside. I quoted Graham to emphasize the possibility that the later Wittgenstein is something like a representative of ordinary wisdom who happened to make explicit within philosophy what others implied by not taking a certain kind of philosophy seriously in the first place. To sell Wittgenstein as a must-read guru looks like more linguistic metaphysics. If Wittgenstein is profound and difficult, then I increase my own status by translating him for the mystified.

As for realizing that there is no such thing, I mostly agree there too, but I'd be careful not to frame it as the result of a method (like a 'theologically' justified atheism.) This is why I think it important to emphasize the wisdom of ordinary 'dummies' who aren't caught up in the game in the first place. It's the same with Taoism. If it's only possible with some particular book or the word 'Tao,' then it's bogus. To 'unknow' some kind of silliness is not to learn a secret but to stop pretending that one has one. (In vague terms like this we're already knee-deep in remystification. Maybe that's the risk of aphorism.)

Not necessarily everyone is trying to win, but there are varying goals which people have behind their use of language. This is why it's a moral issue, because language serves as a means to achieving various goals. If it were an organized game, we'd all have the same goal, trying to win. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is still entirely unclear what counts as 'winning' in this analogy, and you also didn't explain what you meant by "playing for keeps" in the context of a language game. Just a reminder, too, that not all games have the goal of winning (§66).

So for instance, if we say that the purpose of language is for us to understand each other, then we can judge the vague or ambiguous sentence as a bad sentence because it is not conducive to understanding, and therefore not consistent with the designated purpose of language. — Metaphysician Undercover

So, understanding each other (without any doubts?) counts as winning?

But if we allow that language is sometimes for this purpose, sometimes for that purpose, and sometimes for another purpose, then we have no ideal by which to judge language use, and the goodness or badness of each instance of language use must be judged in relation to that particular purpose. — Metaphysician Undercover

What purposes other than understanding do you mean? A lie is still understandable, isn't it? Likewise, jokes, stories, orders, reports, and all of the other language-games (or purposes of language-use) that Wittgenstein lists at §23 may be understood. To include understanding as a similar "purpose" of language appears to be a category error.

Is it the purpose of telling a story that the storyteller is understood or that the story is enjoyed (or both/neither)? What if I understood the story but I didn't enjoy it? Did the storyteller win?

The problem is that the particular purpose may itself be morally wrong. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is irrelevant. We are here to discuss Wittgenstein's philosophy, not yours. Wittgenstein is talking about the sense of a sentence at §98, and that's all. There is no need to drag morality into it just because the word 'ideal' has been used.

I might be trying to knock him down a few notches, but that's my approach to every philosopher, look for weaknesses as well as strengths, to me that's what philosophy is. And when it's a philosopher with high esteem, much appeal, the challenge is just as much to find the weaknesses as it is to understand the strengths. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree. I guess a certain suspension of disbelief is necessary in order to feel the strengths of a philosopher, but then an arrogance or restlessness is useful for not being caught in the mystique of a persona in a way that halts progress and further exploration. Of course just getting older helps too. The real world doesn't care much about flavors of opinion but rather about what one can do and refrain from doing. Then there's the realization that plenty of people who have never read the great philosophers are undeniably wise and impressive.

I'm finding your posts fascinating. :up:

Thanks! That's very kind.

I agree (with reservations below), yet you write as if I'm purveying some theory of the non-fuzzy kernel. My position is roughly that it's not worth the trouble to try to create or appeal to a superscience of meaning. This is not to say that such a thing is impossible, for that would be to fall right back into linguistic metaphysics. Instead one can just market a different approach which is not justified in terms of the old approach. Just as a certain kind of atheist doesn't take the God issue seriously enough to debate about it, so an anti-profound 'Wittgensteinian' might no longer bother engaging in certain stripe of theorizing. — old

All I can say to this, is that each person has one's own approach, one's own interests. What one takes seriously, the second might not take seriously, But then the first might not take seriously what the second takes seriously. Like what I said to Luke, the same game that one plays for fun, another will play for keeps.

tend to agree, especially with pushing Wittgenstein aside. I quoted Graham to emphasize the possibility that the later Wittgenstein is something like a representative of ordinary wisdom who happened to make explicit within philosophy what others implied by not taking a certain kind of philosophy seriously in the first place. To sell Wittgenstein as a must-read guru looks like more linguistic metaphysics. If Wittgenstein is profound and difficult, then I increase my own status by translating him for the mystified. — old

The pushing aside is meant to have a look for yourself. If someone is guarding a door, and claiming there is nothing behind that door, so don't even bother trying to look, doesn't it make you want to have a look for yourself?

As for realizing that there is no such thing, I mostly agree there too, but I'd be careful not to frame it as the result of a method (like a 'theologically' justified atheism.) — old

It is a method though, a descriptive method, and as such it's not unlike the empirical method which justifies atheism. The wisdom of the ordinary "dummy" is to approach without knowing anything, no preconceived notions, only the desire to describe what is, that's the "wonder' of Socrates, the root of philosophy. The problem though is that the descriptive method uses words, and there are preconceptions inherent within word use, so we need first to rid ourselves of these preconceptions which seem to inhere within the way that we use words. We might try to describe language and word use first, but the issue cannot be avoided, there's no such thing as not being caught up in the game, we're in it already, whether we like it or not. So there is no such thing as proceeding without a method, because a method is already inherent within the language use, and we can't get out of those preconceptions without a method for this.

It is still entirely unclear what counts as 'winning' in this analogy, and you also didn't explain what you meant by "playing for keeps" in the context of a language game. Just a reminder, too, that not all games have the goal of winning (§66). — Luke

Playing for keeps is to play with seriousness. Whatever one's objective might be, that person would take seriously obtaining that goal. In the context of language games, we use language to help and obtain our goals. That's what I mean by playing for keeps, we have serious goals and we use language seriously as a means of obtaining those goals. So it's not about "winning the game", it's about achieving my goals.

What purposes other than understanding do you mean? A lie is still understandable, isn't it? Likewise, jokes, stories, orders, reports, and all of the other language-games (or purposes of language-use) that Wittgenstein lists at §23 may be understood. To include understanding as a similar "purpose" of language appears to be a category error. — Luke

Your examples here are called "kinds of use". They are not purposes of use. So for example, an order is a kind of use, but an order is done for a purpose, it is not the purpose itself. Likewise with the other kinds of use. So it only appears to you as category error, because you haven't gotten into the category of "purposes" you are in the category of "kinds of use".

Suppose for example, that a lie is a kind of use. The purpose of the lie is to make the other person misunderstand what you are doing. The words misrepresent your aims. That is deception, to intentionally make another misunderstand what you are doing, or what your aims are. And deception comes in many forms other than lying. So the purpose of lying, and other forms of deception, the goal or intent of lying, is misunderstanding. If the person understood what you were doing you could not deceive them. Between having understanding as a goal, in which the intent is to have the other understand my actions or purpose, and deception, in which the intent is to have the other misunderstand my actions or purpose, there other kinds of use. Ambiguity, vagueness, and obscurities may be intended to leave the other person in a state of neither understanding nor misunderstanding my actions or purpose, more like in a state of uncertainty.

This is irrelevant. We are here to discuss Wittgenstein's philosophy, not yours. — Luke

It's not irrelevant at all. If we are dealing with human acts, following rules etc., then morality is relevant. If a philosopher proposes a system of philosophy in which a human act may be both bad and good at the same time, this is a problem for that philosophy which needs a resolution.

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Your examples here are called "kinds of use". They are not purposes of use. So for example, an order is a kind of use, but an order is done for a purpose, it is not the purpose itself. — Metaphysician Undercover

You did not answer the question: What purposes other than understanding do you mean?

When is the purpose of language use "for us to understand each other"? If it is not always the purpose of language use, then what other purposes are you talking about? Provide an example.

According to you, a lie is a kind of use, it is not the purpose itself.

The purpose of the lie is to make the other person misunderstand what you are doing. — Metaphysician Undercover

But not to make them misunderstand what I am saying. Otherwise, the lie would not fulfil its purpose. All that is relevant here (to §98) is understanding what is said.

The pushing aside is meant to have a look for yourself. If someone is guarding a door, and claiming there is nothing behind that door, so don't even bother trying to look, doesn't it make you want to have a look for yourself? — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah, I'd want to look. The guard says it all. I just wanted present the anti-profound reading as a current favorite that I didn't already see on the thread. I'm always looking for better words, a slight further clarification. I'm glad I joined the conversation.

You did not answer the question: What purposes other than understanding do you mean?

When is the purpose of language use "for us to understand each other"? If it is not always the purpose of language use, then what other purposes are you talking about? Provide an example.

According to you, a lie is a kind of use, it is not the purpose itself. — Luke

I gave you the example, misunderstanding. In deception the purpose, or goal is misunderstanding. Meaning is use, and the person being deceived does not understand what the person deceiving is doing with the words, how the person is using the words, therefore the person being deceived misunderstands. And that is the deceiver's purpose, goal, to make the other person misunderstand how the words are being used. It doesn't matter if the one being deceived thinks that the sentence has "a meaning", and assumes to understand the meaning, meaning is use, and the one being deceived really does not understand how the words are being used.

But not to make them misunderstand what I am saying. Otherwise, the lie would not fulfil its purpose. All that is relevant here (to §98) is understanding what is said. — Luke

You're forgetting the premise. Meaning is use! If meaning is use, there is no such thing as "what I am saying", there is only "what I am doing". We cannot have a "what I am saying" here, as if there is a set meaning to the words which are spoken. That's the purpose of the premise, "meaning is use", to remove this false idea. This is why it is necessarily a moral issue. Meaning is attributed to the act, "use", not the words. So we are now trying to understand language through human acts, "games". But human acts are subject to moral judgements. Now we need to create consistency between what is "good" morally, and what is "good" linguistically. Otherwise we'll have human acts which are both good and bad at the same time.

Yeah, I'd want to look. The guard says it all. I just wanted present the anti-profound reading as a current favorite that I didn't already see on the thread. I'm always looking for better words, a slight further clarification. I'm glad I joined the conversation. — old

Good, I hope you continue with us, I appreciate your input. it may be a long slow process though.

I gave you the example, misunderstanding. In deception the purpose, or goal is misunderstanding. — Metaphysician Undercover

You're saying that there are only two "purposes" of language use: for understanding and for misunderstanding; for good and for evil? Yeah, okay.

If meaning is use, there is no such thing as "what I am saying", there is only "what I am doing". — Metaphysician Undercover

Now we need to create consistency between what is "good" morally, and what is "good" linguistically. — Metaphysician Undercover

First you say that there is no saying and only doing, but then you say that we need to create consistency between saying and doing. How do we create consistency between saying and doing if they are the same thing?

If I lie and tell you that "I cannot attend your party today because I am ill" (when I am not ill) do you not understand what "I cannot attend your party today because I am ill" means?

Again, you need to understand what I am saying in order for a lie to fulfil its purpose (i.e. to lead you to "misunderstand what I am doing" - or however you describe it).

If someone is guarding a door, and claiming there is nothing behind that door, so don't even bother trying to look, doesn't it make you want to have a look for yourself? — Metaphysician Undercover

This reminds me of something Wittgenstein says in Culture and Value:

A man will be imprisoned in a room with a door that's unlocked and opens inwards; as long as it does not occur to him to pull rather than push.

As long as you keep pushing you will remain trapped by your own efforts.

And this, from a draft of a foreword to his book Philosophical Remarks:

The danger in a long foreword is that the spirit of a book has to be evident in the book itself and cannot be described. For if a book has been written for just a few readers that will be clear just from the fact that only a few people understand it. The book must automatically separate those who understand it from those who do not. Even the foreword is written just for those who understand the book.

Telling someone something he does not understand is pointless, even if you add
that he will not be able to understand it. (That so often happens with someone you love.)

If you have a room which you do not want certain people to get into, put a lock on
it for which they do not have the key. But there is no point in talking to them about it,
unless of course you want them to admire the room from outside!

The honorable thing to do is to put a lock on the door which will be noticed only
by those who can open it, not by the rest.

You're saying that there are only two "purposes" of language use: for understanding and for misunderstanding; for good and for evil? Yeah, okay. — Luke

No I didn't say that, those were examples, not the "only two" possibilities. I also said the purpose of language, in general, might be communication, etc..

First you say that there is no saying and only doing, but then you say that we need to create consistency between saying and doing. How do we create consistency between saying and doing if they are the same thing? — Luke

Again, I didn't say that. I said we need to create consistency in what is determined as "good", so that the same thing would not be both good and bad..

If I lie and tell you that "I cannot attend your party today because I am ill" (when I am not ill) do you not understand what "I cannot attend your party today because I am ill" means? — Luke

No you do not understand. Because you do not understand what the speaker is doing with the words, you do not understand the use of the words in that instance. And meaning is use.

Again, you need to understand what I am saying in order for a lie to fulfil its purpose (i.e. to lead you to "misunderstand what I am doing" - or however you describe it). — Luke

It's not the case that you need to understand what I am saying in order for a lie to fulfil its purpose. You need to think that you understand what I am saying. Misunderstanding is when you think that you understand and you really do not.

If meaning is use, there is no such thing as the meaning of "what is said", other than what the person is using the words for. The words are sign-posts. The deceiver misleads you. Therefore you only think that you understand what the words mean when you are being deceived, you are being misled. In reality you do not know how the person is using the words, therefore you do not know the meaning of the words, and that's why you are deceived. It is the assumption that the words have a meaning (independent from what they are being used for), which allows you to think "I know what those words mean", and come to a conclusion about the words' meaning, which is other than what the person is actually using the words for. And that's what deception is. When a person thinks that words have a meaning which is independent from what the speaker is doing with the words, then they might think that they understand what the words mean, without even trying to understand what the speaker is doing with the words, and this thinking that they understand the meaning, when they do not understand what the words are actually being used for, is deception.

If you have a room which you do not want certain people to get into, put a lock on
it for which they do not have the key. But there is no point in talking to them about it,
unless of course you want them to admire the room from outside!

The honorable thing to do is to put a lock on the door which will be noticed only
by those who can open it, not by the rest.

If what I've described, is somewhat accurate, and Wittgenstein is accurate in his description of "the honourable thing" here, then he's faced with a sort of dilemma at this section of "Philosophical Investigations". He's leading us right to the door of what he calls 'the ideal", "the preconceived idea of crystalline purity", what old called 'the kernel of meaning". But then he says let's turn things around (107), so that we won't see the need to look behind that door. I'm going to lead you away from the door now.

The problem is that now he has already shown us the locked door, talked about it. It's too late to turn us away from it, or not talk about it to those who do not hold the key. And it's probably impossible to talk about the locked door in such a way that only those with the key to open it will know of its existence. The question is, how would you keep a secret, allowing some people access to that secret, and at the same time completely hiding the existence of the secret from all others. It can't be done, so perhaps allowing that some people have the key, and others do not, is itself a dishonourable thing.

I said we need to create consistency in what is determined as "good", so that the same thing would not be both good and bad.. — Metaphysician Undercover

How can the same thing be both good and bad? What same thing?

Your attempt to collapse the distinction between "saying" and "doing" is bullshit, designed only to try and maintain your theoretical house of cards. You have claimed that "There's no such thing as 'what I am saying'." Honestly? Nobody really says anything - is that what you're saying? Also, this is hardly the main insight of "meaning is use".

No you do not understand. Because you do not understand what the speaker is doing with the words, you do not understand the use of the words in that instance. — Metaphysician Undercover

I see. If the speaker is being honest then you can understand the sentence, but if they are lying then you can't understand the (same) sentence. But how do you know when they're lying? Do you suddenly become unable to comprehend English?