Notice the bracketed remark "(One might say: the axis of reference of our examination must be rotated, but about the fixed point of our real need.)" We must remove the ideal, which is the requirement we place on logic, the burden that we place on logic is that it be ideal. Once we have done this, we can examine it in the light of our real needs, our real goals, to get a true description of logic, because this is how we really use it, not to obtain ideals.

Yes, notice Fooloso4's reference to 108. "The preconceived idea of crystalline purity can only be removed by turning our whole examination round." That's what I'm talking about, removing the ideal.

Didn't you already say that you were having trouble with 109? Try reading it from my perspective, 109 makes perfect sense.

That's not true, in this section 95-105 he is telling us that the notion of "ideal" is distorting the way that we see things. Go back and read what he says about logic at 81. Then at 107, the ideal is a "requirement" which we hold for logic, it is not derived from a description of what logic really is. That's what he's leading into here, the separation between what we think of logic, based on what we want to get from it, that it is somehow "ideal", or "sublime", and what it really is, by description.

Have a look at §99.

This is the other voice, answering §98.

Then look at §100. Perfection does to belong here. — Banno

Of course there is room for perfection here, that's what 98 says, even the vaguest sentence is in its own way perfect. There is no room for "ideal" though. What he has done at 98 is separate "perfect" from "ideal", such that we can have perfection without "ideal". The notion of "ideal" is distorting the way we see things, we are dazzled by it. But notice at 103, he implies that we might take off these glasses (the ideal).

Are they incommensurate? Or are they doing different things? Talking past each other. They do not contradict each other. — Banno

Two things don't need to contradict each other to be incommensurable, it just means that the two cannot be measured by the same standard. I would say that if they are doing different things, then they are incommensurable, because the standard for measurement here is the goal, or purpose.

IS this what Metaphysician Undercover is doing - seeing the frame rather than the picture?

I think it is something like that. His points always seem off-target — Banno

Luke sees boundaries, I just see the picture. Targets might be what creates boundaries within the picture, but there is no such thing as "the target", because that's an ideal. The only targets are individual goals.

"Inexact" is really a reproach, and "exact" is praise. And that is to
say that what is inexact attains its goal less perfectly than what is more
exact. Thus the point here is what we call "the goal". Am I inexact
when I do not give our distance from the sun to the nearest foot, or
tell a joiner the width of a table to the nearest thousandth of an inch?
No single ideal of exactness has been laid down; we do not know
what we should be supposed to imagine under this head—unless you
yourself lay down what is to be so called. But you will find it difficult
to hit upon such a convention; at least any that satisfies you. — PI..88

There's no such thing as off-target or on-target, except in relation to a goal. So consider this:

98. On the one hand it is clear that every sentence in our language
'is in order as it is'. That is to say, we are not striving after an ideal,
as if our ordinary vague sentences had not yet got a quite unexceptionable
sense, and a perfect language awaited construction by us.—On the
other hand it seems clear that where there is sense there must be perfect
order.——So there must be perfect order even in the vaguest sentence. — P.I.98

Every sentence, every statement, exists in relation to its own individual purpose. That's how it has meaning, it has purpose, and in the sense that it has its own purpose, a purpose which is proper to itself and nothing else, it has its own perfection in that existence. It is perfect. So it doesn't make sense to say that someone's remarks are "off-target", because each remark has its own target, proper to itself. It is the notion that there is an ideal "the target", which is not in line with what Wittgenstein is saying.

I don't know if Wittgenstein thought pictures and language games incommensurable, but I think Davidson has shown that they can't be, that if there is a contradiction between them, then one is wrong; or more likely, one is talking past the other. — Banno

76. If someone were to draw a sharp boundary I could not acknowledge
it as the one that I too always wanted to draw, or had drawn in
my mind. For I did not want to draw one at all. His concept can then
be said to be not the same as mine, but akin to it. The kinship is
that of two pictures, one of which consists of colour patches with
vague contours, and the other of patches similarly shaped and distributed,
but with clear contours. The kinship is just as undeniable as
the difference.
77. And if we carry this comparison still further it is clear that the
degree to which the sharp picture can resemble the blurred one depends
on the latter's degree of vagueness. For imagine having to sketch a
sharply defined picture 'corresponding' to a blurred one. In the latter
there is a blurred red rectangle: for it you put down a sharply defined
one. Of course—several such sharply defined rectangles can be drawn
to correspond to the indefinite one.—But if the colours in the original
merge without a hint of any outline won't it become a hopeless task
to draw a sharp picture corresponding to the blurred one? Won't
you then have to say: "Here I might just as well draw a circle or heart
as a rectangle, for all the colours merge. Anything—and nothing—is
right."——And this is the position you are in if you look for definitions
corresponding to our concepts in aesthetics or ethics.
In such a difficulty always ask yourself: How did we learn the meaning
of tliis word ("good" for instance)? From what sort of examples?
in what language-games? Then it will be easier for you to see that the
word must have a family of meanings. — P.I.

The blurred picture is incommensurable with the one that has sharp boundaries, at least it is a "hopeless task" to try to make them commensurate.

You know they weren't even using IQ tests back then, don't you?

What method? — Luke

There is definitely a method which is being described here. That's what learning is, a method for restricting doubt, and this is what Wittgenstein is focused on, that method. He started off the book with simple descriptions of ostensive definition, and showed how these description were deficient. Now he has progressed to the point of addressing doubt in the same context, the context of learning. If we learn rules, the rules are like sign-posts, and we must learn how to restrict the doubt we have in relation to what the sign-post is telling us, to have confidence in understanding, in order to proceed.

What I am pointing to, at this place in the text, is that he is reversing the perspective. At 87 he speaks from the perspective of the person learning, or attempting to read the sign-post. This person, to restrict one's own doubt in one's own understanding of the sign-post, asks for explanation. But by the end of 87 he has reversed the perspective to the third person observer, to say "The sign-post is in order—if, under normal circumstances, it fulfils its purpose." This third person perspective does not assist the person at the beginning of 87 who is asking for explanation, so it does not suffice as a principle to remove the threat of infinite regress implied at 87. He does a similar thing at 88 with the concept of "exact".

We can see the root of this procedure, of reversing the perspective, well exposed at 85.

85. A rule stands there like a sign-post.—Does the sign-post leave
no doubt open about the way I have to go? Does it shew which
direction I am to take when I have passed it; whether along the road
or the footpath or cross-country? But where is it said which way I
am to follow it; whether in the direction of its ringer or (e.g.) in the
opposite one?—And if there were, not a single sign-post, but a chain
of adjacent ones or of chalk marks on the ground—is there only one
way of interpreting them?—So I can say, the sign-post does after all
leave no room for doubt. Or rather: it sometimes leaves room for
doubt and sometimes not. And now this is no longer a philosophical
proposition, but an empirical one. — PI 85

If we take "the sign-post sometimes leaves room for doubt, and sometimes does not leave room for doubt" as an empirical proposition (third person perspective of the observer), it cannot be justified. That the person proceeds from the sign-post does not justify "the sign-post has left no room for doubt". The person reading the sign-post may or may not proceed with doubt, so the observer cannot conclude that the one who proceeds has no doubt.

So the point is that Wittgenstein is describing a method for limiting doubt, a description of learning. And, his description of how doubt is limited, and certainty is produced is inaccurate. There is exposed here, a relationship between the first person perspective (my experience of learning), and the third person perspective (me as the observer), which is not properly drawn out. It is a very important relationship because it is how we move from our own experience of possibility, toward making inductive conclusions about the way things are, as an observer. We first approach the sign-post with doubt, 'what is it telling me, I need an explanation'. With experience, we approach the sign-post with confidence, 'under normal circumstance its purpose is this'. What happens in between is the means by which doubt is restricted.

We can proceed in our reading of the text, to switch perspectives, from the perspective of the learner, the reader of the sign-post attempting to reduce doubt through the process of learning, to the perspective of an observer, if that's the way that the text goes. But the perspective of the observer has not yet been supported with any firm principles, and we ought not proceed with any false premises, such as, that inductive conclusions which are the basis of the third person perspective (observer) have removed doubt. And the distinction between learner (one who doubts) and knower (one with confidence), if there even is such a division, has not yet been laid out.

That's right, it's the point I've been trying to make for days now, Wittgenstein's method for restricting doubt does not fulfil its purpose. Clearly the doubt is not at all absurd. If someone told me "stand roughly there", I'd wonder why they were saying "roughly there" instead of "stand there". I'd have doubt as to where they actually wanted me to stand, and for what reason they phrased it in that strange way. I'd think perhaps it's a trick, to see if I would stand there, or some other place which I thought qualified as "roughly there". To apprehend where that person actually wanted me to stand, I'd ask for an explanation, "what do you mean by 'roughly there'". We can't limit doubt by saying that we need as much clarity as the situation calls for, because we are all different, and see the situation differently. As Sam26 says, we have different IQs, so what is cause for doubt for me may not be cause for doubt for you, but this does not mean that my doubt is absurd.

It wouldn't surprise me that we're wrong about 50% of the time, in terms of paraphrasing his thoughts. — Sam26

That's why it's best to take our time and consider each passage individually, most of them contain an important point. This way we can lower that number substantially.

Wittgenstein's IQ was probably somewhere around 190, so to think we can get into his head all the time is a fool's errand. And for anyone to think, as MU does, that he was wrong about this or that thing, is just silly. — Sam26

Whose head can you get into at any time? No one but your own. That's why doubt is justified. And, no matter how high one's IQ is, we all make mistakes, and sometimes it's the person with the low IQ who points out the mistake of the person with high IQ. It's just a matter of how we see the same things in different ways.

However, the purpose of this thread is to discuss Wittgenstein's philosophy and his Philosophical Investigations. You appear to have no interest in either, and only seem interested in discussing your own personal philosophy about Christianity or something — Luke

To disagree with the effectiveness of my example is one thing, but the conclusion you've made about my purpose is absurd, so I think this serves as a good example of what Wittgenstein is calling misunderstanding.

§89 - if you will permit me to take my own advice... — Banno

I would argue that Wittgenstein' characterization of logic at 89 is completely backward. Logic does not seek to see the bottom of things. It relies on premises, and can only proceed outward (or upward) from the premises. The premises are the bottom, and logic proceeds from that bottom. The premises dictate the conclusions. So logic is not at the bottom of the sciences at all. What is at the bottom is the empirical descriptions (the propositions), which provide the premises from which logic may proceed.

Of course, Wittgenstein says logic "seemed" to be like this, so I would think that his effort is going to be to dispel this backward opinion of what logic is.

You originally used the "stand roughly there" example in the context of doubt/certainty, which is irrelevant to Wittgenstein's usage of it. Now you want to pretend that you were originally using the example in the context of exactness as he does at §88? Please. — Luke

It seems you still haven't read 88. His reference to doubt at 87 is in the context of understanding, and his reference to inexact at 88, is likewise in the context of understanding. Therefore the two are related through the means of the context, "understanding". But this relationship does not necessitate the claim that doubt is anything like "inexact understanding". As I said already, doubt relates to the possibility of misunderstanding.

As he explains at 88, "inexact" and "exact" are expressions of judgement (reproach and praise), as to whether the words used are sufficient to achieve the intended goal. Notice the necessity of a judgement in application of the terms exact and inexact, and therefore the possibility of doubt in making that judgement. It is very similar to the earlier judgement referred to at the end of 87:
"The sign-post is in order—if, under normal circumstances, it fulfils its purpose."
What he is talking about in both of these instances is a judgement as to whether the sign-posts (the words used) are sufficient to fulfil the purpose. A judgement of sufficiency would constitute a judgement of understanding, but this requires knowing the purpose. Your attempt to exclude "doubt" from this judgement is totally unjustified. Likewise, Wittgenstein's attempt to put an end to the infinite regress of explanation which is required to ensure understanding (by removing the possibility of misunderstanding), with this principle which itself is a judgement subject to doubt, is a failure.

There definitely is such a thing. — Luke

If you really believe that there is such a thing as certainty, then you ought to be able to show me this thing empirically. Doubt can be seen in a person's actions. Confidence can be seen in a person's actions. Certainty cannot be seen in a person's actions. Where do we see, or perceive certainty in any way?

Let's be clear: the idea of exact understanding is yours, not mine. — Luke

No, that's your phrase, not mine, that's why I said to you, I don't know what you would mean by "exact understanding"..

The reason for his direction is irrelevant. — Luke

Did you not read 88 yet? Exactness is relative to the goal. The "reason for his direction" is the goal. Therefore, the reason why he says "stand roughly there", instead of marking a spot, and saying "stand exactly there", or some other thing, is relevant. The exactness required to fulfill the goal intended by "roughly there", can only be known by apprehending the goal. So to fully understand what is meant by "stand roughly there" requires understanding the reason for saying those words. To go where the sign-post directs (the goal), requires apprehending the goal.

As Fooloso4 said, Wittgenstein "is not arguing that it is possible to eliminate doubt but that the role of certainty in our lives and language is not the certainty that Descartes and others sought". — Luke

I don't see how Descartes is relevant. If Wittgenstein is seeking a certainty which is other than the exclusion of doubt, I haven't yet seen this other type of certainty described. And he did mention at 85, that sometimes there is no room for doubt. Simply saying that Wittgenstein is seeking a type of certainty different from the type of certainty Descartes was seeking doesn't tell me anything; especially since Wittgenstein is telling me that he's seeking a certainty which leaves no room for doubt.

Why the obsession with certainty? Certainty is an ideal. Wittgenstein is arguing here that these ideals are not real, and ought not be sought. Forget about certainty, there is no such thing, discussing it is a waste of time. What we need to discuss is doubt.

Consider this proposition. There is a certainty which is foundational to Christian society, certainty in the existence of God. But don't you see that it's not a real certainty at all? It's a false certainty. There is no certainty there at all, in fact it's an uncertainty, a fundamental doubt, which is foundational to Christian society. However, this fundamental uncertainty, this doubt which is foundational to our society, somehow managed to get itself disguised as certainty. Confidence allows us to overcome our doubt, and that's often a virtue, like courage, but when confidence makes what is uncertain appear to be certain, that's a vice. So if, when you say that Wittgenstein is looking at a different type of certainty, you mean that he is looking at a type of certainty which is really not a certainty at all, it's really an uncertainty, a form of doubt, then I might believe you.

You are mistaking 'acting as if...' for a claim that it is the case. The PI is a method, not a book of facts, Wittgenstein makes this pretty clear when he states quite unequivocally that philosophy does not discover new facts. Philosophy is not capable of deducing what exists and what does not. — Isaac

It is a statement. If you want to describe statements as "acting as if...", I have no problem with that. But then all ontological statements are "acting as if..", and Wittgenstein's instance of "acting as if..." is no different from any other ontological statement, which are all instances of 'acting as if...".

No, the point is that we are certain about some things whether we think it to be a good idea or not. The psychological state comes first, then we seek to understand it. — Isaac

This is where you, along with what seems like everyone else here except fooloso4, have things backwards. Doubt is the primitive condition, which precedes certainty. The first time you see a specific type of sign-post you will not know what it is telling you unless someone explains it to you. Certainty is created through things like memory exercises and logical practises. Logic, certainty, and belief (which is a form of certainty), follow from language. Prior to this, we have curiosity and wonder, which Socrates described as the foundation of philosophy, and these are forms of doubt.

The result of this reversal which you express, is things like people claiming that doubt must be justified. Doubt does not need to be justified, it is the product of not knowing, it is the primitive condition. Certainty is what needs to be justified. So if unenlightened asserts that there is a tree outside the window, and I doubt that, I need to give no reason for my doubt, because doubt is inherently grounded in a lack of understanding. The burden of proof is on the one who claims certainty, because certainty requires justification. If psychologists disagree, then perhaps this is just another instance in a long history of psychologists being wrong. Or perhaps, Wittgenstein's ontology of rules is wrong, and there is some sort of underlying certainty, as expressed by Plato's theory of recollection.

The ratios between successive pairs of numbers in the sequences;
1, 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 13, 21, 34
2, 2, 4, 6, 10, 16, 26, 42, 68
3, 3, 6, 9, 15, 24, 39, 63, 102
4, 4, 8,12, 20, 32, 52, 84, 136
are identical. Look at the vertical columns. the numbers in the sequences below the numbers in the first sequence are multiples of those numbers. You can start with any number and the ratios between the numbers in any vertical column and any other vertical column are the same throughout. This means that every number is part of a Fibonacci sequence, which is as it should be. — Janus

OK, now you have the same ratio, but you've changed things. You have a repeating digit in each case now, as the fundamental unit. It doesn't matter if the fundamental unit is represented as 1, 2, 3, 4, or whatever, what is required is the fundamental unit. In so-called natural occurrences, the fundamental unit might be 2mm, 4 mm 1cm, whatever, the actual measured size is unimportant, what is important is that there is a fundamental unit. The point is that there is a fundamental unit of a particular size in each case, which is the starting point. The fundamental unit is a size which may or may not be arbitrary, but it is necessary to assume a fundamental unit, as a starting point. And so, that unit is the essential foundation of the mathematical operation which follows.

So the question was, when this occurs in "nature", is nature assuming this fundamental unit, and performing the mathematical operation which follows, or is there intention involved. If it is nature, then why wouldn't it be nature when human beings assume this fundamental unit and proceed with the mathematical operation?

Exact understanding is where there is no doubt; where there is certainty. You state that we need to limit the possibility of misunderstanding to an acceptable degree, implying that the possibility of misunderstanding cannot be completely removed. If the possibility of misunderstanding cannot be completely removed (without any doubt), then we can never be certain to have understanding. Therefore, understanding is impossible. — Luke

Read Wittgenstein's example of time at 88. We settle on the degree of precision required for our goals. To talk about exact understanding does not make sense. Your conclusion does not follow from your argument, because it requires the premise that certainty, or exactness is essential to "understanding", that a person cannot be said to have understood unless there is exactitude, and certainty to one's understanding. But that's not reality, as Wittgenstein is trying to say. If he says "stand roughly here", I understand that he's telling me that he wants me to stand somewhere in this general area, but I don't understand why he's just telling me to stand in this general area, rather than telling me to stand at this point or at that point. So despite the fact that there is understanding, there is also much which is also not understood.

But in that case, what is the threshold level of doubt at which understanding turns to misunderstanding? How many percentage points below 100% certainty before I am no longer sure whether I understand, or at which I misunderstand? — Luke

Well that's a complex problem isn't it? And that's where doubt is useful, to prevent unnecessary haste in such a judgement. But just because it's a complex problem which has no one solution to fit all situations, doesn't mean that we should reject this conclusion as not the way reality is. When our description of reality gives us a complex problem, it doesn't solve the problem to just say that the description must be wrong.

How? — Luke

It is explicitly stated, at 81 and 98 for example, and implied all over the place, such as right here at 88, that seeking the ideal is the wrong approach. So if in this book, In which seeking the ideal is portrayed as the wrong approach, Wittgenstein is actually seeking the ideal, wouldn't his efforts to portray seeking the ideal as the wrong approach, defeat his purpose, of seeking the ideal?

I only asked whether you have ever avoided a misunderstanding before. Have you ever understood something, or is it a matter of degree? — Luke

I'd say it's very clearly a matter of degree, as Wittgenstein describes. When someone says something to me I often grasp what the person intends, to the point of fulfilling that person's purpose. Sometimes not. I never assume to understand with certainty, another's intentions.

I think a lot of the misunderstanding around the PI comes from a misplaced attempt to treat it as a treatise, as MU has done ("Wittgenstein's ontology" , "Wittgenstein's epistemology" ... neither of which he is presenting here), but it is also worth attaching to the comments of others about foundational beliefs. It should be borne in mind the the significance of Wittgenstein's view on such hinges are that they are post hoc, they do not represent a 'discovery', we have not learned some new fact about what is the case in learning the nature of such a device, only relieved ourselves of the burden of seeking further assurance. — Isaac

I disagree with this. Wittgenstein presents an ontology of rules which is very clearly stated in this section. The rule is the sign-post. This positions the rule as existing externally to the mind which interprets it, it is the sign-post. It is contrary to any ontology which positions the rule as a principle within the mind, an idea. It is also contrary to the common definition of "rule", which states that a rule is "a principle". This is clearly an ontology which gives the existence of "the rule", an unconventional description. If you do not fully understand this, and give respect to the ontological status which Wittgenstein gives to 'the rule", you are likely to equivocate in other parts of the book, thinking that Wittgenstein talks of "rule" in the conventional way, as a principle.

The consequence of this ontological status which Wittgenstein gives to "the rule", is the need for interpretation of rules. This suggests the appearance of an infinite regress of explanation. The problem of infinite regress can be approached in two distinct ways. It can be approached as an ontological problem, in which case the appearance of infinite regress is assumed to be the result of a deficient ontology. Or, it can be approached as an epistemological problem, in which case the appearance of infinite regress is treated as a deficiency in the mind which is trying to understand according to the description established by the ontology. Wittgenstein chooses the latter. He wants to stand fast with his ontology of rules, but this means that the real existence of possibility lies between the mind and the rules by which we understand. Therefore the doubt created by the existence of possibility between the mind and the rules, is inherent within knowledge and understanding.

Debates on this whole site would be a lot more interesting and fruitful if people stopped trying to deduce what 'is the case' from their armchairs. — Isaac

I suggest that the armchair is the best place for reading and trying to understand books like this. Do you think that philosophers ought to follow the example of Socrates, wondering around with their heads in the clouds? I suppose you believe that philosophers should all meet the same fate as Socrates as well.

Most modern psychologists would disagree with you here. Considering some of the outrageous things you claim to doubt, why so certain of this? — Isaac

That's exactly the point. If we cannot be certain concerning something so basic, like one is not the same as the other, why think that we can be certain about anything at all?

Because sometimes we have no doubt when following the signpost but other times we might. That, he points out, is an empirical proposition. — Fooloso4

This is the statement I disagree with. Doubt is not an all or nothing proposition, it exists by degree, because it is based in the possibility of error, and therefore we limit doubt through probability. So it is not the case that after one reads the sign-post, that the person either proceeds with certainty, or does not proceed because of doubt, the person may proceed with some degree of doubt. Therefore, it cannot be an empirical proposition, because even if the person is observed to proceed this does not mean that there is no doubt. Further, since the possibility of misunderstanding cannot be eliminated, it is illogical to conclude that there is no doubt. So not only is the claim "sometimes we have no doubt" not supported by empirical evidence, it is also illogical, and therefore an extremely irrational statement.

Wittgenstein is saying that we should replace the picture of knowledge as what is built on unchanging foundations. There is no fixed point or ground: — Fooloso4

This is inconsistent with your quote, in which he is talking about learning "propositions which stand fast for me". That sounds like an unchanging foundation to me.

166. The difficulty is to realize the groundlessness of our believing. — On Certainty

This is why I say there is incoherency. He was talking about learning proposition which are firmly believed, "stand fast". But at the same time he wants to say here, that there is no grounds for these beliefs. So we have beliefs which stand fast, and he also seems to say that it is irrational to doubt these beliefs, that being why they stand fast, yet they are "groundless" It makes no sense to say that there are beliefs which are groundless, yet it's irrational to doubt them. Since they are "groundless", what is really irrational is to accept them, believe them, and allow them to stand fast, without doubting them.

The second is that despite this he does think it irrational to doubt such things in practice. — Fooloso4

Do you not see this as fundamentally flawed? How can one truly believe that it is possible that one day there will be an abyss outside the door, but also say that it is irrational to have such a doubt? If the person truly believed that it is irrational to have such a doubt, then wouldn't the person in a move of reason deny the belief that it is possible. if you tell yourself such a doubt is irrational, then you will no longer believe it as a possibility, it's irrational. But if your belief in the possibility is stronger then your capacity to tell yourself that the doubt is irrational, then you will not think that the doubt is irrational, and you'll believe in the possibility. Isn't it impossible to truly hold two beliefs which you know to be incompatible, at the same time?

The importance of this is far reaching. It reverses the order that has long been held and cherished by philosophers. Logic is arbitrary. It does not stand independent of language and thought, imposing a necessary order on all things, or on determining truth.

The logical rules or grammar are derived from within the lived context of the language game. — Fooloso4

Right, I think that this is important. Logic is built on belief, which is a confidence, a type of certainty. These are simple principles which we can have confidence in, like I cannot believe that X is the case, and also that X is not the case, at the same time. And so logic is constructed on a firm commitment, confidence, belief. Language is prior to logic though, and doesn't require the same confidence and certainty. Language can exist without belief, it can exist and be used in cases when people do not know what to believe. Not knowing what to believe is the realm of doubt. So the foundation of language, being prior to logic, is doubt, language is based in doubt, a condition of not knowing what to believe. And from language came logic and belief, which is a form of certainty, because doubt is not a comfortable position to be in.

Perhaps one way to set out what is at hand that might satisfy Metaphysician Undercover would be to say that we have no foundations as he thinks of it, but that the fact remains that we get on with it anyway. — Banno

I agree with this, so long as we do not use the fact "that we get on with it anyway", as empirical evidence that doubt has been removed. That's what I object to, because I believe that despite having doubts, we get on with it anyway.

I'm with you there. Now the question I've been asking is why does Wittgenstein appear to persist in this misguided objective, to find the principles which exclude the possibility of misunderstanding, in On Certainty? And even here, at 85, where he says that the sign-post "sometimes leaves room for doubt and sometimes not"? If he has determined here, that there are no such principles of certainty, no such logic which excludes the possibility of misunderstanding, underlying our language and knowledge, and that it was misguided or wrong to have assumed such, then why does he proceed in that text, On Certainty, as if he is seeking these principles? Do I completely misunderstand his intention in On Certainty, is he trying to give "certainty" a different meaning which does not consist of excluding the possibility of mistake? Or does he misunderstand the principles he has stated here, himself?

The point being that if there is a possibility of misunderstanding, then some degree of doubt is justified. Therefore doubt cannot be completely dismissed as irrational. But Wittgenstein appears to have a desire to completely dismiss doubt in some situations, as completely irrational in those situations, without completely excluding the possibility of misunderstanding in those situations, and this itself is irrational.

are those two patterns the same?

What about these?: — Janus

Your examples are not the same, because you cannot represent the Fibonacci series in a partial way, starting in the middle. It has a unique starting point of one unit, which is replicated. And the whole series relies on replicating that original unit. The pattern is not properly represented without the starting point.

No physically instantiated pattern can represent the whole series, or even any more than the tiniest part of it. So, although both natural and man-made patterns may instantiate the intentionally conceptualized series, the series as mathematically expressed is not a visual pattern, but a pattern that consists merely in a recurring specific operation of addition. — Janus

So the question then. When a thing, produces a pattern based in that sequence, is this not necessarily an intentional pattern rather than a natural one? The pattern relies on assuming a fundamental unit, and then a "specific operation of addition" follows from that assumption of a fundamental unit. If this operation is intentional, then I would think that all so-called natural instances are really intentional. The thing creating the pattern must assume a fundamental unit and perform a specific operation of addition. But if the so-called natural occurrences of this pattern are not intentional, they actually are natural, then why assume that the human occurrence of the pattern, the assuming a fundamental unit, and performing a specific operation of addition, is necessarily intentional?

You complain that doubt can always remain; that we can always fall short of an exact understanding, but these are merely imagined possibilities. The logical result of this claim is that understanding (or exact understanding) is impossible. — Luke

They are not imagined possibilities, they are what Wittgenstein describes. I believe what he describes, but if you think his description is imaginary, that's between you and him. Look at how he describes exactness at 88. The degree of exactness which we strive for, which is required, is relative to our purpose, the goal, what we are doing (his example of time is very good).

I think we should have the same attitude with respect to misunderstanding, and doubt. We should limit the possibility of misunderstanding (this is doubt, recognition of the possibility of misunderstanding), to the degree required for our purposes. Wittgenstein is rejecting the notion that we strive for "ideals". But if he posits "certainty', or "leaves no room for doubt", as what he is striving for, he is just being hypocritical. In this case he has made his goal an ideal, an absolute, and this is inconsistent with the way that he says we use words. We do not strive for ideals, we settle for what is required relative to the purpose at hand.

The "logical result", of "misunderstanding is possible" is not "understanding is impossible", and I don't know what you would mean by "exact understanding". The point is that we ought to limit the possibility of misunderstanding to a degree acceptable, relative to the situation. If the president of the USA has his finger on the nuclear button, there is a need to limit the possibility of misunderstanding to a high degree. When my wife gives me a list of items for the grocery store, I need to limit the possibility of misunderstanding to a lesser degree. But striving for certainty, in the sense of leaving no room for doubt, is nonsense in the context of PI. To strive for the ideal would actually defeat the purpose of the book.

Can you honestly state that there has never been an occasion on which you have understood a signpost or what someone tells you? Understanding signposts and what people say is both possible and actual - it happens every day. — Luke

This is judgement after the fact, it's irrelevant. What we are talking about is avoiding misunderstanding, preventing misunderstanding. We are talking about a judgement made by the person planting the sign-posts, prior to the act of reading the sign-posts. But I'll tell you one thing, the fact that understanding is possible, does not produce the logical conclusion that misunderstanding is impossible. You seem to be employing some bad logic.

You simply repeat the interlocutor's concern at §87: "But then how does an explanation help me to understand, if, after all, it is not the final one? In that case the explanation is never completed; so I still don’t understand what he means, and never shall!”

Yet you fail to acknowledge or be satisfied by Wittgenstein's response.

I have no further interest in attempting to explain it. — Luke

Yes. The so-called interlocutor's concern is a concern which Wittgenstein had about his description of rules, or else he would not have brought it up as a concern. And, as I've explained, Wittgenstein's response to that concern is lame. It's inconsistent with his description. He may have been better off not to have broached the issue of doubt. It's an issue he was not prepared to deal with.

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I thought that large numbers of buffalo were wantonly shot -- and not slaughtered, maybe just skinned for their hides -- as a way of depriving the plains Indians of food. Is that true? Don't know for sure at this moment. — Bitter Crank

Could have been partly that, but I think that the buffalo's land was wanted for cattle, competition for the grass. The best way to take their land is to kill them. Kill two birds with one stone?

There are some natural occurring instances of the pattern. The mathematical Fibonacci series are intentionally produced. — Janus

Is the naturally occurring pattern a different pattern from the intentionally produced pattern then?

Wittgenstein's solution is to provide a circuit breaker to the regress. We don't need to justify every word or statement, as the regress problem would have it; we only need to provide an explanation in order to avoid a misunderstanding. Wittgenstein cuts off the regress near the surface level of language use, rather than at the foundation. — Luke

If these sign-posts (rules) do not need further explanation, then they are foundational. You are simply calling them "surface level". Anyway, whether it's properly called foundational or surface level is irrelevant, the point is that whatever you call it, it doesn't succeed as an attempt to justify certainty.

It is hard to see why you think that this is a foundationalist philosophy. There is no chain of justification ending at basic beliefs here: "none stands in need of another - unless we require it to avoid a misunderstanding". — Luke

There is a problem of infinite regress of explanation described by Wittgenstein at 87. Unless it is the "final" explanation, it is as if the explanation is just hanging in the air. He makes "an attempt to respond to the regress problem", as per your definition of foundationalism. The "none stands in need of another
- unless we require it to avoid a misunderstanding", represents that attempt. Call it surface level rather than foundational if you want.

The problem, as I just explained to Banno, is that to avoid misunderstanding requires that we eliminate the possibility of misunderstanding. (In On Certainty he describes objectively certain as logically excluding the possibility of mistake). Remember, what Wittgenstein is trying to curb is doubt, and doubt is induced by the possibility of misunderstanding. But, due to the nature of rules, having the characteristics of sign-posts, there is always a possibility of misunderstanding. Therefore an explanation would always be required to avoid the doubt incurred by the possibility of misunderstanding. So, Wittgenstein's attempt to avoid the infinite regress fails.

That is, the signpost is in order if, under normal circumstances, no further explanation is required to avoid a misunderstanding. Conversely, we avoid a misunderstanding if, under normal circumstances, the signpost (or words used) fulfils its purpose. — Luke

Right, I took this up with unenlightened already. How would one determine "normal circumstances" to know whether an explanation is required or not, to avoid misunderstanding. Further, how would you know whether or not the sign-post fulfilled its purpose, and avoided misunderstanding until after it is too late to avoid misunderstanding. This principle is completely impotent as an attempt at indicating when an explanation is or is not required. It amounts to stating "If there was normal circumstances, and the sign-post fulfilled its purpose, then misunderstanding was avoided". It tells us nothing about how to know when misunderstanding is probable, and therefore an explanation is required.

Indeed. — Banno

Misunderstanding, therefore explanation was required.

What do you mean by "Fibonacci sequence"? Do you refer to natural phenomena such as the whorls of seeds on the face of a sunflower, or a written series of numbers where each one (except of course the first) is the sum of the two preceding numbers? — Janus

That's what I asked you, don't turn the question back on me. I don't use your system of classification, so I'm asking you, how you would class the Fibonacci sequence. Does it qualify as a naturally produced pattern, or is it an intentionally produced pattern, under your system of classification?

Damn, I didn't want to get drawn in to this. — Banno

Hi Banno, I welcome your contribution to this little problem which seems to be mine only. Getting bored elsewhere?

You added the word possible. — Banno

Right, that's the point. To prevent misunderstanding, requires having measures in place to prevent it, every time misunderstanding is possible. This is implied by "prevent misunderstanding". If you wait until after misunderstanding occurs, and try to fix it at that time, then you haven't prevented misunderstanding. Wittgenstein seems to be trying to dodge this fact.

Following the rule, or not, is shown in the doing. If the actions are in accord with the rules, that will suffice; if the signpost leads us in the right direction, that is all that we require of it. There is no need to dig further; but moreover, digging further would be an error. — Banno

I agree, if by "right direction" you mean as Wittgenstein says, the sign-post (rule) fulfils its purpose. If it fulfils its purpose it has lead you in the right direction. However, the possibility that it will be misunderstood is very real, and that's when explanation is necessary.

Wittgenstein could have stopped there, accepting that the possibility of misunderstanding is very real. If epistemologists said to him, you have a problem because doubt arises from the possibility of misunderstanding, he could have just replied that doubt is a fact of life, if that's a problem for your epistemology, then deal with it. Thus he might provide us with some grounds for skepticism. However, Wittgenstein did not stop there. He seems to have become obsessed with the idea that doubt is some sort of problem, and proceeded in On Certainty, in an attempt to limit doubt in some foundationalist way. But why? If his description of rules is accurate, and the result is that propositions of doubt and skepticism are valid propositions, then so be it.

it's as if you were asking why the bishop only move diagonally, and wanting not an explanation from the history of the game, but a further rule within the game. — Banno

I don't see what you are saying. The rule is the sign-post. I see a sign-post, (rule) and I'm not certain that I understand what it is telling me. If I need other sign-posts to understand that sign-post, then the probability of misunderstanding likely increases. Also, infinite regress is possible. My best option might be to proceed in the direction that I think the sign-post is telling me, but without certainty, with some degree of doubt.

Again I'd suggest moving on, since there is no further way to convince Meta that it's a rabbit and a duck if he only sees the duck. The point must be taken as moot. As the conversation moves on, other points of disagreement will arise. — Banno

I think you have the roles reversed. I see the rabbit and the duck, skepticism and foundationalism. The problem is that to assume both is incoherent. If the sign-post (rule) is designed such that it will tell you both "I'm a duck", and "I'm a rabbit", then it's not a sign-post (rule) at all, because it's designed to confuse you. And when the purpose is to confuse you, we call that deception. We ought not allow so-called sign-posts, whose purpose is to deceive, fulfil their purpose.

What is not being appreciated, is that the OP is written 'post Descartes'. Descartes divided the whole issue along completely different lines to Aristotle. So from a post-Cartesian point of view, of course Aristotle's conception of matter doesn't make sense. But the question uncritically operates from a post-Cartesian point of view, which of course we nowadays all embody, without understanding what that shsift in perspective really entails. In order to properly critique the Aristotelian conception of 'hyle' requires an understanding of the context in which such an idea made sense. — Wayfarer

The Cartesian division, body and mind is a step backward from Aristotle. That's the division, along with its problems, that Plato dealt with. The problems, in dividing reality along those lines are irresolvable as Plato demonstrated. Aristotle's solution was to divide the entirety of reality by dualist principles (matter and form). So as where Aristotle made a move to bring dualism into the range of intelligibility, the Cartesian shift is a move which makes dualism appear incomprehensible.

Intentionally produced patterns are not the same as naturally occurring patterns; the former are semantically meaningful, and the latter are not — Janus

How would you class the Fibonacci sequence? Is it a naturally occurring pattern, void of semantic meaning, or is it intentionally produced?

To remove doubt, we seek an explanation. But then the explanation requires an explanation, and unless it's the final one, it's as if the explanation is hung in the air. Wittgenstein prevents this possibility of infinite regress of doubt and explanation, by asserting that an explanation is only needed, "if required to prevent a misunderstanding".

That is the point I've been arguing. Notice that "to prevent a misunderstanding" implies that an explanation is needed any time misunderstanding is possible. If we cannot remove the possibility of misunderstanding, then an explanation is required. The nature of the rules for understanding, as Wittgenstein describes them as sign-posts, is such that there is always the possibility of misunderstanding the rule. That's the nature of a sign-post, as W describes. Therefore it appears like an explanation is required for everything, if we are to prevent the possibility of misunderstanding. Wittgenstein recognizes this problem in the following statement:

It may easily look as if every doubt merely revealed an existing gap
in the foundations; so that secure understanding is only possible if we
first doubt everything that can be doubted, and then remove all these
doubts. — 87

So he offers as a resolution, to eliminate that doubt, and secure the foundation, "The sign-post is in order—if, under normal circumstances, it fulfils its purpose." But this principle is completely impotent. for its intended purpose,

I didn't say it wasn't philosophical thinking; I said it wasn't foundational philosophical thinking. See Foundationalism. — Luke

In relation to what is said at 87, this statement is questionable.

But, of course, you should follow Wittgenstein. :grin: — Luke

I agree, but despite his claims that doubt can sometimes be excluded, he hasn't shown me any principles whereby we can actually expect to exclude doubt in relation to any of our knowledge. So his position, even though he may have claimed otherwise, seems to be very supportive of skepticism.

Wittgenstein in no way attempts to "establish the foundations for an epistemology in which doubt has been removed". This type of foundational philosophical thinking is rejected by Wittgenstein, and is a way of thought he is attempting to subvert via his therapeutic writing. The next 40-50 passages in the text seek to disabuse the reader of thinking in these ideal terms. Most of us - philosophers and non-philosophers alike - proceed in many of our daily activities with certainty without the need for any perfect epistemological foundation. — Luke

I suggest you reread 85-87. It is all philosophical thinking, regardless of whether Wittgenstein says otherwise.

85: "the sign-post does after all leave no room for doubt. Or rather: it sometimes leaves room for doubt and sometimes not. And now this is no longer a philosophical proposition, but an empirical one."

The proposition that a sign-post sometimes leaves no room for doubt is not an empirical proposition, it's a philosophical proposition. The degree of doubt which an individual has, cannot be observed. empirically. And, the fact that an individual will proceed into an activity does not mean that the person does not have doubt concerning the success or failure of the activity. We often proceed into actions with doubt concerning the action's success. So we cannot use the empirical observation that the person is proceeding to act, to conclude that there is no doubt. This is a philosophical proposition made by Wittgenstein.

Further, the entirety of 87, discussing the need for explanation to avoid misunderstanding, along with the conclusion, "The sign-post is in order—if, under normal circumstances, it fulfils its purpose." is philosophical, and not empirical. The status of one's understanding, like the status of one's doubt cannot be empirically observed. And the judgement of whether something fulfils a purpose is not an empirical judgement because a purpose cannot be observed empirically, to determine whether the thing has fulfilled that purpose. So this quoted statement is clearly a philosophical proposition rather than empirical.

Therefore, if Wittgenstein proceeds to reject such philosophical thinking, then that is just more evidence of the incoherency of his position. The means by which he attempts to exclude doubt, is a philosophical argument, and a defective one at that. He really should not have ventured into that philosophical issue, and completely left aside the subject of doubt. It clearly is a philosophical subject, rather than an empirical subject, and his attempt to make it empirical is a failure. That his intent, in venturing into the subject of doubt, was to establish a foundation for an epistemology, is evident in On Certainty.

Most of us - philosophers and non-philosophers alike - proceed in many of our daily activities with certainty without the need for any perfect epistemological foundation. — Luke

I agree with this, many people, myself included, often claim to be certain. That is our habitual way of talking which is derived from our background of platonic idealism. Platonic idealism provides the grounds for certainty, in independent Forms, and it is the principal ontology of Christianity so it is bedrock in our linguistic habits. The point is that if we adhere to Wittgenstein's principles, that rules are sign-posts, we ought to recognize that these claims of certainty are unjustifiable. This leaves us with two options, either we accept that we ought not claim certainty, because such claims are false under our ontological principles, or we reject Wittgenstein's principles, which may allow us to find a way to justify our claims of certainty in another form of ontology. The problem is in trying to maintain both, our claims of certainty, and W's ontology of rules, because they are inconsistent with each other.

When you say 'phrase', I assume you mean 'tasty sausage', is that right? — unenlightened

You've almost got it, but "phrase" is different from "tasty sausage", so that's not quite it. Every time someone says "phrase", they mean to say "phrase". But every time someone says "phrase", they might not be using the word in the same way as another time. So how can you be certain of how the person is using "phrase" at any particular time? Look at Wittgenstein's example of "Moses".

What I said, or at least meant to say is that my certainty of whether or not there is "a green growing thing that I can see through my window", is dependent on the certainty that I have an unmistakably correct understanding of what that phrase means. If I cannot be certain that my understanding of the phrase is not mistaken, then I cannot be certain as to whether or not the phrase is true. And, the belief that the rules for understanding are like sign-posts, leaves me in the position where I cannot be certain that I am not misunderstanding the meaning of the phrase. Therefore I cannot be certain whether or not the phrase is true, and so I do not agree that there is no uncertainty.

We can argue about nomenclature, but it is a different kind of uncertainty entirely, and one that W. also goes into exhaustively. Why muddy the waters instead of dealing with the example given, and the special circumstances given? — unenlightened

I am not the one muddying the waters, nomenclature is what is at issue here. The rule stands like a sign-post. The words, as sign-posts, are themselves, the "rules" for understanding themselves. The question is whether we can remove the possibility of misunderstanding the words, and thereby remove doubt.

Yeah language can become divorced from context and so meaning can become less clear and certain.
But again you are not dealing with the challenge but posing a different language problem. Deal with the tree, or the shrub if you want to call it a shrub. Deal with the source of the uncertainty of its being, not the uncertainty of its name. You seem to me to want to run to a linguistic confusion in order to avoid dealing with the argument. — unenlightened

The problem is this. One cannot proceed to judge the certainty of the truth or falsity of the statement "that is a tree", until one has certainty with respect to the meaning of the word "tree". Certainty of meaning underlies certainty of truth or falsity. If there is no certainty of the meaning, there can be no certainty as to truth or falsity of the statement. Wittgenstein is questioning the certainty we have in relation to what the words mean, at 87 specifically, whether or not an explanation is needed to avoid misunderstanding the words (sign-post). The doubt we are concerned with is doubt in relation to understanding or misunderstanding the sign-posts. The foundation of certainty is certainty of meaning, and there cannot be any certainty with respect to truth or falsity without certainty of meaning.

Wittgenstein's ontology removes the certainty of meaning, which is granted to us in an ontology like platonic realism, which asserts an objective, and independent meaning to the words as independent Forms. Assuming independent Forms can give us certainty that there is "the meaning" to the words, and we can base certainty that we understand 'the meaning" on this certainty. But if we deny that there is such as thing as "the meaning", which Wittgenstein does, then where do we base any certainty that we have understood, and not misunderstood the words?

Despite your talk of uncertainly you seem certain that you have understood Wittgenstein, and that his epistemology is incoherent, and that those who do not agree with you have not been paying sufficient attention. — Fooloso4

I wouldn't be inviting people to explain to me where I've gone wrong, if I was certain that I hadn't gone wrong. That's nonsense. I put that out there as a topic to be discussed, to see if someone else could provide the foundation which I believe Wittgenstein has not provided. Or, to show me where I've misunderstood the words which are supposed to provide the foundation, which I have not found.

The irony is that you have not "been mislead by Wittgenstein's words". It is not the words that are misleading. Like the signpost, someone can always interpret it in the wrong way, but that is not the fault of the signpost. — Fooloso4

Right, that's my point isn't it? If there is the possibility that I might be interpreting the words in the wrong way, how do I remove the doubt I have in relation to my understanding?

When I come to stop sign I do not wait for a go sign to appear before proceeding. There is no room for doubt, but someone who does not know what a stop sign is might never go any further once he has seen "stop". — Fooloso4

Another person might not even stop at the stop sign. So, when you proceed from the stop sign, after stopping, you ought to proceed with doubt, being aware of the possibility that another person may not stop. Being certain, I understand, and the other person misunderstands, doesn't protect you from the other person's folly of misunderstanding. Therefore the form of certainty which you are pushing for, is an unjustified certainty.

Not really, because in the very next sentence of §85 - which is unchanged in both the third and fourth editions - W says: "Or rather, it sometimes leaves room for doubt, and sometimes not." You've willfully ignored this sentence for the last few pages of this discussion, and built your 'incoherent epistemology' thesis around the claim that W says "leaves no room for doubt" (only). — Luke

I haven't ignored this statement, that is the very quote I referred to when I started this discussion. My argument was, that according to Wittgenstein's ontology of rules, every situation leaves some degree of uncertainty, and therefore some room for doubt. He does not provide the premises required for the conclusion "sometimes there is no room for doubt".

This is Wittgenstein's view, which is what everyone here has been trying to tell you. — Luke

I fully realize that this is "Wittgenstein's view". The question is whether his stated "view" is consistent with his description. His description is what I have called his ontology of rules, rules exist like sign-posts. His stated "view" is the foundation of his epistemology. If there is inconsistency between these two, as I have argued, then his epistemology is incoherent. So the question is whether we can proceed logically from his ontology, the description of rules existing as sign-posts, to his epistemology, his "view" that sometimes there is no room for doubt.

At 86 - 87 he proceeds to describe the need for explanation in order to exclude the possibility of misunderstanding the sign-post, the rule. It doesn't make sense to him, that we would always need an explanation to avoid doubt, because this would mean that the explanation would need an explanation, etc., resulting in infinite regress, then doubt could not be avoided. So his claim is that we only need an explanation if an explanation is necessary to avoid misunderstanding. And, therefore, the sign-post requires no further explanation if under "normal circumstances" it fulfills its purpose.

My argument is that to exclude doubt, to leave no room for doubt, requires that the possibility of misunderstanding be removed. So I can say that what is stated here, at 87 is insufficient for removing doubt.

"Whereas an explanation may indeed rest on another one that has been given, but none stands in need of another—unless we require it to prevent a misunderstanding."

What is needed to remove doubt, is to prevent the possibility of misunderstanding. Wittgenstein's statement here really makes no sense, because we often do not know whether or not there is a misunderstanding. In these cases we do not know whether misunderstanding has been prevented. So we do not know whether an explanation is needed or not. Therefore doubt is justified. But if Wittgenstein had made the necessary statement, "an explanation is needed when required to prevent the possibility of misunderstanding", this would not support his epistemological principle, that sometimes doubt can be removed. An explanation would always be needed to remove the possibility of misunderstanding, and an explanation of the explanation, etc.. If there is a possibility of misunderstanding, then doubt cannot be removed, no matter how low the probability of misunderstanding is.

The appropriate way for Wittgenstein to deal with the infinite regress of explanation which is required to remove the possibility of misunderstanding, is to accept the fact that doubt cannot be excluded. This simply means that we proceed in our activities without certainty. And, this thing which he attempts to do, establish the foundations for an epistemology in which doubt has been removed, and there is certainty, is impossible. His description of rules, as sign-posts, does not provide what is needed to remove doubt and provide certainty in any circumstances.

Doubt (as we are addressing it) is a conscious activity. Do we agree? — javra

No, I don't agree with that. I am closer to unenlightened's characterisation which has doubt and certainty as a frame of mind. It's an attitude, the way we approach things, which affects our conscious activities. Either way, the attitude of doubt, or the attitude of certainty, is cultured into our habitual ways of acting and thinking, such that it is not necessary to consciously choose to be certain or doubtful. However, I do agree that there are levels of certainty and doubt which are properly conscious certainties and doubts.

I did not understand you division between uncertainty, and doubt, but now I think I see it. You seem to be positioning uncertainty and certainty as frames of mind, attitudes, and then placing doubt as a conscious activity. Your argument appears to be that we cannot proceed into any activity without certainty, therefore the activity of doubting requires certainty. My argument is that we can and do proceed into activities without certainty, and this is evident in other animals which do not have the rational capacity to produce certainty, but still act.

But let me take your premise, that doubting is an activity, and see where it leads. Let's start with the assumption that animals may act (and this includes mental acts), without certainty. Do you agree that certainty comes into existence from rational activity? If so, wouldn't this rational activity which creates certainty be going on when the animal is uncertain. And wouldn't this be a form of doubt? Or, do you place certainty as some underlying attitude, which even animals without rational capacity have?

So, when doubting the location of the cup, can one simultaneously doubt that one is doubting, and furthermore doubt that one is in doubt about one's doubting of where the cup is, and this in infinite regress, at a level of momentary conscious awareness? If not, one will be psychologically certain that one is in doubt at the moment one is in doubt. Thereby making global doubt a psychological impossibility. — javra

As I said already, I see no inconsistency between doubt and infinite regress. Doubt is a feature of infinite regress. Doubt is inherent within infinite regress because infinite regress is a lack of resolution. So when one considers the possibility of infinite regress, that person is doubtful, and this does not mean that the person is actively thinking about an infinite number of different thoughts. This argument, that certainty must underlie doubt, or else there would be an infinite regress of doubt, is fundamentally flawed, because infinite regress is consistent with doubt. It is only certainty which requires the removal of infinite regress. If we cannot find the principles to remove the infinite regress, then doubt is what we have, as doubt is consistent with infinite regress, and therefore certainty is lost.

But, then, if by "global doubt" one intends to express the held psychological certainty that there are no infallible certainties, this would in itself be a position one is certain about - and this, of itself, contradicts the position of global doubt. — javra

This is just not true. One can hold a belief without being certain that what is believed is true. Faith and religion are based in this fact. We believe without certainty. So to believe that there are no infallible certainties does not require that one is certain about this. The opposite, what you've described, is blatant misrepresentation produced for the purpose of supporting your untenable epistemological position.

Notice that engaging the clutch does not stop the engine; it just sits there spinning away - not unlike Metaphysician Undercover, with whom I and others have had this discussion many times over the years. — Banno

You mean disengaging the clutch don't you? If it is true that we need certainty with respect to our understanding of the sign-post before we proceed, as some here seem to be arguing, we'll sit here spinning away, forever. And, if we proceed on the premise that certainty can be produced without removing doubt, we proceed on a false premise. Equally false is the premise that doubt can be removed without removing the possibility of misunderstanding the sign-post. So, do we or do we not proceed on the premise that doubt cannot be removed from our interpretation of the sign-post, and therefore we are uncertain as to whether or not we are proceeding in the right direction?

I think you're packing several weeks of a course on Aristotle into a few paragraphs. I accept it as ground for thinking about Aristotle's thought on this topic. — tim wood

The truth is, I've had more than one course on Aristotle, and have written numerous papers on his work. There's a heck of a lot there to study.

As I understand your representation of his argument, it goes something like this:
"This thing here, this "X," I called X yesterday and I call it X today. Yet clearly today's X is not the same as yesterday's X. If not the same, then it changed. But if it changed, then what was X is no longer X."

On its face this seems merely a naming problem. Whether the kitten that becomes a cat or Theseus's boat, what they are called is a matter of convention and the understanding of language in context. I'm not telling or arguing, I am instead supposing that Aristotle would have figured this aspect out faster than it takes to write it. — tim wood

It's not just a naming problem though, it's a problem of getting an epistemology which is consistent with one's ontology. If it was just a naming problem we'd say that yesterday it was X and today it is Y. But this means that we have two distinct objects, X and Y. But we really believe, and our ontology follows our belief, that X and Y are one and the same object with temporal continuity, despite having changed. So for the sake of epistemology we want to say that it is two distinct objects, name them as distinct objects, and get it over with. But our ontology, and true belief, is that there is a temporal continuity, one object which is changing.

Supposing Aristotle dismissed the naming - language - aspect of the paradox as trivial (which I think it is), that leaves his problem of accounting for change. No doubt he observed and was sensitive to change all around him: he could not have questioned the sheer fact of change. In standing beside a mountain stream he would have observed himself captivated by the turbulent inexorability of change flowing and splashing at his feet! — tim wood

it is clear that Aristotle had great respect for the reality of change, that's why it was such an important part of his physics. The problem is that we understand "change" in a way such that some aspect changes, while another aspect stays the same. We do not understand it as a complete ending of what was at one moment, with a completely new beginning at the next. We understand that something persists, and stays the same through the change. So we have contradictory principles within the concept of change, one aspect stays the same as it was, while another aspect is not the same as it was.

It seems to me that invoking a concept of continuous process gets Aristotle from t1 to t2 in complete safety, sophists notwithstanding and in any case mere annoyances (maybe large annoyances, but annoyances nonetheless). The sparkling stream a his feet, the smooth movement of dancers, the wind even in his face, or his kitten that became cat; all these must have been suggestive: why didn't he take on their instruction? — tim wood

The problem is that "continuous process" was fundamentally unintelligible to the logic of his time. That's evident in Zeno.s paradoxes. And, I would argue that quantum physics demonstrates that continuous process remains fundamentally unintelligible. Aristotle posited "matter" as the aspect of reality which gives us the appearance of continuity. The problem is that this concept really tells us very little. It tells us that we observe a certain temporal continuity, but this temporal continuity is fundamentally unintelligible. Nevertheless, he posited "matter" to account for the temporal continuity which appears to us. Newton described the temporal continuity with what we call inertia, and now the inertia of mass has been replaced by the conservation of energy. But continuous process remains fundamentally unintelligible.

As astute a mind as Aristotle's must have grasped this. Indeed did, inasmuch as he recognized a problem that he tried to solve. But his solution I find peculiar in that he retreated to metaphysics, the thinking about the thinking, and then apparently tried to make the μετα, the about which, the real. Had he remained in the physics of the thing, I think he would have buried the problem for all time. I wonder why he didn't. — tim wood

The thinking about thinking is central to his ethics. The problems of metaphysics were far from solved, as they remain today, but Aristotle figured contemplation, thinking about thinking was the most virtuous activity.
,

Of course we have his problem's difficult descendant in quantum theory, in which the continuity of the discontinuity of things is resolved in probability. — tim wood

Right, the problem of continuity remains, but it is now in an evolved state. Probability is not a resolution though, because it cannot replace explanation.. Mathematics with probability brings us to the point of prediction. But being able to predict is far from understanding. Consider that Thales predicted a solar eclipse far before the heliocentric model was proposed. That's the power of mathematics, we can predict without understanding. The spatiotemporal map gives us the capacity to follow patterns, but it doesn't give us the principles behind the patterns..

Let me make it clear: you have misunderstood Wittgenstein. — Fooloso4

To justify this assertion, you ought to address this section of the text, and show me where I've been mislead by Wittgenstein's words.

The third edition has it as "leave no room for doubt", but the fourth edition has it as "leave room for doubt" (at §85). — Luke

Good, this supports my claim that "leaves no room for doubt", is inconsistent with what Wittgenstein was trying to say. And, if he goes on to introduce epistemological principles in "On Certainty", where doubt may be excluded, that would be inconsistent with what he is saying here in PI.

Since you agree with me that he is saying that the rules, as sign-posts, leave room for doubt, then for what reasons do you not agree that his position is consistent with what I've described, what you've called "radical doubt"? This so-called "radical doubt" is the consequence of Wittgenstein's ontology of rules.

I'll have one more go with you Meta, as all my other threads are full of trolls at the moment. — unenlightened

Thanks for the reassurance, I get the impression that the other two here have placed me in the troll category.

It is not by some complex argument or power of reason, but in exactly the same way as the non-philosopher, by going about the world, and coming across these special circumstances, and learning to recognise them in exactly the same way that he learns to recognise a tree. — unenlightened

I would not agree with this statement. I think that the "special circumstances" are brought to light by the power of reason, and complex arguments. Suppose your example goes another way, suppose the person who is asking, differs from the person answering, and says "no that's not a tree, it's a shrub", and then produces of argument for that point of view. The person who claimed that it was a tree, and insisted on certainty, did not know of the special circumstances, without the power of reason and argument.

Remember the knights who are the keepers of the sacred word Ni? Living in a forest of trees, they want a shrubbery.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MYSMPjMVnAU

Each person gets set in one's own habits of seeing the world in a particular way, but the way that each of us sees it, is slightly different from each other. The "special circumstance" which is conducive to doubt, is the situation where we disagree. It's not by going out in the world, that we learn to recognize the special circumstances, it's by having them pointed out to us. Imagine people thousands of years ago. One person points out a rock to another and says look at this rock, I can put it in the fire and separate an element (gold) out from this rock. Until that point, the other person doesn't even see the rock as a special rock. Metaphysicians seek those special circumstances at the foundational level.

I think that this is what the capacity to understand language consists of, seeing every instance as a special instance. This is a fundamental reversal from the perspective of relating the sameness of the use of words, to say that each word has "a meaning". Meaning is related to context, and every instance of usage has its own special context and therefore its own special meaning. The view that each word has "a meaning" is a mistaken view, because the meaning is peculiar to the context. This means that in the context of language usage, every instance is a special circumstance.

Consider what might happen when the context gets old, written material has aged for hundreds of years. Living in a different era now, we have great difficulty determining the meaning of old texts, because this requires putting ourselves in that context. This for example, is always a problem in interpreting religious texts, and has become a notable issue in the interpretation of the 2nd amendment of the USA.

The apparent sophistication of doubt turns out to have no firmer foundation than the naive certainty it replaces. — unenlightened

The point is that there is no firm foundation. The shifting sands of time are what supports the theory of social collapse spoken of by Dr. Bendell in your other thread. Whether a "collapse" or a "shift" is unknown, but change is inevitable. Are you familiar with Kuhn's concept of paradigm shift? The paradigm shift is only made possible by a foundation which is not firm. Wittgenstein was no stranger to Kuhn.

The leading implicit (psychological) certainty in this hypothetical is that “I’ve lost my cup”. Devoid of this certainty, how would doubts as to where it might be begin manifesting? — javra

I don't see how you can make a valid argument here. I'm doubting the location of my cup. But at the same time I might also be doubting if I even had a cup. I'm thinking where's my cup, and start looking, then right away, I realize that I might not have even gotten a cup in the first place. Now I'm wondering where is my cup, and looking for it, but I'm at the very same time wondering if I even have a cup. So I don't see how you can claim any necessary, underlying certainty. It's simply not there. We may proceed into action without certainty of what we are doing. Perhaps it's a function of habit. I want my coffee, so I proceed into looking for where I set it down, before I properly consider whether or not I even got a coffee yet. Proceeding into an habitual action is not a function of certainty.

Aristotle developed the position that knowledge always must lead from the more certain toward the less certain. This means that something with a higher degree of certainty always underlies and supports the thing with the lower degree of certainty. But now we're talking about doubt, and there is nothing to indicate that there must be certainty underlying doubt. We naturally doubt the less certain things first, but this may lead us to doubt the underlying things which are more certain. I doubt where the cup is, but this might lead me to doubt whether I even have a cup. And, when we find, as Wittgenstein demonstrates to us, that the meanings of the words which express our knowledge, are themselves dubitable, this justifies doubting the entire structure of knowledge.

Emotive reasons for such statements aside, when it is said, “It is certain that the planet Earth is not flat,” one here affirms, what I’ll term, an ontic certainty: a determinate state of affairs that thereby holds no alternative possibilities. — javra

What is at question in the context of this thread, is the understanding of the phrase "the planet earth is not flat". There is no point to saying "I am certain that ...", until I am certain that I understand what "..." means. Certainty that the statement is true can only be supported by certainty that the statement is not misunderstood. If there are "alternative possibilities" to the meanings of these terms, "planet", "earth", "flat", as Wittgenstein explains that there are possibilities for meaning, then we need to assess the certainty we have with respect to the meaning of the phrase. If I cannot say with certainty, that I know what "the planet earth is not flat" means, then I cannot proceed to have any certainty about whether the statement is true or false.

Devoid of our subjective certainty that there is a relevant, underlying ontic certainty to be discovered, states of uncertainty and doubt become meaningless. — javra

This appears to be fundamentally untrue. We can proceed with doubt as to whether or not such certainty is possible to obtain. This doubt does not prevent us from proceeding. I do not need certainty that I will win the game, before I proceed into playing the game. I do not even need to be certain that winning is possible before I proceed. And, we might never know until after we proceed, whether or not such certainty is possible. Perhaps certainty is impossible, but we do not know that it is impossible, we might never know whether it's possible or not until we attempt to obtain it.

“The cup is on the table” doesn’t express a probability but a fact, which, as facts go, are taken by us to be absolute/total/complete actualities (in so far as they are not mere possibility, or mere potential regarding being). — javra

So what is at issue here is what is meant by "the cup is on the table". We cannot proceed to discuss whether it is certain or not, that this is true, until we are certain of the meaning of the phrase. Since there are a number of possibilities for meaning, then any determination of the meaning of this phrase, whether it is the intended meaning, really is a matter of probability.

More briefly, one must first be certain that something is in fact the case in order to be uncertain or in doubt about what the case might in fact be. — javra

This is a fundamental misrepresentation. One can be uncertain, and in doubt, without even knowing "what the case is" means. So you are assuming that one must know what "what the case is" means, prior to having doubt about what is the case. But that's irrelevant, because the person can still be uncertain and doubtful about what is going on, without even knowing what "what the case is" means. Sure, the person would not be doubting what "is in fact the case", but the person would still be doubting and uncertain. Therefore one does not need to be "certain that something is in fact the case", in order to be doubtful of one's knowledge of the situation.

I think it is no longer worth my time and effort trying to help you see more than your myopic vision allows. It is one thing to discuss the texts but quite another when you resort to personal insult. — Fooloso4

I apologize for classing you with Luke, or any other thing which you may have apprehended as an insult. Insult was not my intention. But it's very frustrating for me, with a sincere desire to discuss the text, to have people showing no indication that they have even read the section in question, insinuating that I have misunderstood what Wittgenstein has said. Only unenlightened has actually engaged me on the basis of the terms in the text. The issue was whether or not Wittgenstein's appeal to "ordinary circumstances" (87), is sufficient to "leave no room for doubt" (85).

My reading of Aristotle. thin enough to be nearly transparent, did not cover anything so deliberate and conscious as his identifying such a problem and trying to resolve it tactically. I'm not arguing here or even asking for citation. But can you expand even a little on that part of Aristotle's thinking? I think of him as mainly an observer and secondarily a thinker about what he has observed. — tim wood

Aristotle is more famous for his principles of logic than anything else. Long after his observational works were replaced by the modern sciences of physics and biology, his logic remained a respectable subject of study

There's a number of concepts involve in what I wrote, and the relationships between them are best explained in his Metaphysics. To begin with, there's at least a couple distinct places, one in his logic, Categories I believe, and another in his Metaphysics where he discusses the incompatibility between being and becoming, this is a problem outlined by Plato. If reality only consists of "what is", and "what is not" being and not being, then change, or becoming is unintelligible, as it escapes the logical principles of being and not being. When there is change, what is at one moment is different from what is at the next. You might say that change is in between. At each moment we have what is, and what is not, and this is different at each consecutive moment of change. If, when we posit something between the two states of being to account for the "becoming" (changing), we posit another state of being, then we have the same problem all over again, and we set up an infinite regress, never able to account for what happens between two states of being. What happens between is becoming, or change. Aristotle complained that sophists had taken advantage of this problem to prove the reality of ridiculous scenarios.

He discusses two possible resolutions. One would be to allow for violation of the law of non-contradiction to account for becoming. The thing could be, some sort of unity of what it is at t1, and what it is at t2, and also what it is not at t1, and what it is not at t2, all together, when it is changing from the first state of being to the second. The other possible resolution is to allow for violation of the law of excluded middle. He pushes for the latter option through development of the concept of potential. "Potential" refers to what neither is nor is not, it may or may not be. It is a concept derived from the way that we understand future events which may or may not be. It is not acceptable to assign true or false to a future event which may or may not occur (there is the famous sea battle tomorrow example). And, even if it comes to pass that the event occurs, it is unacceptable to look back, and say that before the event occurred, it was true that the event will occur. There is simply neither truth nor falsity to the subject, and I believe this is the basis for modern modal logic. Aristotle's might be a firm denial of eternalism. But positions like eternalism make change completely unintelligible, whereas Aristotle allows some fundamental principles in an attempt to bring becoming and change into the realm of intelligibility. Some modern positions like dialethism, and dialectical materialism, move to dismiss the law of non-contradiction, to deal with the reality of becoming. This stems from Hegel's dialectic of being, in which being and not-being are subsumed within, so as to co-exist within the concept of becoming.

So in Aristotle's physics, matter is placed in the category of potential. As the potential for change, it gives reality to, as the foundation for understanding, that which neither is nor is not, in the physical world. And, in his logic, the reality of a thing's inherent material element is implicit in his law of identity. His law of identity states that a thing is the same as itself. Those who misunderstand the importance of this principle will dismiss it as a useless tautology. But this principle of identity removes a things identity from what we say it is (that's what contributes to the sophistry), and dictates that each thing has its own identity proper to itself. It's the grounding for realism. And, the particular thing, the individual, the material object, is what substantiates all logic. "Substance', in its most fundamental use of the term refers to the material individual, so that when it's not grounded in the reality of material particulars, logic loses its substance. However, the material element of the particulars, and this might be characterized as the accidentals, leaves a part of the particular as fundamentally unintelligible to logic.

Aristotle thought that matter was eternal and that there was a prime mover that made matter change. — Walter Pound

The unmoved mover is an eternal form, circular motion. He introduced this idea after the demonstration, in his Metaphysics, that anything eternal must be actual, formal. It is a faulty idea because the circular motion requires something which is moving, matter. An eternal motion without anything which is actually moving is incoherent. Then the matter (potential) which is moving would also be eternal, and this contradicts his own conclusion that anything eternal must be actual.

Firstly, it isn't a consequence of Wittgenstein's ontology or position; it is only your misreading. — Luke

I noticed you haven't participated in our discussion of this section of the book where doubt is discussed, so that claim is rather hollow.

That is how we use the term. — Fooloso4

Speak for yourself. I wouldn't use "certainty" in such a deceptive way.

The rules of grammar according to W. are arbitrary. — Fooloso4

Where did I say rules are arbitrary for W? They are like sign-posts, which one might understand, or misunderstand. Haven't you been following the book? Or are you like Luke, just joining in to add your two cents worth in some haphazard fashion, with no respect for what is written in the book?

That depends on what you think stands as justification. See the discussions of the river banks of knowledge, hinges, and his call for a step like that of relativity in On Certainty. See also what he says about groundlessness. It is not incoherent it describes what terms such as certainty and knowledge actually mean based on their use. Consider scientific knowledge. It does not establish eternal, unchanging truths. It represents how we understand things at present, and that will change over time. — Fooloso4

All this does is support my challenge, that Wittgenstein's epistemology is incoherent. He provides his own definition of objectively certain, in On Certainty, as excluding the possibility of mistake. Why would he provide a definition, then proceed to use certainty in some other way, unless equivocation was his intent?

What makes you think it is unwarranted? — Fooloso4

"I am certain that I am sitting here typing" adds nothing to the statement "I am sitting here typing", other than an air of confidence. The air of confidence is unwarranted, because the nature of possibility is such that you may not have used adequate words to describe the situation, therefore misunderstanding cannot be ruled out as impossible, even if it is highly improbable.

Really? If you doubt that you are reading this or that your fingers are moving or that their moving is part of your response to what I have said then why do it? Or that is not the right question because you cannot even be certain that you are doing it. — Fooloso4

That you can act, and put words to your actions, does not mean that you understand what you are doing. I really doubt that you even know what it means for a human being to be doing something, let alone understand what a human being is actually doing.

Once again, the ability to doubt is not a reason to doubt. — Fooloso4

Sure, but the possibility of mistake is reason to doubt. I went through this with unenlightened. Each lottery ticket is highly probable to be a loser. However there is still a possibility that it is a winner. Therefore we have reason to doubt that it is a loser, so we verify the numbers. You might insist that it is unreasonable to buy a ticket, but if someone gives you one, it is not unreasonable to verify the numbers. That is because no matter how improbable, it is still reasonable to doubt, because the improbable thing is still possible.

The ability to doubt is not a reason to doubt. The kind of certainty Wittgenstein appeals to in On Certainty is not indubitable, necessary, or infallible. It is the certainty of our everyday lives. The certainty that I am sitting here typing this. The certainty that I have read On Certainty. — Fooloso4

I consider this to be contradictory. If certainty is not indubitable, necessary, or infallible, then how is it "certainty"? What is the point in saying "I am certain", unless you truly believe that the thing you are supposedly certain of, is indubitable, necessary, or infallible? You could only be using "certain" as a means of deception. As unenlightened described, to be certain is a frame of mind, I would call it a confidence. If we accept Wittgenstein's ontology of rules, then we ought to face the consequences, that such an attitude of confidence is unjustified, as I explained to unenlightened. This is the point, and why I insist Wittgenstein's epistemology is incoherent. You could use "certain" in another way, as Wittgenstein tries in On Certainty, but what would be the point of that?

Why not just say "I am sitting here typing this", and "I have read On Certainty". What does "I am certain" add to these phrases other than an unwarranted air of confidence?

Now one might invent a situation in which it is possible that I am mistaken about these things, but the more serious and sinister mistake is the philosophical mistake that because such a thing is possible that anything that follows from it disrupts the certainty with which we live and act and think and speak. Descartes' Archimedean point of indubitability is a philosophical illusion. — Fooloso4

Of course it disrupts the certainty with which we act, that's the whole point. If you are fully aware that there is a possibility of mistake in your actions, how is it at all logical for you to proceed with certainty? But as I explained, this does not impede our capacity to act. We will still proceed in actions, only without the unwarranted air of confidence. This is not a "sinister mistake", it is the virtue of prudence.

You should ask yourself this question, given that you are the one making claims of radical doubt — Luke

Just let me be clear here. This "radical doubt" as you call it, is the consequence of Wittgenstein's ontology of rules. I am explaining how this form of doubt is the consequence of his ontology. I am not necessarily supporting this ontology, but it appears to be very forceful, and I see no good reason yet, to reject it. If you believe that this so-called radical doubt, which comes as the logical consequence of this ontology is reason to reject the ontology, then you might reject it. I do not judge ontology in this way. If the ontology is based in good solid principles, I'll accept it and allow the epistemological consequences to follow.

Are you certain that your words mean what you think they mean? — Luke

No, I am never certain that my words mean what I think they mean. I have a dictionary beside me which I use incessantly, attempting to find words to fulfil my purpose. I don't even know how I could judge whether I am certain of such a thing, because the words have families of meanings, as Wittgenstein describes. Therefore there is no such thing as the meaning of the word that I am using, only numerous possibilities for meaning. So how could there even be such a thing as what I think the word means, when I see the word as numerous possibilities for meaning? Therefore, I try very hard to make a conscious effort to bear in mind, every time that I print words on the page, or speak words, the possibility that people will misunderstand me, so I choose my words in a deliberate way, hoping to avoid such misunderstanding.

According to you, you cannot be certain what the word "doubt" (or any other word) means, so how can you maintain your argument? — Luke

I don't see a matter of maintaining an argument here. We have a description, from Wittgenstein, of the nature of using words and language. The description is that there is no precise, exact, ideal, meaning to the words, a word indicates an area of possible meanings, like "stand roughly here" indicates an area of possible places to stand. Either you agree with this description or you do not. If you agree, with this, then we can proceed into the epistemology of doubt which follows from the nature of possibility. But if you do not, then there is no point, simply reject Wittgenstein's ontology of rules.

Is matter eternal in the sense that it is timeless or is matter eternal in the sense that matter has always existed in the infinite past? — Walter Pound

Matter cannot be eternal, Aristotle demonstrates this with the cosmological argument. Matter is placed in the category of potential, as being the potential for change in relation to the forms of things, which actually change. According to the cosmological argument, anything eternal must be actual. This means that there is no such thing as prime matter, matter without form, as the idea of prime matter, is unintelligible.

Isn't the "whatness" a thing's essence? — Walter Pound

Yes, essence is a form. And we need to distinguish "form" in two distinct senses. The thing's essence is the form of the thing, what human beings have within their minds, the abstracted essence. But each particular thing has a form proper to itself, in its material existence, making it the thing that it is rather than something else. The difference is that the form of the thing, which is proper to the thing itself, in its material existence, includes accidentals, whereas the essence of the thing, the form in the human mind, does not include accidentals.

then why not just say that features are all there is- the bundle theorists could explain our experience without leaving things unexplained. — Walter Pound

This leaves us with the problem of temporal continuity in a changing thing. At one moment the thing is "X" according to its features, and at the next moment the thing is something different, "Y", according to its features. These are two distinct things. Aristotle posits "matter" as an underlying thing which doesn't change, to allow for temporal continuity. At both times, the thing is the same thing "X", but having different features at each moment of existence.