I did read some commentary books on Hegel. I did not read any of his original works.Have you read one of Hegel's books? — Gregory
Cool. You must be very much familiar with Hegel's system. :up:I've Phenomenology of the Mind about 7 times, and his "encyclopaedia' a few times. Sometimes there can be synchronisity in life — Gregory
Ok, fair enough. I was wondering if reason and logic are the same or separate faculties in Kant. If they are the separate faculties, then they might create possible contradictory situations in their operations. That was my point to Mww. For the word "faculties", Kant uses the word often in his Lecture on "LOGIC" for meaning divisions.No.
There's a lot of lingo there that can be interpreted in various ways. But "No", I think, is the true answer to all of your questions above. — Moliere
We can see the word "faculty" often in the Logic Lecture book of Kant. For example "Reason is the faculty of the derivation of the particular from the universal or cognition a priori." - pp.442"Faculty" is a fun word from the early modern period. It doesn't specify much other than thought-furniture/functions in the imaginations of the early moderns. — Moliere
No reason to believe otherwise, unless willing to believe in the impossible. — Fire Ologist
Eternal oblivion is a poetic way of simply saying “not here anymore.” — Fire Ologist
Purpose for what? Isn't purpose from your psychology?Where does purpose come from? We don't know but it's there. — Gregory
Under what evidence is it the case? Gadamer was into Hegel stuff for mainly on hermeneutics, but not sure if Heidegger was.And yes, Hedeigger was a finitist Hegelian lol, imo — Gregory
First of all, nowhere in the statement that made no sense to me was the concept of reality to be found, — Mww
The second statement, in response, in the form of a secondary conditional query, the conception of reality is found, so that statement makes sense to me. — Mww
Now I can say, reality does not hold contradiction, that being the purview of pure a priori logic manifest in critical thought, so even though the statement makes sense, it is theoretically invalid. — Mww
When there are the official definition of formal logic, describing logic in commonly and loosely was a bit odd. We do use symbols extensively in all sciences, mathematics, arts, and communications too. Ignoring the symbols would be ignoring intelligence.Which is why I said “commonly, but loosely, called”, insofar as the human intellectual faculties do not use symbols or language; — Mww
How could a case of contradiction which is possible in the reality and also in logical thinking not make sense to you?….reason says true on X, but the logic says false on X at the same time…..
— Corvus
Sorry, that makes no sense to me. — Mww
What do you mean by a paralogical bi-reality? Could you elaborate on that please?All this is too obvious. Beneath the surface of things there is a paralogical bi-reality. — Gregory
We are not just matter.We have matter first. We are matter, we are extended so we are extension. — Gregory
Isn't extended or extension a property of matter? That is obvious. If not, indeed what do you mean?People think saying matter is extension is too Cartesian but look: that car there is extended that way, pushes off to the side there, ect. It's extended. It's not the principle of extension maybe, but what does that even mean? — Gregory
Formal logic means the type of logic which uses symbols and formal languages for analysing the statements and propositions for validity i.e. propositional logic, predicate logic and modal logic.Logic employed by the understanding is commonly, albeit loosely, called formal, — Mww
Reason itself is a faculty which analyses and finds truths, but if it is to employ transcendental logic for its operation, then does it not duplicate itself with another faculty of truth telling system? Does it imply that reason says true on X, but the logic says false on X at the same time? If both of them says true, then why does reason need the logic, and why logic needs reason?Reason, on the other hand, employs transcendental logic, which has congruent subject/predicate form, but different origin of conceptions contained therein. — Mww
On the other hand we have Descartes arguments for soul. There is nothing about pure abstraction that speaks of an entended organ. This feels strange to write because i feel my own brain and know i am just a body on a material, dangerous planet. However, he has a point that spiritual experiences are perceived as going beyond matter. — Gregory
Could it be said that Kant was not Hegelian, but was he an absurdist? — Gregory
For Hegel contradiction is the essential element in the changes and progress of the world.Dialetheism is associated usually with Hegel, — Gregory
Kant's logic was not formal logic. It was transcendental logic i.e. he thought transcendental idealism works under the principle of the logic.Kant, who was very interested in formal logic, — Gregory
Antinomies were what our reasons face when dealing with God, world, freedom and souls. Reason was supposed to know truth on everything. But when it comes to these objects, reason doesn't know what they are. For Kant, that was antinomy of reason, which is also the limitation of reason.has his mental "antimonies" in his system. So my question is: was contradiction a necessary part of logic and/or reality in the worldview of Kant? If we can only see two sides of an idea, how do we know they unite at a highet level? — Gregory
Memories, for instance -- where might they fall on the "willful" spectrum? — J
As is now apparent, this is a little microcosm of the whole mental-causation problem. But I offer it because it’s curiously amenable to analysis, and makes me wonder whether any sleep researchers have actually used brain scans to look into this. — J
Our only knowledge about any mind-independent world, any objective reality, starts with our subjective mental states. This means that knowledge about an objective reality cannot be separated from our subjective mental states. — RussellA
Impossible for the mind to describe a mind-independent world. — RussellA
Our only knowledge about any mind-independent world, any objective reality, starts with our subjective mental states. — RussellA
X is a free variable. It can take any value in it. X could have been a statue of Pegasus for its original value. Your inability to understand even what a variable has been the cause of muddle and confusionBut if X was originally a statue of X, then a statue of X is X. No?
— Corvus
No. The Trojan Horse was arguably a mythological statue. Pegasus was never a mythological statue. — noAxioms
It is not matter of if you wanted. We have had this discussion many times before, and it had been concluded that number is concept. Your ignorance on the fact has been contributing to beating around the bush in circles instead of seeing any progress in the discussion., if I wanted to refer to the concept of 14, I would have explicitly said something like 'the concept of 14' or 'the perception of X' — noAxioms
In exactly the same way, any pain a person experiences cannot be judged by anyone other than that person, as mind reading is impossible. — RussellA
They are subjective mental states, nothing to do with knowledge. If you have knowledge of something, then you must be able to verify, demonstrate and prove on what you know objectively to other minds in linguistic forms, when asked.Seeing a colour and feeling a pain are both subjective experiences that are unknowable to any one other than a mind reader. — RussellA
The world or reality means that you live in it, interact with other minds and objects in the world. If you cannot do that, then it is not a world, and it is not the world either. In that sense mind-independent world is a fiction.If you knew something about a mind-independent world then it couldn't be a mind-independent world.
That would be like knowing something that is unknown. — RussellA
When there are discrepancies in the claims of knowledge on the same situation or object between different folks, you always have chance to carry out testimonies on the knowledge via repeated observations, experiments, or testing on the claims, and update your false beliefs, or correct the other folks false claim on his knowledge. You also have option of mutual agreements on knowledge with the other folks who had different account of the knowledge from you via clarification process.But persons A and B are interchangeable,
Therefore, it is possible that a person may see a colour that in fact doesn't exist in reality in the world — RussellA
What we see is the only world there is. There is no other world. Mind-independent world is meaningless if you cannot see or know what it is.Therefore Direct Realism is not a valid philosophy. The reality of a mind-independent world is inaccessible to the mind. — RussellA
It's a statue of X, not X. There's a difference, kind of the same difference between the concept of 14 and 14. — noAxioms
Your seeing the colour red is knowledge about what is in the mind, but is not knowledge about what is in the world. — RussellA
You need to check if you were wearing red coloured eye glasses, or perhaps you might have developed problems with your sights? Or indeed there is an object which is green, but appears red. The important thing here is that, you are thinking and reasoning that you are seeing red, but it could be green.You could look at the green object from all directions and all times of the day and will always see this green object as red. — RussellA
Because human mind thinks, imagines, reasons and infers on what they perceive.How is it possible for the human mind to analyse the fact that they always see a red object to discover the truth of reality that the object in the world is actually green? — RussellA
That sounds an extreme scepticism. We do have knowledge about the truth of reality, because we have perception and reasoning and inferring on the perception. Not just perception.As regards the world, you may believe the colour of the object is red. You may be able to justify that the colour of the object is red. But if the object is in reality actually green, then you have no knowledge about the truth of reality. — RussellA
If you think, imagine, remember or believe in the existence of the large desk, then it is idea of the desk in your mind. If you stand in front of the desk, touch it, push it or work on it, then it is a matter, or a physical desk you are dealing with.Is that desk there an idea. A large, wooden idea and if i push it over, am i pushing an idea? Is my soul an idea? — Gregory
Soul is a tricky concept. Does your soul exist? Where is it? In what form does your soul exist?How does my sole know matter as matter? Is there something that connects all philosophical ideas within my soul? — Gregory
That is the kind of oblivion that I fear. — Paine
Why should our perceptions necessarily give us knowledge about the world? — RussellA
But in order to reason about my perceptions, I must first know that I am perceiving the colour red, for example. I don't think that I am seeing the colour red. I don't believe that I am seeing the colour red. I don't need to reason that I am seeing the colour red. I know that I am seeing the colour red. — RussellA
The Indirect Realist
Not entirely. The Indirect Realist has knowledge about what exists in their mind, such as when they perceive the colour red. But they argue that we can only have beliefs about what exists in the world that may be causing these perceptions in the mind. — RussellA
However, as I see it, Direct Realist is an invalid philosophy. IE, they are wrong. — RussellA
Does it mean that Indirect Realist can only have beliefs? No knowledge at all?Indirect knowledge signifies a belief.
I believe that the Space Needle in Seattle was originally sketched on a napkin, but I don't know it for a fact as I wasn't there at the time. — RussellA
That seems to imply that they are back to the dualism.In relation to something in the world. The relation between what exists in the mind and what exists in the world. — RussellA
the Indirect Realist argues that their reasoning can only give them indirect knowledge about the something in the world that caused their perception. — RussellA
Thanks for the clarification.As I wrote on page 2 — RussellA
That sounds confusing. Is it not the other way around? Are you sure you haven't put them wrong way around in the definition? What significance the word "indirect" have in the name? Why indirect?Suppose someone perceives the colour red. Both the Indirect and Direct Realist would agree that something in the world caused their perception.
The Direct Realist says the person is directly perceiving the cause of their perceiving the colour red. The Indirect realist says that the person is only directly perceiving the colour red.
You seem to be confusing the point that I was trying to point out the fact that transcendental idealism has problem of having dualistic view of the world i.e. phenomenon and noumenon. I was trying to clarify that ideal realism is not transcendental realism. Banno seems to be confusing himself on this point in his post above, which I tried to correct his confusion.I am trying to show that this is a misrepresentation of Indirect Realism. For Indirect Realism, there is only "1x copy of every object in your perception." — RussellA
I only mentioned on indirect realism, because you brought it up. I don't actually know what it is claiming officially, because just by reading your posts about it, it sounded like a tautological statement as I mentioned before.There is only one object of perception for the Indirect Realist, and that is the direct perception of the colour red.
What is an object, for you? — Banno
This again is the problem of confounding what you believe with what is true. That you will not know that you are oblivious does not mean you are not oblivious... Rather the opposite. — Banno