Lucid dreaming is a phenomenon that I want to analyze. What are your thoughts about it? — Shawn

According to Freud and Jung, aren't the lucid dreaming the evidence for the existence of different types of consciousness?, viz, conscious, subconscious, collective unconscious, objective psyche ..etc.
I have seen some folks trying to make the predictions for their future by interpreting their dreams.

For me personally, I sometimes have lucid dreams, and it can be very entertaining in the dreams. When I wake up, and the dream which was so lucid, vivid and entertaining disappears from the mind can give disappointment for the day in real life.

The original version of CycL was a frame language, but the modern version is not. Rather, it is a declarative language based on classical first-order logic, with extensions for modal operators and higher order quantification. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CycL — PL Olcott

Does it handle / process abstract concepts such as God, souls, freedom or immortality?

In information science, an ontology encompasses a representation, formal naming, and definitions of the categories, properties, and relations between the concepts, data, or entities that pertain to one, many, or all domains of discourse. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science) — PL Olcott

This is a good link for the concept "Ontology in Information Science". Thanks.

Here is some logical grounds for believing in the existence of the world from ChatGPT.

"The logical ground for belief in the existence of the world can be approached from various philosophical perspectives, each offering different arguments and justifications. Here are a few key approaches:

1. **Empirical Realism**: Empirical realism is the view that the external world exists independently of our perceptions and experiences of it. This position is based on the idea that our senses provide us with reliable information about the world, and that we can trust our sensory experiences as a basis for forming beliefs about reality. From this perspective, the existence of the world is grounded in the evidence provided by our senses and the consistency of our observations across different perceptual experiences.

2. **Metaphysical Realism**: Metaphysical realism holds that the external world exists objectively, regardless of our perceptions or beliefs about it. This position is based on the idea that there is a mind-independent reality that exists independently of human consciousness. Metaphysical realists argue that the world has an intrinsic nature and existence that is not contingent upon our subjective experiences or interpretations of it.

3. **Inference to the Best Explanation**: Some philosophers argue for the existence of the world based on the principle of inference to the best explanation. According to this principle, we should believe in the existence of the world because it provides the best explanation for our experiences and observations. The existence of the world is posited as the simplest and most coherent explanation for the diversity and regularity of our sensory experiences.

4. **Pragmatic Justification**: Pragmatic approaches to belief in the existence of the world emphasize the practical consequences of adopting such a belief. From a pragmatic perspective, belief in the existence of the world is justified because it is necessary for successful navigation of our environment, interaction with others, and attainment of our goals and desires. Belief in the existence of the world is seen as a useful and necessary assumption for engaging effectively with our surroundings.

These approaches provide different justifications for believing in the existence of the world, ranging from appeals to sensory experience and empirical evidence to arguments based on metaphysical realism and pragmatic considerations. While each approach has its strengths and weaknesses, belief in the existence of the world is generally regarded as a foundational assumption of human cognition and inquiry, underlying our understanding of the natural world and our place within it."

I wonder if these views provide the solid enough grounds for the beliefs, or do they have some logical flaws in their views.

Thank you. Seems like a great forum. — Gary Venter

Welcome. Yes, it is. :)

Quite a different approach to logic, though, we find in the scriptures of Friedrich Hegel. He maintained, that contradictions are a vital prerequisite of all progress. The german word “aufheben” can have a dual meaning: to save and to abolish. In his expression “synthesis” it is just that, the combination of two mutually excluding ideas into one, encompassing both. — Pez

Hegel applied this principle to human mind, in his famous work "Phenomenology of Spirits" for describing and understanding the workings of human consciousness. Marx took over the idea applying the principle into the existence of material and the operational principle for the societies, providing the ideological foundation for the extreme materialism and communism.

If we apply Hegel's idea to philosophy at large, it is not idle talk at all but the necessary ingredient for a dynamic development of ideas. — Pez

Agreed. :up: :fire:

We don't have to believe in the existence of anything - doing so doesn't have much advantage - but exploring and entertaining the possibilities of competing theories - and developing new ones - can be useful to life. — Gary Venter

An interesting post. :up: It is interesting, because it was unusual to read about the sceptical world view, which is based on, and coming from science and QM perspective, not some idealistic immaterialism. I used to have the idea (still do), when science especially physics and QM knowledge get mature and deepen to the limits culminating its level of knowledge in the domain, that would be a kind of views on the world and universe, rather than being absolutely certain about them. There are lot of points in your post to go over, mull over, reading up, and return for further discussions. Thank you for the great post. Welcome to TPF. :pray: :cool:

I don't currently know how to handle contentious knowledge. — PL Olcott

Any AI system needs some sort of reasoning logic based on the different domains and hierarchical structure of the data. It is more challenging to implement the reasoning logics onto the natural language based data, because computers cannot handle the human natural languages well, hence converting the data into the axiomatised symbolic formalisation using the semantic frames would be needed? Just guessing.

Here is some conceptual definition of the semantic frames in AI knowledge based system.

"In semantics, particularly in the context of knowledge representation and artificial intelligence, a frame is a data structure used to represent knowledge about a particular concept or domain. Frames provide a way to organize information hierarchically and capture both structural and procedural knowledge.

Here are some key components and characteristics of frames in semantics:

1. **Slots**: Frames consist of slots, which represent attributes or properties of the concept being modeled. Each slot can have a name and a value, where the value can be a simple data type (such as a string or number) or another frame, allowing for nested structures.

2. **Values**: The values associated with slots can represent various kinds of information, such as characteristics, relationships, or behaviors of the concept being modeled. For example, a frame representing a "car" might have slots for attributes like "color," "model," "manufacturer," and "engine type."

3. **Inheritance**: Frames can inherit properties and relationships from other frames, forming a hierarchical structure. This allows for the representation of generalizations and specializations within a domain. For example, a frame representing a "sedan" might inherit properties from a more general "car" frame.

4. **Prototypes**: Frames can serve as prototypes or templates for creating instances of concepts. By specifying default values for slots, frames can capture common characteristics shared by instances within a category.

5. **Scripts**: Frames can also include procedural knowledge in the form of scripts, which represent sequences of actions or events associated with the concept. Scripts provide a way to represent typical sequences of behavior or events related to a particular concept.

Frames are used in various applications, including expert systems, natural language processing, semantic networks, and knowledge-based systems. They provide a flexible and intuitive way to represent knowledge about complex concepts and domains, allowing for efficient reasoning and inference in AI systems." - ChatGPT

He also agrees that Cyc project's flaw is the problem of handling contradictions in the input data.

Just like the Cyc project each unique sense meaning has its own unique GUID
9824b3dc-7237-4b4b-9a71-fb788348bc9a for the living animal "Cat"
9f444cef-f49f-4aa8-89bf-248ee5976b92 for "Cat Palm" — PL Olcott

So how do the users know which is which? Do they have to type in the unique GUID into the system to get the correct definition they want?

Or can the Cyc project know which is the right one the user wants to know? How does it do that?
Some users could call cat palm as just "cat", and some may have a cat called "cat palm".

The formal semantic class {dogs} is a node in the above inheritance hierarchy. — PL Olcott

What about the case where cat means a plant?
"What is a cat plant?
Chamaedorea Cataractarum, also known as a Cat Palm, is a small, bushy palm tree that is native to Southern Mexico and Central America. It's an easy-to-care-for houseplant with beautiful foliage!" - Google

You have an analytic expression in your system, which says, cat is animal.
But when someone asks about cat (to mean the plant), the system will say cat is animal.
The answer from the AI "Cat is animal." is a wrong answer. The answer must be "Cat is plant." is right.

So you update the system after the complaint.

Cat is animal.
Cat is plant.

But after the update, the system has two expressions for the same word cat, which are contradictory.

Of course logicians would object, that logic is independent of time, an eternal static thing so to speak. — Pez

The Temporal logicians wouldn't object. There are tons of different non-classic logics out there.
It is sunny. (It was true this morning.)
It is sunny. (It is not true a few hours later.)

Every expression of language that can be verified as true or false entirely on the basis of textual analysis is Analytic(Olcott), thus your expression is Analytic(Olcott). — PL Olcott

Analytic knowledge is still limited in a sense that it doesn't add any new information to the knowledge. If you knew the meaning of cat, then you don't need the AI system to look at what it means. If you didn't know the meaning of cat, then you can look up a dictionary or google it.
Therefore, why do you need the AI analytic info system?

Yeah, ok. — Mww

Kant's TI was opposed and criticised by many of the other Philosophers after his time such as Nietzsche, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Bolzano, Heidegger ... etc. His TI wasn't absolutely perfect. But then which philosophy is?

Good luck. — Mww

Thanks. To you too. :ok:

Every expression of language that can be verified as true or false entirely on the basis of textual analysis is Analytic(Olcott), thus your expression is Analytic(Olcott). — PL Olcott

Yes correct. It is true regardless a cat is or is not in the living room.

This stipulative definition specifies that "Cats are animals." <is> Analytic(Olcott) and "There is a cat in my living room right now." <is not> Analytic(Olcott). We finally have an unequivocal criterion measure where disagreement is simply incorrect. — PL Olcott

How about "There is a cat or there is not a cat in my living room right now." ? Is this sentence analytic or not?

What operation? For this operation it doesn’t, for that operation it does. I’m not going to guess which one you’re talking about. — Mww

If you traced back what you wrote, you just kept on saying that judgement has nothing to do with reason. But then now you seem to have changed your words talking about "the other operation.", and tell us you won't guess which one. It is not a straight forward way of discourse.

Good luck finding where I said judgement are concepts. If I didn’t say it, what possible ground could there be for you to claim a misunderstanding of mine related to it? — Mww

It would be much helpful if you could / would just explain the unclear things in straight forward manner instead of keep beating around the bush.

While this is correct, do you see the fault in judgement in supposing it has been the case with respect to this conversation? And if there’s no evidence for the case other than mere observation of the disparity in our respective comments, and even if that assertion never was directed towards this conversation in the first place, what purpose is served by stating the obvious? — Mww

Your misunderstanding seems to come from thinking judgements are concepts, and judgements have no association with reasoning in the operation. If this is the case, what is the purpose of reason in CPR? What does reason supposed to be doing in the minds?

Nahhhh. To understand Kant is to think as if in his place and time. Work with what he worked with. You didn’t read in that link, where the author said pretty much the same thing? That people are apt to misunderstand him because they’re using asymmetrical conditions in attempting to arrive at congruent conclusions. Sadly, KAnt must be wrong because he’s three hundred years ago. — Mww

Judgement is an act of judging. Concept is more close to definition. Judgement can have concepts in its content, and it is always in propositional form. That is what Bolzano said in The Theory of Science. I think that makes sense. If one says concept is judgement and they are the same, then it doesn't sound right logically. If that is what Kant said, then one should point it out as an absurd idea.

Anyways, ok, we agree to disagree. :) Worshipping Kant as if he is some God, and CPR is the bible is not a good philosophy. It is, rather, a religion in disguise of the philosophy. :grin:

Further? This implies concepts are judgements, when they are in fact only representations. — Mww

It breaks the traditional meaning of judgement and concept. I am not sure if there is a point for insisting on the point apart from creating confusion.

For why judgement is needed, when there are already conceptions, consult A67-76/B92-101. — Mww

If that is really what Kant said, then you, as a serious reader of CPR, should be in a position to criticise the point, rather than blindly accepting it, and worshiping CPR as if it were a bible. If concept were judgements, then is the Sun the Moon? Is a dog a cat? Is an apple a bucket? It just creates unnecessary and unacceptable confusions.

CPR is not a bible to be worshipped. It has to be interpreted and understood in the making sense way for the present days. If it is not making sense, it is not worth it. I try to read it making sense way. Someone said "To understand Kant is to transcend him." I think he was right in saying so.

All judgements having to do with things, are of conceptions only. — Mww

If you already have the concepts of things, why do you need further judgements on them?
What are there to judge with things?

We will have to bring Kant back from the dead, — Lionino

You could join the time travel thread, and travel into the 1700s. :nerd:

Voilà, another interpretation of the term. — Lionino

Yes, there are many different interpretations even in the academic communities. Which one is the absolute true one?

All and each sensation, depending on its mode of intuition, is represented by its own conceptions. The compendium of those conceptions, synthesized in an aggregate series of relations to each other, gives the cognition of the thing as a whole. For those singular sensations, by themselves, not in conjunction with other modes of intuition, only judgements relative to that mode of intuition, that sensation, are possible.

Sufficient to explain why not all possible sensations are necessary to judge an object, and, that each sensation manifests in a possible judgement of its own, in accordance initially with its physiology, henceforth in accordance with the rules implicit in the faculty of understanding. — Mww

Not quite clear what you are trying to say here. Could you give some real life examples, where you can make judgements with conception only without any other mental faculties associated?

Judgement needs conceptions for its operation, proper or otherwise, such operation being the functional unity in understanding. — Mww

It sounds absurd to say judgements only need conceptions for its operation. It needs more than conception to operate. How can you judge if the apple taste good without having eaten it? Just by conception of apple, it is impossible to judge if the apple tastes good.

How can you judge if the Eiffel tower is taller than the Tokyo tower without measuring the heights and comparing the measurements of them? Can you do that with just the concepts of the towers?

What….so the associative theory of mind works like the relation of car parts, I understand the relation of car parts….obviously, since I presented it…..yet I don’t understand the associative theory of mind which is just like it?

Didn’t I mention that each member of a system works in conjunction with the others? — Mww

Maybe you did. Not sure. Anyway the point is that judgement needs reason for its proper operation.
Without reason, judgement will work. But without support of reason judgement will arrive at irrational conclusions.

Crap, I spoke too fast. Imagination synthesizes; judgement merely represents the synthesis. My badly stated shortcut, sorry. Productive imagination synthesizes conceptions, that is, relates the conception in the subject of a possible cognition, to the conception in the predicate, the unity of that relation is then called judgement. — Mww

:ok: Every mental operation is actually synthesis of the other mental operation and the sensibility. And human perception is not all automatic process. They must make efforts to perceive better in the case of perceiving tricky looking objects or the world objects with the scarce data due to the remote distance or the size of the objects which are difficult to observe.

In the case of the bent stick, initially it appears bent when it is not. It is a tricky case. Some folks wonder if the stick is really bent. This is due to reason has not been applied to their visual perception. Or they applied their reasons but not correctly. They synthesise into the wrong conclusions. Synthesis is the process of combining all the data available, but judgement concludes for the best validity or what appears to be truth with the available data with the help of reason.

That each member of a system operates in conjunction with the others, does not make explicit any have to do with the other. Pretty simple, really: the engine in a car has nothing to do with the rear axle, each being specific in itself for purpose and function, but without both, the car goes nowhere. — Mww

The association theory of mind for Hume and Kant doesn't say different mental faculties are the same entities. It means they work together just like the different car parts working together to get the car running example as you presented. But you seem to misunderstand the association theory of mind. It doesn't say different mental faculties are the same. It says that they work together under the principle of causality.

Judgement doesn’t conclude, it synthesizes. — Mww

Why does it synthesise? What is synthesis for, if it doesn't offer conclusion?

Just ask yourself….what did Hume say reason couldn’t do? And if the major raison d’etre of CPR was to expose what reason can do, such that Hume’s philosophy was proved incomplete, then it is the case reason has nothing to do with experience, appearance, intuitions and judgement, which Hume’s empirical philosophy covered well enough on its own. It has to do with, not all those, but how all those are possible in the first place, and they are all only possible iff it is the case synthetic, and altogether pure a priori cognitions are themselves possible.

THAT….is what reason does, and we call them…..waaiiiitttt for itttttt…..principles!!!!! — Mww

I have a few AI book here, and all of them talk about the association theory of mental faculties in Hume and Kant. Of course reason has limitations for its capabilities, and that is what Hume and Kant professed. But it doesn't mean that reason has nothing to do with the other mental faculties.

That reason has for its object understanding, and understanding has for its object experience, it does not follow that reason has to do with experience or empirical knowledge itself. — Mww

From Hume to Kant, they all agree on the connection theory that all the mental faculties operate on the basis of the causality between each and every mental functions and events. Reason can serve nothing useful or rational if it stood itself in the mind with no connections to experience, appearance, intuitions and judgement.

This point had been confirmed, upheld and propounded by William James 200 years later for establishing his Psychological Theories of Human Mind. Even this day and age, this perspective has not changed. Without the causal operations between reason and judgement, AI system would have no logical footings for their design ideas and operandi principia.

Illusory or outright mistaken understandings relative to real things, is a function of judgement, not reason. — Mww

How can judgement function for arriving at rational conclusions, if it were severed from reason?

It is a planet called Vulcan. It is not observable in physical form in the sky, — Corvus

Classical logic is useful, even just in its sentential component, which is the Boolean logic used in ordinary computing, and further as classical logic is the logic for the ordinary mathematics for the sciences and for the study of recursive functions and the theory or computability that are at the very heart of the invention and development of the digital computer. And, while predicate logic cannot account for all forms of inference, predicate logic is usually prerequisite for study of the more advanced logics. — TonesInDeepFreeze

Good point. Yes, I agree with that. Classic logic is very useful in checking out logical validity and soundness in the spoken languages and written documents. It is also the foundation of all the other non-classic logic too. One must learn classic logic first in order to understand all the non-classical logics.

It does have the meaning of 'having through the senses', which is contrary to how Kant uses it, but it also shows "given by the spirit", which is how some dictionaries define the (modern) word noumenon. — Lionino

I was reading "A Kant Dictionary" by H. Caygill last night, and it says, Noumenon is not a being or existence in Kant. But it is a boundary of human knowledge and pure reason for the limitation. Phenomenon presents us with the appearance to our sensibility, but not in full. It does so only to a certain degree, then there is a boundary that reason cannot handle due to the non appearance of phenomenon. The boundary and beyond of phenomenon is called Noumenon. In that case, it sounds like Noumenon is just part of Phenomenon where the appearance ends and beyond.

From what I have heard there is no scholarly agreement on the (in)equality of noumenon and Ding an sich. Some are confident in their interpretation that they are absolutely distinct. But being that the problematic of Kant's language is that you don't know when something is being used as a synonym of a word or of another, as is the case with "object", I don't think we will ever know. Ecce maledictio linguarum naturalium. — Lionino

I agree with this. There is no such a thing as the officially accepted definition or interpretation of Ding-An-Sich and Noumenon even in the academic communities. Insisting that the one in SEP or some other internet site definitions are right, and the casual readers or students definitions and points are wrong, just because they are hobby readers and students has no logical ground for the argument.

Kant proves the outside world by showing that some appearances are indeed phenomenons, and due to their causal relationship, phenomenons imply real world objects. — Lionino

I think this is a good point. I could go with that. However, G E Moore proved the existence of the external world by waving his two hands - saying, "Here is one hand, and here is another hand." Seeing the hands and being able to wave them proves that there exists the external world.

I don’t agree with much of this. — AmadeusD

Ok, we agree to disagree. That is fine.

I have provided where, in Kant, the two concepts are objectively removed from one another. Not sure what else to say, but I very much respect your dedication here. — AmadeusD

Thanks. I thought this thread had ended when it had around 600 posts. It disappeared for a while, but then it reemerged with the new points continuing the discussions. I wasn't following the batman brain stuff as I know nothing about it, but when Kant was being mentioned, I thought I could join again for a wee reading and discussing.

My opinion on that account: the use of transcendental conceptions of reason, re: that which underlies appearances as immaterial or simply conceived as something, is what the critique was all about, that is, an exposition on what not to do. Or, technically, what reason has no warrant or entitlement to do, in the pursuit of empirical knowledge, which is all that appearances concern. — Mww

This sounds like the point I was getting across to RussellA in the other thread. But I am not sure if reason has no warrant or entitlement to do in the pursuit of empirical knowledge, because it is all that appearance concern. Reason still does warrant on all the appearances coming in via sensibility - in the case of the bent stick in the glass of water, some people think the stick is bent. But reason when applied to the appearance, tells them no it is the refracted light by the water which makes it look bent. It is not really bent.

In the cases of perception with appearance, but the perceiver still thinks or intuits on the unobservable objects, Kant tells us that is the limit of our reason. We then have to transcend reason, and employ some other mental faculties such as imagination, beliefs and faith to deal with the perception.

The cases of the unobservable physical objects exist in Scientific enquiries in reality. I think I have written about it before somewhere in the TPF. It is a planet called Vulcan. It is not observable in physical form in the sky, but with all the calculations of the movements based on the gravities of the other planets, there must exist this planet called Vulcan. This unobservable planet had been in existence for many years in the scientists calculated conjectures and imagination.

I am not sure if they have actually confirmed the existence of the planet Vulcan yet. But even the scientists don't rule out the existence of unobservable physical objects just because it is invisible. I am sure it is the rational induction of reasoning which has been applied in this case of believing in the existence of the object which has no appearance by the scientists.

I think the Ding an sich is an epistemological being, not an ontological one. — Lionino

I was thinking about this today, and this idea came to my mind. If something is an existence, how can it be without ontology or epistemology? They go together. Without perception, ontology is not seen and not known. Without ontology, there is nothing to perceive. If something is an ontological being, then it must be also epistemological being for it to be qualified as an existence. If something is an epistemic being, then it must be also ontological being. If not, then it would be unknowable even whether it exists or not. No?

That’s fine, provided proper account is taken for it. — Mww

What would be the proper account in your opinion?

I'm unsure what an 'officially accepted' interpretation is, but it seems to be the most common. — AmadeusD

Indeed. That was what I meant. When you said that my post was not adequately outlined, I was wondering then what is the right outline on the topic? Was there the officially accepted and verified outline on noumenon and thing-in-itself? No. There is not, and you agreed with that. In that case, every interpretation is more plausible, plausible or less plausible. No interpretation is wrong. If it was felt as wrong in someone's mind, that doesn't mean it is objectively wrong. It is not a matter of an analytic judgement. It is a matter of belief, understanding and opinion.

I have around 20 different books on Kant, and they all have somewhat different interpretations on the topic, but I found Graham Bird's books were more plausible, and were agreeing with my ideas, hence I kept on sticking with the books as the bible of understanding Kant's CPR. I don't have the book by Palmquist by the way.

Bird clearly says Thing-in-itself and Noumena are the same concept, and I agree with the point. Kant makes various different remarks on the concepts in CPR in various different places in the book depending on the context, hence it would be difficult to say, this or that is the correct definition of them. It really depends on what you are talking them with in what context and what arguments you are presenting with, which makes either more plausible, plausible or less plausible.

And whatever definition one comes up with, there will be someone who will disagree with it, and prove the definition is illogical, or come up with quotes from the CPR which says exactly the opposite.

It is not something that anyone could prove logically right or wrong, hence they are in the category of the antinomies. They are still very useful concepts, if one had some thoughts on epistemic, ontological or metaphysical ideas, and those concepts fit nicely for explaining or positing something which would be difficult otherwise to do due to the abstract nature of the arguments or ideas.

Did you read the “Multi-Layered Conception….” paper linked on the previous page? — Mww

Not the paper itself (Is there a link for the full paper?). Just the quote. The following is the point I used to agree with, and still do. What is your own point?

Yet he goes on to note that we do not have to conceive of the ‘something’ that underlies appearances as a material object. It might as well be considered as something that is immaterial and can only be thought. — Kant’s Multi-Layered Conception of Things in Themselves