Yes, but to presuppose is to deduce, it is not to perceive. — Mww

Presupposition is condition, not to deduce.

Then you must grant that space can affect the senses in the same manner as objects, which reduces to the necessity that space must have properties. At which point, upon determining that space cannot have properties, insofar as there is no possibility of space appearing to you as an object, — Mww

Yes, isn't it what exactly Kant was pointing out? Space is a necessary precondition for appearance of objects in TI. But it is also an object of perception in material empiricism. (according to Antinomy of Pure Reason).

Space has both aspects of being a priori condition for perception as well as physical object. Space as object has its physical properties.

"Dimensions: Space is typically described in terms of three spatial dimensions (length, width, and height). In the context of spacetime in relativity, time is considered a fourth dimension.

Curvature: The curvature of space is a fundamental concept in Einstein's theory of General Relativity. Massive objects, like stars and planets, curve the fabric of spacetime around them, influencing the motion of other objects.

Expansion: The universe itself is expanding. Galaxies are moving away from each other over time, indicating that the fabric of space is stretching. This expansion is a key feature of the Big Bang theory.

Gravity: Space is influenced by gravity, and gravity is often described as the warping or curvature of spacetime caused by mass. Objects with mass, like planets and stars, influence the geometry of space around them.

Vacuum Energy: Even in seemingly empty space, there is a concept known as vacuum energy or dark energy. This is a mysterious form of energy that is thought to be responsible for the observed acceleration of the expansion of the universe." - ChatGPT notes

I always suffer when my beliefs turn out to be groundless. — RussellA

That sounds like psychological not epistemological. :nerd:

How this maps onto what is existent is another matter and kind of what Kant went into in a deep way in terms of investigating what can be known prior to experience. — I like sushi

That is not the only thing Kant was writing about. He wrote about wide variety of topics.

If Real is taken to be existence, then it relates to the problem of belief in the existence of the world, and also Kant's paralogism. I thought this was obvious.

After all you brought in the term 'Real' in your claim. I just thought we could clarify on what you were claiming about.

If space is incomprehensible…..
— Corvus

It isn’t. — Mww

Sorry I thought you were claiming that space is incomprehensible.

No. The objective validity of that which relates the objects as separate from the perceiver, or as separate from each other, is deduced from perception of objects. — Mww

Were we not talking about perception of space? My point was that you cannot perceive objects without perceiving space. Space is presupposed in the perception of the objects. It follows that space or perception of space cannot be illusion, be transcendental or empirical.

What about you? If you see an elephant flying in the sky how do you know about it? — I like sushi

For me, I also can see a flying elephant, when I try to imagine one in my mind. It does have a pair of wings, and flies above the clouds like a hang glider. The image is vivid and feels REAL to me.
But I am not sure if I can claim the flying elephant in my mind is real.
Because it is unreal, and I was seeing the UNREAL object which was made up in my imagination.
I was going to claim that we see real objects as well as UNREAL objects too. My flying elephant in my imagination is UNREAL.

Your saying that you see a flying elephant and it is real to you, is a self-contradiction.
Because the flying elephant was an unreal object to you and to the world. You were seeing an unreal flying elephant.

Just to point out your saying that your flying elephant is real, which is unreal was denying the principle of consistency A=A. You were saying A = Not A.

I believe "I saw an Ichthyocentaur in the garden". I reason that my belief was groundless.

Could I then not say "I was suffering an illusion"? — RussellA

Suffering sounds like from "illness" or "pain". No.
You were having a groundless belief, and your reason confirmed it as a groundless belief.

Asked and answered. — Mww

n so far as space is merely itself a representation, and perception of representations is impossible, perception of space is incomprehensible. — Mww

If space is incomprehensible / impossible to perceive, then how is it possible to perceive the objects in it? Isn't perception of space necessarily deduced in the perception of objects? Surely that is what Kant meant by space and time are necessary a priori condition for appearance.

Perception is an activity; space is a pure representation. — Mww

Ehyyyy - I was not asking about Perception, but Perception of space.

I already answered. It is ‘real’ to me. We experience what we experience. There is no ‘knowing’ for me in any absolute sense.

Now, how do you know what you perceive is ‘real’? If you answer your own question it might help, unless you find it meaningless? — I like sushi

It appears that you were trying to clarify the concept of real before giving out more of your answers, but unfortunately you were interrupted by .

I think the concept of Real is vague in philosophical uses, and it is interesting to clarify the uses with our epistemic claims. I was expecting you to choose any concept you feel relevant and come back with your answers to my question - what do you know about your flying elephant?

PERCEPTION (of space is an illusion) becomes SPACE (is an illusion). — Mww

What are the differences on PERCEPTION of space and SPACE?

It wouldn't be an illusion if I saw an Ichthyocentaur, but to think that Ichthyocentaurs exist in the world would be an illusion. — RussellA

Aren't illusions to do with unfounded or mistaken sense perception?
"For example:

Auditory Illusions: These involve the sense of hearing. An example is the Shepard tone, an auditory illusion that sounds like a continuously ascending or descending pitch but is actually a cyclically repeating pattern.

Tactile Illusions: These involve the sense of touch. The rubber hand illusion is an example, where a person can be made to feel as if a rubber hand is their own by simultaneously stroking their real hand and a rubber hand.

Olfactory Illusions: These involve the sense of smell. Sometimes, our brain can interpret smells in a way that doesn't match the actual stimuli, creating olfactory illusions.

Gustatory Illusions: These involve the sense of taste. Flavor perception can be influenced by various factors, leading to illusions in the perception of taste." - CHATGPT

OR Visual illusions like from your own case, seeing an Ichthyocentaur, when it was actually a next door neighbor's dog, or a shadow of a chair.

You wouldn't say your thinking that 1+1=5, or your belief that there are Martians dancing in Mars are illusion.

To think that something exists in the world when it doesn't is misunderstanding or fallacies. To believe in something that is not the case is a groundless belief or fallacies, but not an illusion.

Frankly I find it to be a ridiculous question BUT given that you asked it I imagine if you answer it it may shed light on where you are going with this. — I like sushi

It is beyond belief that you seem to be in total oblivion that my question was against your claim. The question would have never been put to you, if you hadn't made your claim. Philosophy is all about claiming, asking and probing on the metaphysical issues . If you renounce that, then I don't see your point of doing philosophy.

Do you have a point or are you just going to throw out facile questions? — I like sushi

If you are able to recall, you claimed that you do actually say that the world you experience is real. in your post in this thread.
My questions was, how do you know it is real? It is a classic epistemological question. Maybe to it could have sounded like a silly game. But if you have read any book on Epistemology, you cannot deny that it is one of the central topic of the subject.

Why do you twist it as facile question? If it were a facile question, why did you keep on responding asking more questions?

If you are able to recall, it is not me who dragged you into this thread. But it was you who participated in the thread from your own Will.

Category mistake?
— Corvus

Not the case. Res cogitans and res extensa are two distinct things, yet they are both still substances. — Lionino

Can substance be further broken down into their constructive elements?
For example, bread is made of flour. Water is made of 2 hydrogen and 1 oxygen molecules.
What is res extensa made of? What is res cogitans made of?

:cool: :ok:

So our perception of time is an illusion — RussellA

So our perception of space is also an illusion. — RussellA

But in Kant, Space and Time are a priori condition for our experience of the external world. He doesn't see them as illusion. On that basis, can Kant be branded as an Indirect Realist?

Tell me what you mean by ‘real’. — I like sushi

Only thing I have done was responding to your request.

Then I was asked to cut to the chase,

Again, cut to the chase please. — I like sushi

and then pops up with a senseless comment that this is a silly game.

You have not even answered my question.

if I see a flying elephant that is not actually there (everyone else denies it is there) then the elephant does not exist but is real for me - unless I am being gaslighted.
— I like sushi
What do you know about the flying elephant in your mind? — Corvus

Now who are playing a silly game?

I believe that Kant would say that he has both an indirect perception (causally indirect) and indirect cognition of the postbox as it really is in a mind-independent world, ie, the same as what an Indirect Realist would say. — RussellA

What do the Indirect Realist say about A priori concepts and space and time? Can these be mind-independent?

Tell me what you mean by ‘real’. — I like sushi

1. Real can mean physical existence. You are not just seeing something, but you can also touch grab feel use manipulate transfer and throw out physically.
2. Real can also mean genuine, not bogus, not look alike, not copy of the genuine.
3. Real means actual, not dream, not hallucinating, not illusion.

if I see a flying elephant that is not actually there (everyone else denies it is there) then the elephant does not exist but is real for me - unless I am being gaslighted. — I like sushi

What do you know about the flying elephant in your mind?

I feel like this is why you are probing? We know things because we can doubt them. — I like sushi

Probing helps us understand how our mind works, why we have beliefs on certain things and not, and the nature of doubting etc.

Find A491/B519.

It will tell you what you want to know, but not what you should be asking, at least with respect to Kantian metaphysics in general and CPR in particular. — Mww

Could it be the part of CPR where Kant explains the antinomy of Pure Reason? The reason has to deal with two controversial cases in perception.

First case is, TI, that perceived objects appear in mind as internal representations, and even space and time must be regarded as internal forms of the mind. In this case, the perceived objects are treated as the existence in Thing-in-itself, and we are not supposed to know anything about them at all.

The other case is that objects in perception exist as external to the mind as real objects. You see the appearance, but you realise that they are actually the real objects, which you can grab, touch, feel and manipulate. Even space and time feels external, where space is the external existence and time is the external process. This is the case of material empiricism.

The pure reason has both sides to deal with, and both are true. Kant seemed to be NOT committing himself as either an idealist or realist at this part of CPR.

(well aware you did not ask me.. Just adding a perspective as I'm reading CPR right now for the first time so feel like i need this type of thing to nut out whether i understand.. any.. of it LOL) — AmadeusD

Thank you for your post. It is always good to have more different opinions on the topic, which makes discussions more diverse and interesting.

Issue is, it seems to me Kant denies the 'actual' existence of the object aside from the inner sense of it, so... I need to read more lol. — AmadeusD

Yes, I think this is quite interesting point and also where there are different interpretations between the traditional and contemporary commentators on Kant.

From my understanding, Kant was elucidating the both side of pure reason i.e. TI side which assumes the perceived objects belonging to Thing-in-Itself, which appears in minds as mere representation of the objects into the schema of a priori form of space and time which are all internal. We don't know anything about Thing-in-itself, hence we cannot even ask about it.

And then there is material empiricism side of pure reason, which takes the perceived objects as the real objects in the external world as they are. The reason sees the appearance, which are the actual objects that one can grab touch feel and manipulate. Thing-in-itself is part of the world we don't fully know, but is conceivable.

Pure reason deals with this conflicting nature of our perception. That's why Kant is explaining about them in the section called "Antinomy of Pure Reason". Therefore Kant was not committing himself as either idealist or realist at all in CPR. His aim was to investigate what Pure Reason does, and how it does it viz. the limitation and methodology of Pure reason.

I am also in the middle of reading Kant, and trying to understand him better. I use read him a few year ago, but stopped for a while doing other things. Recently I have been trying to get back to reading him again.

The problem is then knowing what "direct" refers to. Does it mean causally direct or cognitively direct? — RussellA

Another case of linguistic aberration?

What are your definitions…..
— Corvus

Mine are his. But having the definition still requires understanding the myriad instances of the term in accordance with it. THAT’S the hard part. — Mww

What is Kant's own definition of Transcendental Idealism? I was under impression that he hadn't given out clear definitions on TI as such. According to your answer, it sounds like it is highly challenging or even impossible to come up with a clearcut definition of TI. But there got to be one, if you claim that yours is Kant's definition.

How do you want me too?

What kind of argument do you want me to present?

Note: I find no need to ‘prove’ it to myself. — I like sushi

OK, let's see it this way. Are sure all your sense organs are perfectly accurate?
How do you know they are? Or perhaps they are not?
Tell me what you are seeing as real in front of you.

Possibly. The Wikipedia article on Direct and Indirect Realism does give alternate names:
In the philosophy of perception and philosophy of mind, direct or naïve realism, as opposed to indirect or representational realism, are differing models that describe the nature of conscious experiences.

The problem is, is it possible to describe a theory about which millions of words have been written using just two words. — RussellA

Yeah, whenever I read "Indirect X", I always get curious, "Indirect" from what, how and why?

I think of "Indirect Realism" as a name rather than a description, as the Taj Mahal is the name of and not a description of a building. Similarly I think of "Transcendental Idealism" as a name rather than a description. — RussellA

Perhaps you could be right.

What would be the ground of making him anything but what he made himself? — Mww

It must be all the recent Kant commentators who pigeonholed Kant to be an idealist, realist, or phenomenologist etc etc, and we are just to trying to find on what basis was Kant so and so-ist? Maybe Kant had all those characteristic tendencies in his writings? It is just part and parcel of trying to understand Kant better suppose. Of course Kant was a Kantian.

So a guy knows what TI stands for, then reads herein TI has nothing to do with idealism. What’s he to think, when he understands perfectly well that the I in TI intentionally represents idealism? — Mww

Could Transcendental have implied "Anti"? I am not quite sure what the true definition of "Transcendental" in Kant exactly means either. I am suspicious if it meant simply "prior to experience".
What are your definitions of "Transcendental" and "Transcendental Idealism" in Kant?

But comparing stones (or other such objects) with minds (res cogitans) seems to me a egregious equivocation of the idea of substance.
— Wayfarer

How so? — Lionino

Category mistake?

Could one perhaps say that the world as they experience it is real to them?
— RussellA

We do actually say that for everyone. — I like sushi

How do you prove the world that you perceive is real?

I would argue that Kant is in today's terms definitely an "Indirect Realist". — RussellA

Only thing about "Indirect Realism" is that, "Indirect" sounds a bit vague. Would it not be better called something like "Representational Realism"? Because appearance and sense-data represent the contents in the mind.

but to answer your question: squirrel live roughly 10-30% (2-6 years) of their natural life span in the wild. With the hawk, foxes, and cars around here not good odds for a house squirrel. — Vaskane

I never believed that squirrels can live in houses. I have seen a few of them in the garden sometimes. They are very fast, and agile. They quickly do their business and disappear into the woods.
I believe that animals might have beliefs in the existence of the world too. If they do, what would their beliefs be like?

Husserl seems central to Phenomenology. From SEP Phenomenology:
Still, the discipline of phenomenology, its roots tracing back through the centuries, came to full flower in Husserl. — RussellA

There seem different schools of Phenomenology. For example, Heidegger's Phenomenology is much different from Husserl's. Merlou-Ponty has again different Phenomenology in its methodology and subjects too. Hence framing Kant as a Phenomenologist needs close investigation i.e. first defining what Phenomenology is, then under what ground Kant is Phenomenologist or not.

Speaking as an Indirect Realist, I would say that Appearance and Sense-data are synonyms, where both are figures of speech, and are two different ways of looking at the same thing. — RussellA

I think this is a fair comment. Appearance and sense-data is very similar if not the same. Kant keeps saying Appearance and objects are the same in CPR. Would it be the ground for making Kant an Indirect Realist? Kant definitely says that TI is nothing to do with idealism in the Prolegomena.

So, to you, if someone loses their memory, they simply die and become another person? — Lionino

Not necessarily. One may only lose one's identity. Of course, this doesn't mean that one's objective identity is lost too. One only loses one's subjective identity with the loss of one's memory. The objective identity is intact as a fact whether one can recall who one is or not.

If you lost all your memory, I am sure you wouldn't know who you are. But at the time of one's death, all the memories of that life time will be flushed out into blank.

Hence when having been reborn into the secular world, one cannot recall the previous life's memories clearly. One can only scrounge the previous life memories via imagination and one's own dreams.

Are you actually saying that or this is some figurate speech I am not picking up on? — Lionino

As Kant said, any claims made on the Soul, also the opposite is true.

:cool: :ok:

We are not doubting the world, objects, things, pets or people when we are seeing them. We are doubting when we don't seem them anymore. If your pet is suddenly not there anymore having hidden somewhere in the house, then do you still believe in their existence in your house? Would you worry or doubt that they may not be there anymore having gone out the house, and lost their way back home? If you haven't seen them for weeks, would you still believe that they are with you?

Suppose someone sees a red postbox. — RussellA

If they were a Phenomenalist, the Appearance is the real world. — RussellA

If they were an Indirect Realist, they would say that although the postbox appears red, the postbox as a Thing-in-Itself is not necessarily red. For the Indirect Realist, although the Appearance is real, the real world is the unknown Thing-in-Itself that is the cause of the Appearance. — RussellA

1. Do the Phenomenalists claim to know the real world perceived as the appearance? Or is it unknown existence?
2. What would be the differences between Appearance of the postbox, and Sense-Data of the postbox?

:up: Interesting point, and great writeup. However, Appearance has hint of being the mental representation. Appearance is not the world either, is it?

I’m not sure how that proves you’re not perceiving the world. If you weren’t perceiving the world you wouldn’t hear the alarm clock. — NOS4A2

Should you not say that you were disturbed by the alarm clock, which woke you up involuntarily from your sleep, rather than you perceived the alarm bell ringing from the clock?

Even so, if you’re not perceiving the world, what are you perceiving? Are you perceiving nothing? Are you not perceiving? Or are perceiving something other than the world? — NOS4A2

When you are sleeping, I would say you were not perceiving the world, because you would have been unconscious during the sleep. Your brain would have shutdown from your normal perception taking rest. Maybe you might be having dreams in sleep, but no perception on the world for sure. If you were perceiving something in the world in your sleep, then it is likely you weren't in deep sleep, or you weren't asleep at all.

Given this, is it reasonable to doubt the existence of the cup when you were not looking at it? — NOS4A2

If you accept that your perception is caused by the external object, but for some reason, the object you were perceiving is invisible from your sight, then you have no perception because you don't have the object causing your perception anymore. In that case, it would be rational to have no belief in the existence of the object or the world.

We are not saying why you cannot doubt, or can doubt with all the evidence the other person produces to you with the films and videos what have you. We are saying, the cause of your perception is not existing anymore, therefore you have no perception of the object, therefore you have no reason to believe in the existence of the object or world.

you cannot say “the window was broken by a thing-in-itself”.
— Mww — RussellA

As Kant was not a phenomenologist, and believed in both Appearance and Things-in-Themselves, where the Things-in-Themselves are the cause of the Appearance, the Category of Causality cannot apply just to the Appearance but must also apply to the cause of that Appearance, ie the Things-in-Themselves. — RussellA

So then which world is real, Appearance or Thing-in-itself? Or are they the same world?

So specifically, I am searching for arguments, preferrably complete, even more preferrably in syllogistic form, for the belief that the self persists. Otherwise, I will remain in doubt, and in absence of any evidence of permanence, I will default to the position that it does not stay at all, and that we are constantly as always dying, as the comic posted in the first page depicts. — Lionino

I recall reading Plato saying that our innate abstract ideas on the world and objects, and the mathematical knowledge are from our recollection of our previous lives. So based on that perspective, I tried to come up with a syllogistic proof of the permanence of the human soul.

From Descartes famous declaration "cogito ergo zum", one cannot mistake one's own identity who one is, the identity of the human soul is one of the essence or properties of the human soul, therefore it stays the same no matter what happens to the body of the soul residing, or no matter how long time has passed since the birth of the soul.

The other properties of a person are subject to the changes through time or events of course such as the body will grow old, thoughts and views might change depending on the experience and age of the person etc, but the identity of the person remains the same no matter what changes have gone through to the whole body or thoughts, and the base of the identity is one's own memory of the past.

1. I have no recollection of the past experience of my previous life (if there was one) in my daily conscious mind, no matter how hard I try to remember them (it is just blank). But I can imagine my soul's existence in the ancient times, medieval times and 18 centuries. I was imagining meeting up with Plato, and having a chat in the sunny corner of the Roman square talking about the world of ideas. I can imagine myself walking along the medieval town of London dressed in the medieval clothing and a pointed hat going for a beer in the pub.

I am not sure how I can do these imagining if my soul had NOT existed in those times and NOT actually gone through in the real past lives seeing and encountering the images in my mind experiencing them personally. The people I see in my imagination are the ones I have never seen or met before in my real life or seen on TV or films.

2. On some days I have dreams in my sleep. The images I see in my dreams are the ones I have never seen before in my daily real life. The people I see and meet in my dreams are totally strangers to me, as well as the places I see are new and unfamiliar. I have absolutely no control of the contents of my dreams, and they are totally random in nature.

I often wonder why I dreamt these images and saw the people whom I never met or know, but there is no logical or causal explanation for the reasons. The only logical analogy I can come up with is that my soul had existed sometime in the past prior to my birth, and it encountered the places and situations in the images and people in my dreams. The only logical conclusion I could come up with is that all these contents of my imagination and dreams are my recollection of my past lives. If they are not, where else could they be from?

3. According to Descartes, soul is a different existence from body which is distinct itself, independent and composed of different substance to bodies. So it implies, souls can depart the body and keep existing transcending to some other possible worlds or universe for a while until finding a new born body to settle the new life in the body. When bodies get old the memory gets weak, and when the body dies the memory gets killed off too with all the other mental functionalities. But the soul is intact with its identity and all the latent memories, which survives the death, keeps existing, and gets reborn in the new body, which explains all the dreaming and imaginations which are based on its previous lives.

Therefore if one's soul had existed in the past outside one's body of the present life, then there is no reason why it shouldn't exist in the future when one's body no longer exists. The soul must exist throughout past, present and future permanently as long as the universe keeps existing, keep coming back to the profane lives whenever there is a match between a newly being born body and the body-less soul made up by God or coincidence - one of the laws of the universe.

Yes, figures of speech can be confusing, but as figures of speech are an inherent part of language, figures of speech and the confusion they bring is unavoidable. — RussellA

Yes, good point. Here is the summary from ChatGPT on the problems of OLP.

"1. **Circularity and Conservatism:**
- Critics argue that OLP can be circular in its reasoning. It sometimes relies on everyday language to define philosophical concepts, but this can lead to a conservative stance, where it merely reflects and reinforces existing linguistic practices rather than challenging or transcending them.

2. **Inadequacy for Complex Topics:**
- OLP may be criticized for its perceived inadequacy in dealing with complex philosophical problems that require more abstract and formal analysis. Some argue that it is better suited for addressing everyday language use rather than tackling deep metaphysical or epistemological questions.

3. **Failure to Address Non-Linguistic Aspects:**
- Ordinary Language Philosophy tends to focus heavily on language and linguistic expressions, potentially neglecting non-linguistic aspects of human experience. This limitation can be problematic when dealing with issues that go beyond language, such as emotions, sensations, or certain aspects of consciousness.

4. **Limited Cross-Cultural Applicability:**
- OLP has been criticized for its cultural specificity, as it is primarily based on the analysis of English-language usage. Some argue that the insights gained from studying ordinary language may not be easily translatable or applicable to languages and cultures with different linguistic structures and philosophical traditions.

5. **Development of Later Wittgenstein's Thought:**
- The later works of Ludwig Wittgenstein, often associated with OLP, are complex and open to different interpretations. Some critics argue that later Wittgenstein's ideas are not a unified and coherent system, making it challenging to pin down a clear and consistent account of OLP.

6. **Neglect of Ontological Questions:**
- Ordinary Language Philosophy tends to be more focused on linguistic and conceptual analysis rather than engaging deeply with ontological questions about the nature of reality. Critics argue that it may sidestep important metaphysical issues.

7. **Evolution of Analytic Philosophy:**
- As analytic philosophy evolved, many philosophers moved away from the strictures of OLP. Analytic philosophy developed new methodologies and approaches, which led to a decline in the influence of OLP in mainstream philosophical discourse." - ChatGPT