I'm afraid this triggers one of my hobby-horses. Language is also for expressing emotions, giving orders, consoling people, deceiving people, inspiring the troops, shaming wrong-doers and many other things. Focusing on one, admittedly important, use of language narrows the vision of philosophy and distorts the understanding of people living in the world.
There is, I believe, even an argument that the origins of language, assuming they lie in animal communication systems are severely practical things like expressing peaceful or aggressive intentions, making demands, expressing anger, fear, pleasure and pain and such.
The theoretical uses of language are not the core, but a derivative, and arguably still marginal, use of language. — Ludwig V

Yes, good point. You seem to agree that language cannot grasp or understand the world in full. Because it cannot perceive or think about the objects. It can express, describe, criticise and diagnose on the objects and world according to the mental events and judgments.

I was expecting to come back with his own points or arguments against my points. But I was disappointed at his response saying that my points on the Philosophy of Language are too general to give any replies. I didn't feel that was a fair and right response from him, which was also anti-philosophical. Because Philosophy is all about brining one's own arguments against the others' trying to either agree or disagree on the points, but never dismissing the other interlocutor's points on the basis of the non-philosophical reasons.

My points were not general as makes out, and was never out of blue, because I was particularly responding to his own points on few of his previous posts where he suggests that Linguistic Philosophy can understand the world in full.

The problem with language is that, no matter what one says, and how one says on something, if it were about abstract objects, then it will just be a statement about the abstract objects in one's mind.

If the sayings were about external objects, but it didn't cohere with the external object one was talking about, then it will be judged as false, or meaningless statements.

Ok. — Banno

Yeah, feel free. No pressure. Although I had some criticisms on the methodology and the subject itself, I also must admit that I have learnt a lot during the readings of "Sense and Sensibilia".

I didn't mean the topic is not interesting. I was wondering why anyone should reject the related points being rasied with the topic insisting on staying only in the book. It sounded like some religious ceremonial reading rather than philsophical debate.

I never asked or expect anyone to reply to me. It is totally up to you whether you reply or not. I have been keeping responding to the questions to me, and where I feel related and appropriate, asking back and expressing my own point of view.

I was not having a go at Austin. I was just responding to your question. (rememebr you asked me a question?)

I was wondering if rejecting all other points being raised with Austin's methodology and the points of his book, but keep on insisting to be recalcitrant for staying in the only one book of Austin, in that one book only, and regurgitating what he said repeatedly would be a good approach in understanding Austin. Because at the end of the day, it is a topic of Linguistic Philosophy as well as Perception.

what are you referring to with "contemporary criticisms and analyses on the points laid out in his works"? There's lots of critique out there. What do you have in mind? — Banno

I was just guessing there would be, but I don't have any in particular. From my own view, I am not sure if Ordinary Language Philosophy can grasp and understand the world in full, because

1. Language is for expressing, describing and communicating thoughts and the contents of perception.
2. Language never have access to the world direct.
3. Language is the last activity in the chain of the mental events i.e. you perceive, think, then speak in that order, never the other way around.

And let us be clear about this. The whole point of CPR was to explicate how human reason works, and what limitations it has. It is not about God, the soul, freedom, immortality, virtue, happiness, causality and morality, although they were recruited to assist the exegesis.

Of its 785 pages, can you narrow it down a bit? — RussellA

I am afraid not. But here is a hint. Reason's main capability is reflection. Reason deals with objects and propositions which entered your perception. Never on the external objects direct.

When reason is trying to find out on the nature of reason, the only way is by reflecting itself. There is no other way.

I don't deny that we think, remember, judge, imagine, etc. etc. How could I? I'm not sure that I know what mental objects are supposed to be. — Ludwig V

Here is the link for mental objects from Wiki.
Account of Mental Objects / Representation from SEP.

Mental images are the mental objects which happen to be images in your mind, be it imagined, intuited, perceived or remembered.

Account for mental imagery in SEP.
Account for mental image in Wiki

Keep reading CPR. The answer is in it.

Impossible. — RussellA

The answer appears to have emanated from the situation of someone who misread, or haven't read CPR at all.

Reason in the CPR looks outwards to objects of reason not inwards to itself, which would be a logical impossibility. — RussellA

CPR is the critic on Pure Reason, explaining how it works with all those objects, and its limitations too. The only way that can be done is by Reason reflecting on itself.

In the case of imagining something, there is no object - I mean that unicorns don't exist and that it is misleading to suppose that when we imagine unicorns we necessarily see something unicorn-like. (When we imagine or remember visiting the Parthenon, we are not visiting the Parthenon). — Ludwig V

But doesn't it exist in your mind as a mental image? Oh you said you don't get mental images. I find it hard to accept. I mean how do you dream? Do you deny the existence of mental objects?

Surely you must see the mental images in your dream? OK, you say you only have linguistic and reasoning objects only, in your mind. But how do you dream linguistically?

Dangling pronouns cause problems — RussellA

The whole part of CPR is about reason reflecting on itself via critical thinking. :roll:

Perception will not bear the epistemological weight philosophers put on its shoulders. it needs help. — Banno

OK, that's fair enough. :)   But Austin shouldn't be afraid, or shy away from facing the contemporary criticisms and analyses on the points laid out in his works, if they are to be confirmed as having good grounds to stand on as a legitimate constructive philosophical methodology which must be a non-dogmatic and non nitpicking linguistic-quibble.

Even if it were an observation, should it not be backed with the evidence and verification, when requested or doubted on the ground of veridicality?

Anyhow if it were a mere observation, it loses validity, objectivity and factuality until it had been fully analysed, reasoned and verified.

Ok. That is what I believe in too. But I am not sure on the conclusion, if "Dropping either one altogether leads to irrationality." follows from the premies, or if it is a true conclusion. Therefore your argument might not be a valid one. What do you mean by "irrationality"?

No. — Banno

Could you explain the difference in the meanings between the two sentences in detail? Bearing in mind he never mentioned your 'ground for doubt'.

Why is that the question? — Banno

Have you not read Ludwig's post? I was asking against his points.

It most resembles 3, (the hallucination, except that, of course, you are not fooled, deluded) in that there is no dagger nor image of a dagger involved. Isn't that good enough reason to say they are not perceptions? — Ludwig V

Why not "What grounds do you have for doubt?" — Banno

Would it not be just the same question in different wording?

How can one be sure one is not fooled? or deluded?
There are even discussions in the Scientific theory symposiums where the scientists discuss how can you tell the Scientific knowledge is what the world really is, not the one imagines the world might be when all the Scientific researches, studies and experiments are based on the fallible human sense observations of the world.

Anyhow, what about the case of illusion where a folk sees an Oasis in the desert when there isn't one? The case of illusion when a folk sees a ghost, when there isn't one? Is there always clear distinction between delusion and illusion? How could you tell which perception is delusion, which one is illusion and which one was the real perception from the first order perspective?

Logically, how can something reflect on itself? — RussellA

Reason can reflect on itself.

Why should it?

There is a very clear distinction to be made between imagining a cup and pouring tea into it. And a long historical agreement that perception concerns the sense, and the objects in the world around us, and so is best contrasted, rather than confused, with imagination.

But even if you are inclined to hesitate at that distinction, it would be best to keep clear as to the difference between what is imagined and what isn't, lest one spill the tea. — Banno

You seem to have misunderstood me. I was not saying that seeing and imagining is the same thing.

I was saying that if delusions, illusions are regarded as a type of perception, then why shouldn't seeing mental images in memories, imaginations, thinking and intuitions be thought of as a type of perception too. It was a suggestion, not a claim.

I'm afraid I have a mild form of aphantasia. You can speak for yourself, but not for me. — Ludwig V

I tend to see mental images all the time, when I am remembering or imagining, even when I think of something, I can see images of the object I am thinking of.  

Even when I do gardening, before even starting the work, I would first imagine how it should look after the work, and commence the work as the images seen in my mind, and try to match the reality to the image, and it works better.

Maybe some people cannot see mental images as you said. Do your reasoning, thinking and linguistics  overrides the mental images that you try to see? I am not sure. I cannot imagine it. I am not sure what should be a normativity in this regard.

But I was wondering, Austin and Ayer, talk about perceptions in terms of delusions, illusions, hallucinations, and just ordinary visual perceptions, and they all occur in the realm of so called perception.  But why don't they include mental images we see during our remembering, imagining, thinking, and intuiting? That was my question.  

That's perfectly true. But those activities are not perception, so I'm not quite sure what your point is. — Ludwig V

The point is whether seeing an object in your mind, not in the external world should be included in perception. When you are not seeing the cup in the external world anymore, (having returned to your study room from the kitchen where the cup was), you could remember, think, imagine bringing the cup to your study room etc. You visualise the cup in your mind, and are seeing the mental images of the cup.

I suggest that Austin does not allow himself to be seduced by the cartesian sceptical argument into pursuing some perfectly assured certainty, which in the end destroys so much, but to notice that when things go wrong, there are ways of coping. Somewhat as, when you drive down a road, you have no assurance that the unexpected will not happen. But you are confident that you can deal with such incidents as and when they occur. That's particularly clear in his fourth point, that real is an adjuster word. — Ludwig V

When Austin keeps analysing the Delusion and Illusion case, he appears to be acknowledging the fact that perception has cases where it gives wrong perception rather than the real perception, which lacks certainty. Of course he is not talking about Cartesian certainty here.

I am not sure if Austin's extensive arguments on Delusion and Illusion were meaningful in his voracious attempt opposing Ayer's Sense-Datum concept. He could just have said that perceptions can lack certainty in certain cases.

I feel that perception doesn't end there, but it activates the other mental activities in the mind such as reasoning, judgement and imagination for the assured certainty on the perceived content, as well as being stored in the memory for later retrieval in the mind for the other mental activities such as analytic, synthetic and creative uses, or the motivation for actions.

And when the perceivers doesn't believe the perceived content has certainty, they will keep on trying to verify on the validity of the perception until reasonable certainty is available to them.

If not, they will be concluded as mistaken identity or illusion, or else conclude or be opened minded the perceived object as unknown or mysterious perception. In case of Delusion, perhaps the perceiver will never find out or acknowledge, if what the perceiver was seeing was delusion.

Yes, I agree with your point there.

I guess you would like the following quote from Austin: — javi2541997

Yes, I think when Austin goes on explaining about the usage of word "Real", even he was aware that our perception was not 100% immune from infallibility. There could be cases of illusion, hallucination, delusion, and confronting with the bogus objects which look like certain objects, but found out to be bogus, lookalikes, mistaken identities etc. Hence the contents of perception require further judgements of its "authenticity" to have assurance as legitimate knowledge. The word "Real" is a qualifier to mean that what was perceived is fit for authentic knowledge of our perception among the other uses of the word.

Cheers. I hope I made a good effort after all. — javi2541997

Great points. Thanks for your effort. :up: :cool:

It now seems to me that you have not understood what Austin is doing. I suggest a re-read. — Banno

Austin's English and writing style is very clear, so there is little possibility for misunderstanding what he was saying.  And all the points we have been discussing in the threads are also clear.  I have given out my arguments against yours.  You just need to give out yours.

:cool: :clap::100:

Yes, good point actually. But then does Austin defines what perception is? His analysis on Delusion and Illusion is interesting.

I feel what Austin was forgetting was that perception is a subject process. Perception happens in one's mind which has no access by other minds. But he keeps stating problems on Ayer's account on Sense-data, Delusion and Illusion from 3rd point of view.

Something is only Delusion and Illusion when you know that why the perceived object is either delusion or illusion from 3rd party point of view. To the perceiver who doesn't know why the object appears as it does, but appears as it does, it is how an object appears in his mind, and that is the perception. What is described by 3rd party mind as delusion or illusion is not the perception, but explanation of why it is not real perception. In other words, to Austin the bent straw was an illusion, but someone who doesn't know why it appears as bent, the bent straw is a legitimate perception until he knows why it appears as bent, but straight when taken out from the water.

When one finds out, that what he was perceiving was an illusion or delusion, then he would know that it was an illusion, but before that it was a perception. Therefore perception is not just seeing something, identifying an object as something, and the end. But it goes on to further mental certification and judgement process of confirmation, correction and reconfirmation.

Austin is at pains to make the point that our perceptions are sometimes direct, sometimes indirect, and that neither is always the case.And this is one of his arguments against the sense data view that all our perceptions are indirect.

Again, it now seems to me that you have missed a rather important part of the argument against sense data. — Banno

Ludwig V says that Austin might not have had any idea on Perception. In that case, I am wondering on what Philosophical ground Austin was opposing Sense-data theory apart from some ordinary people's linguistic uses of 1930-1950s in England.

According to what you are saying, if Austin had any theory of perception of his own, it would have been called "sometimes direct, sometimes indirect, and that neither is always the case"-ism. It sounds too mouthful, and is empty in content.

Quick search brings up Computational Theory of Perception.

If Austin was not a direct realist, then it would disappoint me. Because then it implies that he didn't even have his own belief in perceptual theory, but was just after attacking Sense-data theory on the basis of shallow linguistic perspective.

Not necessarily, but it does show that good ideas are universal. — RussellA

and timeless.

The question has a presupposition, which is in question. So it can't be answered. It's comparable to the traditional "Have you stopped beating your wife?" In this case, whether I answer yes or no, I commit to accepting that direct realism is a coherent possibility. — Ludwig V

Your statement is based on a fallacy of false dichotomy. Surely there are more perceptual theories than just the two. The question didn't presuppose anything. It could be the case that Austin had no idea on perception theories at all coming from a linguistic background.

In a sense, muons are things-in-themselves, postulated as empirical existences necessary to explain what is observed. — RussellA

Does it leads to a conclusion that modern QM is basing some of their theories and hypotheses on Kant's Thing-in-Itself?

I don't think the bit I bolded is right. Indeed, Austin is at pains to make the point that our perceptions are sometimes direct, sometimes indirect, and that neither is always the case.And this is one of his arguments against the sense data view that all our perceptions are indirect.

Again, it now seems to me that you have missed a rather important part of the argument against sense data. — Banno

Austin's claim seems to be devoid of good evidence or reasoning apart from the fact that it is revealing some aspect of perception from the perspective of the linguistic usages at the time when Austin was alive. I don't think the claim is a strong argument to say that Sense-Data theory is untenable. The claim seems not even relevant in opposing Sense-data theory.

Times have moved on more than a half century since "Sense and Sensibilia", and you must be aware that linguistic usage of so-called "ordinary people" changes considerably along with time.

You still have not answered the question on whether Austin was a direct realist or not. You must also realise that language is not perception. They are related, but one is not the other, and vice versa.

Say it is the case thing-in-itself is a name. What am I given by it? What does that name tell me?
— Mww

That it exists. — RussellA

Where does it exist?

Doesn't this imply that perception of sense data or perhaps "the sensed information" is direct perception? — Ludwig V

It implies that it is indirect.

Yes. The meaning of "direct" and "indirect" is determined by the context. The sense-datum theorist is like someone who insists that what we call the direct flight is actually indirect because it follows a route on the journey. That's a problem. — Ludwig V

Direct and indirect are just words i.e. adjectives and adverbs describing how perception worked. One can say, I can see it directly, indirectly, clearly, dimly, sharply, indubitably, lucidly, positively, distinctly, manifestly, conspicuously, translucently, unmistakably, evidently, or precisely, .... etc etc.

I had thought you had seen what Austin shows: that "direct" gets its use from "indirect". It seems that needs reinforcing. — Banno

My understanding was that "directly" was used to emphasise the fact that we don't perceive material things "directly", but perceive indirectly via sense-datum in Austin's book page 2. Austin gives out the classic general account of indirect perception, and says the issue is not trivial matter, and some people find it even "disturbing" on the account.

I was understanding that Austin dismisses the distinction between direct and indirect perception as not
meaningful, because he thinks perceptions are direct, although some perceptions are indirect such as when using binoculars or telescopes in visual perception.  I might have misunderstood the point. If so, please correct me, and confirm what is the case.

From my view, direct perception does not exist. All perception is indirect via sense data and sense-organ which carries the sensed information into the brain via sense organs.  Indirect or direct are just linguistic terms to mean that activities or motions are one to one link without any medium or stop off place between the subject and object, or there are ( in case of indirect processes).  Direct and indirect are not some essential properties of existence or entities as some folks seem to think.  We could easily have used "mediated" or "medium-less" instead of direct or indirect.

If I speak to you via phone, then I am speaking to you indirectly via phone.  If I speak to you face to face over a table, then I am speaking to you directly.  But we wouldn't even talk that way unless someone asked you "was your conversation direct or indirect i.e. via phone or video link?" No one would ask that type of questions in ordinary daily life of course. :)

Plane from London to Sydney is a direct flight, if it flies without stopping anywhere during flight, takes off from London and lands in Sydney then it is a direct flight.  If it stops in some other airports such as Dubai or Singapore, then it would be an indirect flight.

If asked how does smelling works, I would refer to the standard scientific account - I'm doing philosophy, so I don't know anything those scientists don't also know. But those accounts do not talk of direct and indirect smelling, except when they adopt a philosophical stance. — Banno

Scientists would definitely start with the sense organ Nose for their account of how smelling works. I am not sure if they would be interested in talking about direct or indirect smelling. I only gave my ideas on indirect smelling, because you asked for it. And that was just out of my impromptu reasoning on the indirect smelling case.

Smelling is different from visual perception, and it is more vague to think in terms of direct or indirect smelling.

But it tells you that smelling is definitely indirect perception because the object is the body, and what you are perceiving is the body scent. The body is a physical existence with mass and weight in space. The scent is a property emanated from the body with no physical properties at all. Your nose is inhaling the air mixed with the sense data of the body scent. If the perception was direct, then you couldn't smell it from the underwear on the floor, when you picked it up and sniffed it off, as the body was either in the shower or making breakfast in the kitchen.

Cool. In each example you give, you are able to set to clearly the indirect case that allows us to make sense of the direct case. — Banno

If you were asked who was smelling the body scent from the underwear, of course, you could say "I ( ) was smelling it directly from the underwear."

But if you were asked how does the smelling work, then I would expect you to say (if want to be reasonable), smelling works indirectly via the nose as the sense organ which is the main medium, and there was 2nd medium in this case (you could have more than one medium on perception) which was the underwear (because the scent was not originated from the underwear but from the body). The body scent you smelt was of course a sense-data.

These are not easy issues to work through. One thing that might help is remembering that sight is not the only sense, and that an account of how we perceive must wok as well for touch and smell as for vision.

So are you sure you understand how it works to touch something indirectly? To smell the coffee, indirectly?

I certainly don't. — Banno

Sure. Touching someone indirectly is possible. Think of a dermatology doctor wearing thin surgical rubber gloves, and performing skin examination of a patient. His specially manufactured surgical gloves are made so thin, almost transparent and super sentient to the doctor's hands so he can feel the parts of the skin being touched just like with skin to skin, but there is a barrier between his hands and the patient's skin being touched and examined.

Indirect smelling? Well as Austin said, there are various types of smelling too. Forget coffees.
Think of your partner's underwear. You used to smell the body scent from the body directly, but you can smell the body scent from the underwear when it was taken off and left on the bedroom floor on one lazy Sunday morning. You are smelling the body scent indirectly via the underwear.

There's a homunculus lurking here. — Banno

The research paper about the topic was in a Psychology and Neurology article. I remember reading it.