I am sorry but it does not make sense to say that physicalism has nothing to do with formal logic.
A great many physicalist philosophers have attempted to justify physicalism with formal logic.
That is just a fact my friend.
Sorry.

Man I don't have time to link you to all the author's that have made formal arguments for physicalism.

I thought your quibble was whether or not there is any deductive(a priori) method for justifying physicalism.

You should probably browse the entire article or skip to the references and begin browsing there for examples of the tradition of physicalism and formal logic.

Here.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/#PriPosPhy

Now answer my question.
How is that you believe there is no formal method for justification of physicalism yet you claim to be a physicalist?

I find it odd that you claim to be a physicalist yet insist there is no formal logic to support your position.

You are silly if you think there is no formal logic that justifies the position of physicalism ontology.

I have laid out the deductive reason why physicalism asserts the claims that it does.

When physics predicts results that have not been empirically verified it is because these predictions exist as a result of the formal logic.
This was what lead to the acceptance of GR in particular, the formal logic predicted things that were eventually empirically verified.
It more like a two way street.
We make formal logic models, and then verify them from observation and vice versa.

I will be honest, I have no interest in why you believe that what you said is valid.
It is irrelevant to any point I have made on this thread.

You said physicalism has nothing to do with formal logic.
That is demonstrably false.
The physical world is described with maths.
Hence formal logic has a great deal to do with physicalism.

Saying it does not is silly and I have no obligation to engage such an obvious falsehood.

Where it is not logically possible to doubt then there is an effective procedure to account.

Now now.
Be nice.
I don't give an example because it is not necessary to do so.
Physics is described with math (formal logics).
This is readily available fact for all.

Yes but if Chalmers is certain he has mental phenomena, then this can be reduced to an effective procedure for ac count on my view.

If red is undecidable then Chalmers should not know if he is or is not experiencing it.

Where he is sure that he does, logically entails an effective method.

Nonsense.

Well this is just silly because...yes it does.

Not just physics.
Again I pointed out that there are good deductive reasons for rejecting solipsism.

Do we draw a line in the sand and deny that color, sounds, smells, etc are really being experienced? — Marchesk

We have to draw a line somewhere.
If these things are decidable then there is a method for describing them mechanically.
So decidability is a great line to draw in the context of physicalism.
The trick is learning how nature accomplishes this in physical systems.
It is not an easy problem but there is no reason to assume it is the hard problem such that there is no avail.

If we can do that, then why stop there? What makes the objective world that we experience any more real? Why not deny that we experience shape, number, etc? — Marchesk

The objective world is just about accessible information.
For the physicalist subjective and objective are not mutually exclusive terms and physicalism does not approach explanations of phenomena under the assumption that these terms are mutually exclusive.

It potentially undermines itself, or at the very lest, is inconsistent. What is being done is deciding that certain experiences are real, and the rest are not even experienced. — Marchesk

I must admit I do not follow you here.
I don't understand why how this is the case?

Except that physicalism explains reality with formal logic.

Really I don't want to spend my time refuting solipsism.
You can conjectured that is the case if you want.
But of course you cannot logically found that solipsism is a necessary truth.

No I am saying it is not possible to abstract anything from elusive subjective access.
This would lead to an infinite regress from ill definition.
If it were necessarily the case that this were true it would lead to self recursion.

If self recursion is not the case then we can be logically certain that it is not the case that there is only exclusively subjective access.

If you are not then you have no well formed logical method to define self.
You would not be able to distinguish self from not self.

Actually you have it backwards.
Subjectivity is abstracted from a necessary objectively existent dichotomy.

There is the self, and the not self.

Were it not so that these are necessarily distinct things it is not logically possible to arrive at either subjective or objective.

As sure as you are that there is self, you are necessarily just as sure that there is a not self.

Yes being logically certain entails and effective procedure.
If there is no logical room for doubt there is method such that you can decide without error.

All these arguments are undermined by any claim that there is certainty beyond logical doubt that mental phenomena exist.
If there is such a certainty there is an effective procedure for deciding.

That is the point.
When we claim there is no logical grounds for doubt this entails an effective procedure.
Descartes showed that to doubt existence would be a logical contradiction.
Where there is no existence there is no doubt.
If there is doubt then there is existence.
To doubt entails that something must that doubts.

How do I know I exist? How can I be sure? — Marchesk

If I am certain that you exist, it is because there is an effective procedure such that it is not logically possible to doubt that you exist.

How do I know that I think? What makes thinking any different than experience with existential questions?

I experience therefore I am. That's just as good. — Marchesk

If there is no room for logical doubt this will entail that there is an effective procedure for deciding.

You might ask me to logically argue for being self-aware. But that would be silly. — Marchesk

I guess philosophy is just silly that way!
8-)

Again how do you know you are having them?
How can you be sure?

Descartes has already demonstrated that there is a logical method for being sure you exist.
That you are not subjectively aware of a method is not equal to therefor it just is.

Yes having no full and complete account is very different from having no account.

I agree physicalism does not have a full and complete account of mental phenomena.

But like I said there is no reason to assume that there can be no full or complete account, or rather it is not logically necessary to assume this.

But there is no logical argument for the raw fact that you have experiences. You just have them, and then at some point, encounter different arguments for why and what they are. And then maybe make your own version of them. — Marchesk

Yes that does not address the issue of your knowledge of mental phenomena that simply are.
How to you know they simply are?
If you can't not know they simply are, for the physicalist, this is equal to saying there exists some effective procedure which decides mental phenomena.
That you are subjectively aware of that effective procedure is how to account for the perception that mental phenomena just are.

Seems like a topic for another thread maybe.

No, do you? How does that work? You form an argument and then experiences pop out with the conclusion? — Marchesk

Then you cannot actually claim you are logically certain you are having them.
If you are sure then you must appeal to some other method, and the burden of proof is not on the physicalist.

There's a logical argument for what constitutes mental phenomena, but that I experience seeing red, etc is not an argument. — Marchesk

Again that you are seeing red is either decidable or it is not.
If it is decidable, then the physicality appeals to an effective procedure as the account for red.
If it is undecidable then you are not sure you are seeing red.
Or there is the appeal to other method for deciding the existence of red, which again is not the physicist's burden of proof.

My entire point here is that physicalist do have an account for mental phenomena, and that the skeptics can disagree with that account to be sure, but what they would be in error if they said that mental phenomena is inexpiable for the physicalist and the physicalist has no account for them.

Physicalism claims that the account for mental phenomena is an effective procedure because mental phenomena is decidable.

The same sort of thing could be said of external objects. An idealist could turn your argument on it's head and claim that material objects are undecidable for the physicalist. — Marchesk

I don't follow sorry.

I disagree that this something to be logically determined. My experiences would be the premises one starts with to make a logical argument. It's not something to be argued for. There is no line of reasoning I follow to logically determine that I see red. I just see red and am aware of it. That's where logical argument can begin, but not before then. — Marchesk

So you don't use logic to know if you have experiences or not?

I don't need to determine that I have experiences. I have experiences, period. What do those experiences amount to? That's something which can possibly be determined by logical argument, but not that I have them. — Marchesk

So there is no logical method for deciding if you do or do not have mental phenomena?

Now whether you have experiences which I don't have (as an extension of my experiences) is something which can and has been argued ad nauseam. But notice that the solipsist need not and cannot make an argument for their own experiences. They just are. It's brute. — Marchesk

Or it is possible that there is some logical method for determining your experiences, but it is simply not within your subjective awareness, and thus seems to be brute when in fact it would be an effective logical method.

I also don't agree with the notion that because mental phenomena just are, no unpacking necessary, that therefor there is an issue for physicalism.
That would actually be an issue for those making the claim that mental phenomena just are.

You mean there is no objective method. Subjectively, I know that mental phenomena exist, because I experience it. That's how I can know with certainty that nobody else can be a solipsist, to the extent one takes solipsism seriously. — Marchesk

No, I mean there is no logical method if it is undecidable.

You mean to be sure other people have mental content? Because again, I experience my thoughts, my perspective, my dreams, etc. Whatever mental content are, I have them, and I cannot doubt that I have these experiences, however one wishes to categorize them. — Marchesk

To say you are definitively aware of experiencing your thoughts, to physicalist, is no different from saying there is an effective method for being certain about the existence of your thoughts.
That is to say that thoughts are decidable.
If they are not decidable that poses problems for physicalism sure, it would mean that we cannot
logically determine if we experience intentional states.
But it would also be a problem for everyone else as well.

You mean what can be objectively known. Here is a potential problem for physicalism. It beings with objectivity, which means factoring out our individual subjective experiences. This works great for science. But it has the one big problem of turning around and explaining subjectivity, because at the start, subjectivity was removed. — Marchesk

There would be no logical method to decide, subjectively or objectively, that we have experiences.
If there is a logical method for deciding the existence of experiences and intentional states then there is no issue for physicalism.

In Lockean terms, you get rind of color, sounds, smells, etc to explain the world in terms of number, shape, extension, etc. That's great until you need to account for our having colors, smells, etc. — Marchesk

If a color or smell is undecidable then how could you be certain you were experiencing colors or smells?
If you can be certain physicalism assumes this means these things are decidable and that therefor an effective mechanical procedure is the account.
Sure it would be more interesting if we imagine that there is something else going on, but no breakthroughs in methodology exist to warrant such speculation, it is simply a speculation for speculations sake.
There is no issue for a physicalist because if you can be certain about these things, then that means these things are decidable, which means that there is an effective mechanical procedure to account for that decidability.

That leaves two options, these things are not decidable, a problem for the physicalist and everyone else.
Or there is some other method for decidable problems in new formal systems of logic as of yet undiscovered, an unnecessary assumption at this point.

How does one derive smell from number? Is there a mathematical equation for experience? Do you now what sort of algorithm would enable a machine to experience the sweet smell of rose? — Marchesk

The answer is simple.
How does one know for certain if there is a smell such that this question is answered definitively yes or no?
The only currently known method for this is with an effective procedure of finite steps.
Or decidability.
If there is no effective method and a smell is an undecidable thing, then this is not simply an issue for physicalism, it is an issue for anybody claiming that they smell.
If smell was undecidable you would not actually know if you smell or not.

For a physicalist saying that you know for certain that you smell is the logical equivalent of saying there is an effective method for deciding that you smell.

You can conjecture that decisions about the existence of intentional states and/or experiences is undecidable from current understandings in logic, sure.
It is probably more interesting than the physicalist position, sure.
But it certainly isn't logically necessary to speculate thus, at least not at this point.

oops, I did not read the last bit of your post carefully enough...sorry

Physicalism assumes that all mental phenomena is strictly mechanical, if intentionality is a mental phenomena then it is also, by default, a physical phenomena.
This means there is some effective mechanical procedure.

What physicalism does not do fully, yet, is give a complete account of all mental phenomena.

However this should not be a hard problem (it simply means reverse engineering the mechanisms of the brain that produce mental phenomena and intentional states, so I guess kind of a hard problem but not the hard problem).
That is to say if you can be sure that you have mental phenomena there must be some effective mechanical procedure for arriving at that conclusion without error.
If there is not such an effective mechanical procedure then you cannot actually arrive at the conclusion without error.

For physicalism there is no issue, all mental phenomena has an effective mechanical procedure.
Of course this remains a assumption at this point and will remain so until a full account of mental phenomena is arrived at.

But if there is not an effective mechanical procedure for all mental phenomena this would be quite a difficult philosophical problem.
It would mean that our own mental phenomena is undecidable and there is no way for formal logic to assail the issue.

Note that if mental phenomena and intentional states are undecidable then there is no method for concluding that those phenomena or states exist.
It would be undecidable as it were, so being sure that they exist, physicalism assumes, is the same as being sure there is an effective mechanical procedure to determine that existence.

For any problem that has a definite yes or no answer there is an effective mechanical procedure for resolving that issue.
If mental phenomena has no effective mechanical procedures then it should not be possible to say...
Determine with certainty that you have intentional states...for example.
If you can determine that you have intentional states then there is an effective mechanical procedure for doing so.

The physicalist answer to the question of intentionality is actually philosophically boring, it assumes that there is some mechanical process at work that can effectively produce mental phenomena.

It would be more interesting, to be sure, if we imagine that something else is the case and then still presume that intentional states can be arrived at without any effective procedure.
If there were some other method for achieving this that would be quite a remarkable breakthrough indeed.

However no such breakthrough has been discovered so, philosophically, physicalist proceed with what we can know based on current methods.

off topic but
what is your avatar pic of?

Well it's not just ruthlessness, greed, and ambition.
There are plenty with these traits that don't make it to the top.

So I think there has to be something more to it than just these things.

I think so yeah.
In the west you don't have to be born wealthy or powerful to attain wealth or power.
And in the west they tend to value upward mobility.
I suppose you could say this is something of a soft spot for the underdog.

I would not say it is the liberal view to "revile anyone who has self-love and to teach that the proper mode is to be poor, helpless, and full of self-loathing."

Many liberals are wealthy and or in positions of power themselves for one.

I think the liberal resentment of the wealthy has to do with the percentage of their income that they spend on taxes.
Compared to middle and lower classes they pay significantly less.
The wealthy often earns money from capital gains for example, and the rate at which capital gains are tax compared to wage earners is significantly less.
So yeah there is resentment there.
There is also resentment concerning environmental issues.
That large corporations can have a much larger impact on the environment than individuals but then argue that they should not also have a much larger legal obligation because of that capacity.