Interesting. I find that the orgasms in a smoothly functioning monogamy are pretty reliably great. On the other hand, the anticipation and pre-orgasm sex act aren't on the same level as the first few acts with a compatible new partner. I can't think of a better experience than that first unveiling and 'possession' of an enthusiastic participant who is exactly one's physical/visual type.

Yes, there is some difference in our positions. I can't speak for everyone, but I think idealizations during the sex act sometimes help prop up monogamy. There's an old country song ('Don't Close Your Eyes') that speaks to concerns about this. And there is the old way of marketing porn in terms of a 'marital aid.'

The real McCoy is quite good but often it fails to exceed expectations, anticipations.

We chase the fleshy dragon in reality, but we can only ever catch it again in our dreams. — VagabondSpectre

Indeed. The act of seduction and its anticipations is so stimulating that some, I believe, sabotage every stable situation resulting from successful seduction to repeat that initial excitement. As you imply, that excitement is founded on projection and therefore ignorance. Successful monogamy seems to me to involve a trading of excitement for security.

And we might also ask about the degree to which fantasy invades actual sex. I've known some who claim not to fantasize at all during sex acts, but I'm inclined to believe that many supplement the sensual happening with an imaginative frame.

On a more general note, I think becoming wary of one's projections is a large part of the maturation process.

I'm the kind of person who is interested in the results irrespective of whether they're seen as good or bad - whether it's a cure for cancer or a meteorite that's going to wipe us out at some point in the future. — Sapientia

I very much relate to this. For me intellectual heroes often have an 'amoral' edge. They are willing to think beyond the morality of their community ('evil' thinking) and/or immerse themselves in studies with no immediate application (aesthetic or curiosity-driven thinking).

Can you give an example of one or more of those cases where you think that "we" have the sense of choice? I for one do not have any genuine sense of choice with respect to what I believe, and I'm certainly not the only one like this. — Sapientia

All I intend is the state of mind in which we are really not sure what is going on. Imagine a person who hosts a party and then can't find something valuable afterward. Did someone steal it? Or is this just coincidence? Now they have the choice of whether to ask embarrassing questions. I can imagine a person spending a few angst hours on this decision. More examples are a person trying to figure out whether they should or should not go to grad school or ask a female friend about becoming romantic or a boss for a raise. Illusion or not, the burden of decision seems pretty real to me.

I do see, of course, that many of our beliefs are beyond our control.

In closing I feel that what America needs is to approach this problem from the point of addressing the emotional needs of men, as men. Not with programs originally intended for women, or cookie cutter systems. People need to wake up and realize that men have emotional needs that are distinctly different than those of women. — Antaus

I suggest shifting from politics (what America should do) to what you personally can do. In my view, the millions and millions of other Americans are more or less going to do what they are going to do. It's presumably easier to adapt personally to your local situation. I speak as someone who once took politics more seriously.

I never quite understood the interpretation of Heraclitus as the "weeping philosopher." — Erik

I bet he glowered, but I also bet he was happy in there.

H goes from that insight to the idea that we must always start from somewhere within the hermeneutic circle. — frank

The way I tend to understand this is that language itself is another 'bike' most of the time. It is 'transparent' while we use it. When we double back on our own language to question it, the questioning language is 'transparent' while the questioned language has become translucent or opaque.

Can any of us remember 'fading in' to this basic knowhow. I sure can't. For me the fact of always already possessing this We-dependent-knowhow is our thrown-ness into the hermeneutic circle.

I have a question, is it right to pick beliefs regardless of accuracy if they make you a better, more functional person? — AlmostOutlier

What comes to my mind is how accuracy is entangled with beliefs that make us better and more functional. Why do we care about accuracy in the first place? Would we care about being scientific and rational if we didn't associate these things with physical and moral positive results?

Others have (accurately I think) mentioned that we don't get to pick many of our beliefs. In this context I think it's pretty clear that you intend those cases where we have the sense of choice. To me this sense of choice is 'free will' enough, though I believe there are other arguments against determinism. Assuming that determinism is a sufficiently meaningful/specified position to be true or false, I've never been bothered by the idea that all is predetermined. In fact, I think it has its attractions --as long as we are indeed mortal as I think we are.

This a perspective Heiddeger shared with Kierkegaard. It means that the conscious me is understood to ____ from a mindless state of established practices. I left the verb blank because I'm not sure how to describe it. — frank

This is a great theme too. I think of the 'I' emerging from the 'We' both ecstatically and anxiously (like a little boy wandering away from his mother to explore or demonstrate independence?)

So this would be a way to address the relationship between logic and the world: we actually don't use logic for most of the actions we take...
Driving a car or riding a bike are obvious examples of mindless action. — frank

Hi. Great examples. The following may not at all be new to you, but in that case we can at least enjoy sharing awareness/agreement.

What do we know when we know how to ride a bike with no hands, for example? It is not propositional or linguistic knowledge. It is 'knowhow.'

And how does the bike exist for this knowhow? I don't think we can capture that propositionally either. Sometimes the bike is 'transparent.' I forget about it and look at the fox I saw tonight on my ride. Sometimes there's an obstacle to look out for, and I am conscious of the bike as I carefully turn it without using my hands. But the no-longer-transparent bike is not tranformed into a theoretical object but rather into a tool consciously employed.

Is the same true for personality? Is the 'true' philosophy a knowhow as opposed to a knowthat? Of course we need plenty of knowthats in life, but perhaps you see what I'm getting at. The philosophers for whom practice was primary and the supporting theory of that practice secondary come to mind.