Physical" means now the reality it calls to mind now. Its meaning may change over time (and has), but the present paradigms are based on our conceptual space as it now exists. Changing paradigms involves redefining our conceptual space, and a consequent redefinition of terms such as "physical" and "natural." — Dfpolis

I don't think it requires redefining "physical" and "natural", it means reconsidering the nature of our thoughts. A visual image is something distinct from the object seen, it's a functionally accurate representation of the object. In general, our conceptual basis for a thought is based on the way things seem to be, but the seemings may be illusory. It seems as if a concept is a mental object, but when employed in a thought, it may more accurate to describe it as a particular reaction, or memory of a reaction: process and feeling, rather than object.

Like the problem of distinguishing self-data from object-data, this seems to intimate that we have a ca­pacity to grasp intelligibility that is not fully modeled in our present understanding. — Dfpolis

I agree with this, and suggest this may just mean we have a problematic paradigm. E.g. reference to "information" seems problematic, because information connotes meaning, and meaning entails (conscious) understanding - which seems circular, and it doesn' seem possible to ground these concepts in something physical. That doesn't prove mind is grounded in the nonphysical, it may just be an inapplicable paradigm.

Consciousness is that which mediates between stimulus and response. As such, we should consider the evolution of consciousness from the simplest (direct stimulus-response), to increasing complexity, and develop a paradigm that can be applied to the development of mediation processes. As far as I know, this has not been done.

The threat I am referring to, is the inability for human beings to find activities that suitably pass the time. — Jhn4

Mankind has invented this forum. Problem solved.

when do we require new technology? When do we decide that the human race has reached stagnation and cannot collectively produce new 'content' to keep itself fresh?...
...I would argue that we are reaching that stage in history now, and that it poses a threat to our existence, and it is an emergency that needs tackling. — Jhn4

What threat(s) to our existence are you referring to?

The hypothesis needs further testing. I suggest you help elect Bernie Sanders to test whether the stress this induces in conservatives results in their bearing more females.

If true, it's ironic that Trump - the womanizer - is the cause of more women.

That’s right. The issue is this should be self-evident and the problem is people just don’t understand the words. — Zelebg

I think it's a product of the pedagogy of mathematics, physics, logic and some related fields. We're taught that triangles and laws of physics (expressed as equations) exist. This leads us to speak of them that way, and this leads to treating them as ontic, and not just as a manner of speaking.

From the point of view of a mathematician or physicist doing his normal work, it doesn't matter. It's convenient to treat them as existing, as a methodological principle. But when mathematician's and physicists conflate the methodological semantics with ontological claims, they've gone too far.

Again, your definition of what exists is too narrow. — Wayfarer

I disagree with describing it "narrow". It is parsimonious, but leaves nothing unaccounted for. It's reasonable to methodologically treat abstractions as independent existents, but that utility does not depend on an ontological commitment.

Emphasis on the qualifier "independent", because this parsimonious ontology doesn't deny the existence of triangles and right angles, it just denies that they exist independently of the things that have those properties. The angles between the walls of my bedroom are 90 degrees - and this angle does actually exist, just not independently of the walls. Many other things have this exact same property, and that's why "having a 90 degree angle" is a universal.

My issue is that there's no good reason to assume "90 degree angle" exists independent of the things that have it. Sure, we can think abstractly about this property without considering the things that have it, and that's a product of our powers of abstraction.

If you don't accept my premise about parsimony (that we should minimize the ontological furniture), then you are free to assume "90 degree angle" actually is an independently existing Platonic entity. But you would need to account for the relation between this entity and the items that exhibit it.You also need to distinguish between abstractions that actually exist (like "90 degree angle") and fictions that exist only within minds (single minds, or even many minds) - fictions like Spider-Man.

you could explain it through a simple mathematical formula (time= distance/speed). And as such, we are back to abstracts. Mathematical abstracts.

Are they real? (Where do they come from, a priori.) How is this phenomenon even possible? — 3017amen

Distance exists in the real world as an ontic relation between two objects (two states of affairs) separated in space. Time exists as an ontic relation between two events (two states of affairs) separated in time. Considered apart from their respective objects, distance and time are abstractions - mental objects, that can be abstractly mapped to numbers, which we can mentally manipulate mathematically - computing such things as ratios (distance/time = speed).

Does it really make more sense to suggest the relations exist independently, and the states of affairs that exhibit them have some sort of ontic relation to those platonic objects?
— Relativist

I believe so. Don't overlook the fact that the current model of the so-called fundamental constituents of matter, the so-called 'particle zoo', is a mathematical model. — Wayfarer

Mathematical models don't entail the independent existence of platonic entities.

Consider the simple case of the relations between electrons and protons. How do we account for these with platonic entities? We'd have an electron with some sort of ontic relation to the abstract object "-1 electric charge", and the proton has an ontic relation to the abstract object "+1 electric charge", and then these abstractions have an "attraction relation" between them. It is simpler to simply assume the attraction relation exists between electrons and protons by virtue of their respective intrinsic properties (their electric charge). This account minimizes the number of ontic entities, and does not constrain our ability to reason and do math.

what is the status of the definition? I would have thought that triangles would be discovered in all possible worlds, in other words, their reality is not dependent on our definition of it, but our definition of it must conform to the concept

The definition of triangle is not impacted, just the ontology behind it. There are states of affairs that have triangularity among the constituents. We can mentally consider the property "triangular" while ignoring the other details of the object, but that doesn't require the abstract object "triangle" to be ontic. It's a semantic convenience, and has the utility of allowing us to do the math,but we can do the math witthout making an ontological commitment to them.

, you're assuming a reality independent of any observing mind, but that assumption might be philosophically problematical, i.e. it might not be as self-evident as you're assuming it to be. — Wayfarer

Yes, I'm assuming a reality independent of the observing mind; i..e. I deny solipsism. But this belief is not a deduction, it's just an articulation of a component of our intrinsic (not deduced) view of the world. While it's possibly false, that mere possibility is not adequate grounds to undercut the belief in an external world - a belief that is directly derived from considering our hard-wired relation to that world.

This is about ontology- what actually exists, and we should not be promiscuous with our assumptions about what exists. Triangularity still exists, and we can still reason with triangles (as well-defined mental objects) without adding them to the furniture of the world.

OK, so you think it extremely important that people start taking Medicare for All seriously. I presume you believe that this provides the optimal path toward its eventual adoption. That's debatable. There's a very real chance that a public option for Obamacare will pass if a Democrat is elected, and that also paves the way toward an eventual Medicare for All. The hope would be that the public option proves to be the best option, and the others fade away. So it's debatable as which direction will have the more positive long term effect, and in either case - the public option (along with additional structural changes that are needed) will do good.

What's not debatable is the consequence of Trump continuing: not only will you not get "Medicare for All" in the discussion, you risk taking a step backward - eliminating Obamacare. Consider that the Supreme Court has agreed to review the law for Constitutionality in the next term, which will be after the election. If Trump is elected, the Solicitor General will be arguing to eliminate it. If a Democrat is elected, there will be a Solicitor General defending Obamacare. There's also a good chance they can restore it to Constitutionality (it could be as simple as reinstating the fee/"tax" for failing to have coverage, which Republicans zeroed out).

I see. If I understood you correctly then there are such things as second-order abstract objects e.g. tesseract. However zero and infinity are first-order abstractions in my opinion; so they should have concrete instantiations. — TheMadFool

Zero is second order: it is conceived as a negative fact, like removing the apples from a basket, one by one, ultimately leaving 0 apples. Negative facts are indirect - they don't tell us what IS, they tell us a subset of what isn't. One refers to 0 apples in this example only because of the psychological context - we're considering apples. Although the basket has no apples, it may contain oranges and orangutans. It is the indirect nature of negative facts that makes them second order.

I agree it can't be completed and my intuition on the matter may be off the mark but consider this: I sometimes see only part of a person, say when that person is behind a tree or low wall but that doesn't mean the person doesn't exist does it? — TheMadFool

Consider how the notion of infinity is manifested in your counting example. Counting is a process. There is no infinity at any identifiable step of the process. Rather, infinity manifests as the process itself, one that never ends - and process is not an existent. It's still a reasonable way to conceive of a potential infinity, but this conception doesn't work for an actual infinity - including a past infinity. A conception for an actual infinity cannot be some ongoing process. It would entail a COMPLETED process.

You do realize that Medicare for All will not pass even if Sanders is elected, right? Are you just interested in getting the idea taken seriously, with the hope this will catch on over time?

If you mean this article, then it doesn't say that, and it would be pretty incredible if it did, because the best established cosmological model to date implies an infinitely extended universe without the assumption of an infinite past. Note that the article spends considerable time talking about inflation, which is less well established than standard Big Bang cosmology, but inflation doesn't imply what you claim either. — SophistiCat

The article states: "In fact, unless inflation went on for a truly infinite amount of time, or the Universe was born infinitely large, the Universe ought to be finite in extent." I admit I was only addressing the first possibility, but the second possibility remains just a brute fact assumption.

Physics analysis can't apply an arbitrary limit, so they must start with an absence of boundaries. That does not establish the existence of an actual infinity, it just indicates that the physics entails no boundary.

As for your first order/second order abstractions, that's something completely different. I won't go further than just to say that I am not buying your epistemological construction. — SophistiCat

At least you see it's different. I consider rational belief to require rational justification, and logical consistency seems inadequate as a rational justification. 90-dimensional cube analogues are logically consistent, but there's no rational basis for believing they exist in objective reality.

I was talking about spatial extension. Simply put, if space is infinite, which seems plausible from what we know, and if the rest of it looks much like what we can see around us, which is very plausible, then there's your actual infinity (if by that you mean an infinite number of material objects). — SophistiCat

The first article showed that, according to accepted physics, spatial extension can only be infinite if there is an infinite past - that's why I focused on past time.

Smith does address the sort of argument that you are hinting at in his section VI:

the collection of events cannot add up to an infinite collection in a finite amount of time, but they do so add up in an infinite amount of time. And since it is coherent to suppose that in relation to any present an infinite amount of time has elapsed, it is also coherent to suppose that in relation to any present an infinite collection of past events has already been formed by successive addition.
— Smith, Infinity and the Past — SophistiCat

This does not apply to my claim. Sure, it's coherent - his statement entails no logical contradiction, but it circularly assumes the infinity exists, and it is that assumption that I challenge. The concept of infinity is a second order abstraction - an extrapolation of first order abstractions. (see the last paragraph of my last response to TheMadFool). A 90-dimensional analogue of a cube is an extrapolation of a cube. It could be described coherently, and consistent mathematical inferences could be made- nevertheless, this does not justify believing there exist objects of the world that correspond to it (there would actually have to exist 90 spatial dimensions). The general lesson is that we should be suspicious of second order abstractions - the mere fact that they have logicallly coherent properties does not establish their having real-world instantiations. Something more than logical coherence is needed to justify believing it.

I hope you see that my argument is purely epistemological, and specifically concerns whether or not belief in an actual infinity is justifiable.

What I'm aware of is this: every abstract idea is basically mined from the concrete.Your numerical example is perfect for demonstrating that: an idea pulled out of sets/collections of concrete objects. If so then zero must be an abstraction of sets that contain no members. Infinity, being more of a concept than an actual number, is to me, simply an extension of finite concrete sets, understandable in terms of the never-ending process of adding elements, say adding 1 to the preceding element, to a preexisting set. — TheMadFool

Your suggesting that: since concrete objects entail abstract objects, that all abstract objects entail concrete objects. That does not follow; it commits the fallacy of affirming the consequent.

First order abstractions are formed by considering multiple objects of the world that have some common features, and mentally discarding the features that distinguish them. Second order abstractions are mentally constructed by extrapolation of first order absteactions - they don't necessarily have instantiations in the real world. Consider extrapolating from squares to cubes, to tesseracts, and beyond to higher dimensional analogues of cubes. They can only exist in the world if the world actually has that number of spatial dimensions.

I say that such an assertion implicitly pre-supposes a division between the 'real world' which is presumed to exist independently of any conceptual framework, and the purported 'internal world' of ideas, concepts and abstractions, but that this division is really a false dichotomy. — Wayfarer

Yes, I assume that the images in our mind are different from the objects beyond our minds. Only you have access to your mind's contents; the content is subjective, and it comes to exist solely through mental activity, and ceases to exist when your mind ceases to exist (or sooner; you don't remember all the details of all your past experiences). This is different from objects of the external world, which exist independent of minds - they have objective existence.

And the problem with your theory of numbers, is that it fails to account for the 'unreasonable efficacy of mathematics in the natural sciences' — Wayfarer

The objects of the world are states of affairs whose constituents have relations to one another, and these relations can be described mathematically. I'm not saying the rekations don't exist, I'm just saying they don't exist independently of the states of affairs in which they are instantiated.

Does it really make more sense to suggest the relations exist independently, and the states of affairs that exhibit them have some sort of ontic relation to those platonic objects? The efficacy of math is not dependent on it.

The abstraction "triangle" that exists in your brain is spatially located in your brain, so it is not the identical object located in my brain.
— Relativist

It is no more ‘located in the brain’ than actors are located inside televisions. Rather a rational mind is able to recognize such concepts which however are not dependent on being recognized in order to be real. — Wayfarer

Each TV has its own set of pixel producing devices, and while you and I may perceive nearly identical images, the images in my brain are in MY brain, not yours.

Abstactions like triangles are well defined, that's why we can each consider objects with triangular properties, and engage in the way of abstraction. That does not entail the independent existence of the abstraction, "triangle".

Infinity exists for the simple reason that if you were to task me to write down all the natural numbers then that would be an instantiation of infinity in the real world. — TheMadFool

You have described an uncomp!etable task,not an existent.

If I had 5 pennies in my wallet and I gave you all of them then my empty wallet is a real-world instantiation of zero. — TheMadFool

Negative facts do not establish what exists.

As I see it, the concrete precedes the abstract, the latter being derived from the former. Doesn't it follow then that "all" abstract objects will invariably be instantiated in a concrete object? — TheMadFool

As I see it, the concrete precedes the abstract, the latter being derived from the former. Doesn't it follow then that "all" abstract objects will invariably be instantiated in a concrete object? — TheMadFool

We can abstractly consider geometrical objects of 4 or more dimensions. That doesn't imply such things exist in the world.

It depends on what you mean by exist doesn't it? From what I gather existence to you has to be physical - tangible and perceivable through the senses. Existence so defined implies nothing of the mind, let alone numbers, exists. The onus then is on you to show us why you're specifically concerned about infinity and zero. What about their nonexistence is nontrivial? — TheMadFool

I'm not insisting that only physical objects have existence - I'm open to other possibilities, but I suggest we should be parsimonious in our assumptions of what actually exists in the world. I'd be fine accepting the existence of angels and devils despite being immaterial, if their existence is needed to explain some aspect of the world. I accept the existence of mental objects (exactly what they are depends on what the nature of mind is). On the other hand, abstract objects (all of them, not just infinity and zero) ostensibly exist independently of minds. Where are they? Why include them an an ontology? They aren't causally efficacious, and they can be accounted for without assuming they are components of the world. We need to treat them as existing when doing math, but this utility doesn't force us to treat them as actual, independent components of the world. Math works just fine even if they're just useful fictions.

If one apple exists on a table there is one apple. If zero apples exist on a table there are zero apples. zero exists. — christian2017

Only in your mind, because you're considering the possible presence of apples on the table. Suppose there were oranges and bananas on the table. The negative fact (there are no apples on the table) provides no information about what DOES exist on the table.

There are no more truths than those entailed by the conjunction of all positive truths, so negative truths are redundant.

The article says quite clearly, and more than once, that we don't know whether the universe is spatially finite or infinite. We can estimate a lower bound on its size, but not an upper bound. The simplest topology consistent with our observations at large scales is an infinite, flat space; this is what the most common current cosmological model posits (so-called FLRW model). However, there are also closed topologies that are consistent with the same observations. — SophistiCat

Physics will never be able to prove the past is infinite, all it can possibly do is to show that no past boundary of time has been found.

As for your conceptual anti-infinitist argument, this is an old and surprisingly persistent confusion. Quentin Smith had a nice analysis of this and several other such arguments in a 1987 paper Infinity and the Past.

Thanks for the article. I'd seen it a few years ago, but forgot about it. However, it does not address my argument.

My argument is in the spirit of David Conway’s, in that I utilize the concept of completeness. However, Smith’s refutation doesn’t apply to my argument. I’m not making the bold claim that an infinite past is logically impossible, I simply claim that there’s no conceptual basis for considering it POSSIBLE, and therefore it’s more rational to reject it. An infinite past entails the completion of a sequential process of infinitely many steps, each of which is of finite duration. How can an infinity of days become completed? Our concept of an infinite future entails a process that never ends. This concept isn’t reversible to the past because the past has ended. All Smith does is to assert the past can be mapped to the (infinite) set of negative numbers – a logical relation, that doesn’t account for the process.

I’m not sure if that article makes one interesting distinction about the abstraction algorithm called “visual perception”. There are colors, clearly an abstraction of who knows what order, but then, there are lines and shapes, and countable discrete things, not quite abstracted, but rather mapped kind of directly. — Zelebg

Setting aside the question of what quailia are, colors are first order - we consider objects that are red, and abstract redness from the memory of those perceptions. The geometrical figure "line" is second order - we may envision a drawing of a line on a page, which is imperfectly straight, and 3-dimensional, and imagine its ideal form as one dimensional. A similar process with 2 dimensional objects.

We form concepts about countable discrete things and extrapolate, but these things can also be abstracted directly from something discrete.

One of my focuses is whether or not physicalism is true. Each of the 4 questions you raised are pertinent to that question. If physicalism is true:
1) the Star Trek transporter will definitely kill you, and then create a replica.
2) p-zombies are possible (I think)
3) objective moral values are not existents, so you need to explore psychology, sociology and evolution to understand why most of us don't want to boil babies alive (btw, I prefer my veal to be grilled).
4) existence (rather than nothingness) may be a brute fact, which may not be satisfying - but does that justify choosing an answer (e.g. "God") just because it doesn't leave you hanging?

The ontological status of abstractions is pertinent to physicalism, because they aren't physical, but abstractions don't actually falsify physicalism because they can be accounted for in the Aristotelian way, as I'm doing: they exist in their instantiations, but do not have independent existence apart from these other than as mental objects.
.

While it is true that abstract concepts only exist in minds as mental entities, minds themselves have no other source of information than the actuality of the external world, so they are all ultimately grounded or abstracted from the real world and are really only extrapolations and variations on the theme provided by the universe itself. — Zelebg

Indeed the Way of Abstraction is grounded in the real world: first order abstractions are mental creations formed by considering several similar (actually existing objects) and omitting all features except for those held in common. Second order abstractions are formed by extrapolating from first order abstractions - they are abstractions of abstractions, and these are not grounded in existing objects (unless they can also be formed in first-order fashion).

As far as we can see integer numbers are instantiated or mapped to the real world, how do you find it reasonable to assume this relation abruptly stops above some very large number or below number one? — Zelebg

I was referring to that fact that infinity is not a number that is mapped to. That fact doesn't entail an upper bound.

And yet, if space is finite, it's contents are finite - which would entail some upper bound. Current physics indicates that space, and its contents, extends in space through a temporal process (described here). This means the extent can only be unbounded if the past is unbounded (which the article also states). The article indicates that current physics does not establish whether there was, or was not, a past boundary in time.

However, there are hypotheses that do establish a past boundary in time. For example, Stephen Hawking's last paper. There are others that entail a finite past, and none that establish an infinite past - they only fail to establish a physical basis for a temporal boundary.

So there may be a physical basis for a past temporal boundary, and there can be no physical basis for an eternal past. But there is a conceptual problem with an infinite past: completeness. The universe, as it exists at this moment (its current extent, including everything within it) reflects a completed temporal process. Processes of infinitely long duration entail incompleteness at every temporal step. We conceptualize an infinite future as follows: every future point in time, Ti, will be succeeded by a point in time Ti +1. i.e. there is no point in time at which there is completeness. Now turn this around: to reach the current moment would entail a completed infinity, which contradicts this conceptualization. This provides a reasonable conceptual basis for believing the past is finite. This doesn't show it to be logically impossible, but a denial entails a burden to provide a conceptual basis for an infinite (completed) past.

I think no beliefs are properly basic, because foundationalism is false, — Pfhorrest

You disagree with foundationalism, but do you have any other particular system for evaluating the reasonableness of your beliefs, and the beliefs of others?

Do you think belief in God can be rational? If the answer is yes, then Plantinga's Reformed Epistemology may be irrelevant to you. If no, then please describe your basis for thinking that.

If Bernie runs, even if it were more likely that he would lose to Trump, there's still a good chance Bernie will win. Let's call that chance x%.

That means there's a (100-x)% chance the status quo will change in the opposite direction.

A risk-based approach means Bernie is the only viable candidate. — Benkei

You are giving weight to changing the "status quo" and it seems you are saying Bernie, and only Bernie can possibly do that.

What specific status quo changes do you seek?

Are my big issues at all relevant to you? Do they fit into, or out of, the status quo? They are: rescuing Obamacare and improving access to affordable health care, judicial appointments (which indirectly protect abortion rights), comprehensive immigration reform, and social security reform. I overlap with Bernie supporters in also wanting to make it easier to climb out of poverty (which I did, growing up in the 1960s-70s). I give the edge to Bernie only on that last point, but I have low expectations about what he could possibly accomplish. I very much like his voting record, but he hasn't gotten any revolutionary bills to pass (he's the principle sponsor on a total of 7 bills that passed, during his 13 years in the Senate).

That seems to suggest he did not believe there are laws of nature, because these entail necessitation. Perhaps he had a Humean view of regularities rather than law.

Personally, I’m even more convinced that the game is rigged... to put it bluntly. Thoughts? — 0 thru 9

I don't think anyone, or any group, has rigged it. Nature is taking its course, and voter complacency (regardless of reason for it) helps define the course.

It's a de facto ologarchy, but one can't just blame the "oligarchs". The populace has the power, but to exercise it they'd have to take the time and make the effort to learn more. In another thread, I complained that voters are stupid. Someone wisely corrected me - it's not stupidity, it's that people don't have the time and resources to learn and get involved. Nevertheless, the latent power is there, so responsibility is shared.

said that the future does not exist because it is indeterminate; — aletheist

There are components of the future that are determinate, for example: the positions of the planets with respect to the sun, at this exact time tomorrow. Does this determinacy mean it exists?

What about you? Will the governments of the world be our hero in the battle against climate change? — NOS4A2

The odds are against governments eliminating the problem, but there's a good chance governments can produce meaningful benefits - so it's wothwhile to push.

Well, I’d go further and say I oppose government intervention in general. I don’t think we need it to tackle climate change. I do believe that humans can get together and cooperate to solve problems without the coercive force of the government. — NOS4A2

I can respect the libertarian principle that less is best for government, even though I don't embrace it. But where collective action is needed, like climate change in particular, there is no hope for this being solved by a free market or by individuals voluntarily choosing to behave nobly.

If you set aside your belief that action is unnecessary, and accept the premise that action IS needed (hypothetically), would you agree?

Sure, but intuitively - A and B have equal, independent ontological status, and his approach doesn't seem to acknowledge that. Instead, it treats that alternate universe the same as an abstraction -real but not existing.

Also, not to nit-pick, but Trump didn't do shit. — Benkei

That judgment depends on what your priorities are.

And Bernie isn't going to change anything about it. But his political base might if they realise that winning or losing isn't the end of the fight. He seems to be the only candidate that has such a politically motivated base at this time. — Benkei

What happens to them in the likely event that he's ineffectual?

You have a good point but I think Plantinga might argue that a "proper functioning" person cannot sensibly doubt God's existence.

The US needs not only a political shift but a cultural one as well and that's not going to happen with another status quo candidate. — Benkei

Trump has shifted the status quo toward xenophobia, racism, and celebrating inequality, and that will only get worse in a second term. And I seriously doubt Bernie will be able to actually do any more than any other candidate. None of the ambitious policies he pushes are likely to pass. On the plus side, he will be a voice. In my book, getting a voice is not worth the risk of a 2nd term for Trump.

The statement that God exists is not the same as "My hand exists." We don't have direct experiences with God, at least not in the sense that we do with our hands, or even our mothers, fathers, siblings, friends, etc. This would be true even if some people did have direct experiences with God. Why? Because most of us don't have direct experiences with God — Sam26

On the contrary, Plantinga claims that most people DO have direct exprerience - a sense of divinity that produces beliefs about God:


The sensus divinitatis is a disposition or set of dispositions to form theistic beliefs in various circumstancs, in response to the sorts of conditions or stimuli that trigger the working of this sense of divinity. ...this knowledge of God is not arrived at by inference or argument but in a more immediate way. The deliverances of the sensus divinitatis are not quick and sotto voce inferences from the circumstances that trigger its operation. It isn't that one beholds the night sky, notes that it is grand, and concludes that there must be a God....It s rather that, upon perception of the night sky...these beliefs just arise in us. They are occasioned by the circumstances; they are not conclusions of them. -- Warranted Christian Belief, p173-175

This is analogous to seeing a hand, and this producing the belief "my hand exists".

I oppose any Green New Deal because it is uniquely authoritarian and statist. — NOS4A2

By opposing any Green New Deal, does that mean you oppose any government interventiions that are aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions?

If yes, do you really believe the free market can solve the problem?
If no, then what sort of interventions do you favor?

That seems problematic, since it makes existence relative, and both A and B have being.