I'm curious: what leads you to believe this?

All the information we have about Jesus comes from writings from early Christians, so one should expect consistency between what was written and what they believed - irrespective of the historical accuracy.

My favorite topic is theory of mind - particularly the problems and possible solutions to physicalism (on the one hand) and the mind-body problem (on the other hand).

Note that this establishes a potential basis for abductively (as IBE) judging metaphysical claims. — Relativist

Falsification is not abduction. It is the basis for a sound deduction by the modus tolens, — Dfpolis

I agree falsification is not abduction, and I never suggested it was. I said, "Clearly the theory must be coherent, and as I've also said repeatedly - it must also be able to account for all aspects of reality against which it can be tested.

How well each theory accounts for reality can often be judged, even if the judgment is subjective. That judgment is an IBE. The same process is involved with historiography (which is also unfalsifiable, in principle).

I'm sorry, but that's absurd - you have some beliefs about metaphysics, and you draw inferences from those beliefs. — Relativist

No, I have some awareness of how the world interacts with me and I draw conclusions based on that awareness. — Dfpolis

What you are "aware of" is belief. The conceptual framework in which you interpret this awareness is belief, and your conclusion is belief. Even if your belief has sufficient warrant for knowledge, it is still belief.

I gave you a link to an outline listing a variety of metaphysical accounts of natural law, this was to demonstrate to you that there are indeed contradictory metaphysical accounts - which demonstrates that metaphysical analysis can get it wrong, in spite of the fact they are constructed just as you describe - based on "awareness of how the world interacts" with the metaphysician. It may seem like an exact science to you, but it isn't.

So you're saying that Trump's collusion with Russia is actually one big trap that was set by Obama and Hillary in order to try and get him impeached once he won the election? — VagabondSpectre


Stzrok: “insurance policy”. — raza

I'm OK with drawing a connection and investigating to see where it leads, but you've a long way to go to connecting Strzok's comment to this meeting. This sounds along the lines of O.J.'s defense, which consisted of connecting one racist detective to a pervasive conspiracy to frame him.

Yes, a leap. You're passing along the distortion of events invented by Trump.
See this.

metaphysical theories are contingent upon the the imperfect mental processes that develop them. — Relativist
Following the method I suggested will avoid this. If you have a specific example of contradictory arguments, I would be happy to comment on them. — Dfpolis

A method to avoid imperfect metaphysical theories would be a monumental achievement - it would finally, after all these centuries, remove all controversy from metaphysical inquiry. I'm a wee bit skeptical.

Regarding examples: Metaphysical theories of natural law are a good example of disagreement. Here's a handy outline depicting the variety of metaphysical theories about natural law.

Since metaphysics is concerned with the nature of being, it must be based on our experience of being -- not on a priori assumptions, however "coherent" they may be. That's why I require metaphysical principles be abstracted (not induced) from experience.

I watched the second video, and noticed you asserting definitions of "existence" (power to act) and "essence" (specification of possible acts). These can be defined differently but equally plausibly, and this will lead one in different directions.

Coherence is no guaranty of truth.

Of course not, but the point is that incoherence is a guaranty of falsehood.

The coherence of truth derives from the self-consistency of reality.

Yes, but the truths of reality are not apparent, and much of reality may be hidden to us. Consequently we need to apply good epistemology to identify what should be believed, and when we should withhold judgment.

It's always good to give reality a bit of weight in your reasoning.
It is contingent on a particular metaphysical theory. — Relativist

No, it is not.

I'm sorry, but that's absurd - you have some beliefs about metaphysics, and you draw inferences from those beliefs.

You make a good case for looking beyond coherence -- considering adequacy to reality instead.

Instead?! Surely you misspoke. Clearly the theory must be coherent, and as I've also said repeatedly - it must also be able to account for all aspects of reality against which it can be tested. Note that this establishes a potential basis for abductively (as IBE) judging metaphysical claims. This can help us decide what metaphysical beliefs are worthy of belief, and on which we should withhold judgment. Your assertions have not given me any reason to change my view that judgment should be withheld, and the fact that you're unaware of alternative metaphysical theories makes me think that you may have settled on something a bit hastily.

"-1" electric charge is a property that exists in every instance of electron. Four-ness exists in every state of affairs that consists of 4 particulars. These are universals.
— Relativist

No, they are a bunch of particulars with the same intelligibility -- the same power of evoke concepts.

Until a concept is actually evoked, there is no actual universal.

I'm providing you a taste of a physicalist metaphysics. You have at least twice referred to my description as statements of faith, when all I've endeavored to do is to show there to be alternate metaphysical accounts. Your reaction here is pretty revealing about whose position is a product of faith.

1. I am not dismissing one "metaphysical hypothesis." I am dismissing any hypothetico-deductive deductive approach to metaphysics. The proper method of metaphysics is to abstract necessary principles from our experience of reality, then, applying them to concrete experiences, deduce necessary conclusions about the nature of being and our place in it.

And you overlook the fact that this "proper method of metaphysics" leads in multiple directions. I do not dispute that some paths lead in the direction you are defending, but merely point out that other paths do not lead there. You object to my label of "assumption" to metaphysics, but label aside - metaphysical theories are contingent upon the the imperfect mental processes that develop them. You would recognize this problem better if you would educate yourself in coherent physicalist metaphysics - this is a clear deficiency in your analysis. I strongly suggest you read A World of States of Affairs and What is a Law of Nature?, both by D. M. Armstrong. Then you could perhaps show why this path is a blind alley, but ignoring it doesn't make your perferred path any more credible - indeed, it makes it seem misleading.

2. Independently of the field of application, unfalsifiable hypotheses are unacceptable in the hypothetico-deductive (scientific) method because it can't be applied to them. The method works by feigning hypotheses, deducting consequences of those hypotheses, and testing the deduced consequences against reality. If a hypothesis is unfalsifiable, we can't test it, and so the method is inapplicable. Feigning an unfalsifiable hypothesis is simply stating a faith position.

Again, keep in mind that there are multiple metaphysical theories. If your arguments persuasive power depends on one such theory, and fails with another, how can it be said to truly have persuasive power? This is my issue with ignoring other metaphysical theories.

BTW - a metaphysical theory can be falsified by finding incoherence. Short of that, you can argue against it by identifying areas in which its accounts are deficient. I'll even give you a tip: physicalism has a problem with consciousness. If not for that problem, I'd lean more strongly toward physicalism rather than being on the fence.

3. The FTA is an argumentum signum quia. As such, it is not a sound deductive argument, or even a hypothetical argument. It is merely a persuasive case.

It is contingent on a particular metaphysical theory. That sums up my objection. I am agnostic to naturalism/deism specifically because there are coherent metaphysical theories for each. Your argument therefore has no persuasive power to me. I suggest that anyone who understands that there are indeed multiple (but incompatible) coherent metaphysical theories would agree it is unpersuasive.

[physicalism and universals]seem like incompatible positions. Physics has nothing to say about the logical order and universals belong to the logical order.

This has nothing to do with logical order, it relates what is. It just entails that the same property can be instantiated in multiple particulars. Look back at my example. "-1" electric charge is a property that exists in every instance of electron. Four-ness exists in every state of affairs that consists of 4 particulars. These are universals.

Someone actually claimed that Trump is always honest?

Zillions of untruths come out of his mouth, but I wonder how many of them are actually cases where he knows the truth but chooses to tell something else.

The other day, my wife got into an argument with a Trump supporter about his lies. The Trumpist said, "all politicians lie... look at that lie Obama told that we could keep our doctors." I tend to doubt Obama knew better and was intentionally trying to mislead. I expect a lot of Trump's untruths are of this nature. We see more of them because he's stupid and deludes himself.

Are Trump's untruths lies, or are they the product of stupidity?

The existence of an actual infinity (vs a potential infinity) is controversial among philosophers. I'm of the opinion an actual infinity cannot exist. I feel strongest about the impossibility of an infinite past, because that would entail a completed infinity: how could infinitely many days have passed?

Physicists accept the possibility of infinity in space and time simply because there is no known law of nature that rules it out. That doesn't imply the philosophical analysis is wrong, it just means that we don't know of any particular limits.

My opinions are consistent with the dominant opinion among philosophers prior to Cantor's set theory, but that doesn't seem like a very good reason to believe an actual infinity exists in the world.

Just who is this appealing to? Is his base that twisted?

Here's 3 quotes from Adolf Hitler:

All propaganda has to be popular and has to accommodate itself to the comprehension of the least intelligent of those whom it seeks to reach.

Hate is more lasting than dislike.

How fortunate for governments that the people they administer don't think.

Make the lie big, make it simple, keep saying it, and eventually they will believe it.


It seems that great minds think alike. So do not-so-great minds.

It comes down to semantics. Infinity can be considered a quantity in terms of transfinite math - so there are actually many "infinities" (aleph-0 is less than aleph-1; there are "more" real numbers than integers). But it's not a quantity in a sense that it corresponds to anything that exists in the material world.

His capitalization is just one more way he hypnotizes his base. The capitalized words convey another slogan, or meme. It is (unfortunately) effective.

No rational discourse comes out of him. Don't play his game- respond by being rational.

Trump to me is that he apparently has no idea how capitalization in the English language works

I wish that were the only gap in his knowledge.

Henri - How do you define "atheist"? I'm anticipating it won't apply to me. My position is that of "agnostic deist" - i.e. I acknowledge the possibility that there exists some sort of first cause, that either constitutes the world (such as in pantheism) or transcends the world. It is also possible that the physical world is all that exists (possibly with the addendum of some things that are ontologically emergent). I acknowledge this possibility because it's possible that one or more of the various arguments for "God's" existence is sound. Those arguments do not actually make a case for God (as usually defined by theists); they only make the case (say) for a first cause, or source of goodness.

This position puts me in the "atheist" category, because I think it's quite unlikely that a God exists - where "God" is defined in the usual theist sense of a being that is omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent, and omnipresent.

I disagree that one can assign epistemic priorities consistently. This has been analyzed by epistemologists, and I think they've shown it to be untenable.

How can an agnostic and believer both be rational on this issue and come to different conclusions? It's because agnostic uses only basic assessment, and stops at first conclusion, without going further.

It's interesting you'd say that, because it is the exact opposite of what I think. The atheists and agnostics I've engaged with invariably consider themselves on a perpetual search for truth. For example, I wouldn't at all mind being shown I'm wrong - I invite criticism of my reasoning. I adapt what I believe based on what I learn. On the other hand, every committed theist I've engaged thinks they have the truth - and this certainty ends up being an end-point - they have no motivation or desire to look further. IMO, one should always be open to the possibility he is wrong, and it depends on seriously entertaining the possibility that one is wrong. Do you seriously entertain the possibility a God does not exist?

That said, I actually do agree that theism can be a rational position. So can atheism - at least per my definition (someone who believes God probably doesn't exist). That doesn't mean all atheists and all theists actually reached that position rationally.

"Given Hume’s critique of causality, our grasp of time-sequenced causality is not adequately based on observing physical events. However, it is warranted by our experience of willing. Being aware of our own committed intentionality and its subse­quent incar­nation, we expect analogues in nature. Contrary to de­terminists who give time-sequenced causality prior­ity over voli­tion, will is the prime analogue and causality deriva­­tive. Associ­ation plays a role, but, as Hume noted, asso­cia­­tion does not warrant necessity. The idea of causal con­nec­tion over time derives from our experience as agents."

Hume's view of causality is nominalist. Consider reading Armstrong's "What is a Law Of Nature." Armstrong (a physicalist and realist regarding universals) postulates that laws are relations between universals. For example, electron is a universal: it is a type of object with a -1 electric charge as a constituent property. Electrons and protons have as a relation between them: attraction. This attraction-relation is a relation between those two universals (electron, proton), and is therefore a "law." The law exists in its instantiations: each actual pair pf electrons have this relation. Armstrong's postulate is supported by the success of science (whereas Hume's constant conjunction makes the success of science surprising), and I suggest should be more compelling at least for realists. However, it doesn't appear to be consistent with your thesis of intentionality, and that seems a flaw for your position.

There is no attitude regarding relationships that correspond to truth: it's all about what we tell ourselves. So you might as well follow whatever path leads you to happiness.

I agree with what you said, but after all - we ARE human, so when we're speaking of "artificial" intelligence, it pertains to that which humans regard as intelligence (as opposed to dogs). That is at least the prototype, which can permit some deviation.

If the AI doesn't have intrinsic needs and wants, that is a deviation. We could consider an externally imposed set of needs/wants (like Asimov's 3 laws of robotics). The obstacle is for the AI to feel these needs, not just have them be part of the code that directs activity. It needs self-direction, or an analogue.

So a human would say. If it acquired all information..

I do not have all information, and I say it. Our one sure model of intelligence is the human mind, and in the human mind, the linkage is there.

what is existence beyond our wants and needs?

What does that have to do with intelligence?

Attributes and relations do not constitute objects, they reveal something about them.

I beg to differ : objects have intrinsic properties. Where p is an intrinsic property of object x: if p is not an intrinsic property of object y, then y is not x. i.e. p is a necessary property of x.

The converse is to assume particulars exist without properties. But if that's true, how do properties become associated with particulars?

entity with intelligence but no will, will have no need for going on and will see the logic. They will not "care" in the most literal sense. They will have no motivation to.

I suggest it is a mistake to separate intelligence and will. True intelligent thought requires a will. Deliberation is goal-driven.

Earth as matrix, with heaven as the true reality would be a more coherent model. Instead of death being a sleep., it would be an awakening. I'll start writing hymns.

The form of reasoning in the FTA is heuristic, not hypothetico-deductive. The FTA doesn't make a hypothesis, and then deduce its consequences as hypothetico-deductive reasoning does. Saying it does is a distortion. Instead, it argues that coordinated means directed to a common end signify intelligent direction.

But the FTA CAN be framed abductively (as an IBE), and this is a more comprehensive analysis than what you are arguing. Each hypothesis deserves equal consideration, and they should all be evaluated on the same basis- this is the heart of my objection to your analysis. If all hypotheses that lack direct empirical evidence are to be excluded, then you won't get very far. If you're going to enter the "fact" of fine tuning into evidence for your preferred hypothesis, then you have to accept them into evidence for the alternate hypotheses as well.

Metaphysics requires sound deductive reasoning, not hypothetico-deductive reasoning -- but if it did, it would still require hypotheses to be falsifiable.

Special pleading. Apply the same rules to your preferred hypothesis.

As I said, this is not an analogous case

It is absolutely analogous to my objection concerning the value (or specialness) of life - the objection that you have not dealt with much at all, as I'll show in a bit.

if we allow any exception to the principle of causality, we undermine all science.

You're pontificating an absurdity. Science need concern itself with nothing other than identifying laws of nature (how things work) and working toward a basic understanding of what is physically fundamental in the world. There may be a "first cause" (and I think it likely), and this doesn't undermine science. In fact, I expect a lot of scientists would find that laughable (consider the Hartle-Hawking "no boundary" proposal, or the Carroll/Chen model.

Causation refers to something that occurs in the universe, a relation between physical things in the universe. There's no basis for claiming it to be more than that (such as a metaphysical principle), so your claim commits the fallacy of composition.

Either every phenomenon has an adequate explanation, or we have no rational grounds for requiring an explanation for any phenomena.

You're conflating physical causation with explanation. Explanations exist only in minds; causation exists in its physical instantiations.

R: " Physicalism entails the non-existence of states that are "logically prior"

Physics problems often specify an initial state that is logically (and temporally) prior to the final state. Any information used as a starting point in reasoning is, by definition, logically prior to the conclusion.

You're conflating explanations (and "problems") with what actually exists. "Logical priority" only applies to the descriptions of the sequence of states. Descriptions are products of mind (abstractions), and don't exist in the absence of minds. The physical evolution of a quantum system has no dependency on description of that evolution. Each physical state deterministically evolves to subsequent states (there being no "final" state contrary to your locution), and "logic" (i.e. reasoning) has no bearing on this physical evolution.

[Causation is temporal] is a baseless simplification often assumed in contemporary thought. Here is a counter example. If John is building his house, clearly John is the cause of his house being built. But, the house is not being built if John is not building it. Here cause (John building) and effect (John's house being built) are clearly concurrent, not sequential or time-ordered.

You're merely identifying the agents of causation, ignoring the temporal context - so your account is incomplete. No clear case of causation occurs other than in a temporal context.

Another example is my thinking of you. My thinking is the cause of you being thought of. Time does not enter into my thinking of you in any essential way

Of course it's temporal! You weren't thinking of me prior to our initial engagement on this forum. Our interactions were temporal, from the reading of a post to the thinking about the post, to the formulation and typing of a reply. To have a new thought entails a prior state in which the thought is absent.

Relativist: "Claiming they demonstrate intentionality is just a different way of saying they demonstrate design, or they imply God"

Establishing the truth of premises is not arguing their conclusion.

I'm not seeing anything that contradicts my analysis. The claim, "the fundamental constants are a sign of intentionality " simply ignores the possibility that life is just a byproduct of the way the world happens to be, and depends on treating life as an "ends" - which you have not justified. A byproduct is logically equivalent to an unintended consequence. Your analysis is incomplete if you fail to examine both logical forks: a) the constants as being intentional; b) the constants being unintentional.

From your paper:

What is the observable sign of intentionality? Is it not a systematic time development ordered to ends?

This again suggests you're considering life an ends. I completely agree that if you make this assumption, that this entails intentionality, and a mind to hold that intention. But you haven't provided a reason to think life is an "ends", and you haven't examined the other logical fork (that it is unintended). This is the point of the Douglas Adams quote.

First, I am not rejecting the multiverse hypothesis. I agree a multiverse is possible. Second, the lack of supporting evidence is just one reason for saying it has no epistic value. Another is that it's unfalsifiable and a third is that it is unparsimonious.

I still contend that the most complete analysis of fine tuning requires stepping back from the narrow analysis you seem to be contemplating, and applying consistent principles. The inference to the best explanation analysis I proposed is a fuller analysis.

Relativist: "multiverse seems to be entailed by the theory of cosmic inflation"

There is no "seems to be" wrt to entailment. Either something is entailed or it is not. As far as I can tell the multiverse is not entailed by cosmic inflation.

When I said it "seems entailed" I was referring to statements like this (from the article I linked):

"In most of the models of inflation, if inflation is there, then the multiverse is there. It's possible to invent models of inflation that do not allow [a] multiverse, but it's difficult. Every experiment that brings better credence to inflationary theory brings us much closer to hints that the multiverse is real." - Stanford University theoretical physicist Andrei Linde.

The referenced inflationary models constitute the available evidence, and so the preponderance of evidence implies the multiverse is entailed. Of course, one of the contrary models could still be true, even though it seems unlikely given that they are in the minority.

First, I am not rejecting the multiverse hypothesis. I agree a multiverse is possible. Second, the lack of supporting evidence is just one reason for saying it has no epistic value. Another is that it's unfalsifiable and a third is that it is unparsimonious.

The fact that multiverse is possible gives it the same epistemic standing as the alternative you're pushing. The facts you submit into evidence for inferring intentionality are the same facts I'm submitting in evidence for multiverse - so your claim is false.

When entertaining the metaphysical possiblity of a multiverse, I agree it's unfalsifiable, but so is the metaphysical possibility of intentionality in nature. But as I pointed out earlier, most inflationary models entail multiverse - and these physical models are certainly falsifiable. If I were to play the same game you play, I could use this fact to simply exclude your intentionality hypothesis. But I'm interested in a balanced analysis, not merely interested in proving something to myself that I already believe.

Relativist:" Inflation also entails symmetry breaking, which is the mechanism that produces the classical world that we know."

No, it does not. If a symmetry is perfect, inflation will not break it. If a symmetry is imperfect, inflation can make the imperfection manifest.

You don't seem to understand what I'm referring to. Symmetry breaking is the process by which a physical system in a symmetric state ends up in an asymmetric state. This can occur during a change of phase when the system undergoes a temperature change - that's the way it's treated in inflation models. here's a tutorial.

Relativist: " Symmetry breaking at the level of a quantum system almost certainly entails alternative physics because most processes of a quantum system entail quantum indeterminacy"

This is false. All unobserved processes are completely deterministic in quantum theory. Quantum indeterminacy is a feature of measurement processes, and so cannot have occurred before the advent of intelligent observers -- making them "special."

Your understanding is decades out of date: the Copenhagen interpretation, with its wavefunction collapse at observation has fallen from favor, and never really made sense as anything more that an instrumentalist's heuristic. 21st century physicists understand that an "observation" is just an entanglement between an observer and an eigenstate of the quantum system. Eigenstates can become entangled with anything in the environment. Clearly a classical world emerges from the quantum system of the Planck epoch, so there is ample environment to become entangled with.

So you really have no grounds for dismissing the physical possibility that the observed laws of physics might be a consequence of symmetry breaking of eigenstates of superpostion quantum states. I don't claim this necessarily occurred, but it's consistent with the available facts.

As I said above, (1) metaphysics does not use the hypothetico-deductive method, and (2) if it did, no unfalsifiable hypothesis can pass methodological muster.

I am baffled as to how you can justify dismissing one metaphysically possible hypothesis for its ostensible unfalsifiability whilst claiming victory for your preferred hypothesis that is (at best) equally unfalsifiable.

When I refer to this as a metaphysical theory, I am not claiming this constitutes a metaphysical system, but rather that it is metaphysically possible: the space of possibility that is broader than the narrow physical possibility you use as a methodological hurdle to dismiss anything not entailed by established science. This is the same space of possibility where your intentionality hypothesis resides: broadly logical possibility.

Relativist: "Violating the "norms of the scientific method" is irrelevant to evaluating metaphysical hypotheses

False. As I said, methodological norms arise from the nature of the method, not from the nature of the discipline using the method.

Your entire case depends on utilizing methodological "norms" as rationale for special pleading. You overlook the fact that all disciplines of study (science, history, mathematics, philosophy...) are unified in being a search for truth. An epistemological method valid for one discipline is not invalid for another - either it serves to advance us toward truth or it does not. There are more stringent norms for science, like falsifiability, only because the empirical nature of scientific investigation makes it feasible - so we needn't settle for less. But metaphysical investigation (i.e. looking beyond science) has to settle for less, or it doesn't get off the ground. So even if it were true that a scientific multiverse hypothesis fails to meet the norms of science, it's fair game to consider it in our search that looks beyond science, and it deserves that same looser standards under which any other metaphysically possible hypothesis is tested.

<value> is a concept that arises out of the relation between the thing valued and the subject(s) by whom it is valued. There is no value devoid of a valuing subject. So, not only is there no "objective value," the very concept is an oxymoron.

I agree - and this seems problematic for your position.

The FTA does suggest that the result of coordinated, improbable means is of value to the intelligence instantiating those means -- that life is valued by God -- because one does not seek to effect an end one does not value. This is a conclusion, not an assumption.

If you do not start with the assumption that life has value then what is your basis for claiming there is intentionality for life? As I brought up earlier, you can't claim there's a remarkable coincidence without there being two coinciding things. The existence of life coincides with nothing - unless you assume it is coinciding with an intent for life, which is circular.

[accidental=not intended] is begging the question to decide this prior to examining arguments

I didn't decide it! I've merely argued that you have not even considered it. You're the one claiming fine tuning entails intentionality/a mind/God - so you have the burden of proof to show why "intended" is more likely than unintended. You've agreed to take value of life off the table, so what's left?

No system of human thought can do this, because humans have both a limited representational capacity and a limited lifetime. So, if metaphysics is to be a real, human science, it must be far less ambitious.

Obviously we're not omniscient, and we can't prove coherence - but philosophers try to prove incoherence in the theories of those they disagree with. The opponent then responds with a new or revised account that maintains coherence.

I see metaphysics as the science concerned with nature of existence and how more specialized sciences are grounded in existence. It derives its principles, not from assumption or hypothesis, but from a reflection on our experience of being. It demonstrates the adequacy of its concepts and conclusions by showing how they are grounded in our experience of being.

That reflection on our experience beings results in a conceptual framework. The objective and hope is that the conceptual framework actually corresponds to reality (i.e. "is true" per correspondence theory). Correspondence can't be vague and imprecise, it must be a perfect match to be true. Is it true, or is it actually just assumed true? I contend it is the latter. As an example, consider Aristotelean agent causation - as I pointed out, reference to agents does not fully account for causation. Unless you can fully account for causation, then there's clearly something untrue about the conceptual framework.

The problem of universals requires reflection and analysis, not the assumption of an a priori solution.

I wasn't suggesting philosophers had failed to do their due diligence of reflection and analysis. Rather I'm highlighting that this reflection and analysis leads to different answers among different philosophers. I'll assume each of them has a rationally justified belief in whatever they decide - so how do we account for the differences of opinion? I submit that this is due to assumptions within their analysis - there have to be, because it's not based solely on analytic truths.

The multiverse hypothesis posits not just one or a few other universes, but a myriad of other universes. If does not posit other universes like ours, but universes with a range of physical constants that we do not know to be self-consistent. Clearly, it is an unparsimonious solution to the fact of fine tuning.

The variability of physical constants is due to exactly one assumption: that the constants are a product of quantum uncertainty - that they arise from entanglements with the environment from a superposition of all the possibilities. This one additional assumption is not superfluous, because it explains the alleged fine tuning.

the operation of intelligence in the cosmos does not require the rejection of standard physics. If it did, I would say it did.

Provide an account of intelligence in the cosmos based on standard physics.

The difference is that we have an observational basis for accepting GR and none for the multiverse.

That observational basis has taken decades to reveal itself, but GR was accepted physics long before that.

We judge the merits of an argument by how well it conforms to the accepted norms of reasoning, not by the nature of its conclusion

I agree, but my problem with your argument is your creative special pleading, holding multiverse to the higher standard of science while using a looser standard for your preferred solution.

Sound reasoning entails God. Unsound reasoning does not.

I have yet to see any such sound reasoning. They all depend on assumptions.

The point I was making is that a BIV is in a nearly identical epistemic position as are we, except we know the BIV cannot have knowledge of the physical world, because his belief is a Gettier condition.

It's another matter about whether or not physicalism is a justified belief. The truism "absence of evidence is not evidence of absence" just means physicalism is possibly false- and without evidence, it is just a bare possibility, and the mere possibility of being wrong does not serve as a defeater for that belief. Compare this to solipsism -no one believes it's true despite the possibility it is false.

What is the difference between "grounded in observation" and "empirically verified"?

One can't empirically verify a negative (physicalism is the doctrine that no non-physical things exist). However, it may be reasonable to infer that only physical things exist because there's no evidence of anything else existing - that is still "grounded" in observation.

Are you saying this because physicalism can't be verified empirically (which isn't the same thing as being "grounded in observation") or because of something different about a BIV?

I agree physicalism can't be verified; neither can non-physicalist metaphysics. They are just theories, and all one can do is test their ability to account for aspects of the world, and potentially falsifying it by showing it incoherent.

Physicalism can't be grounded in observation whether BIV or not

Yes and no. Our perception of the world (our mental interpretation of our sensory input) constitutes non-verbal beliefs, that are properly basic (they are innate, and are the product of nature to provide us a perceptual image that corresponds to some aspects of the actual world), about an external world and it's nature. This grounds our belief in a physical world. One can then infer the physical world to be all that exists (i.e physicalism).

I assume you mean false sensory impressions. In terms of formal epistemology, his belief in the physical world would be just as justified as ours, so this could also lead him to to justifiably infer physicalism - just as we could.

However, his belief in the physical world (and thus his belief in physicalism) would not constitute knowledge in the formal sense. That's because his belief is due to a Gettier condition (i.e. his belief is true by accident). Knowledge = a belief that is justified, true, and does not entail a Gettier problem.

Contrast this with our belief in the physical world. We believe there is such a thing because of our actual physical contact with it, through our innate capacity. Of course, we could be wrong - solipsism is possibly true (or you could be a brain in a vat who is imagining this conversation). That possibility just implies that our justified belief is actually false, and therefore doesn't constitute knowledge. But as long as our belief is true, we indeed have knowledge.

Let's say a person is actually a brain in a vat. They are convinced that physicalism is the case, which is to say that all of reality is made up of the stuff of physics without exception

How did this brain come to believe there is actually a physical world (a sine qua non for physicalism)? That is an essential question, because it has bearing on the rationality of its belief. In the real world, we believe there is a physical world because we interact with it (or so it seems, but it seems that way because of the way our perceptions are hardwired).

No, [dark matter and dark energy] are part of a hypothetical physical (as in 'physics') system. Metaphysics, as I understand it, is not what you think.

I agree, but it would be helpful to define "physical". I offer the following definition:

The physical includes all objects that are pardigmatically considered physical*, the properties and objects that account for these paradigmatic objects, and all other objects that have those properties or are composed of any of the objects in the account.

* i.e. the stuff of everyday experience, and taken for granted as being "physical". The concept is grounded in our hard-wired perceptual capacities to interact with an external world.

"There isnt much of a connection between Trump and crazy evangelicals as there was with Bush 43."

There IS a connection, and it is not pretty.

Lot's of Evangelicals voted for Trump because of his promises to appoint anti-abortion rights justices ( a promise he is fufilling). That is somewhat understandable, but what is not understandable is the continued defense of Trump by many Evangelicals. F or example, consider Frankin Graham's defense of Trump.

Suppose the universe just happened to have beings of type x, but these beings would not exist had some set of historical facts (F) not occurred. Does this imply F was designed to produce x?

Relativist: "The FTA doesn't point to evidence, it fits a hypothesis to a set of facts."

In fitting a hypothesis to a set of facts, it points to those facts as evidence.

I agree with this, but the point is that those same facts serve as evidence for each of the hypotheses to be considered. However your next statement is problematic:

I have considered the multiverse hypothesis and found that (1) there is no observational data in support of it (in contrast to the FTA) and (2) it makes no clear, falsifiable predictions.

It entails a special pleading, because you identified criteria to dismiss one hypothesis but ignore these criteria with respect to the God-hypothesis.

You need to show how the facts might not signify what proponents of the FTA say.

I've done that, by providing alternative hypotheses that explain the facts.

the existence of a multiverse is a physical hypothesis. So, we have to judge it as we do any physical hypothesis -- and it simply does not pass muster.

Wrong. Multiverse is BOTH a physical hypothesis and a metaphysical hypothesis. You are overhasty in dismissing it as a physical hypothesis, and you fail to take it into consideration as metaphysical hypothesis.

Defense of the Multiverse Physical hypothesis:
1. There is no valid reason to reject a physical hypothesis solely on the basis that it is not entailed by accepted science. If that were done, no new science could ever get off the ground.

2. There are valid scientific reasons to believe there is multiverse, for example : multiverse seems to be entailed by the theory of cosmic inflation (which is widely accepted science). (see this). Inflation also entails symmetry breaking, which is the mechanism that produces the classical world that we know. Symmetry breaking at the level of a quantum system almost certainly entails alternative physics because most processes of a quantum system entail quantum indeterminacy. These hypotheses are consistent with established physics; they simply assume there's a more fundamental basis for the laws of physics as we know them.

Defense of the Multiverse Metaphysical Hypothesis:
Multiverse is conceptually possible, it is consistent with a variety of physical models of physical reality, consistent with physicalist metaphysics, and it has explanatory value. Any proposed physical multiverse hypothesis is thus a viable metaphysical hypothesis, even if one were to reject it as a valid scientific hypothesis due to some presumed methodological restriction (as you do).

We have abundant evidence [of the persuasive power of the FTA]. Many people, including atheists, find the argument so strong they need to violate the norms of the scientific method to hypothesize an alternative explanation.

Violating the "norms of the scientific method" is irrelevant to evaluating metaphysical hypotheses, and this again betrays your special pleading in exempting the designer-hypothesis from this methodological criterion.

<Significance> and <importance> are concepts depending on human valuation. If humans use life as a sign, then it has significance. If humans see life as pivotal, it has importance.

This is a key point that deserves more discussion. Obviously, we all value human life - it's human nature to do so. And this explain why many people uncritically accept the FTA (and hence, its persuasive power is due to a lack of imagination in challenging a questionable assumption) - it seems to us that human life is special. The problem that is often overlooked is that the FTA depends on there being an objective value to human life. Holding human life to be of value obviously has a survival value, and so our having this value is consistent with natural selection and doesn't depend on there being an objective truth that we're (magically) grasping.

I am not sure how you're defining "accidental." (referring to the possibility that "life is an accidental byproduct of the nature of this universe").

I simply mean "not designed"; "not intended".

Relativist: “ imagine a puddle ..."

For this to be analogous to the FTA, other "holes" (other sets of constants) would have to "fit" (work) equally well. They do not.

You're missing the point: the puddle exists accidentally, not a product of design, but from its perspective the world seems designed for it.

Relativist: "How do we explain natural law? That's a metaphysical question..."

When you make an actual argument on the baseless nature of metaphysics, I'll give you an actual reply.

You're changing the subject. I was pointing out that a brute fact basis for natural law does not violate a principle of science, because accounting for the existence of natural law is in the realm of metaphysics (science just investigates what actual natural laws exist).

I don't think physicalism entails the non-existence of a state logically prior to this universe

Physicalism entails the non-existence of states that are "logically prior". Logical priority pertains to epistemic investigation of propositions that are about reality, and hence it has no bearing on what actually exists. Causation in the world (as opposed to its propositional description) is a temporal phenomenon.

No, because it neither mentions nor assumes the existence of God. It deals with the essential character of the laws of nature. if you have a criticism of my actual analysis, please state it.

You didn't provide an analysis, you only made a vague allusion. But I inferred that you were claiming the "finely tuned" constants entail intentionality, and I'm pointing out that this is a presumption - or just an alternate way of presenting the fine-tuning hypothesis. Claiming they demonstrate intentionality is just a different way of saying they demonstrate design, or they imply God. So this doesn't in any way support your case, it's just another way of stating it.

Not everything called "metaphysics" is an adequate to reality. A rational metaphysics is not based on assumption or speculation, but on sound reflection and analysis of our experience of existence.

A metaphysics demonstrates its adequacy to reality by its ability to coherently account for everything that we perceive exists. It's no trivial task to construct a metaphysics that is coherent and complete, but it certainly does depend on speculation and assumptions. Consider a nominalist metaphysics: it's the product of sound reflection and analysis, and it can account for everything that exists, but it is founded on the assumption that universals do not exist. An assumption of universals existence/non-existence is not an arbitrary assumption - it takes a great deal of analysis to convince oneself either way, but clearly these are pivotal to a metaphysical system and their existence can be neither firmly proven nor firmly disproven.

(1) The FTA is evidence based, while the multiverse hypothesis is not.

The facts presented in evidence for the fine-tuning also serve as evidence for a metaphysical multiverse hypothesis. That's why I've said we have to consider this an "inference to best explanation."

(2) It is more parsimonious to posit one God than a myriad of other universes which have the additional property, also unsupported by evidence, of diverse physical constants.

Parsimony does not entail a small number of existing things, it entails no more assumptions than are necessary to explain a set of facts. We could debate how many assumptions are entailed by multiverse vs God, but I doubt we'd ever find common ground.

That the FTA is a classic argumentum signum quia -- a rational form of heuristic reasoning (e.g. "Where there's smoke, there's fire"). On the other hand, positing a multiverse violates the accepted norms of the scientific method by (a) being unfalsifiable, and (b) rejecting the standard framework of physics (which sees the laws and constants of nature as universal).

Special pleading: failing to apply consistent criteria to the various possible explanations.

IF we choose to consider life as something objectively special (which you have not shown), then we need to account for fine-tuning. We've discussed two metaphysical hypotheses that can account for it: 1) God; 2) multiverse. Neither is falsifiable; neither is entailed by established physics - although multiverse is consistent with established physics while God is not.

Your claim that multiverse depends on "rejecting the standard framework of physics (which sees the laws and constants of nature)" can only possibly apply to a physical multiverse hypothesis, not the metaphysical one. However, it doesn't even apply to the physical: all physical hypotheses are consistent with that framework, it simply extrapolates to a hypothesis that established physics is a special case of more fundamental physics. This is exactly the same framework as Newton's gravitational theory is within General Relativity (which is a theory of gravitation): Newton's theory applies more narrowly than GR.

Relativist: "clearly one can't assume God exists if one is to claim the FTA makes a persuasive case for God's existence"

I disagree. We are not debating the existence of God, but the merits of the FTA.

Fine tuning entails a fine-tuner. In the context of our discussion, I am using the term "God" to refer to the fine tuner (or that which is the holder of the intention, if you prefer).

If we look at our early ancestors, I agree: some would evoke my concept <human> and others not. I further agree that different individuals might evoke your <human> concept than would evoke mine. Nonetheless, whatever creatures evoked your concept would do so because they have the objective capacity to do so. So, I don't see that these differences undermine my case.

We have the objective capacity to create "a perfectly well-defined set of criteria" (as you put it), but these will be arbitrary. Each generation was capable of breeding with the prior generation (and many generations back), throughout evolutionary history, so any criteria that might be developed will necessarily draw an arbitrary line. Each change that has occurred in evolutionary history is an accident, and therefore every property that exists in humans today is accident -there is therefore nothing to distinguish an accidental property from an essential property.

So, how does this widespread agreement show anyone is "assuming" their common position rather than abstracting it from reality?

All metaphysics is based on abstracting from reality, and there is not agreement on all matters.

Relativist: Causation is a spatio-temporal relation between particulars (due to laws of nature). "
Definitions are not assumptions.

It is a postulate (which is an assumption) that has explanatory scope and is consistent with physicalism. These relations are also universals. It's used to account for the observed regularity in the world which could also be accounted for through trope-like behavior that a nominalist metaphysics might have).

You cannot define yourself into a conclusion about reality.

That is my point. One metaphysical system entails God, and another does not. Both are developed consistent with observed reality through contemplation and analysis. Both are coherent. The one that concludes "God" is basically "defining itself a conclusion about reality."

Apparently it means it's time for monologues. Here's mine: I admire your passion.

Michael - I seem to recall your saying you would give me the last word. Maybe I dreamed it. Seriously, I don't have time to respond to everything you wrote, but if you will identify the most important thing you'd like me to respond to, I'll be happy to do so.

OK, but then the statement, "The probability of (E given design) > probability of (E given no design)" is vacuous. I look at a grain of sand under a microscope, and produce a digital map of it's irregular shape. The probability that it would have that exact shape is higher if it was designed. So what?

the other piece, which is at the heart of FTA that I am not sure you have addressed is the overwhelming large odds against the observed criteria that exist and support sentient beings like us. Again on the order of 52!. An incredibly large number. This is an important concept of FTA.

I addressed this - it depends on treating sentient life as privileged. In any world, something will exist, and the a priori probability that it would exist is infinitesmal. Yet, something must exist.

Consider a lottery: what is low probability is that a chosen number will match what is drawn - this entails a coincidence, two sets of numbers coinciding. Sentient life has no prior thing that it is coinciding with. It is just something that happens to exists.

1. We exist
2. The set of conditions that allow us to exist are incredibly precise and incredibly unlikely.

What are the probabilities that this situation is be design, chance, other. Which is more likely.

That is equivalent to saying:
The probability of (life given design) >probability of (life given no design)

Let's analyze the reasoning.

1. Every metaphysically possible world entails some type of existent (E) whose existence depends on the properties of that world - irrespective of whether that world is designed or exists by chance.
2. The probability of (E given design) > probability of (E given no design)

Conclusion 2 seems a truism, but does not imply there was design, because every world has unlikely existents irrespective of whether the world is actually designed or exists by chance.

I looked at the linked paper, and confirmed it does not address this objection. It treats observers in a privileged way.

anyone who thinks or believes that there is less than 50% chance that God exists, is irrational on the issue. They are absolutely not thinking logically (on the issue of God being real).

My only issue with your statement is that there is no consistent means of assigning epistemic probability. It's tempting to base it on the principle of indifference, but that has a major flaw.

We must not be referring to the same thing. I'm referring to arguments like this:

1. The fine-tuning of the universe is due to either physical necessity, chance, or design.

2. It is not due to physical necessity or chance.

3. Therefore, it is due to design.

The conclusion is presented as a truth claim, one deduced from the premises. The premises are also truth claims. I have seen arguments like this presented as a reason to believe God (a designer) exists.

This is the sort of argument I am refuting.