" I suggest that a physical world is a logical-system, consisting of abstract logical implications that just 'are'."

That doesn't make any sense. Logic is an epistemological tool; it applies to propositions (descriptions of some aspects of reality) not to the ontic objects of reality. If there are no intelligent minds articulating descriptions of reality, then there are no propositions (except in some abstract sense that every aspect of the world is describable, in principle).

"Anyway, when the "problem of evil" is stated, there's over-emphasis on this physical world and its importance. Sure, this life matters, in the sense that how we conduct ourselves in it matters.
But this life and this world are a blip in timelessness. In fact, the long but finite sequence of lives that you're in is likewise only a blip in timelessness."

That seems a self-defeating position. Why bother continuing to live, and to improve your life and that of your loved ones?

More importantly, why did God bother to put us into this hellhole (as it is for some, at least)? Did he want some maleficent amusement?

"Metaphysically impossible" depends on "broadly logically impossible", which depends on how the terms are defined. So "metaphysically impossible" is dependent on the definitions of the terms. "Square circle" could be metaphysically possible if the terms were defined such that this would not be contradictory."
That's right.

"Since we can define the terms however we please, how is this relevant to whether something exists or not? "
If you define “circle” and “square” differently from me, then you and I won’t be able to have a meaningful discussion about circles and squares. We need to agree on semantics to discuss the logic.
Consider this proposition:
Prop A: X is a circle & X is not a circle
Is it possible for X to exist? No, because it violates the law of non-contradition. Now consider this statement:
Prop B: X is a circle & X is a square.

“Square” is generally defined in such a way that it is not a circle. So with this definition in mind, Prop B entails Prop A. Therefore the X of Prop B can’t exist because it violates the law of non-contradition.

My argument does not depend on the non-existence of mental entities qua mental entities. I resolved your original issue when I replaced "logically impossible" with "metaphysically impossible." A state of affairs is metaphysically impossible if its existence is broadly logically impossible. A square circle is strictly logically possible (logic alone does not entail a contradiction), but it is broadly logically impossible because the meanings of "square" and "circle" entail a contradiction; i.e. its actualization would violate the law of non-contradiction.

"The entire Mueller process is a political stunt for the midterms."
How do you account for the fact that Mueller (a Republican) was appointed by a Republican (Rosenstein), and Rosenstein was a Trump appointee? I'll certainly grant that Dems have, and will continue to use this politically, but isn't this typical of our political system? Need any reminders about Trump's making political capital out of the negative Hilary news?

" If the Mueller team had anything they would have leaked it by now, since this has been the pattern. They are looking to stain Trump by associations to third parties."
What pattern? There have been no leaks! We don't know what Mueller might uncover - and there's no justifiable basis for believing that an absence of leaks entails either Trump's guilt OR innocence.

The best case scenario for Trump is to let it complete and have him fully vindicated. If the Republicans are hurt politically in the meantime, that's unfortunate - but the same thing happens to Democrats. Personally, I'd like for our system of government to work, but it won't work well by applying double standards - so we have to expect political fallout, both deserved and undeserved.

" isn't the meaning of the proposition part of reality as well"
Meaning is something that exists only in the mind. It constitutes relations among other elements of the mind, so meaning is still just another abstraction. Abstractions are a special kind of existent, and one can argue that they do not actually exist. e.g. circles do not actually exist; rather, circular objects exist from which we abstract out the concept of circular via the way of abstraction.

This seems a digression. At issue is: what non-mental objects exist? Contradictions exist only as mental objects.

" How do you account for the existence of impossibility?"

Impossibility is a property of propositions, not of the elements of reality that may be described by the propositions. True propositions correspond to elements of reality, but propositions are false because they do not correspond to elements of reality (i.e. I subscribe to correspondence theory of truth). An impossibility = a proposition that is false out of logical necessity, so it cannot correspond to an element of reality.

OK, contradictory semantic constructions exist - but they have no referent in the actual world. How's this?:

1. An object that is describable as a logical contradiction is metaphysically impossible. (e.g. square circles are metaphysically impossible)
2. If x exists then x is metaphysically possible (converse of 1)
3. Omnipotence entails the ability to directly create any contingent entity whose existence is metaphysically possible.
4. There exist contingent free-willed souls in heaven who do not sin (e.g. the departed souls of faithful Christians). (Christian doctrine).
5. Therefore God's omnipotence entails the ability to directly create free-willed beings that do not sin.
6. Therefore God could have created a world of free-willed beings who do not sin
7. In this world, evil befalls the innocent due to the sinful acts of free-willed individuals
8. God created this world instead of a world of free willed beings that do not sin.
9. Therefore God chose a world with needless pain and suffering.
10. Therefore God is not omnibenevolent.

"the beings in heaven have had that ability and, by the decisions they chose to make, have qualified for entry to heaven"
Yes, but God set up this process - he defined the qualifications, and they are contingent - God had a choice (i.e. the qualifications do not appear to be metaphysically necessary). It is basically a game that God created that will inevitably lead to harm coming to good people while on earth, and eternal harm coming to those who don't pass the test. Both sets of harm seem inconsistent with omnibenevolence. Further, it doesn't even appear that the test is administered fairly - obviously some have a harder time of it than others.

it is enough for an apologist that the qualified being once had free will.

That is certainly a distinction, and any distinction can provide an escape hatch. That's why I don't suggest my arguments could convince a committed Christian - they can always resort to "God moves in mysterious ways." Arguments such as mine are only relevant to someone who is actually willing to entertain the possibility that a 3-omni God does not exist. The real lesson is that such a God's non-existence seems more likely than his existence.

BTW, Mary being "immaculate" just means she was born without original sin (see this)

Thanks for your comments - I agree with everything you said. If I decide to put this into an essay, I'll try to be more comprehensive. For now, I'm working through bits of it at at time.

Incidentally, I previously raised this question on a Christian forum, and almost everyone who replied actually agreed with the premise that the souls in heaven have free-will and do not sin. They could not explain why God could not just create such beings directly - they just asserted he can't. The reasoning appeared to be: he would've if he could've, but he didn't so he couldn't.

The PSR may commit a category error by asserting there are "reasons." There are causes for everything, and when we understand the causes we can label this the "explanation." However, the presence of causal "explanations" for everything does not imply that everything necessarily has an explanation. In particular: if there is a first cause, then by definition it was uncaused. There's no basis for claiming it must therefore have a non-causal explanation. i.e. there's no basis for claiming the first cause "must" be something that exists out of metaphysical necessity. In fact, that seems unlikely because all known objects that exist out of metaphysical necessity are abstractions, and abstractions lack causal efficacy.

Asimov's robots have positronic brains which give them full consciousness (self-awareness, intentionality, etc). They think as we do, except for being unable to violate the 3 laws.

My main point is that, IMO, goodness is not dependent on truly free will. In a sense, God lacks free will: he can't do evil because that is against his nature. And yet, he is considered the personification of goodness.

OK, Thanks. I agree that my argument is tied to that premise, but if the premise is false this just changes the problem.

Assuming the souls in heaven lack free will: If the ultimate fate of good people is to live eternally without free will, then why would God ever put us in a state of free will? Less good comes of it because it results in some good souls unnecessarily experiencing evil done to them on earth, and it results in some souls choosing evil and not receiving a good, eternal life with God. It's a contingent fact that God put this system in place, and it does not exhibit maximal goodness. Therefore God is not omnibenevolent.

Assuming the souls in heaven HAVE free will, then Christianity is false.

Are you suggesting Christianity is incoherent (since Romans 6:7 is generally accepted), or are you suggesting the souls in heaven lack free will? I can't tell what you're disagreeing with.

At death, we stop having these choices — Relativist

Not necessarily. — EnPassant

You previously said, "They would give up the freedom to sin but would still be free in infinite possibilities of goodness" This seems to imply we stop having these choices to sin or not.

What good comes from this brief period of moral freedom? — Relativist

Great good. If we become good we will be closer to God in the next life. — EnPassant

You seem to be suggesting it is a good thing to be close to God in spite of a loss of moral freedom. Well and good, but then why not create beings with that absence of moral freedom to begin with? Then everybody wins: this results in more good than the merit system God devised - a merit system that results in good people suffering. How is God's merit system better than what I proposed?

"i do not see how, "Because freedom is necessary if goodness is to be freely chosen"
is a tautology"

It just defines what it means to be a free choice. A free choice is only free if there is freedom.

" It is not real goodness if it is not freely chosen."
This seems a different statement, but I disagree with this one. I don't see a good thing must be freely chosen to be considered good. Hypothetically, a robot that follows Asimov's 3 laws of robotics can still do good, even though it cannot choose to do harm.

Do you agree with the both of the following:

1. If there are free-willed souls in heaven, then:
at least some of them will sin & Romans 6:7:
(" anyone who has died has been set free from sin") is false

2. If the souls in heaven do not sin then they lack free will.

I think you will agree, but I'd like you to verify.

"freedom is necessary if goodness is to be freely chosen. "
Sure, but that's a tautology. We make choices every day, sometimes choosing good and sometimes bad. At death, we stop having these choices (according to your theory). What good comes from this brief period of moral freedom? Is it good because some will fail and suffer damnation? That makes no sense.

"They would give up the freedom to sin but would still be free in infinite possibilities of goodness. "
Why wouldn't an omnibenevolent God just create beings like THAT - without a freedom to sin, but free in infinite possibilities of goodness?

Are you really choosing to give up free will, or is that an unexpected consequence? Is it a good thing to lack free will? Why bother with suffering on earth (a consequence of free will) for our brief stay here, while spending eternity as robots? If it's good to lack free will, why ever give people that chance to fail?

Thanks for spotting the numbering error. I corrected it.

"What is choice?

I undersand it's a road crossing. There is more than one path to take and, if we have free will, we can choose, unaffected by any factors, to travel down any one of those paths."

It is problematic to say free will choices are "unaffected by any factors." Choices are the product of factors ( e.g. beliefs, objectives, desires, whims, perverseness...). What you're missing is that there is an agent who is responsible for the ultimate choice.

A computer program is not responsible for the outcome of following a decision tree. A human is responsible because the decision is based on factors of his own choosing - even if he chose to follow a scripted decision tree. i.e. we own our choices.

" Meaning is reference to states of affairs. "

That sounds about right, in terms of D.M. Armstrong's "States of Affairs" ontology. Meaning seems to be a set of relations between various mental constructs (including feelings).

It seems to me, an objective Trump supporter ought to acknowldge Trump's deficiencies even if he embraces most of what Trump does. We will always have political differences, but we should be able to agree on what constitutes inappropriate, or alarming, behavior.

"They are in heaven because they freely chose not to fall with the rest of creation, not because God made it impossible for them to fall."
Is it impossible to fail in heaven, or are the souls in heaven changed in some way?

Consider a world identical to this one except it lacks intelligent life. Does "meaning" correspond to anything that exists in that world? "Meaning" refers to relations among elements of the mind. If there are no minds, there is no meaning.

Does that make reality arbitrary? It probably makes the ontological foundation of reality arbitrary, in that it is a brute fact. What follows from the foundation is out of mathematical necessity - so that is not arbitrary.

So your dilemma reduces to the foundation of existence. Isn't any foundation arbitrary -including God? Why is there a God, rather than not?

Knowledge entails information,and information entails encoding. The encoding of omniscience would be of infinite complexity.

"Who is to say that the pain and suffering is 'needless'? Suppose it serves a greater good? Suppose when we all get to heaven we agree that a little suffering helped us to grow closer to God? Isn't God and only He, the ultimate judge on what is needless or not?"

This is the heart of the problem of evil. We see evil all around us, with no apparent good coming out of it. A committed Christian can always rationalize it in terms of God "having a plan" beyond our understanding, but that is a non-answer to the question of "why?" The simplest answer to the " why? " is: the Creator is indifferent or he lacks the ability to prevent it. So while I acknowledge that strong faith can provide a reason to reject the argument from evil, it doesnt satisfy those who develop doubt and seriously entertain the possibility there is no God.

"Your argument is that God can make us free but determine the outcome of that freedom. "
That is not my argument. If God's knowledge of the outcome entails being determined, then the non-sinning souls in heaven do not have free will. But if there are non-sinning free-willed souls in heaven, then such beings can exist without contradiction. Omnipotence implies God can create any contingent thing that does not entail a contradiction.

Epistemological justification for adopting this form of argument:
it is a valid deductive proof (as far as I can tell, although I admittedly skipped a couple steps - such as from 4 to 5, because they seemed trivial), so the conclusion is necessarily true if the premises are true. Further, the truth of the premises is more plausible than the converse - so it's reasonable to believe them (again, as far as I can tell).

I'm not claiming the argument has dialectical efficacy - i.e. that it can persuade a Christian. Rather, it is reasoning that a person should consider who is having doubts about God as a result of considering the problem of evil. The free-will defense is often presented as a defeater of the argument from evil, and I'm presenting this as a defeater of THAT defeater.

I agree it doesn't defeat all possible theological arguments, just the one I alluded to. I'll add that the "free will defense" only addresses the evil performed by free-willed individuals; there are other evils in the world - but that's beyond the scope of this discussion.

There is a tension between God's omnipotence and his inability to create free-willed beings that do not sin. It's the crux of my argument, and it also has bearing on the atonement. This also is beyond the scope of the present discussion.

Premise 4 is based on Romans 6:7:
" anyone who has died has been set free from sin"

1John3 also supports this. It also shows that we will be like Christ, glorified and pure - i.e. improved and therefore not diminished in any way, while a lack of free will would be a diminishment.

EnPassant/Rank Amateur -

Please address the actual argument and tell me what premise(s) you disagree with.