You do not even recognize the process you are part of. — Heiko

I am sorry you think I am so unreflective. As I see it, it is better to light small candles than lament the darkness.

I read your response. I am unsure what point your first paragraph is making other than many people question human knowledge. I give no weight to group opinions without rational grounds.

It may well be that a natural number is always a real number as well but that doesn't make the natural numbers the real numbers or vice versa. — Heiko

I never implied that it did, but it remains the case that while 1 is both natural and real, natural and real are distinct concepts.

if the sciences of nature managed to say what you were up to do without even asking, what importance would the insistence of being "a deciding subject" make? "You" do what you do, right? This is about perspectives only, we are talking reasons. Reasons may seem compelling or void - who should judge that? Is it enough that someone felt compelled to do something to make the reason sufficient? Is there a higher-than-individual (divine) reason that could judge? We are far away from any "knowing" if we even can argue about such things. — Heiko

As with many questions, the answers depend on details not given. If I decide to do x, physical changes will result before I actually do x. It is theoretically possible to detect these, and predict that I will do x, but that does not imply that there was no prior intentional operation.

We each have to decide what reasons we find compelling in light of our experience and background knowledge.

Different reasons may be sufficient to different acts. A feeling of compulsion my be sufficient for some.

We can show, rationally, that there is a God who is the source of intentionality. I do not pretend to know if God makes moral judgements as we think of them. It seems more likely to me that any rewards and punishments are built into the structure of reality.

I used the words "we are free to choose either L1 or L2." You used the words "L1 and L2 are equally in our power." Your words and mine mean exactly the same. — Herg

No, they mean something quite different. I can choose a Maserati over a Fiat, but that does not mean it is in my power to buy a Maserati. Choosing is selecting an intentional state, but if we cannot effect that intentionality, if what we choose is not in our power, then it cannot result in the corresponding new line of action.

Considering this from a different perspective, an epiphenomenalist or a physical determinist might be willing to grant that I can make a number of choices as long as they remain purely intentional, as he or she might hold that only one line of physical action is possible.

So in my (b) I could have written "it seems to us that L1 and L2 are equally in our power", and that would have meant the same as what I actually wrote (and would also be true). — Herg

The relevant point is not what seems to be true, but your unargued claim that it only seems to be true. A great many things that seem to be true are also known to be true.

So, the question is: how do we know what is possible? There are two ways. First, whatever actually happens must be possible, or it could not happen. The second way is knowledge by analogy, which is how science makes its predictions. For example, in previous cases, mixing vinegar and baking soda has produced carbon dioxide. Even though the present case differs slightly from previous cases, I know, by analogy that, if I have vinegar and baking soda I have the potential to produce carbon dioxide. I know this for a fact, whether or not I actually mix them to produce carbon dioxide.

So, you can choose to say that we only "seem" to have potentials that are not actualized, but in doing so, you reject the structure of science, and specifically, its ability to make reliable predictions.

What feature(s) of your past experience do you believe give you this knowledge? I don't believe there are any such features. — Herg

The fact that I have gone to the store and stayed at home previously, and have not suffered any relevant disability since.

You are not entitled to describe your state of mind as "awareness of alternatives being equally in my power" until it is established that these alternatives actually are equally in your power; and since this is precisely the issue between us, you are begging the question. — Herg

But, that has been established by previous analogous cases. There is no question begging, as I have shown how we know unrealized potentials, and that schema applies here. The ball is in your court to show why it applies to mixing vinegar and baking soda, but not to going to the store.

This is almost certainly not true of our universe. Nature is probabilistic rather than deterministic at the quantum level, and quantum superposition means that there is usually more than one line of action leading from the present state. — Herg

This is a common misunderstanding among non-physicists. Actually, quantum theory says that all unobserved physical processes are fully deterministic. Unpredictability enters only when quantum systems are observed.

Superposition does not mean that there are many states present but that the one state present is can be analyzed into a sum of mathematically independent function. Further, superposition only applies when the dynamics is linear to a good approximation. As electron-electron interactions bind bulk matter and are intrinsically nonlinear, the concept of superposition breaks down for bulk matter.

Since, as I have just stated, our universe is almost certainly not deterministic, and there are multiple lines of action in purely physical systems, humans having multiple lines of action does not imply that humans are not purely physical systems. — Herg

As I explained, this is based on a misunderstanding of physics. Since there were no quantum observations before the advent of intelligent observers, and even now they are quite rare, no matter what interpretation of quantum measurement you subscribe to, the physical universe is almost completely deterministic.

Further, whether or not you believe in collapse on awareness (I do not), measurement, as the one possible exception to determinism, involves intelligent observers. This undermines your argument, as the possible indeterminism you cite only occurs when intelligent observers become involved.

Finally, if you believe that the universe is not deterministic, how can you object to the reality of incompatible possibilities?

But even if the universe is deterministic, and purely physical systems only have one line of action leading from the present state, while humans see multiple lines of action before them, you still have not shown that we are free to choose between those multiple lines of action. — Herg

We are free if we are not constrained. We are constrained when we want to do A, but are prevented. This happens many times, so we know how to recognize constraints when we see them. For example, yesterday I wanted to go 70mph or more on the I-15, but traffic constrained me from going more than 0-20 mph. When I decide whether or not to go to the store, I experience no such constraint. So, I am free to choose either.

Your premise 1 begs the question by describing our state of mind as "we are aware that...", as I have already noted. — Herg

I do not understand what you're claiming. We have to begin any sound line of reasoning with experiential facts -- things we are aware of. I have explained how we know what is possible. So, what, exactly is your objection?

The sense of "in my power" that you use here will not deliver what you need to establish free will. What you mean here is that there are facts about the physical world - such as the gravitational attraction between your body and the earth, and the lack of any surface between the earth and moon on which you could walk - that prevent you walking to the moon, but that do not prevent you walking to the store. That sense of "in my power" is all about the limitations physical laws place upon a body like yours; it has nothing at all to do with free will. — Herg

It has much to do with free will, but not everything. Mechanistic determinists claim that the laws of nature preclude free will. You have pointed out some of the things the laws of nature prevent, and going to the store is not among them. Let's suppose that the laws of physical nature prevented me, at some micro-level, from going to the store. That would not prevent me from forming and committing to the intention to go to the store. Then I could commit to going to the store, only to find that I was physically unable to do so, as I was physically unable to go over 20 mph on the I-15 yesterday.

Of course, there are other kinds of determinism. For example, motivational determinists claim that we are determined to do whatever will be the most emotionally rewarding, or some variation on that. As you claim that the physical world is not determined, I am not sure what kind of constraint you think prevents us from being free.

Second, being in my power is a real state, with well-defined truth conditions.

The truth conditions are that you should be free to choose between alternatives; but you are not entitled to say that this is a real state unless we have established that those truth conditions obtain, and since this is precisely the issue between us, you are once again begging the question. — Herg

I have explained how we know unrealized possibilities. I await your response.

Staying home ceases to be in my power once I am on my way to the store.

Of course. But you cannot validly infer from this that staying home was in your power before you set off to the store. — Herg

No, but it shows that there are well-defined truth conditions for being able to do something that we do not do.

If we chose L1 instead of L2, then the only way we could have grounds for thinking that we had the power to choose L2 would be to have actually chosen L2, and of course that was prevented by our choosing L1. — Herg

Then, if we do not pour the vinegar on the backing soda, the possibility of producing carbon dioxide never existed? Where does this leave chemistry?

The first is that we do not need it to explain anything that happens in the world; and the second is that the notion of free will is incoherent, because it requires there to be a third possibility between determinism and indeterminism (which is mere randomness), and there is no such third possibility. — Herg

Free will is necessary to explain the reality of moral responsibility -- which happens in the world. People know that they are responsible for actions they freely choose, and are not responsible for actions when they had no choice. This knowledge has physical consequences -- which also happen in the world.

Your second argument is fallacious. Determinism means that choices are fully immanent in the state of the world before the agent exists. For there to be no middle ground, the Principle of Excluded Middle requires indeterminism to be the strict contradiction of determinism: that choices are not fully immanent in the state of the world before the agent exists. That differs from "mere randomness," which is mindless, for it does not consider the determining operation of the agent's mind.

So, there is a middle ground between fully determined and mindlessly random, viz. the result of mindful action on the part of a free agent.

I think this makes it clear that Dfpolis is making the categorical claim, not the hypothetical claim. — Herg

Exactly right.

I'm not sure I can not follow you. Are you sure you answered the question? — Heiko

No, I'm not sure I answered your question, "You are different from the physical object observed, so... why should anyone assume you got something to do with it?" The reason is that "something to do with it" is rather vague. As I was talking about knowing, I assumed that you were as well. If you had something else in mind, please explain what.

Your "intelligibility" for example either is something I could not care about less or something that science would only be concerned about as far as you pose as an object. Not even Kant would have made the mistake to call his deductions as describing a thing in itself. — Heiko

None of this rebuts what I said. Whether or not you or science care about intelligibility is irrelevant to the truth of my claim. The same applies to what Kant may or may not have done. If you have a factual objection, please give it.

I stick with the phenomenological account that you put forth the identity of subject and object on the one hand while implying a sharp distinction on the other. — Heiko

The partial identity of subject and object in the act of knowing is an ontological fact. Distinction belongs to the logical order. Ideas of the identical reality can be distinct if they consider that reality from different perspectives. A change of perspective does not entail a change in what is perceived.

Of course! This is a tautology. It's like saying, "As long as I continue to will my goal, I continue to will my goal." So what is will? — Noah Te Stroete

It is not a tautology as the intention is mental and the working is often physical, so they are not identical.

Will is a power, not a thing. Humans are ostensible unities, one aspect of which is the power to chose and commit. It is that power that we call "will."

So the will is uncaused. How did you refute Strawson again? I'm genuinely confused here. Could you clarify how the will is not accidentally necessarily and sufficiently caused? — Noah Te Stroete

The will is not determined by accidental causality, which is probably what you mean by "causality." It is, however, caused -- by whatever actualizes its potential to continue in operation, which leads ultimately to an uncaused concurrent cause some call "God." Just as the builder being sufficient to build this house does not mean that he or she is insufficient to build other houses, so the fact that my will is sufficient to instantiate this line of action does not mean that it is insufficient to instantiate other lines of action. So, the principle of sufficient causality is not violated. All that is "violated" is the idea that accidental causes involve necessity -- which was never true to begin with (as Hume showed).

Could you clarify how the will is not accidentally necessarily and sufficiently caused? — Noah Te Stroete

I just discussed this. As Hume showed, accidental causality is not intrinsically necessary. It derives whatever necessity it has from the essential or concurrent causality of the laws of nature. When we integrate their concurrent operation over time, we find initial states are transformed into determinate final states. This requires that the guiding intentionality (the laws of nature) remain constant over the course of the integration. In the case of humans (excluded from physics by the fundamental abstraction), intentionality changes over time in an unpredictable way, and so the required integration cannot be carried out. Thus, we are not subject to determination by accidental causality.

Because you felt compelled to put me in my place. — Noah Te Stroete

I see no reason to put anyone "in their place." We are discussing what is, and hopefully we will each teach the other something new. I am quite sure you know things I do not.

I'm saying it's necessary AND sufficient. Not just sufficient. Where am I going wrong? I'm confused. — Noah Te Stroete

It is necessary that every phenomenon have a sufficient cause. It is not necessary that every cause operate to a predetermined end. Houses necessarily have builders, but builders are not predetermined to build particular houses. Their sufficiency as causes does not necessitate a specific effect.

If I had a frontal lobotomy (which I'm considering after this exchange), then I couldn't speak coherently no matter how much I willed it. So, is not the will dependent on the physical-natural brain which operates according to necessary AND sufficient causes? — Noah Te Stroete

Of course the mind has interdependent data processing and intentional subsystems. If the data processing subsystem is compromised, the data we are aware of may be defective, we may lack the means of effecting our intentions,

You are different from the physical object observed, so... why should anyone assume you got something to do with it? — Heiko

Because:
1. The intelligibility of the object and the capacity of the subject to be informed are both actualized by the identical act, viz. the subject's awareness of the object, and
2. The object informing the subject is identically the subject being informed by the object.

So the point to consider here is that the activity of a physical system cannot be explained through reference to its "present state". That would be to make the same category mistake. To explain the activity of a physical system requires reference to the temporal extension of that system, and this means something beyond the "present state". — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes. Intentionality is revealed by time-development -- whether that intentionality be human or merely physical.

But what is your evidence that it isn't pre-determined? How do you reconcile free will with everything that we know about the natural world? — Noah Te Stroete

I provided a positive case for my position. I am prepared to rebut any counter argument. (I have reviewed all that I could find.) That is the best I can do.

I dispute your claim that free will is in any way incompatible "with everything that we know about the natural world." Surely humans are part of nature and our our experiences of ourselves as agents are as natural as our experiences of physical objects. What it is incompatible with is physical determinism.

I have argued previously that although all knowing is a subject-object relation, natural science begins with a fundamental abstraction that focuses on physical objects to the exclusion of the knowing subject. Consequently, the natural sciences are bereft of data on subjective agents, and has, therefore, no means of connecting what it has learned of the physical world with the intentional operations of subject-agents. That means that any attempt to apply purely physical concepts to such agency is an instance of Whitehead's Fallacy of Misplace Concreteness (applying abstractions to situations in which the abstracted context is relevant).

All natural phenomena have sufficient and necessary causes.
Choices are natural phenomena.
Choices have sufficient and necessary causes. — Noah Te Stroete

Agreed. Still, while it is necessary that every effect have an adequate cause, it is not necessary that the cause that informs the effect be predetermined to a particular effect. The problem with this sort of argument is that modern philosophy has forgotten the distinction between accidental and essential causes.

Accidental causes (which are all most moderns think about) are the time-sequence by rule that occupied the minds of Hume and Kant. They connect two temporally disjoint events, and as the separation allows for intervention, this kind of causality is not necessary -- a point famously made by Hume, but also known to Aristotle, ibn Sina and Aquinas. That is why time-sequenced causality is called "accidental." Since accidental causality is not necessary, it cannot justify determinism.

Essential or concurrent causality is quite different. Aristotle's paradigm case is the builder building the house. The builder building the house is identically the house being built by the builder. Because of this identity and the fact that only a single event is involved, essential causality has an intrinsic necessity that accidental causality lacks. Every happening is a doing, and every doing is a happening. For example, the law of conservation of mass-energy conserving this system's mass-energy is identically this system's mass-energy being conserved by the law of conservation of mass-energy. If the law were not operative here and now, mass-energy would not be conserved here and now -- and vice versa.

Human will acts concurrently. As long as I continue to will my goal, I continue to work toward that goal. Thus, a free will can be the necessary sufficient cause you argue for if it is sufficient to commit to the line of action (say L1) that it in fact commits to. That it is sufficient to commit to L1 does not preclude it from also being sufficient to commit to L2, which it did not commit to.

Approaching the choice, we are aware that incompatible lines of action, L1, L2, ..., are equally in our power. — Dfpolis

Are we aware of this? I don't know that this is true. — Noah Te Stroete

Even though I choose to stay home, I am aware that I have the power to walk to the store while I do not have the power to walk to the moon. How could you not know this?

If you really have free will, then refrain from posting further. — Noah Te Stroete

How would following your dictate prove anything?

hypotheses of the sort you are advancing are unfalsifiable, and so unscientific. — Dfpolis

Proponents of free will think that this is false, and that new lines of action have their radical origin in human agents. — Dfpolis

And this isn't unfalsifiable? — Noah Te Stroete

Falsifiability is a criterion applicable only to the hypothetico-deductive or scientific method. One cannot apply that method to a hypothesis that is unfalsifiable. It does not apply to either experiential observation or to deduction, which are reliable or not on their own grounds. You presented what, on its face, appears to be a scientific hypothesis. I presented a deductive, experienced-based argument for my position. If you have and experiential/deductive argument for determinism, please advance it.

I justify it by the fact that the limbic system has been shown by neuroscience to be the driver of our frontal lobe's decision making process. — Noah Te Stroete

Really? I've studied the question of brain modelling, and discuss in the last chapter of my book. Given our present state of knowledge, such modeling is an impossible task. Our brain has approximately 100,000,000,000 neurons with perhaps 100 times that many connections, and we have 10 times that many glia. We have little idea of how glial cells contribute to data processing, but we know that they do. Depending on how you count, there are 30-100 neurotransmitters, and the function of the majority is unknown.

We know that neurons respond nonlinearly to excitatory and inhibiting inputs, and that their response depends on their long and short term history. Chaos theory tells us that any minor change in the assumed inputs of a nonlinear system can result in completely different outputs. I show in the first chapter of my book that any attempt to determine our actual brain state (needed for input by any predictive brain model) would both fry our brain and require a data processing time much greater than the age of the universe.

We do know that the limbic system (composed mainly of the amygdala, hippocampus, thalamus, hypothalamus, basal ganglia, and cingulate gyrus) is involved in memory, emotion and arousal or stimulation. We do not know, and, in light of the aforementioned data acquisition and modeling difficulties, cannot know, that its outputs determine our brain's neuromotor outputs. Thus, hypotheses of the sort you are advancing are unfalsifiable, and so unscientific.

So, I ask again, why do you think that the limbic system determines, as opposed to influencing, our decisions?

What we choose is what we really want most of all, so is there really a choice?
— Noah Te Stroete

This is merely a tautology. The question is, is what we want most predetermined? If it is not, but it is ultimately we who give weigh our incommensurate needs and desires, then we are free. As different people assign different weights to different motives, it is clear that the assignment of weights depends on the agent. — Dfpolis

It is not a tautology because you seem to be claiming that we could've chosen something that we didn't want most of all. — Noah Te Stroete

I made no such claim. Let's think about this. How do we know what a person most wants? By observing what they choose. This is true whether or not that choice is predetermined. So, it is a tautology to say that "What we choose is what we really want most of all." Of course we do.

Volitional determinists believe that all human acts are fully immanent in the state of the universe prior to the existence of the human agent. Proponents of free will think that this is false, and that new lines of action have their radical origin in human agents. That is the question that needs to be discussed with regard to the existence of free will, and it is a question that cannot be evaded by compatibilist redefinitions of "free will."

It is predetermined by the limbic system which drives the frontal lobe (the "thinking" or "weighing" part which I said is just like "going through a mental exercise"). — Noah Te Stroete

This makes no evolutionary sense. Why waste time and energy on a process that is merely for show? Who is nature trying to fool and why?

Only why would I bother to read what you have to say, whether in a book or in a forum post, given that you don't know what you are talking about? — SophistiCat

Because if you read what I write, you can decide if I know what I am talking about. You certainly can't rationally decide a priori. I do not need to know everything Galen Strawson and his father ever wrote to know his argument is fallacious.

2. To have free will means that we have incompatible lines of action equally in our power. — Dfpolis

I could just deny your second premise. — Noah Te Stroete

You could, but as it is a definition, that would buy you little. It would merely mean that we use words in different ways.

I believe we are compelled to make the choices we make, and the availability of choices is just a mental exercise. — Noah Te Stroete

You can believe what you will. The question is how do you justify such a belief? I have offered a justification for my position, and all you have objected to is how I use the term "free will."

What we choose is what we really want most of all, so is there really a choice? — Noah Te Stroete

This is merely a tautology. The question is, is what we want most predetermined? If it is not, but it is ultimately we who give weigh our incommensurate needs and desires, then we are free. As different people assign different weights to different motives, it is clear that the assignment of weights depends on the agent.

The key here is incommensurability. As each desire is satisfied by different desiderata, there is no predetermined, automatic trade off between different motives. In other words there is no single utility, measure of happiness, or of libido, to be maximized. It is the agent who gives more or less weight to charity, honesty, prestige, power, various physical desires, etc. -- thus valuing one option above another.

So the argument really is not if an individual act is determined, but if the entire series of acts is determined, which than leads to logical question what or who determined the first act in this series — Rank Amateur

I think it is both the individual act and the series that is in question. So, you raise an interesting point.

he seems to be conflating what's supposed to be an argument against freedom with comments that are primarily focused on whether we can be considered culpable for our actions. Those are two different ideas. — Terrapin Station

Yes, he does seem to be conflating a number of ideas, making his use of "responsible" even more equivocal than I said.

Is he even talking about making choices per se? That wasn't clear to me, which is why I said that "it's not clear what sort of free will he's even talking about." I got the impression that maybe he was referring to free will in more of a murky Dennettian sense, but I wasn't sure. (Dennett is a compatibilist. In my opinion, compatibilism can't be made coherent.) — Terrapin Station

His argument might work vs. Dennett's position, but I think Dennett is fooling himself in thinking that deterministic avoidance can warrant personal responsibility. Strawson's argument surely does not work vs. the capacity to choose one of a number of equally possible options.

This isn't true. All that experience tells us is that:
a) approaching a choice, we are aware of more than one new line of action (let's call these lines L1 and L2)
(b) it seems to us that we are free to choose either L1 or L2
(c) after we have chosen (say) L1, it seems to us that we could have chosen L2 instead. — Herg

I experience tells us more than this. It additionally tells us, in many cases, that L1 and L2 are equally in our power. It is equally in my power, for example, to go to the store to buy an ingredient for dinner or to stay home a while longer to discuss philosophy. I know both are equally in my power on the basis of my past experience. This awareness of alternatives being equally in my power, and not "I could have chosen otherwise," is what I mean by free will. Of course, the fact that the alternatives were equally in my power means that I could have chosen otherwise, but that is derivative, and not the critical act of awareness.

There is a further experiential point worthy of reflection. Purely physical systems (as opposed to physical systems with intellect and will) have only one immanent line of action -- that determined by its present state and the laws of nature. Intentional systems, such as humans, are essentially different in that we can have multiple lines of actions immanent before we commit to one. The difference in the number of immanent lines of action is critical, for it means that we differ from purely physical systems. So any analogy to their deterministic nature fails.

If we lay this out as a logical argument intended to prove that we could in fact have chosen another line of action, it fails:
Premise 1: Approaching the choice, we are aware of L1 and L2.
Premise 2: Approaching the choice, it seems to us that are free to choose between L1 and L2.
Premise 3: After choosing L1, it seems to us that we could have chosen L2 instead.
Conclusion: Therefore the choice between L1 and L2 was not pre-determined, and we could have chosen L2.

Clearly the conclusion does not follow from the premisses. — Herg

Agreed. The argument is unsound, so that is not an argument I would use. My argument is:

1. Approaching the choice, we are aware that incompatible lines of action, L1, L2, ..., are equally in our power.
2. To have free will means that we have incompatible lines of action equally in our power.
3. Therefore, we have free will.

You could deny premise 1, but only dogmatically. First, I know what is and what is not in my power from my experience as a human in the world. It is in my power to walk to the store it is not in my power to walk to the moon. Second, being in my power is a real state, with well-defined truth conditions. Staying home ceases to be in my power once I am on my way to the store.

Instead of relying on someone's summary of a Youtube video, you should read some of Strawson's papers, such as The impossibility of moral responsibility (1994) — SophistiCat

The video is Strawson presenting his own argument, not a third party summary. Before I posted, I did a brief search for text in which Strawson presented the same argument, but did not find it.

Were I to take up the task of writing a book on free will again, I would read opposing views extensively, as I did for my book on naturalism. Until I do take up that task, Strawson is not likely to be on my reading list.

It seems to me that "perception" itself entails using symbolism to symbolize other things, including other symbols. The symbols are just as real as what they symbolize. Why would it matter if you get at the symbols or the real thing? Isn't the information what you need to get at - what those symbols symbolize (red apples mean ripe apples, black apples mean rotten apples)? Isn't it the information that is real and useful? — Harry Hindu

I think this is close to the mark, except that ideas are not like other symbols. In the case of words and physical signs we first have to grasp the form of the symbolic object before we can discern its meaning. In the case of ideas, we do not have to grasp that we have an idea and which idea it is before it means its referent. Rather, mental signs (formal signs) signify directly, with no need for us to grasp what they are before they refer.

maybe that means that I kind of agree with you, or at least with this: perception is sometimes direct and sometimes indirect — jamalrob

While I agree with what you say about confusing the forms of perception with the thing perceived, I don't think that the difference between sensation without and with awareness has anything to do with whether or not perception is direct. To deal with the question of directness, we first have to agree on what "direct perception" means. It seems to me to be a matter of degree. If we perceive at all, then the object is acting on us, modifying our neural state. The fact that this involves the mediation of instrumental causes seems no more relevant to the role of the object than the sculptor's use of hammer and chisel to the agency of the artist.

However, when I'm conscious of driving, the content of my perception is a conscious experience, which is mental. I'm no longer directly perceiving the car on the road. Instead, I'm perceiving a world of feels, sounds, colors, smells, and so on. The phenomenal objects of my consciousness are made up these sensations. The road, the car, the wheel, the air and so on are not made up of colors, sounds, smells and so on. They are not phenomenal objects, but rather real, physical ones.

Therefore, I cannot be directly perceiving the real, physical objects when I'm conscious. — Marchesk

This seems confused to me. The qualia of colors, sounds, smells and so on are the forms of conscious perception. The fact that your perception has such forms does not mean that it is not the perception of its object. We have essentially the same the same sensations whether or not we are aware of them. The fact that our awareness of various sensory modalities has correlative forms (qualia) does not change this.

Eventually things are timelessly better, and I agree on that. But I’m just saying that, at the time when the horrors are happening, that’s still pretty bad, isn’t it? And it likely seems like a long time. I’m saying that Benevolence wouldn’t and didn’t make there be that. — Michael Ossipoff

i agree on the pain. As I said, I don't see God as the author of moral evil, but moral agents who can choose evil acts. As for physical evils, yes, it is a problem, but the Gnostic solution does not work.

I have never understood how reincarnation makes sense. How can one be the same person/being

You won’t be the same person in every regard, but you will still be you, because there’s continuity of experience, as I answer about directly below. — Michael Ossipoff

But, I have no continuity of experience with a former life. If I did, I would agree that reincarnation is real.

Among the infinity of hypothetical experience-stories, there’s one whose protagonist and his experience are the same as you and your experience at that time. — Michael Ossipoff

Hypotheticals have no cognitive value beyond being notions to consider and test. If they are confirmed, they have practical value, but no intrinsic certainty. On the other hand, my life, and everyone else's, is an experiential reality.

, when there is no physical or intentional continuity between the old and the new self?

But there is intentional continuity. There’s continuity of experience. And there isn’t a new self.
...
Though you’re unconscious at that time, you still have subconscious perceptions of need, want, inclination, predisposition, future-orientation and Will-to-Life. …like someone who is in (some part of) a life. — Michael Ossipoff

I do not see either innate or learned inclinations, etc., as evidence of a former life. There are much simpler explanations. I can see that they might motivate a faith commitment, but that is not a conclusion.

you can’t claim any proof that it has some kind of absolute, noncontextual, context-independent reality. — Michael Ossipoff

I am happy to agree that reality is contextual. The difference between what I judge to be real and what is merely hypothetical, is that the real acts (directly or indirectly) on me, while that there is no reason to think the merely hypothetical does. That is a manifest difference.

Such a hypothetical story has the requirement of consistency. That requirement is satisfied if the continuation of your experience is consistent with your current experience, including your subconscious feelings. — Michael Ossipoff

No, it is not. There is nothing inconsistent in rejecting previous lives.

If that sounds like something made up, or unsupportedly believed-in, I’ll just say that reincarnation is a natural and expected consequence of my Ontic Structural Subjective Idealism metaphysics. — Michael Ossipoff

How does that help convince others who do not agree with your metaphysics?

If there’s a reason why you’re in a life, and if, at the end of this life, that reason remains, then what does that suggest? It suggests that you’ll again be in a life. — Michael Ossipoff

That I am who I am, is no reason for me to have other lives. Also, there is no separate "me." I am a single, unified being (body and soul). If I survive death, it will not be the whole of me that survives, but only my subjectivity -- my intentional core.

The reason I am who I am is that I was created a unique person, individuated by the network of relationships into which I was conceived. I am the one who relates to my correlative relata -- you are the one who relates to yours.

So, among that infinity of abstract logical systems, one of those, with suitable renaming of its things, has a description that is the same as a description of the experience of someone who is just like you — Michael Ossipoff

Yes, and I know that one is real because I experience it. The overwhelming majority of the others are completely unparsimonious and irrelevant. Why create this vast structure, when experiential reality is ever so much more compact and relevant?

I claim that, among the things of the describable realm, there’s no such thing as absolute-existence. — Michael Ossipoff

You may claim whatever you like, but the rest of us need evidence and analysis.

That person/story-protagonist, and that person’s “Will-to-Life” is a necessary complementary part of that hypothetical life-experience-story. — Michael Ossipoff

Think about this. Our “Will-to-Life” cannot be the reason we are alive because, absent life, we can't will anything. Also, as evidenced by suicide, many people do not have a “Will-to-Life."

Because there are no mutually-inconsistent facts, consistency is the requirement of your experience-story. So, the physical world that is the setting of that life-experience story will of course be one that is consistent with the person that you are. — Michael Ossipoff

I think you have this backward. Consistence is not a requirement, but a consequence of the nature of reality, of being. No putative thing can both be and not be at one and the same time in one and the same way. On the other hand, hypotheticals, as mental constructs, can have implicit inconsistencies. We can imagine living in a world with slightly different physical constants, but, as the physics behind the fine tuning argument shows, such a world would not support our life.

At the end-of-lives (or at the end of this life, if there weren’t reincarnation) of course there’s sleep, — Michael Ossipoff

How do you know? Mystics claim that there is an experiential state of non-empirical awareness that isw not sleep.

What I mean is that each kind of being has its own good

But there’s temporary unnecessary experience of suffering. — Michael Ossipoff

Pain is not evil in itself. It is a warning that something is wrong and a motivation to take corrective action, and so good in itself.

just as there logically can’t be a true-and-false proposition, so there logically couldn’t not be the abstract facts that comprise our hypothetical life-experience-stories. — Michael Ossipoff

I have no idea what this means.

“unloving” is an understatement for the worst people — Michael Ossipoff

I agree, the term is not forceful enough.

It’s more meaningful, definable and philosophically-supportable, to speak of us as purposefully-responsive devices. — Michael Ossipoff

Doing so ignores our experience of being subjects,which is how we know we are conscious.

I emphasize that I don’t claim any existence for them. As I said:
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I’m talking about inevitable timeless logical relations and inter-reference among timeless abstract facts about propositions about hypothetical things. — Michael Ossipoff

But, there are no relations except existential relations.

The physical laws, and the things that they describe, are figments of logic, and, as such, need no explanation. — Michael Ossipoff

Not quite. The laws of physics are not fictions, but describe an aspect of reality. They are approximate descriptions of laws observed to be operative in nature, and so quite real. It is continued operation of the laws of/in nature that requires an explanation.

I suggest that God didn’t create us, didn’t and doesn’t make there be the inevitable apparent worldly-lives, but, rather, made there be overall good, with the apparent worldly lives as good as possible under their inevitable circumstances. — Michael Ossipoff

Sound reasoning requires that God sustain the continuing existence of all finite being. This is the classical creatio contunuo. So, your solution does not work.

We use observed data to determine “physical” facts within the logical/mathematical relational structure of our experience-stories.
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That doesn’t mean that the whole experience-story is other than a hypothetical story, consisting of the relational-structure among a hypothetical complex system of inter-referring abstract-implications about propositions about hypothetical things. — Michael Ossipoff

Of course it means exactly that it is more than hypothetical. Once we observe a reality, it ceases to be merely hypothetical.

You might be interested in The Idea of the Holy by Rudolf Otto. He discusses the kind of feelings I think you have in mind.

Well, the point is that "form" in the sense of what is in the knowing subject is "form' in the sense of essence, and "form" in the sense of what is in the material object is a different meaning, of "form", including accidentals. Therefore your claim that the form of the object is the form in the knowing subject is nothing but equivocation. — Metaphysician Undercover

I have explained in detail why it is not an equivocation. Repeating your claims does not help. You need to show why the arguments I have made are unsound.

But the form in the mind of the artist is not the same form as the form in the work. — Metaphysician Undercover

Only to the extent that the work is poorly executed. To the extent that the work is well-done, it embodies the very form in the mind of its maker.

It is not the case that the artist takes the form out of the mind and puts it into the matter. — Metaphysician Undercover

But, it is, except it need not leave the mind of the artist in being embodied in the work.

The artist does not take the material and inform it with the form in the mind, the artist takes the material and changes the form which it has, to correspond with what's in the mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

And the difference is? In any change, the matter is informed with the new form.

See here is evidence of that very mistake. The artist cannot give the stone whatever form is desired, being limited by the form which the stone already has. — Metaphysician Undercover

You're right, but you're taking my claim out of context, The context was that the matter is proportionate and suitable to the desired form. Obviously, you can't make the Eiffel Tower out of a hair pin. However, given that amount of metal Eiffel could have made many other things.

The notes are not numerically one though, that's the point. Each note is different between the object and the mind, one having accidentals, the other not. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, the notes are things that can be predicated of the object, and so accidents, not substances that can have accidents predicated of them.

Each note of intelligibility in the mind is an abstraction, therefore not the same as the intelligibility of the thing abstracted from. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is exactly wrong. As Aristotle observed the mind being inform by the object is identically the object being informing the mind. The notes of comprehension in our mind are our awareness of the notes of intelligibility in the object. What else could they be?

So in relation to your example, the "humanity" in me is not the same as the "humanity" in you because of the differences in accidentals. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is confused. You and I do have different accidents, but they are what is left behind in abstracting our common humanity. Accidents belong to individuals, not to the universals they instantiate.

"Relational" is formal. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, but not the form of one thing in isolation.

This isn't the thread for it, but I think the idea that meaning significantly lives in individual words is still fairly dominant --which contributes to lots of uncharitable interpretation. — macrosoft

Yes. I think we can be more charitable if we try to stand beside our dialogue partner and try to see what he or she is seeing, rather than taking their words on face value. I have to admit that I often fail in this.

In Aristotle though, quiddity is a sense of "form". Aristotle doesn't make the clear distinction between form and essence which you refer to in Aquinas. In Aristotle this is just two senses of "form". — Metaphysician Undercover

We are concerned with reality, not with what may or may not have been anyone's historical position per se. I am only citing these authors to credit them and to define terms.

You ought to recognize that the word "essence" did not exist for Aristotle. — Metaphysician Undercover

‘Essence’ is the standard English translation of Aristotle’s curious phrase to ti ên einai, literally “the what it was to be” for a thing. This phrase so boggled his Roman translators that they coined the word essentia to render the entire phrase, and it is from this Latin word that ours derives. Aristotle also sometimes uses the shorter phrase to ti esti, literally “the what it is,” for approximately the same idea.) In his logical works, Aristotle links the notion of essence to that of definition (horismos)—“a definition is an account (logos) that signifies an essence” (Topics 102a3) — SEP: Aristotle's Metaphysics by S. Marc Cohen

And clearly there are many instances when "form" is used to indicate formula, or essence. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, but this does not advance you case that the form of the object is not also partially in the knowing subject.

I still don't understand how you can say that form informs matter without assuming separate forms. — Metaphysician Undercover

I am sorry that you do not see this. Consider a piece of abstract art. It's form occurred first in the mind of the artist, then in the work. The artist takes material and informs it according to the intended form. In natural bodies, the prior state of the matter is informed by the laws of nature, which play the intentional role. There is no reason in either case to assume a separate form.

Wouldn't the possible forms which the matter chooses from, necessarily have separate existence? Otherwise that matter which is choosing, would already have all these different forms at once, and that's contradictory. — Metaphysician Undercover

Matter is not intelligent and makes no choices. As I just said, the intentional role is played by the laws of nature.

There is no contradiction in having multiple possibilities. The artist can give the stone whatever form is desired. It is only a contradiction if something actually is and actually is not at the same time.

If there were no moon, I would see no image of the moon. So, clearly the moon acts (via mediation) to form its image on my retina. — Dfpolis

Your logic is faulty here. You do not have the required premise to say that if you see something, that thing is necessarily acting. — Metaphysician Undercover

I am not arguing a priori, but a posteriori. We know of no instance in which we see an object in which the object does not act on us by scattering light into our eyes. If you have a counterexample please give it.

The moon might be completely passive, with an active medium, and then it would be wrong to say that the moon acts. — Metaphysician Undercover

Whatever might be, a priori, what actually is, is an active moon. I studied electrodynamics. It shows that scattering occurs because incident light oscillates the atomic electrons (of the moon) and they re-radiate light as a result. If the moon's electrons did not act to radiate light, we would not see the moon. So, whatever grammatical form you use, the moon acts in being seen.

The medium is an instrumental, not an efficient or formal, cause. It is absurd to argue that the sculptor does not sculpt because she uses a hammer and chisel to cut the stone.

We describe a thing as "what it is", it's form — Metaphysician Undercover

No. A human being is not an abstract human form, but a material body with human form.

So if you want to define a thing by "its present powers", then to account for its ability to act, which require a specific type of temporal relation, you need to refer to something other than "what it is". — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I don't. As I said, humans are rational animals even when we are not being rational. Our essence is our nature, which defines the kind of things we can do, even if we are not doing them at the moment.

You're begging the question again, with your assumption that objects act, when really they might only be passive, acted on. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I am arguing from the data of experience. Nothing can be purely passive, for if it did not re-act when we act on it, then, however much we exerted ourselves, we would not be acting on it at all.

Right, my assumptions concerning activity are not the same as your assumptions, but I think mine are more realistic. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is not an assumption on my part, but an empirical fact that the moon acts in many ways here on earth. It scatters light into our eyes and it acts on the oceans to produce tides.

This is contrary to the fundamental laws of logic. — Metaphysician Undercover

Specifically?

There are two beings, "the object and the subject". You are claiming that these two distinct beings have one and the same (numerically identical) form. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not the same form in the sense of having all the notes of intelligibility, but the same in the sense that they notes they do share are numerically one. That is the nature of universals. Every instance of a note of intelligibility is an instance of the identical note or it would not be an instance. The instances (tokens) are different, but what they are instances of (their type) is identical. For example, the abstraction <humanity> is one, even though many individuals have humanity.

But the very principle (the law of identity) which allows us to say that two distinct things have different matter, disallows us from saying that they have the same form — Metaphysician Undercover

How? Further, I do not see that the law of identity ("What ever is, is") enters into differentiating individuals.

It is only by the fact that they have different forms, that we can say that they have different matter. Matter is only distinguishable as this or that particular matter by its form, so you cannot say that the subject and object have different matter without respecting that they have different forms. So the subject and object can in no way share have same form. — Metaphysician Undercover

I can't agree with a word of this analysis. We can have two quite indistinguishable objects and still know that they are two, not one, in light of their relation to each other and to us. One is on the right, the other on the left. One is closer, the other further.

Of course they would not be objects if they had no form. That is why they are countable, but the reason they aren't one is relational.

No note is a perfect, ideal, or absolute understanding. — Metaphysician Undercover

No human understanding of being is "perfect, ideal, or absolute" because we apprehend some notes and not others. Still, the notes we do grasp are notes in the object.

In Aristotle's philosophy "form" refers to "what a thing is". There are two distinct senses of "form". One is the essence of a thing, how we know a thing, and this is without the accidents which we do not observe. The other is the form of the thing in itself, the complete "what a thing is", including all aspect which are missed by us. In his physics, a thing consists of two aspects, the matter and the form. This form is complete with accidents. — Metaphysician Undercover

As I argue in my hyle paper, in Aristotle "form" refers to what a thing is now, while hyle refers to its tendency to be something else. Classically, "what a thing is" (its quidity) is not its form, but its essence. Essences are the foundation in reality for essential definitions. In De ente et essentia Aquinas explains that form and essence are different. As it would be an error to leave out a body's materiality in defining it, the essence of a material thing includes both its form and matter.

"Form" can mean mean either a thing's entire present reality, which includes all of its accidents, or it can mean "substantial form" which is what it has in common with other instances of its species, and which excludes variable accidents.

"Accident" also means two things: (1) An aspect that is not essential, and so can vary both between individuals of the same species, and in the same individual over time. (2) What can be predicated of a substance (of a ostensible unity). As we cannot truly predicate anything of a being that is not an aspect of it, accidents in this second sense can be either essential or accidental in sense (1).

It is certainly true that we do not know all that a thing is. Still, the object as known is not what Aristotle means by "form."

I don't know what you mean by forms are "what informs matter". This is not Aristotelian, but more like Neo-Platonist, perhaps. — Metaphysician Undercover

There is nothing Neoplatonic in saying that form informs matter, unless you mean that forms exist without matter -- which I do not. Matter can be many things, but at any point in time it has one determinate form, which can be said to "inform it." Just as information is the reduction of possibility, so informing matter selects out of its possibilities the one it actually has. It does not mean that the form exists prior to matter being informed.

As to what informs matter, it is a determinate intentionality rather than a Platonic form. That is the role of final causality.

I do not believe that the moon is acting on your retina when you see the moon. — Metaphysician Undercover

If there were no moon, I would see no image of the moon. So, clearly the moon acts (via mediation) to form its image on my retina. In the same way, if I knock over a row of dominoes, I knock over every domino in the row, even though I only push the first.

"Form" refers to actuality, what is actual, not "capabilities", what is potential. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are confusing two kinds of potential here: the proximate potencies inherent in being the kind of thing a being is (which is its form), and the remote potential to stop being what it is, and become something else (which is its matter). The form of a thing is what it is now, defined by its present powers -- a living person, not a dead body; or an acorn, not an oak tree. What something is now is defined by all the things it can do now, even though it is not doing them. Thus, human beings are rational animals even when they are acting irrationally.

But the issue is the "form" that the moon has independently of the sphere we draw, and what exists within us. These two are really reducible to the same. The sphere we draw, is really within us. For Aristotle the object has a form which makes it the object which it is, independently of how we perceive it, and the sphere we draw. — Metaphysician Undercover

Of course objects exist (or not) independently of how we think of them. My point about the sphere was that thinking of the moon only as that within the sphere does not mean that the moon is only within the sphere. It has a radiance of action that extends to everything it influences. The moon as an object with a tidy boundary is an abstraction. The real moon is that, and every effect it has. We can see this because if we remove the effects, say the tides, then we are no longer thinking of the moon as it is, but an abstraction that does not act like the real moon. Removing any effect diminishes the reality of the moon.

But whether or not that light is received into the eye of an observer on earth, has no effect on the moon. So simple observation, in itself, does not affect the object. — Metaphysician Undercover

That is because your idea of the moon is a circumscribed abstraction, not the real being with its web of interactions.

The ambiguity of P1 is created by you, not me. I clearly mean numerical identity. You introduce ambiguity, suggesting a different meaning of "very same", in order to dismiss the argument by equivocation. The equivocation is yours, not mine, created with the intent to reject the argument. — Metaphysician Undercover

But, I affirmed the sense of numerical Identity, which is what you intended.

Your objection to p2, I cannot even understand because you are talking about informing this and that, which as I explained above, I don't understand this usage. We are talking about the form of the object, what the object is, not "informing the object" whatever you mean by that. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is a question about how to count. I count one form, you count two forms. Let me explain why there is one, not two forms. Clearly, there are two informed beings: the object and the subject. Does that mean that there are two forms? No! Why? Because the basis of the twoness is the different matter of the subject and the object. But, we are not talking about the informed matter of the object, or the informed matter in my brain, but about the form in abstraction from matter.

Because the form is specifically immaterial, we cannot use different matter or places to multiply its count. We have to count based on properties intrinsic to the form the form(s) we are counting. What are these properties? Notes of intelligibility or of comprehension. So, the only basis for saying one form is not another is if they have different notes of comprehension. In the same way, the only basis for saying one note of comprehension is not another is if they have different information.

I've said that the form in the subject does not exhaust the form in the object. So, they differ in light of having different notes of intelligibility/comprehension. Still, as the notes of comprehension we do have are identical with notes in the object, they (the notes we have) are one with those of the object.

Here is a good example of a non sequitur argument. Your conclusion here "only one individual is needed to abstract a universal concept", does not support your claim "abstractions are not generalizations". — Metaphysician Undercover

I seem to have erred in interpreting what you were saying. I apologize. I was thinking of the Hume-Mill model of induction, in which generalization is the result of repeated experience, not abstraction. That is not what you were saying.

The problem is that the generalization based on only one instance of occurrence is much more likely to be faulty, though it still is a generalization — Metaphysician Undercover

This confuses generalization on the Hume-Mill model, in which we constructively add the hypothesis that future cases will be like past cases with abstraction in which we add nothing, but subtract notes of comprehension that are individuating.

What accounts for the universality of concepts is the objective capacity (intelligibility) of many individuals to elicit the same concept. — Dfpolis

Huh? What is "objective capacity' supposed to mean? — Metaphysician Undercover

It means that each instance has the objective notes of intelligibility required to elicit the concept.

Thank you for your appreciative comment on behalf of myself and my dialogue partners. If you have questions, you should feel free to ask them. It is not necessary that you take a "position" to be part of the conversation.

What I was driving at in the passage you weren't sure about was the [potential] priority of something other than concept and propositional truth when it comes to religion. — macrosoft

Yes, I think you are right. I think that is what Augustine was expressing in defining theology as "faith seeking understanding" (fide quaerens intellectum).

I can conceive an 'atheist' and a 'theist' being tuned in to the same hazy thing, merely with different words for it. — macrosoft

Agreed. I think what a lot of atheists reject is not what I understand by "God." When they tell me what they reject, I often agree with them.

I like this approach to the spiritual. It exists 'within.' — macrosoft

Thank you.

Right. And the 'object' of this knowledge and reflection might just be a 'how' of living, a way that cannot be fully formalized or publicly confirmed like the reading of a thermometer. — macrosoft

Right. Certainly not something measurable.

Where we might differ is that I don't see how God apart from this 'how' is central. — macrosoft

I am not sure exactly what you are driving at in this paragraph. I think what is of interest varies from person to person, and there is nothing wrong or regrettable in that. I do not see God as in any way apart from us. We are divine activities. (God holding us in being is identically us being held in being by God.) And, in mystical encounters, we become aware of this union. In the Eastern tradition, if is expressed in the central insight that Atman (the True Self) is Brahman (the Transcendent). We are all and only what God holds open to us. Still, we do not exhaust the reality that is God.

I think we need to reflect on what is meant by "spiritual." Despite B-movies and the scoffing of naturalists, I don't think that most people mean some ectoplasmic form of matter when they speak of being "spiritual." They are taking about the kind of intentionality a person has. So, I see the spiritual realm as the intentional realm.

That means that is is not completely mysterious. Even though intentionality is deeply subjective, it is something all humans experience. While it does not belong to the realm of physical objects, it can be and is an object of knowledge and reflection.

So, teleology, in pointing to a deep intentionality in nature (at the level of its operative laws), shows that nature is not exhausted by its material states, but also has an intentional, and so a spiritual, aspect. That does not end the story, but is a fact requiring further reflection.

No apologies are required.

The best I can come up with is, as you suggest, it is a small thing in the "big picture" -- a side effect that will be made up for in other ways. But, I claim no certainty here.

I said it, but that answer didn’t entirely satisfy me.
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Can major injury, misery and horror, followed by early death be “made up for”? — Michael Ossipoff

If you believe in some form of eternal bliss.

But would it even mean anything to say that what’s happening to those people is somehow later (if there’s reincarnation) “outweighed” or “cancelled-out”? How does that change anything when it’s happening to them? When it’s there, it’s there, and that isn’t a good thing. — Michael Ossipoff

I have never understood how reincarnation makes sense. How can one be the same person/being, when there is no physical or intentional continuity between the old and the new self?

What does make moral sense to me is the idea that death is not the end, so that this life is the birth pain of a new stage of existence.

Do you mean “Tough luck for the unfortunate war-maimed civilians, because what matters is the greatest good for the greatest number?” That doesn’t sound like a situation that Benevolence made there be. — Michael Ossipoff

No, that is not what i mean. What I mean is that each kind of being has its own good, and we need to bear that in mind if we are thinking objectively. As a matter of belief, supported by probable reason, I think that the good are rewarded and the evil punished, not by divine fiat, but by the ontological structure of reality.

What do I mean by that? In a context in which love means willing the good of the beloved, morally good acts are loving acts, and morally evil acts are unloving acts. As God necessarily wills the good of His creatures, God is identically love. Those who live a life of love, necessarily have an intentionality that will lead them to a life of bliss (a life intentionally linked to God). Those who live an unloving life will also find what they have chosen: a life of eternal alienation and frustration of their natural end. These final states trivialize any suffering that has come before.

It isn’t about anthropocentricity, because the same misfortunes happen to the other animals too. — Michael Ossipoff

I take the unpopular view that the reactions of creatures without intellect and will are fully explained by their mechanics and they are aware of nothing. In saying this, I am not saying that humans are the only creatures with intellect and will, even on this planet.

Time is only within a physical world, a property of a physical world. — Michael Ossipoff

Agreed.

I’m talking about inevitable timeless logical relations and inter-reference among timeless abstract facts about propositions about hypothetical things. — Michael Ossipoff

Yes. I missed that. I responded too quickly. My apologies.

Logical relations have no actual existence apart from the minds that think them. Independently of such minds, they are only possible, not actual. So, they have no being of their own to persist.

So, within this physical universe, there are a number of laws that require the continuations that you referred to. — Michael Ossipoff

Yes, there are. I address this exact question in my paper. These laws are not self-conserving. For example, the law of conservation of mass-energy conserves mass-energy, not itself. So there has to be a meta-law conserving it. To avoid an infinite regress of meta-meta-meta-...laws, we must come to a self-conserving law, God.

Those relations and inter-reference in those logical systems are inevitable in the same way as it’s an inevitable tautology that there’s no true-and-false proposition. — Michael Ossipoff

The fact that we use observed data to decide questions shows that this in not the case.

We have distinguished the form as it is in the object, as different from the form in the mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think you're confused here. Forms are not material objects that can be different because they are in different places. They are what informs matter. That information can be entire, as it is with the the material object, or partial, as it is in the mind of the knowing subject.

In sensation, the object might act on us, being external to us, but it is not "acting within us". — Metaphysician Undercover

Of course it is. It acts on my retina to form the image by which I see it. It acts on my eardrum so that I hear it, etc. These lines of action continue in the neural signals distributing the information to the brain's various processing centers which present the information of which I am aware.

if it were acting within us then the whole form of the object, not just a part, would be within us. — Metaphysician Undercover

Why? When I mow the lawn, are all my capabilities revealed? Of course not. I am much more than a lawn mower. When things act, they reveal only part of the actuality, and forms are the actuality of a being.

If a part of the object were within us, this implies that the whole of the object would not exist without the mind which apprehends it, it would be missing a part. The object would be incomplete without being apprehended by a mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is quite true. As Aristotle notes, the object would have an unactualized potential -- its intelligibility.

If a part leaves the object to act within the mind, then the simple act of seeing an object would change that object. How would seeing the moon change the moon? — Metaphysician Undercover

This is the reason I said you were confused above. There is no "part" that leaves. There is a form that informs both within the sphere we draw around the moon and with in us.

Objects do change when we observe them. All observations are interactions, with action and reaction. We can usually ignore that fact because the changes to the object are negligible, but occasionally, as in quantum observations, they become pivotal. We could not see the moon were light not scattered off it. That light changes the moon, but in a small way we can ignore from a practical point of view.

P1: To take the form of the object means to have the very same form. P2: The form which exists in the mind is not the same as the form which is in the object. C:Therefore the mind does not take the form of the object. — Metaphysician Undercover

P1 is ambiguous. "Very same" can mean numerical identity, which is present in experiential cognition, or it can mean having the identical set of properties, which is not the case when only some notes of intelligibility are apprehended.

P2 is true if you mean that we do not apprehend all the notes of the object's intelligibility, but false if you mean that we are not informed by the numerically identical form that informs the object. We could not possibly know anything if one form informed the object, and a numerically different form informed our mind -- for then we would know the second form, not the from of the object.

C is a non sequitur.

Why not accept the obvious, and simple solution, that the form in the mind is distinct from the form in the object, just like a representation is distinct from the thing represented? — Metaphysician Undercover

Because a representation is informed by the artist, while my perception is informed by the object perceived.

Are you claiming that in sense perception there is no separation, no medium, between the object perceived, and the perceiver? — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, actions can be mediated; nonetheless, mediated acts are still their agent's acts.

But you cannot form the concept of "human" from one individual, Jane, because such a concept is a generalization of many humans. — Metaphysician Undercover

Abstractions are not generalizations. For example, there are deep ocean species that have only been seen once. Still, if another individual were observed, we would recognize that it was the same kind of creature as the first. Thus, only one individual is needed to abstract a universal concept.

And so the concept "human" extends to all human beings. Therefore even if the human beings which one has met already "partially exist within us", this does not account for intentionality, which gives one the capacity to designate a person not yet met as human. — Metaphysician Undercover

What accounts for the universality of concepts is the objective capacity (intelligibility) of many individuals to elicit the same concept.

It's a bunch of irrelevant stuff to read through. — Terrapin Station

I am sorry that you don't feel this discussion is worth the investment of your time. Given that you are unwilling to commit time to the discussion, there is no point in me committing time to further responses.

How does that response answer how something like "grains of wheat growing into wheat stalks" is evidence of intentionality? — Terrapin Station

By referring you to the arguments in my paper. What advantage is there to my retyping the arguments here when you can click on the link? (https://www.academia.edu/27797943/Mind_or_Randomness_in_Evolution). The intro to the arguments begins on p. 4, the arguments proper begin on p. 5.

determinate final states in physics; grains of wheat growing into wheat stalks, not oaks; Spiders building webs to catch insects to eat. — Dfpolis


How is any of that evidence of intentionality? — Terrapin Station

As I pointed out, there are a number of questions to be considered successively. This is evidence of teleology. The arguments for intentionality are given in my paper: (1) the discussion of logical propagators, (2) the discussion of intentionality as characterized by Brentano and (3) the recognition of intentionality by other, naturalistic authors.

So when Dfpolis says that in his view there is evidence of teleology, and then I ask what he considers evidence of it, I ask him to point at the stuff in question, and he doesn't bother, from our perspective, not yours, it's not a matter of getting into a religious debate or not. — Terrapin Station

I am sorry, did I not provide you with evidence on some point? I thought I did: determinate final states in physics; grains of wheat growing into wheat stalks, not oaks; spiders building webs to catch insects to eat. In my article I also point to the preferred (end) forms revealed by convergent evolution, punctuated equilibrium showing that evolution does not drift aimlessly, and refractory toolkit genes evolving before there is any pressure to fully express them as evidence of means preceding ends.

The point I've been trying to make, is that the form in the mind is a different form from the one in the object. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is different in the sense that the part is different from the whole.is different from the part. It is not different in the sense of having a separate existence for in so far as it is the object acting within us, the form in our mind is part of the form of the object.

We do not have "a part" of the form in our minds, because that would require taking a part away from the object, so we do not have the form "partially" within or minds. — Metaphysician Undercover

We do not have a "part" in the sense of a physical part, but in the sense of an aspect, which is to say limited notes of intelligibility belonging jointly to the knower and known. This does not require taking the part away form the object, as things are where they act.

Aristotle was well aware of this issue, and points out that experiential knowledge involves shared existence. This is why he points out that the actualization of the object's intelligibility is the same as the actualization of the subject's capacity to be informed. As they are one and the same act, these actualizations share a common existence. So, while we may think of these actualizations separately, thye are ontologically inseparable.

Thus, no part of the object's form is taken away. In fact, as the form is not material, but the object's actuality, it has no parts outside of parts that would allow for such a division. The only possible division is mental -- apprehending this note of intelligibility, but not that.

You still continue to deny the necessary conclusion. — Metaphysician Undercover

You have not argued for a necessary conclusion. If you think you have, put it in the form of a syllogism.

you cannot describe the act of perception as the mind taking the form of the object, and subtracting things from it. — Metaphysician Undercover

I am not describing it hat way. "Perception" can mean either the sensory act, in which there is no separation or subtraction, or the mental act, in which we are not taking aspects away from the the form, but fixing on the object to the exclusion of its context. In doing that we apprehend, we are aware of, the individual object as something that can be distinguished form its context. So far we have taken nothing away from the form, we have only ignored the contextual noise.

It is when we go on to form a universal concept that we start taking away notes of comprehension. What we take away are the notes that individuate the the object, e.g. the time and place of our experience, the exact size, color, etc. We see, for example, that though Jane is freckled, a person does not have to be freckled to be human. Still, if we form our concept of <human> from Jane, the form of that concept is Jane's humanity informing us -- acting in us. So, in knowing Jane, she partially exists within us. That is what is meant by "intentional existence."

In reality, the mind is creating a form, which is a representation of the object. — Metaphysician Undercover

I have already acknowledged that as part of experience, there is a final, constructive phase. In it, we take elements from previous experiences, and add them to the intention existence of Jane within us. Aristotle likens this to the formation of a military unit: as each soldier assumes position, the formation emerges. We have seen Jane before, and so know that her ears are pierced, even though we cant see them now. We have seen other women before, and so we know what they look like naked, even though Jane is clothed. It is this constructive phase that can lead to errors. Perhaps Jane is a pre-operative trans-woman and her anatomy does not conform to our construct. If so, our construct has failed us.

The form which is in the mind might be just a symbol of the object, and as in the case of words, a symbol doesn't have to have any similarity to the object represented, it just needs to represent. — Metaphysician Undercover

As I have pointed out before, thoughts are formal signs, while words are instrumental signs. So, they do not signify in the same way. In the present case, our perception of Jane is identically Jane operating within us to inform our mind. The word "Jane" has not such ontological connection. It indicates Jane by convention, not by its intrinsic nature as our perceptual awareness does.

Well, I could quote a passage to justify that claim, but I know from my experience with you, that you will just turn around and say "that's not what the author meant". — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't usually rest arguments on what an author meant, but on the reality the author was considering. Of course, sometimes an author is misunderstood, but that then the issue is interpretation, not reality. Here we are concerned with facts, not texts.

That does not make sense. If the "individuating notes" are left behind, then the form in the mind is not the same as the form in the object. — Metaphysician Undercover

Right! As I have said many times, it is a projection of the object's form in two senses: (!) it is a projection in the sense of an existential penetration and (2) it is a projection in the sense of a dimensionally diminished map. In other words, it is the object as acting on our cognitive system, not the object in its entirety.

Whether the process subtracts or adds, or does some of both, is actually nonsensical, because the mind never has the proper form of the object within, it has something different. So it cannot use this as a base to add or subtract from. It must create the form, using whatever information it has, but the created form is clearly in no way the same form as that which is in the object, it is created separate from the object. — Metaphysician Undercover

We have the form partially, not exhaustively. I fail to see how admitting this is nonsense.

Information is the reduction of possibility. We are informed because prior to our experience, it was possible that the object could not at on us as it does. Once we have experienced how it acts on us, that possibility is eliminated. So we do not create the form in the mind. We only add awareness.

Our experiences are complex and contextual. In fixing attention on the object, we remove notes of comprehension that are irrelevant. We do not add notes in the act of perception, but we may add them in a second movement of mind in which we use past experience to fill in gaps. In adding these supplemental notes we may create an enhanced form that is not fully justified by the current experience.

If you read Kant's Critique of Pure reason, you will see that time and space are intuitions. — Metaphysician Undercover

I have not read more than selections from the Critique. I have only read the Prolegomena and secondary sources. That said, "intuitions" is such a vague term, I have no idea what it means. I do know what it means to impose a form on experience, and that is what Kant says we do with the forms of space, time and causality.

These intuitions are not derived from our experience of change, but necessary conditions for the possibility of experiencing change. — Metaphysician Undercover

Repeating the claim does not justify it.

Is this necessarily a religious idea, by the way? — Terrapin Station

No. There are three related issues.
1. Are there observable instances of teleology:
a. Do natural processes tend to determinate ends?
b. Are there means-ends relations in nature?
2. If there are observable instances of teleology, can they reasonably be called "intentional"?
3. If there is intentionality in nature, is it reasonable to see God as its source?

Each of these is a philosophical, not a religious question. Religion comes into play when, after affirming the existence of some god or one God, one relates to it with more than bare assent.

I don't think this is the thread to discuss the soundness of proofs for the existence of God, which is a huge question. I will simply say that in my considered opinion there are sound proofs for the existence of a self-explaining being capable of doing any logically possible act, and that this being concurrently holds all others in being.

As for the nature of good, I think we're in general agreement. Following Aquinas, I see "good" as an analogous, not as a univocal term. It means different, but analogous, things in different contexts. What makes automotive grease "good" is not what makes non-slip flooring "good." What makes anything "good" is suitability to its correlative end. This makes the issue of teleology fundamental to ethics. Teleology allows us to bridge the is-ought gap. It nullifies arguments for a "naturalistic fallacy."

The (as definitionally goes without saying) subjective nature of our experience, with experience being the center and source of what we know about our physical surroundings, suggests that there’s no more reason to believe in the Materialist’s inanimate and neutral Reality than in is his objective Realist metaphysics. — Michael Ossipoff

As I have said before, experience is inescapably both objective and subjective. There is necessarily both an experiencing subject and an experienced object. Materialists forget this -- focusing on the experienced object to the exclusion of the experiencing subject -- thus committing Whitehead's Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness.

But neither what I’ve just said, nor what you said, answers the question about why Benevolence would (in some lives) put us through a pretty horrible experience. …even though it’s temporary, arguably not real, and not-itself-created. — Michael Ossipoff

Yes. This is a profound question. The best I can come up with is, as you suggest, it is a small thing in the "big picture" -- a side effect that will be made up for in other ways. But, I claim no certainty here.

…hence the Gnostic position, which I agree with, that God didn’t create the physical universes, or make there be them. — Michael Ossipoff

I see this solution as ruled out by the need for a sufficient explanation -- which must terminate in one, self-explaining source. Perhaps the answer is that we see things too anthropocentrically -- as though everything needs to be judged in terms of what is goof for us, instead of what is good for creation as a whole.

Isn’t continuation inevitable for each timeless, inevitable logical-system? — Michael Ossipoff

No, I don't think so, for two reasons. First, from an Aristotelian perspective, the persistence of a being through time is the ongoing actualization of its potential to exist in the next instant. As it does not already exist in that instance, it can't act to actualize its own potential. From the perspective of a space-time manifold, just as existence here does not imply existence there, so existence now does not entail existence then. Thus, we need something outside of the space-time manifold to effect the continuity we observe.

Thank you for the kind words.

I think we can both reason by analogy and make strict deductions leading us to an understanding of the existence and general character of God. Of course, a finite mind can't know an infinite being in any proportionate way. — Dfpolis

Cart before the horse?
One day it's "greatest", another "infinite", the next "simplest", the day after that "triune", ... One for each occasion. What gives?
How'd you came up with "infinite being" anyway?
"Simplest" is typically an assertion in response to an infinite regress (sometimes humorously called "simpleton").
It's almost like anything goes.
Personification fallacy. — jorndoe

Not giving the details of an argument does not mean that there is no argument. Clearly, I was asserting there are arguments, and referenced my paper in which I give some of them. You are welcome to read and criticize the arguments I give. Judging them before reading them is not reasonable.

We had best stop as we do not have a common understanding of the nature of evidence and the role of logic.

Thank you.