I predict it will be really close again, and the fossil fuel party has a good chance of winning. The price of gas has gone up about $1.50 a gallon in the past five years, and there have been howls of despair. People want to combat climate change, but they don't want to sacrifice their standard of living while doing it. — RogueAI

Exactly. And that's basically what I have been saying. It's a main factor in the inertia.

Some of the denial you see on this very thread, including stock phrases like "nothing can be done," "it's good for the planet," "the climate always changes," "people don't want to change," etc., all serves in a minor way to divert from what we should be doing, which is acting. Not just individually, but collectively. Discussing local energy committees or public utilities commissions and ways to attend/influence them, local organizations to involve oneself in, individual actions like more efficient energy use/electrification (heat pumps, solar panels, induction stoves, community solar programs, better insulation, energy audits, available tax credits and rebates), and so on and so forth, is what should be going on. There's lots of information all around us. — Mikie

Yeah one problem is the idea of separation between production and consumption. These issues of regulation affect the owners of manufacturing and agricultural enterprises. Most people are not these people. Thus, it's not "the people's problem", and thus it is left to the people that "do" care, special interests and such who wheel and deal in this kind of reform. Is it hitting someone's pocket book right now? People tend to care less.

People also want quality things. Of course, no one wants low quality expensive anything. Of course people don't want suffering. You make a philosophy of platitudes. There is more to life than want. — unenlightened

I'm not saying people don't want to do something about climate change (well, some don't but..), it's just that to get that takes sacrifices that are too much for people to really want to take that action.

Consider a working class individual/family that goes to XMart (made up), because of its dirt low prices on food and goods. They are doing what is economically what they perceive in their best interests. They can't afford better quality food/products. XMart will do. In fact, it may be more expensive in the long run because it's cheaper quality, but that's not what they are thinking about in the short term.

Meanwhile, higher the economic totem pole, is the upper middle classer going to OrganicFoods the nifty high quality organic food market. They see that all the food is marked for organic and greener food sources. The prices are higher as a result so they can afford it. Meanwhile, they are driving to these high end green food marts in their Mercedes and BMW large SUVs.

Oh, well in that case, you are wrong. Covid has clearly shown that most people are very willing to make quite radical changes and sacrifices as long as they feel they are doing it to help others in a time of crisis and we are all acting together. So the problem is not that people are just greedy and uncaring. — unenlightened

That was a crisis people perceived could immediately harm them or their relatives- as in hospitalization or death. And even then, in some countries people ignored the guidelines or actively worked against it. Climate change, no matter how much footage of ice caps melting and X phenomenon isn't perceived by people as their problem. So I don't see how any of that really counters this:

People want cheap things. Adding costs to manufacturers to try to have cleaner emissions or greener processes will not make the consumer happy, lower output, and lower profit. Then, the politicians who claim to be "pro-economy" will rail against the regulations, and the process will continue.

Not to mention the epistemological claim of how to measure progress when there are so many sources adding to the problem. The pro-economy parties will say it's a risky, untested regulation that will hamper current success. And thus, ironically, they will take a line from Keynes and say:

"In the long run, we are all dead". And that is basically the cynical view of most political actions. — schopenhauer1

I think that is what is the case. What is going on.

Believe me, brotha, I too care about something that is large in scope (antinatalism). And I too, lament how people just don't get how (in my case at least) not doing one simple thing, will prevent a future person's suffering, and will not violate their autonomy, and force them into the suffering entailed in existence. But you see, you will balk at what I say and call me a defeatist (though I take that term as a good thing), and many other things. What you think of me, many will think of your ideas on actions regarding climate change.

Of course we do. This thread is about climate change. Anyone else care about that? Or shall we tell a few jokes and shoot the breeze? — unenlightened

I thought I was directly discussing climate change- specifically, the general mechanism for the inertia you are seeing.

I don't expect other people to care. But I care. that's all. I'm just some guy railing about what I care about. Nothing for you to concern yourself about. — unenlightened

Hey we all care about something. You are railing publicly and I am answering publicly about an issue that affects the wider public.

People want cheap things. Adding costs to manufacturers to try to have cleaner emissions or greener processes will not make the consumer happy, lower output, and lower profit. Then, the politicians who claim to be "pro-economy" will rail against the regulations, and the process will continue.

Not to mention the epistemological claim of how to measure progress when there are so many sources adding to the problem. The pro-economy parties will say it's a risky, untested regulation that will hamper current success. And thus, ironically, they will take a line from Keynes and say:

"In the long run, we are all dead". And that is basically the cynical view of most political actions.

But no worries chaps, carry on eating beef and flying round the world on holiday, all our politicians are very stable geniarses, and will solve the problem before anything bad happens, global oil and global meat are on the case. — unenlightened

People barely get involved with local politics unless it quite literally immediately affects them (and then not even most of the time). How do you expect people to care about anything further than that? Politics is just characters in media talking. People barely take actions that help their local communities let alone "The Climate". And that's only talking about people who agree with what the climate scientists are saying or if they do agree, who think that something can be done and it's not a foregone conclusion.

Yes. I think the default setting for most emotional states is to accept it - happy or not. We often assume how we feel is normal. We may not even be certain what it is we are feeling. Nevertheless, off we go, looking for distractions. — Tom Storm

I think this I wrote in another thread might be of relevance in this discussion:

That is to say some sort of communal recognition of the situation. That is we must exhaust the idea of progress, scientific enthusiasm, pleasures, and happiness in this life to understand the situation and come to a sort of resignation. Unlike Hartmann though, I don't think it necessarily has to be Nirvana, but maybe a sort of quietude and recognition that it's "all vanity".

Right understanding through a communal catharsis will then take away the barriers of optimism. It would be a recognition that suffering is real and inherent in the human condition. That we resolve not to start it for others. That we empathize with the suffering of others and let others grieve that suffering, helping find solutions. In this sense, Schopenhauer's "compassion" and "empathy" is the correct foundation for a "positive ethics" (actions to perform instead of prevent). But this kind of foundation is only done out of seeing others as "fellow-sufferers". I can't emphasize that enough. In our hedonistic culture we are inculcated and bombarded with optimistic slogans. But these simply become an impediment to the true understanding of the inevitability and pervasiveness, in fact inherent quality that suffering has in the human condition. That is why Buddhism and Schopenhauer's understanding of suffering isn't "just" hedonic calculus but is a deeper sense of dissatisfaction that is even had when we are supposedly hedonically not harmed. And thus, since it is inherent, we must recognize it which means taking the empathetic pessimistic stance of compassion. — schopenhauer1

Why call it a view if there is no view? It's no view from anywhere; so obviously we cannot imagine what it is, because that would be to turn it into a view from somewhere. — Janus

I mean this argument parallels the OP of this discussion no? How can you refer to something that is inherently ineffable? I need to designate the concept, and one of the ways to do that is to say that something exists, but there is no epistemological viewer of said events (view from nowhere).

So, as i see it both you and Wayfarer view life through a lens that sees only suffering; without salvation or at least the possibility of salvation, of something more than just this life, this life would be unbearable. Wayfarer still hopes to find something somewhere through reading, whereas you think the only answer is to cease breeding. Correct me if I'm wrong, but I think that is because he believes in a life hereafter, that there is an overarching spiritual purpose, whereas you don't. — Janus

I can't speak for @Wayfarer, but he seems to believe in the Buddhist idea of karmic cycle and that to escape from the cycle one has to reach Nirvana so that they are not reborn. In a less religious-sounding way, I think he thinks that identity of self is a delusion compounded by our ego's desires. When we reach enlightenment, we cease to identify as this or that person who is attached to this or that worldly desires. He thinks this sublime state is possible, and I am skeptical. If it is anything at all, it is some sort of ego-death but nothing on some karmic spiritual level. And hence, in a way, he agrees more with Schopenhauer's notion of "denying the will" through reaching a supreme state of total will-lessness, I guess.

Contra that notion, I don't see any spiritual significance in the ascetic practice more than habits of mind, more akin to cleaning your house to feel less cluttered. In other words, it's a coping mechanism like many others, and also alike with many others. I also point out that event if we take this mystical idea seriously that some sublime Nirvana state is obtainable, it doesn't get rid of the karmic cycle itself, just the individual's cycle. Now, Mahayana technically has a solution in the Bodhisattva, but that only helps a few more people and still doesn't fix the cycle itself.

Contra all of that notion, there is something we can do to help people not suffer in the first place, and that is simply not procreate. That simple "negative act" (not doing something), will prevent a new person's experience of suffering. Now you can say that the criticism I had of Buddhism can be leveled here. That is to say, you can say that preventing your own children's birth isn't going to prevent all birth, and animals continue, etc. However, my point with that criticism is that Buddhism and Schopenhauer had an idea that something like suicide or perhaps even not procreating, doesn't "solve" the problem of suffering because Suffering itself still continues. My point was that Buddhism and Schopenhauer's notion of Nirvana has the same issue. Except, whereas empirically, we cannot prove that this state of Nirvana is true, we can 100% empirically know that we did not procreate someone who would then suffer.

However, antinatalism is not the same as Pessimism per se. It is one ethical argument that may come out of it. There is also what to do once we are already here. To this I think we can have some sort of communal catharsis. That is, it actually does mean people have to have the right understanding in order to have a sense of the situation. Antinatalism is not just the action of not breeding but is a marker for the "lament of life". And thus, it is this attitude that I am saying is the right view of things. To get to the level of ennui. As Hartmann described here:

The essential feature of the morality built upon the basis of Von Hartmann's philosophy is the realization that all is one and that, while every attempt to gain happiness is illusory, yet before deliverance is possible, all forms of the illusion must appear and be tried to the utmost. Even he who recognizes the vanity of life best serves the highest aims by giving himself up to the illusion, and living as eagerly as if he thought life good. It is only through the constant attempt to gain happiness that people can learn the desirability of nothingness; and when this knowledge has become universal, or at least general, deliverance will come and the world will cease. No better proof of the rational nature of the universe is needed than that afforded by the different ways in which men have hoped to find happiness and so have been led unconsciously to work for the final goal. The first of these is the hope of good in the present, the confidence in the pleasures of this world, such as was felt by the Greeks. This is followed by the Christian transference of happiness to another and better life, to which in turn succeeds the illusion that looks for happiness in progress, and dreams of a future made worth while by the achievements of science. All alike are empty promises, and known as such in the final stage, which sees all human desires as equally vain and the only good in the peace of Nirvana. — Hartmann Wiki

That is to say some sort of communal recognition of the situation. That is we must exhaust the idea of progress, scientific enthusiasm, pleasures, and happiness in this life to understand the situation and come to a sort of resignation. Unlike Hartmann though, I don't think it necessarily has to be Nirvana, but maybe a sort of quietude and recognition that it's "all vanity".

Right understanding through a communal catharsis will then take away the barriers of optimism. It would be a recognition that suffering is real and inherent in the human condition. That we resolve not to start it for others. That we empathize with the suffering of others and let others grieve that suffering, helping find solutions. In this sense, Schopenhauer's "compassion" and "empathy" is the correct foundation for a "positive ethics" (actions to perform instead of prevent). But this kind of foundation is only done out of seeing others as "fellow-sufferers". I can't emphasize that enough. In our hedonistic culture we are inculcated and bombarded with optimistic slogans. But these simply become an impediment to the true understanding of the inevitability and pervasiveness, in fact inherent quality that suffering has in the human condition. That is why Buddhism and Schopenhauer's understanding of suffering isn't "just" hedonic calculus but is a deeper sense of dissatisfaction that is even had when we are supposedly hedonically not harmed. And thus, since it is inherent, we must recognize it which means taking the empathetic pessimistic stance of compassion.

Ha wild reaction man. If you want to correct me, go ahead.

For a physicalist, thoughts, ideas, concepts (and possibly qualia) would have their neural correlates. So they exist in a physical state of a dynamic neural configuration. Is that right? — Mark Nyquist

You actually seem to make a hidden dualism error here.
Part 1: thoughts, ideas, concepts (and possibly qualia) would have their neural correlates.
Part 2: So they exist in a physical state of a dynamic neural configuration. Is that right?[/quote]

You are making it seem like the concepts exist in these states, as if, you were to examine the physical state long enough you will find "thoughts ideas, concepts (and possibly qualia).

Good finds. They are glaring.

It's even weirder when you can literally predict the next move, call it out before they do it, and then they do it anyways as if you didn't call it out. Generally, one tries to avoid what is being called out. Some people lean into it.

That is -- putting biology first isn't so crazy as it sounds because we're not modeling the world off of natural selection, but instead questioning what sort of causation is truly fundamental.

Or, if we are dedicated Humeans, we'll note that neither is fundamental at all, that there is no most basic kind of causation that everything can be reduced to, that it's a mere habit of the mind. — Moliere

This reminds me of the problems of emergentism and notions of "downward causation". How does a higher level influence a lower level, if the higher level doesn't exist yet? Are we going to invoke some sort of quantum level of indeterminacy of time? That seems a stretch. I am not saying it's necessarily wrong, but that approach seems a stretch.

But this brings up a more fundamental question. How do properties (without a knower already in the equation) "emerge" from nothing to something, other than by assertion that "things exist from more basic things it appears". That is just restating what is the case, instead of the question of how that works.

Actually, the SEP entry addresses this very question in Section 6. — Wayfarer

That's a really interesting section. This almost directly addresses the OP here:

In light of this, Schopenhauer sometimes expresses the view that the thing-in-itself is multidimensional, and although the thing-in-itself is not wholly identical to the world as Will, it nonetheless includes as its manifestations, the world as Will and the world as representation. This lends a panentheistic structure to Schopenhauer’s view (noted earlier in the views of K.C.F. Krause). From a scholarly standpoint, it implies that interpretations of Schopenhauer that portray him as a Kantian who believes that knowledge of the thing-in-itself is impossible, do not fit with what Schopenhauer himself believed. It also implies that interpretations that portray him as a traditional metaphysician who claims that the thing-in-itself is straightforwardly, wholly and unconditionally Will, also stand in need of qualification. — SEP

It definitely mirrors gnostic/neoplatonic (and similar) notions of the ineffable nature of the thing-itself. That is to say, Will is only Will in hindsight of Representation. However, Will without representation is ineffably more complex than simply the "striving" that it manifests in its representational form (i.e. as a referent from the point of view of a subject for an object conditioned by space, time, and causality).

But equating 'will' with 'the divine' is exactly the kind of idea he vehemently criticizes in Fichte and Schelling, saying that they are preaching religion in the guise of philosophy. — Wayfarer

Yeah, he definitely doesn't want it to be of a religious nature. From this, I can only think to mean that it should not be attached to either a 1) telos / logos or 2) dogmatic religious system of beliefs (like Christianity). Clearly he does believe in sublime states of being, so "mystical" in some sense can be applied here.

There's a saying in the NT, basic to the Christian faith 'let not my will be done but thine' which is as much a denial of will as anything Schopenhauer says. But because he denies God, that avenua does not seem to be open to him. It's puzzling. I think, maybe, it's 'churchianity' which he's so hostile to, more so that 'religion' per se. — Wayfarer

See my comment above.

He then compares this to the Prajñāpāramitā of the Buddha. We may well ask - If only knowledge remains, then what is it knowledge of? Maybe the answer is that we won't know until we reach it - and precious few are destined to do that. Until then, we'll never know. — Wayfarer

Yeah, essentially it's ineffable. I still think none of this answers my main question:

But this is where I asked at the beginning what Schop's take is on solipsism. That is to say, if one achieves "nirvana" and quiets the Will for good in oneself, is that quieting the whole Will? That seems to be at odds. That is to say, the reason suicide is no good is because Will Proper still remains even if your will ceases. However, he seems to be saying that with Nirvana, one Will Proper will cease. How is that so? It contradicts his prior point that suicide is not a valid way of ceasing Will Proper because it is only an individual will. So which is it for Schopenhauer? — schopenhauer1

In other words, is denying will, denying one's individual only or all of Will itself? If it is denying individual will only, then why is suicide not valid? If all of Will is denied/nullified, how so? What does that even mean? Pretending someone like a Buddha achieved Nirvana, the "illusion" of a representational version of Will is still here it seems in all its manifestations.

I mean do you want to explain how you want to use Ryle? He’s an early eliminitavist who seems to skirt the hard problem by way of saying that red is a public event. It’s a kind if intersubjective behaviorism whereby we can’t understand red in private way. I think it confuses concepts for the qualia of them. The eliminitavists need there to be a false assigning of origins but they don’t account for the actual phenomena. They replace origin with experience in itself.

I'm saying that on the materialist perspective there is no view in a world lacking any percipients, whether from nowhere or of nowhere. — Janus

You seem confused. That is the view from nowhere. Meaning there is a somewhere (materially ontologically speaking) but with no view of it.

Yes, but most people would see life as a net harm although of course it is going to involve some harm. Like discipling your kids or sending them to school, the overall benefit would generally be seen as outweighing the harm, otherwise people would not have kids deliberately and thoughtfully, which no doubt many do. — Janus

This doesn’t refute my claim about blind eye and I specifically mentioned this below because you would answer using these kind of non analogous examples of mitigation of already existing people:

None of the context-dependent reasons to cause harm can be used in this scenario either, as you would need a person for that to matter for, so there we go. — schopenhauer1

You may be right, or you may not be right; we simply don't and cannot, measure the suffering of other species, or even of other humans. — Janus

Hence I said "I see them...". It's precisely because I don't know what they "think or feel" as I said.

In any case, I've thought about it, I've heard all your arguments, I personally never decided to have children, which means I have no skin in the game, and yet I still disagree with you, so there is no point insistently rehearsing all the same arguments I've heard before. — Janus

Well enough I guess. But to the claim you made about morality, I think it's more about first principles and whether one's actions accord with them. That is to say, it is akin to calling out a politician who is corrupt in the same way and degree in your party as much as in the opponent's party. That is to say, a large part of the how morality functions is simply being consistent with one's own values. More-or-less, people's values do (and we can debate the meta-ethical reasons for it but that's not the argument) care about suffering and autonomy and not causing harm. It is simply applying it to realms where people turn a blind eye to because of preference, tradition, and the like. That's not consistency in following values.

None of the context-dependent reasons to cause harm can be used in this scenario either, as you would need a person for that to matter for, so there we go.

In other words, if the world exists absent perceivers, then there is no view, but it does not follow that there is no world, just that there is no perceived world. — Janus

Um, that's what I mean it's the view from nowhere, not the view of nowhere.

Also in the idealist model, if there is a universal mind or God that holds the world in view, that view would be the view from everywhere, or in other words from nowhere in particular, not from nowhere at all, just as such a God, if it existed, would not exist nowhere, but everywhere, and only nowhere in the sense of 'nowhere in particular'. If you said such a god existed nowhere at all, that would be no different than saying that it simply didn't exist. — Janus

But that part was not about idealist views, and I explicitly said that.

I think, from the perspective of Indian philosophies generally, that the 'price of ignorance' is that we have some really fundamental and basic misconception about the nature of existence. Like, we have tinted glasses on, which influence everything we see, but which we're accustomed to, so that we don't notice we're wearing them. I suppose all philosophy is like that, in a way, but I don't think there are many Western equivalents, outside Schopenhauer and the German idealists, that share that kind of understanding with Indian philosophy. — Wayfarer

Without biasing the metaphysics, what would a non-idealist Schopenhauer look like in your estimation?

But from the perspectives of the cosmic philosophies, mind is more like the organising intelligence which gives rise to organisms in the first place (which doesn't necessarily mean theistic creation as this kind of general understanding is characteristic of e.g. neoplatonism.) So from a cosmic perspective, our embodiment in material form might be what is ultimately transient. I attended lectures by an esteemed prof of Hindu philosophy, who used to intone, in that lilting Indian school-teacherly way, that evolution was the process by which 'what is latent becomes patent' - that the whole Universe is a way for Brahman to explore horizons of being. Within that explanatory framework, mokṣa is the point where the devotee realises his/her true nature or 'supreme identity' in Watts' terms. — Wayfarer

At the end of the day, philosophy-of-mind is either a mind-is-already-present or an emergent phenomenon. Those are the two broad categories. Most idealists take the first. Most materialists take the second. Both have their glaring problems. Materialists must ignore qualities and then insert it in after the fact. They also must contend with the problem of a view from nowhere. The idealists have to deal with the incredulity that mind is universal in some sense, being that it seems to be empirically the case at least, that mind accompanies some sort of cellular/nervous system.

Certainly the "hard problemers" have put the focus on the "hard" part so that either can't skirt to their preferred tenets and not address the elephant in the room. One simply can't just ignore qualia for example, or wave it away as illusion without accounting for the illusion. Idealists also can't deny things like ancestrality and extinction, and a universe without animal consciousness (or perhaps just "consciousness" or at least a "point of view").

Clearly humans can detect regularities in nature. One can say this was devised by the ancient Greeks, but certainly catapulted to greater heights with Galileo and the Renaissance thinkers. John Locke proposed that there are primary or secondary qualities. Unofficially, this is the stance when observing natural physical properties like mass, spin, charge, and such. The valence electrons and their quantifiable properties allow for chemical properties, whose molecular properties create the topology that allows for biological processes, etc. These primary properties are "out there" and we are just "observing them". The secondary qualities are simply "our qualitative perception" of them.

What does it mean when there is a view from nowhere (i.e. when there is no conscious animal / a point of view)? A realist my propose that it is the charges and spin and mass, and elementary interactions of particles/waves or something of this nature. These have existed since there was a Big Bang 13.8 billion years ago. Idealists need not postulate a world of mind. It is the interactions of particle forces that "really" exist.

But this starts a series of questions...
1) How do interactions between particles "happen"?
Realist Answer: Time and space are not mind dependent. Thus events are localized.
1a) But even if that is so, "what" is interacting?
Realist Answer: The various properties of particles are interacting.
1b) But even so, "what" does it mean to interact without a point of view?
Realist Answer: There need not be a mind for localized interaction in time/space. Wherever interaction occurs that is an event in time/space.
1c) But even so, how can we intelligebly say an event happened without a knower?
Realist Answer: You don't need a knower. Since time/space is real, these conditions allow for the event.

And on and on it goes. I guess then it becomes a question of what it means if "time/space" is real, and how that allows for existence for an event.

I think it's best to start with a series of thought exercises on these kind of things. For example:

1) What is the liminal view of an organic molecule that is the first functioning cell?
2) Look at our own wills/bodies/minds in the present. Notice there is already an MO for the human animal from the start. That is, to want/need/fill the lack. And here is Schopenhauer/Buddhism's great insights. Something about our wills reveals something about consciousness.
3) When something emerges, does there need to be a point of view prior to the emergent property? If not, how is it that emergence works from nothing to something?

Animals will not do that, they will continue breeding as usual, which means there will always be suffering as long as there are animals to suffer. — Janus

I don't pretend to speak on behalf of other animal species. If they eventually evolve into self-aware beings who can deliberate, they too can decide to prevent suffering. I see them, however, as suffering less because of not having the level of self-awareness as humans. We have overshot Eden and fell into time.

I don't see forms of suffering as some sort of aggregated thing. I see it as morality at the margins. You don't not save a life because you can't save everyone's life.

I think both of you guys have a rather surprisingly dim view of the value of this life considered just in itself. I can see that life has its dark moments and aspects, but I certainly don't count it as an overall net negative, and I would venture to guess that many, perhaps most, people do not have such a view either. Perhaps it comes down to brain chemistry; some are just cursed with a dearth of serotonin or whatever. — Janus

Well, I think it's a political and ethical question. When someone decides to birth another person, they are deciding for that person, in an aggressively paternalistic fashion, that this life's spectrum of experiences and limited choices (culturally and physically), as well as the suffering that is inevitable and incumbent with life is ok to impose on another person. If carried out, it becomes a gross violation of principles of autonomy and non-malfeasance. Starting someone else's suffering, with the justification of "but there could be good experiences" or "I have a hunch because ad populum" doesn't justify going ahead and violating these kinds of principles.

Also, coupled with these principles, the logic makes sense that "not starting good experiences" (i.e. not depriving already existing person, but rather starting it de novo), is neutral whilst "starting bad experiences" (i.e. starting suffering de novo, not mitigating a person who is already suffering) is morally bad. It is suffering that is the basis of the ethics and is the morally relevant aspect, not any other contingencies. Certainly using people because "Science" or "Discovery" or "Pleasure" or "Self-Actualization" (none of which matters for the non-existent) or so you can bullshit on a philosophy forum, or so you can tinker in your garden on your retirement plan, or anything else is not a justification.

Couple the violation of autonomy, non-malfeasance, and asymmetry of starting suffering versus starting good experiences, and the case is pretty strong.

The political aspect is the fact that we are "pressing" people into the dictates/limits that this universe entails. People vote with their procreation "yay". That the human condition is something that must be experienced by others. It's imposing not only a life, but the form of life that comes with having to survive as a human who suffers and deals with burdens in the world. As I said earlier to your inevitable comments which I predicted (because by now it's very predictable what people will say):

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/831573

They're pretty clever observations, but I think we're talking at cross-purposes. To me, none of these questions are only hypothetical - there is something real at stake, but it's also very difficult to discern or fathom (and I won't for a minute claim to have done so.) — Wayfarer

Ok thanks, but what of the questions. Do you have any hypothesis or inking of an answer from a Schopenhauerian perspective? Here they are again:

But this is where I asked at the beginning what Schop's take is on solipsism. That is to say, if one achieves "nirvana" and quiets the Will for good in oneself, is that quieting the whole Will? That seems to be at odds. That is to say, the reason suicide is no good is because Will Proper still remains even if your will ceases. However, he seems to be saying that with Nirvana, one Will Proper will cease. How is that so? It contradicts his prior point that suicide is not a valid way of ceasing Will Proper because it is only an individual will. So which is it for Schopenhauer? — schopenhauer1

And I also brought up this:

But you need a life to exist in order for you to have desire or suffering or dissatisfaction. The problem exists prior to finding a solution out of it. And this is where we disagree most as far as what to do. That is, I think it cannot be denied that we exist first before we desire some sort of sublime state of "unborn" or whatever paradoxical state you want to ascribe to Nirvana. And because you cannot accept ancestrality as legitimate (that there was a time before animals and consciousness), you will say that mind was always in the equation and it is our job to calm it.

But here I can form a more materialistic version of Schopenhauer. That is to say, clearly this seeking Nirvana is always going to be the case. However, there was a time when it wasn't necessary, and presumably there will be a time when it is unnecessary. That is to say, there was a time before humans/animals and a time when humans/animals will go extinct. That negates this "ever present mind" idea that is necessary so that materialist solutions will always be invalid. However, it seems to me that there is a solution. It starts with the already-born recognizing the suffering and simply not starting new individual experiences of that suffering. — schopenhauer1

Do you have anything to speak to that?

Well, yes, but as many have pointed out, Dawkins and Dennett have kind of appropriated many of the tropes of Christian humanism, but then wrapped them around the idea scientific progress. But there's a clear conflict in their philosophy, in that both of them see humans as basically gene machines or robots, but then don't seem to have the philosophical persipecuity to understand the inherent conflict in their worldviews. — Wayfarer

There's a school of Buddhist philosophy called Yogācāra which is often said to be idealist, although scholars point out that there are very important differences between Indian and Western idealism. It's sometimes been translated as 'cognition-only'. You can see the ChatGPT summary here. I'm interested in the common boundaries between these schools and the German idealists. — Wayfarer

I'm not sure it's a conflict so much, if I am reading this right. Rather, it's simply a downplaying of forms of suffering. It's the usual tropes of the rest of humanity. As Zapffe laid out, it's a mechanism of defense- anchoring (Science and Progress and Humanism), isolation (what suffering?), and distraction (pleasures of any kind). These help mitigate any ethical/political stance against the other side of the coin regarding the human condition.

All this emphasis on individuals finding enlightenment, and nothing about the karmic cycle itself. Communal catharsis. Right understanding.

I don't think this accurately represents the understanding of those who believe that phenomenal consciousness can be studied effectively using scientific methods. — T Clark

It's this part that I am rebutting. That is to say, hard problemers have no problem studying phenomenal consciousness.

Yes, but the way you made it seem here:

Many of us shake our heads when others tell us they can't conceive that consciousness and human experience can be understood scientifically. — T Clark

You make it seem that the (fairly large) amount of people who acknowledge the hard problem deny the easy problems! Of course they don't deny that many aspects of physical correlates of consciousness can be observed such as processing, categorization, perceptual discrimination, and so on. Brain regions can be observed in an fMRI, neural networks can be modelled, brain chemistry can be analyzed. Matching behavior and mental aspects with their functional correlates in the brain can be conducted. No one is denying that easy problems are amenable to science. So I guess it is the way you worded it.

Rather, the "hard problemers" see the question of how/why the "what it's like" subjective/qualitative nature of consciousness as precisely not amenable to empirical methods. This article lays it out nicely:

Chalmers explains the persistence of this question by arguing against the possibility of a “reductive explanation” for phenomenal consciousness (hereafter, I will generally just use the term ‘consciousness’ for the phenomenon causing the problem). A reductive explanation in Chalmers’s sense (following David Lewis (1972)), provides a form of deductive argument concluding with an identity statement between the target explanandum (the thing we are trying to explain) and a lower-level phenomenon that is physical in nature or more obviously reducible to the physical. Reductive explanations of this type have two premises. The first presents a functional analysis of the target phenomenon, which fully characterizes the target in terms of its functional role. The second presents an empirically-discovered realizer of the functionally characterized target, one playing that very functional role. Then, by transitivity of identity, the target and realizer are deduced to be identical. For example, the gene may be reductively explained in terms of DNA as follows:

The gene = the unit of hereditary transmission. (By analysis.)
Regions of DNA = the unit of hereditary transmission. (By empirical investigation.)
Therefore, the gene = regions of DNA. (By transitivity of identity, 1, 2.)
Chalmers contends that such reductive explanations are available in principle for all other natural phenomena, but not for consciousness. This is the hard problem.

The reason that reductive explanation fails for consciousness, according to Chalmers, is that it cannot be functionally analyzed. This is demonstrated by the continued conceivability of what Chalmers terms “zombies”—creatures physically (and so functionally) identical to us, but lacking consciousness—even in the face of a range of proffered functional analyses. If we had a satisfying functional analysis of consciousness, zombies should not be conceivable. The lack of a functional analysis is also shown by the continued conceivability of spectrum inversion (perhaps what it looks like for me to see green is what it looks like when you see red), the persistence of the “other minds” problem, the plausibility of the “knowledge argument” (Jackson 1982) and the manifest implausibility of offered functional characterizations. If consciousness really could be functionally characterized, these problems would disappear. Since they retain their grip on philosophers, scientists, and lay-people alike, we can conclude that no functional characterization is available. But then the first premise of a reductive explanation cannot be properly formulated, and reductive explanation fails. We are left, Chalmers claims, with the following stark choice: either eliminate consciousness (deny that it exists at all) or add consciousness to our ontology as an unreduced feature of reality, on par with gravity and electromagnetism. Either way, we are faced with a special ontological problem, one that resists solution by the usual reductive methods. — Hard Problem of Consciousness - IEP

As the will is what is eternal, I guess this means that it will always find a way to be born, and, insofar as we identify with it, we will be carried along with the tide. Unless you're truly de-coupled from that urge - which S. says is the aim of asceticism - then you haven't succeeded in any real liberation. — Wayfarer

Yes, that is Schop's interpretation more-or-less. Every subject is a manifestation of Will. Even if your subjectivity is gone, subjectivity en toto is still there, striving for its objects in space and time.

But this is where I asked at the beginning what Schop's take is on solipsism. That is to say, if one achieves "nirvana" and quiets the Will for good in oneself, is that quieting the whole Will? That seems to be at odds. That is to say, the reason suicide is no good is because Will Proper still remains even if your will ceases. However, he seems to be saying that with Nirvana, one Will Proper will cease. How is that so? It contradicts his prior point that suicide is not a valid way of ceasing Will Proper because it is only an individual will. So which is it for Schopenhauer?

But nibbana (Nirvāṇa) is neither ceasing to exist, nor continuing to exist. Both of those, at root, are desires - the desire not to be (because of the burdensome nature of life) or the desire to continue to be (because of the pleasurable nature of life). So those drives are, at root, hatred or aversion, and desire or attachment (two of the 'three poisons', the third being stupidity or delusion. However, it should be mentioned that the canonical text which describes all this is the longest text in the Pali canon and these are obviously deep and recondite matters of Buddhist doctrine.) — Wayfarer

But you need a life to exist in order for you to have desire or suffering or dissatisfaction. The problem exists prior to finding a solution out of it. And this is where we disagree most as far as what to do. That is, I think it cannot be denied that we exist first before we desire some sort of sublime state of "unborn" or whatever paradoxical state you want to ascribe to Nirvana. And because you cannot accept ancestrality as legitimate (that there was a time before animals and consciousness), you will say that mind was always in the equation and it is our job to calm it.

But here I can form a more materialistic version of Schopenhauer. That is to say, clearly this seeking Nirvana is always going to be the case. However, there was a time when it wasn't necessary, and presumably there will be a time when it is unnecessary. That is to say, there was a time before humans/animals and a time when humans/animals will go extinct. That negates this "ever present mind" idea that is necessary so that materialist solutions will always be invalid. However, it seems to me that there is a solution. It starts with the already-born recognizing the suffering and simply not starting new individual experiences of that suffering.

Also, the Sangha in Buddhism isn't just utilitarian to get to Nirvana. I see it as like group therapy, or even going to a comedy show, as a cathartic communal endeavor. That is why I advocate for "communal catharsis". That is to say, we understand the plight and recognize it in each other and our situations to help relieve some of the pain and stress. In this conception, it is the idea akin to Hartmann that one can understand about the human condition.

That is to say things like "science, pleasure, tradition, and achievements" are somehow the hopeful carrot-stick that make it all worthwhile. You cannot impute all materialists (so-called "nihilists") with the same brush. In fact, most "nihilists" (as you call them) are more-or-less optimists. Look at Dawkins and all the rest of the popular atheists. They are optimistic about scientific innovation being the height of human achievement and thus a sort of "reason" to exist.. presumably, to have more children, even though we suffer, because "it's worth it" to see these advancements play out and do more research. In other words, Pessimists (like Benatar, Zapffe, Cioran, etc.) are very much out of favor and in the minority, even in the "nihilistic" camp.

That sense of the world is the world. It's no use asking, 'what happens to it, if we don't exist', because we cannot but conceive of it, or of anything, in the absence of that, nor can we really get outside of that to see it as it would be with no observer whatever. None of which negates the empirical fact that your or my consciousness only came into existence in very recent times. (I know this is a right can'o'worms, but there it is.) — Wayfarer

Indeed, and this is a whole philosophy of mind debate in itself.

There may be a view from nowhere without consciousness, because there seems to be an aspect where subject/object is always in the picture. What is a planet "in-itself"? What is a universe "in-itself"? What is a sub-atomic particle "in-itself"? What is a process "in-itself" even?

However, the exact answers for that don't necessarily mean that thus, everything is an eternal X (Will, subjective being, etc.). Rather, it just means, idealism might not be an answer. Also, it seems that it's a necessary component so that Buddhism doesn't collapse into Pessimism. Something like Will needs to be there and thus a solution will always be by way of this special technique that Buddha or the myth of Buddha has shared through the writings and lineage of sages. However, this goes back to what I am saying earlier. Suffering only exists when there are beings that suffer. If being is not ever-present but of a particular time and place, then this idea of an eternal struggle is moot. But also, if it is an eternal struggle, then the escape from it seems to not do much for anything as it doesn't solve the cycle of suffering, just one instance of it. Clearly, Buddha's enlightenment (or whatever word you want to use), did not negate the cycle of suffering itself.

The hard problem of Consciousness - We have this argument over and over here on the forum. Many of us shake our heads when others tell us they can't conceive that consciousness and human experience can be understood scientifically. — T Clark

It is very frustrating to the point of willed ignorance that you keep misinterpreting/misrepresenting the hard problem of consciousness. In your own words, can you even summarize it correctly??

I'll give you a hint, it's not about "consciousness and human experience not being understood scientifically".

Did you stop responding? Just to go over where I left off:

But I am refuting the metaphysical premise that there will always be representation. Representation without animal minds is not possible. So your move is to say mind is somewhere not in animals. This is always the paradox Schopenhauer and idealists and perhaps Buddhists must contend with. Otherwise, the “nihilistic” solution of passively not procreating would technically end suffering within a generation for the animal who has self awareness about this. That is to say, the unborn truly is being never born. That ends the cycle.

But this is too physiological an answer. You need it to be something that can’t be solved in such a straightforward way. So bring on ideas of karmic eternal recurrence and all that. — schopenhauer1

To provide some alternative, there is the notion of Integrated Information Theory (IIT) that Tononi worked on. So according to him, he says that it is possible to measure a system's "consciousness" by a function called "phi" that he derived. These systems may be non-animal. Even a thermostat, according to this theory may have some degree of "phi" I guess.

I am not sure how that answers the question any better than other materialist answers that have a hidden dualism or fall into the homunculus fallacy.

That is to say, just because I criticize idealism, doesn't mean I don't criticize materialist approaches.

The reality of existence is not a word game or polemical gambit. — Wayfarer

But I am refuting the metaphysical premise that there will always be representation. Representation without animal minds is not possible. So your move is to say mind is somewhere not in animals. This is always the paradox Schopenhauer and idealists and perhaps Buddhists must contend with. Otherwise, the “nihilistic” solution of passively not procreating would technically end suffering within a generation for the animal who has self awareness about this. That is to say, the unborn truly is being never born. That ends the cycle.

But this is too physiological an answer. You need it to be something that can’t be solved in such a straightforward way. So bring on ideas of karmic eternal recurrence and all that.

Added more to the above.

What does that refer to? If you explain that, I might understand what you were asking. — Wayfarer

You need a consciousness. No animals, no consciousness. Whence consciousness? This is that paradox of the first mind and ancestral statements, etc. The idealist always needs this in the equation.

There is no need for escape if there's no consciousness to escape with/from. But the doublespeak is saying that there never was a time without mind. This is the doublespeak I guess:

The former is mere absence, or the negation of the existence of some particular; the latter is the absence of specificity of the unmanifest/unborn/uncreated. It is not 'a thing' - neither this nor that ('neti, neti') but is also not mere absence or non-existence. — Wayfarer

It speaks of being "uncreated/unborn", but the way through this understanding is through physically "being born". You can say that I take a naive view of "born" then, but there is the doublespeak.

You hold onto nirvana itself as a desire, you desire enough that you will let the suffering continue so you can have nirvana. But the wrong-headed thinking you accuse me of, I can say back at what you are saying. That is to say, you need to have the "problem" to "fix the problem". And of course, for your philosophy to work, there can be no other way to solve "the problem" than your solution. And your solution needs people to be born so they can solve the problem with your solution.

But here there is an escape. Don't start the problem. The end. There is no, "But wait!.. You aren't getting rid of the unborn cycles of karmic blah blah and such and such". That is post-facto defense to keep the desire for the solution relevant and necessary.

It reminds me of this simple answer to a supposedly hard haiku-type question:

Don’t play stupid. I’m pretty sure you know what I’m asking. It has to do with Thing in itself. If there are no animals…what is the implication for Buddhism? What is the implication for how Buddhism views existing itself?

No I get the way Buddhist concepts are about the idea that this is an "illusion" etc. It's doublespeak.

What if there were no living things in the world, and evolution never created any new form of consciousness?

You would have to say in your belief system that this is an impossibility. Is that correct? Let us say Earth is the only life with consciousness and the asteroid that killed the dinosaurs, killed all life as well. What would you have to say based on your belief system?

But I think it is a fair description of anti-natalism. — Wayfarer

No it is not.
Antinatalism is an ethical principle so clearly violates your definition of nihilism as

nothing has any ultimate moral — Wayfarer

.

In that sense, many people have "nihilistic ideas", not just antinatalism.. That is to say, no belief in an afterlife. And even then, some antinatalists might even believe in such and have reasons related to that for their belief. Anyways, go back to that post as I went more in depth.

Nihilism is the description of various schools of philosophy which hold that nothing is real, or that nothing has any ultimate moral or ethical principle or implication. It is often associated (per Nietszche) with the 'death of God' signifiying the collapse of belief in religious ethical systems. — Wayfarer

And none of this seems to characterize my thoughts.

Or not - it might amount to a very 'inconvenient truth' indeed. — Wayfarer

It's convenient in that it justifies procreation now doesn't it? Odd. Fuck it (literally), it's inevitable anyways.. If literally everyone stopped procreating, there is no guarantee any new evolution repeats to consciousness. That is not determined. In fact, perhaps it is an interesting feature, not a bug. Perhaps, when all animal entities get to a certain level of awareness, they stop procreating. Anyways, I am just trying to give understanding that there is a sort of hand-waving assertion that the inevitability of more humans (to thus be enlightened) must be the case.

And oddly enough, I think that not procreating also helps the Buddhist cause. As this actually promotes the wider soteriological end goal, not just the individual. Afterall, it would be better if there were no cycle not just that some can escape it.

I think the Buddhist view would be that even if you don't procreate, you will be re-born in a future existence in accordance with your karma — Wayfarer

But isn't that convenient...

I suppose in the absence of a belief in re-birth, it seems like escaping the cycle - but again, that is a nihilistic view. (Important distinction: there's a world of difference in religious philosophies between 'nothing' and 'no-thing-ness'. T — Wayfarer

Saying something is "nihilistic" doesn't impute anything other than it's a term you use for X.

Also I wrote more in that post if you want to reply to that or not.

I see you quoted and mentioned me. Did you want me to add anything or was it just a reference?

I think you mischaracterize the move to prevent suffering above and beyond dealing with it. It's ok though, it's not just you. I think it is telling in Buddhism that you have to be born so you can escape the burden. Here we have a clear and decisive path (don't procreate), and the other is an arduous one that can be questioned and even if true is only had by the ones who have "reincarnated" to such a position to reach nirvana.

Here is maybe where we can both agree:

It is about right understanding.
I bet you there are people, right here on this forum, who have lived a relatively charmed life. That is so far, they haven't felt they had major negative setbacks, or ones that have "broken their spirit" and thus, LIFE MUST NOT BE SUFFERING. I don't agree with this. Certainly most Buddhists don't agree with this. This kind of Western notion of hedonic calculus for determining life's goodness is not quite the kind of "suffering" Buddha had in mind.

However, even in terms of this Westernized version of suffering (i.e. the hedonic calculus), at one moment, someone can beat the shit out of you and leave you for dead, you can get into a near-fatal car crash, you can encounter X, Y, Z, and then your former stance is fucked, and you were wrong by way of a new experience.

That is to say, suffering definitely does (in the case of Buddhist notions of the pervasiveness of suffering to existence) or certainly can be suffering (in the duller common, everyday sense of the word). In the Western's case, the potential for suffering itself is the kicker. Not necessarily the "thus lived experience". That is to say, this isn't a game where anything is guaranteed.

Not to mention, I do think there is a sense that someone can have very negative moments and after-the-fact assessments of life that can differ. Being in an awkward, deadly, annoying, and frustrating situation tends to look different than not being in one.

Anyways, this is all to say life has suffering, and this cannot be denied. Both the Pessimist and the Buddhist can agree with this.

What I would call for is a sort of Communal Catharsis. That is to say, like Buddhism, there needs to be appropriate understanding that suffering exists(!). If we don't even acknowledge this, we can't even get past square 1. So, if this is acknowledged, and that this world is not only not a utopia, but not even close to one, then we have some thinking to do about that...

Well, what is it then? All is vanity is a good ole place to start. But what does that mean? Empathy should come by way of tragic comedy. We need to understand all the nuanced ways we are all fucked, and if we understand this, then we can be on the same page about not wanting to continue it for others. We might also take things less seriously, and cope with negative situations a bit less harshly. It's not any grand metaphysical apotheosis, but it is simply a socially recognized realization. That is to say, the Pessimism is right in your face and not hidden by myths, or only whispered to therapists or your best friend. Everyone acknowledges it, understands it and kind of breath a collective sigh at dealing with the collective burdens and the individual burdens we all must deal with.

What does power mean but "from itself". But what is God? The MIND asks this. Or maybe this God can't produce from himself because he can not be imitated. — Gregory

I see these are words, but they don't mean much. I'm in a conversation with @frank about language use, and this is an example of a language game where terms are so vague that we are going to keep talking over each other.

To me, it seems like the same idea really, but a real life example of how math is radically different. The rule is you can add to three but any more, it's just a "a bunch of stuff" (you mine as well say 3+X). The focus here should not be the content but the fact that there is a different rule on how addition works in that language community. — schopenhauer1

In other words, it's almost a "nominalism" versus "essentialism" argument. Early Wittgenstein versus later Wittgenstein might be another phrasing. Logical positivists versus post-modernists. And on and on.

To me, it seems like the same idea really, but a real life example of how math is radically different. The rule is you can add to three but any more, it's just a "a bunch of stuff" (you mine as well say 3+X). The focus here should not be the content but the fact that there is a different rule on how addition works in that language community.