The fact that most religions have a better idea of what hell is like (exquisitely detailed descriptions exist, complete with ghastly illustrations) than what heaven is like is rather disheartening; we know suffering better than we know happiness which speaks volumes in re the living conditions on earth (hellish). — Agent Smith
Victim or Victimizer; choose! — Agent Smith
A person...either gonna hurt or gonna hurt! No point to being born! — Agent Smith
Maybe there's a perspective other than the egological. — Wayfarer
. Also, he always comes to the discussions prepared with specific positions and arguments, unlike 63.459% of the other members. He writes well.
If I'm not in the mood to cross swords with his brand of pessimism, I avoid the discussion. You can't say you didn't expect what you get. — T Clark
We have both gotten used to being voices howling in the wilderness. We wilderness howlers are dismissed out of hand, even if our howled message is right on the money. Dressed in rags, eating locusts, (roasted. salted, nutty, crunchy, nutritious), howling, of course; and harshing the mellow of the bourgeoisie just doesn't make one popular,
"Blessed are the shat upon." Simon and Garfunkel — Bitter Crank
Nice try. "Inner aspects" is all you, schop1. — 180 Proof
It's clear now that I don't know what you're whinging about, man, because you don't know what you're whinging about either. — 180 Proof
Almost everyone's "favored existence" would include being able to live sociably and peacefully with other people. Clearly then, almost every favored existence requires people to accept your so-called "infringement," otherwise known as friendship, loyalty, love, generosity, empathy, compassion, trust, honesty... — T Clark
Yeah, well, it's never too late for "some people" to abruptly end their "encounter". :smirk: — 180 Proof
"Moral" (or not) belongs to existents, not "existence". — 180 Proof
statistical, and varies in intensity of preferences not satisfied. And this may be for the worse for humans as there will be slow realization of it being morally worse off. It also leads to continual conflict between those whose preferences are being at least minimally satisfied (those who don't mind let's say working to survive), and those who would have never asked for this if the world aligned to their preferences.
With the idea of only SOME people's preferences satisfied, and those preferences entailing the infringement of other people's preferences, this makes this existence morally disqualifying. — schopenhauer1
If that were satisfied you would consider it moral. One would have to accept your concept of having never been born as a preferable alternative to life in order to consider existence immoral. — Joshs
Most panpsychists criticize physicalism. — Jackson
I did not introduce the notion of "inner aspects" – whether or not entities have "inner aspects" – you did, schop1, and thereby the "oddly presupposed panpsychism" is your dilemma / inconsistency not mine. — 180 Proof
If so, then they are also material; if not, then "inner aspects", with respect to the "material", are a distinction without a difference, no? — 180 Proof
For Nietzsche the two sides of this battle are really the same concept, truth and morality as the unchanging , the pure, the perfect. Nietzsche wants to replace this traditional morality with an ethics that recognizes, celebrates and accelerates the incessant differentiating change underlying and overflowing your static notions of the nothing and of suffering. — Joshs
But the ideal of representing all people's preferences is something all societies pursue in some way no matter the religion or culture. — Ajemo
So then perhaps the future we seek isn't just "don't bother me and I won't bother you", but the merging of all our enjoyments and sufferings. — Ajemo
It also leads to continual conflict between those whose preferences are being at least minimally satisfied (those who don't mind let's say working to survive), and those who would have never asked for this if the world aligned to their preferences.
With the idea of only SOME people's preferences satisfied, and those preferences entailing the infringement of other people's preferences, this makes this existence morally disqualifying. — schopenhauer1
It's not opposed to materialism. It's a call for an expansion of what counts as material. — Tate
What do understand by "material" means in "materialism"? — 180 Proof
The map becomes confused with the territory. Or perhaps, the territory has no room for the specific kind of territory and we are back to square one. — schopenhauer1
At most (if your terms are coherent), a scientific problem and not a philosophical question. — 180 Proof
What does "inner aspects" refer to? Are you implying that these "inner aspects" do not affect the "material"? If so, then they are also material; if not, then "inner aspects", with tespect to the "material", are a distinction without a difference, no? — 180 Proof
Incoherent muddle. "Physical" =/= "material" (i.e. event-patterns =/= events). — 180 Proof
The unalienated employee leaps gladsomely into the air, and sings a roundelay having to do with not being estranged — Ciceronianus
f all "category mistake" ultimately means is that they're just very different things and you can't use the same descriptions for both of them, you've offered no explanation; you've just reiterated without explanation that the two are just two very different things.
How are they different? — Hanover
So let's think of different things.. We have the Marxist model of taking over resources and capital. What does that really look like though? I brought this up in another thread about how we can never know even a sliver of the technology that we rely upon. So there will still be "experts", and access to the capital will then have to go through the de facto "gatekeepers" of the knowledgeable. I use a computer, It relies on circuit boards, programming, monitors, electrical components, etc. It relies on materials, plastics, etc. All of which I have no idea about.. So I am stuck in my "realm of expertise".. Whatever that is. Only that is what I can effect, not the whole. So basically I run things by democratically led councils rather than managers.. And I don't know, things just start looking more of the same. I don't see alienation going away any time soon. — schopenhauer1
It's a disturbing number, to say the least.
According to just-released data by Gallup, only 13 percent of employees are "engaged" in their jobs, or emotionally invested in their work and focused on helping their organizations improve.
The data, which are based on nationally representative polling samples in 2011 and 2012 from more than 140 countries, show that 63 percent are "not engaged"—or simply unmotivated and unlikely to exert extra effort—while the remaining 24 percent are "actively disengaged," or truly unhappy and unproductive.
While that's discouraging, it's actually a little better than the last time Gallup issued a global report. In data collected in 2009 and 2010, just 11 percent of workers reported being invested in their jobs, while 27 percent had actively checked out. The small improvement is due to an upswing in the global economy since those two recession years, when unemployment rates were even worse and when people were even more likely to settle for jobs they didn't like because options were so limited. — Washington Post Article
"The hard problem" is a pseudo-problem due to assuming an unwarranted confusion / conflation of an ontological duality with semantic duality compounded subsequently by observing that polar opposite terms "subjectivity" and "objectivity" cannot be described in terms of one another, which amounts to framing the "problem" based on a category mistake. There isn't an "hard problem" to begin with, schop. — 180 Proof
If you know a way to get the food to jump on the plate, I'm all ears. — Hanover
We are slaves to our material existence and survival requires work. How we choose to emotionally respond to that reality is our choice. — Hanover
Of course survival and material acquisition are only the rudimentary elements of our existence, and I would only buy into the generally pessimistic view that life is a series of harsh experiences followed by an unceremonial death if that's all there was. — Hanover
schopenhauer1's antinatalist logic is valid. Life sucks, and having children perpetuates life's suckiness. I agree that life sucks, but not so much that no body should have more children. Similarly, I agree that many people do not seem to be alienated from their work, their product--whatever that is, be it nuts and bolts or legal services. — Bitter Crank
"Managing to get through one's day without going berserk" is not an endorsement of the existing system. Workers' vision becomes much clearer when they experience the harsh side of capitalism, the side where there is no negotiation towards a tolerable middle ground. It is also the case that capitalism works very hard to portray itself positively. The positive portrait is the one hanging in most Americans' living room. — Bitter Crank
Marx holds that work has the potential to be something creative and fulfilling. He consequently rejects the view of work as a necessary evil, denying that the negative character of work is part of our fate, a universal fact about the human condition that no amount of social change could remedy. Indeed, productive activity, on Marx’s account, is a central element in what it is to be a human being, and self-realisation through work is a vital component of human flourishing. That he thinks that work—in a different form of society—could be creative and fulfilling, perhaps explains the intensity and scale of Marx’s condemnation of contemporary economic arrangements and their transformation of workers into deformed and “dehumanised” beings (MECW 3: 284).
It was suggested above that alienation consists of dysfunctional separations—separations between entities that properly belong together—and that theories of alienation typically presuppose some baseline condition whose frustration or violation by the relevant separation identifies the latter as dysfunctional. For Marx, that baseline seems to be provided by an account of human flourishing, which he conceptualises in terms of self-realisation (understood here as the development and deployment of our essential human capacities). Labour in capitalism, we can say, is alienated because it embodies separations preventing the self-realisation of producers; because it is organised in a way that frustrates the human need for free, conscious, and creative work.
So understood, and returning to the four separations said to characterise alienated labour, we can see that it is the implicit claim about human nature (the fourth separation) which identifies the other three separations as dysfunctional. If one subscribed to the same formal model of alienation and self-realisation, but held a different account of the substance of human nature, very different claims about work in capitalist society might result. Imagine a theorist who held that human beings were solitary, egoistic creatures, by nature. That theorist could accept that work in capitalist society encouraged isolation and selfishness, but deny that such results were alienating, because those results would not frustrate their baseline account of what it is to be a human being (indeed, they would rather facilitate those characteristics). — Karl Marx SEP
In fact, however, when the limited bourgeois form is stripped away, what is wealth other than the universality of individual needs, capacities, pleasures, productive forces etc., created through universal exchange? The full development of human mastery over the forces of nature, those of so-called nature as well as of humanity’s own nature? The absolute working-out of his creative potentialities, with no presupposition other than the previous historic development, which makes this totality of development, i.e. the development of all human powers as such the end in itself, not as measured on a predetermined yardstick? Where he does not reproduce himself in one specificity, but produces his totality? Strives not to remain something he has become, but is in the absolute movement of becoming? In bourgeois economics – and in the epoch of production to which it corresponds – this complete working-out of the human content appears as a complete emptying-out, this universal objectification as total alienation, and the tearing-down of all limited, one-sided aims as sacrifice of the human end-in-itself to an entirely external end. This is why the childish world of antiquity appears on one side as loftier. On the other side, it really is loftier in all matters where closed shapes, forms and given limits are sought for. It is satisfaction from a limited standpoint; while the modern gives no satisfaction; or, where it appears satisfied with itself, it is vulgar. — Marx- Grundrisse
"It is of course very simple to imagine that some powerful, physically dominant individual, after first having caught the animal, then catches humans in order to have them catch animals; in a word, uses human beings as another naturally occurring condition for his reproduction (whereby his own labour reduces itself to ruling) like any other natural creature. But such a notion is stupid – correct as it may be from the standpoint of some particular given clan or commune – because it proceeds from the development of isolated individuals. But human beings become individuals only through the process of history. He appears originally as a species-being [Gattungswesen], clan being, herd animal – although in no way whatever as a ζῶον πολιτιϰόν [4] in the political sense. Exchange itself is a chief means of this individuation [Vereinzelung]. It makes the herd-like existence superfluous and dissolves it. Soon the matter [has] turned in such a way that as an individual he relates himself only to himself, while the means with which he posits himself as individual have become the making of his generality and commonness. In this community, the objective being of the individual as proprietor, say proprietor of land, is presupposed, and presupposed moreover under certain conditions which chain him to the community, or rather form a link in his chain. In bourgeois society, the worker e.g. stands there purely without objectivity, subjectively; but the thing which stands opposite him has now become the true community [Gemeinwesen], [5] which he tries to make a meal of, and which makes a meal of him."
The alienation of the worker in his product means not only that his labor becomes an object, an external existence, but that it exists outside him, independently, as something alien to him, and that it becomes a power on its own confronting him. It means that the life which he has conferred on the object confronts him as something hostile and alien.
In creating a world of objects by his personal activity, in his work upon inorganic nature, man proves himself a conscious species-being, i.e., as a being that treats the species as his own essential being, or that treats itself as a species-being. Admittedly animals also produce. They build themselves nests, dwellings, like the bees, beavers, ants, etc. But an animal only produces what it immediately needs for itself or its young. It produces one-sidedly, whilst man produces universally. It produces only under the dominion of immediate physical need, whilst man produces even when he is free from physical need and only truly produces in freedom therefrom. An animal produces only itself, whilst man reproduces the whole of nature. An animal’s product belongs immediately to its physical body, whilst man freely confronts his product. An animal forms only in accordance with the standard and the need of the species to which it belongs, whilst man knows how to produce in accordance with the standard of every species, and knows how to apply everywhere the inherent standard to the object. Man therefore also forms objects in accordance with the laws of beauty.
It is just in his work upon the objective world, therefore, that man really proves himself to be a species-being. This production is his active species-life. Through this production, nature appears as his work and his reality. The object of labor is, therefore, the objectification of man’s species-life: for he duplicates himself not only, as in consciousness, intellectually, but also actively, in reality, and therefore he sees himself in a world that he has created. In tearing away from man the object of his production, therefore, estranged labor tears from him his species-life, his real objectivity as a member of the species and transforms his advantage over animals into the disadvantage that his inorganic body, nature, is taken from him.
Similarly, in degrading spontaneous, free activity to a means, estranged labor makes man’s species-life a means to his physical existence.
The consciousness which man has of his species is thus transformed by estrangement in such a way that species[-life] becomes for him a means.
Estranged labor turns thus:
(3) Man’s species-being, both nature and his spiritual species-property, into a being alien to him, into a means of his individual existence. It estranges from man his own body, as well as external nature and his spiritual aspect, his human aspect.
(4) An immediate consequence of the fact that man is estranged from the product of his labor, from his life activity, from his species-being, is the estrangement of man from man. When man confronts himself, he confronts the other man. What applies to a man’s relation to his work, to the product of his labor and to himself, also holds of a man’s relation to the other man, and to the other man’s labor and object of labor.
In fact, the proposition that man’s species-nature is estranged from him means that one man is estranged from the other, as each of them is from man’s essential nature.
The estrangement of man, and in fact every relationship in which man [stands] to himself, is realized and expressed only in the relationship in which a man stands to other men.
Hence within the relationship of estranged labor each man views the other in accordance with the standard and the relationship in which he finds himself as a worker.
||XXV| We took our departure from a fact of political economy – the estrangement of the worker and his production. We have formulated this fact in conceptual terms as estranged, alienated labor. We have analyzed this concept – hence analyzing merely a fact of political economy.
Let us now see, further, how the concept of estranged, alienated labor must express and present itself in real life.
If the product of labor is alien to me, if it confronts me as an alien power, to whom, then, does it belong?
To a being other than myself.
Who is this being?
The gods? To be sure, in the earliest times the principal production (for example, the building of temples, etc., in Egypt, India and Mexico) appears to be in the service of the gods, and the product belongs to the gods. However, the gods on their own were never the lords of labor. No more was nature. And what a contradiction it would be if, the more man subjugated nature by his labor and the more the miracles of the gods were rendered superfluous by the miracles of industry, the more man were to renounce the joy of production and the enjoyment of the product to please these powers.
The alien being, to whom labor and the product of labor belongs, in whose service labor is done and for whose benefit the product of labor is provided, can only be man himself.
If the product of labor does not belong to the worker, if it confronts him as an alien power, then this can only be because it belongs to some other man than the worker. If the worker’s activity is a torment to him, to another it must give satisfaction and pleasure. Not the gods, not nature, but only man himself can be this alien power over man.
We must bear in mind the previous proposition that man’s relation to himself becomes for him objective and actual through his relation to the other man. Thus, if the product of his labor, his labor objectified, is for him an alien, hostile, powerful object independent of him, then his position towards it is such that someone else is master of this object, someone who is alien, hostile, powerful, and independent of him. If he treats his own activity as an unfree activity, then he treats it as an activity performed in the service, under the dominion, the coercion, and the yoke of another man.
Every self-estrangement of man, from himself and from nature, appears in the relation in which he places himself and nature to men other than and differentiated from himself. For this reason religious self-estrangement necessarily appears in the relationship of the layman to the priest, or again to a mediator, etc., since we are here dealing with the intellectual world. In the real practical world self-estrangement can only become manifest through the real practical relationship to other men. The medium through which estrangement takes place is itself practical. Thus through estranged labor man not only creates his relationship to the object and to the act of production as to powers [in the manuscript Menschen (men) instead of Mächte (powers). – Ed.] that are alien and hostile to him; he also creates the relationship in which other men stand to his production and to his product, and the relationship in which he stands to these other men. Just as he creates his own production as the loss of his reality, as his punishment; his own product as a loss, as a product not belonging to him; so he creates the domination of the person who does not produce over production and over the product. Just as he estranges his own activity from himself, so he confers upon the stranger an activity which is not his own.
We have until now considered this relationship only from the standpoint of the worker and later on we shall be considering it also from the standpoint of the non-worker.
Through estranged, alienated labor, then, the worker produces the relationship to this labor of a man alien to labor and standing outside it. The relationship of the worker to labor creates the relation to it of the capitalist (or whatever one chooses to call the master of labor). Private property is thus the product, the result, the necessary consequence, of alienated labor, of the external relation of the worker to nature and to himself.
Private property thus results by analysis from the concept of alienated labor, i.e., of alienated man, of estranged labor, of estranged life, of estranged man.
True, it is as a result of the movement of private property that we have obtained the concept of alienated labor (of alienated life) in political economy. But on analysis of this concept it becomes clear that though private property appears to be the reason, the cause of alienated labor, it is rather its consequence, just as the gods are originally not the cause but the effect of man’s intellectual confusion. Later this relationship becomes reciprocal.
Only at the culmination of the development of private property does this, its secret, appear again, namely, that on the one hand it is the product of alienated labor, and that on the other it is the means by which labor alienates itself, the realization of this alienation.
This exposition immediately sheds light on various hitherto unsolved conflicts.
I'm still in the reading phase. The phase you skipped over. Have fun. — ZzzoneiroCosm
Alienation isn't primarily a "feeling". It's an objective circumstance. How unhappy employees may feel depends to a large extent on their expectations. I've worked in temp jobs where I had very few positive expectations, and wasn't oppressed by the meagre quality of work life. Landing in a job where one lacks competence to perform leads to many unhappy experiences, and may not be the fault of the employer. I've found myself in a couple of jobs where I was not competent to handle loathsome detailed paper processing systems and failed. Not the employer's fault -- more mine for lack of self knowledge. — Bitter Crank
It just seems like an incoherent position to me that there could be relations without non-relations (stuffs, or "inner aspects", as you call them). — litewave
The above is surely a description of alienating work overcome by the fellowship of patriotic common cause? Changing my baby's diaper is not alienating to the same extent as changing my granddad's. Self-realisation, in this sense is a personal development in a social world that makes drudgery non-alienating. Thus in the Zen monastery, only the Zen master has the self-realisation to be qualified to clean the toilets, the acolytes would be alienated by such work. Nothing alienates the enlightened. — unenlightened
Marx believed that alienated labor will be eliminated under communism. But the truth is that it will be a feature of all modes of production.
Seems rude. — Jackson
This is, again, confusing the how with the why question by those who answer the question that way. They're answering the how thinking they're providing the why answer. Philosophically, we cannot answer why humans have sensations, consciousness, and feelings. We can only answer the how humans became this way -- through mutation, evolution, etc. — L'éléphant
