It might be neurological, but it isn't physical — Wayfarer

Uh...huh...

Anyways we already did this on my thread and got nowhere. Maybe try again in like a week or something but not 2 days later. Cheers!

But I will add, I think we're more agreed than disagreed, we just use different words for the same stuff. I would never say "It's neurological but not physical" for one.

No disagreement there. "Interpretation" is a purely neurological process after all!

Furthemore, if this post causes anxiety, then that will have metabolic i.e. physical consequences, in terms of blood pressure etc. But the proximate cause of those changes is not physical, it's purely because of a perceived conflict or disagreement. — Wayfarer

You need to separate your variables. In this case there was a visual input and supposedly some perceived conflict. If you want to claim that the metabolic effect took place because of the perceived conflict, and not because of any visual or auditory input, you'd have to find a case where a metabolic effect takes place due to "perceived conflict" alone without any accompanying physical inputs. Otherwise one can easily make the claim that it is the physical input causing the metabolic effect. Good luck with that one!

Some untangling is due here.

If I have a sorted series of red and blue boxes, RRRBBRBRRB for example, is the series physical? As in is the pattern itself, the structure physical? I frankly don't care about the answer to that question because it's definitional. But since you want to define whether or not something is physical by whether or not it possesses mass and volume, then for you probably the pattern is not physical (since the pattern does not possess mass).

For the record, since the pattern is a pattern of physical stuff (boxes) I would call the pattern itself physical, which is maybe why a lot of people on the site think I'm disagreeing with them when I'm not. Maybe my use of physical is weird. Anyways.

I would say this structure is mind. Mind is a structure of matter, specifically brains. Now, here is where you need to be careful not to separate the structure as a separate sort of thing. That's what dualists do. They think "Ah, here is something that doesn't have mass, namely mind! So there must be 2 sorts of things!" but there is no need for that. It's not that there is a something that doesn't have mass, it's just that there is a pattern, and we call that pattern mind.

Because when you make it so that there is something that doesn't have mass that does all the thinking at best you're going to end up with epiphenomenalism, or at worst you're going to try to go against the science (conservation of energy, momentum), and no one likes that. Though there is a way out for dualists, that is shoving the role of mind into QM. As in, although this is true:

I can't seem to do any work with my thought about Aphrodite. I mean my thought about Aphrodite can't seem to deflect even a single air molecule off its path let alone do anything else physical. — TheMadFool

What the thought of Aphrodite does is that it somehow resolves the Quantum Wavefunction in your brain in such a way that the neural correlates of "thoughts about aphrodite" happen (such as an increase in volume. Not in your brain though). That way you can keep your non material mind and have it be doing something without violating the laws of physics. Take this to the extreme and you get panpsychism or whatever Donald Hoffman is doing.

That or you can just hold that a mind is a pattern of matter and that way you get all the same stuff you would get with the dualist/panpsychist route but with a simpler explanation and no need for QM wizardry. Also there is debate over whether this role of mind would be significant at all. QM has very little impact on big objects. So if you claim that mind is an immaterial thing which has the job of resolving wavefunctions in the brain, you might end up with a mind that can't do anything impactful. Frankly, I have no clue how big a role QM plays in the human brain, all I know is there is debate about it.

In this particular case, there is no direction towards the answer. Rather, every direction is as good as any other. And this is true of everyone. It's not about the limitations of the individual but the limitations of being human. You would know this if you read what the quote was referring to instead of wasting time by taking it out of context.

There is an argument that says the world must be ordered, for the simple reason our understanding is very seldom in conflict with it. — Mww

Sure agreed.

Either way, and no matter what, without us and our system, the world, ordered or otherwise, is ontologically, epistemologically, and completely, irrelevant. — Mww

:up:

As weak as they are, I think our sensory system is complete, insofar far as we are affected by the external world with the system we have. — Mww

I mean, we can't see UV waves for one but we're still affected by them. I think it's obvious our sensory system is not complete even when it comes to things that can affect us. Maybe the "food requirement" for having eyes that can detect UV and infrared was not worth the survival benefits. Maybe it is worth it but we just haven't evolved to that point yet.

Maybe our reasoning is incomplete in the same sense too, but so far there hasn't been anything we couldn't comprehend with it. Then again, I think the real evolutionary breakthrough humans have isn't our logic, but our malleability. We have made multiple logics for different uses, even when they are not intuitive, and eventually made them intuitive. We don't have a "single mode of logic".

But I wouldn’t say reason orders the world in the first place, which grants me access to it, whatever its composition or use. — Mww

Agreed.

Again, I don't see the need to place logical principles in the world. I would say even these simple logical principles are akin to sight and hearing. Reasoning is a capacity, not something that's "out there". — khaled

It was Wayfarer that was trying to conceive of an “order out there”, so I pointed it out that it’s useless to talk about such a thing because you’ll never have access to it.

Reason doesn’t organize.....order.....the world; it only informs me of the consistency and legitimacy of the ordering. And THAT I certainly do care about. — Mww

Agreed with a minor nitpick. I would say the argument that our reasoning capacities can be trusted since there is evolutionary advantage in having good reasoning is valid. But not the argument that our reasoning or senses are complete. There’s been research showing that if you set up a “survival game” with multiple AI, the AI that survives longest is the one that has managed to “simplify” the game into as few variables as possible, neglecting vast parts of reality in favor of only being able to detect the things that matter for survival since computation power = need for more food and so is sometimes not worth it. The idea that it is evolutionarily advantageous to have an accurate and complete representation of reality is just plain false in many cases. Accuracy? Yes. The simplification must still be true, even if it’s not the full picture. Completeness is often unnecessary.

The philosophical mind has the desire to know. So such statements are very unphilosophical. — Metaphysician Undercover

Only a fool would want to know something they know they can’t know.

You have to be careful of the word "exist". Let's take the moon for example. Would the moon exist if no one was around? Well, the the big rock would exist, but there would be no one to call it "moon" (or for that matter to differentiate what a "rock" is from the space around it). So does that mean the moon exists or no? Just depends on your definition.

But the idea that things don't exist until something observes them is just Quantum Mechanics. Now all the fighting is over what this "observer" is. Though there is still some fighting over whether or not QM should be interpreted ontologically or epistemologically. When we talk about the uncertainty principle, and say we are uncertain of where the electron is, is this an "epistemological limitation" as in the electron is in fact in a specific location X and we don't know where, or is it an "ontological limitation" as in the electron is in no specific location X, and is ontologically only describable by a probability function? I think the ontological interpretation is more common nowadays, though Multiple Worlds is of the epistemological variety.

Because I have no access to it (or more accurately, I can't tell if I do or not). You claim you have access to it? Your argument for that was:

Reason is efficacious because the reason that orders the world is also a characteristic of the reason that is internal to the mind. — Wayfarer

Which is basically an evolutionary argument. Also a faulty one.

The stoics said that reasoning is more than a capacity of thought, because it's also a principle of cosmic order. Reason is efficacious because the reason that orders the world is also a characteristic of the reason that is internal to the mind. — Wayfarer

Point is, there is no use in talking about "the reason that orders the world". There will always be doubt about that. I remember Donald Hoffman claiming that whenever he tried to simulate evolution on a machine using some sort of "game system", the organisms that ended up surviving were ones that did not understand "the reason that orders the world" but who instead just managed to find a "reason internal to the mind" that specifically suits their survival needs and nothing more.

As such, I don't care about "the reason that orders the world". Maybe it is the same as the reason in my mind, or maybe the reason in my mind is just an "evolutionary shortcut", a hack, a parody of the real thing optimized for survival. Either way, I don't have access to "the reason that orders the world" so I don't care about it.

It is not necessarily true that reason is efficacious because the reason in our minds is the same as "the reason that orders the world" if anything, there is evidence that if our reasoning is efficacious, it is precisly because it is not the reason that orders the world as that would be unnecessarily complicated and not conducive for survival.

What we know, including what we understand the world to be, is a cognitive act, a constructive effort on the part of the embodied mind. — Wayfarer

As long as this "embodied mind" is not a separate sort of thing, I don't think anyone would dispute this. Maybe MWI or other "epistimological quantum mechanics interpretations" fans but I would think that the idea that we construct the world is pretty common now. Not to say that's it's all made up, but that we play an integral part in what the world looks like ontologically not just epistemologically.

There are fundamental, general and simple logical principles, such as the law of identity and the law of the excluded middle, which must be true in all possible worlds. — Wayfarer

Again, I don't see the need to place logical principles in the world. I would say even these simple logical principles are akin to sight and hearing. Reasoning is a capacity, not something that's "out there". And again, we humans have made multiple logics, not just formal logic. This isn't to say we made up the laws any more than we "made up" sight or hearing. We have a capacity of reasoning. Reasoning isn't "out there".

Not a separate sort of object from matter. — Wayfarer

I think we agree more than we disagree but just use different words for things.

You notice how you've subtly made the mind or self an object by asking this question - an 'it'. The mind, the self are not an object. There is no 'it' — Wayfarer

Your use of the term idealism is weird then. So idealism for you does not include that minds are a different sort of "it" from matter? The mind is not an object, yet you're an idealist?

It is assumed that the sophistication of the brain allows for the origination of logic, but the principles of logic are discovered, not invented; however the brain evolves, it has to conform to them, it doesn't produce them out of itself. — Wayfarer

Where do you get this? I wouldn't place logic above an evolutionarily advantageous adaptation. I wouldn't place it "out there" in the world. Laws of logic are about how we think, they're not inherent in the world itself. Otherwise we wouldn't have different logics.

It's weird to me because you seem to think that having any concept of "pattern" or "structure" automatically counts as a form of idealism. Whereas I would assume idealism is a position that proposes the existence of ideas as a separate sort of object from matter, like how the panpsychists or dualists do it.

So it makes no sense to believe there are no unicorns on earth? And "I had nothing for dinner yesterday" makes no sense either?

Ok.

let me rephrase. A belief that Gods do not exist.

Suffice it to say I’m not certain one can have a belief without an object of that belief. — Pinprick

Is it coherent to believe that there are no unicorns on earth?

If atheism is defined as a disbelief in the existence of gods — Pinprick

It could also be defined as a belief in the non existence of Gods. It just depends on whether you think belief or disbelief is the “default position”. That’s really what burden of proof depends on. And in this debate both the theists and the atheists believe the burden of proof is on the other. Because both consider their own position the default, and the other the one that needs justification.

Reply when you're actually interested in having a conversation. Don't waste people's time.

Then you're using 'reduction' in an unusual way. What you're describing is nonreductive physicalism. — frank

"Non-reductive physicalism is the view that mental properties form a separate ontological class to physical properties"

They're not ontologically different. I erased my example but this was what I was about to type:

Jeff's pain is a neurological event that is different from Jane's pain, which is again different from a cow's pain. But they are all neurological events.

Few would accept that definition at this point. — frank

Really? Few would accept a behavioral definition of pain?

How do you know when someone's in pain? Do you directly assess what qualia they're experiencing or do you look at their behavior?

You'll need something like the concept of emergence to cover the diverse physical basis. — frank

I never claimed it's possible to cover the "diverse physical basis" neurologically. I claimed that every instance of a mental event can be reduced to a physical event. Not that we can reduce every instance of a mental event to a single neurological event.

And I would disagree. I don't think you need strong emergence. Just more robust definitions. So instead of trying to reduce something like pain to a single neurological state, you can define it in terms of behavior. So being in pain due to X is acting to avoid X for example. That's an example of a definition that would cover the diverse physical basis. At best I would say this is weak emergence.

My best guess is that you're trying to say we can't reduce something like "pain" to a single neurological state. Sure. But I never claimed we could. As in we could reduce any and all forms of pain to this or that specific neurolocial state. That would be absurd considering how different even human brains are from each other. We can't explain a cow's pain in terms of human brains. But what we can do is reduce every instance of pain to a neurological state. If not the same one. I never claimed all instances of pain can be reduced to "Chemical X going to place Y".

I know what multiple realizability is. I know what neuroscience is. I know what reductionism is. But I don't know what the sentence means.

Again, what does "the neuroscience doesn't work" mean?

Care to elaborate? What does "the neuroscience not work" mean?

The question is whether or not it's possible not whether or not you'd want to do it. It's probably a waste of time to do, agreed.

it's just that these are different levels of description. The level at which we interact with people in a day to day basis, is not the level at which we usually think of them as chemicals. It is much more complex and rich than that, or so it seems to me. — Manuel

And which part of this is not supported by a reductive materialism?

we can speak of the experiential aspects of life (consciousness, mental going ons, thoughts, dreams, qualia) and the non-experiential aspects of life, those aspects of life which lack experience such as a rock or or particles or anything else we think has no experience — Manuel

Right again, which part of this contradicts a reductive materialism? As long as consciousness, mental goingons, etc are not identified as a "different type of thing" then you can still be a materialist and talk about them.

If it is inaccessible, then it's of no consequence. — Banno

:up:

because those whose beliefs about the world didn't map on to reality (those who had false beliefs about the world) were weeded out by natural selection. — RogueAI

Is not proven. If anything there are plenty of situations where hiding useless information about the world is better for your survival instead of having an accurate mental representation of everything.

So no I don't think the evolutionist can claim we have knowledge of the world "as it is". But then again, who cares about the world "as it is"? What matters is how it seems because that's all we have access to anyways.

In other words, even given that the evolutionist can't do it, who exactly can say that we know the world "as it is"? How would they ever know when they only have access to the way the world seems (by definition), just like the rest of us? They would just have to arbitrarily claim that their representations are not faulty. The evolutionist at least has a weak argument for why they may not be faulty (that in general, an accurate representation of reality is better for survival, even if sometimes it isn't)

If Dennett is right in his "materialism", the view that the phenomena of the mind are illusion or bad theoretical postulates — Manuel

Eliminative materialism isn't the only materialism.

I mean, if it's all mere reaction to stimuli and the like, then the loved one is merely a bag of chemicals, so we should be rational and think to ourselves that, I thought this person was unique, funny, smart, perceptive and so on, but I'm wrong, all it was was cleaver reactions to external stimuli. — Manuel

A person can be funny and also be merely a bag of chemicals. IE reductionist materialism.

Why assume that matter and mind are distinct?

Until someone can tell me where matter "stops" and mind "begins", this distinction doesn't make sense. — Manuel

:up:

Or more importantly, why that distinction would be needed.

If mind was an illusion — Manuel

Makes no sense no matter how you look at it imo.

If anyone's still interested: The original point of the thread was to ask what the consequences of the different metaphysics are. So far there's really been one attempt at answering this by Javra who said that a materialist metaphysics cannot support purpose. I don't agree, but at least it was an attempt at answering.

Anyone else? It's not like I can stop you from turning it into another QM thread but I'd like to remind everyone those go nowhere.

Copenhagen also disagrees, in its original guise anyway. The wavefunction in Copenhagen is epistemological, not ontological. — Kenosha Kid

Yes I know it’s not the only interpretation. But I don’t understand epistemological interpretations. And I thought they were the minority with ontological being more popular.

Even wavefunction ontologists who believe in collapse are still usually describing "universal collapse" — Kenosha Kid

I didn’t say the collapse wasn’t universal. I have no clue whether or not it is. Nor do I particularly care much to research it right now.

Yes, but does our observation create the content of that reality: the object and its properties? — Joshs

Yes that’s what I meant by “ontologically”. It is the most popular interpretation of QM, that the wave function somehow “collapses”. And “collapse” isn’t just is “finding out” where the electron “really was all along”, it is literally the electron changing from an undefined wave to a defined particle.

Time,space , the content of the object with all its properties, don’t seem to be co-constituted by a subject , but independent of it. — Joshs

How do you explain what happens in a double slit experiment. If all the electrons are “really somewhere” we just don’t know where then why is it that they ACT as if they’re “really everywhere” until they are observed and collapse into being “really somewhere”.

I don’t know what “constituted by a subject” means. We don’t decide where the electron appears, but without observation, there is no electron, just a quantum wave (or quantum soup as I like to call it).

Most interpretations of QM as far as I understand don’t have it be that electrons are “really somewhere” bumping into each other, but what is “really there” is quantum soup, until something takes a look, then it collapses, ontologically, to electrons bumping into each other. We know this because quantum soup looks different when going through two slits than when electrons go through two slits.

What definition of inherent are you using? — javra

Not assigned. In the thing in the first place. This one:

Naturally as part or consequence of something. — https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/inherent

These also do:

inbuilt, ingrained, intrinsic — https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/inherent

You are pushing the idea that things have inherent purposes that we can be factually wrong about. But every time I've asked you to name the inherent purpose of this or that object you haven't answered. Why is that? My guess is because things don't actually have inherent purposes and that purpose is assigned, not inherent.

And furthermore, you want to argue that if a bit of matter can't assign purpose, therefore any configuration of matter cannot assign purpose. I don't see how that follows. So I don't see what your problem is with purpose in a materialist metaphysics. You haven't actually shown why a materialist metaphysics cannot support purpose. I keep asking you to show the contradiction you think is there.

Were the goal(s) that drove you assigned to you by some other the way you assign purpose to a rock? — javra

No. My goal was assigned to me by me. I decided to respond. No contradiction there either. If you see one point it out.

If not, how was your purpose, your goal-driven behavior, in writing this text not inherent to you? — javra

If I'm to have an inherent purpose I would be very very sad if that inherent purpose was responding to philosophy forum posts :rofl:. Reminds me of the "you pass butter" meme.

Likewise, is my purpose in replying obtained due to some other assigning purpose to me? — javra

I'd assume you assigned it to yourself too, though it's possible you're being forced to type at gunpoint, in whichcase it would be assigned by someone else.

Does a quark assign purpose? You and I might both agree on a "no". Yet we're built from quarks and such, and we assign purpose. — javra

Yes. There is no contradiction here. Quarks aren't at the level of complexity to be thinking about the purposes of things. We are. Now, where's the problem?

Why do you believe that a collection of quarks is incapable of assigning a purpose to something because one quark cannot assign a purpose to something? What is the logical operation being used to go from "Quarks can't assign purposes" to "Humans (a very complicated collection of quarks and such) can't assign purposes". I don't see one. I don't see the need to add any special "purpose assigning powers" to us. The complexity is good enough as an explanation for why we can assign purposes and quarks individually cannot. Just like how a single logic gate cannot drive a car, but a computer can drive a car. Hope I've made it clear now.

You are in essence saying that the "we" you're addressing is the "second sort of thing". — javra

False. You seem to think I need to say this. Again, what's the logical operation you use to come to that conclusion? That if a quark can't assign a purpose then a very complicated collection of quarks and such cannot assign purpose. It doens't follow. I can maintain that a single quark cannot assign purpose, but a very complicated collection of quarks and other subatomic particles put a certain way (humans) can.

No, to me you're not getting the difference between assigning X to Y and Y in fact being X. As one difference: The first can be wrong. The second addresses what is factual. — javra

That difference doesn't exist here. Replace X and Y with what we're actually talking about. You're suggesting a difference between assigning a purpose to a rock and a rock in fact having a purpose. The idea that a rock can "in fact" have a purpose outside of the assigned purpose is absurd. Do you actually defend this idea? You think we can assign the "wrong purpose" to a rock? What's the right purpose of a rock, factually?

I'm simply saying that materialism fails to account for the reality of purpose, and that only a non-physicalist metaphysics can do so. — javra

If by reality of purpose you're suggesting that things inherently have purpose without anyone assigning it to them then, not only is that not even incompataible with materialism (just say that the matter itself has purpose, your original option b) but it's also, again, absurd in my view. If you think things have inherent real purposes then please tell me the "real purpose" of a PC. Is it to chat on forums? Answer emails? Play games? Which is it?

And, if matter / the physical is of itself purposeful, — javra

It isn't inherently. Some matter we assign purpose. Some matter we don't. Which is identical to saying that some matter has purpose and some doesn't, respectively.

Now, we, are also made of matter. I don't see a need to suggest we're different. What's the problem with this?

Again, we're currently working with the premise that purpose is real, and not merely an illusion which we assign to others as well as to ourselves. — javra

I'd say it's real and assigned to others as well as ourselves. Don't know where the "illusion" thing came from. You think it's NOT assigned by us? That purpose is somehow inherent in the matter itself?

But this is confounding the act of assigning X with the the process itself of being X. — javra

How does something having purpose due to assigenment differ from it "itself having purpose". What are you suggesting here?

Something has a purpose when we assign it a purpose.

Goal/aim/end/completion-driven processes can be assigned to some object, rightly or wrongly, yes. But this is not the same as the given addressed in fact being goal/aim/end/completion-driven in what they do. — javra

Ye..Yes it is.

Also how do you "wrongly assign purpose"? If I use rocks to build something have I "misused the rocks" because rocks are "actually" supposed to be used for lighting fires? I don't get this notion of something inherently having purpose. No we assign things purpose, it isn't inherent.

And no, there is no "second sort of thing" required for there to actually be purpose.

The question is, can materialism in any way account for purpose? So far, not that much — javra

?

So you're suggesting some sort of monism in the first sentence. Then asserting that materialism doesn't do it. So idealism? I'm losing you.

I'll again ask from two day's back: Do you find that matter/the physical is in and of itself purposeful, i.e. consists of goal-directed processes? — javra

"Goal oriented" is a human construct. Nothing is inherently goal oriented. Humans are what see purposes in things and people. I think we can agree so far.

Now I also think these humans are not any more than matter. So does "matter itself" consist of goal-oriented processes? Yes and no. Some matter (humans) see purpose in other matter. Rocks don't have purpose inherently, but what gives them purpose (humans) is made up no differently from the rocks themselves (IE made up of matter).

There is no ethereal spirit that decides what does or doesn't have purpose. No "second kind of thing" that decides what matter (the first kind of thing) is to be used for. What is doing the deciding is the same type of thing as the thing whose purpose is getting decided. Because I don't see a need to create a split here. And all I've got in support of one is "Oh it's self evident" which it isn't.

If you think there needs to be some split here please explain why. I asked wayfarer and he told me it's because there is a split there.

If "closest" then maybe not quite it. In which case do you believe there is a duality between non-purposeful matter and purposeful matter — javra

No. See above.

Apropos, you are aware that the vast majority of materialists/physicalists would find it absurd that a subatomic quark, as well as any matter in general, engages in goal-oriented processes. Right? — javra

Inherently? Yes. But we say that a self driving car engages in purposeful behavior. Is there any more to the self driving car than the matter that makes it up? Does the self driving car have a mind? Or whatever you want to call the "second sort of thing" that assigns purposes (which I think there is no need for).

B I guess is closest.

Also as a reminder, you’ve claimed it ridiculous that matter/the physical is of itself purposeful, — javra

When? Quote it.

you're a materialist and for you goal-directed behavior - this, again, being purpose - is not real. — javra

When did I say "goal directed behavior is impossible"?

If you're happy with the notion that everything is just stuff, then probably, don't waste your time on philosophy. — Wayfarer

Ah guess every monist is wrong. Riveting argumentation.

I don't think your thinking is precise enough to appreciate the distinctions that being made. — Wayfarer

Saying "you're too dumb" in 15 words instead of 3 doesn't make it smart. Or less of an ad hom. We were being civil so far and it was enjoyable. So why?

I don't think you have enough evidence to conclude that my thinking is not precise enough. Considering so far you've talked to countless people who have had as much or more experience than you in the field and found none of their thinking to be precise enough. So either you're a genius and truly everyone is just not precise enough, or just confused. From what I've gathered, it's the latter. You think there needs to be an ontological split where it isn't necessary.

it is trivially true that all knowledge of the world has an inextricably subjective component,
— Janus

It is contested by all those who advocate physicalism. — Wayfarer

False.

Then again the way you use physicalism and idealism is weird.

I don't think any of the idealist philosophers seriously contemplate that mind is an objective constituent of things. — Wayfarer

But they're still trying to eliminate something. What, pray tell? — Wayfarer

Unnecessary ontological splitting that you haven't been able to justify despite being asked by everyone to justify it.

So you would say that when a biologist observes lions in the wild, that the biologist is a lion? — Wayfarer

No but that the biologist is a bunch of matter just like the lion.

The quote says I disagree with observers and observed being different kinds of things. A lion and a biologist are the same kind of thing in many respects. Being a physical object for one.

What I disagree with is the idea that the biologist is onotologically different from the lion, not physical somehow. That seems to me to be what you're saying.

What wayfarer’s move does is turn the subject into a kind of object. — Joshs

Yes and I don't like that.

Phenomenology doesn’t begin from a subject looking at an object. Rather, it begins from indissociable interaction wherein each moment of experience is an intentional act composed of a subjective and objective pole. Neither exists by itself and each reciprocally determines the other. — Joshs

As long as the "subjective and objective poles" are made of the same stuff then I can live with that. But I have a problem with splitting the things in the world into objects that need observing and observers that observe them, as 2 ontologically different categories.

Our observation ontologically "creates" reality. That's just QM (at least the versions with collapse, MWI disagrees). My problem is when people say that the observation, and observers, are different kinds of things from the things getting observed. I see no evidence for it and I a lot of problems that can arise.

Even if that were the case. Now what. Ok the subject determines the ontology of the object. This isn't very revolutionary since QM. An electron isn't an electron until something looks at it. Now what?

Do you do a wayfarer and then say that "Thus the subject is a separate sort of thing from the object" or do you stay monist? I don't see the reason behind doing a wayfarer. Maybe you could enlighten me (assuming that's what you want to do).