Humans are also objects. You can pick them up for one.

But yea if your argument for why there should be this subject object split is because "There should be this subject object split, can't you see how this subject is split from this object!" then yea there isn't much to discuss.

What do you mean 'cut off'? — Wayfarer

This:

We ourselves are not objects to ourselves — Wayfarer

I mean, isn't that self-evident? — Wayfarer

No.

well, the body is, in a way. But ourselves, as knowing subjects — Wayfarer

Why this split? That's what I'm asking.

The thing doing the knowing is not an ontologically different type of thing to the thing getting known. I don't see a reason to split them like that.

Is the appearance of the configuration unique to each subject — Joshs

Not sure what you mean but we have different brains so I think so?

can the configuration be described as existing as what it is independently of any given observer? — Joshs

No clue what this means though.

You haven't responded to my question.

What would be the problem with having our reality depend on our perception of the objective domain AND have us be part of the objective domain, no different from the other things in it. Why cut us off? — khaled

That's really the bit I care about.

Having no inherent reality or real being; their nature is imputed to them, not intrinsic to them, in accordance with their causes, context and the intentions of the observer (per the madhyamika dialectic of Mahāyāna Buddhists.)

In the context of physics, that manifested as the inability to discern an absolute point-particle - an atom, in fact. It was found that sub-atomic entities have a kind of ambiguous or indeterminate nature rather than being indivisible atoms. — Wayfarer

Even given this (which I agree with though, again MWI exists and is valid), why do you go on to split the observer as a different type of thing from the thing being observed?

You set up this world picture, here the subject with his ideas, there the world with it things, and think that it's all settled. — Wayfarer

That's dualism and I precisely don't do that.

SO it is easy to believe that a configuration 'stands for' or 'represents' an experience — Wayfarer

No a configuration IS an experience.

but we're not ever really in a position of comparing the object of the experience with the neural data — Wayfarer

There is no "object of experience". The configuration IS the experience. That's my view.

I'm looking at a red object in my room. I'm having the experience of seeing red. There is something that is it like for me to see this red object: me seeing this red object. That is a mental state I can access through introspection. — RogueAI

All of these are physical requirements. A brightly red room, a cup emitting a certain wavelength, and working eyes and visual systems. So the “experience of seeing red” is a physical state. And to have the “experience of seeing red” is to have that (or largely similar) physical state.

The “experience of seeing red” isn’t a different sort of thing from the physical configuration while seeing red. It’s precisely that physical configuration.

That’s how I would answer it. The “experience of seeing red” isn’t a “different kind of object”, it’s just a configuration of the brain.

But I don't think I've seen an argument that refutes "things in themselves" that is satisfactory. Probably because I think it is true — Manuel

QM can be seen as a refutation to that. It only refutes the “in themselves” part, it doesn’t refute the “things” part. There is things outside of us but that depend on us for their existence. Electrons in a double slit experiment for example.

This leads people to say that the world comprises of things-not-in-themselves and the observers which come together to make observations, “creating reality” in a sense. Things need another thing to define them. They’re not “in themselves”

Now wayfarer has stated that this “other thing” is a separate sort of thing from the “things not in themselves” if you understand what I’m saying. I don’t know where the justification for the split came from so I’m not sold on that.

Now there are theories of QM that maintain a “thing in itself” world that doesn’t require our observation in any way, but the only one of those I know is multiple worlds interpretation. If you want to introduce collapse, you’re gonna have to say that things aren’t in themselves until they’re collapsed. I’m just not sold that we doing the collapsing are in any way special, or that the collapsing couldn’t be done by the exact same type of stuff as the stuff getting collapsed.

I have a question for the good folks on both sides of this discussion - does any of this makes a difference in how I should lead my life? — EricH

That was the intent behind the thread. “What are the important consequences of both”. It turned into a generic materialism vs idealism debate though :/. Something I don’t care much about if there is no important consequence behind both. Still fun to participate in.

So far the attempts were: You can’t have purpose with a materialist metaphysics. And you can’t have a house with materialist metaphysics. I’m not convinced of either but at least there were attempts.

But the observing subject is not anywhere to be found in the objective domain — Wayfarer

I don’t see how this follows or why it would be necessary. I was with you until here:

The form of idealism I subscribe to, on the contrary, is not denying that material objects possess empirical reality - deny it at your peril - but saying that reality comprises both the observed object and the observing subject — Wayfarer

I may read the PDF tomorrow but it’s time for me to sign off today.

What would be the problem with having our reality depend on our perception of the objective domain AND have us be part of the objective domain, no different from the other things in it. Why cut us off?

I am not denying that matter exists — Wayfarer

Great.

I am denying is that it possesses intrinsic or inherent reality. — Wayfarer

I think I know what that means now that it's in context. I'll take it.

That is precisely what is at issue, it is what seems to occur. Avoiding that implication is the main motivation behind the 'many worlds' alternative, seems to me. — Wayfarer

Agreed. As I said, I don't agree with the "episemic" interpretations of QM. Many worlds is the only one of those I know about.

I think we agree more than we disagree but I'm too tired to think of it right now. I'll read the quotes more carefully later and respond if I find something I disagree with.

Weird to me that you call this idealist. Especially with:

I am not denying that matter exists, — Wayfarer

If by creating you mean bringing matter into existence, sure we did not create it. — Manuel

Great. Fantastic. That's all I'm asking for.

It's the debate between epistemic structural realists and ontological structural realists. The former are what Strawson and Russell favor. As well as you and me. The latter view, is favored by Ladyman and Ross. These two think that there are only structures all the way down.

Yes, I also agree that it is incoherent to say structure is all there is: a structure is a structure of something. — Manuel

We agree then. I wonder where @Wayfarer is here.

Well we are the ones who designate a world. I don't know what else in biology could even have a concept of a "world". — Manuel

There was something, which we then designated a world. And something we designated "rock" and another thing we designated "river" and so on. All we did was designate. Label. We didn't create the something. And the something will stay behind after we die. Agreed?

Furthermore I'll add that we are also made of that "something". And that that "something" is called matter. And that there is no "other type of thing".

But how this physical stuff remains - what nature it has absent us - is quite obscure. Some can say colorless, odorless particles remain, or perhaps quantum fields. But the only thing we can attribute to them is whatever physics says about them.

But if Russell (and Strawson and Chomsky) is correct, then only those characteristics picked out by our mathematical equations remain, but that wouldn't exhaust what these things are. — Manuel

Sure.

Another view is that structure is all there is, so in this respects we do exhaust the nature of the physical with our physics. — Manuel

And that's what I don't get. A structure, needs something to get structured. A "structure without base matter" is like a building without bricks.

The 'base matter' has been found to have no base. — Wayfarer

False. I don't want to get into QM again but this is far from the only (or even popular) view.

What's been found is 1 of 2 things. Either:

1- There is a base matter about which we can't know. As in the uncertainty principle is an epistemological problem not an ontological one. These are the "epistemological interpretations". The electron IS in a certain space at a certain time acting a certain way, we just can't know where. Incidentally, I don't think this is the case.

2- The base matter itself is affected when observed. An "ontological interpretation". The uncertainty principle isn't us being uncertain where the electron is while it's actually at position X, more like the electron itself is uncertain, it cannot be said to be at X ontologically. But this doesn't negate that the base matter must exist independently of us. The fact that we don't know where an electron is until we look at it DOES NOT lead to the conclusion that the looking is what created the electron which sounds to me like what you're saying.

You say the "base matter has no base". Even so. All I'm putting forward here is that there exists base matter regardless of anyone looking at it. There exists SOMETHING when no one is looking, not an electron sure, but something.

If everyone died tomorrow there would still be something left behind, agreed?

Or no intelligible world at any rate... — Manuel

Agreed. But not "no world". The "base matter" of which we make the presentation in the first place stays.

If whatever form of idealism you subscribe to makes it impossible to imagine empty rooms existing I don't think I want to touch it. I have no clue what you're saying anymore. I already responded to that quote.

You seem to me to be saying that the mind, doesn't only categorize and label, but literally physically creates the room. No observers, no room. I can understand the concept of "room" ceasing to exist without some intelligent being to label it so. But the "base matter" that we labeled room? That should still be there no?

I understand the perplexity about this point. The way I put it is this: that you're imagining the Universe going out of existence when not observed - there one minute, and not there the next. — Wayfarer

Well not the universe, the moon. Because that's what was being asked. "Is the moon still there when no one is looking at it"? Yes.

The problem with the much modern philosophy, is that it believes it can imagine the universe as it truly is in itself, with no observer present. — Wayfarer

It's not a belief. I just did it. I just imagined my room with no one in it. You can do it too.

The mind's ordering of experience and its ability to quantize and rationalise, is what makes measurement and theory possible in the first place. — Wayfarer

Right, but the mind does only that. Orders and quantizes. Does NOT create. So the moon will still be there when no one is looking at it. And the wheels of the train will still be there when no one is looking at them.

If there was no one around then the moon doesn't exist conceptually. There will be no mind to label this particular rock "moon" (or to recognize what a rock is), and contrast it with the empty space around it as its own thing. But the rock itself won't go anywhere.

If tomorrow an evil scientist made everyone forget about the ancient egyptians and made sure no one was looking at the pyramids for a certain period of time, the pyramids will still be there when people wake up and look at them. We would think they're just a weird prank of some sort and take them down maybe, but they'd still be there.

The form of idealism I believe is true, is that the apparently external world is inextricably bound to and by our cognitive abilities - that we see the kind of world we see because of the kinds of beings we are. This doesn’t mean something as simple-minded as ‘the world exists in my mind’, but that the human mind is constitutive of everything we understand as reality. — Wayfarer

:up:

I wouldn't call that idealism. It's not even talking about ontology, more so epistemology. I incidentally agree with everything you've said in that comment. And nowhere did you actually propose "mind stuff" as different from "physical stuff". Only that what we can know about physical stuff is inextricable from our perceptions. Not that the actual physical stuff is inextricable from our perceptions.

As Magee says in his book on Schopenhauer, humans are generally born with an instinctive sense of realism, the problems with which only become clear after considerable intellectual effort. — Wayfarer

Ontological realism isn't the problem. Saying that there is a real world independent of our minds isn't the problem. Saying we can know about said world is. But really, who cares about the world independent of our perceptions? We can't see it.

The sense in which it exists outside of or apart from that mind is an empty question, because nothing we can know is ever outside of or apart from the act of knowing by which we are concious of the existence of the world in the first place. — Wayfarer

:up:

We can't know. But we can sure guess. That's what we do in physics. Try to guess what the mind independent world is like. And stop when we've fulfilled our practical purposes and matched all the observations. We make a guess and see if it's wrong or not. If it is, make another guess. If it isn't, rejoice, until the guess turns out to be wrong.

But we can in fact know some things are not what the mind independent world is like. For instance, we can know the moon doesn't disappear when no one looks at it by organizing an experiment where no one looks at the moon, yet there will still be moonlight. So the mind independent world must have some sort of continuity that doens't require human observation at least.

Does this not make you :brow: ? — TheMadFool

No it doesn’t because the Socratic paradox isn’t a Socrates exclusive idea just for having Socrates in the name. The Socratic paradox is not a part of Socrates. So there is no contradiction between Socrates dying and the Socratic paradox living on. There is as much contradiction in that as me dying and my car continuing to work. My car’s not a part of me. Why did you expect me dying to affect it in any way?

That’s what I meant when I said “Not Socrates specific”. I don’t know how to explain it more. I don’t get what you’re :brow: ing over.

nothing physical (configuration also included) that can be identified as Socrates exists as of 2021 — TheMadFool

Right.

yet his idea that, to be wise is simply to realize one's own abject ignorance (I know that I know nothing) exists still, alive and well I might add in, truth be told, 2021. — TheMadFool

Where's the inconsistency here? No configuration that can be identified as Socrates remains. However a configuration that can be identified as the thought "I know I know nothing" persists.

Socrates "lives" as an idea and will probably continue to do so for many generations to come. — TheMadFool

"I know I know nothing" is not Socrates specific. The thought is a pattern that can arise in anyone. The first guy to point it out died, and the pattern then arose in others at later times, is how a materialist would explain it. I still don't see what inconsistency you're pointing to.

They (ideas) survive death. — TheMadFool

Right but you think if they're physical they shouldn't. What makes you think that?

I thought we were for the time being addressing the (now pejorative ?) purposefulness as as something material. And not as something immaterial. — javra

Yes. I said "When did we add the purpose sauce" sarcastically to imply that there is no "purpose sauce". That there is no "guiding force" over and above the things that are moving.

As to the natural arising part: If mater, or the physical, is that which is natural, and if this is in itself purposeful, then you are just expressing that purposeful given X arose from purposeful given Y. So there's no add-on of purpose involved — javra

Yes. That was the point of the sarcastic comment.

thoughts, ideas to be specific — TheMadFool

Thought =/= idea. Thoughts don't survive after death, heck, most of them don't survive for 5 minutes. You conflate thoughts and ideas.

I'm afraid it is. — TheMadFool

I asked what about ideas makes you think they shouldn't survive after death. You gave an example of an idea that survived after death. That does not answer the question.

What about ideas makes you think they can't survive after death? Saying "socrates died and his ideas survived" isn't an answer to that question.

one of Aristotle conclusions given his premising of teleology what that of an ultimate final cause/telos as the unmoved mover of everything that changes/moves. Our of curiosity, would you say that this notion then conflicts with a purposeful materialism? Why or why not? — javra

If it's "unmoveable" then yes (conflicts). If it's "unmoved" then no. If it's fundamentally unmovable it's not physical. I don't like the idea of an "unmoved mover" in in any metaphysics though.

So I take it that for you it makes perfect sense to deem material substance, or the physical, as purposeful. — javra

I'd ask whether or not you think a self driving car has purpose. And if it does, when exactly did we add the immaterial "purpose sauce"? Seems to have risen naturally.

What about ideas makes you think they don't survive death? I don't see why it needs defending in the first place.

Now premise 2 is just false.

Either 2 or 3 is false. 2 is true if you're referring to actual thoughts but false if you're referring to ideas. 3 is true if you're referring to ideas but false if you're referring to actual thoughts.

In short: The use of "thoughts" in 2 is different from the use of "thoughts" in 3.

I would you can get purpose out of a materialist's viewpoint as well, though not directly. Look at unsupervised learning AI for example.

no materialist or physicalist system will accept matter or the physical to be to any degree determined by aims, teloi. — javra

Yes. There won't be any purpose above and beyond the material. But often the material moves purposefully. And I don't see a reason to propose a "ghost in the machine" that moves it. Again, unsupervised learning AI is a simple example of purposeful action born from purposeless components.

There is no "separate force" that forces things to move purposely over and beyond the physical forces, but the physical forces are enough as far as I can see.

Either under the construct that mind emerges from physical substrata via emergentism such that a property dualism unfolds or, else, that of brain = mind with no property dualism involved — javra

Ok so these are the two options. I subscribe to the second by the way.

The second alternative results in a stark contradiction between experienced reality and theorized reality. For just as we know that minds occur, — javra

? You lost me at "we know minds occur". I thought the second option was that brain = mind. Minds don't occur separately from brains. The way you use "mind occur" here makes no sense assuming the second alternative.

Else expressed, the reality of purpose in any facet of the world requires a non-physicalist metaphysics, of which idealism is one form. — javra

Not convinced. Do you think the self driving car that learned by trial and error moves purposelessly? It seems clear to me it doesn't. And equally clear to me that purpose for this car is NOT some "extra force" or "secret sauce" causing it to move this or that way. Nothing non-material is moving the car, yet it moves purposefully.

By the way, good job for actually answering the question and at least trying to give an example of something that requires an idealist metaphysics. I'm not convinced but at least you answered the question XD.

The question of whether the mind is a thing. — Wayfarer

Anything is a thing. It’s in the word.

The way you define it, mind is a thing in as much as unicorns are a thing as far as I’m concerned.

Way I define it mind is a pattern of physical things. Not a separate entity as you define it.

You said, well, it's an immaterial thing - to which I responded, what are some other examples? But the examples you provided turned out to be things you don't think exist, so they're not actually examples at all. — Wayfarer

Do you think the statement “Unicorns are things” is false on account of unicorns not existing? If not then minds as you define them, are things in the same way in my view.

So, if immaterial things don't exist, then they're not things. — Wayfarer

? A unicorn is a thing. Even if it doesn't exist.

I think we're getting stuck on technicalities here.

Which means, you didn't really answer the question. — Wayfarer

Which was?

So, do you believe that these non-material things are real? — Wayfarer

No I didn't say they existed. I thought that was obvious.

Were you asking a materialist for examples of non material things that exist? None obviously!

"Mind exists" does not need to be proven. We know for a certainty that at least one mind exists. That is not the case with matter. — RogueAI

We know for certainty that one mind exists. But you haven’t given a justification for why we should treat that mind as a separate kind of object from matter. A materialist has no problem with a mind existing. Because a mind is just a material thing. And has no problem with only being able to know for sure that the mind exists. For the same reason.

we have a situation where brain states are correlated with mental states — RogueAI

This is the problem. “Correlated with”. No, brain states ARE mental states. To assume that there is a mental state beyond the brain state by definition makes it something you can’t inquire about. You’ve defined a separate kind of object, that arises magically when the brain works a certain way and disappears magically when it doesn’t. The emotion of “Anger” for example, which in your model is like a ghost in the machine, completely undetectable, yet somehow capable of causing changes in the brain and furthermore changes in the brain in turn affect IT. But no, it’s not material for….some reason. Nor is it a pattern again for some reason. It affects and is affected by the physical world yet is ontologically different from it and can never be detected by measurement.

I just don’t see the point in defining things this way. You’ve defined something in a way that it cannot be touched by scientific method then you asked for a scientific explanation. I don’t see the point in defining emotions for instance this way. As “ghosts in the machine”. What does that explain or allow you to say that just defining them as patterns doesn’t?

My personal "journey" away from materialism is similar to his. — RogueAI

Interesting. I’ve taken the opposite journey. Why’d you ever leave?

Though the longer I think about this the more I start to think that idealists and materialists aren't very different except for which words they want to use. I've asked on this thread since the start of one thing that requires a materialist/idealist viewpoint and no one has presented anything. It seems both positions can say the same things, provided you use their respective definitions.

Well in general when trying to understand the other view you at least try to entertain their starting premise. When I talk to idealists I don't say "You can't prove mind exists so you can't say anything".

I think the main reason you don't find the answers compelling is that you aren't actually entertaining the view. Half your questions wouldn't even make sense to a materialist.

if consciousness is patterns of matter, why does pattern A give rise to the feeling of stubbing a toe — RogueAI

"give rise to" assumes there is a "feelign of stubbing a toe" that is different from pattern A. Already not materialist. For example. The phrasing already assumes materialism is false somehow.

I didn't find your other answers compelling — RogueAI

I don't expect you to but were they at least self consistent? Because I don't care about convincing people, just testing out ideas.

No those were 2 unrelated sentences. I'm excluding mysterianists. Also when I say materialist or idealist I mean not a dualist. In other words when I say "materialist" I am only talking about reductionists or eliminitavists (who I think are ridiculous)

Got any other examples of non-material things? — Wayfarer

God as most people define him. Ghosts, angels, devils, etc as most people define them. Etc.

There’s no ‘outside’ of that. Both ‘inside the mind’ and ‘in the world’ are mental constructs, vorstellung (Schopenhauer) or Vijñāna (Buddhism). But that cuts against realism, so generally it is instinctively rejected. — Wayfarer

I don't think it even brushes against it. That's what I tried to say last time too. You can maintain that we can't know anything outside of these "inside the mind" representations (by definition you can't), and at the same time that there is an "outside the mind" thing in itself. I'm talking about ontology not epistemology here.

I was reading an interesting articlep yesterday about a phenomenon called ‘representational drift’. Experimenters put electrodes on mouse brains and measure which neural systems respond to stimuli. The thing that they’re perplexed by is that the location of the responses keep changing. They would have expected that once a reaction to a familiar experience was habituated, that it would light up the same areas of the brain. But this doesn’t happen - the reactions 'drift' all over the brain. So, what is producing or co-ordinating the unified, holistic response which we call 'memory'? This is somewhat similar in a way to the problem of the subjective unity of perception. — Wayfarer

Why do you think any of this is an issue for me? I never said I could reach into your brain, pull out a piece of meat and proclaim "Here is memory". All I said was that memory is a pattern. None of this is inconsistent with memory being a pattern.

Some are property dualists. Some are mysterianists (materialists who think we'll never figure out consciousness). — RogueAI

I'm excluding those 2. When I say materialist or idealist I mean a purist, IE not a dualist in either case.

A materialist cannot say anything about consciousness with confidence because A), there's no way to prove that matter exists in the first place — RogueAI

"A materialist cannot say anything about consciousness because there is no way to prove matter exists". Come on now. Matter existing is a given. Or else you're not talking to a materialist.

B) even if matter does exist, if consciousness is patterns of matter, why does pattern A give rise to the feeling of stubbing a toe, while pattern B gives rise to the beauty of a sunset, while pattern C gives rise to no experience at all? — RogueAI

What answer here would satisfy you? These questions sound the same to me like "Why is pi equal to 3.14?" Or "Why does gravity exist?" It's just the case. If you want a materialist to answer those then you first answer why pi is equal to 3.14.

How does that work? — RogueAI

If you mean how to get from pattern A to pattern B (stubbing a toe to beauty of sunset) then we can figure that out pretty well.

Why are we conscious in the first place? — RogueAI

Because a certain pattern happened. Why did the certain pattern happen? Why is pi equal to 3.14?

If pattern of matter XYZ gives rise to (or is the same as) experience ABC, and that machine over there looks like it's an instance of pattern of matter XYZ, how do we verify it's having experience ABC? — RogueAI

No verification necessary. Pattern XYZ is experience ABC. All we need to verify to say something is having ABC is that it has pattern XYZ. Because those are the same thing.

This is like asking "How do we verify that the red cup is red?"

Agreed? — RogueAI

No as above. Most of your questions don't make sense in a matrialist context. They're like asking "Why is pi 3.14"

If you disagree, then explain how a scientist would go about detecting consciousness in a machine. — RogueAI

Well what do you mean by consciousness first?

Do you believe that mental states are identical to brain states? — RogueAI

Yes.

If so, how is it that I can have a song playing in my head, but there's no music in my skull? — RogueAI

Why would you think those two things imply each other? Having a certain song playing in your head is a certain brain state. One not necessarily produced by music.

If mental states are identical to brain states, then my mind weighs a couple pounds and is about the size of both of my fists. — RogueAI

A pattern doesn't weigh anything. A brain weighs something. A brain state weighs nothing.

This assumes there is a material thing called a brain that exists outside our minds — RogueAI

It's much simpler to prove than the alternative, that there is no brain and only a mind. Tack a good wack on the back of the head with a baseball bat. Your mind goes away, your brain doesn't. So the brain must exist outside the mind. Or at least, something independent of your mind that sustains it must exist (that's the brain).

A materialist cannot say about the world (with confidence) that consciousness can arise from non-conscious stuff. — RogueAI

Yes he can. Because consciousness to a materialist is a certain pattern of matter. You can easily tell when things follow said pattern.

They can assume and believe it's true, but there is (currently) no explanation for how that can happen — RogueAI

The materialist also cannot say (again, with confidence) that non-conscious stuff exists at all. There is no way to verify it. It's simply a belief. — RogueAI

You seem to already have in mind a particular effect called "consciousness" that we cannot detect that arises from matter. That's not how a materialist would put it. To a materialist, again, consciousness is a pattern, not a seperate "secret sauce" added to things that have matter (usually). That's dualistic.

Consciousness is to a brain what a program is to a PC for a materialist. The program is not a seperate entity that acts on the PC, it's a specific configuration of the PC.

Yea that’s exactly what I said.

A materialist would not say that humans have any mental things attached — khaled

IF

if "mental thing" is to mean some other different kind of substance from physical thing. — khaled

But if

If it means a particular pattern of physical thing then maybe. — khaled

You can still talk of minds and mental things like images, thoughts, feelings, but these arise from states of complex systems. — Kenosha Kid

They don’t “arise from” as that still leaves the door open for a dualist interpretation. They ARE states of complex systems.


Point is that by the materialist definition you get everything an idealist would want. Emotions that spur people to action, deliberation, free will, the whole suite. I’d say even more easily incorporated than an idealist would have it (because no interaction problems to deal with). So the pragmatist in me wants to know: What’s the actual difference between the two positions? What’s a significant position that cannot be put into materialist/idealist terms (whichever you want) without being contradictory. Existence of God? I’d say you’d be able to come up with a materialistic definition of God that gives him/her everything you’d want normally. Etc.

What’s something a materialist cannot say about the world that requires they be an idealist. Or vice versa

Because I’m the type to think that if the answer to the above is “nothing” then the debate isn’t worth a rat’s ass.

You still haven't told me what position a materialist cannot hold that an idealist can't or vice versa. What can one say about the world that the other can't? That God exists? That emotions spur us to action? I can't think of anything they can't both say using their respective definitions.

There are many criticisms of physicalism, including the argument from the hard problem of consciousness, the nomological argument, the argument from reason, and so on. — Wayfarer

Identity theorists don't have to deal with the first one. I find the nomological argument at worst silly and at best irrelevant (because I'm not talking about whether or not God exists). And I think a cursory view of AI will show the problem with the argument from reason.

Nope. The mind is definitely not a thing. — Wayfarer

"Thing" is the most general word you can use. Yes minds are things. Not material things. Things.

I don't usually come by such stereotypical "guru talk" anymore though I enjoyed listening to it to kill time before in my life, so his posts were entertaining for me to read, even if they were extremely low effort cliches. Some days vague eastern philosophy cliche mache is exactly what I want to read. I'll miss those posts.

You throw around ‘stuff’ pretty easily — Wayfarer

Well at the very least we can agree that minds and matter share one thing. They're both stuff. You seem to have taken stuff to mean physical stuff. Maybe even more general. Both minds and brains are things is that better?

A further point is that the investigation of matter itself has yielded nothing like an indivisible particle — Wayfarer

The implication of the observer in the interpretation of physics is also by now a well-known aspect of modern science. — Wayfarer

You seem to be putting a lot of baggage on the word stuff that I didn't put there. I didn't say that stuff need be indivisible. And I didn't say stuff needs to be constantly defined in absence of an observer.

There is no inconsistency with being a materialist and at the same time thinking that there is no indivisible particle and also that particles don't sit still when nothing is looking at them. I say this on many threads but what counts as "matter" has changed a lot. Beforehand matter was what you could see and hold. We can't see or hold electrons yet we consider them material nowadays. Heck they don't even have a fixed location yet we call them material. It just seems like whatever role was taken by "mind stuff" has all been sucked out and included in "physical stuff"

Which again makes me ask the question, What does each position allow you to say that the other cannot hold? Because I can't think of anything. Has the meaning of what is "material" expanded so much that it just encompasses everything now and there is no longer any need for a seperate sort of "mind stuff"? That's what it seems like to me.