What I don't understand is why this mere logical possibility in some hypothetical world has any relevance to how we should act in the actual world, where that almost certainly won't happen in any near future. The criterion of “universalization” as a way to distinguish good acts from bad ones just seems arbitrary to me.

Why is it that if an action can be universalized without contradiction, then the action is morally/ethically justified, and morally/ethically reprehensible otherwise? Without circular reasoning, I mean. — Amalac

Well, I think it is because of Kant's reverence for the principle of autonomy. You only have recourse to your good will, you do not control anybody elses. If you are dependent on others for the good of your action, then you lose that autonomy. That is why he has qualms with consequentialism and the utilitarian calculus as a basis for ethics.

I think his question is not. How should we act? But "can we know how we should act?" His answer is yes, because we can in any case deduce what kinds of acts are problematic. If we are dependent on others to determine the good of our action we have forfeited autonomy. It is not that an action if perse justified if we can universalize it, in any case it does not violate our duties. Both drinking red wine and drinking coca cola or drinking Pepsi can be universalized, however, that does not mean one should drink either. Just that you do not violate any duties by drinking them.

I prefer that over making him terrified and sad/depressed. — Amalac

You might. But you are not the basis for ethics. What you are doing is thinking for someone else and robbing him of his autonomy. He does not as the question for nothing. What you are doing is claiming a status you do not have, namely as someone who can choose to define who is a worthy legislator in the knngdom of ends. According to Kant what you do is wrong and we can see why: if everyone would do the same thing, the whole institution of questioning would collapse. So you can only do it by claiming some sort of eception for yourself.

Why does he have to learn about his fate in the first place? If he doesn't, he won't be terrified by his imminent death. It is more likely that he will suffer less if he doesn't learn about his fate, so I think it's better to lie to him. — Amalac

Because he asked and because of his dignity as a questioning rational human being. If he had not wanted to know it, he should not have asked.

And yes, I know deontologists don't care about the probable effects of actions, but I still find that unreasonable. They themselves use probabilistic criterions all the time: when they get out of their house, they don't give serious consideration to the idea that it might be better to stay home because a meteor might fall on their head if they get out, or that suddenly it'll start to rain heavily leading to them being struck by lightning when they get out — although they can't be certain those things won't happen — because such events are very unlikely to happen. And the same is true for almost all of their beliefs in daily life. — Amalac

I have no idea what bearing this has on anything. Of course you can strategically plan your actions... We have no control over the weather, but we can know how we need to act in the field of ethics. A deontologist uses exactly this example against consequentialism. You cannot be certain so you are basically determining good and bad behavior on contingent outcomes over which you have no control. Ethics depends on your will and whether that will is good or not.

Yet when it comes to ethical considerations about the effects of each action, they suddenly seem to stop caring about the probable consequences of each action, and just care about following the categorical imperative, only because we can't be completely certain about the consequences of each of our actions, and because some elaborate and unlikely scenarios in which the actions lead to bad consequences are possible (not always though, sometimes they do mention possibilities which aren't that unlikely, and should be taken into account). — Amalac

You keep thinking it is some sort of empirical criterion, it is not. It is not because of the consequences we need to apply the categorical imperative, it is because it tells you right from wrong. It does that by showing you what would happen if everyone acted according to the maxim you set yourself. If that cannot be universalized it follows that you can only live by that maxim by claiming some sort of special privilege for yourself.

I'm not trying to refute Kantian ethics, I just think its core criterion is arbitrary. Nor do I think that an act is good because most people think it is (“ad populum”), the examples where intended to make people question whether a criterion that leads them to act in that way is really the best one at their disposal, in accordance with their basic moral intuitions. — Amalac

The first I tend to agree with, that is why I am not a Kantian, but the second is a misreading of Kant. He does not claim an action is good because most people think it is. If everyone is unreasonable everyone will choose a wrong criterion. The right criterion is determined by reason alone, not by people abiding or not abiding by it.

the examples where intended to make people question whether a criterion that leads them to act in that way is really the best one at their disposal, in accordance with their basic moral intuitions. — Amalac

Your examples are actually arguments ad populum, not Kant's.

Supposing it became common knowledge (which is not likely, so long as there are deontologists suggesting a different course of action) I think the suffering they would feel after finding out about their son's dead outweighs the suffering caused by the anxiety they may feel for not being able to get an answer to that question. — Amalac

Yes, you are a utilitarian. So far so good, but Kant is not. I am also not. Refuting Kant's position on the Cat imp. will not save your own ethical system. You would need to engage with Kant's objections to utilitarianism if you want that.

Good post, well articulated. On this.....

Kant's reverence for the principle of autonomy. — Tobias

....I might rather have substituted the reverence for freedom, which autonomy presupposes, but......minor point and takes nothing substantial away from your comments.

The test of universalization (CI) follows, quite obviously and hence slips under our radar, from the simple fact that morality/ethics is all about codes/laws/rules i.e. general guidelines on conduct (thought/speech/actions). Might as well take the hint and go the whole nine yards from that to universal.

If it becomes common knowledge that is such a situation we would lie to the dying father, then dying fathers cannot ask that question anymore because he will never know if he gets an honest answer. So we 'sacrifice' the feelings of the dying father in order to keep our framework, that we answer truthfully, intact. — Tobias

Just because an emotional aspect is introduced does not mean we can throw overboard all reason.

This situation is framed (and framing is all it is) as though one commits some terrible deed by telling the dying man the truth.

First, some special quality is attributed to the fact this man is dying and normal rules of what is right and wrong apparently no longer apply for reasons that remain unmentioned.

But more importantly, it is the dying man that makes the mistake of saddling one with questions he does not want to know the answer to. Even moreso if he takes one's refusal to answer them as a confirmation of his fears.

The situation is tragic, but caused by the dying man himself and not by whatever poor bystander he forces into this difficult dilemma.

Lying is still bad. Telling the truth, arguably, isn't. Not answering most certainly isn't.

@Tzeentch Not answering means ignoring and also means not taking the dying father seriously as an autonomous agent. I would consider that just as wrong, but an easy cop out. But actually, I am on our side in this debate... I think your post is directed mostly @Amalac

Not answering means ignoring and also means not taking the dying father seriously as an autonomous agent. — Tobias

I don't see how any of that follows.

One doesn't owe the man any answers, respect or one's attention. The fact that the man is dying doesn't create a special situation where that would be the case.

Everyone is in the process of dying.

One doesn't owe the man any answers, respect or one's attention. The fact that the man is dying doesn't create a special situation where that would be the case. — Tzeentch

I do not have to answer, but I was asked a question. Why would I not answer? Not answering a question is ignoring. Why would ignoring someone be a good act?

Why would ignoring someone be a good act? — Tobias

This was never the question.

The claim was made (or at least the impression was given) that answering the man truthfully or not answering the question was bad.

I disagreed.

That is not the same as claiming that ignoring the man is good.

I would consider the refusal to answer or to answer truthfully as neutral.

To ensure I answered your post:

Why would I not answer? — Tobias

Because one recognizes one is trapped between a rock and a hard place, namely; to lie, which is bad, or to give the man an answer he does not want to hear, which may not be immoral, but the suffering the man hereby causes unto himself is probably also something undesirable to be a part of.

Not to answer is to choose non-interference, and such is one's right.

The claim was made (or at least the impression was given) that answering the man truthfully or not answering the question was bad.

I disagreed. — Tzeentch

I disagree too. I took your position (ore or less) for the sake of this debate. We disagree on not answering the question. I would say that is bad. You let your own desire not to hurt the man's feelings control you. that is a sign of bad faith... bad faith so it is...

Not to answer is to choose non-interference, and such is one's right. — Tzeentch

Not answering is veiled interference. There is no such thing as a non-answer to a question. The situation when you do not give an answer while a question was asked, is not the same as the situation that there was no question asked to begin with. The man will suffer his anxiety until the bitter end and will not even know, whereas he did ask.... You have decided he should suffer that fate. He decided to ask a question.

The man will suffer his anxiety until the bitter end and will not even know, whereas he did ask.... You have decided he should suffer that fate. — Tobias

No, he decided that fate for himself, however tragic that may be.

There's no reason the cause of his worries and emotions should be projected on some innocent bystander.

No, he decided that fate for himself, however tragic that may be. — Tzeentch

No, he asked the question, so he wanted to know. At least presuming people act rationally. Which we have to, we assume people are rational, that is what accords them human dignity at least according to Kant. You deliberately did not help him and thereby violated an imperfect duty.

There's no reason the cause of his worries and emotions should be projected on some innocent bystander. — Tzeentch

Nor is there if you just told the man the truth. He asked for it, you gave it, what can be wrong. Instead you chose to make yourself the owner of the problem by not telling him.

No, he asked the question, so he wanted to know. — Tobias

Isn't the crux of the dilemma that telling the truth would cause the man significant emotional harm, and thus it was not a question he truly wanted answered?

If that's not the case, then what are we even here for? If the man wants to know the painful truth, then it certainly isn't bad to tell it to him, and lying would be even more clearly wrong.

You deliberately did not help him and thereby violated an imperfect duty. — Tobias

What duty?

Nor is there if you just told the man the truth. He asked for it, you gave it, what can be wrong. Instead you chose to make yourself the owner of the problem by not telling him. — Tobias

Well, if one no longer takes the position that telling the truth causing significant harm, disproportionate to the harm of telling a lie, then there is no dilemma.

But even then, I don't see how non-interference makes one the owner of the problem, as though whoever asks questions may lay some moral claim on the bystander's attention.

Isn't the crux of the dilemma that telling the truth would cause the man significant emotional harm, and thus it was not a question he truly wanted answered?

If that's not the case, then what are we even here for? If the man wants to know the painful truth, then it certainly isn't bad to tell it to him, and lying would be even more clearly wrong. — Tzeentch

The problem is we never know. We can only do our duty, but not think for someone else. If you have perfect knowledge that he did not want this question answered he might be right. However, you never have, so all we can do is accept the other person as an autonomous individual who chooses his own path in life. He chose to ask that question. If you decide he really does not want it answered, you violate his autonomy.

What duty? — Tzeentch

The imperfect duty to help.

Well, if one no longer takes the position that telling the truth causing significant harm, disproportionate to the harm of telling a lie, then there is no dilemma. — Tzeentch

You are using an utilitarian calculus, Kant would not. In another thread you argued that context does not matter. You are an inconsistent Kantian.

But even then, I don't see how non-interference makes one the owner of the problem, as though whoever asks questions may lay some moral claim on the bystander's attention. — Tzeentch

Because you were asked a question. Not answering a question is an act too. You make it seem like it is not an act. That is a wrong assumption. If I ask you in the street "may I ask you a question?" and you are basically ignoring me, you are being rude, or you did not hear it, or you were in a hurry, but at least I am going to think about why you plainly ignored me. You indeed do not owe me an answer, but me asking the question drew you and me into a kind of relationship. However when I pass you by on the street and you say npthing at all I will not think anything of it.

“....(a) I am only bound then to sacrifice to others a part of my welfare without hope of recompense: because it is my duty, and it is impossible to assign definite limits how far that may go. Much depends on what would be the true want of each according to his own feelings, and it must be left to each to determine this for himself. For that one should sacrifice his own happiness, his true wants, in order to promote that of others, would be a self-contradictory maxim if made a universal law. This duty, therefore, is only indeterminate; it has a certain latitude within which one may do more or less without our being able to assign its limits definitely. The law holds only for the maxims, not for definite actions.

.....(b) Moral well-being of others (salus moralis) also belongs to the happiness of others, which it is our duty to promote, but only a negative duty. The pain that a man feels from remorse or conscience, although its origin is moral, is yet in its operation physical, like grief, fear, and every other diseased condition. To take care that he should not be deservedly smitten by this inward reproach is not indeed my duty but his business; nevertheless, it is my duty to do nothing which by the nature of man might seduce him to that for which his conscience may hereafter torment him, that is, it is my duty not to give him occasion of stumbling. But there are no definite limits within which this care for the moral satisfaction of others must be kept; therefore it involves only an indeterminate obligation....”
(The Metaphysical Element of Ethics, VIII, 2, 1780)

Thanks @Mww, it touches on the very thorny subject of the conflict of duties in Kant. What if an imperfect duty, say taking care of the moral well being of others conflicts with the perfect duty not to lie, as in Amalac's case. What to do?

What if an imperfect duty, say taking care of the moral well being of others conflicts with the perfect duty not to lie, as in Amalac's case. — Tobias

The relative texts in Kant’s corpus make clear to lie is always an affront to a good will, from which is derived to lie is never a moral practical objective. From that, it is just as clear the perfect duty is always more compelling.

I would rather be responsible for a guy’s possible torment that may not even manifest seriously, or that torment which subsides over time, than to jeopardize my moral character by lying in order to not cause it.

Much depends on what would be the true want of each according to his own feelings, and it must be left to each to determine this for himself. — Mww

I'm looking at Lectures on Ethics. I don't see feelings. I feel safe wagering that what Kant means by feelings is not what I or most people understand, and with reference to various parts of the Lectures...., not at all.

"If then we are under an obligation to be mindful of the welfare of others, on what is this obligation founded? On principles. For let us consider the world and ourselves. The world is an arena on which nature has provided everything necessary for our temporal welfare, and we are nature's guests. We all have an equal right to the good things which nature has provided. These good have not, however, been shared out by God. He has left man to do the sharing. Every one of us, therefore, in enjoying the good things of life must have regard to the happiness of others; they have an equal right and ought not to be deprived of it. Since God's providence is universal, I may not be indifferent to the happiness of others...." ("Duties Towards Others," 192).

Can you clarify what (you think) Kant means by "feelings"?

That a tough one, right there. Typical Kant....says something here, says something there that makes the here one confusing. Not only that, but he’s got this aggravating propensity to reduce concepts in definitions to definitions of their own, in a chain of definitions, in which by the time you get to the end, you’ve forgotten what he was defining. Plus, the architectonic system of all Kantian philosophy....the absolute necessity of dualism in its most general sense.

I’ve come to the conclusion....mine alone, I must say.....that what Kant means by “feelings” is found in CJ, 1788, Intro, Pt III:

“....For all faculties or capacities of the soul** can be reduced to three, which cannot be any further derived from one common ground***: the faculty of knowledge, the feeling of pleasure and pain, and the faculty of desire....”
** to replace soul with human condition may be more palatable;
*** the common ground simply being awake, aware and rationally competent.

It becomes clear that there are only two feelings, re: pain and pleasure. The moral feeling, then, with respect to this thread, merely announces a pain in disrespect for the moral law, or a pleasure in the conformity to the duty which a moral law prescribes.

Elsewhere in the Kant catalog, differences in feelings are stated as possible subjective conditions....how a subject feels because of something-or-other......determinable by aesthetic judgements from one source or another.

The intent of all that reduces to....it is provable that our empirical knowledge changes with experience, so it must be at least possible to comprehend why sometimes our inner convictions do not, regardless of experience. A nightmare for the metaphysician, and a complete non-issue for Everydayman.

As an aside, and I’m sure you’re aware, that Notes on Lectures on Ethics is not Kant, but iterations of Kant by his students. And just as everybody writing from Kant on venues such as this may have misinterpreted him, there is no promise whatsoever that his students didn’t as well. The Dude Himself said that students that take too much time taking notes probably missed the most important stuff. One can either pay attention, or he can write, but he can’t do both simultaneously.

If you decide he really does not want it answered, you violate his autonomy. — Tobias

That's not a violation of someone's autonomy. Whether one decides to answer or not isn't a matter of someone else's autonomy, but of one's own!

The imperfect duty to help. — Tobias

And that duty is one you have taken upon yourself, or do you also impose it on others?

In another thread you argued that context does not matter. — Tobias

They're two entirely different discussions.

You are an inconsistent Kantian. — Tobias

I am not a Kantian at all.

But even then, I don't see how non-interference makes one the owner of the problem, as though whoever asks questions may lay some moral claim on the bystander's attention. — Tzeentch

Because you were asked a question. Not answering a question is an act too. You make it seem like it is not an act. That is a wrong assumption. If I ask you in the street "may I ask you a question?" and you are basically ignoring me, you are being rude, or you did not hear it, or you were in a hurry, but at least I am going to think about why you plainly ignored me. — Tobias

One is not entitled to my response, my time, attention or even basic politeness, just because they asked a question. What gives one the right to impose any of these things?

It is not my problem, and beliefs of entitlement don't make it mine either.

Further, inaction is not an act. Not giving a response is not an action - it is inaction, and thereby fundamentally different.

That's not a violation of someone's autonomy. Whether one decides to answer or not isn't a matter of someone else's autonomy, but of one's own! — Tzeentch

Yes but you decide by assuming he does not want to have the answer. That is the violation of autonomy not your not answering per se.

And that duty is one you have taken upon yourself, or do you also impose it on others? — Tzeentch

It is imposed on others via the categorical imperative (at least according to Kant).

I am not a Kantian at all. — Tzeentch

Ok. I belief you like to decide the moral order solely for yourself and do whatever suits you. That is fine.

They're two entirely different discussions. — Tzeentch

Well either ethics is context dependent and then it matters that there are different discussions, or it is not and then it really does not matter what the case at hand is. In the other thread you answered it was not, lying was always wrong.

One is not entitled to my response, my time, attention or even basic politeness, just because they asked a question. What gives one the right to impose any of these things? — Tzeentch

I am not saying anyone is entitled to your response, I am saying you responding or not are both acts. Whether you like it or not we live in a world with others and with social expectations.

Further, inaction is not an act. Not giving a response is not an action - it is inaction, and thereby fundamentally different. — Tzeentch

I gave you an argument, namely that the situation is different when you walk past someone who asked you a question or whether you walked past someone without him asking a question. You may counter that by some assertion on your part but it is hardly convincing now is it?
Just because you say so something is such and such does not make it such and such. Luckily you are not a lawyer because you would have a damn hard time wrapping your head around crimes of omission.

The relative texts in Kant’s corpus make clear to lie is always an affront to a good will, from which is derived to lie is never a moral practical objective. From that, it is just as clear the perfect duty is always more compelling. — Mww

I would think that follows as well yes.

I would rather be responsible for a guy’s possible torment that may not even manifest seriously, or that torment which subsides over time, than to jeopardize my moral character by lying in order to not cause it. — Mww

That I would say is also correct Kantian reasoning.

What if an imperfect duty, say taking care of the moral well being of others conflicts with the perfect duty not to lie, as in Amalac's case. What to do? — Tobias

In his, the Murderer at the Door, Kant argues (not in so many words) that the lie is a lie in terms of intent and not necessarily in terms of content. You tell the murderer that his intended victim went home, all the time believing the victim is hiding in your basement - that's the the lie. Aristotle's formulation here applicable: with your mouth you say one thing while your mind thinks another. But unbeknownst to you, the victim went out your back door and went home, and you have in effect killed him! Kant argues that with your lie, you make yourself part of the problem, and thus take on a share of responsibility and liability that the truth or silence would not have imposed.

With @Mww's remark above, my understanding of Kant is enlarged, in this sense. He well knew the difference between himself and others, and certainly to the point where he was not confused as to which he was or in his ethical obligations to himself or to another. This makes him in my perception a somewhat harder and less soft man than I supposed - at least in terms of his thinking. Which is my wrong thinking on pendulum: Kant is concerned with the pure formulations of duty, understanding that between the rule and its application could be considerable slip twixt cup and lip.

As to what to do in the case of conflict, in his Metaphysics of Morals he is explicit. If CIs conflict, then the better rules and the lesser falls away - there being then no conflict. From @Mww again,

The law holds only for the maxims, not for definite actions. — Mww

Wisdom that "might be engraven on a Queen Anne's farthing.., which necessitates a vast volume of commentaries to expound it" (Melville).

Much depends on what would be the true want of each according to his own feelings, and it must be left to each to determine this for himself. — Mww

And feelings as pleasure and pain?! Perhaps the jewel bearing in this watchwork, on which the thing pivots and ticks, is the "true."

But no doubt his "true want" would be unconditioned upon desire - and I'll be out of the spin cycle in just a minute or two. Dig deep enough and it seems that to the degree that reason and humanity differ, at depth in Kant they become the same ground for each other. Among his arts a seeming ability to reconcile the two. Perhaps he might have said that ultimately it's a life we're expounding, as Marshall remarked about a constitution, and we contain multitudes.

This makes him in my perception a somewhat harder and less soft man than I supposed — tim wood

Absolutely. The law is the law, Everyone wishes to be protected by law, and everyone accepts that the world operates according to law, so why not make law sufficient causality for personal conduct?

And feelings as pleasure and pain?! Perhaps the jewel bearing in this watchwork — tim wood

Yep. Feeling is an intrinsic human condition, as is reason. It’s just what we do as humans. Kantian dualism: we feel and we think. And just as there are different reasonings there are different feelings. But each have a irreducible, pure a priori origin, however metaphysically speculative that may be, that reflects the nature of the intellectual beast.

But unbeknownst to you, the victim went out your back door and went home, and you have in effect killed him! Kant argues that with your lie, you make yourself part of the problem, and thus take on a share of responsibility and liability that the truth or silence would not have imposed. — tim wood

Yes, I know that is Kant's answer to the problem.

Kant is concerned with the pure formulations of duty, understanding that between the rule and its application could be considerable slip twixt cup and lip.

As to what to do in the case of conflict, in his Metaphysics of Morals he is explicit. If CIs conflict, then the better rules and the lesser falls away - there being then no conflict. From Mww again,
The law holds only for the maxims, not for definite actions.
— Mww
Wisdom that "might be engraven on a Queen Anne's farthing.., which necessitates a vast volume of commentaries to expound it" (Melville). — tim wood

Yes.... but is this contrary to what I said, or just an addition / clarification? I believe Kant himself refused to accept conflicts of duties always claiming there is one right answer.

I believe Kant himself refused to accept conflicts of duties always claiming there is one right answer. — Tobias

Cite? The ideas of one right answer is naive. In some cases there might well be one right answer, but certainly not always. I read Kant as saying that where there are seeming multiple answers, you take the best of those, the better of them, as best you can determine it. And this reflective of the plain fact that often there is no best answer to be found, as if like the solution to a math problem, but instead a choice to be made from contingent possibilities - a whole different kind of questioning.

Cite? The ideas of one right answer is naive. In some cases there might well be one right answer, but certainly not always. — tim wood

Here is an article on the matter. https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/30317932.pdf However, I easily concede there might be different ways to view it.

The question of a theoretical right answer is not that naive, it may well be necessary. The problem of a categorical imperative is that it is well categorical, applicable in all cases. The question is if there is theoretically speaking a best solution. It might be we cannot find it, but I think in a Kantian structure there has to be one. Actually also in law this claim is sometimes made as per Ronald Dworkin's discussion of 'Judge Hercules'.

Interesting read. Thanks.

What's your point? What is the inconsistency or claim you find in Kant that disqualifies him as an ethicist? What mistake has he made? That is, that can be presented in something less than 29 pages of tying complicated knots. He does not tell people what to do; he tells them what they ought to do and why within the limits of his arguments. And how often have I read some citation that claims to undermine or throw over Kant, only to find the writer very likely has not even read his Kant, or not understood him on the points in question, or the one citing has in some way failed.

I am not asking you personally to discover and prosecute your own case. It is enough to present someone else's in adequate summary - if theirs is a case made.

The problem of a categorical imperative is that it is well categorical, applicable in all cases. — Tobias

If you think that, then you should have no difficulty telling me exactly what to do or not do on all occasions. Or maybe all too many. How about one occasion. Can you adduce any CI that tells me what to do or not do on any occasion?

Yes but you decide by assuming he does not want to have the answer. That is the violation of autonomy ... — Tobias

Having a thought is a violation of someone else's autonomy?

Oh boy, where is this going?

It is imposed on others via the categorical imperative (at least according to Kant). — Tobias

Well, I am interested in your opinion. If I wanted to know Kant's, I'd read Kant.

Apparently Kant views himself as the all-benevolent person who ought to go about assigning people their moral duties. What do you think of this? I think it is profoundly silly.

Well either ethics is context dependent and then it matters that there are different discussions, or it is not and then it really does not matter what the case at hand is. In the other thread you answered it was not, lying was always wrong. — Tobias

That last thread was not about lying. It was about violence. We may have discussed Kant's ideas of lying, but only insofar as it was relevant to violence.

Whether you like it or not we live in a world with others and with social expectations. — Tobias

Other people's expectations do not change the nature of things, nor do I find them particularly relevant in moral discussions.

I gave you an argument, namely that the situation is different when you walk past someone who asked you a question or whether you walked past someone without him asking a question. — Tobias

I don't see how they're all that different for the person who walks past.

The questioner may have all sorts of wonderful expectations and desires, but why would they be of any concern to the walker?

Should I go about having expectations and desires towards other people, and then derive all sorts of moral rights to have those things reciprocated? Or is this the moment we need to start appointing people with opinions on "what is reasonable", and we are back in the mud?

Luckily you are not a lawyer because you would have a damn hard time wrapping your head around crimes of omission. — Tobias

The question of whether action and inaction are fundamentally different (which they are, for the same reason light and dark are fundamentally different) is a seperate discussion from whether inaction is always morally permissable. But that aside, I don't credit lawmakers with having a particularly solid grasp on the nature of things, and morality by extention.