the only causation we actually know happens is psychological - we cause our arm to go up, for example. But this seems to compete with other, physical, causal accounts involving neurons firing.
— Bert1

Descriptions at two different levels. That's good. The more distinctions, the more we understand. What's the problem? — Daemon

The difficulty with the idea of two levels of description is that it creates a dualism, and imports many of the difficulties of that. What accounts for these two points of view? Why do some things have a point of view of their own, but others don't? Why are there two methods of explaining actions in humans, but only one method with cars?

Your intuition that what is necessary for consciousness that there be an inside and an outside is very interesting, as that is suggestive of the creation of two points of view, that of the subject (from the inside) and that of the external observer (from the outside). Is that where you are coming from?

Life has a drive to evolve systems of increasing complexity, and at some point Chance thought of a mechanism for feeling. It seems likely that would be a development of an existing non-conscious mechanism. — Daemon

OK, this is a start. The next question is: at what point in the evolutionary process did feeling first emerge? This is a hypothesis at the moment. How are we going to narrow down the possibilities? If we want to take a scientific approach, how do we test a system for the presence of consciousness?

Is it when the cell wall developed?

EDIT: I know this is a thread about panpsychism, not your view. However part of understanding the theoretical appeal of panpsychism is to come up against the difficulties with emergentism.

I could say "consciousness sometimes feels heavy so maybe it's a property of gravity". Just nonsense, sorry. — Daemon

I think I probably agree with you about that example linking feelings of heavyness to gravity. But still, that feeling of heavyness is one of the things that a fully developed theory of consciousness will have something to say about. While I am a panpsychist, I'm not sure how to get a handle on why particular experiences tend to attach to characteristic physical functions consistently. Just like any other take on consciousness, there remain a lot of unanswered questions. I think the variety of functionalisms, while failing to explain consciousness itself, may nevertheless make headway in explaining what functions go with what experiences.

Yes I would. And I didn't change my mind. Again, I think we are speaking at cross purposes. It sounded to me as if you changed your mind, but no matter.

Absolutely it's an art. And it's a descriptive rough snapshot, and doesn't pretend (or shouldn't) to offer prescriptive certainties.

So dictionary definitions are always awkward and frustrating as they treat language like a game of construction. A word carries some definite content in terms of its semantics. It starts with some complete certainty about the unit of information it represents. — apokrisis

I very much doubt a lexicographer would agree with you on that.

The IIT is a very different kind of panpsychism, and very differently theoretically motivated.
— Bert1

I've looked into that, in my opinion it's a total failure. — Daemon

I mostly agree with you. I think it's a failure as a theory of consciousness, but it might be a very good theory of identity. I think identity admits of degree in a way that consciousness doesn't. The IIT might tell us which bits of the universe are strongly individuated in terms of the complexity of the content of their consciousness. It give us a way to both privilege brains (brains generate an immense variety and complexity of content) and still be panpsychists.

Why do you think it fails?

(I'll get to your other questions in due course - thank you for asking them).

perhaps consciousness is a property of space. This has some intuitive appeal for me as it fits with the phenomenology quite well.
— "Bert1

How do you mean? — Daemon

Consciousness feels container like, it feels still and relatively unmoving (or sometimes does) while things happen in it, yet still connected to those things, consciousness feels stretchy, one can focus in and out, one's awareness can be sharp or diffuse, it unifies and relates its contents in the way space does. This doesn't prove anything of course, but I do like it when discussions of consciousness take seriously such phenomenological intuitions and reflections. In most areas, the truth about the world has nothing to do with subjective feelings about the way it is. However when the subject matter is subjectivity itself, these feelings become far more relevant to the discussion.

It's not clear to me why emergence would require "degree" — Daemon

It doesn't necessarily require it, but it is very hard to think of a non-gradual, instant change in a system that could plausibly be associated with the emergence of consciousness. All relevant changes in the development of a brain in an embryo, for example, or the evolution of the brain, or even the transition from being anaesthetised to be a wakeful state, are gradual changes. At exactly what point does consciousness pop up? And why that point? You need a concept of consciousness that admits of degree, ideally, for this kind of account. But phenomenal consciousness does not seem to admit of degree.

It seems odd that folk suppose consciousness to somehow be central to the nature of the universe when it is so easily dissipated in one's lounge chair on a slow Sunday afternoon. Sleep should cure one of panpsychism. — Banno

We've gone over this before. I don't think you are trolling, so I'll just make the same point. There are different senses of 'consciousness' which you prefer to amalgamate, and lexicographers distinguish. There is a sense in which someone asleep is unconscious by definition, that's just what it means. Moving on to the phenomenal definition, which is the one I take to be operative in philosophical discussions of consciousness, there are a couple of panpsychist responses to the challenge of sleep (or being KO'd, drugged etc).

1) The subject remains conscious, but just not of very much, or perhaps even conscious of nothing at all, and they don't remember when they come to, so they have nothing to report.

2) They cease to exist as a functional unit. The total consciousness remains, but the subjective units are different, perhaps. Like the total mass of a car engine remains after it is dismantled, but it no longer runs. If consciousness is like the mass (rather than the function) then it too can remain, but is a property of smaller functional units, perhaps. With this idea, it is the function that determines the content of consciousness (i.e. what is experienced), not whether or not consciousness is present at all.

Yes, that's the broad picture.

I wonder what the motivation is? — Daemon

There are a number of different motivations depending on the panpsychist, I think. Some panpsychists take a very conceptual approach think that it impossible to make sense of the idea of the emergence of consciousness because the concept does not seem to admit of degree. Goff and Antony develop this line of reasoning.

Panpsychism can be motivated by an examination of the various binding problems, when we look for candidates in nature that can fulfil the binding function, we can see that space relates its contents, and fields are also present at every point in space, so perhaps consciousness is a property of space. This has some intuitive appeal for me as it fits with the phenomonology quite well.

Some panpsychists do think that consciousness emerges, and is reducible to a kind of function, it's just that this function occurs in everything, so consciousness is also in everything. The IIT is an example of this. The IIT is a very different kind of panpsychism, and very differently theoretically motivated.

Some panpsychists are motivated by idealism. Timothy Sprigge is one of these. If you think of Berkeley, but take out the role God plays in maintaining the existence of the external world of ideas, and substitute panpsychism - everything exists in a vast web of mutually perceiving and mutually defining subjects, then I think that is close to Sprigge's view.

Some panpsychists are no doubt motivated by spiritual views, they have already come to the conclusion that consciousness is present at the start of everything, and think that everything after that point will therefore also be conscious, as all subsequent existing things are modifications of the original conscious substance.

One can also come to panpsychism by an examination of psychological causation and the problem of overdetermination - the only causation we actually know happens is psychological - we cause out arm to go up, for example. But this seems to compete with other, physical, causal accounts involving neurons firing. One way out of this puzzle is to reduce physical causation to psychological, and assert that what we normally refer to as forces in the world are actually wills, and the behaviour of matter is determined by how it feels. The slogans might be 'matter does what it does because of how it feels' and 'how matter feels is determined by what it does'.

Panpsychism is attractively monistic. If the basic starting properties in a typical physical explanation of the world (e.g. mass, charge, spin, extension, whatever the latest list is) are not enough to explain everything, one way to fix this is to add a starting property, namely consciousness, especially if the alternatives are more theoretically problematic.

Another way to come at panpsychism is by process of elimination. Consciousness either (a) doesn't exist, or at least isn't what it appears to be (eliminativism) (b) emerged (was not around at the start and arrived on the scene later - this is the majority view I suspect), or (c) was here from the start and exists in everything. Pick the least problematic option. This is the Churchill approach - "Panpsychism is the worst theory of conciousness apart from all the others."

And there's more motivations, and many sub-variants...

I mean, I look around at the world, and I see that some things are conscious, you and me, my dog, and I see that the mechanisms for consciousness are in our brains, we can switch them off and on.

Well, maybe. When we switch consciousness on and off, are we switching consciousness? Or are we switching identity on and off? How could we tell the difference between non-consciousness and non-existence, phenomenologically?

I see that some things are not conscious, rocks, dead people or dogs.

I understand your intuitive starting point. But can these distinctions be maintained? Philosophers will want answers to the following questions: What are you seeing exactly? And what follows from that about consciousness? Why aren't people and dogs conscious? How do you know? What constitutes evidence for consicousness?

I think bacteria for example aren't conscious (because we can explain their behaviour through non-conscious processes), but they do have something which is a prerequisite for consciousness, they are individuals, separated from their environment.

Well, that's very interesting. You have the start of a theory, or at least line of enquiry. I would question whether we can explain their behaviour through non-conscious processes - when we get to the level of forces, we end up saying 'that's just what happens'. But if those forces are wills, we can go, perhaps, one step further into something we can understand - 'because that's what they will'. Conversely, lets take humans. If we can explain bacterial behaviour in terms of non-conscious processes, why can't we do the same with humans? Maybe Apo has an answer - that human behaviour cannot be explained in the kind of bottom-up way that perhaps bacterial behaviour can. And I suspect Apo will say the same about bacteria - there is top down stuff going on there too which is necessary to understand bacterial behaviour. But even if he is right, I don't see how that entails consciousness.

This stuff is surely super-important?! Whether we ourselves and other items are conscious or not really matters to us.

Indeed.

So I'm wondering what is gained by losing the distinction between conscious and not conscious.

I don't think panpsychists do lose the distinction. I can conceive of a rock that isn't conscious.The concept of non-consciousness still has meaning, even if I think that nothing is in fact non-conscious.

Have you had the last word yet? — apokrisis

Not yet!

Have you seen off every challenge to your confusions? — apokrisis

I wish there were some challenges to my confusions that I could understand. Hence my question to you. Could you please have a go at answering it?

Apo, you don't understand the concept of reduction as used in philosophy, and you do not acknowledge different types of panpsychism. What are you doing here?

You gave a bunch of different contradictory answers to the one question. That's slightly different. — apokrisis

Well, I tried. Please would you? I mean, it's not hard. I asked it in such a way as you could say 'yes' or 'no'. So I tried to make it as easy as possible for you, as I did wonder if you have PDA.

It seems according to you, panpsychists don't mean to reduce consciousness to being another ultimately simple property of matter, like presumably mass and charge. — apokrisis

Apo, I don't speak for all panpsychists. It's not a single position. There are many types, with different theoretical justifications.

For myself, I assert that consciousness is a fundamental property. But this is not a reduction, it is the exact opposite of a reduction. So we at least have a difference in usage here, or you don't understand the concept.

And you say that panpsychists also can't see how consciousness could reduce to processes, functions, or information. — apokrisis

Again, you lump all panpsychists together. Tononi, for example, is a panpsychist who does think that consciousness reduces to integrated information. I disagree with him. I can't see how consciousness can be explained in terms of other concepts. That's why I think it's likely fundamental, brute.

And somehow "a snail, a molecule, an atom, a field" are all just essentially the same metaphysical category in your eyes - presumably a system (a system that has no process or function) — apokrisis

No, these systems have processes and functions, of course. It's just that consciousness isn't one of them.

And you say you want clarification from me.... — apokrisis

I do! Most eagerly. I beg you. Please.

.

No. You just continue to badger me without addressing the inconsistencies of your own position. — apokrisis

I answered all your questions Apo! All I ask is that you answer one of mine. It's polite! Humour me.

What the panpsychist argument attempts to do is to depict 'consciouness' in naturalistic terms, as an object or the property of objects. — Wayfarer

It can do, but it can also depict it as primarily a property of substance, and then, a fortiori, derivatively, of modifications of that substance as well.

I have always understood, that the naturalist view, is that consciousness is an emergent property. — Watchmaker

Yes, I think you are exactly right. "Emergentism" is a much clearer and less ambiguous word than "physicalism" or "materialism" or even "naturalism", and better captures people's views. I know I'm not an emergentist. But I can't say for certain that I am not a physicalist, as I don't know what it means.

I think the notion that apokrisis and I take issue with, in different ways, is the depiction of consciousness as a substance or property. What makes this problematic is that it is the tendency to reduce phenomena to physical substance that led to the hard problem to
begin with. If all you have is hammer , then everything looks like a nail, and if your only metaphysics is monistic naturalism, then everything looks like a substance.
But consciousness is neither an object, a substance or a property, but a relational activity. — Joshs

OK, thanks. I still don't really understand though, sorry. I'm OK with reducing phenomena to more basic concepts where we can. But I don't regard consciousness, nor extension, spatiality, as phenomena in need of explanation. They seem to be basic concepts that resist analysis, to me at least.

I'm interested in your view of consciousness as a relational activity if you'd like to say more about that.

So that kind of makes panpsychism sound naturalistic - but at the cost of introducing an attribute or quality for which critics will say there can't be any direct evidence. — Wayfarer

I think that's quite a good summary.

Apo, you are behaving very oddly.

Are you answering any time soon? — apokrisis

I didn't even know you'd asked me. You still haven't, but I presume you intended to. I'll answer.

My own view is that consciousness is a property of reality-as-continuum, perhaps space, or the quantum field. I do not think there is any difference in kind between the consciousness of a human being, a snail, a molecule, an Apokrisis, an atom, or the fields they are behaviours of. All are equally conscious, I do not think consciousness admits of degree. I think any arbitrarily defined object is also conscious.

So now I'll ask my question for the third time:

I see, and that's what you're asserting of panpsychists, that panpsychists think consciousness is a complex phenomenon, fully explained in terms of fundamental constituents, which panpsychists assert are themselves also conscious. Is that right? — bert1

Really? They all claim consciousness is a universal property of systems, not a universal property of matter? — apokrisis

I think so, but it depends what 'matter' means, doesn't it? I tend to think of 'matter' as persistent behaviours of substance. That's what some panpsychists assert as the primary bearers of consciousness (e.g. the IIT theory). Other panpsychists go a step further and assert consciousness as a property of substance. That would include me. If we use 'matter' instead to refer to substance (as many people do), then I'm one to assert that consciousness is a property of matter. The dictionary definition of panpsychism you found is roughly OK, but as you would expect in philosophy, there are distinctions that are glossed over in a simple one-sentence definition.

Was this the version of panpsychism that I was responding to in the OP? — apokrisis

I don't know.

As I understood the OP it was asking for clarification of what panpsychism is, rather than clearly stipulating a definition.

Or the more usual dictionary definition? — apokrisis

I don't know.

I gave you the dictionary definitions. They fit what I was saying. If you think different, show me how. — apokrisis

I'm just asking for clarification, that's all! I wasn't sure what you meant, and it sounded odd to me. The dictionary definitions you offered are not clear to me. I tried to put into my own words what I thought you were saying, and asked if I'd got it right! That's a nice thing to do isn't it? I don't understand why you are making this so difficult.

I don't know! You introduced the term and said panpsychism was reductionist. I'm just trying to understand what you mean!

There's lots of different conceptions of reduction - look at the Stanford article. My usual casual understanding of it is that one thing (the reduced thing) is fully explained in terms of other things (the things it is reduced to). But I'm not an expert on the concept. And I wasn't sure what you meant by it. So that's why I asked, it's odd to think of panpsychism as a reductionist theory, because it is precisely difficulties reducing consciousness to processes, functions, information, whatever, which motivates some panpsychists.

Panpsychism covers a number of views. What most of them have in common is perhaps that consciousness is present in every system. It's problematic trying to get a single definition to cover the variety of views accurately. Are you asking what my particular panpsychist view is?

Anyway, this:

The simple answer is that you don't seem to understand the terms in the usual way. — apokrisis

..is not an answer to this:

I see, and that's what you're asserting of panpsychists, that panpsychists think consciousness is a complex phenomenon, fully explained in terms of fundamental constituents, which panpsychists assert are themselves also conscious. Is that right? — bert1

I'm trying to understand what you're saying. Please will you help? Did I get it right?

I see, and that's what you're asserting of panpsychists, that panpsychists think consciousness is a complex phenomenon, fully explained in terms of fundamental constituents, which panpsychists assert are themselves also conscious. Is that right? — bert1

@apokrisis It's a really simple question.

Let the dictionary be your friend: "[Reductionism is] the practice of analysing and describing a complex phenomenon in terms of its simple or fundamental constituents, especially when this is said to provide a sufficient explanation." — apokrisis

I see, and that's what you're asserting of panpsychists, that panpsychists think consciousness is a complex phenomenon, fully explained in terms of fundamental constituents, which panpsychists assert are themselves also conscious. Is that right?

That the substance that the universe is composed of is essentially consciousness? — Watchmaker

That's what I think, yes. Not all panpsychists think that though.

Where did "knowing" come into play? Something had to initially know how to arrange atoms and chemicals in way to give rise to awareness. — Watchmaker

I don't understand what you mean, or what that's got to do with panpsychism. Panpsychists do not usually explain consciousness in functional, chemical or any such terms, although some do. Even those who do would say there is no prior knowing, knowing is these processes, not a pre-existing condition of them.

Panpsychism says that consciousness is fundamental. What does that mean exactly, that consciousness is fundamental? That the substance that the universe is composed of is essentially consciousness? Where did "knowing" come into play? Something had to initially know how to arrange atoms and chemicals in way to give rise to awareness. — Watchmaker

Not all panpsychists think that consciousness is fundamental. I do though.

All that is necessary for panpsychism is that consciousness is present somehow in everything. The IIT, for example, is reductionist, it says consciousness is integrated information, so in a sense information is more fundamental than consciousness, it just so happens that there is no unintegrated information around, so everything is, in fact, minimally conscious.

There are also micropsychists, that take a bottom-up panpsychist approach, starting with small things and building up; and macrospsychists, who take consciousnes as a property of reality as a whole and get to multiple subjects by division (rather than addition). Lots of different versions with different theoretical motivations.

In other words, as others have suggested, "panpsychism" is a reductionist... — 180 Proof

Panpsychism is the pathological metaphysics that arises when you try to reduce all existence to materialism, and wind up including "consciousness" as "another face of matter". — apokrisis

Could you explain the reduction?

Reduction normally involves explaining one thing completely in terms of things other than it. So a is reduced to x, y, z if a is fully explained by x, y, z with no reference to a in that explanation. Something like that anyway.

So if panpsychism is a reductionist theory of consciousness, what non-conscious things do you think it reduces consciousness to?

I find this very odd, as one of the primary theoretical motivators for panpsychism is the that is it not a reductionist theory, that is, difficulties with attempts to explain consciousness in non-question-begging terms lead us to the conclusion (not assumption) that consciousness is a fundamental property of reality.

That's a really clear explanation. I don't have the knowledge to know if you've got it right or not, but it's very nicely set out.

If atheism is the view that there are no gods then it would have nothing to do with free speech. If atheism challenges theism to show proof of god/s, then it would most certainly be challenging theism's right to free speech. If atheism isn't to the left, then theism isn't to the right???

There are two possibly valid positions, one, the belief in a naturally occurring universe, and one in a supernaturally occurring universe. Consequently, there can be no (logically) valid middle ground.

You ask theists for evidence of god/s then you have no evidence of god/s yourself, for your request to be valid, means you also have no evidence of Nature (a naturally occurring universe). You can't hold out for evidence of one then still ask for evidence of the other

Some atheists challenge some theists from time to time to justify their beliefs. On a philosophy forum that is entirely appropriate and acceptable. It's also appropriate and acceptable in public discourse in response to theists arguing for their beliefs, or even just proselytising. I don't think I've ever heard an atheist say that theists should not be allowed to express their views.

You personify atheism and theism in your post, which I think causes conceptual mischief.

Indeed, both theism and atheism are neutral with regard to political handedness. There are many lefties in the clergy in the UK for example. And many right wing people whom I very much doubt believe in anything much past the narrow material interests of themselves and their loved ones.

I'm not sure if I'm an atheist or not, but in any case I ask both theists and atheists to justify their metaphysical views on a philosophy forum. The question of the burden of proof is interesting and complex it seems to me.

Atheism is a rejection of free-speech — Gregory A

Eh? Atheirsm is the view that there are no gods. What has it got to do with free speech? It's nothing to do with politics, it's not a political movement or anything of the sort.

When you say 'invalid' what I think you mean is 'false'. Atheism is not an argument but an assertion/proposition about the way things are. Only arguments can be valid or invalid. Beliefs, assertions etc, can be true or false.

Perhaps this (existential-cosmological) uniqueness is each one's "soul" or "daimon" ... — 180 Proof

I rather like that conception of soul. Intelligible without departing massively from the already existing concept, such as it is.

We are a vile bunch of assholes. Actually you're not. You're quite nice.

Oh that's a shame. Spunky lad. Liked him.

Where's Garrett gone? Is he ok? @Garret Travers I can't summon him. Oh, maybe I can. The name didn't come up as an automatic option.

Recipe for a functionalist theory of consciousness:

1) Specify the concept of consciousness your theory is a theory of. It is important to separate theory from definition as much as possible. Without that, you risk just redefining words to fit the theory.

E.g. the IIT, as expressed by Tononi, does have a phenomenal concept. It's fairly clear at the start of his paper.

2) Identify the critical function. What does a system have to do to realise consciousness?

E.g. the IIT specifies integrating information as the critical function.

3) Pick your verb. Does the function realise, instantiate, constitute consciousness? These are verbs indicating identity, and that's what you really need. Other verbs indicating a relationship (other than identity) between two conceptually distinct things indicate a non functionalist theory. Verbs such as cause, produce, give rise to, etc.

E.g. the IIT says consciousness IS integrated information, so it is indeed a functionalist theory, I think. A system is conscious when and only when it is integrating information, we should read that as.

4) Why can't all that happen in the dark? if the starting point is a phenomenal conception of consciousness, say why that function could not take place without the system being conscious. This really connects the dots and is the holy grail. Is the hard bit. One way to do this is to say "but that's just what we mean by the word", but that is rarely plausible in cases of theories of phenomenal consciousness. That works better with other kinds of functions, like 'walking'. In the case of walking, theory and definition coincide to a high degree, theory probably just filling in a lot more details not normally included in the definition/concept.

E.g. the IIT does not do this as far as I am aware. There's just no answer to this question.

I'm particularly interested in comments by @fdrake and @Cuthbert if you have time. Others as well of course.

If I am interpreting him correctly, Bert is asking why the kinds of behavior you observe, and capacities you attribute, to the jumping spider, your example, could not exist, for example, in an unconscious robot. — Janus

Yes that's pretty much it

Why would an entity doing all the semiotic things an organism like a jumper spider does be unconscious. Or even a robot? — apokrisis

Because everything else in the universe is unconscious, according to the emergentist.

it is your choice to assert but not support the position that consciousness is something that can exist without a content. — apokrisis

It's off topic Apo. If you want, start another thread entitled 'Why bert1 is a cunt' and you can ask me all the questions you want and I'll try to answer them. But this thread is about neurology-based accounts of consciousness.

I didn't even say that it was possible for consciousness to exist without content. I'm not sure about the answer to that anyway. It's a difficult question. The distinction I was attempting to make, apparently without clarity, was between being conscious of something in particular (like the experience of being drunk) and the possibility of consciousness of anything at all. To have the experience of being drunk, you have to be capable of experience at all. And that latter is what I can't find an explanation for.

And if I have failed to provide the support you seek for that position, then so be it.

I'm not asking you to support my position! I just want to know why the functions you identify, and no others, necessitate/generate/instantiate/constitute/exemplify (pick you verb) consciousness. If you don't know, that's OK, there's no shame in that. If you can't be arsed to explain it, that's fine too. If you need more time to consider it, that's OK. If you don't understand the question, that's fine. Just let me know.

If that's the question you mean to ask me when you say 'the same question', I would say a couple of things. First, I don't think that the existence of life is something that can necessarily be explained. One of the other really useful essays on I read on biosemiosis What is Information?, refers to the work of Hubert Yockey who attempted to apply Claude Shannon's information theory to living organisms. — Wayfarer

Thanks that looks interesting. I was vaguely hoping you understood Apo's position so you could explain it to me, but It's a big ask.