Comments

  • The Unequivocal Triumph Of Neuroscience - On Consciousness
    Are we incapable of having a conversation Apo?
  • The Unequivocal Triumph Of Neuroscience - On Consciousness
    You still haven't said why modelling, selective attention, and all the other things you take as hallmarks of consciousness cannot also happen without consciousness. — bert1
  • The Unequivocal Triumph Of Neuroscience - On Consciousness
    I also asked you for a relatively theory-free definition, but you ignored that question as well.
  • The Unequivocal Triumph Of Neuroscience - On Consciousness
    This isn't about me. Look at the title of the thread. I don't feel embarrassed! No doubt I'm wrong in all kinds of ways, but we can talk about that another day, indeed we already have. So, back on topic:

    You still haven't said why modelling, selective attention, and all the other things you take as hallmarks of consciousness cannot also happen without consciousness.
  • Awareness & Consciousness
    Roughly interchangeable, although it's not hard to imagine times when people want to make distinctions and to specify usage. Just have to pay attention to the context and hope people, when stipulating meaning, are clear about it.
  • The Unequivocal Triumph Of Neuroscience - On Consciousness
    You still haven't said why modelling, selective attention, and all the other things you take as hallmarks of consciousness cannot also happen without consciousness. — bert1
  • The Unequivocal Triumph Of Neuroscience - On Consciousness
    ↪apokrisis
    Apo, you asked me a lot of questions but didn't answer mine. I'm happy to discuss panpsychism in another thread. Your post is blusterous and insubstantial. You still haven't said why modelling, selective attention, and all the other things you take as hallmarks of consciousness cannot also happen without consciousness. You are unclear on the relationship between these functions and consciousness, are they identical with experience, or are they evidence of experience, or do they cause experience, or what?
  • The Unequivocal Triumph Of Neuroscience - On Consciousness
    What supports your contention that all that neurology - by far the most extreme kilo or two of functional complexity in the known universe - could happen “in the dark”? — apokrisis

    I don't think it does, but that's not because I think the complexity is relevant, it's because I'm a panpsychist.

    I'm trying to understand the position of the emergentist, who typically thinks there is no consciousness in the universe at all except when and where there are brains (or perhaps functionally equivalent things). I take it that is your position. So we have a situation in which for the vast majority of the lifetime of the universe, and for the vast majority of places in it, there is no consciousness. Then something happens, and there is consciousness. But why? This is crying out for an explanation, even assuming this emergentist story is true. Why can't all the processes keep going on just as before, regardless of the complexity, just without the experience? What's the difference? And you've already told us what the difference is, which is great, you've said the difference is entering into a modelling relationship with the world. And my reply is, sure, but what is it about that that means it feels like something? We all know it does feel like something, I'm not denying that, obviously. What I'm asking is why does that explanation work, and not others. What is it about that particular function that constitutes an experience, but not the function of, say, an internal combustion engine?

    How do you get drunk if the neurology has nothing to do with there being a state of experience in your noggin?

    Well this is just about the distinction between consciousness and content. We can conclude very easily from the evidence that changes in brain function in humans alters the content of experience in humans. Of course it does. No one is denying that, not even the most extreme substance dualists. But how do we get from that to the very general conclusion that consciousness, regardless of the content, only occurs when brains do a certain type of thing? If I was 180, I might say that this was a hasty generalisation, but I'm not so I won't.
  • The Unequivocal Triumph Of Neuroscience - On Consciousness
    ↪EugeneW
    It's a question to ask of any kind of functionalism I think. Although previously Apo has said he isn't a functionalist, but maybe that's just a terminology thing.

    As @Wayfarer has been reading up on this stuff, more so than I have, I'd like to ask him the same question. I think I'd find his writing easier. He writes instruction manuals I think for money, if I remember correctly, so maybe that will help.

    There is a move available, which I don't think will help the situation, and that is to say that consciousness emerges at point X because consciousness is necessary for X. That might be what Apo thinks, I don't know.
  • The Unequivocal Triumph Of Neuroscience - On Consciousness
    ↪apokrisis
    That's all great, but why can't all that happen in the dark?

    I'd be happy with your account if you didn't market it as an explanation for consciousness. Even if you have correctly identified the point in the development of a system at which consciousness emerges (assuming emergentism is true), i.e. when systems model their environment and predict the future, it's still a mystery why this is the point when systems start having experiences. Why can't they model their environment and predict the future without experiencing anything?

    My irritation with your postings on this forum is not a dislike of your general knowledge and expertise on systems theory, which is really interesting, if a bit impenetrable most of the time. The forum is lucky to have you here as an expert on these ideas. It's the irrelevance to the problem of consciousness that I find annoying.

    Mind clearly has a huge array of functional aspects, what Block calls access consciouness, and your account may very well be highly relevant to that, I don't know. But that is not the relevant sense.
  • The Unequivocal Triumph Of Neuroscience - On Consciousness
    @apokrisis

    That's my complaint. You "consciousness" guys are bogged in the mud because you have a dys-functional conception of what its about. The mind can't make causal sense until you adopt a functional, enactive and embodied perspective. — apokrisis

    The mind does make causal sense to me. I don't feel bogged down except when I try to make sense of various emergentist accounts, such as yours. There has not been one that makes sense to me that is faithful the phenomenal conception of consciousness. I'm interested though. Are you in agreement with Pattee in his cell phenomenology paper?
  • The Unequivocal Triumph Of Neuroscience - On Consciousness
    @apokrisis
    Can you offer a relatively theory-free definition of 'consciousness', that picks out what theories of consciousness are theories of?
  • The Unequivocal Triumph Of Neuroscience - On Consciousness
    Well everyone accepts it is the kind of thing that could produce life. — apokrisis

    Indeed, but life, at least since biologists got hold of the concept, is defined functionally. Consciousness is not defined in functional terms, at least not in the relevant sense. Unless by fiat, which is what Pattee does in Cell Phenomenology: The First Experience.
  • The Unequivocal Triumph Of Neuroscience - On Consciousness
    ↪apokrisis
    what is the hard problem?
  • The Unequivocal Triumph Of Neuroscience - On Consciousness
    I don't think you see the point. The point of the hard problem argument is simply that the first-person nature of being (or experience) can never be reduced to (or explained in terms of) a third-person description. It's an extremely simple point which nevertheless eludes the advocates of physicalist reductionism, who insist that 'there is a straightforward, conservative extension of objective science that handsomely covers the ground — all the ground — of human consciousness, doing justice to all the data without ever having to abandon the rules and constraints of the experimental method that have worked so well in the rest of science'. (Dennett)

    No boggling required.     — Wayfarer

    Yup. That's a good Dennett quote.

    A recent exchange with 180 shocked me a bit as it demonstrated, or appeared to demonstrate, that he actually lacked the concept of consciousness that you and I, and many others on and off the forum, have. It's shocking because in other ways 180 is very insightful. Now this has me wondering about Apo. When dismissing the hard problem, I'm not sure Apo has grasped what it is. I say this tentatively, because I find it incredible. I feel bad saying this, because it is exclusionary. It's almost disqualifying people from the conversation, which feels bad.

    EDIT: Pattee (yes, I am interested in Apo's stuff) in his paper on cell phenomenology, the first experience, says lots of very interesting things, and then completely spoils it by defining, by fiat, the phenomenal in functional terms. Thereby removing himself from the conversation. It was very interesting. His paper was about something interesting, but it wasn't about consciousness. It's phonomenology, but not as we know it, Jim.
  • The Unequivocal Triumph Of Neuroscience - On Consciousness
    I'll look at the global workspace theory more as that is what Garrett seems to be drawn to, and I like the idea of a space, as consciouness seems somewhat space-like to me, and space might be a candidate for that which unifies brain processes.
  • The Unequivocal Triumph Of Neuroscience - On Consciousness
    Why is the binding problem a problem? — EugeneW

    The existence of binding is not a problem, it's a good thing. Accounting for it, explaining how it happens is the problem.

    There are a number of slightly different binding problems. I presume the neural binding problem is the fact that many individual stimuli come into the body from outside it, they don't all arrive at exactly the same time in the same place. Neurons fire around the brain, but there is no obvious spot where they all meet. But, phenomenologically, experiences are unified, we don't experience photon1 signal followed by photon2 signal etc. We see a car, a whole. All experiences involve some kind of many-in-one event. How this unification is achieved is the issue. My thought is that fields are extended throughout the brain, and indeed everything, and consciousness is perhaps best understood as a fundamental field-property. We feel what our brains are doing because we are the fields that constitute and unify it.
  • The Unequivocal Triumph Of Neuroscience - On Consciousness
    Dennett I regard as a blustering charlatan — Daemon

    Yep. That's always how he seemed to me.
  • A Question for Physicalists
    Yes, and the problem here is, that's an anti-philosophical cop-out for disregarding the science that has been established, that people employ here almost every single time I bring this u on this website. There is no understanding consciousness without the understanding what it is that is producing it, and how it operates. If one is going to have philosophical deliberations on the nature of consciousness, the science has to be incorporated into that view. To do otherwise would be a disregarding known science fallacy. Besides, the OP was about the functionalist aspect of consciousness. So, literally anybody disagreeing with me here about this is going to need to bring some data, and at bare minimum contend with what I have already brought that dispels with the mind/body "distinction" that doesn't exist according to the data. — Garrett Travers

    Every theory of consciousness, even including substance dualism, is consistent with the data. The science just doesn't rule much out.
  • Last Thursdayism
    Is this similar to Goodman's new riddle of induction?
  • The Unequivocal Triumph Of Neuroscience - On Consciousness
    @Garrett Travers

    Thank you very much for responding to my questions. I'd also like you to comment on this:

    The IIT's two major proponents, Koch and Tononi have both come out as panpsychists of a kind. They think that inanimate systems are conscious, for example simple molecules, atoms and thermostats. — bert1

    But you cited the IIT as one of your respectable theories that shows consciousness only occurs in brains. But the IIT is expressly an panpsychic theory. It attributed consciousness to any system at all that integrates information. Have you blundered here? Or have I misunderstood you?

    Where do you stand on multiple realisability? That gets you out of the brain doesn't it?

    Functionalism of any kind suggests that any system that can replicate the function of a system we know (or believe) is conscious, is also conscious. So a faithful brain-simulator would be conscious like a brain, no?
  • The Unequivocal Triumph Of Neuroscience - On Consciousness
    Basically what the article concludes "a neural network of consciousness in which the paraventricular nucleus formally serves as the control nucleus of arousal, which is closely related to the maintenance of consciousness, and the neurons in the posterior cerebral cortex. It is related to the integration of feelings and the generation of consciousness content. Besides, the claustrum also represents the key channel of the consciousness loop and the transmission of control information." — Garrett Travers

    OK, so this identifies some relationships between consciousness and some brain activity. The relationships is one of 'maintenance', 'integration', and 'generation', and possibly others. So this is an account of one side of a relationship between two conceptually distinct things, yes? It may not be that they are distinct in substance, of course. But to have a relationship there must be two, no?

    No, that's not really been established yet. — Garrett Travers

    Thank you for your candour. I guess sometimes theory can proceed without identifying what a theory is a theory of. Do you think that is the case with the scientific study of consciousness?

    But, fundamnetally, the wakeful attention that characterizes human cognition. — Garrett Travers

    OK, thanks. So you are specifying humans. Are we not considering animals with brains here? If not, why not?

    Also you are specifying wakeful attention. What about dreams when asleep? Are we conscious then?

    And what about when our attention is very diffuse, almost as if we are not attending to anything in particular, and allowing an unanalysed body of stimuli determine our experience? Does that count as consciousness?

    Global Workspace Theory, Quantum Theory, Integrated Information Theory — Garrett Travers

    These are pretty speculative, no?

    The Global Workspace Theory is interesting as I think it captures something of the phenomenal character of experience, namely that it feels container-like. But what is it exactly? I don't know enough about the theory. Is it a field, like the electromagnetic field? Or is it a property of an existing field? If so, how can we limit it to a brain as fields are everywhere? Or is it a kind of mathematical space, like a simulated virtual reality? If so, can't that happen outside a human brain also? IIT is, as you say, a kind of functionalism, as perhaps are the others as well. The IIT's two major proponents, Koch and Tononi have both come out as panpsychists of a kind. They think that inanimate systems are conscious, for example simple molecules, atoms and thermostats.

    The trouble with all flavours of functionalism is that they tend to be silent when asked "OK, but why can't all that happen in the dark? What is it about any of that that necessitates phenomenal experience?"

    Where do you stand on multiple realisability? That gets you out of the brain doesn't it?

    There are several Quantum Consciousness theories I think. Are you thinking of the Penrose one?

    These are all very different Garrett. And some don't necessarily involve brains. Are you sure it's all as settled as you think?
  • The Unequivocal Triumph Of Neuroscience - On Consciousness
    Garrett, just to make sure we are not talking a cross purposes, what is the concept of consciousness that is operative in your OP? Do you have a definition of the word? Can you indicate what the neuroscientific theory of consciousness (if there is one single one, which there isn't as far as I know) is a theory of? To put it another way, what have you said about x when you say 'x is conscious'?
  • Is Dishbrain Conscious?
    ↪180 Proof
    Sure, fair enough.
  • Is Dishbrain Conscious?
    I don't think this is what we are asking about when we ask whether Dishbrain is conscious. I think we are asking if Dishbrain can feel anything. Whether it has experiences. — Daemon

    Indeed. That is definition by synonym (more or less).
  • Is Dishbrain Conscious?
    I think on a philosophy forum, on this issue particularly, it should be socially acceptable to deny another's experience. In a way that would less acceptable to deny a person's experience of, say, disability discrimination or racial discrimination.
  • Is Dishbrain Conscious?
    It's true that the ostensive definition is private. But that's ok, because the way we go on to talk then indicates if we have both performed the same ostensive definition. We can't be 100% sure, but we can be 99% sure, the more we talk. RogueAI and I, if we continue our discourse, are likely to say similar enough things about consciousness, and use it in the same places, that we will gradually become more sure that we share a concept.

    @180 Proof I know you don't share the concept, but do you accept that RigueAI and I do share a concept?

    If you don't have the concept, how is it possible for you to say something relevant to our discourse?
  • Is Dishbrain Conscious?
    There is another way you can define it, but that is not very satisfactory. And that is by synonym, and that definition you can find in a dictionary. Usually listed as the very first sense of the word.
  • Is Dishbrain Conscious?
    .↪bert1 ↪Daemon Light sensors, for example, "point to green" (or other EM frequencies); the capability "to point" does not itself indicate (define) "consciousness". — 180 Proof

    This is informative. It shows you haven't grasped the concept. RogueAI was not saying that the capacity to point indicates consciousness. You haven't performed the reflexive act which would furnish you with the referent of the word.

    RogueAI's definition is both philosophical and discursive. It's is clear enough that we are speaking about the same thing, we understand each other as far as I can tell. And it is this definition that is employed by many philosophers, and that is operative in discussions of the hard problem. And rejection of this definition is what puts so many discussions about consciousness at cross purposes.
  • Is Dishbrain Conscious?
    You can define consciousness ostensively, that's what RogueAI was implying, I think. — Daemon

    Yes, I agree. Do you understand what RogueAI means? Has this definition worked for you the way it worked for me, as far as you can tell?
  • Something the Philosophical Community Needs To Discuss As We Approach Global Conflict Once More
    Garrett, I'm sympathetic. It is indeed weird that we have the power, collectively, to fix everything, and to order the world in a sensible way. There are some unfortunate facts that make it difficult. Narcissists and psychopaths, who are clever and have lots of energy and ambition really can fuck it up for everyone, before everyone notices. Then there are systemic faults, like first past the post democratic systems which end up in voters not voting for who they want, but voting against who they don't want. Also the lack of a world government that can legislate and enforce ecological policy globally simultaneously. I like the EU as a project. Moving in the right direction. Gradual democratic Union of different states. UK took itself out because of Rupert Murdoch gaining undue influence in the UK.
  • Is Dishbrain Conscious?
    Ok. I do.
  • Is Dishbrain Conscious?
    ↪180 Proof


    I don't think we can define consciousness, other than we each have a private definition of it, which we assume everyone else has a similar definition (are you a P-zombie, 180???).

    That. From this I know exactly what RogueAI is talking about, so for me it's a successful definition. It accurately picks it the bit of the world we want to talk about. But it's not much good for someone who doesn't share this reflexive perception.
  • Something the Philosophical Community Needs To Discuss As We Approach Global Conflict Once More
    I rather like Garrett.

    Unfortunately I'm vaguely hoping we accidentally wipe ourselves out in some way that I can survive and father the next inbred human plague of cannibals and necrophiliacs. That's still a kind of love. Sorry Garrett.
  • Panpsychism/cosmopsychism
    Garrett, philosophers rarely dispute science. That's the whole point. Philosophy tackles questions science leaves open.
  • Is Dishbrain Conscious?
    Anyway, your OP question is incoherent without you defining "conscious" — 180 Proof

    He did define it
  • Panpsychism/cosmopsychism
    Made up assertion.

    https://www.researchgate.net/publication/333802932_The_Unfolding_Argument_Why_IIT_and_Other_Causal_Structure_Theories_Cannot_Explain_Consciousness?_iepl%5BgeneralViewId%5D=kIPDJTnFJ1jtMG391GeRJBJ0XILeoGNXFMbS&_iepl%5Bcontexts%5D%5B0%5D=searchReact&_iepl%5BviewId%5D=xPTKXCJDhxoUdEQTTs0NbH0ptyvbHWXKpdG8&_iepl%5BsearchType%5D=publication&_iepl%5Bdata%5D%5BcountLessEqual20%5D=1&_iepl%5Bdata%5D%5BinteractedWithPosition5%5D=1&_iepl%5Bdata%5D%5BwithoutEnrichment%5D=1&_iepl%5Bposition%5D=5&_iepl%5BrgKey%5D=PB%3A333802932&_iepl%5BtargetEntityId%5D=PB%3A333802932&_iepl%5BinteractionType%5D=publicationTitle

    is ubiquitous in philosophy and not just an issue for panpsychists
    — bert1

    No it isn't, just to mystics.

    Mind cannot sustainably be 'attributed to' natural processes, in the sense of 'fully explained by' or 'reduced to' or even 'emerge from', in my view.
    — bert1

    It doesn't matter what your view is, dude. The evidence is present. Read the above research.

    The 'hard problem', which exists for emergentists, has yet to be solved, or dissolved. The difficulties are conceptual rather than empirical.
    — bert1

    Solved has nothing to do with anything, it's about what all evidence suggests, which is that the brain controls all functions of the body. It is not conceptual. Conceptual views are what is stopping people from understanding what the evidence blatantly, and exclusively suggests. This is an argument from igorance. It is precisely the conceptual views that have solved no problem and provided no evidence, that is who you should be making claims of "solving" to. To do otherwise is completely dishonest, and you're just living in make-believe because you want to.     — Garrett Travers

    There is no philosophy in this post. Nor any indication of any awareness of the philosophical issues involved.
  • The problem with "Materialism"
    The thing that jumped out to me is the claim that causes can't be ignored, while hunger and red lights can. Made me think of positivism and the need for "if p then q" not to be conditional, to hold its status in logical notation such that "if p then always q." Predicate logic can tolerate conditionals ("just in case p and r and s, then q") to be sure, but it can't tolerate modality that well.

    That might not be where he is coming from, but it seems related as an issue when you talk about showing cause.

    But I'm not sure what he's saying either.

    I do see how such claims could work though. If you take a (somewhat) nominalist view of material entities' attributes, then names for complex phenomena will invariably be imperfect constructs, maps instead of the territory itself. The idea of signaling is protean in the sciences and comes in myriad disparate physical forms that are simply not the same thing.

    You have the flip side of Kant's transcendental: cognitive models of cause are always filtered through faculties and abstraction, and so don't reflect the reality of actual entities. You're not getting to the real causes when you use imprecise stand-ins for entities and their behavior such as "signaling."

    The problem I see here is that this issue is equally true of all scientific/factual statements. Every claim requires auxillary hypotheses for its premises to hold and they all use such stand-ins. That and physics doesn't work without the ability to arbitrarily define systems. It also requires an observation point that represents a physical system itself to avoid violating its own rules (magical observers that can move faster than light, access information without having to store it physically, etc. have caused all sorts of problems for the field but are incredibly difficult to avoid).

    We probably shouldn't worry too much about our observational biases. If external objects are real, we must be getting information from them somehow, and we have to be storing that information physically. Recursive representations of the enviornment are the only way a system is knowable.     — Count Timothy von Icarus

    Thanks, that's interesting. A bit too abstract for me though. Not sure I understand you.
  • Panpsychism/cosmopsychism
    No, that's just objective material phenomena. I mean evidence for your claim of: the mind or a mindlike aspect is a fundamental and ubiquitous feature of reality. — Garrett Travers

    Yes, something happening. The only causes we know about are psychological, I suggest. |We know we do things because of how we feel. Laws of nature, if reified at all are inferred. Or else identified with what just happens.

    Where do you see this mind?

    I only 'see' my own mind. The problem of other minds is ubiquitous in philosophy and not just an issue for panpsychists. Indeed panpsychism might be a conclusion resulting from an examination of the problem of other minds.

    Any evidence of this mind that 1. cannot be attributed to natural processes, and

    Mind cannot sustainably be 'attributed to' natural processes, in the sense of 'fully explained by' or 'reduced to' or even 'emerge from', in my view. The 'hard problem', which exists for emergentists, has yet to be solved, or dissolved. The difficulties are conceptual rather than empirical.

    [/quote2. can be attributed to mental processes? You'll need both to make this claim, if you don't have both, you are playing make-believe.[/quote]

    I take it as self evident that mental process can be attributed to mental processes. I suspect I have not grasped your point.

    Except as idle speculation – no. "Panosychism / cosmopsychism" (is) just woo-of-the-explanatory-gaps —

    I love the mysterious brackets around 'is'.
  • Panpsychism/cosmopsychism
    ↪Garrett Travers
    Sure, anything happening at all
Home » bert1