How do you tell when a rock is sleeping?

And if you do not see this question as somewhat absurd, then perhaps that's an end to our discussion. — Banno

On the definition of 'consciousness' you are using, we are in complete agreement. Rocks are unconscious in that sense. This definition entails the possibility of sleep and being knocked out and so on. These conditions are defined in terms of brain function. Rocks, by definition, do not have brains. Therefore rocks, by definition, are not conscious in this sense. We agree.

Panpsychism is therefore wrong, by definition. Is that right?

I'm not seeing the difference. The reason we call a knocked-out person 'unconscious' is because they don't appear to have those properties. When they 'come to' again, we mark that they have done so by the apparent return of those properties. If those properties collectively, define consciousness it sounds almost exactly like the medical definition. — Isaac

The medical definition talks about levels of responsiveness in humans. The definition is in terms of behaviour, and we assume that these behaviours are accompanied by corresponding characteristically human experiences.

But we don't have to limit the use of 'consciousness' (even partly defined in terms of behaviour) to humans. We can wonder, for example, if the responsive behaviour of rocks is evidence of their subjective experience.

The definition of 'consciousness' (sense 1 in most dictionaries) is distinct from the medical definition in that it does not include any specific behaviour and speaks in very general terms about 'sensations', 'feelings', 'experiences' which are not, by definition, tied to any particular species, and even plants and minerals are not ruled out. If we want to say rocks are not conscious in this sense, we can't just appeal to a definition. We need a theory.

The degrees given in scales like these refer to differences in content, not in consciousness in the sense that the OP means it.

EDIT: What I said ^ is wrong. I should have said 'observable behaviour' not 'content'.

If you are going to argue that rocks are conscious, you are also going to have to acknowledge and explain your novel use of the word "conscious" — Banno

It's not novel. It's roughly the first sense listed at dictionary.com:

"the state of being conscious; awareness of one's own existence, sensations, thoughts, surroundings, etc."

I'd want to perhaps cut a couple of those out if I'm talking about the consciousness of rocks, perhaps limit it to just to feelings and sensations, but the basic sense is the same I think. Philosophers put various glosses on this basic idea in order to make it clearer (or less clear for some) what they are talking about. Such glosses talk about experience, qualia (which I dislike), something it is like to be it, subjectivity, having a point of view, and so on.

Your insistence that the medical definition is the only one is very annoying.

The point was why on earth would anyone consider giving up just because the positions don't seem right to RogueAI? — Isaac

Oh, I see. I think you both have a point. I'd like materialists to keep working on it, even though I suspect they will not find the solution they are after. They may discover other interesting things in the process. For example, Tononi might have stumbled on a good theory of identity (rather than consciousness), in my view. That is to say, the entities that have a unitary consciousness are those entities that integrate information.

Too complicated for me :)) — Eugen

Setting out arguments always makes them seem more complicated than they are. I just quite like doing it. My point is just that in the sense of 'consciousness' used in this thread, it is not necessary that conscious things must be able to be knocked out.

It's a wonder the professional cognitive scientists, neuroscientists, philosophers and psychologists who've been diligently investigating conciousness for the past few decades, don't just hang up their coats right now after such a damning counter-argument. — Isaac

Some of them agree with RogueAI. His view does not stand in opposition of to the views of the overwhelming majority of academics studying consciousness. There is no settled position on this such that opposition to it is by default unreasonable.

I think they should be treated as part of a reductio ad absurdum. Hence, Panpsychism fails. — Banno

Let's set out the reductio:

1) Quarks are conscious (panpsychist thesis as target for reductio) (assumption)
2) If quarks are conscious then they can be knocked out, put to sleep (assumption)
3) NOT quarks can be knocked out, put to sleep (assumption)
4) NOT Quarks are conscious (MTT 2.3)
5) Quarks are conscious AND NOT quarks are conscious (& introduction 1,4)
6) NOT Quarks are conscious (RAA 1,5)

Is that right?

I'd just do the reductio on 2 rather than 1

EDIT: fixed spelling

But to be honest, I don't know if ''more consciouss'' even makes sense. — Eugen

I share your perception/intuition. I don't think it does make sense. To my mind, nothing is any more conscious than anything else. Consciousness does not come in degrees, just as, (arguably) existence does not come in degrees. For example, we don't say a car has more existence than a rock. They are very different things, but in terms of their existence, they are equal. One does not exist more than the other.

I think Jorndoe has correctly characterised the difference between a person and a super-intelligent alien species of greater cognitive complexity:

Something could be "conscious of more" than we are. — jorndoe

The difference between the conscious minds of different types of entities consists in what they are aware of, what computations they can perform, what things they can perceive, what specialisations their senses may have, how they can reason about their experience, the emotions they can feel, and so on. In terms of their being conscious, they are exactly the same; just as in terms of their existence alone, they are exactly the same. When one says something exists, one has said very little about it. Similarly, when one says something is conscious, one has only said one thing about it. It's really very uninformative about the nature of that thing. On the other hand, if you say something has the mind of a typical human, you have said a great deal about it in terms of what it can do and the kind of experiences it can have.

I have not made arguments here, I am appealing to intuitions about what we typically mean when (in philosophy) we assert that something is conscious.

So we can discuss endlessly.
I am a materialist. — Vladimir Krymchakov

Yes, such endless discussion is not optional on a philosophy forum, it is mandatory. If you just express opinions without any engagement with arguments to and fro, you are not doing philosophy, and you have ended up on the wrong forum..

First of all, we don't know whether other animals have a conscience or not. We're talking about human consciousness and more especially our own. — David Mo

The OP isn't, it's consciousness in general.

It is good evidence to think that a living human brain is a necessary and sufficient condition to have a human consciousness. — David Mo

Yes, but that only evidences something about humans. And it's not completely clear what theory this evidence supports.

When you alter a brain such that the unified consciousness 'disappears' (e.g. gets KO'd) there's a couple of ways to interpret this. It's consistent with two theories:

1) It's the consciousness that disappears. Consciousness is dependent on certain brain function, and when that brain function does not happen, the consciousness no longer exists.

2) Consciousness is more like mass. When someone's brain function is disrupted, the identity is disrupted. There is no longer a strongly unified human subject which has experiences, but there is still consciousness. The units have changed - other things are conscious, maybe smaller units (if you are a microspychist). Just like with the mass of a car, arranged so it can function it is a car, arranged differently it is a pile of scrap, but the mass remains. The identities are different. That's what I think: when I lose consciousness, I do not remain. The consciousness that remains is not mine, because I don't exist. When consciousness 'returns' it is really my identity that has rebooted.

What is consciousness then? If you introspect into your consciousness you will find experiences and emotions. Nothing more. Remove the experiences and emotions and your consciousness will be empty. — David Mo

You've given the two main options here. In your first two sentences you have identified consciousness with content. And in the last you have described consciousness as like an empty container, which is something more than its contents.

My view is that consciousness is the latter, so that consciousness does not entail content necessarily (it is possible for the theatre to be empty, the ocean to be still, to pick a couple of metaphors). In practice, of course, there is nearly always content.

It is possible to use 'consciousness' to refer to the totality of content, and this is a valid usage (and given in dictionaries). But I don't think this usage is typically what philosophers concerned with the hard problem are talking about. Or at least they are talking about consciousness as abstracted from individual experiences (and this sense is also listed in dictionaries).

I'd like to do a thread on definitions of 'consciousness', as discussions very often end up with haggling over definitions. I think a dictionary could help, as it is a neutral more objective voice in the discussion.

I think you would find our consciousness very much can be changed by altering our brain. Taking psychedelics -ie adding chemicals to the composition of the brain, being inflicted with brain damage, meditating, sleeping. All of these actions dramatically influence our state of consciousness — Benj96

They change what you experience, of course. And we can call the content of consciousness 'states' of consciousness. But this sheds no light on what the general necessary and sufficient conditions for consciousness (or identity in my view) are in anything other than humans.

Only such a complex system as the brain can produce consciousness. — Vladimir Krymchakov

Why?

For the existence of consciousness requires complex organic matter. — Vladimir Krymchakov

Why?

Consciousness without an active brain does not exist. — Vladimir Krymchakov

How do you know that?

Most physicalist theories of mind say that the mind is supervenient on matter, i.e., matter is what is real, and the mind is dependent on it. — Wayfarer

That's not supervenience

The definition of consciousness is different from the definition of experience.

We can change our experiences and our identity by altering our brains, but we can't change our consciousness. We can change what is experienced, and what experiences, but we can't change the fact that experience happens whatever we do.

jorndoe

What would an idealist say in response to your critique?

I pity the poor, innocent chunk of dead flesh lying in the morgue, conscious, but not aware of itself. — jgill

It is a worry.

Switch off brain, and there goes consciousness. — jgill

There goes identity, not consciousness

By 'feel consciously' do you mean 'undergo an experience'?

My vote, FWIW... where human infants acquire competence in pointing symbols (including samples) at things, so that a red thing is perceived as an example of red things. — bongo fury

Really? So get a newborn, poke it with a sharp stick, does it feel anything?

Physicalism is not identical to eliminativism.
— Pfhorrest

No, but it is usually implied by it. — bongo fury

Physicalism regarding consciousness is the view that consciousness is real, and it is physical. Eliminativism is the view that consciousness is not real (at least not in one of the main commonly meant senses).

What panpsychism is about is when people ask "Okay that accounts for the behavior of people and their brains but where in any of this emergence of complex behaviors did phenomenal experience start happening and why?" — Pfhorrest

I'd love to hear an actual answer to this.

Soon we're going to start talking about definitions.

To repeat. My MAIN qualm is with people naively suggesting atoms are ‘conscious’ with the poor defense of ‘just a different kind of conscious’ - which is nonsensical. — I like sushi

Indeed, if a panspychist said that I too would disagree with them. Who says this though?

↪Pfhorrest Eliminativism & emergentism are non-exclusionary — 180 Proof

Of course they are exclusionary, by definition. Functionalism, for example, excludes eliminativism. Functionalism says that consciousness exists and is a function. Eliminativism says that consciousness does not exist.

3:15 to 7:05 maybe for an intro to the idea. Continue to 15:00 if you like. Basically the first fifteen minutes gives an overview.

Are you asking if your parents could have given you a different name, or are you asking if you had a different father but the same mother, would you still be you. — Harry Hindu

Neither of those. Have you watched the video I linked to at the start of the thread?

If bert1 were someone else, he wouldn't be bert1. That's why. — neonspectraltoast

Ok, that's good, thanks.

I am bert1

Is this a necessary or contingent truth? (Banno will like this)

If "I" (when spoken by bert1) just means "bert1" then presumably the answer is that this is a necessary truth, and the problem is solved. I am bert1 because it is necessarily true that I am bert1. Denying this would entail the contradiction: bert1 is not bert1.

If I is not in every sense bert1, then the fact that I am bert1 is a contingent truth, and could have been otherwise.

So if we take the OP seriously, and think this an interesting question, and we think that I could have been other than bert1, then we must think that "I", even when spoken by bert1 does not entirely mean "bert1". That is, when bert1 is completely specified, there remains some leftovers, like cold Christmas dinner.

So this question will split philosophers between those who think that (at least metaphysically) "I am bert1" = "bert1 is bert1" and those who think that "I am bert1" is not the same metaphysical statement than "bert1 is bert1"

Thoughts on this characterisation of the problem?

I don't think the question is about why we are the way we are. That question may well be answerable by reference to experience and DNA, environment, cosmic rays, astrology and whatever else. It's about why I am this one (regardless of the properties of this one) and not another one (regardless of the properties of that one). I don't know how to say it differently to get across the different idea. I can see why you think the question is about why I am the way that I am rather than some other way. Maybe this:

The difference isn't about my being one of several possible qualitative identities, but about being one of several quantitatively/numerically distinct entities that I might have been any one of, but were not. (Not sure if that's right)

Banno understands the question I think, even though he thinks it rests on a misunderstanding or mistake.

If you're trying to suggest that all identities are identical aside from being in different locales inhabiting different bodies, you're sorely mistaken. — neonspectraltoast

That's one possibility, I'm not sure it's the right one and I'm not sure it actually answers the OP even if it is right. But I'm interested in why you think this could not be the case.

You seem to know what you are - a bert1 - but are ignorant of why you are bert1? Is that not a question about causation? — Harry Hindu

Yes, I think it might be. But not about the causation of bert1 - that is independent of the question of why I am bert 1, that is to say, why an I looking out of bert1's eyes and not, say Banno's. One could rephrase to say "What caused me to be bert1 rather than someone else."

You're all honestly confused about why you don't identify as other people...? — neonspectraltoast

I'm not sure why I am bert1 rather than someone else

Hah! Well, that would be a bonus, but it is not the intention. This stuff fries my brain, I find it very hard to think about. I think this is the hard end of philosophy, because we can't think objectively about this, we have to include our point of view, which we are not used to doing, or at least I'm not. I'm still trying to get to grips with Banno's post, and one thing I notice about it is that it is all third person (the first-person speech is reported in the third person). I think the video I linked to by Stephen Priest really sets out the idea as clearly as can be done, and I recommend having a look. If indeed that idea is the same as the one the OP wants us to talk about. Priest thinks it is an extraordinary fact that out of all the billions of people one of them is extremely peculiar in that it has the absolutely unique property of being me. Banno thinks this is just a matter of grammar. I don't think it is. It's not a matter of grammar that I can see everyone's face except my own.

Should qualia on that definition be regarded as consciousness? — Graeme M

I don't think so, no. Consciousness is an essential prerequisite for an experience. If I'm conscious, it means I'm capable of experience. Exactly what I experience is not yet determined merely by the fact of my being conscious. What I experience are the qualia, and these change. We can't identify consciousness and qualia because qualia change and consciousness doesn't. We are conscious of one thing, then another, then another. The content changes, the consciousness doesn't. This seems really obvious to me but it seems other people's intuitions on this are quite different to mine, so much so that it is hard to have a conversation and know we are talking about the same ideas. Consciousness is that property by virtue of which I am able to have experiences. Consciousness is that which all qualia and experiences have in common, by virtue of which they have a felt character.

I don't know if a dictionary will help, but it might. Lets take a look at the first two senses of 'consciousness' on dictionary.com:

1) the state of being conscious; awareness of one's own existence, sensations, thoughts, surroundings, etc.

2) the thoughts and feelings, collectively, of an individual or of an aggregate of people: — dictionary.com

When I'm talking about consciousness, I mean sense 1, and this is what I believe most panpsychists and people like Chalmers who go on about the hard problem mean. The focus of definition 1 is on the awareness, not what one is aware of. There is a list of categories of content, but only to indicate that is the kind of thing that one's awareness is often aware of.

It is possible to talk about consciousness in sense 2, we refer to someone's consciousness as the totality of the contents of their conscious mind. In this definition, the focus is on the content of awareness, not on the awareness of content.

There's other senses as well, like the awake/unconscious distinction. Some like Banno think that covers the concept adequately. I just don't think it is the sense that most philosophers of mind use. I think philosophers typically are using 'consciousness' in sense 1 or 2.

Does that help at all?

Aside from the fact its virtually impossible between exact circumstance, place, society, or genetics you literally went through the absolute same experience and thus have the same perspective, yours would be yours and theirs would be theirs. — Outlander

Yes, but what determines which one you are?

So my objection to panpsychism is that I think people are mistaking the descriptive capacity of appropriate systems for actual physical entities. — Graeme M

I can't speak for other panpsychists, but I don't think experiences, or qualia, are objects, so as far as that is concerned I agree with you. I think it makes much more sense to say that the content of experience is determined by processes and functions, possibly computations, I don't know. But I don't think any of these things can simply be identified with consciousness. For me, an experience happens when a conscious system undergoes a change.

Yes, we should probably stop talking about bananas. I was hoping the OP would return and give us some guidance about what we should be arguing about. It's easy enough to find things to argue about anyway I suppose, but it's good to stick on topic. :)

If I'm in a room with a ten other people, and I'm not sure which one I am, I don't have to study everyone's DNA, or any of the other things that make people the way they are. I am the one whose face I can't see.