Yes, but you don't say "ouch" because of the experience. You say "ouch" because of a completely physical and traceable series of neural molecular and electrical reactions. You would say "ouch" even if you were a robot programmed to say "ouch" every time you stub your toe. — Isaac

This is helpful and clearly expressed. I think I do say 'ouch' because of the experience, although this is questionable as there may be times when I say 'ouch' in a sort of reflexive, automatic way, before I actually experience any pain. In fact, I think I've sometimes said 'ouch' and the pain never actually arrived, I was just expecting it. Anyway, maybe hunger would be a better example as reflex plays less of a role. I believe I eat because I feel hungry. Intuitively, experiences do generally seem to play a causal role in what we do. But maybe you don't agree with me. Perhaps you are an epiphenomenalist, or even an eliminativist, as your use of scare quotes around 'experience' might suggest?

The 'experience' you claim is private is not physically connected to saying "ouch" in any way (if it was, it would be a physical phenomenon). So the fact that your friend doesn't say "ouch" can't possibly stand as evidence either for or against the type of experience he's having - if experiences are private. He might have exactly the same experience as you do when you say "ouch" alongside watching someone say "ouch"... Or not...

Yes, I think your logic makes sense. I just think that experiences, feelings, etc, do play a causal role in what physically happens. That's what one would expect of a panpsychist.

So presumably your next query would be about the causal closure of the physical - there's no need, nor indeed room, for psychological explanations when the physical explanations are both necessary and sufficient? Would that be right?

Thank you. :) EDIT: I infer from your response that you think we just keep going until we have a good theory that you don't perceive as a tautology.

'Giving up' does not constitute a position but a lack of one. — StreetlightX

Indeed. I don't regard panpsychism as giving up, but you do. And giving up on explaining consciousness in terms of brain function may not necessarily entail becoming a panpsychist anyway.

So, my question remains.

I don't see them as distinguishable, in the case of panpsychcism. — StreetlightX

Just out of interest, at what point, in the attempt to explain consciousness in terms of brain function, would giving up be justified, and not be lazy?

Can you tell me what's false about that? — Daemon

Most starkly, I think that's impossible because the formation of an identity is always a vague matter, there is no absolutely sharp cut-off point between being non-individuated and being individuated. Indeed a cell may never be totally individuated, as it is always in a transactional relationship with its environment, exchanging material etc. And as consciousness is not a vague concept, it seems impossible to get it to plausibly fit anywhere.

Also, whatever stage you want to put the emergence of consciousness, the question remains, "OK, but why can't all that happen without consciousness?" What that question indicates is the conceptual gulf between our concept of consciousness and our other concepts based on structure and function. I think this is what Chalmers was probably getting at with his conceivability argument.

Why not? You being unconscious doesn't mean the psyche has left the material. — Haglund

I'm talking about functionalist theories of consciousness that say that consciousness just is brain function. If consciousness brain function, and that ceases, then psyche (consciousness) has indeed left the material. I don't think that, I'm just characterising the functionalist view.

There is no sharp cut-off point between being bald and non-bald
— bert1
of course there is. You just choose not to admit it. Here are the extremes for both cases(Again)
A. a head without hair b. a head with hair.
A a unconscious state b. a conscious state.
Both extremes in both cases display many stages in between. — Nickolasgaspar

OK, lets write it out:

[bald] .... [1 hair, 2 hairs.....501 hairs....100,001 hairs]... [not bald]
[seven] ... [???] ... [not-seven]
[spatial] ... [???] ... [not spatial]
[unconscious] .... [what do we write here???]... [conscious]

Please tell me what goes in between unconscious and conscious?

I have included the concepts of seven and space as these are arguably binary as well, with no middle ground, just to illustrate the point. I'm suggesting consciousness is like that.

Has anyone said laziness yet? — StreetlightX

I suspect the OP was asking for theoretical motivations, not psychological ones. I say this because this is a philosophy forum, not a psychology forum.

When you're unconscious Bert1, is it like anything? It isn't for me. I'm pretty sure that's the same for everybody.

I have been unconscious when asleep, when I hit myself on the head with a pickaxe, and when I had a general anaesthetic. I am confidently expecting to be unconscious when I'm dead.

We've got all this complex machinery in our heads, the most complex thing we know about, and it can be switched off with a pickaxe or anaesthetic.

If it isn't like anything to be you, when you're unconscious, so you understand what unconsciousness is, and you understand the effects of anaesthetics and suchlike, and their relationship to the complex mechanisms, then why would you think that consciousness would be found in the absence of those mechanisms? — Daemon

When I'm unconscious, say from an anaesthetic, of being knocked out, or in a very deep sleep, I guess there are few possibilities as to what is going on:

1) I have moved from being in a conscious condition to being in an unconscious condition. The structure hasn't changed, but the function has. My brain isn't doing the things that constitute consciousness, so it is no longer modelling its environment, or no longer integrating as much information, or whatever your particular functionalist theory of consciousness is. This is not consistent with panpsychism.

2) I, as a functional unity, cease to exist. This is subtly different from (1), and is consistent with panpsychism. In this case, modelling my environment, or integrating information is not what makes me conscious, it's what makes me me. Identity is a function, not a property, I suggest. Things are what they are because of what they do. Whereas consciousess is a property, not a function. So when an anaesthetic stops some of my brain function, it disrupts that functional unity that makes me me. Everything that composes my brain is still conscious (just as it still has mass) but there is no overarching identity that unifies them. This leaves the big problem for panpsychism: the combination problem.

3) Another possibility that my consciousness actually remains, but I'm not really aware of anything much except perhaps the vaguest of fuzzy experiences, and I don't remember it anyway, so it seems as if I haven't experienced anything at all.

4) Another possibility is that I'm still conscious, just not conscious of anything. And this would perhaps be indistinguishable (not conceptually but practically) from not being conscious at all, as there is no difference in terms of content of consciousness. Some on this forum think this is a logical absurdity - they say that it is necessarily part f the concept of consciousness that we are aware of something. Consciousness must have content to be consciousness. I'm not convinced of that. Consider an ocean with waves, and consider the ocean to be consciousness and the waves to be the content. It is not a contradiction to suppose that the ocean is still, with no waves on it. And it is not a contradiction to suppose that there can be consciousness, just nothing in it. Like an empty box. Boxes don't necessarily have to have anything in them. Whether this state actually ever obtains is doubtful, but that's a matter of empirical possibility, not of logical, or conceptual possibility.

The only one of these I think is definitely false is (1). The other three are consistent with panpsychism, and I'm not totally sure which I prefer. Maybe all of them have some truth. All of them allow functional theories a role to play.
(1) Consciousness is a function
(2) Identity is a function
(3) and (4) Content is determined by function

Well what it matter is what it tells to experts, not to us. Our brain has the hardware that allows it to be conscious, it is hooked on a sensory system that provides information about the world and the organism, it has centers that process meaning,memory, symbolic language, pattern recognition. — Nickolasgaspar

But how does all of that result in consciousness? Why can't all of that happen without consciousness?

To be aware of what exist to be aware of stimuli environmental or organic. — Nickolasgaspar

Thank you. To be clear, would you consider a thermostat to be aware of temperature in this sense?

Neuroscience describes how we as agents produce meaning and identify intention and purpose in other agents. We are driven by stimuli that arouse our emotions that we reason in to feelings, concepts thoughts. — Nickolasgaspar

I'd love for you to expand on this if you have time. How does a brain generate an emotion?

And before p, q and r can be conscious? — Daemon

a,b,c, and d,e,f, and g,h,i, that constitute p, q and r must be conscious. :)

The regress stops when we get to some foundation, like the quantum field, or space, or some such concept. I'm agnostic about exactly what this is.

The usual idea is that consciousness emerges from the non-conscious, e.g. x doing such-and-such (say, modelling its environment, or integrating information, or some other functionalist theory) constitutes x being conscious. Whereas I'm proposing that consciousness is not a function at all but a property, a bit like mass perhaps. So for x to have mass, x must be composed of other things that have mass (I don't know if that's always true with mass, but you get the idea). If you start with things that don't have mass, it doesn't matter how you arrange them or what they do, the result still won't have mass. I'm suggesting consciousness is like that. If this seems rather primitive and uncomplicated, it is.

Because the alternative options are false. Regarding my loss of consciousness under the circumstances you mention, I think what is lost is not consciousness, but identity.

I can't be absolutely sure that the concept is shared. I'm pretty sure the experience isn't shared because when I stub my toe my friend doesn't say ouch.

The concept is shared, not the experience.

To be clear, you have evidence of something. You can't possibly have private evidence of consciousness, how would you know what the word meant if your only evidence of it was private? How would your language community have taught you how to use the word, what it referred to? — Isaac

I think there's a plausible story to be told involving a series of inferences and an abstraction. First, I stub my toe and I feel pain, I might say 'ouch that hurts.' Then my friend stubs their toe and also says 'ouch that hurts.' I don't feel my friend's pain, and they don't feel mine, but I can instinctively infer that they probably feel something roughly similar to what I felt. So we have a common language describing private experiences. I don't really see the problem with that. Then, in a more philosophical mood, when we have have gathered a large number of such experiences, we might reflect on one thing they all have in common, namely that they are all experiences, there is something it is like to have them. That faculty whereby we are able to have experiences, we have a name for, consciousness. I can have a conversation with my friend, and we can discuss philosophy, and while my consciousness is not his consciousness, and while I can't be absolutely certain he isn't an Australian zombie, we can nevertheless both perform this abstraction and reasonably share the concept. I don't see any great problem with this.

What..................? That is a binary position mate...you can use it as an argument for nothing. You are either right or not right, you are either guilty or not guilty.
That is a tautology based on the Logical Absolutes.
There is gradation on what we can be conscious of many reasons and that proves that our physiology and conditions affect the quality of our conscious states.
Again there is no value saying that one can be conscious or not. It offers zero meaningful information to the discussion or your position. — Nickolasgaspar

Yes, I can use it as an argument for something. Consciousness is an unusual concept. The vast majority of concepts do admit of degree. That's why I mentioned the example of baldness. It's a perfectly good concept, but it is not binary. There is no sharp cut-off point between being bald and non-bald. That's the point you're making isn't it? You're saying it's bogus to insist on a binary dichotomy, right? Well, for the vast majority of properties in the world, I completely agree with you. But consciousness is different. The concept does not seem to allow of degree. There is of course, plenty of degree about what we experience once we have got consciousness 'booted up' as it were, to use an emergentist metaphor, but if there is a 'booting up', there has to be a binary transition from non-conscious to conscious. But nature generally lacks such binary transitions, especially when you get the microscope out and look closely. So that presents a problem for the emergentist.

Objective evidence that are accessible to everyone. — Nickolasgaspar

But I have evidence of my consciousness that no one else can have, because no one else is me.

Then not only Panpsychism denies an observable fact of the world, that's emergence (i.e. two explosive molecules when combined produce a substance with the emergent fire extinguishing property) — Nickolasgaspar

When I say panpsychism is a denial of emergentism, that's only with regard to the emergence of consciousness specifically. I'm only talking about the philosophy of mind. Of course, the vast majority of properties in the world are emergent. But consciousness isn't one of them. Consciousness is very unusual like that.

it also makes a medieval claim for a substance being responsible for a phenomenon (like Phlogiston, Miasma, Orgone energy etc). — Nickolasgaspar

I think you might be confusing panpsychism with substance dualism. Panpsychism is typically a monistic view.

yes this is something that you need to demonstrated not assume. — Nickolasgaspar

It isn't assumed. Panpsychism must be true if the alternatives are false.

We can demonstrate the necessary and sufficient role of a functioning brain for thinking agents to interact and be aware of their environment. — Nickolasgaspar

The evidence you are referring to doesn't show what you think it shows. Of course a functioning human brain in a human body is necessary and sufficient for a functioning human being, that's pretty much true by definition. You haven't told me anything interesting about consciousness. This says nothing about the consciousness of, say, a snail, thermostat, or lawnmower. It doesn't tell me why a functioning human brain is conscious, and why, say, an internal combustion engine isn't. Why can't a brain do all the things it does in the dark, without consciousness? We know it doesn't, but why not?

Of course there are objective metrics that allow us to identify conscious states in other agents, from our interactions to necessary brain functions to our ability to decode complex conscious thoughts by watching the fMRI scan of a patient. — Nickolasgaspar

OK, that's good. OK, so we look at an fRMI scan and what? See consciousness there? Or do we infer consciousness? Or what? If we infer it, what is the inference? Can you spell it out?

You are responding to my conscious states....by consciously processing what they have produced. — Nickolasgaspar

I agree with you, I think I am. But the evidence I have for your consciousness is not the same evidence I have for my own consciousness.

well its a reoccurring pattern also observable in our previous interaction, so I am not so sure about that....but you can always falsify my hypothesis. Enjoy your dinner and "news" ..if that is possible by our modern media!. — Nickolasgaspar

It's well known that Banno is a marsupial Hobbit. It is rare he is not having a poached egg on toast with vegemite, or some such abominable snack.

Either the awareness is there or it is not. Consciousness is also present in a dampened state. It is like numbers, a number is either zero or not zero. There is nothing in between. — SolarWind

Yes, that's how it seems to me. Dampened consciousness is still consciousness.

Before x can be conscious, there has to be an unconscious x. — Daemon

That's the emergentist view. My view could perhaps be: before x can be conscious, there has to be a conscious p, q and r.

Again when certain types of anaesthetic are administered we can see a gradual diminution in neuronal activity, corresponding to a greying out of conscious experience. — Daemon

Sure, I agree there is a greying out. It's the transition from they faintest of greys to nothing at all I'm interested in. The faintest of greys is still a state of consciousness, no? There's an experience going on.

The mechanisms responsible for conscious experience are operating, but below the threshold where consciousness begins. We can see this from the outside. It's in the nature of consciousness that a gradual onset would be difficult for the "user" to detect. — Daemon

That's interesting. You are still using the concept pf a threshold though, which suggests a sharp dividing line to me. If the user is not conscious of the gradual onset of consciousness, then it's not a gradual onset is it? It's when they do become conscious of it, that they are conscious of it. Does that moment of realisation happen suddenly?

What's the rationale for that distinction then? — Daemon

I don't know, you'd have to ask a biologist I guess. Prescientific concepts of life might well have included an element of consciousness. But at some point, like got redefined in terms of reproductive ability, taking things from the environment and exploiting them, adapting, responding to stimuli (I'm talking out of my arse here, I don't actually know what the latest biological definition of life is) and that sort of thing. Things you can objectively look for anyway. Presumably this was satisfactory to demarcate the bits of the world they were interested in.

The difference between human brain and other "brains" (computers) is that computers work with algorithms. Inputs inform the algorithm and the algorithm provides "decisions".
In the case of human brain it processes emotion and meaning. A stimuli produces an emotion or affection and our brain(based on previous inputs(experiences),biological setup i.e. homeostasis or our biological hardware i.e. taste buds brain receptors , production of hormones etc) reasons them in to feeling and what they mean for the organism. — Nickolasgaspar

OK, thanks. Why can't all that happen without there being an emotion, meaning or feeling?

Assuming something that you have the burden to prove offers nothing of the above. — Nickolasgaspar

Panpsychism is a conclusion, not an assumption. Consider:

Either panpsychism, emergentism or eliminativism
Not emergentism
Not eliminativism
Therefore, panpsychism.

That's a valid argument. It might be unsound (one or more promises might be false), but that's another conversation. Panpsychism is the conclusion, not an assumption.

Subjectivity is not a mental property. It is a quality we observe in thinking agents because their conscious thoughts are the product of emotions(experiences) reasoned in to feelings and what they mean to them.
Subjectivity is an evaluation term on how people reason and experiences things differently.
It can not exist without biological thinking agents comparing their differences in their experiences
Consciousness doesn't mean subjectivity.
Consciousness is our ability to be conscious of environmental and organic stimuli and produce thoughts with content. Subjective is an abstract concept that described the differences between experiences of different agents.....This is an equivocation fallacy.

Abstract concepts do not exist...they are descriptive labels we use on processes.
This is bad language mode and it is common with claims about consciousness being a "thing" not a process or a property of a process. — Nickolasgaspar

OK, I probably shouldn't have used the word 'subjectivity' as it has confused the issue.

Consciousness is our ability to be conscious of environmental and organic stimuli and produce thoughts with content.

Here you have used the word 'conscious' in your definition of 'consciousness'. You could means several different things, and I'm not sure which one.

Are you denying degrees of consciousness? — Nickolasgaspar

Yes.

So you have never being asleep? light sleep, heavy sleep, sleep with dreams,sleep with environmental stimuli intruding in your dream,nightmare, sleepwalking, drunk, intoxicated,under anesthesia, brain injury(I hope not) concision, head ache, tooth ache, memory issues,Defuse thinking, focus thinking,preoccupied, terribly tired etc et.all those states that affect and even limit the quality of our ability to be conscious of our thoughts,mental abilities and environment. — Nickolasgaspar

These are gradations in what we are conscious of. They are not gradations between being conscious of nothing at all, and being conscious of something.

-No no, all theories of consciousness need to be a narrative of FACTS and a description of observable mechanisms. — Nickolasgaspar

But that's to prejudice the debate. That everything must be a mechanism is itself a theory.

Panpsychism only makes unflasifiable declarations.

Unfalsifiable by an empirical experiment, perhaps, but there are other ways to falsify claims. It's true that it's not a typical scientific hypothesis.

It doesn't describe how conscious states arise and how they gain their mental content.

It would be odd to expect it to. The idea that conscious states arise is emergentism. Panpsychism is typically a denial of emergentism.

How and why mental content is what it is, and what entities have what content and why, these are still open and difficult questions, and I agree panpsychists have not really got many good answers to these yet. I think various functionalist theories could be re-purposed to this end, perhaps.

Its in direct conflict with the establish Scientific Paradigm. Advanced properties are the product of structures with complex structures.

Panpsychists generally do not think consciousness is an advanced property, it's a primitive, simple property, of the kind that could be fundamental.

IT's also in conflict with the null hypothesis. The rejection of correlations between A(existence) and b(ghost of consciousness) until significant observations falsify that rejection should be your default position.

What should be the default position is an interesting question. Arguments could be made either way it seems to me. Panpsychism is ontologically simpler than emergentism, for example. Emergentism says there are two kinds of system in nature: conscious systems and unconscious ones. Panpsychists usually say there is just one, conscious.

Karl Popper's Demarcation principle. The problem is not that it is wrong, its not Even wrong! It can not be falsified, verified or tested. IT can not be used to produce accurate predictions or to use its principles in technical applications.

Some versions of panpsychism do make predictions, but not empirically testable ones. The difficulty is that there is no objective test for the presence of consciousness in systems other than our own self. I know I'm conscious. But I can't empirically verify that you are, or that my friend is. I think you probably are, but that is based on philosophical reasoning, not on empirical investigation. If you are saying that philosophy is not science, I agree with you.

Now ..its just theology in a really vague suit.

It's not theology

Books I've particularly enjoyed:

Tomorrow's Children, edited by Asimov
Farmer Giles of Ham, Tolkien's best work IMO
Assassin's Apprentice and sequels, Robin Hobb. Best fantasy author I've read.
Ronald Dahl's short stories
The Remains Of the Day, Ishiguro
Loud Hands, various autistic authors
The Once and Future King, T H White

I think it's hopeless getting other people to read books, there's something about recommending a book that immediately makes people not want to read it. Askng for recommendations is different. I've never read any of the Russian ones in the OP.

Titus Groan stayed with me a long time. Unique and very evocative.

Only very briefly! He was a guest speaker on the predecessor to this forum, and I asked him a question.

We can see that the process of development of the mechanisms is gradual, but it's in the nature of consciousness that to the user it can only appear to be instantaneous. — Daemon

I agree! When people disagree with me they usually say that consciousness does admit of degree. It's interesting and gratifying that you share my intuition that it doesn't. We're not the only ones by the way. Goff, Antony, and even one or two emergentists agree with us I think, last time I looked.

No no no.....I didn't ask anything about that abstract concept/ quality of subjectivity . I was clear. The claim is that mental properties can emerge non contingent to a biological brain. I didn't demand to demonstrate the subjective content of them. I only want you to point to a phenomenon where Reasoning, Intention,purpose, conscious realization, symbolic thinking, intelligence, pattern recognition, problem solving etc are properties that can be displayed by a brainless agent.
Can you point to a headless organism that can practice the above mental qualities? — Nickolasgaspar

Thank you for the clarification. We were talking at cross-purposes. Indeed, most of these I suppose only occur in brainy animals, perhaps some of them exist in some computer systems, maybe some of them exist in a rudimentary form in unicellular organisms, I don't know for certain. But I take your point. I do not assert that all of these mental capacities, functions, abilities, occur in everything. I only assert that subjectivity does, and that is all I mean by 'consciousness'.

Regarding the other functions you mention, I am interested if you think these could happen without any subjectivity. Could a complex entity, a cybernetic brain or something, could do all these things, but without actually experiencing anything?

Educations plays no role in superstitious beliefs. We know from neuroscience that decision in our brain are taken and they we reason them to our selves. — Nickolasgaspar

Sure, but I don't think that proves anything about panpsychism. Could you spell it out?

We can make a patients hand to jerk by using electrodes in his brain and he will provide a reason why "He did" what he did. — Nickolasgaspar

Sure, brains cause behaviour. What does that imply about panpsychism?

Does "life" admit of degree? — Daemon

Very good question. If you take modern biological definitions, then it would very much appear so, yes. But if you mean by 'life' (as some do) a centre of experience, then I think the answer is 'no'.

First of all can you pls explain to me what do you mean by the phrase "Consciousness doesn't admit of degree"? — Nickolasgaspar

I'll try. I mean there are no intermediate states between x not being conscious at all, and x being conscious. As soon as x has the faintest vaguest shimmer of experience, then x is having an experience, and that meets the definition of consciousness. It doesn't matter how far we turn the volume down on this experience, it's still experience. It has to click off completely to be non-conscious.

Contrast this with other properties, such as being bald, or being a heap (classic often discussed examples). With these we can think of intermediate states which are neither bald or not-bald. Even when we try to arbitrarily sharpen up these concepts, we find that the sharpenings can always be sharpened yet further, until we get down to single jerky quantum changes in an atom.

I know this about the concept of consciousness is by examination of the concept, how we use it in language, and by having conversation like this about it, and reflecting on the concept of vagueness.

Like any other claim or worldview, panpsychism has a burden of proof. Its burden is quite high since it is in direct conflict with the current establish paradigm of Science! — Nickolasgaspar

It does have a burden of proof. But so does every other theory of consciousness. We look at them all and pick the least problematic. I reckon it's panpsychism.

I don't see that it is in direct conflict with any established scientific knowledge. Can you give an example?