Your meaning is clear -- my identity is a lie because I ought select from the binary on the shelf like everyone else so that we can get onto the important things — Moliere

Not at all what I mean.

Let me try again. I'm not saying that we ought select from publicly available narratives, I'm saying we do. I'm making an empirical claim about the way the human psyche works. We do not construct unique and detailed identities from scratch through some internal interrogation. We pick from the stories we see around us, the identities, like parts in a play. I'm not making an ethical claim. You are ethically free to construct your identity from scratch. I don't believe you either can or will.

or else you're just clearly playing the victim so you don't have to deal with the guilt of living in the global north but can instead play the victim of the people you sympathize with while simultaneously not realizing your material life depends upon their suffering. — Moliere

It's not an 'or else' but yes, I'll stand by that. We have a victim culture, and I believe guilt is at least a major part of the reason. We all know how much better off we are and we all know it's grossly unfair. If that didn't have an effect we'd be zombies, and if that effect was universally positive we'd be saints. I don't believe we're either.

I've been trying to highlight how identity isn't a scientific concept, and that we utilize it not on the basis of our shared language, but on a day-to-day basis for understanding one another and ourselves. — Moliere

Your second second half belies the first. You claim "we utilize it not on the basis of our shared language, but on a day-to-day basis for understanding one another and ourselves". That's a scientific claim. It's making a statement about how humans (a clearly empirical object) think. You can't claim the concept isn't scientific and then give a detailed account of how it works.

Since meaning is use, after all, new meanings are invented daily as we re-encounter new contexts. Every use of the word is itself a new meaning which isn't fixed by a Public Shelf of Meaning, but is instead invented as we provide charity for creative uses in new contexts. — Moliere

I don't see how language could possibly work that way. We'd never understand what each other were saying if we just allowed new meanings to constantly spring forth. I wouldn't get five minutes into my day if those I'm speaking to had no foundation to judge my meaning. Sure, language evolves, but that's not that same as saying anything goes. Some neologisms take, others don't. None just spring forth fully formed from day-to-day.

And why does 'charity' get invoked with new meanings but not with the retention of old ones? I might well 'charitably' interpret a new use of a word in a new context. It'd be more polite than simply assuming error. But that's not what's happening here. I'm not being asked to merely understand a new use of gender terms, I'm being asked to partake in it. And not just that, I'm being asked to entirely replace my previous use with this new one, and further in many cases being accused of hate speech and bigotry if I don't.

I really think it's stretching credulity to lump all that under mere request for charitable interpretation.

There's a sense in which identity is performance, and so it's not truth-apt. But that's not to say it's not real. — Moliere

Yes, were on the same page here. It's why I'm comfortable saying there's no such thing. Identity isn't a psychological state one 'discovers' by interoception, it's part of our naming and storytelling practices, like 'hippy', or 'geek'. We collect performances into useful groupings and name them. The utility is about them playing a role in our stories so they're less surprising, and that works both ways - it's not imposed, it's agreed upon.

I don't think the difficulties of specifying identity are unique to trans individuals, but have always been there -- it's just that this topic has highlighted these difficulties for people. — Moliere

Yes, I agree. There's a tension between the expectations of public roles and the utility of having them at all. It's not all one way though. Knowing what to do next is fiendishly complicated and fraught with uncertainty. A device for resolving some of that uncertainty isn't always a bad thing.

if you belive that IMF cripples freddom, could you provide specific data how the IMF impacts the HFI? — Jabberwock

Again, I'm not the best person to learn this from, there are far better resources online, unless you seriously think there isn't even an argument in that respect, then a few online resources aren't going to help.

When I have pointed out the internal factors in Russia, such as political oppression, which might prevent that, you simply dismissed them. And now you are saying Ukraine cannot improve its HFI, citing economic oppression AND internal factors, which are suddenly important.

Are you even serious? — Jabberwock

Quite serious yes. The former were historical figures, the net result of which were already included in the summary data, the latter are predictions about future effects, they obviously require consideration of factors.

If you want to bring in estimates for Russian occupied Donbas over the next 10 years, you'll have to explain why you're rejecting the data from Russian occupied Crimea, which provides what would seem to be an almost perfect data set for that prediction.

the countries in the US sphere of influence are perfectly capable of reaching HFIs so high that they outperform even the US... How does constitute an argument that Ukraine should not join them? — Jabberwock

You're suggesting that the US's net influence is to make other countries better than it can even manage of itself? Is the theory that it nobly sacrifices it's own people's freedoms to help improve those under it's sheltering wing?

I though this thread had reached a peak of US bootlicking sycophancy, but turns out there's whole new levels I hadn't expected.

My support is that for the last year Russia has made very minor gains, while Ukraine had major gains. Ukraine has liberated half of the territory that Russia grabbed since 2022. — Jabberwock

I assume the experts considering the situation have probably taken that into account. But if you think not... I've been taking my latest understanding of the situation from Samual Charap's excellent article in Foreign Affairs. He can be contacted at Samuel_Charapatranddotorg, I suggest you drop him a line and let him know he's missed something. I'm sure he'll be very grateful.

To argue for peace you have to show there is a reasonable chance for an alternative. The very issue is that you refuse to do so. — Jabberwock

Of course I refuse to do it. I also refuse to argue in favour of the many worlds interpretation of quantum physics. I refuse to argue for my own pet theory of economics, or some idea I had about how the digestive system of the bat might work... I'm not qualified to do so. I do, however, have preferred experts I turn to, and I'm more than happy to talk about and defend my choices there (something we're all experts on), I'm happy to talk about the ideology that guides those choices, even the epistemological commitments which frame that choice. What I'm not prepared to do is pretend that me pitting what my sources say against you paraphrasing what your sources say is going to actually yield anything other than two shoddy summaries of writing which is freely available in full, unadulterated form online.

No, just crap negotiations are over, which you yourself acknowledge Minsk 1 and 2 were. As you said, we would have to do better. I do not how we are supposed to do that. You know, but will not tell. — Jabberwock

I've linked the article on the factors which lead to strong armistices. That you didn't read it is not something I'm equipped to help with.

On the chart you have provided Russian exports are 'picking up' month to month, which means that they might have a good sale or two in one month (especially if the previous one was rather poor), but it is not indicator of recovery for the longer run. If you look at the 1Y, 5Y or 10Y graph, it always has smaller ups and downs (for every country), which is not indicative of the long-term trend. — Jabberwock

And? The 5yr graph shows a small drop to 2018 levels after what was an unprecedented high. The drop id less than that experienced by the US for example late 2020. So where's this economic collapse you're suggesting?

The fact is that Russian exports are overall lower than before the war and last year. — Jabberwock

As above. They're no lower than 2018 - it's on the chart. You know people can see these charts, right?

if you can explain how the country that has apparently income at least 25% lower and expenses 40% higher year to year (or in any reasonable longer period) is doing great, I am all ears. You can also explain how a country that depends on the imports for a significant portion of its war effort can finance increased military spending when its currency is tumbling down. You might also tell me why Russia has classified most of its economic indicators, if it is doing well. — Jabberwock

Gods! Why the fuck would I explain, I'm not an economist. You may consider yourself to be some kind of genius polymath able to wrangle with the greatest in economics, international relations, history, military strategy, and foreign affairs, but I'm afraid you've picked the wrong interlocutor for your Walter Mitty moment. Here's the articles - https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2022/05/07/russias-economy-is-back-on-its-feet and https://www.economist.com/briefing/2023/04/23/russias-economy-can-withstand-a-long-war-but-not-a-more-intense-one ... As if you don't know how to use a search engine.

we know current score for Russia, Ukraine and, say, Belarus, and we know current scores for countries which are no longer in Russian sphere of influence. The difference in HFI is rather significant, which might motivate Ukrainians to leave it. — Jabberwock

Yes, we already agree that being less Russia-like yields an improvement on the HFI, I'm not sure why you're going down this path at all. No one is confused as to why Ukraine wants to be outside of Russia's sphere of influence.

The discussion is about the price it is worth paying relative to the likely degree of success in that venture. Ukraine will unlikely get as far as the Baltic states because it will have crippling debts which are themselves authoritarian, far more in debt than the Baltic states ever were, they have mega-companies like Black Rock involved now which was simply not an issue in the late 20th century, the power of these multinationals to control policy is exponentially higher than it was then, they're entering a fractured Europe in runaway recession cycles desperate for cheap labour and manufacturing facilities, and they're starting from a position of being a lot more Russia-like in the first place. Add to that a strong right-wing nationalist sentiment, the region's biggest black market in illegal arms recently flooded with untraceable weapons, virtually zero intact infrastructure, and some of the most important exports in the world up for grabs for whoever controls that economy...

Oh, and most of those Baltic states rank higher on the HFI than the US. So we should keep Ukraine out of the US's sphere of influence too, yes?

The difference is that at least some of the area might be deoccupied (and some already were), while your 'leaving them' would likely end in occupation of the whole Ukraine (and we have no idea when it might end). — Jabberwock

'Might' and 'Likely' are doing all the work there. some area's might be de-occupied, or more areas might be occupied. It might result in the whole of Ukraine being occupied, but might not. all you're expressing is that there's uncertainty. It doesn't support your argument.

As I've said before, these arguments are asymmetric because no one wants war. therefore to argue for peace I have to show there's a reasonable chance, to argue for war you have to show there's no reasonable alternative. they don't have an equal burden of proof because war is utterly horrific and we avoid it at all costs, anyone advocating it needs to show that those other options are ruled out. I don't need to show that war wouldn't work to advocate peaceful resolution, because it's what we'd prefer anyway.

The issue is that non-violent means, negotiations and agreement were already tried and they did not work. — Jabberwock

So never again? That's it for negotiations the world over now? It's just war? Funny how "we tried negotiations" get trotted out in defence of warmongering, but "we tried war" never does.

I've already provided you with the historical assessment. War has not worked. It has not yielded victory in the timescale which is usually decisive.

So you believe trade deficit is equally hurtful for major exporters and minor exporters? You believe month to month is a better indicator of export rise than year to year or 5Y to 5Y? — Jabberwock

I believe that there exist a wide range of indicators of economic strength, some of which I've cited. there's a reason why sites like tradingeconomics offer those metrics. Russian exports are picking up. that's indicative of a recovery. It was you who mentioned trade deficit. I've cited the figures we actually have that are closest to the measure you said were indicative of Russia's economic state, that's why they're directly underneath quotes from you. those are the measures you picked. If you now want to back track because you don't like the results, then pick some others.

we have a prejudice in favor of situations where we perceive ourselves as free to act, or, better, that we filter out predictions that we interpret as curtailing our freedom to act. — Srap Tasmaner

Yeah, I think that's right. It's a good way to express it. I think they system is designed to produce actions that minimise surprise, so everything is couched in terms action, that makes stories in which the action is determinate easier to model.

Maybe you're right that we prefer the one we think we understand to the one we're clueless about.

But I still think there's some prejudice for perceived agency, and maybe it's just that people think "poverty doesn't take my freedom" because they don't understand it. — Srap Tasmaner

I don't think the two are opposed. We don't really understand lack of agency because it's not something we tend to make narratives for, because our narrative explain, predict and produce action.

But here there's obviously other elements at play. It's not so hard to see how poverty is more of a threat than political oppression, not is it so hard to see how not having enough money to pay for healthcare is as completely out of your control as having a riot policeman block your protest route. It's not intuitive perhaps, it's not our preferred narrative, but it's not out of reach either.

So we're looking for political and social reasons why people are so resistant to the idea in this instance. And when looking for political reasons, it makes sense to start with the group who make most money out of the situation. Here, that's arms traders and the 'reconstruction' industries, much as it was in Iraq.

I don't want to relitigate the wisdom or necessity of lockdowns — Srap Tasmaner

Ha! feels like that would be a walk in the park now compared to vitriol on this thread.

the deep resistance some people felt, the revulsion for having their freedom curtailed, was accompanied by this message that they had much less agency than they wanted to believe, that if they went about their regular lives they would get sick and make others sick and it would just happen, not up to you, not a matter of choice. — Srap Tasmaner

Yeah, I think that's true. One of the triggers for anxiety disorders is loss of agency (you see a disproportionate amount centred around invisible things like germs, where there's no simple ability to identify the threat and remove it). Part of rejecting agency-less narratives might be a defence mechanism against that. Sometimes I think people with anxiety disorders have just admitted a truth that the rest of us are too scared to admit.

Anti-natalism fulfils the first two better than any other policy. — unenlightened

True, but they weren't intended as targets, more measures.

I think perhaps one might better distinguish first violent from non-violent, and individual from national responses. — unenlightened

OK. But level of violence matters right? I mean I'm all in favour of the fact the governments need to be scared of their populace, there needs to at least be a credible threat of violence, but some bottles and bricks usually does the job. There's a very wide gap between a Molotov cocktail and a fleet of Hellfire-laden drones.

Though both are violent, I think the Molotov cocktail is closer to Gandhi than it is to the Hellfire.

As far as individual and national responses, in most cases, a national response is a request (demand in Ukraine's case) for individuals to act. Seeing it otherwise is how wars are sanitised. The national authority moves wooden pieces around on the map. The individual has his leg blown to bloody shreds by a land mine.

Maybe there's a similar mistake here: under an authoritarian regime, you have no freedom, no opportunity to control your fate; if you're poor but free, at least there's a chance you can do something. People do across the board refuse to believe that great, impersonal, historical forces affect them, so they reject the idea that poverty would be as deadly for them as a bullet. — Srap Tasmaner

Yeah, I think that's it. That plus...narratives. We understand the story of being oppressed directly because we can relate (we think we can), we've all been told to do stuff we don't want to do, we've all been to school.

For myself, and most people I've spoken to who've been to the poorest nations (which isn't many) we just don't know how to come to terms with the absolute poverty there. I don't know if you've ever been to some of the poorest countries, but it's just truly shocking in a way that we don't seem to have stories for. The Ukrainians fighting the bad guys to win back their freedom is just so much easier to come to terms with (even for the Ukrainians I suspect) than the 7 million people that die every year because we don't have stringent enough air pollution laws.

I do not see skimming off the top as being a optimal way forward. — I like sushi

Why not? Why is lobbying your government to get a bigger cut of rich people's wealth always the only thing which is for some reason ruled out in the great 'American Dream' spirit of entrepreneurialism?

Apparently, you can put babies on spikes* if it's going to make a profit and 'well done you' for your hard work and dedication, any complex financial fabrication you like, even literally printing money... but lobby government, strike, campaign... apparently that's not hard work any more, that's not an entrepreneurial way of acquiring more money, it's suddenly become lazy sponging off the state.

*

I suspect this skepticism is a luxury. The sovereignty of my nation is not in question. For some, achieving sovereignty is the necessary first step to securing freedom. — Srap Tasmaner

Absolutely. Faith in a solution and realism about one are two different matters. In some respects I think that makes the West's response here even worse. We can realistically expect Ukrainians to feel the need to establish sovereignty, if they have none. It's because we have the luxury of scepticism that we ought to be providing cooler-headed council.

Why do you also think there's little to choose between being under Putin's boot and the IMF? Surely there's more room to maneuver against an enemy that puts you in debt than one that assassinates or imprisons you. — Srap Tasmaner

Mainly because of the data I have available for comparison. I'm using OHCHR data and Amnesty International reports relating to Donbas and Crimea; and the HFI from Cato Institute. They don't seem to show an awful lot of difference between Ukrainian governance and Russian occupation. There is a difference, no doubt about it, but it's not Norway vs Sudan, it's more Nigeria vs Ethiopia. So the first issue is the scale of the improvement to people's lives if Ukraine wins back sovereignty, I just don't think it'll be that substantial, not enough to justify the cost.

Secondly, I'm looking at countries like Greece which have suffered greatly under the ECB rules, and places like Latvia which have suffered from pecuniary IMF and global reconstruction efforts. Ukraine will be in this position already, even deeper the more it commits to a war it can't afford.

You're right that none of this economic pressure amounts to direct threats to life, but life expectancy reduction due to poverty kills more people than any authoritarian regime could ever muster. It might be hard to fight the police. It's even harder to fight heart disease.

When they were communist states, they were more like Russia, so when they stopped, their HFI would increase (if it was assessed then). — Jabberwock

Yes. That's just saying the same thing I said. Communism isn't good for the HFI score. How does that relate to a comparison of modern Russia (not communist) and modern Ukraine (not a Baltic State). And why are we speculating on these unavailable data sources when we have available ones with which to make the comparison?

I think it is quite possible that Russia will not give up all the territories it has gained and Ukraine will not be able to get them back. As I said, the main point is depleting Russia's potential to the point when it is no longer capable of threatening Ukraine. — Jabberwock

So it's 'leave them there' in both scenarios then. All that talk of sovereignty and freedom was a waste, you're expecting ten more years of occupation anyway.

So the debate is around how best to neutralise the Russian threat. Political instability and isolation, negotiations, agreements... Or use up all their bombs by cunningly giving them Ukrainian hospitals to fire at until they run out...

And why would Putin use nuclear weapons? Free Ukraine might be a mortal threat in the future, using nukes would end his regime definitely and rather quickly. — Jabberwock

Again, I can't think why you'd be asking me. If you think the people concerned about the risk of nuclear escalation are wrong then I suggest you take it up with them. If you don't, then why on earth are you asking me as if there wasn't a good set of reasons?

This notion that a bunch of laymen can somehow 'thrash out' the data and come up with answers that have defied the people whose job it is to do exactly that is absolutely dumbfounding.

I am asking you to support it — Jabberwock

You're not asking me to support it, if you wanted support you would have read the relevant expert opinion already.

You're using mock astonishment as a rhetorical device to imply that there isn't any support, despite knowing full well there is. I'm not playing that game.

trade to GDP ratio — Jabberwock

year to year, or compare 2021 — Jabberwock

depend as heavily on trade — Jabberwock

several PPP indices — Jabberwock

...are certainly all other measures of economic stability. Now...where did I put that article about cherry-picking...

No, there is passive resistance and underground resistance, and argument and demonstrative protest, and a thousand variations thereof, from labour strike to hunger strike and from assassination attempt to the whole repertoire of terrorism. — unenlightened

Something unites all those things that sets them apart from war;

1) they kill fewer people.
2) they make less profit.
3) the mainstream left have decided that (1) and (2) are suddenly irrelevant compared to war uniquely in the case of Ukraine.

'Cos it's always the previous war that was wrong, never the current one.

But the police themselves confront. overwhelm and arrest muggers, and do risk their lives. Otherwise they would have no authority to give any advice. — unenlightened

Yes. We engineer the system so that the police (backed up by the army if necessary) have the greater power. They have guns, we don't.

That's why an assessment of the power balance is important. Pluck isn't sufficient.

even the police do not advise giving up your home, your children and your neighbours to the muggers. — unenlightened

Yes (as I mentioned to Srap above).

That's why an assessment of what is at stake is so important. Comparing Donbas under Ukraine to Crimea under Russia, the answer seems to be not much.

We cannot know the consequences of our acts in advance, nor the counterfactual consequences of alternative acts with hindsight. Gandhi suggested that Hitler could have been stopped by non-violent means but even he admitted it would have been difficult and costly — unenlightened

Fair enough. So the alternative is...?

The policy of non-resistance has the highest authority — unenlightened

It seems as if there's an epidemic of imagination loss going around. Is open war the only alternative to non-resistance?

So in fact their freedom increased? — Jabberwock

Yes.

now their HFI is quite high, much higher than Russia's. Thus is it reasonable to assume that if Ukraine stopped being 'just like Russia', as you claim it is now, and was more like them, HFI of its citizens would significantly improve. — Jabberwock

Yes, that's right. Russian HFI is low, so not being like Russia raise the HFI. I don't think that's in dispute. You've not provided the data you were using for your claims that their HFI soared.

It would be sufficient to maintain a simmering conflict, as you wrote, not for a full-scale war effort which it is taking now. — Jabberwock

So?

The conflict would be resolved by getting Russia to a point when Ukraine will be able to integrate with the West without Russia preventing it. — Jabberwock

Right. But how? You've not provided a mechanism. How does Ukraine get Russia to a point where is will give up all the territory it has gained, but somehow not run into exactly the same supply problems Russia faces? And all this without racking up so massive a debt that it will never get it's sovereignty back? And at no point provoking Russia into using nuclear weapons? And all this somehow without Russia realising that capability (otherwise Russia would have good reason to negotiate now)?

Without addressing all the particular reasons for why this is not likely in this particular case — Jabberwock

What reasons? Do you think all armistices only came on the back of serious of amazingly successful previous agreements? Minsk agreements were crap, so we do better. It's not a difficult concept to get your head around. There's loads of expert opinion online about why the Mins agreements failed, if you're interested. As there is on why negotiations might succeed. It's really daft to try and learn this stuff from me. Look it up, you have the internet.

trade deficit — Jabberwock

Russia's balance of trade https://tradingeconomics.com/russia/balance-of-trade
The US's https://tradingeconomics.com/united-states/balance-of-trade

exports income — Jabberwock

Russia exports (rising) https://tradingeconomics.com/russia/exports
US exports (falling) https://tradingeconomics.com/united-states/exports

current account — Jabberwock

Russia current account https://tradingeconomics.com/russia/current-account
US current account https://tradingeconomics.com/united-states/current-account

ruble exchange rate — Jabberwock

The Ruble https://tradingeconomics.com/russia/currency
The Dollar https://tradingeconomics.com/united-states/currency

it might be reasonable to turn e.g. to basket-based indices, such as Romir. — Jabberwock

...and the equivalent rate for the US/Europe would be...? Of course, you don't have one because the aim is simply to give an alarming rate fo Russia and leave it there.

Russia Core Consumer Prices https://tradingeconomics.com/russia/core-consumer-prices
US Core Consumer Prices https://tradingeconomics.com/united-states/core-consumer-prices

where do the loan repayments come from? — LuckyR

Ha! 'Loan repayments'... Good one...

There are many things we can do — any of them would be a start. Close these loopholes; wealth tax; higher corporate and individual taxes; higher capital gains tax; get rid of the social security cap. — Mikie

None of those are things we can do. That's the point. they're all things government can do.

Things we can do;

1. Put a brick through the window of the nearest Amazon
2. Put a brick through the window of the nearest such investment bank
3. Put a brick through the window of the nearest...

You get the picture. It involves bricks.

The problem is that points 1, 2 and 3 are in conflict with points 4, 5, and 6.

People differ in opinion largely because they disagree as to matters like topicality, clarity and validity. So keeping a discussion on track according to one set of views on those first matters tends to work against that latter. In other words, the conversation becomes limited to a group of people sufficiently close in view that they find little to challenge their views among the participants.

If you want...

a diversity of ideas and opinions and stimulate new ways of looking at issues among the participants — Alkis Piskas

... you are going to struggle with...

well-supported — Alkis Piskas

... since the quality of the support will almost inevitably be the very "diversity of ideas and opinions" you're looking for.

Despite oddly niche opinion to the contrary, logic isn't that hard. Looking at data and drawing a rational conclusion from it is simply not that difficult for most intelligent, educated people, so most disagreements at that level are about the validity of the data (methodological issues) or the frame (the qualities of the model other than it's fit to the data).

It's a phenomena unique to a certain stage of intelligentsia, the belief that the key battle ground of ideas is in some mental boxing ring of rational punches and logic counter-blocks out of which the truth comes victorious.

I'm not sure "teaching them a lesson" is the only other possible goal in refusing. I think there are times when people acknowledge that you might be able to take what you want from them, but you're going to have to take it, they're not going to give it to you just on the threat that you'll take it. — Srap Tasmaner

Yeah. That, I expect, is why the police don't offer the same advice to threat of rape, for example. Some things are not worth a struggle, but others are.

It's why I think it's so important to have a realistic idea of what Ukraine and Russia are like comparatively, and why the media effort is so strong to erase Ukraine's less rosy aspects. Life for the people in Donbas and Crimea was no picnic before the Russian invasion and the fair share of the cause was Ukraine's. It's reflected in the Amnesty reports in the region, and it's reflected in the split in the population when polled, or when voting.

One of the things I think is mistaken here (quite unpleasantly so) is that the horror of war, particularly war with Russia, is contrasted with sovereignty, and those two are not opposites. Ukraine's sovereignty is like the handbag. It's not worth fighting for (not with the absolute human devastation of war). It's just a flag.

Ukrainian's freedom... that might be worth sacrificing a generation for, that's not just a handbag. But fighting for freedom is not a matter of changing borders, it's a matter of changing systems, and even then not just exchanging one form of exploitation for another.

It's that process that I'm trying to separate out from the act of war. War, even at its best and most noble, is nowadays merely pushing tyranny around the globe, penning it in here and there. It's not actually dealing with it. Dealing with it requires a populace to have more power than the authority exploiting them. That doesn't need war, it needs solidarity.

if a population could sustain a strategy of not complying, they raise the cost of control for the would-be boss, and that's rational, even if you can't be sure you're raising the cost enough to deter him. — Srap Tasmaner

Absolutely. Exactly what I'm talking about here. Given the state of affairs in East Ukraine prior to the invasion, swapping leaders isn't going to make an awful lot of difference - it's why I gave the example of Crimea, which did exactly that - we can read what difference it made. Not much. What will make a lot of difference is the kind of resistance you're talking about. That can be against a corrupt and pecuniary Ukrainian government, or against a corrupt and repressive Russian one.

And I'm not, in that, suggesting those two states of affairs are equal. I'm suggesting they're not 100,000 dead soldier's worth of different.

After the communism Eastern European countries were in a rather poor state, with rather poor infrastructures, inefficient, seriously outdated industry, etc. Then they were in significant debt from the IMF (with significant part of it relieved) and they had 'imposed' pecuniary free market restrictions. It did not limit their freedom — Jabberwock

It did. It just did so less than the relief from communist dictatorship improved it.

their freedom (i.e. HFI) soared. — Jabberwock

What dataset are you using, the HFI started in 2013 with data going back from their previous methodology to 2008. The countries you're mentioning were last under communist rule in the late 20th century?

Well, at least we see Russia is running out of artillery, although slowly — Jabberwock

Not to any meaningful extent. what matters is their ability to replenish, and as the historical data I've presented shows, that ability is usually sufficient to maintain war for decades. That Russia will be the exception for some reason is wishful thinking.

What you propose is wild and unsubstantiated hope that somehow Russia will leave Ukraine alone if we give them more and more, even though it has no reason to do so. — Jabberwock

It's not wild and unsubstantiated. I've provided you with the evidence of armistices working.

Notwithstanding that, your two suggestions here make no sense together. If Russia are going to run out of artillery first, then they must know that. If they know that, then they know they're going to lose, therefore they have good reason to accept terms.

You can't have it both ways. Ukraine can't have an excellent chance of winning a war, depleting Russia's armoury to almost redundancy, and threatening Putin's grip on power... and also claim Russia has no reason at all to accept terms. Either continued war is an existential risk for Russia or it isn't.

It needs to be sustained at the level higher than Russia, which hurts economically much more. — Jabberwock

It doesn't.

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-inflation-024-first-nine-days-2023-2023-01-11/

https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/russian-consumer-inflation-drops-below-4-target-first-time-year-2023-04-12/

https://www.euronews.com/2023/06/01/europe-inflation-rate-takes-positive-turn-dropping-to-61

Where are you getting your figures from?

Sure, I have already said that strong ceasefire negotiations work. What is required for that, however, is some sort of conflict resolution. — Jabberwock

Ceasefires are conflict resolution. Read the paper.

You cite hypothetical unknown assumed factors that would prevent Putin from starting the war. If that is so, I can cite hypothetical unknown assumed factors that would push Putin to war. — Jabberwock

I'm not the one suggesting your opinion is nonsense, remember? I think your opinion is perfectly valid. I'm defending the claim that mine isn't.

do not expect that an argument that you are unwilling to support will get any serious consideration. — Jabberwock

Serious consideration isn't a priority, nor would I expect it on the basis of argument (been there).

these are only useful approximations -- even when they're descriptive not of a person but of a role we need them to play. — Srap Tasmaner

Yeah, that's right, but the point I'm making is that they are useful, not just descriptives, but predictives. they reduce surprise, they help us navigate each other's needs and likely actions, and not just others (like a badge or uniform might) but ourselves too. Having these broad stories for ourselves helps us make sense of our own actions and thoughts, put them into context, give them a purpose and a coherence (that they might otherwise lack).

I'd like to be distinguishing here and there between 'cultural' and 'social' but without doing that I've been giving short shrift to the necessary social context. -- Sexuality is obviously a social thing even when it's not cultural (among other mammals, say). — Srap Tasmaner

I suppose I'm using the term 'culture' to mean how humans do social stuff. It may be too ambiguous a term. But sexuality might be more appropriately put into the category of raw sensation. The matter of what stimuli do what is data, the matter of why is story. 'Lesbian' is a story to explain why certain stimuli seem to have certain effects, but as a piece of culture, it offers so much more than just that single explanation, it carries behavioural answers to the question 'what do I do about this sensation?', it contains explanations for potentially unrelated matters - 'why do I feel so left out'?, 'why do most other girls never seem to like me?', 'why did my parents not bond with me as they did my other sister?'...etc. All of which may or may not have any connection to arousal, or even be true, but they're made sense of by the story and that makes them seem less frighteningly random.

That's a nice analogy, so what's wrong with it? — Srap Tasmaner

Lack of international law.

The US don't even recognise the jurisdiction of the very court it's popular press are in such a lather about Putin having violated.

They're now sending cluster bombs, to much popular cheering, internationally banned in most countries.

The invasion of Iraq, Kosovo, Libya... All verging on war crimes.

I won't go on, I'm sure you know all this, though others seem to perilously short memories.

Basically, we need an international law that is, well, international. That means it constrains the US and Europe too. Then the sanctions of that law need to be something we can realistically put in place without committing the very crime we're punishing (most countries have banned capital punishment for a reason).

But that too is stymied because those sanctions would be financial and no one wants to create systems which are robust enough to do that (the quick buck, non robust ones simply earn more).

What that layer comes up with might be puzzling sometimes, not just to others but to ourselves, and obviously that's an opportunity for culture to step in and offer to tell you what you actually think or feel, since you're evidently confused. — Srap Tasmaner

I love the turn of phrase.

Bit it's more than just an opportunity, I think. The construction of something as complex as a selfhood is really difficult, I don't believe it's even possible outside of a social context where key parts are available to build from. It'd be like trying to write a computer operating system from scratch.

Things like 'gay', 'woman', 'trans', 'geek', 'leader', 'hippy',... are pretty much needed as almost fully built units because the cost of building from scratch is just too high.

Those inferences might be in some ways more nuanced and in some ways less -- they don't care how elegant or comprehensive or consistent the taxonomy we make out of them is. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes. There might even be a kind of meta level to this where we make simpler constructs as facon de parler simply to handle the more complex constructs that we actually use.

it all seems too static, as if 'society' has a list of acceptable moves and you have to pick from those else you're speaking nonsense.

But exactly what we're talking about is creating the social capital you acquire by changing the rules of the game. — Srap Tasmaner

Sure, but there's rules for that too. Like how all neologisms evolve, I suppose someone started them, but "I declare 'bobby' is now a type of cake!" isn't going to make it so, it's not a legal move in the game

So, sure, we ought to add some dynamics to the model, but dynamics isn't anarchy.

Side note, one of my last study interests was in chaotic dynamics within social feedback. Like Asch conformity but with a message system prone to chaotic perturbation. Didn't really go anywhere, but interesting that you're pointing perhaps in that direction (or maybe I've misread).

what we're talking about is creating the social capital you acquire by changing the rules of the game. — Srap Tasmaner

Possibly, but I think that applies to a very small subset of the population. The anthropologist Clive Finlayson calls them 'innovators'. Mostly reviled until something they think suddenly works, then they gain a brief moment in the sun before going back to being reviled by the new normal.

I guess that's possibly true for our new stories about gender, but I suspect very few are mold-breakers. Most have seen the mold-breaking, seen the benefits that brings in terms of a social group with membership criteria they find easier to meet, and jumped at that.

The stories we tell and the social moves we make may have to work with conflicting intuitions. I'm not going to be on board with sexuality being purely social, that just seems crazy to me. — Srap Tasmaner

Yeah. As above, the choice of story isn't a free one, we still do have stuff going on which is the raw matter in need of modeling. I don't see any reason why something like sexuality might not be part of that raw matter, but at that level it's just axons firing, nothing of the sort we could categorise into natural kinds. At least, I don't think so.

A good story can really help people struggling to model their particular mentality by using the existing ones, and innovation can help there, but all I'm saying is that model utility isn't the only criteria people are using to choose them. Like theories, there are many stories which could explain the same set of mental activity. So choosing involves more than just a good fit, and there's no denying these other motivators.

Have you tried climate? Abortion? — jorndoe

Climate is less interesting because experts don't really disagree. Sure one or two obviously paid off ones might take their 20 pieces from the oil companies, but no one is in much doubt about their motives.

Abortion does seem to be genuinely split (two sides at each other's throats) but over what they agree are value judgments - women's right vs sanctity of life (proto-life). Not really an issue in which there is any agreed expertise.

Covid and Ukraine are different. Experts with no vested interests and no clear ulterior motives, genuinely disagree as to the appropriate strategy with (seemingly) the same broad objectives in mind - general humanitarian goods.

Yet one side wants to claim possession of the absolute truth and accuse the other of being something beyond merely being wrong; usually lying, or spreading 'disinformation', or being uninformed, even (we've had it right here) in the pay of Russia... for both issues, wierdly.

It's like right at the beginning of the Covid stuff, Facebook censored the British Medical Journal (one of the top medical journals in the world)... For disinformation! How did we get to a place where Facebook are seen to have access to a Truth about medicine that the British Medical Journal apparently don't? Anyway... Off topic. That's where my interest is.

It's not that people weren't somewhere on the gender-bender spectrum, it's that it has become acceptable in some circles to be yourself in that way. In another time people would re-express in various ways, but -- in the positive spirit of capitalism that Marx likes -- we've invented new social forms because it was profitable to do so. — Moliere

Sure, yeah. I think that people take up the new opportunities that new social groups present.

People really are different in their various ways of relating to their gender, their body, and their identity or gender-identity. — Moliere

I think this is at the core of how we see things differently. I just don't believe in this notion of a 'true self'. People tell themselves stories and usually these stories are ones they pick from those society offers, or construct from parts thereof. I don't think these are true (nor false either). They just more or less provide a way of understanding the sometimes contradictory mental goings on they have.

So, if a reasonably explanatory story offers good social capital, it's a selling point. Truth doesn't enter into it.

the situation had changed quite much from what Peskov had suggested. — ssu

Absolutely. It's got way worse. What was on the table at the time was fairly mild in the circumstances - knowing the West weren't going to seriously commit to Ukraine's defense at the outset. It's like the police always say to mugging victims "just give them your handbag, it's not worth your life". It doesn't somehow become less sensible advice at different scales. International legal action is the way to deal with criminal acts of invasion, not utterly devastating your country to somehow 'teach them a lesson'.

A good deal was scuppered and that's on the heads of all involved. Now the choice is decades of war or an armistice which is definitely going to leave all Russian-occupied territory as it is. At least for the foreseeable future.

The only thing actually that China has done is that it has declared it won't tolerate the use of nuclear weapons. At least that's positive. — ssu

Yes, let's hope that carries some weight.

I wouldn't reach for guilt-removal/repression-expression as much as I'd reach for learned callousness -- people learn to be selfish and pursue their own needs. — Moliere

Yes I agree, but we're a social species, we're dead without a community. Most people's 'needs' are primarily to be part of a social group. So yes, some callousness, some selfishness, but that still manifests as tactical choice about which social group one has the best chances of being a valued member of.

I'm not trying to deny the reality of being trans, quite the opposite, I'm saying that if one finds oneself in that situation, what social groups are made available that one can feel part of? The benefits are relatively high given how the limits of their feelings already constrain them.

Let us check then the one sufficient indicator of human freedom there is: the Human Freedom Index. How those poor Eastern European countries opressed by the IMF (which practically financed their transition) and the free market practices of the EU are faring? — Jabberwock

Have any of their countries had their infrastructure wiped out and over a hundred billion debt racked up by war? No. Even the IMF can only lend people the money they ask for. It cannot create debt out of thin air. That's why war is so popular, it makes a good load of debt.

I did not say it will be short and decisive. — Jabberwock

Right. So if no peace deal is reached, history tells us the war will drag on for decades. So remind me again how that helps the people of Ukraine? Remind me how decades of war gets them any more freedom, any more 'sovereignty'. Just your wild and unsubstantiated hope that somehow Russia will run out of artillery first?

Rocket attacks on the cities are nasty, but they have little to no military significance. They might hinder formal acceptance into NATO, but they will not be able to stop Ukraine's militarization and informal integration. — Jabberwock

On what basis? The economy is already tanking https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-war-drags-europes-economy-succumbs-crisis-2022-08-23/ . What grounds do you have for believing this level of militarisation can be sustained for another ten years?

While the war is simmering, it will not be formally accepted, it will just be armed and informally integrated, like Sweden. There will be no security guarantees, just military assistance. The point is that Russia must be too weak to stop it. — Jabberwock

Again, on what grounds? This is just pie in the sky wishful thinking at the moment. How is the west going to sustain this level of militarisation for decades when it can't even keep out of recession after just two years?

That is not 'just leaving them there', that already assumes successful negotiation of ceasefire with Putin on unknown terms. And not resolving the conflict at this point leaves him with enough potential to start trouble again soon. — Jabberwock

Yes. Again, history shows that strong ceasefire negotiations work https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/japanese-journal-of-political-science/article/abs/virginia-page-fortna-peace-time-ceasefire-agreements-and-the-durability-of-peace-princeton-university-press-5500-hbk-isbn-0691115117-1895-pbk-isbn-0691115125/7EA4C90743959B060B9C319E6F9C6EAD

It also shows, as above, that continued war doesn't.

I assume that there are exactly as many factors that Putin would take into account in determining future military action that would prevent it as there are factors that would convince him to do it. — Jabberwock

What exactly?

If you are not interested in discussing support for your theory, why are you interested in discussing it at all? — Jabberwock

Because I'm darkly fascinated by this new trend for absolute certainty in the mainstream opinion. Ukraine, Covid, ... both shared this odd feature that even though solidly qualified experts in the respective fields disagreed, the lay populace were utterly convinced that only one side were right and the other were little short of murderers. I'm exploring that.

Is there even a side? Or are there a multiplicity of sides being generated in order to keep people coming back? — Moliere

Yes, I think that's right, but as you said, predictability is the key, so that limits the number of opposing groups to a manageable level. Pushing people into a marketable niche. My favourite example of this is one given by a speaker I saw decades ago, but I can't remember her name; I'm paraphrasing - " think about how hard it is for you and your partner to agree on a wall colour for the spare room, it's not easy. so what are the chances of everyone in the world deciding that almost the exact same shade of blue is the ideal colour for their casual trousers?" It's just easier to get a profit off mass produced blue jeans, the marketing worked, we all think that colour is the one that would look best now.

No marketing company wants hundreds of different nuanced groups with different ideas about gender. They want a small number of groups with the same ideas so they they can profile them, advertise to them and design products to appeal to them.

A bank needs to know that a rainbow flag on it's door is going to work to distract people from the fact that it is destroying LGBTQ+ lives for profit in exactly the same way as it's destroying anyone else's. The shocking thing is that it actually works.

I think it affects us all pretty equally. It's like when you learn there's this cognitive bias called such and such: just because you know about it doesn't mean you're immune to it. Even if you have a ritual, as I've outlined with absolute skepticism, the propaganda still effects feelings -- Propaganda works. — Moliere

Yeah, I have to say this a lot as a psychologist. People assume that if I make some statement about how we think, I'm declaring myself 'above it all' somehow, but no. Knowing about it doesn't seem to do much to get around it.

I don't think anyone is playing victim either -- I think trans people are victimized through violence against them. — Moliere

This seems like an oversimplification. why would no one play victim? We're on a thread where half the human population are being at least implicated in oppressing the other half. We've heard the insensitivity of white folk to their privilege. there doesn't seem to be any hesitation in assuming all sorts of malicious (conscious and subconscious) behaviour on the part of the currently vilified (whites, men, cis), so why would minority groups suddenly become so angelic?

I think of this whole thing as giving the lie to the libertarian (or anarcho-capitalist) worldview that trade and commerce and markets are natural and self-sustaining. They're not — Srap Tasmaner

Yeah. I think this is what gets in the way of people accepting Mearsheimer-like realism, they've been fed the bullshit of self-regulation such that it seems impossible to find ourselves in a situation where we might have to do what one of the warlords says because he's got more guns. there's a sense that there simply must be some balancing side of the equation, some internal motivating set of factors which prevent this kind of thing. But there isn't. Russia has enough weapons to threaten absolute devastation if they don't get what they want, and there's nothing we can do about that foundational position. The US is the most free-market country there is yet it commits to more wars than any other nation on earth. Far from politics by other means, war is business by other means. It's just another tool which will be reached for by businesses competing in the open market for profit. The moment it is more profitable to lobby for war, that is what they will do. In Russia, the businesses are, of course, directly in charge of government so there's no need to even lobby.

International policing would be an ideal, but at the moment, it could only be an agreement between governments and the power of the industry lobbies would ensure any such thing were entirely toothless.

The thing with government (strong or otherwise) is that it too is just a tool. It's an amalgamation of power which means it can get jobs done that individuals couldn't do, but what matters is who's wielding it. Here, of course, we have two choices; the most powerful, or the most numerous. The first group have default control (kings, landowners, corporations), for the second group to have any say requires that they speak in collectives, which requires solidarity, which requires organising.

The final nail in the coffin of any hope we had of 'the people' wielding that power was the almost complete buyout of the press and campaign groups. Without any organising capability, people are just people, shaking our fists at the sky.

Sorry, been a bit sick, so I respond only now, well later of the discussion: — ssu

So sorry to hear that. Hope you're recovered now.

it's now obvious that Russia doesn't have the ability to destroy the Ukrainian military, hence some kind of settlement between both sides has to be reached by both sides. Yet this depends on the military situation. If war is a continuation of politics by other means, then surely a political settlement of a war depends on the military situation on the ground. — ssu

Agreed. Neither side can win this and negotiation is inevitable. Ukraine must weigh any gains it might make at the negotiating table from it's military position against the losses that obtaining that position might entail. The US and Europe must do the same regarding their support, but with the additional concern of the losses in their economies and wider humanitarian concerns.

In these kind of situation it's difficult to see the reasons just why a settled peace would have been possible. — ssu

Difficult may be, but as I said...

Obviously people better informed than me thought it possible so that's good enough for me to consider it a reasonable option. — Isaac

... so any difficulty is on our part understanding the factors those experts took into account, not a judgement of the likelihood. My guess there would be considering a different theory about Putin's motives, the way in which Putin interprets a satisfactory 'sphere of influence' will determine what negotiation positions people think might have proven sufficient.

Of course we can bemoan that he ever obtained that much leverage, but that ship's sailed now.

Please give a reference to this or the source. — ssu

https://www.newsweek.com/russia-ukraine-invasion-end-ukraine-war-four-conditions-1685492

And do notice that both Republics are now part of Russia and Russia has annexed even more oblasts from Ukraine. — ssu

I'm not sure what that's supposed to indicate. Russia were offering a deal they thought they might be an opening to getting stuff they wanted. It wasn't a shopping list.

The real possible interlocutor would be China in this case, but it doesn't feel the urge to commit everything to find a solution. — ssu

Yes, China's involvement I think would be incredibly useful.

This redefinition has even less to do with the conflict in Ukraine. — Jabberwock

The longer Ukraine continue their attempt to regain the lost territories, the more in debt they get to those institutions, the less sovereignty they have. Having pecuniary free market restrictions on your economy limits economic freedom and is directed by a central power. It's definitionally authoritarianism. So if Ukraine are avoiding Russian authoritarianism, it's extremely relevant that their method could lead to an equal authoritarianism from a different source.

Sure, if the war is short and indecisive. Then the conflict will still not be resolved. — Jabberwock

Nor will it if the war is long...

A study from the CSIS, using data from 1946 to 2021 found that “when interstate wars last longer than a year, they extend to over a decade on average.”

Your notion that there might now be a short decisive war is... what's your term... ahistorical.

But no doubt history now suddenly loses it's relevance. No doubt this war becomes the special case.

Destroying Russian's potential to wage war prevents it from further attacks for a longer time. If Russia is too weak to attack again, then Ukraine may join NATO which will prevent Russia's attack for much longer. The conflict is still unresolved, but Russia is unable to resolve it militarily. — Jabberwock

And how do you propose to do that? Charap again...

Although its armed forces have suffered significant casualties and equipment losses that will take years to recover from, they are still formidable. And as they demonstrate daily, even in their current sorry state, they can cause significant death and destruction for Ukrainian military forces and civilians alike. The campaign to destroy Ukraine’s power grid might have fizzled, but Moscow will maintain the ability to hit Ukraine’s cities at any time using airpower, land-based assets, and sea-launched weapons...In other words, no matter where the frontline is, Russia and Ukraine will have the capabilities to pose a permanent threat to each other. But the evidence of the past year suggests that neither has or will have the capacity to achieve a decisive victory—assuming, of course, that Russia does not resort to weapons of mass destruction

From where are you getting this idea that Ukraine could somehow wipe out Russia's military capability?

this is not about moving a front line, but joining by Ukraine the economic and military community which will put it outside of Russia's reach for a long time. — Jabberwock

What makes you think Ukraine will be allowed into NATO with the war still simmering? If NATO countries were willing to go to war with Russia, why not now?

That is absurdly false. Taking the southern coast would not be possible, if Ukrainians held Crimea and Donbas. — Jabberwock

According to whom? And why is it only the southern coast relevant now?

But this is still irrelevant to the resolution of the conflict. — Jabberwock

It's highly relevant, as I've explained dozens of times now. War is devastating, it needs to win very high gains to be worth it. Measuring the likely gains is absolutely crucial. It's practically psychopathic to suggest that war is a good option regardless of the gains.

The issue is that just 'leaving them there', unlike 'leaving them there and causing a regime change', does not resolve anything, and in particular, it does not stop the war. — Jabberwock

It resolves a lot for the people currently being shot at and shelled which will no longer be. It literally stops the war, Ukraine are currently on the offensive. It might not, of course, resolve the conflict, but it will, right now, stop the war.

I am waiting for the competing factors. What are they? — Jabberwock

You're seriously assuming that there are no other factors that Putin would take into account in determining future military action other than whether Ukraine is free and democratic? If not, then why are you asking me for them? Explain why you've discarded them, your argument is incomplete otherwise.

That is it? — Jabberwock

Lol. — Jabberwock

I'm not interested in discussing the details of this. The suggestions I've made are those that have been made by experts in the field with far more knowledge and experience than I have, or you. Unlike a truly remarkable number of people here, I don't see myself as qualified to make these kinds of judgements because I don't have sufficient expertise in the area. I choose those theories which seem to best fit my world-view. What I'm interested in here is why you are so certain of your beliefs here that you're so casually willing to assume all other theories are nonsense, to be laughed off. It just makes you look stupid, I can't think why so many seem to think it a good play.

I have described it above: decreasing Russia's military potential to the degree where it is no longer capable of preventing Ukraine's accession to NATO and EU, which is the only 'assurance' it can get. Hopefully this results in Ukraine getting back its lands, but it is far from certain. — Jabberwock

Lol! That's it! How's that gonna work? Ukraine gonna take all of Russia's nuclear warheads! Ha! What a stupid idea! Rotfl!

capital "wants" people to be predictable because then you can plan profit flows, have workers show up on time, and so on. Or maximize engagement -- the propaganda machine automatically selects for any belief which will maximize engagement. — Moliere

Totally agree with you here. Probably disagree as to which 'side' this most affects.

This is how pronouns work. — Moliere

I'm sure they could. It's not how they do.

Unless I'm very much an oddity, I've been using pronouns to address people differently on the basis of sex (assumed from sight, name, etc) for my entire life. So has everyone I know. It is absolutely not how pronouns work.

It might be how pronouns ought to work. It might be how pronouns could work in future. It might be how you'd like pronouns to work. But it is not how pronouns actually do work. We look at someone (or their name) take a guess at their sex, and apply the appropriate word.

I've never in my life thought about what someone's gender role is, and I couldn't even possibly think about what their gender-identity is because I've still no idea what such a thing could possibly even be. And yet, miraculously it now seems, I can't think of a single occasion until now when my use of a pronoun has had to be corrected on that basis.

This is exactly how the absolutist framing of this discussion is self-defeating. I don't even think it's that terrible an idea to stop using different pronouns based on a guess about sex. I think it might be better if we ditched the whole practice altogether, or, as many places do now, just ask. But that's not the plan... Better isn't good enough, discussion isn't good enough, because the Holy Grail here is not a better world, it's victimhood. I must be wrong, not merely behind-the-times. I must be wrong so that they can be wronged.

On the other hand, 'authoritarianism' as you define it now — Jabberwock

I'm not defining it any differently. Read the quotes I provided earlier, they explain how the "strong central power" your Wikipedia article names need not be a government. The World Bank, the IMF, Black Rock... these all act as "strong central powers" which is why economic freedom is equally important when considering freedom from authoritarianism.

you can have a nice HFI in Crimea and still attack your neighbors — Jabberwock

Yes. You can be defeated in a land war and still attack your neighbours. Being able to attack neighbours is not a factor which differentiates our two approaches.

As Samuel Charap recently pointed out in Foreign Affairs...

no matter where the frontline is, Russia and Ukraine will have the capabilities to pose a permanent threat to each other

Pushing Russia back does not end war, it changes the location of the front line.

your argument stops being relevant to the resolution of conflict in Ukraine. — Jabberwock

I disagree. As above, if one is merely moving a front line then it is of crucial importance to the advisability of that strategy that one can be sure of making improvements to the lives of those on your side of that line which are commensurate with the cost to them of that action.

As such measuring of the likely improvement is of paramount relevance to the strategy choice.

Mine has the advantage of accepting the war on more advantageous terms, yours does not (because it involves ceding territories, which can be used as a staging ground for future wars, exactly as Crimea and Donbas were used). — Jabberwock

Russia is staging ground for future wars. In this current war, forces entered from Russia and Belarus. They did not need Crimea.

Notwithstanding that, the whole argument I'm making is that ceding territories is not that much of a disadvantage. Ukraine was no picnic before the war, especially in Donbas. Ukrainian national pride might be damaged by ceding territory, but I don't give a fuck about Ukrainian national pride.

Are you saying that wars do not resolve conflicts? — Jabberwock

No, I'm saying wars don't avoid war.

Are you saying negotiations don't resolve conflicts?

Do you believe those are the only two possible or the two most possible options? — Jabberwock

What these...

leave them there and fight to free the whole of Russia (including those regions) from tyranny, or expel them and continue Ukraine's progress toward the removal of tyranny in it's regions. — Isaac

...? Yes. I'd say either leave them there or don't leave them there pretty much exhausts the options.

the fact that Putin has already attacked Ukraine and annexed its territory, then threatened it with a war and started it does not give us any indication to what his possible decisions might be? — Jabberwock

Again, you keep dialing back from 'most likely', or 'likely' to just 'any indication' (the Motte-and-bailey fallacy - for your collection). Yes, Putin's past decisions give us information about his future ones. No, citing a single past decision is not sufficient to support an argument that a future one is likely. Not without acknowledging and ruling out competing factors.

what is your proposed peaceful solution to the conflict in Ukraine? — Jabberwock

Personally I think negotiations over independence for Donbas and an unallied Ukraine might have done it last year.

Now I think the best we can hope for is an armistice based on the current front line, some assurances of Ukraine's security (perhaps from Europe), maybe reparation payments from Russia, lifting of sanctions, perhaps trade deals to assist Ukraine in lost output from Russian occupied territory...

Then, meantime, focusing on building Russia into something better so that it's less likely to break the armistice over time.

What's yours?

No, I have explained for many posts before that relying on a single datapoint out of many is incorrect. I have talked about it over and over. — Jabberwock

And I've explained how it isn't always the case, which is how we have a discussion because you're not the fucking teacher, and though this will blow your mind, it is actually possible that you're wrong.

Have you read it? — Jabberwock

I cited from the fucking article in the last post. What did you think I'd done? Lucky guess?

As to your 'other indices'...

The Economist Democracy Index — Jabberwock

Is a measure of democracy, not freedom. I've clearly explained, even citing an expert in Eastern European economics why the two were not comparable. You ignored that.

RSF Freedom of Press — Jabberwock

Is even more specific, hardly covering freedom and certainly having nothing to do with regime change which you claimed to believe was the argument.

Human Freedom index for 2008 — Jabberwock

Is Cato's own index anyway, and for a year that we're not even discussing. And Cato's index from a different year is not a source conflicting Cato's index from the year in question.

Polity IV State Fragility 2009 — Jabberwock

Is again specifically about democratic institutions and is again, from a year we're not even discussing.

Leaving us with...

Freedom in the World 2013 — Jabberwock

... from the wrong year.

My argument is that Ukraine moved, in the last eight years, in terms of freedom from tyranny (as defined by the dictionary definition I gave before), the same distance as it would take to get from where Russia is now to where Ukraine is now.

You've provided a load of indices from years that I'm not even talking about using measures that I'm not even talking about and claimed they disprove the claim.

They all show that the situation in Russia and Ukraine is not nearly as comparable as HFI would have us believe. — Jabberwock

They don't. They are from the wrong years and focus on highly specific sets of data except one (the Freedom in the World - except it's still from the wrong year).

you switched from 'we have two options, peaceful regime change in the WHOLE OF RUSSIA and war' to 'freedom in Donbass can improve'. — Jabberwock

Then provide me with the quotes where I have made such claims. I'm not going to argue for claims you'd like me to have made. I will defend claims I've actually made.

I have already responded: it would require to discuss it and reexamine your argument in view of it, just like i did with your evidence. — Jabberwock

And what evidence do you have that I haven't done so, other than the fact that I still don't agree?

it just means that the strategy you advocate likely does not prevent the war, just delays it. That is, the strategy you advocate likely leads to war — Jabberwock

Nonsense. Just because a strategy doesn't address the mechanism by which conflict is ended it doesn't mean it leads to war. And besides, we're comparing it to your strategy which actually is war, so what does it not ending war have to do with any meaningful comparison. Your strategy doesn't end war, nor prevent future wars either.

That is a method toward solution, not a solution. It tells me nothing about how the conflict would be resolved. — Jabberwock

Neither does "keep chucking arms at it".

If you write 'there are two options', you typically mean that the options are reasonably exhaustive and exclusive. If there are more options to avoid the war, why not mention them? — Jabberwock

Read what I've written. The full context was...

The idea that the only way to promote the freedom of the people of Donbas is to fight a bloody and destructive war to keep them under Ukrainian rule is ridiculous and ahistorical. Extraction from the yoke of tyranny has almost universally been won by the people, not governments invading each other.

For better or worse, Russia are now embedded in Donbas and Crimea. There are two choices; leave them there and fight to free the whole of Russia (including those regions) from tyranny, or expel them and continue Ukraine's progress toward the removal of tyranny in it's regions. — Isaac

I've bolded the relevant context to assist your reading comprehension.

we have a strong reason - i.e. previous Putin's conduct - to believe it is unlikely. — Jabberwock

That's not a reason, it's throwing a loose and undefined general comment at it in lieu of any real argument.

I don't. Have I anywhere made the argument "just cede Donbas, do nothing else, and that'll work"? — Isaac


You wrote specifically:

The argument was subsequent to negotiation, and territorial ceding (which are the means by which the conflict might end). — Isaac


So that is what I go by. — Jabberwock

Except that you skipped over the words 'negotiaion, and...' to create a ridiculous straw man.

this evidence was used to argue that a peaceful regime change in Russia is likely, which was your argument (once) — Jabberwock

Again, if it was my argument, you could quote me arguing it.

On the subject of the admirably obdurate Stock...

This latest piece is very apt to the current discussion.

https://unherd.com/2023/07/who-is-the-asshole/

I have described very specifically why your support is inappropriate — Jabberwock

You said it was cherry-picking and fleeced a quote from Wikipedia. That's not 'describing specifically'.

There is nothing political about including several indices as opposed to one. — Jabberwock

You haven't 'included' several indices any more than I have. You've decided that you agree with the weightings in one and disagree with those in another.

the single one given is an outlier. — Jabberwock

It isn't, and repeatedly saying it is is an argument from assertion (seeing as you're so keen on your fallacies). There are only two indices in the world which make a claim to cover human freedom as a whole (rather than specific elements like economy, press, or democracy). Those are Freedom House and Cato. That does not make Cato's an 'outlier'.

You have switch talk about changing regime (which is specifically required for the improvement of the situation, as you have yourself admitted) to talk about nebulous freedoms and insisted that improvement in the latter somehow impact the probability of the former. — Jabberwock

Then you should have no trouble quoting my doing so.

argued that it is sufficient to support your very specific argument about probability of peaceful regime change in Russia — Jabberwock

Again, you could quote me doing so if that we're the case.

People in Crimea reaching higher HFI did not stop Putin from starting the other war, therefore it is not unreasonable to conclude that leaving people in Donbas to reach higher HFI will not stop Putin from starting another war for Kharkiv, Odessa or Kiev itself. — Jabberwock

Correct. It may surprise you to hear this, but it, takes more than one single factor to stop war. I suspect that's why I've never made such a ridiculous claim as that improvement on the HFI prevents war.

i have accussed you of not engaging with counterevidence I have spoken about. — Jabberwock

And I've asked you what 'engaging' would constitute in, but since you refuse to answer I can't see how I can defend that particular accusation.

If you are content with a solution that does absolutely nothing to resolve the conflict, so be it, but then it means (given your alternative) that the only other option to actually end the conflict is war — Jabberwock

I mean... Just read that again and if it still makes any kind of sense on a second read, I don't know if I can help...

"If a strategy I advocate doesn't prevent the conflict, then that proves the only thing that will is war"? Seriously?

you have failed to propose a peaceful path for resolving the conflict. — Jabberwock

Negotiations. Compromise.

If we have two choices: to go to the Italian restaurant for dinner or starve, and we reject starving, then there is no other option but to go to the Italian restaurant. — Jabberwock

So? What has that bizarre invented counterfactual have to do with your claim that I claimed any course of action was a requirement?

So your solution is to cede territory and hope that the conflict MIGHT end. — Jabberwock

Yes, in part. As I've said, your incredulity isn't an argument.

Putin was peacefully given Crimea and it did not stop the conflict — Jabberwock

No. It clearly takes more than just ceding territory.

Why think ceding Donbas would be different? — Jabberwock

I don't. Have I anywhere made the argument "just cede Donbas, do nothing else, and that'll work"?

You have just asserted that your cherry picking does not constitute fallacy, without explaining why it would not. That is the difference. — Jabberwock

That you think it acceptable practice to just throw out accusations without any basis given and then expect them to stand unless sufficiently rebutted is not something I'd be particularly advertising, if I were in your shoes, but...

My use of the HFI is not cherry-picking because, as I have pointed out, the decision about which factors to include and which to weigh is a political one, not a scientific one. There's no 'right' answer, there's no rational calculation we can apply to determine which are the 'right' data points to pick and which ought to have what weight. We make a political choice as to what kind of thing we think constitutes human freedom. Cherry-picking does not apply to making political choices about value judgements, it applies to the selection of a subset of data from a wider pool of data of the same type. It applies to picking a subset from a wider set which ought to be included, not from a wider set for which there are reasons for exclusion.

If I were to pick temperature records (as your article uses) from a wider pool of temperature records, that would be cherry-picking seeing as my decision to correlate temperature already implies that any measure of temperature ought be included. If I, on the other hand, decide to use income-equality as a measure of development rather than GDP, that is not cherry-picking, it is making a value judgement as to what best indicates 'development'.

That said, I should not have to rebut a claim that is made without basis. It is reasonable to expect that if such a claim is made, it is accompanied by an explanation of how it applies first. Hence my sarcastic response (which you unfortunately took seriously - I though the self-defeating reference to argument form authority at the end would have made it obvious, but...)

you do not ask for clarity, you dismiss terms — Jabberwock

Then what is...

I'm asking how. What is this 'taking together' you think you're doing? Half way between the two? Biggest wins? What are you actually doing when you're 'taking together'? — Isaac

How? Explain what you think happens. Cato make mistakes. Freedom House make mistakes. You put them together, then what? The mistakes magically pop out? What happens to the mistakes when you look at both reports? You see the differences. How do you know which ones are mistakes/biases? Majority rules? Magic bias detector? — Isaac

...? Most likely? Where are you getting your probabilities from? — Isaac

'Likely', 'most likely'. Any idea as to the difference? — Isaac

What would constitute 'engaging' with them? — Isaac

The HFI is as good a measure of 'tyranny' as any. Short of you getting out your tyranny-o-meter, what could you possibly bring to bear to dispute that? — Isaac

Is it? How? — Isaac

And yet you still cannot tell me what 'engaging' is... — Isaac

What fallacy? You've still not explained how my data selection in this instance is a fallacy — Isaac

What exactly is the nature of Freedom House's 'challenge'? What exactly am I supposed to show to demonstrate having 'reflected' on it? — Isaac

... all of which are requests for clarity, none of which you've answered.

The point of all this is that your application of rational deductive practices to these historical, political and social facts is inappropriate, they are not data points on a graph to which we can apply some statistical analyses. Trust me, I've spent 20 years in research in social science, it can't be done.

I have talked extensively about the only piece of evidence presented by you and I am ready to talk about any other you would be willing to present (but you are not willing). You refuse to talk about evidence presented by me. That is the difference. — Jabberwock

That wasn't the accusation though was it? It's not about 'willingness' You accused me of not engaging with the counter-evidence on the basis that I hadn't spoken about it. Have you spoken about the counter-evidence to all your theories here? No. So your accusation is unfounded. We do not typically present all the counter-evidence for our theories, we support them, and expect others to counter them.

I've supported my theory about Russian-occupied Donbas's ability to achieve Ukraine-like levels of freedom within eight years, using an index which I believe shows that.

You've countered by presenting other indices which use other measures of freedom and place different weightings on those which crossover.

I disagree with the weightings and choices those other indices have made. My disagreement is a political one, I don't think they focus on the measures of freedom that are important. That's a value judgement, and making it is neither cherry-picking, nor 'ignoring' counter-evidence.

Given that you explicitly reject the second choice (i.e. continuing the war), then you are committed to the first one — Jabberwock

I am. Which is very much not the same as declaring it to be a requirement. Thinking that we ought to go to the Italian restaurant for dinner is not the same as declaring it to be a requirement that we go to the Italian restaurant for dinner.

Improving the HFI (even if likely, which your evidence does not show, because it can move both ways) does nothing to resolve the conflict in Ukraine. — Jabberwock

Who said it would? Again, you're 're-framing' the argument. The argument was subsequent to negotiation, and territorial ceding (which are the means by which the conflict might end). The counter to that is usually that it would cause more harm than good. I countered that by pointing to the relative harms in occupied Crimea and the possibilities of reaching Ukraine-like levels of freedom in Russia-occupied Donbas over that period by means other than invading it. I didn't think it was that complicated an argument, but it's clearly been caught up in the "every argument that's not 'MORE WAR!' must be wrong" trope that seems to apply to the Ukraine situation.

I believe that having a tight state control over protests, social gathering and social organization in general has a negative effect on probability of regime overthrow by peaceful protests, because all budding protests are dispersed immediately, often brutally, and their leaders are quickly taken out by the unfair judicial process, so the protests cannot gain momentum. Do you disagree? — Jabberwock

No, I don't disagree. There's a difference between a negative effect and a sufficient negative effect. Political oppression is not the only factor to consider. To dispute the case (that Ukraine-like levels of freedom are possible to achieve in eight years), you need to show why you believe that these negative factors are sufficient to make that unlikely, not merely that they work in that direction.

That's why I've used indices. They take multiple factors into account, which means that we don't have to rely on untestable predictions about how strong the effect of one or two factors might be.

I think it's a pretty common distinction across languages, though my familiarity is European languages: English as primary with some studies in German and Spanish. So it's not the linguist's viewpoint. — Moliere

I meant 'our' as in humanity, not 'our' as in English-speakers. I don't know of any language that doesn't have those distinctions, but my knowledge of language is very limited.

I don't think it an oddity at all though because patriarchy -- the patrilineal descent and control of property -- is a common among the cultures which utilize these languages. We mark distinctions which are important, and being able to tell who is going to own the stuff after I die is important. — Moliere

So the correct application is to sex (reproductive capability, here), not gender (a much wider grouping of expressions and roles)? You seemed to be saying earlier that the correct usage was to apply it according to individual preferences.

In real life, and not on the internet (which is different), any trans person I've known has been gracious towards me figuring out the customs they prefer.

Probably why I'm pro-trans. I've never really had a problem with any trans person I've met in real life. — Moliere

Me neither, but I've met probably three or four. I can easily think of three or four men I know who have zero toxicity, yet here we are with a thread on it. Men are about 50% of the population, trans people about 0.3% in America, so your potential for base rate errors is very large.

the internet, though, as I said earlier -- I really think it changes the way we relate, at least on the social media pages with algorithms designed to increase engagement no matter what — Moliere

These people aren't on the internet, ruining a woman's career because they disagree with her...



Neither are these...



I can't see any more good reason to limit your assessment of the general trans movement to the people you've met that you would limit your assessment of masculinity to only those men you've met. We have means by which we can expand our knowledge of how larger groups act.

I have given your four articles about the fallacy you commit. You either understand them or not. — Jabberwock

Odd then that none of your other arguments have simply been conducted by vague reference to Wikipedia articles. I gave you 15 articles about the fallacies and bias you committed. Was that sufficient for you to be persuaded? Or did you feel there was some room for me to have been wrong about the application of any of those to your case?

Yes, it seems all terms are amorphous to you. — Jabberwock

Many are, yes. that's why I ask for clarity. Is that odd behaviour to you? To ask for clarity when faced with ambiguous terms.

Well, even if you had a glance, you have refused to talk about it, which is about the same. — Jabberwock

I really don't see how. Did you talk about all the evidence opposing your theories? If I look back over the thread, will I find all the theories you've proposed about the war accompanied by a short statement about all the counter-evidence that there is on the matter and how you rejected it?

Here you go: — Jabberwock

For better or worse, Russia are now embedded in Donbas and Crimea. There are two choices; leave them there and fight to free the whole of Russia (including those regions) from tyranny, or expel them and continue Ukraine's progress toward the removal of tyranny in it's regions. — Isaac

In what way is that the same as...

the resolution of the conflict in Ukraine requires overthrowing of tyranny — Jabberwock

...? The first gives two choices, the second asserts that there's only one.

I counted on your intelligence, did not expect that I have to spell it all out for you. — Jabberwock

So your measure of intelligence is the degree to which people agree with you? Sling a load of facts together which seem to you to reach a particular conclusion and then if other people see it, they must be intelligent too. If they don't, then the only option is that they must not be very intelligent. After all, it couldn't possibly be because you're wrong, could it now? It couldn't possibly be that the way things seem to you to be is not necessarily the way things actually are?

If you misgender a cis person then you are corrected, right? — Moliere

Or they are. If a toddler were to refer to a girl as 'he' you'd correct them. If someone learning English mixed up 'he' and 'she' you'd correct them. The words have correct usage in our language by virtue of our collective agreement on how they're used.

I've spent the last 50 odd years of my life using 'she' to refer to females. I've done so on a rough estimate based primarily on looks but sometimes on name or title of address. I've never been corrected. It's worked fine for 50 years, as it has, I suspect for virtually everyone for the 50 years prior to that.

So no, if someone who is male thinks they ought to be referred to as 'she', they've misunderstood how the word is used. Doesn't mean they can't wear dresses, doesn't mean they can't wear make-up. It's just an odd facet of our language that we use a different form of address for different sexes.

Maybe (I strongly suspect, in fact) in 50 years time its use will have changed. But right now, one is not misusing a word because a particular group want it used differently.

Of course, I've no intention of traumatising anyone by deliberately doing something which is going to upset them, but honestly, if people are going to be upset by the fact that the entire world does not jump to it in support of their preferred treatment, I think they have much bigger issues to concern themselves with than my habits of address.