“Kant's synthetic a priori is the principle that we can discover a priori necessity from a posteriori contingency". — RussellA

Where it all began, yes, but I reject that as nonsense, justification for it not found in the over-used reference.

Kant’s synthetic a priori is the principle…..synthetic a priori isn’t a principle, it’s a relation of the content of certain kinds of conceptions to each other;

We can discover a priori necessity….necessity isn’t discovered, it’s given as a transcendental deduction a priori for the use of the understanding in its empirical judgements;

We can discover a priori necessity from a posteriori contingency…..implies the possibility of apodeitic certainty from empirical conditions, which contradicts experience.

What sense does it make to say, that I am conscious of the determination of my own existence in time, is a discovery?

What sense does it make to say that the determination in time of which I am conscious, is only discoverable because of the existence of external things?

That I am conscious of a determination in time does not in itself necessarily extend to my own existence. To add my existence is to add a predicate to an a priori judgement, which then becomes a synthetic a priori judgement, a mere logical inference of understanding the proof of which is not yet given, and is still not thereby a proper principle, the origins of which, is reason.

“…. That is to say, the consciousness of my own existence is at the same time an immediate consciousness of the existence of other things without me….”

This is not proof of the existence of external things, but the proof for the necessity of them, insofar as if I am conscious of my determinations with respect to the former it is requisite that I be conscious of my determinations with respect to the latter. Or, more exactly, if I am conscious of the determination of my own existence in time it is requisite that I be conscious of the determinations of the existence of external things in time, which makes explicit the necessary existence of those things, and by which the conditional a posteriori contingency, is lost.

Immediate consciousness of the determination of the existence of external objects does not imply the intuitive representation belonging to them. The proof of the existence of an object, regardless of any of my conscious determinations in time related to it, is the effect it has on sensibility, which is very far indeed from the mere consciousness of time-determinations alone.

Where do we make our conscious determinations in time? In understanding.
Where do the pure conceptions of necessity and existence reside? In understanding.
Where does the synthesis of pure conceptions with representations of the external objects occur? In understanding.

Only through proper understanding then, is the doubting and/or impossibility of external objects destroyed, which just is the refutation of material idealism, all with which this section was ever concerned. As if the title didn’t say enough.

Over the course of seven days, you’ve included B276 in every single one of seven consecutive responses to my posts to you, but never say any more than the text itself.

Can’t you do any better? Have you nothing more to offer?

One must not overlook the significance embedded in propositions such as, consciousness of determinations of existence in time.

We don’t care, at this point, that there are things external to me, only that it would be impossible for me to determine my own existence in time if there weren’t. Therefore, insofar as I most certainly can determine, and am certainly conscious of, my own existence in time, the doubt of external existences manifest in problematic idealism, and indeed the impossibility of them as manifest in dogmatic idealism, does not hold, and material idealism in general is properly refuted.

And what of the significance in NOT proposing the consciousness of determinations of existence in space? Insofar as they are all thought, all conscious determinations are in time, external existence, which can only be of real objects in space anyway, eliminating the mere presupposition of their possibility, being just another one of them.

“One more step, and it becomes clear why there are only two pure intuitions, given the dualistic nature of the human intellect.
-Mww

Could you elaborate on this? I didn’t follow this part. — Bob Ross

In its simplest form, that which doesn’t require any explanation and without regard to any exceptions, we perceive things, and we think things. If the primary conditions for both of those very dissimilar activities had equal functional necessity, we couldn’t distinguish one from the other. But it is in our nature that we can, and we are perfectly aware we can, and that without any self-contradiction whatsoever, the content of either being whatever they may.

It follows that for the thought of things and the perception of things, even of the very same thing, there is necessarily a primary, fundamental difference in whatever it is that enables us to do both, such is the dualistic nature of the human intellect.

Again, on its simplest form, if we can do both, and each is different than the other, it follows that perception of things is conditioned differently than thought of things. Most obviously the difference in perception and thought, is one is conditioned necessarily on real things external to us and the other is not so necessarily conditioned.

So all we need is that which makes “external” necessary, which is nothing more than a relation between the object and the subject affected by it, and we ended up calling that relation “space”, such that the subject and the object are related to each other by the necessary differences in their spaces. It turns out mighty convenient that we can also determine the relation of objects to each other by their spaces.

All well and good, but turns out not all we need, in that space doesn’t give us something else just as necessary, that being, the immediate recognition that a multiplicity of objects is perfectly warranted, but absolutely not any of them in the same space. Or, and just as important, we can immediately recognize the existence of an object and the immediate non-existence of the very same object, which…..DUH!!!….has absolutely nothing whatsoever to do with the space of it. From all that, we conceive coexistence, duration and succession, and call that recognition, time. And this is why we have two and only two pure intuitions. I mean, we just don't need more than two, and any less negates the functionality of our kind of strictly empirical intuition.

Now, since time and space have to do with our perception of objects, yet have nothing to do with each other, we can now proceed to what is missing from the thought of objects, such that the difference in these perception/thought activities is valid, without the negation of either because of the intrinsic relation they may have to each other. Right? I mean, the object we merely think is not external to us, so there isn’t a representation of it as a phenomenon at the time of its thought, which absolutely requires a space, but is only represented as a conception, which doesn’t.
(Here’s where someone telling you he put your car in the garage prevents your knowledge of it being there, insofar as all you know is what he tells you but not of anything regarding the object he tells you about. All you’re allowed, is to think the car is where he said he put it, contingent on his honesty, but you have no ground whatsoever to claim to know either the moral inclination of his honesty, or the empirical location of the car.)

Ehhhh……enough already. In perception, it is a fact more than one sensory device can be affected by the same object, but in thought, it is impossible to think more than one object at a time. So it is that perception is conditioned by both space and time, but thought is conditioned by time alone without regard to space. But those objects we think, if they have already been antecedent cognitions, re: from memory for the psychologists in the audience, or consciousness for the philosophers, have already been condition by time as a pure intuition in phenomenal representation, and if not already cognized must be nonetheless a possible phenomenal representation, insofar as to think an impossible object is itself impossible, and thereby in conjunction with the categories which are themselves, not conditioned by time, but conditions of it. And we end up with time as the fundamental condition of thought, even if not as a pure intuition as needed for perception.
————-

Your #2:

The Kantian way of thinking about it, philosophically, is essentially:

1. An object “impacts” your senses.
2. Your sensations produce sensations. — Bob Ross

That got the Andy Rooney-esque single raised eyebrow from me. Like…wha???

Anyway, 5 days ago, so long passed.

Sorry if I talked too long about stuff too obscure. It’s what sometimes happens to the elderly retired hence otherwise idle. (Grin)

In B276, Kant starts with the theorem: "The mere, but empirically determined, consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of objects in space outside me." — RussellA

While that is the case, it is merely beside the point. It needs be shown why external objects as considered by the established idealisms of the day were conceived without proper regard for what came to be posited as transcendental conditions, the foremost being, of course, time.

“….The reader will observe, that in the foregoing proof the game which idealism plays is retorted upon itself, and with more justice. It assumed that the only immediate experience is internal and that from this we can only infer the existence of external things. But, as always happens, when we reason from given effects to determined causes, idealism has reasoned with too much haste and uncertainty, for it is quite possible that the cause of our representations may lie in ourselves, and that we ascribe it falsely to external things. But our proof shows that external experience is properly immediate, that only by virtue of it—(…) internal experience—is possible.…”

“…. as regards the third postulate, it applies to material necessity in existence, and not to merely formal and logical necessity in the connection of conceptions. (…) But the only existence cognized, under the condition of other given phenomena, as necessary, is the existence of effects from given causes in conformity with the laws of causality. It is consequently not the necessity of the existence of things (as substances), but the necessity of the state of things that we cognize, and that not immediately, but by means of the existence of other states given in perception, according to empirical laws of causality….”

The first says immediate experience is entirely internal and is projected onto the world of external things, re: Berkeley’s ideas, in that these are the cause of our representations and the things in the world are accounted for by them. Kant reverses that notion of material idealism, making it so our representations are given from external things and not originating on their own internally. We do not project our ideas on the world; the world gives itself to us by being perceived, and we discern for ourselves what we are given.

The second says immediate experience, re: Descartes’ problematic idealism, of things, is not the case at all, insofar as all perceptions of things, which give us immediate existences, must then be mediated by the logical part of the system as a whole, in order for there to even be experience at all. The empirical laws of causality, of course, being the purview of understanding, and not in any way connected to sensibility.

Immediate experience, in Kant-speak, is consciousness, in that the subject is affected by himself, with or without affectation from empirical conditions. Experience proper, is cognition by means of conceptions, of which sensibility is incapable, and shows where Descartes misstepped: we indeed do have the capacity for formal judgements of strict certainty other than, or in addition to, the consciousness of the determinations of our own existence in time.

B276 is all well and good, but beaten to death at the expense of The Grand Scheme of Things. The Big Picture. Alas….The Critique of Pure Reason.

Alright Mww and @Wayfarer, your mysterious forces are beginning to sway me. — Bob Ross

HA!!! Mysterious forces.

There’s some great stuff in your post here, Bob. I particularly note your “introspectively analyze my own thinking” and its relation to time. One more step, and it becomes clear why there are only two pure intuitions, given the dualistic nature of the human intellect.

I might mention your #2 from a few days ago, but that wasn’t addressed to me.

Anyway…..carry on.

The removal/deletion of a single word makes your latest remarkably improved over the preceding. Kant’s use of internal/external experience has to be judged from its context or exposition, and sometimes is better left alone. He does the same thing with phenomena and sense, etc., expecting the reader to know the difference in his meanings.
—————-

This is the purpose of Kant's Refutation of Idealism, an attempt to prove the existence of objects in space outside a representation of them. — RussellA

Kant has no need to prove the existence of objects external to us, those having been granted as necessary in the first sentence of the first paragraph of the first book, in the Doctrine of Elements.

He is demonstrating the fallacy in dogmatic idealism on the one hand, insofar as existent objects are denied by it, and the insufficient logic of problematic idealism on the other, insofar as the existent objects are merely doubted. The thesis, re: that the consciousness of my own existence as determined in time proves the existence of objects in space outside me, is just to show the premises in material idealism’s arguments are ill-grounded, which tends to make the conclusions from such premises, irrational.

In other words, insofar as it is apodeitically certain I am conscious of my own existence as determined in time, it is only so insofar as time-determinant conditions are given relative to existences in general. Time-determinant conditions are themselves possible only insofar as there is a permanence external to me by which time determinations in me are possible. It is already the case I am conscious of my own time-determined existence, which presupposes the time-determinant conditions as not merely possible but necessary and are that by which my time-determinations are given. The only permanence external to me, a necessity, is given from the reality of things which appear to my senses, and from which time-determinant conditions of which I am already conscious, are given.

Kant isn’t proving the existence of things as much as he’s proving the material idealist’s denial or doubt of things, is improperly justified. As an added bonus, he is also solidifying his contention, or admonishment if you like, that our representations are not entirely imaginary. As if getting, e.g., a broken arm from falling out of a tree wasn’t sufficient reason for granting external reality.

He has no issue with the validity of realism, being a self-admitted dualist having the real/reality/realism as half of such dualism. But, naturally enough, that “realism” from the perspective of 18th century understandings, which should prohibit the attachment of modern alterations.
—————-

“….From the fact that the existence of external things is a necessary condition of the possibility of a determined consciousness of ourselves, it does not follow that every intuitive representation of external
things involves the existence of these things, for their representations may very well be the mere products of the imagination (in dreams as well as in madness); though, indeed, these are themselves created by the reproduction of previous external perceptions, which, as has been shown, are possible only through the reality of external objects…”

I think it better to understand that, that is to say for me the system of transcendental metaphysics is more comprehensible when, Kant isn’t proving the existence of external things, but suggesting, first, it is absurd to suppose, then, second, proving it is impossible, that there aren’t any.
————-

This seems to be a transcendental argument. — RussellA

Yeah, well….any argument, or even a dialectical thesis, having Kantian transcendental philosophy as its ground, which is to say any argument or dialectical thesis ultimately given by and for reason itself, is transcendental, in the proper sense. Other non-Kantian definitions or descriptions of the concept, of course, don’t count. (Grin)

“I am conscious of my existence as determined in time" is an a priori pure intuition. — RussellA

The quoted section is only a synthetic judgement based on a pure a priori intuition.

There are but two pure intuitions, space and time, operating a priori to make phenomena possible, and no discursive judgement relative to existences, is given from mere phenomena.

My existence as a body begins as an empirical intuition. Neither the consciousness of my body’s existence, nor the experience of it, can be found in faculties the only function of which is to represent appearances.

I am conscious of my body’s existence as determined in time, only insofar as no other determination with respect to the existence of my body, or any other body whatsoever, is at all possible.
—————-

“The existence of actual things that I perceive outside myself" is a posteriori empirical experience. — RussellA

The quoted part is a pretty good definition of sensation. The assertion as a whole is false, insofar as experience is not of things perceived, but representations of them.
—————-

….my a priori pure intuition is possible only by means of a posteriori empirical experience. — RussellA

Why would the refutation of material idealism have this as a conclusion? Space and time, those being the only two pure a priori intuitions, are only possible because there occur experiences?

Maybe YOUR a priori pure intuitions according to your transcendental argument, but if Kant with his means for humanity in general the only two are space and time, and they are the necessary conditions for possible experience, it is the other way around from yours.

….how does Kant explain the origin of these a priori pure intuitions and a priori pure concepts? — RussellA

By transcendental exposition for the former, by transcendental deduction in the latter. Insofar as pure intuition relates to the form of objects of sense in general a priori, and pure conceptions relate to the form of objects of thought in general a priori with respect to time, he doesn’t need to explain by what facts their employment is justified, but merely by what right they have for it. That appearances are the necessary antecedent occasions for their employment, it does not follow they are derived from them, and in accordance with the theory, they are indeed, not, nor can they be.
—————-

it seems to me that the CPR only makes sense if a priori necessity has transcendentally derived from a posteriori contingency. — RussellA

It would seem to me that CPR would only make sense if the conceptions represented by the words in the title are taken together, and understood under the conditions presented by the author. In the case of investigations of pure reason grounded in transcendental conditions alone, the concern is only for the legitimacy of its objects according to principles, as opposed to the de facto mode of origin regarding empirical representations in understanding according to rules.

Makes you wonder, donnit……~3b neuroconnections/mm3 in the human brain, yet we can only have one thought at a time….what are they all doing? Or, how come it takes so many? Or, how in the HELL do they all work together in order to get anything done at all?

No matter how ya look at it, it’s fascinating. Still, I can see where the pure empiricist would rather wait for the science that answers all those questions, then hold with a metaphysic that doesn’t even try.
————-

I question whether mathematical axioms count as 'phenomena', which is 'what appears'. — Wayfarer

Therewith has been set the stage for both a proper dualism on the one hand, and a certain idealism connected to it on the other.

If that’s what you get out of it, so be it. More power to ya.

Thanks anyway.

Kant's synthetic a priori is the principle that we can discover a priori necessity from a posteriori contingency — RussellA

Where in the pertinent text might I find support for such an assertion?

Ehhhh…..no correcting coming from me. puts out thought-provoking stuff I find worth addressing, is all.

I see no obvious reason why consciousness cannot perceive itself as an object.
— ucarr

Grab your right hand with your right hand and report back. — Wayfarer

There shouldn’t be a report. Back or otherwise, re: objectively with regard to the impossibility of the physical exercise itself, or subjectively with regard to a necessarily irrational construction of an explanation relative to the claim to which the exercise refers.

Hard to tell, innit? Whether definitions set the stage for good philosophy, or get in the way of it.

My understanding is limited, and deploys a limited concept of ‘real’ in order to construct my conscious experience. — Bob Ross

As it should be, and does…..

“…..the understanding which is occupied merely with empirical exercise, (…) is quite unable to do one thing, and that of very great importance, to determine, namely, the bounds that limit its employment, and to know what lies within or without its own sphere….”

……but on the other hand….

Through reason, pure reason, which is purely self-reflective, I can know that reality must be far more than what the understanding determines it to be. — Bob Ross

…..troubles abound from such insistence, insofar as….

“….the dogmatical use of reason without criticism leads to groundless assertions, against which others equally specious can always be set, thus ending unavoidably in scepticism….”

…. correction and guidance seemingly required…..

“….because it aims (…) to serve as a touchstone of the worth or worthlessness of all knowledge à priori….”

….and in this case, where you’ve given understanding the power of cognizing the content of experience and calling it knowledge, you then your invite pure reason to question, arbitrate and possibly overthrow that very power.

Pure reason, in its “dogmatical” use, cannot inform you there MUST be more to reality than understanding determines, insofar as immediately upon deducing there must be, it may also deduce with equal justice there cannot be, you end up knowing neither, and you, in order to maintain rational integrity, revert back to what understanding has already told you, re: reality is that which is susceptible to sensation in general, from which, a priori, properly critiqued pure reason can only inform for that which does not appear, the reality of it remains undetermined.
—————-

you are using the concept of ‘reality’ which is a transcendental category of the understanding; and deny, for some reason, the concept as understood by self-reflective reason—by meta-cognition. — Bob Ross

Meta-cognition. Ehhhh….thinking about thinking. What a waste. Thinking about thinking just IS thinking. I don’t know how what seems to be me thinking, comes about, I haven’t a freakin’ clue. All I’m doing here, is iterating my comprehension of some theory by which the ways and means of what appears to be my thinking makes sense to me, without any possibility of it actually being the case. I’m not thinking about thinking; I’m thinking about the content of a speculative metaphysic, my actually thinking, if there be such a thing, be what it may.

So it is that within the predicates of this particular theory, there is no such thing as meta-cognition, the description of a system in operation in the talking about it, which I know because it is me describing it, is very far from the system in operation, in itself, which I don’t know at all, and for which I can say nothing**. It is only in the description can stuff like “concept as understood by self-reflective reason” be said, insofar as in the operation of the system itself, reason doesn’t understand and understanding doesn’t reason.

In my comprehension of the theory, then, it arises that, yes, I use reality as a pure conception of the understanding, a category, because that’s what the theory stipulates, and likewise deny to reason the use of that category, and all other categories, in its transcendental activities, for transcendental reason is that by which the deduction of them, the restrictive applicability of them, hence their objective validity, is given.
—————

And now it comes to pass, that this cannot be true…..

My other point, now, would be that our self-reflective reason has the ability to understand, just like it can about other transcendental things, that the true concept of reality cannot be identical to that category of the understanding which you refer; because something can be which is not sensed. — Bob Ross

…..because pure reason is the origin of the concept of reality transcendnetally in the first place, which instantiates it as the “true” concept understanding uses in its synthetical apperceptions a priori, regarding things that appear to the senses. While the category “reality” belongs to understanding for its use, and while it is not the same as the conception named reality thought to arise spontaneously in the synthesis of conceptions to phenomena for the act of judging objects, these are two very different functions of understanding itself and are deserving of their differences.
—————-

Because something can be which is not sensed, is a logical inference, which must be separated from existence. There can be conceptions, there can be intuitions, there can be judgements, the actual experiences of which are impossible, just as there can be inhabitants of some other celestial body, the experience of which may be possible. Reality can be but not be sensed, but reality is not an existent. We experience real things, or, if you like, and loosely speaking, we experience things that are in reality; either way, we do not experience reality. As it is with all the pure conceptions of the understanding deduced by pure reason transcendentally: necessity can be that required for experience but necessity is not itself sensed; causality can be that required for experience but causality is not itself sensed, and so on.

Same with pure intuitions deduced transcendentally a priori. We manufacture the conception of time to understand Nature, but we have no understanding of the reality of time itself, insofar as it can never be an appearance to sensibility, but only reason to it for its necessity as a primary condition for everything else.
—————-

If you deny this, then the very concept of ‘reality’, as a category of the understanding, is not real; nor anything which is not currently being sensed; nor anything else transcendentally determined. — Bob Ross

I do deny “reality” as a category, reality as a condition. Or, I affirm that “reality” as a category, is not real, as well as all else transcendentally originated. As far as the real juxtapositioned to the not currently being sensed, still leaves the possibility of sensation in the future, by which the reality of the thing would then be given. Reality, being defined as the reception of sensation in general, makes no allowance for time, or, which is the same thing, allows for sensation in any time.

Is this legitimate? Yes, not only legitimate, but necessary, within the predicates of this particular speculative metaphysics, for which logic is the only arbiter. The more pertinent question then becomes….is this particular metaphysics itself, or the tripartite syllogistic logic which grounds it, legitimate, and for that, only a subjective motivation or inclination suffices for the determination of an answer.

(** and Wittgenstein thought he had itself an epiphany. (Sigh) Sorry, dude; long before you it had already been covered)
—————-

….how can something which isn’t real cognize something which is? — Bob Ross

First you have to prove why it must be that only the real can cognize the real. Or, prove from a pure, empirically grounded, science, that the non-real cannot cognize the real. In no other way can you prove it is impossible the merely valid can be sufficient to cognize the real. Failing that, it comes about that we already know how something which isn’t real can cognize the real. Whether or not that knowledge is worth a damn, is another question altogether.

Why isn’t it real for you if you have no intuition of it? — Bob Ross

Because of the definition in play for the conception of reality, which is a category, having all the real as schemata subsumed under it, re: “….Reality, in the pure conception of the understanding, is that which corresponds to a sensation in general; that, consequently, the conception of which indicates a being (in time).…”

I spoke of things I merely think, and for those things, there is nothing that appears to me by my perception of it, hence no sensation, no intuition, no phenomenon, so do not meet the criterion of the definition of the real in play.

Your car in the garage isn’t real right now, even though you have every reason to believe it is there, because you can’t currently sense it? — Bob Ross

Correct, it isn’t a real thing as far as my sensibility is concerned, unless, of course, I can perceive it by being in the garage along with it. But to say I have every reason to think it is where I put it when I’m not there, is wrong, insofar as I only have one reason, re: I have the certainty of knowing I put it there. The best I can say otherwise, is that I have no reason to think it isn’t still there, but that does not authorize me to say I know it is still there.
—————-

This is incoherent though: you are saying that there could be a thing which is in reality but is not (i.e., does not exist because it cannot be given to the senses). — Bob Ross

The parenthetical is wrong: a thing can exist and not be given to the senses. Without the parenthetical the statement is a contradiction, re: there could be a thing in reality but is not.

I would agree to the statement that there could be a real thing that is not given to the senses, or, there could be an existence I’ll never experience.
——————

You are playing around with ‘being’ in ways that are not fundamental enough — Bob Ross

Except I’ve never used the word, preferring exists or existence instead. The word and concept represented by it is contained in the quote above, but that’s not my usage. And I use existence because to me that’s as fundamental as it gets, with respect to real things.
—————-

….to know things (…) from that reasoning alone, is a posteriori reasoning.
-Mww

Then, you are claiming that all a posteriori knowledge….. — Bob Ross

Why are you talking about knowledge, when I’m talking about reasoning?

…..since only directly perceived things exist. — Bob Ross

No. Only perceived things are real; things may exist that are not perceived. But if a thing is perceived its existence is given. All of which is irrelevant, insofar as to reason about an experience presupposes it, and the existent thing perceived in order to make the experience possible. From the faculty of reason, the thing reasoned about is an indirect perception, or, if you like, a historic perception.

Technically, the content of the experience being reasoned about, resides in consciousness, so isn’t perception, direct or otherwise. I should have written that differently. But still, reasoning about experience is a posteriori reasoning because its contents are all empirical.
—————-

Your answer doesn’t respect the question.
-Mww

How so? Isn’t it epistemically justification enough to claim that the car is in the garage (even though I don’t see it right now) because I had just drove it in there 5 seconds ago? — Bob Ross

If you read the damn question, you’d know you weren’t the one driving!!! THAT’S how so.
—————-

“Space, a purely logical concept if there ever was one, would be useless if it didn’t refer to concrete things….”
-Mww

Noooo. The concept of space refers to extension….. — Bob Ross

Hmmm. Ya know, that could be reasonable, in that space refers to concrete things, which always must be extended, so maybe space refers to extension.

However, I personally take the idea of extension in relation to things, from A21/B35, which says….

“…..Thus, if I take away from our representation of a body all that the understanding thinks as belonging to it, as substance, force, divisibility, etc., and also whatever belongs to sensation, as impenetrability, hardness, colour, etc.; yet there is still something left us from this empirical intuition, namely, extension and shape….”

….key part being “what the understanding thinks”. It follows that understanding cannot think away extension, which leaves in to remain in empirical intuition. Empirical intuition, now, as defined at A20/B34, is that intuition which relates to an object through sensation. Sensation, as defined just beforehand, is the effect of objects on the faculty of representation insofar as we are affected by it.

“Still something left for us”, then, seems most likely to be that which can never be dismissed from the things that appear to the senses. This makes more sense when we consider that in thinking away all that belongs to things, we cannot think away the space in was in. The space of the thing is represented a priori in us by the extension of it represented a posteriori by its appearance to us, therefore extension must belong to the thing.

Another way to look at it: we can easily think the non-existence of things, but can never think the non-existence of space. The non-existence of a thing reduces to the mere absence of extension, while the space remains for a thing to be extended into, making explicit they are not the same kind of representations.
—————

So it is that space, as a pure intuition all its own, doesn’t refer to extension, but refers to the relation of things to us, and thereby is a condition belonging to the subjects themselves. Extension, as well as shape, on the other hand, represents that condition of things the negation of which is impossible, for otherwise there is nothing to appear, hence belongs to objects alone.

Something else: in normal cognitive operations, understanding thinks that which belongs to objects in order to cognize something about them. Understanding has no need to think extension as a necessary conception in its syntheses with a phenomenon in order to form a cognition of it, which makes explicit extension is already given. Support herein arises from the predicates of a particular speculative metaphysics in which the categories are necessary for the cognition of things, and in which extension is not a category.

To me, because understanding cannot think away what it hasn’t first connected, and it cannot think away extension hence doesn’t need to think of things in accordance with that conception, extension itself doesn’t belong to any part of the internal system by which things are thought. Which leaves extension belonging only to things as they are given. Furthermore, if it is the matter of things which is given to sensibility, as the text mandates, it follows that extension is necessarily presupposed.
—————-

then I agree. — Bob Ross

YEA!!!
(Does the happy dance, feet just a’flyin’, enough to make Snoopy jealous, I tell ya)

Then a thing-in-itself is not a concept which is purely logical—that was my only point on this note. It is referencing something concrete. Mww is denying this, and I thought so were you. — Bob Ross

The thing-in-itself is a purely logical concept, distinguishing the concept of the empirical thing as sensibility would have it, from the concept of the empirical thing as reason itself would have it without input from sensibility. Thus, a purely logical concept can still have reference to something concrete, even if cognition of something concrete belonging to that conception, is not determinable from such mere reference alone.

Space, a purely logical concept if there ever was one, would be useless if it didn’t refer to concrete things, so……there ya go. The categories, even while being deduced a priori from reason, reference concrete things, in that no judgement regarding cognitions of concrete things is possible without the relevant schema of categories.

So, no, I do not deny the thing-in-itself references something concrete, while maintaining the thing-in-itself is a purely logical conception.

Hopefully there’s no need to clarify the sense of logic being used here. But just in case, it is entirely syllogistic and propositional in its expositions in the form of a particular philosophy, that is, first in its theoretical construction and then its subsequent analysis, as governed by Aristotle’s laws of proper rational thought, with the additional methodological limitation from Kant, that understanding and reason are the two cognitive faculties the metaphysical functions of which are legislated by those laws, which is not as much its philosophical exposition as its speculative use by a system predicated on that philosophy.

How, then, do you distinguish from a fake thing which is does not exist, and one which does (but of which both are not given to the senses)? — Bob Ross

In experience, I can do nothing with, thus have no more than passing interest in, that which does not appear to my senses. For that of which I merely think, which would be that thing which for me cannot be real because I have no intuition of it, there’s no difference in my internal treatment of a real and a non-real thing, insofar as the only representation for either of them is a conception or a series of conceptions, in accordance with a rule.

….a ‘fake [viz., non-real] thing’…. — Bob Ross

This is a logical contradiction when viewed from proper understanding, to which a fake thing is nonsense and a non-real thing is impossible, re: optical illusion, and a transcendental antinomy when viewed from reason, to which a synthesis of ideas and experience occurs but from principles without the power to unite them, re: deities, infinite time of the world, etc..
————-

It is necessary that some thing exists, which becomes the experience of, in this case, cup.
-Mww

Agreed; but you are also saying that this necessary thing that is given not only exists but is real; which implies that a thing which exists but is not given is not real. — Bob Ross

Yes, for any experience, a real existent is necessary for it. For that of which existence is possible, but for which there is no appearance to my senses of it, I can affirm nothing of its reality, for there is nothing to affirm.
———-

the sensibility must have some pre-structured way of sensing before anything is intuited or cognized—i.e., without reason. — Bob Ross

Yes, sensibility must be capable of accomplishing what reason theorizes in its prescriptions for it. If we are not conscious of the machinations of sensibility as an empirical faculty in a physical system, and there is a feasible method for its machinations as a metaphysical faculty in speculative system, why would those of us not in the field of cognitive neuroscience and related disciplines, care how it does it?
————-

I have no clue why we would assume that most, if not everything, can be sensed by our sensibility—viz., given to the senses. — Bob Ross

It is safe to assume every thing can be given to the senses, iff it meets the criteria of pure intuitions and pure conceptions proposed as belonging to human intelligence. Every thing is not, nor can ever be, the same as everything, and a silly language game ensues for lack of separating the respective notions from each other, according to rules.

The real and the existent are pretty much already interchangeable….
-Mww

Not at all under your view! The real is only a subset of existent things which are given or (perhaps) possibly given to the senses. I — Bob Ross

Not quite. Dialectical consistency mandates that, for us, the real and the existent are necessarily codependent, it follows that the merely possible existent holds as only possibly real. In other words, it is not certain that possible existences are real.

The real, then, is the set….not a subset…..of existent things given to the senses, which says nothing at all about things not given to the senses, and for which, therefore, the real has no ground for consideration.
—————-

I think you still see my point: we can reason about our experience to know things which are not directly perceived. — Bob Ross

All experience is from that which is directly perceived. That which is not directly perceived cannot be experience. Hence to reason about experience, and to know things not directly perceived from that reasoning alone, is a posteriori reasoning. Knowledge of that which is not directly perceived is possible, but does not descend from, or relate to, experience, hence is called a priori reasoning. These are principles, pure conceptions, and so on, which ground experience but are not experiences themselves or reasoned from them but rather, make reasoning about them possible.

This is the difference between “…. though all our knowledge begins with experience, it by no means follows that all arises out of experience….”.
—————-

What do you really know, with respect to the car itself, when somebody tells you he put your car in the garage?

I know it, because I have a true, justified belief. E.g., I just drove it into the garage, went inside, and now am being asked “is the car in the garage?” — Bob Ross

Your answer doesn’t respect the question. Trust me, it’s pertinent, at least to the theme we’re immersed in up to our eyeballs in right now.
—————-

What makes something a priori and knowledge, then? — Bob Ross

Pure reason. What a human does, and the conclusions he infers, when he thinks in general.
—————-

there is just a pre-structure for doing so, and that propositions that we (qua agents) know a priori because of that pre-structure (e.g., “all bodies are extended”)? I can get on board with that. — Bob Ross

Cool. This pre-structure is very far from the pre-structure you assigned to sensibility, however. The pre-structure here, re” “all bodies are extended”, is an empirical principle, in that it applies to things alone, and is only susceptible to natural proofs, but our knowledge of this arises through separate pure principles of universality and necessity, in that without these pure principles, the empirical principles cannot have natural proofs at all, from which follows the possibility some bodies are not extended, and we are presented with a contradiction and our knowledge of empirical things becomes forever undeterminable.
(Sidebar: technically called Hume’s dilemma, for which ol’ Dave had no answer.)

…..“that which is real its existence is given; a real thing cannot not exist (necessity)”
-Mww

Is this “real thing” the object which was given to the senses? — "Bob

Yes.

Why would it be necessary that a cup exists because we experience a cup? — Bob Ross

It is necessary that some thing exists, which becomes the experience of, in this case, cup.

I don’t see the necessity you are talking about here. — Bob Ross

The thing is necessary for human intelligence to have something to work with. If not the thing, then at least something not contained in any part of human intelligence, which is the same as being outside all parts of it, so why not just call it an appearance, in which case the thing is just shorthand for that which appears.
—————-

The way we sense is prestructured (….) in a certain way to react to stimuli — Bob Ross

That just says what we sense with, is prestructured, which is true. Ears hear this way, eyes see this way, and so on. Science has a lot to say nowadays about the way we see, that wasn’t available in the times of traditional metaphysical theory. But even so, I suspect empirical science hasn’t much consideration for a priori ventures into the sublime.

Ehhhhh….until 1925 anyway, when scientists became philosophers once again, or at least were forced to think like one.
——————

Technically, though, the a priori structure of sensibility itself (…) resides in reason, insofar as the matter of sensation is transcendental.

I don’t see how it would be. Our neurons send the sensations to the brain; not vice-versa. — Bob Ross

Errrr….wha??? We don’t care what neurons do when talking about speculative transcendental architecture. You’re explicitly demanding neurons send the feeling of a mosquito bite, when the science legislating neural activity will only permit neurons to send quantitative electrochemical signals.
—————-

I think we have good reasons to believe, e.g., that electrons exist. — Bob Ross

That was never a contention; believing in a thing is very far from knowledge of it.

Why not, though, just use ‘real’ and ‘existent’ interchangeably and note, instead, that not all the models and concepts we deploy to explain experience necessarily exist in reality (i.e., are not real)? — Bob Ross

The real and the existent are pretty much already interchangeable, and none of the concepts we deploy to explain experience exist in reality to begin with, so….what’s the point?
——————

If we can't sense it, can’t indicating an impossibility, how would we know it exists?

Through empirical tests with the help of self-reflective reason. — Bob Ross

Then it’s no longer impossible. Sensing an affirmative second-hand representation proves a possibility. Sensing changes in spectral lines proves that which changes state is possible, without sensing the electrons themselves.
——————-

That’s an equivocation. (1) I wasn’t asking just about empirical knowledge…… — Bob Ross

Yes you were, you just didn’t know it. Because you’re talking sensing, the only knowledge you’re going to get from it, if you get any at all, is empirical.

your using the term ‘empirical’ to only strictly refer to what is sensed—that’s not what it usually means. — Bob Ross

That’s all it’s ever meant to me. I use empirical to describe a kind of knowledge, rather than a posteriori, which prescribes its ground or source.

What else does it refer to for you?
———————-

I know that my car is in my garage even though no one is sensing it. For you, this is invalid knowledge. — Bob Ross

For me it’s unjustified to call it knowledge.

What do you really know, with respect to the car itself, when somebody tells you he put your car in the garage?
———————-

……representing objects in space is a priori knowledge; which I thought you were denying because it is intuition. — Bob Ross

Representing objects in space is a priori; it is intuition, which isn’t knowledge.
———————-

We are getting there — Bob Ross

Helps to keep foremost in mind here….we’re not talking about things you know, we’re talking about how you know things.

We take it for granted for the sake of convenience, but the proof is not established. — Manuel

Well said.

Otherwise is Hume’s “constant conjunction”. Never once have I put a cup in the cupboard, come back later and NOT found that cup just where I left it. Hence, my claim that I know that stupid cup is right where I left it, even without seeing it, is proven?

Nahhhhh….it’s just easier on my poor ol’ brain to think the vanishing impossibility that it isn’t there, suffices for proof that it is.

If it is real, then it exists; and if it exists, then it is real. This clearly does not hold in your schema. — Bob Ross

Too simplistic. For that which is real its existence is given; a real thing cannot not exist (necessity). For that which exists, whether or not it’s real depends on experience; a thing may exist without ever being a real thing of experience (contingency).

Sensibility has an a priori structure for sensing…. — Bob Ross

No, it doesn’t. Sensibility has an a priori structure for representing; sensing is entirely physiological, real physical things called organs being affected by real physical appearances, called things.

Technically, though, the a priori structure of sensibility itself, as the faculty of empirical representation, resides in reason, insofar as the matter of sensation is transcendental. But with respect to the operation of the empirical side of human cognition, the transcendental aspect has no influence.

We are scientifically aware of many objects which are real… — Bob Ross

Or is that we are scientifically aware of second-hand representations of those objects? We don’t perceive electromotive force, re: voltage, as a real thing, but do perceive its manifestations on devices manufactured to represent it. Even getting a real shock is only our own existent physiology in conflict with a force not apprehended as such.
————-

Are you saying that anything that we can’t sense, but of which we know exists, isn’t real? — Bob Ross

If we can't sense it, can’t indicating an impossibility, how would we know it exists? if follows that if an existence is impossible to sense, it is then contradictory to say that same existence is real. That which is impossible to sense cannot be thought as real. That which is as yet not sensed, indicating a possible existence, holds a possible reality in conjunction with it.

Anything else is merely logical inference given from direct represention of an indirectly perceived, hence contingent, existence.
————

Don’t you agree that we have knowledge of things which we cannot sense? — Bob Ross

No, I do not. We can think things we cannot sense, which is to say we can conceive things we cannot sense, from which the logical inference for the possibility of things we cannot sense, but in its strictest relation, there is no experience, hence no empirical knowledge, of things we cannot sense.

Such knowledge is the conclusion of a system’s function in its entirety, which makes explicit if the system does not function in its entirety, there is no possibility of a conclusion given by it, which is sufficient reason justifying that in the absence of sensed things the system has nothing on which to direct its function, so not only does it not function in its entirety, it doesn’t function at all, with respect to empirical conditions.
————-

What do you take a priori knowledge to be then? — Bob Ross

Well….that’s just the system functioning without regard to empirical conditions. In this case, the entirety of it is not required, which is fortunate on the one hand and awful damn convenient on the other, because in the case of a priori cognitions, there isn’t anything given to sensibility for the remainder of the system to use.

Technically, though, empirical knowledge is the synthesis of conceptions derivable from intuition, whereas a priori knowledge is the synthesis of internally constructed conceptions, without the input from intuition, re: mathematical symbology and geometric figure, logical principles, axioms, imperatives, and the like.

This is relevant, in that with this distinction in method and initial conditions, comes the justification for distinguishing between the real, and the merely valid.
————-

I sincerely am not trying to straw man nor misrepresent your view — Bob Ross

Oh, I know, Bob. It’s just that this stuff is so obviously reasonable to me, yet I cannot get either inkling nor epiphany from you from its exposition. Which means I’m not presenting it well enough, or, you’re of such a mindset and/or worldview it wouldn’t matter what form the exposition takes. Nobody’s at fault, just different ingrained perspectives.

I’m saying, the effect of objects on our senses is necessary, but not sufficient, for knowledge about them.

It is necessary for the human cognitive system, in whatever form it actually is, to do something with that effect, within its intrinsic capacities, sufficient to relate the effect the object imparts, to a cognition of it, such that what was initially given as mere appearance can be known as a certain particular object.

C’mon, Bob. You asked if things-in-themselves are real for me, I said no (by definition), and now you say I said things-in-themselves don’t exist for me. That’s not even wrong, as my ol’ buddy Wolfgang used to say.

I’ve never denied the existence of things-in-themselves, for to do so is to question the very existence of real things, insofar as the mere appearance of any such thing to human sensibility is sufficient causality for its very existence, an absurdity into which no one has rightfully fallen.

Do you really believe that all objects in reality are possible objects of sense for humans? — Bob Ross

Why would you not?

There’s absolutely nothing about reality that entails that there isn’t an object which we are incapable of sensing. — Bob Ross

Yes, agreed. Which calls into question why you might think it not possible that all objects in reality are possible objects of sense in humans. I mean….all any one of them has to do, is appear to our senses, and VOILA!!!!….we’re capable of sensing it. Doesn’t mean they will or must, but iff they do.
—————

If you take that reality is the totality of existence, on the contrary, then you find that things-in-themselves, as properly understood, are the things which comprise that totality. — Bob Ross

Hmmmm. Might this be backwards? If, instead, you take existence as the totality of reality, there remains the possibility of existences that are not members of reality, hence not members of that which is susceptible to sensation in humans, i.e., dark energy. Quarks. And whatnot.

Added bonus…if you let the totality of existence contain all of reality, that of which reality is not a condition may still be contained in it. Then you have justification for permitting things-in-themselves as existing but not for being real. Not to mention, we conceived the idea of e.g., dark energy, from its effects, so by the same token the idea of things-in-themselves is conceivable by their effects, re: things.
————

…..the intuition aspect of representation in space is non-cognitive (so there is no knowledge in that regard)…. — Bob Ross

Yes.

…..our faculty of judgment, understanding, and cognition must formulate justified, true, beliefs in relation to the a priori principles and conceptions…. — Bob Ross

Yes.

….in order to actually represent the objects in space, according to spatial-mathematical relations. — Bob Ross

Ehhhh…not so sure about that. According to spatial-mathematical relations is a form of knowledge, which flies in the face of what was already given as the case, re: there is no knowledge in regard to representation in space.

Objects are already represented in space by intuition, and are called phenomena. The in order, then, for these first two, is for the possibility of empirical knowledge, or, which is the same thing, experience.

And a minor supplement: justified true beliefs…assuming one grants such a thing in the first place….are given as stated, but in relation to a priori principles and conceptions is close to overstepping the purview of understanding, which, as afore-mentioned, is for the behoof and use of experience alone. While understanding may be in relation to such principles and conceptions, they do not arise from it, which hints there’s much more to the overall system.

the only thing we know about distal objects is how they affect our senses. — Michael

I considered that part irrelevant, insofar as we know nothing of a thing by its effect on our senses, except that is “…an undetermined something….”. To say we know how they affect our senses is already given by sensation, which only informs as to which sense it is, but nothing whatsoever about the thing, except its real existence.

D’accord.
————



Hey….I got the R right.

Thanks.
————-

I think this quote provides a simple account of it:

“And we indeed, rightly considering objects of sense as mere appearances, confess thereby that they are based upon a thing in itself, though we know not this thing as it is in itself, but only know its appearances, viz., the way in which our senses are affected by this unknown something.” — Michael

The quote is self-contradictory:
….objects of sense as mere appearance, yes;
….based upon a thing-in-itself, yes;
….know not this thing-in-itself, yes;
….but only know its appearance…..no. The thing-in-itself does not appear; if it did, it wouldn’t be in-itself. It would be that object of sense as mere appearance, hence the contradiction.

Under what authority do we “rightly confess”?

Relevant indeed.

Existence questions are hard, and Kant among others, doesn’t bother with them.

There’s a world, it’s really a world…..so what? World being, of course, an abstract entity. Sorta like Rawls (?)….where’s the university.
(Crap. I can't remember the author or the name of the paradox. Maybe identity. Guy sees all the accoutrements which constitute a university, but wants to know where the university he came to visit is located.)

…..thing-in-itself-as-it-is-in-itself….. — tim wood

I’ve seen that myself, but don’t remember, and couldn’t find, where I saw it. I thought Guyer/Wood’s marvelous intro, but, no luck. Anyway….good point.

What can be doubted is the accuracy of the correspondence of the perception to the dass itself — tim wood

Absolutely. And we depend on Mother to make us aware our inaccuracies, hopefully not at too great an expense.

…..as ordinary folk, not so much. — tim wood

Funny, innit. An ordinary folk looks out, is perfectly convinced he sees a tree, but you the metaphysician tell him, nahhhh, you don’t. You see a thing, and that thing is only called a tree because somebody, somewhere, some long time ago, said so, and you’re just regurtitatin’ what’s been taught to you.

But then, there’s markedly more ordinary folk than there are metaphysicians, so…..there ya go. “I see a tree” rules the day.

I am thinking that we use reason to determine that there must be a thing-in-itself which is the ground for our experience of some thing…. — Bob Ross

Good enough superficially….

…..and that this is a claim in concreto about the thing as opposed to in abstracta. — Bob Ross

…..and superficially because reason cannot do in concreto claims, but is transcendental, which is itself either theoretical or speculative. Even practical reason has a pure aspect, and while not always transcendental, re: with respect to moral judgements, is still entirely in abstracta.

So it is that reason does inform the system that for a thing that appears a thing-in-itself is a necessary condition, but makes no concrete claims with respect to that condition.
————

Kant was addressing philosophers (…) with respect to their long standing disputes about knowledge. — Bob Ross

Yes, addressing, but not in relation to one opposed to the other, but one combined with the other, re: human empirical knowledge requires both a rational and an empirical aspect, and, conversely, no empirical knowledge is at all possible without some determinable aspect of both. But, and more importantly, a priori knowledge is both possible and valid without any empirical content whatsoever, but relies nonetheless on empirical conditions for its justifications, re: pure mathematics.
————

“The limitation is proof for the impossibility of an intelligence of our kind ever cognizing the unconditioned.”
-Mww

So, the thing-in-itself to you is not real? The thing as it is unconditioned isn’t real? — Bob Ross

By definition the real is that which is contained in reality, and by definition reality is that of which the susceptibility to sensation is given. The thing-in-itself does not meet the criterion of susceptibility to sensation hence is not real. But it can still exist as a necessary condition for that which follows from it. Just as space and time are not real, but suffice as necessary conditions, in this case, as pure intuitions a priori, necessary for the construction of phenomena.

Also, as transcendental ideas given from reason, things-in-themselves are not real, in the same sense as things are real.

Also, the thing as it is unconditioned is a contradiction, in that sensibility is always conditioned by appearances. If the thing didn’t appear it couldn’t be a thing, hence the reality of a thing serves as the condition for its appearance. Space and time are the conditions for the experience of the thing, not for the appearance of the thing.

But to answer the question, no, things-in-themselves are not real to me. Or anybody else, iff he finds himself under the auspices of this particular speculative epistemological methodology. It does not follow from the condition that reason proposes a real existence, that there must in fact necessarily be one that corresponds to it.

Metaphysical reductionism, or, a dog chasing his tail. One must chose what to make of philosophy in general, right?

I agree with your comment therein; it was a very well done exposition.

……whether Kant intended a 'two world ' interpetation or a 'two aspect' interpretation. — Janus

“…..which has always two aspects, the one, the object considered as a thing in itself, without regard to the mode of intuiting it (…), the other, the form of our intuition of the object, which must be sought not in the object as a thing in itself, but in the subject to which it appears….”

A bone of contention that shouldn’t be. I mean….as long as one trusts the translator(s).
————-

……the mere logical counterpoint to phenomena. — Janus

Logic belongs to understanding, the faculty of thought/cognition, noumena are understood as logically counter to things-in-themselves….

“….. At the same time, when we designate certain objects as (…) sensuous existences*, thus distinguishing our mode of intuiting them from their own nature as things in themselves**, it is evident that by this very distinction we as it were place the latter, considered in this their own nature, although we do not so intuite them, in opposition to the former, or, on the other hand, we do so place other possible things, which are not objects of our senses***, but are cogitated by the understanding alone, and call them intelligible existences (noumena).…..”
* because we are affected by them;
**the above mentioned two-aspect dichotomy;
***a very different kind of two-aspect dichotomy.

…..we see “other possible things which are not objects of our senses” to be not sensuous existences, from which follows if not sensuous existence then intellectual existence, but existence nonetheless, in opposition to phenomena which are nothing but representations of existences given from the mode of being intuitions. As well, “but are cogitated” must implicate things, or objects, in order to maintain dialectical consistency with the beginning “when we designate certain objects”. That is to say, when we designate certain objects as sensed must relate to certain objects as cogitated. As found here:

“…. things which the understanding is obliged to cogitate apart from any relation to our mode of intuition, consequently not as mere phenomena, but as things in themselves….”

……things and objects of course, being equal and things-in-themselves always being apart from any relation to our mode of intuition, which is representative by means of internal imagination, yet always part of the causality of that which appears to those modes, which is sensuous by means of external reality.

So….understanding forced to cogitate things not as phenomena but as things-in-themselves…..but understanding cannot cogitate objects as things-in-themselves, insofar as things-in-themselves belong to reason alone. And here is the ground of ***, the very different kind of two-aspect dichotomy, which obviously isn’t going to work.

This whole exposition in CPR is to show understanding, with respect to human knowledge, has no business thinking objects on its own, which is to say cognitions with noumena as their objects are illegitimate, even if constructed with non-contradictory conceptions. And it is the illegitimacy of those cognitions by which noumena and things-in-themselves are confused with each other, insofar as both are futile attempts at representation, albeit under different conditions.

Now, and quickly because looking around I don’t see anybody still here….things-in-themselves belong to reason and noumena belong to understanding because reason is the only fully transcendental faculty, whereas….

“…. We have seen that everything which the understanding draws from itself, without borrowing from experience, it nevertheless possesses only for the behoof and use of experience….”

…..and nothing in experience, as such, is transcendental. It follows that things-in-themselves, because they can never be for the behoof and use of experience as such under any conditions whatsoever, while noumena would be if only our faculty of intuition was intellectual rather than sensuous, can only belong to that faculty which does not concern itself with experience as such, but only the construction of pure a priori principles by which the manifold of experiences are arbitrated with respect to each other and to reality itself.

IknowIknow…..shades of R.E.M.? I’ve said too much I haven’t said enough.

So as to not facilitate solipsism and radical skepticism, yes, I agree with that.

…..but still, they are known by us as appearing objects….. — Wayfarer

If the thing-in-itself is known to us as appearing objects, why is it said things-in-themselves are unknown to us?

If the thing-in-itself appears, it isn’t in-itself. It is isn’t in itself, and it is something that appears, then it must appear to us, which becomes phenomenon in us, which becomes an object of experience for us, and the entire transcendental aesthetic contradicts itself.

So either Hegel and Schopenhaur were right, or, the transcendental aesthetic does not contradict itself.

Six of one, half dozen of the other?

A sense of mystery indeed. The raison d’etre for the first Critique was to first, reign reason in from its proclivity for seeking the unconditioned, and second, prove the possibility and validity of synthetic a priori cognitions.

With respect to the first, granting possibility of knowing about the thing in itself promises knowledge of everything whether it be experience or not, which is immediately contradictory, insofar as we are constantly learning.
—————

Does this other cognitive mode happen to have a typically south-central Asian name?

Real thing as opposed to apparent thing is a common misconception, yes, which makes the comparison by means of them, moot.

But in light of this…..

“…. At the same time, it must be carefully borne in mind that, while we surrender the power of cognizing, we still reserve the power of thinking objects**, as things in themselves. For, otherwise, we should require to affirm the existence of an appearance, without something that appears, which would be absurd…”

……is found tacit acknowledgement that the thing that really exists that we do cognize, as first it appears, is the thing of the ding as sich, which also must really exist, but is not cognized because it isn’t that which appears.

This is what Bob was trying to get at by saying the thing-in-itself is the ground of the thing we perceive. The problem is, the thing we perceive is “…the undetermined object….” of intuition, which just says while it may be the case there is a ground for it, we have no means to determine anything about it, so …..like….who cares? If the perceived object is undetermined, what is there to say about its ground?
(Hegel and Schopenaur did, but that’s another can of transcendental worms altogether.)

** from which comes thing in itself “…considered by reason alone…”, which….(sigh)….was the A/B pagination clue I left for Bob.

Can you put in simple terms what you think it is? — Bob Ross

The thing in itself is the thing considered by reason alone. As the referenced quote says.

It represents an object in reality as it is in-itself—i.e., qua itself—i.e., independent of any experience of it — Bob Ross

Nothing independent of experience or possible experience can ever be represented. Or, which is the same thing, representation is always and only of things of possible experience. No human can ever experience an object considered by reason alone.

outlining the limits of reason; especially as it relates to rationalism vs. (british) empiricism. — Bob Ross

Yes, and no. Limits, but not as relates to rationalism vs empiricism.

Because something representational requires something which was not representational — Bob Ross

No. The limitation is proof for the impossibility of an intelligence of our kind ever cognizing the unconditioned.

Think as you wish, and I don’t understand “dead-ender”, so…….

There is nothing wrong with doing this….. — AmadeusD

YEA!!!!

…..but you would need to make this make sense outside of that for it to hold much water. — AmadeusD

Make sense outside of what….my interpretation? Or outside of one work? The work under discussion is CPR, so there is no other work that matters.

I never said nor implied my interpretations were the case, hence the liberal account from quotation; it’s almost a given they may not be, insofar as the quotes themselves may be misappropriations. If anyone wishes to refute what I say, he should have at it, but I’d ignore any attempted refutation that does not arise directly from Kantian philosophy.

are you saying that the thing as it is in-itself does NOT excite our senses such that we perceive something? — Bob Ross

I’m saying I think that’s what Kant wants understood. What do you think the thing-in-itself actually is, what concept is being represented by those words? As far as that goes, what do you think the Big Picture is for CPR? What does he mean by “critique”. And why, exactly, is it that the thing-in-itself ends up as one of the necessary limitations proved for this particular, albeit theoretical, method of human cognition and empirical knowledge?

The A/B pagination listed above is the place to start. If you’d researched it, you’d see what is meant by “that is” (without reference to our sensibility).

The thing as a whole excites such that we perceive, but it isn’t the whole thing we intuit from that perception. The thing as a whole is not the same a a thing in itself.
————-

And make no mistake: by his own admission, but in modern venencular, Prolegomena is “CPR For Dummies”, so if one wishes to critique the one, he must set aside the other.
————

I am pretty sure it also says it outright in the CRP…. — Bob Ross

If it does, and all else unsusceptible to equivocation, I’d be forced to re-think.

…it is far further from me to think I’m qualified to affirm the necessary conditions…..
— Mww

Oh, I think it's a bit over-cautious to say that we know nothing about animals. — Ludwig V

True enough; I trust nothing I said implies otherwise. If it appears I did, I shall reconcile whatever it was with granting without reservation that to claim we know nothing about animals, is catastrophically false.
————

However, I take the point that the sentimental explanation is not always the right one. — Ludwig V

While I agree wholeheartedly, if it is the case we looking for truths relative to other un-like animal’s rational machinations, we must first presuppose there is such a thing, and we find that the only way to grant such a presupposition, is relative to our own, for which no presupposition is even the least required. Further than that we cannot go, and remain strictly objective in our investigations.

I do agree that the thought is almost impossible to formulate clearly without a lot of dancing around explaining. — Ludwig V

Odd, innit. The thing everybody does, in precisely the same way….because we’re all human….is the very thing on which not everyone agrees as to what that way is. I for one, readily admit I haven’t a freakin’ clue regarding the necessary conditions controlling the disgust I hold concerning, e.g., Lima beans, or controlling the supposed exhilaration for an experience I never had.

With that in mind, it is far further from me to think I’m qualified to affirm the necessary conditions controlling the inner machinations of any animal that isn’t just like me, insofar as I have nothing whatsoever with which to judge those conditions except my own, which I’ve already been forced to admit I don’t know, hence can only guess. Or, as some of us are wont to say, in order to make ourselves feel better about not knowing…..speculate.

(Guy puts a camera in his living room, records his faithful companion looking out the window…
….Guy thinks….awww, how sweet; he’s anticipating my car coming into the driveway….
….Guy next door has a similar camera….
….1st guy shows his dog to the second guy, remarks: look at Fido sitting at attention, anticipating….
….2nd guy shows 1st guy a squirrel sitting on the lawn, by the tree, next to the 1st guy’s driveway…
….says, yeah, he’s anticipatin’ alright. Anticipatin’ the hunt, and lunch at the end of it.)

it makes no sense to say that the thing-in-itself is not the object which impacted our senses….. — Bob Ross

Notice in the text it’s “objects which affect our senses”, not thing-in-themselves. Which is to say things-in-themselves are not that which affects our senses.

Then I’d love to know, for you to inform me, what sensation I would receive from a thing-in-itself. If I receive a sensation in conjunction with the sensory device being impacted, then I should be able to smell, hear, taste, etc., a thing-in-itself. How, then, do I distinguish it from a thing?

Section 32 is intended to make clear the thing-in-itself just means not thing-in-us. The thing of the thing-in-itself is that which appears to sensibility, the thing-as-it-is-in-itself(without-influence-on-a-sensory-mechanism) is that which does not. That’s what he means by one being the ground of the other. That things-in-themselves are the ground of things is utterly irrelevant, when it is only things that appear, and of which are the matter of phenomena.

The thing is provided by Nature, appears to us and becomes empirical knowledge; the -in-itself is provided by reason, “….that is, without reference to the constitution of our sensibility….”, representing only non-appearance, and is merely a logical inference.

Obviously, without reference to our sensibility means sensibility has no part to play, hence is not affected, which means it is not an appearance, insofar as it is appearances only that do affect our sensibility. See A28/B44.