Yeah, sorry. A judgement is the synthesis of conceptions. A cognition is the synthesis of judgements. The use of one judgement authorizing only this cognition cannot be used to justifying any cognition not related to it. What we’re dealing with here, then becomes…a judgement used to authorize a cognition regarding sensible objects, cannot be used to authorize cognitions on non-sensible objects, which are concepts. Or, ideas.

What is the proof Kant's solipsism? — Corvus

Of course there isn’t one. What is irrefutable, is the fact Kant writes most importantly on the critique of reason in its various forms, all of which belong to a subjective entity of some specified kind. If your entire raison d’etre, as demonstrated by your philosophical catalog, concerns the individual rational subject and his abilities, then you are writing with respect to each and every instance of that subject, for and by itself, which in turn, approaches the concept of solipsism. The clues are in the catalog..…the metaphysics of morals, the metaphysics of ethics, the metaphysics of natural science.

Solipsism has a varied history, so…best be careful with the concept generally employed.
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…..an object of reason, or, a transcendental idea.
— Mww
Doesn't it imply that then you don't know what the world is? — Corvus

More than that. It is that there is no world, as such, of which to know. It isn’t that you don’t know the world because you’ve never perceived it, but you don’t know the world because it isn’t ever going to be a perception. Pretty simple, innit? If it is impossible to know each and every single thing a world might contain, how is it possible to know the world as it is? Hence, the unconditioned reason seeks but never finds.
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How could you logically say "the world exist." when you don't know what it is? — Corvus

The fundamental example of the dreaded transcendental illusion: saying something about something, when the warrant you’re using to justify the claim, doesn’t. The reconciliation of the illusion, is don’t say a thing exists when it is impossible to know what it is. This is the converse of the logical necessity, that all that can be known a posteriori, is that which exists.

The critique of reason is not a denial of its abilities, as demonstrated by: “…I can think whatever I please….”, but rather, it is an exposition on its methodological limits, re: “….provided only that I do not contradict myself…”.
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As long as we're sure the term, in this context, isn't trying to do the work of it's every-day definition, there's no difficulty. — AmadeusD

Part of the whole critical deal is to expose the errors in doing just that, bearing in mind none of this works under the tenets of a different theory.

Were Kant a solipsists? No. — Corvus

By what measure? By whose standard? I’d never be so bold as to call him, or deny to him, anything he wasn’t on record as calling himself, re: a dualist, at least with regards to empirical determinations. He called himself other things in regards to other considerations, which don’t concern us here.

he said the world is not a concept. The world is a subject of cosmology i.e. physics, and a part of the universe. — Corvus

You realize that every word represents a concept, right? The fun part is figuring out that “world”, while an empirical concept arising from understanding alone, as do all concepts, doesn’t conform to the rules by which experience is possible given such empirical concept. Reason now intercedes, and because “world” is a valid concept, but does not lend itself to a synthesis with phenomenal representations, hence can never be an experience, becomes an object of reason, or, a transcendental idea. That “world” is a subject of cosmology has to do only with how Kant uses the term, and he means by it only its relation to the regressive series of empirical conditions, re: that which we do experience as objects in the world, to the unconditioned totality of all possible things in the world, which makes the world itself, unconditioned. For Kant, then, world and Universe are pretty much the same thing, or, rather, reason must treat them as the same kind of transcendental idea.
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The problem is, that if you say the world is a concept, then you cannot say the world exists. — Corvus

Correct, according to the very specific tenets of a very specific metaphysical philosophy. The world doesn’t exist; things which can be phenomena for us necessarily do exist, and those things are conceived as belonging to the manifold of all possibly existing things, the totality of which is conceived as represented by the word “world”.

Beauty doesn’t exist, yet there are beautiful things. Justice doesn’t exist, yet there are instances of that which is just. Morality doesn’t exist, yet there are instances of moral agency. You get the picture.

How do you apply the concept of the world to the world, when your world in physical form doesn't exist? — Corvus

I don’t. I apply the concept of “world” as the representation of the totality of possible existences. I, as most regular folk, use the word conventionally as a matter of linguistic convenience. Which is fine, insofar as most regular folk aren’t doing philosophy when we speak conventionally.

Real physical objects, irrespective of how they are represented, when predicated with the pure category “existence”, or one of its derivatives, is a separate and entirely distinct problem, having its relation, not with pure reason, but with understanding and the logic of judgements.

Hey, now!!! I’ll have you know, I’m cheap but I ain’t easy. (Grin)

are you not committing yourself into the dark chamber of solipsism? — Corvus

Of a sort, perhaps. On the other hand, if late-Enlightenment transcendental philosophy stands as a legitimate, albeit speculative methodological system, every human thinking subject/moral agent resides in the same chamber, which implies it is the default modus operandi of the human intellect in general, from which follows…..how dark can it be? Besides, given the overwhelming commonality in human thought that we’re all fundamentally the same between the ears gains credence. So if we all happen to be solipsists, big deal, right?

If you say, the world is not an object, but a concept, and the predicate 'exist' is logical rather than real, then wouldn't Kant say to you, that you are an idealist with extreme solipsism? — Corvus

Hell, that guy can say anything he wants about me. If he said that, I’d say, imitating my ol’ buddy Col Jessup….you damn right I am!!!!! Seriously though, I should hope he’d call me a transcendental idealist, insofar as I have not drank the real for merely logical predicate Kool-Aid.

Regarding solipsistic mentality though, it is foolish of me to deny to any cogent rationality a mind as functional as my own, just as it is foolish of that mind to think to know me as well as I know myself. It never should be a matter of capacity, which is granted, but of accessibility, which is denied.
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The record shows Kant had high esteem for Wolff generally, but only for Leibniz or Spinoza in the pre-critical era, for both of whom he established refutations of, or in your words, revolted against, their respective primary theses in his critical era, the former in CPR, the latter in CpR and Lectures on Metaphysics.

Still, in order to relate how all that is the case, one would need an equal exposure to all those guys, which I don’t have. Secondary literature tells me so, is all I got, plus the few-and-far-between direct references in the relevant Kant texts.

Kant was apparently a proper Prussian gentlemen, in that he didn’t blast the guys he disagreed with, re: Schopenhaur regarding Hegelians, but made no bones about praising those with whom he did agree. It was left to the reader, intended to be an academic peer, to fathom who he was refuting by his arguments but without being always named.
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Regarding “dogmatic slumbers”, care is advised in the subtlety of the expression, in light of this….

“…. This critical science is not opposed to the dogmatic procedure of reason in pure cognition; for pure cognition must always be dogmatic, that is, must rest on strict demonstration from sure principles à priori…”

….which implies it is his slumber that is being critiqued, not what quality of the slumber it has.

Due to this view, Kant believes that the proposition "The world exists." is a form of subreption{1} caused by hypostatisation{2}. — Corvus

“…..I should have a reasonable hope of putting an end for ever to this sophistical mode of argumentation, by a strict definition of the conception of existence, did not my own experience teach me that the illusion{1} arising from our confounding a logical with a real predicate{2} (a predicate which aids in the determination of a thing) resists almost all the endeavours of explanation and illustration. A logical predicate may be what you please, even the subject may be predicated of itself; for logic pays no regard to the content of a judgement. But the determination of a conception is a predicate, which adds to and enlarges the conception. It must not, therefore, be contained in the conception….”

One man’s mental masturbations, re: Leibniz, et al, ca1712-14, is another’s epiphanic paradigm shift.

…..if the world is not an object, but just a mere concept, then could it be A priori…. — Corvus

Simply put, all concepts are from the understanding, hence always arise a priori. But it isn’t enough to class all conceptions as a priori when their application is more informative, that application depending exclusively on the theory developed to prescribe it.
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So the garbage man taking the BBQ rack away was sufficient reason for you not to believe in its existence? There’s your transcendental illusion for ya…..because the rack isn’t in this space at this time, it isn’t in any space at any time.

YIKES!!!!

Hmmmm……most obviously, I suppose, objects are separated from concepts by definition, when the former is conditioned by space and time, but the latter is conditioned only by time, each being defined accordingly. Metaphysical theory-specific distinctions might be something like…objects are determinable from sensibility, concepts are determined from understanding, defined accordingly. Another way…phenomena represent objects perceived, concepts represent objects merely thought, again, defined accordingly.

In such case where an object is itself a concept, re: the predicate in an a priori cognition, that object separates from concepts generally as a matter of relation, or, more precisely, judgement. Here, though it isn’t so much a separation by definition as of belonging.

The problem with definitions is that there aren’t any that perfectly relate representations to each other, except those for mathematical objects.
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I didn’t notice you added to your comment.

The reason to believe in the totality of possible appearances the “world” represents, even without immediate perception, is….experience. Given experience, the negation of reason to belief, is a contradiction.

The world is still undefined concept. — Corvus

Ehhh….it’s defined well enough as a concept, but I’d agree it’s not well-defined as an object. Problem is, and hence the notion of transcendental illusion, and….as you made mention, one of the antinomies of pure reason…..it is generally treated as an object, thereby the existence of which there would be sufficient reason to believe even if not perceived.

But the world is not an object; it is merely a euphemism for the totality of possible appearances, from which follows there’s no reason to believe in the existence of it, DUH!!!! because it doesn’t, but there is reason to believe in the totality of possible appearances the conception “world” represents.
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But can the world be the object of a priori knowledge? — Corvus

I missed that clue, for which there is no excuse.

Yes because within the hypothesis that the world is a projection….. — PL Olcott

That hypothesis is not one of the conditions by which I would affirm the thesis.

Which did you know first, the video or Kant’s cosmological idea?

I’ve adjusted my response: you are correct in that there is no reason to believe in the existence of the world when not perceived, under two conditions. First, iff perception is taken as Hume intended, and second, iff the world is taken as a transcendental idea.

I seriously doubt anyone thinks along those lines these days. Doesn’t make you any less correct, or the dialectic any less interesting, but perhaps does question the relevance.

Hume's writing can be deceptive in Treatise….. — Corvus

I think got this right. For my part, I don’t think his writing deceptive, as much as just disagreeing with the way he uses his conceptions, which follows from how other philosophers use the same ones.

In the case of the dilemma of existence, on the other hand, which he names as such in T.H.N., it isn’t the dilemma itself that’s disagreeable, but rather, it is the principle he claims as ground for it, insofar as if the principle is inappropriate or misconceived, the dilemma disappears and with it the disagreement. Or, maybe, which is usually what happens, the dilemma just changes its clothes.
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The statement "The world exist." should it not be dissected for the legitimacy and rationality ? — Corvus

Yes, it should, if one wishes. But it remains whether the legitimacy and rationality can even be addressed by transcendental ideas, and as you can read for yourself in A424, it is just the epitome of a sceptical method in which nobody wins. I think the question as to the illogical appending of existence as a predicate to an empirical conception is properly addressed elsewhere in the text.

In addition, the impossibility of a certain method of belief does not follow from the denial of certain predicates, which makes this…..

If it is even irrational or illogical to utter the statement, then belief in the existence will be proven to have no ground either. — Corvus

….false, if the uttered statement is “the world exists”, insofar as the logical legitimacy in accordance with rules, is not the same as a belief, which is nothing but a judgement based on the synthesis of conceptions, regardless of rules.

While we’re here, the rule is…you can’t synthesis an empirical conception, re: the world, with a transcendental conception, re: existence. To do so is the ground of illegitimacy, in the form of “…a mere sophism…” or, “….a miserable tautology….”. But to believe the condition of a thing, that rule is not evidenced in the mere synthesis of conceptions, hence is not illegitimate in that way.

So it is that once World as you use the term is understood as a cosmological idea, it becomes just as illegitimate to believe in its existence, as it is legitimate for Everydayman to believe in the existence of the plain ol’ world of appearances. Kantian dualism run amok, n’est ce pas?

All well and good, but why would you invoke the antinomies of pure reason, especially with respect to cosmological ideas, when the question was only ever to do with believing something?

Even to change the initial ask regarding perception and belief, to one of the illogic of appending existence as a predicate, still only involves understanding and has no need or call for transcendental ideas and whether or not they abide with dogmatic proofs.

You’ve went and done made the World a cosmological idea for which there is no possibility of any experience, but it started out as a mere totality of possible appearances, any one of which may be a experience.

So what….we’re just moving here? We’ve left the original query and it’s offspring aside? Fine by me, but you outta warn whoever’s left.

”The concept of “fact”, the primary intended meaning of that which the word represents, being empirical, shouldn’t be adjoined to that human condition having no definitive empirical predication whatsoever.”
-Mww

I agree: so where does that leave moral realism, then? — Bob Ross

Either the moral isn’t real as conditioned by fact, or, the moral is real but conditioned by non-empirical fact, a contradiction. For a non-empirical fact to carry non-contradictory implication yet retain certainty, it is merely a subjective truth, from which follows that the moral is real iff conditioned by subjective truths.

All of which solves nothing, in that it remains contentious that the merely subjective can be real, which reflects on whether the moral, when conditioned by subjective truths, can be real. But if morality is a human condition, in which every human of otherwise rational constitution thinks himself a moral character, and if every human in moral circumstance thinks himself as properly according himself to it, then it must seem to him that he really is a moral agent. Even so, it is still suspect that the moral in and of itself, is real, when it is the subject that merely thinks he is being moral by some self-determined expression of a condition intrinsic to his human nature.

So….where does that leave moral realism? In a great big pile of odiferous philosophical bullshit. There never was a need or a good reason to imbue the moral with the real, especially when the real had already been well-established as representing EXACTLY what the moral is not.

Which gets us, finally, to this: when, pray tell, did you ever, in any arbitrary, albeit immediate, moral circumstance whatsoever, make a statement about it? If you never did…and of course you actually never did….moral statements are nothing but cum hoc ergo propter hoc critiques or judgements of moral activity in general, from which follows it isn’t a case of the truth of the statements at all, but the correspondence of the moral activity to its critique or judgement. Now, the subject, to which both the act and the critique belong, must already be fully conscious of both and the truth is given regarding that correspondence, and for that subject to which the act does not belong but the statement does, for instance when someone not you makes statements about something you did, he cannot possibly be conscious to the same degree nor in the same manner, and therefore the truth in that correspondence cannot ever be given.

So say you do make a moral statement, not in immediate relation to a circumstance but before or after an act representing the circumstance. If before, it cannot be a true statement representing the act because the act hasn’t happened and may not happen, and if after, it is true statement only because the act made it so, which transfers the quality of “true statement” to mere “account”.

Yeahyeahyeah….I know. The word “statement” can be bastardized to represent “act”, in which case a moral statement is slipped sideways, shoehorned if you will, into representing a moral act, and from which it follows that any moral act is a moral statement. But here, we have the absurdity of an act being either one or the other moral or immoral immediately upon its implementation, an expression of morality itself, in juxtaposition to a statement being true or false with respect to an act being moral or immoral whether or not it is ever implemented, an expression relative possibility hence not of morality itself. The former is necessary, the latter contingent; they have no legitimate connection to each other, that irresponsible flights of fancy hasn’t heaped upon the unguarded.

Just another stupid language game, dreamed up by those who couldn’t improve what had already been done. Of which I could be similarly accused, so…..there ya go.

It is illogical to say "the World exists." Because pure reason cannot grasp totality of all appearance in the universe… — Corvus

Ehhhh, maybe. I’ll have to back check that. But there’s a more exact exposition of why not. See A592/B620 for the groundwork, if you’re so inclined.

where does that leave moral realism, then? As opposed to normative realism? — Bob Ross

Dunno, don’t care. I don’t bother with -isms or -ists that confound more than confine. Dunno how to answer where is moral realism left when there’s no non-arbitrary meaning for what moral realism is, insofar as there is no irreducible consensus for what either moral, or real, is.

The ask in the OP was for thoughts; I gave mine, and admittedly, they will have very little in conjunction with the rest of the commentary.

is it logically correct in saying "The world exists."? — Corvus

Might be interesting how that even came to be a question.

Thoughts? — Bob Ross

First thought:
“…. Nothing can be more real, or concern us more, than our own sentiments of pleasure and uneasiness; and if these be favourable to virtue, and unfavourable to vice, no more can be requisite to the regulation of our conduct and behaviour….”
(T. H. N., 3. 1. 1. “Morals Not Derived From Reason)

Subsequent paradigm shifts in moral philosophy demonstrate that no matter what necessarily regulates our conduct, it is not sufficient in itself to explain those factual occasions where manifest conduct does not conform to it. That being the case, Hume’s argument with respect to mere sentiment in general, and its regulatory power over our conduct, is falsified, insofar as under those conditions, rather than no ought follows from an is, it is the case an ought is all that can follow from an is.
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Second thought:
The concept of “fact”, the primary intended meaning of that which the word represents, being empirical, shouldn’t be adjoined to that human condition having no definitive empirical predication whatsoever. Thus, it isn’t so much that there are no moral facts, but that the notion of moral facts doesn’t make any sense. As it happens, explanatory gaps in moral philosophy are conceptually relieved by exchanging fact for disposition, or…..yikes, dare I say?…..imperative.

End thoughts.

l don't think there is any explanation as to how material objects, such as trees, can instantiate a mathematical number. — Sirius

On the one hand, as soon as some sufficiently capable intelligence wants to know of various attributions of “how many”, the material thing is that which instantiates both the object of such intellectual want in general and the means of satisfying it in particular.

On the other hand, material objects are not so much the instantiation of mathematical objects, but only serve as the occasion for an intelligence to instantiate by its own means, a method sufficient for that which it wants to know about those objects, from which arises the construction of mathematical objects.

What would be a reason for mathematical objects at all, if not for an intelligence that seeks judgement on certain kinds of relations, given between real, physical things? Perhaps, then it is neither the material object itself, not the intelligence itself, that instantiates mathematical objects, but it is merely the occurrence of natural relations between the two, that demands them.

It never was the question of explanation, but only the affirmative power of whatever it may be.
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It appears to me that our minds project mathematical concepts onto the world and shape our phenomenal experience for us. — Sirius

Yep, just like that. But the instantiation of them remains unexplained by the mere projection.

1. True statements can only exist as cognitive content.
2. Cognitive content depends on the existence of a mind which can comprehend it. — Sirius

This reduces to…the true statements that exist depend on the existence of a mind that can comprehend them.

What’s to say the mind on which the cognitive content depends, is the same kind of mind which comprehends cognitive content? From which follows, what may be true cognitive content existing in one kind of mind, is incomprehensible given the cognitive content of another kind. Or, which is the same thing, there are as many true statements as there are minds that exist on which the comprehension of true statements depends.

There is nothing contained in the conclusion that there are necessarily a multiplicity of kinds of minds, given the relative incomprehensibility of cognitive content, that there is therefore a singular all-encompassing mind to which all true statements belong.
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That true statements can only exist as cognitive content, is true; that cognitive content depends on the existence of a mind, is true, that true statements depend on a truth-criterion, is true. Parsimony suggests, then, any mind that exists comprehends only its own cognitive content, insofar as the mere existence of a mind is insufficient for a truth-criterion which grants to true statements their validity, and, more importantly, denies to the totality of all cognitive content the validity of truth.

An all-encompassing mind does not necessarily exist. It might, but not necessarily.

All I wanted to see was the philosophical arguments…. — Corvus

Cool. I know you saw mine, scattered in the two threads where this has come up.

The visual memory content is also appearance? No? — Corvus

No. Memory content is representation of cognized things. Appearance is neither representation nor cognition.

There are unjustified or groundless beliefs too as well as justified ones? — Corvus

Over time, yes, but belief in general, each in and of itself in its time, is nothing but judgement, justified by and grounded in, the relations between the conceptions contained in it. Any discursive judgement may be falsified, but only but another with different relations, in succession, and not by itself.

But isn't there also the possibility that all your past perception of the existence of the world could be an illusion? — Corvus

Not if perception is strictly a non-cognitive operation. If it is the case perception is nothing but a physiological effect of real things on specifically adapted receptive organs, there is no administration of it by the intellectual system, hence no judgement can be made on it, which would preclude whether or not it is illusory.

Why should you rely on the past memory of the world in order to perceive the present world's existence? — Corvus

I don’t. I rely on my senses for perception of things in the world, but I possess nothing that can perceive existence. I understand what you mean, but going only by what you wrote…..makes no sense.

I maintain there is reason to believe the world exists when I’m not perceiving it, which is all I ever meant to comment on.

But can the world be the object of a priori knowledge? — Corvus

No, but irrelevant, because the question was, can it be believed the world exists without perception of it.

When you say precedent perception, could it be memory? — Corvus

Ehhhh….that’s for the psychologist. For the metaphysical philosopher, perception is mere appearance, an as-yet undetermined affect on physiology by something, and from which there is no memory as a determined thing.

Doesn't memory tend to be unreliable for qualifying as a ground of infallible knowledge or justified belief? — Corvus

Every belief is justified, and no empirical knowledge is infallible, so it would seem memory drops out of consideration for either. A priori knowledge, on the other hand, is infallible, but does not obtain its certainty from memories of things, but from the necessity of principles.

But we’re talking about believing in the existence of the world, which already presupposes it. We should be discussing belief in the continuation of such existence, rather than existence itself.
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I think it is interesting and significant because perception is perhaps the most important thing in leading a meaningful and trouble free life. — Corvus

In which case, we shall always disagree, in that you are doing empirical anthropology and I’m doing cognitive metaphysics. This irreconcilable dichotomy reduces to the impossibility for qualitative judgements such as meaningful and trouble-free life, being derivable from ontological predicates, such as existence.

Now, there is the domain or paradigm where the subjective condition is pleased or disturbed….certainly a qualitative judgement if there ever was one….given the mere sensation of something, but with respect to the original query, re: can the existence of the world be believed without perceiving it, these judgements, being purely aesthetic in nature, have no say regarding objective necessity.

if you drive a car when you are not perceiving the road ahead of you….. — Corvus

….then you are not driving the car. You’re merely the payload in a projectile.

I would like to see the logical and epistemic arguments laid out for the reason for believing in the existence of the world. — Corvus

You are correct in that you have no immediate reason a posteriori to believe in the existence of the world in the absence of perception. It is still the case you have mediate reason to believe a priori, in the existence of the world, iff you’ve a set of cognitions from antecedent perceptions. And it is impossible that you do not insofar as you’re alive and functioning, so…..

The logical and epistemic arguments for a priori justifications has been done, and is in the public record. They serve as explanation for not having to re-learn your alphabet after waking up each morning, given that you already know it.
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Is our belief in the existence of the world….. — Corvus

Everydayman doesn’t bother himself with believing in so obvious an existence, any more than he bothers himself with doubting the non-existence of it.

For the philosopher or the scientist, it is quite absurd to suppose either of those merely believe in that existence the ignorance of which, for them, is impossible.

Which begs the question….who else would even wonder about it?

No matter how one defines the term (“free will”) I will not accept it. — Judaka

Nor I. I think of the term as simple speech at the expense of critical thought.

Pretty sad, I must say, to create a philosophy predicated on the convenience of a phrase.

Apparently your interest is in with examining what the will does, whereas my interest concerns what the will is, or, what it is about human agency that makes it possible.

So it isn’t so much first cause, as it is metaphysical reduction. And from that, it becomes clear the will is not determined by my experiences or desires and whatnot, but the determinations the will makes, which manifest as my choice of behaviors, are conditioned by them. If we already understand that’s what happens, it remains to find out how it happens. As you say…we seek a reason, a transcendent cause I remember you calling it. Or, at least make a reasonable philosophical stab at it.

I figured I just gave you one. Kinda. Transcendental rather than transcendent, but a form of cause nonetheless.

Nor do I see how substituting a "universal will"….. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Cool. I never said or implied any sort of universal will.

For my actions to be mine, whatever their cause must be in me. Who ever contested that? Did you really get from what I said, that I was implying anything else?

Oh well. Ever onward.

It basically comes down to this; "If something is not determined by anything in what way is it not random?" — Count Timothy von Icarus

While that may indeed be true, it does not follow from it, that there is nothing not caused by something. If it is necessary that everything be caused by something, it becomes a matter of what can cause and whatever relation is possible from it.

Simply put, the principle of cause and effect legislates either in a progressive or regressive series of given empirical conditions, but for which the terminus of the series is not given.

For purely rational conditions, on the other hand, as in a perfectly suitable self-determining system, it is possible that the will be that which is a cause for the progressive series of effects, terminating in an action manifest in the world. But this, even if the case, still leaves the will as either necessitating a cause of itself, or, be itself uncaused. If uncaused, the principle of cause and effect is contradictory, and if the principle of cause and effect is contradictory under some conditions, its total validity immediately becomes questionable, and from which the empirical power of science is doubtable.

If it is unreliable to question the principle of cause and effect, it must be allowed to condition the will, in which case, the regressive series continues. But if the regressive series continues, there is no reason for the notion of a will free to determine anything on its own accord, which destroys the very idea of will as such and inevitably makes morality as a innate human condition, impossible.

It all reduces to the fact the principle of cause and effect cannot be denied, and at the same time but under different conditions, it cannot be used. Which leaves the idea of a substitution for it that does not contradict or intervene on those conditions for which it is necessary.

Given that the principle of cause and effect, as either a progressive or regressive series, is conditioned by time, a non-contradictory substitution for that which is legislated by it, in this case the will and that in a regressive series alone, insofar as its progressive series ends in a behavior congruent with the determination for what it ought to be, must justify the exclusion of regressive successions of time as its own condition.

So it is that that which is not determined by anything may be random, but that which is determined by the will is determined by something, hence not random. But to say an effect is not random does not say anything of its cause other than there is one, and in the case of such cause that has will for its effect, that in its turn being a cause, must have the time condition legislating any other cause/effect series, excluded from it.

There is but one conception, while not precisely sufficient for causality is nonetheless non-contradictory with respect to it, and, most importantly, is irrespective of time, and that is spontaneity. But this conception of spontaneity does not carry the implication that the will is a spontaneous faculty, but only that it is conditioned by it, and from which the conception of autonomy is a logically valid deduction, and from that, arises the conception of freedom.

Easy-peasy.

Or not.

If supernatural is all you got then i get it... you're intellectually bankrupt in that specific area at least (not meant to be offensive, just an observation). — punos

I’d agree to intellectual bankruptcy…..not my own of course; no one willingly admits impoverished rationality…..if supernatural predication was all there was. But it isn’t, and because I’m approaching the issue of will and non-natural causality from the domain of pure practical reason, I’m exempted from any such indirect accusation.

There really is only one will, the singular will of a deterministic universe…… — punos

Ahhh, a Schopenhaur-ian then. Of some sort? Very far from my interest, so….carry on.

Neither you nor anyone else has ever provided me with a 4th option to my list, do you have one? — punos

Nope, and no one ever will. Your list seeks natural causality for the way the universe behaves in relation to the possibility for free will, but in considerations for how human agency itself behaves, which presupposes free will, natural causality won’t work. Hence, the introduction of a non-natural causality, or force in your terms, sufficient for metaphysically establishing a logical ground for human behavior, re: freedom.

I’m using free will because you did…..dialectical consistency and all that. They do not belong together, insofar as free does not describe the will under every possible condition of its use in human agency.

But, as you say, I don’t do debates either. You asked, I offered; do with it as you wish.

If you wanna feel like you're taking it a step further than Nietzsche go ahead, especially if it is the basis for some line of reasoning for you — Vaskane

Well said. I say that, because it’s pretty much the same sentiment I offered in response to his “Making a Case for Transcendental Idealism”.

i acknowledge the challenge of providing a logically consistent and satisfying account of free will, as it would necessitate introducing a force beyond demonstrable science and outside the laws of our universe. — punos

Because you say there would need to be one, would I be correct in assuming you already know there was such a force? If not, there was, introduced in 1785, meeting your general criteria, although the degree of satisfaction obtainable from the account of that force is rather subjective, to be sure.

Is there another option not listed that I should be aware of? — punos

Maybe that given the mere appearance that sufficiently intelligent beings behave in at least one way not available to non-intelligent beings, the case should be granted that they actually do. It follows that if such behavior is granted, it is only logical that there be a force serving as both justification and necessary causality for it, that is not available to non-intelligent beings.

I don't think he would have thought of it as the brain doing it. — frank

Oh, he was quite aware the brain does everything, but we as human don’t consciously operate in accordance with the scientific mode of brain mechanics. And, of course, we don’t give a damn how we operate un- or sub-consciously, insofar we are not sufficiently equipped to know of it, so not much point in constructing a speculative methodological system grounded in something we know precious little about.
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Yeah, well, I’m still on your side, though we’re both technically outside the boundaries of the discussion.

The logical ground for me to believe the tree exists across the road is that, I have perceived its existence. — Corvus

I agree you have the logical ground for the existence of a thing, as you say, while not perceiving it, iff you’ve already had the experience of that thing, under sufficiently congruent conditions. Your #1 asserts you have no logical ground for believing while not perceiving, which is precisely the time in which that ground is all you have.

There is no other ground for me to believe in the tree to exist apart from the perception. — Corvus

Actually, there is no other ground for knowing the tree exists, with apodeitic certainty, apart from the perception of it. You can still think whatever you please.

So the whole point of argument was about the logical ground for belief in the world, rather than the existence of the world itself. — Corvus

Agreed, which makes explicit the vast dissimilarities between mere belief conditioned by logic and empirical knowledge conditioned by perception.

While in general support of your arguments, I think your #1 is suspect.

It’s nonetheless quite obvious, if you’re doing continental metaphysics and everyone else is doing meta-linguistics, the chances for agreeing on much of anything is vanishingly small.

So paint-guy leaves the diagonal unpainted, merely playing the odds that shovel-guy would take the most direct route. Shovel-guy’s just following directions: go from here to there, don’t step outside your own track. Not much of a challenge, is it?

I don’t vote, and I don’t see will as having much to do with this gedankenexperiment.

How would you define it? — Matias

Kant works for me, but it comes with the burden of attributing to judgement more power than most common folk, and too few current philosophers, are prepared to grant.

A. OF REASON IN GENERAL.” , A299/B355.
B. OF THE LOGICAL USE OF REASON.
C. OF THE PURE USE OF REASON.

it appears as though Kant has no grounds to be an indirect realist. — Bob Ross

I wonder. Say I get famous. In a hundred years, will they take what made me famous, look at it way differently than I meant for it, then call me something I wouldn’t call myself, because of the way they looked at what I said?

“…. the real—that which corresponds to sensation—….”. All sensations are given directly from perception which is given directly from the appearance of real things, so…..

Why would ever suggest Kant was an indirect realist? If anything, he would be an indirect epistemologist, in that all our empirical knowledge is only possible indirectly from representations of real objects.

Elsewhere, has invited the “mediate/immediate” distinction, as opposed to the direct/indirect. From a purely subjective perspective….what a guy thinks for himself and not what a philosopher thinks for everybody….the invite is a much better approach, and is used by Kant himself.
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Kant gives a proof for everything he claims — Bob Ross

Actually, he admits to not knowing how some things he posits work, re: imagination, even reason itself. He posits logical arguments, which are treated as internal proofs, but are never susceptible to objectively repeatable experiment, hence never empirically proven. He can’t prove there are representations, conceptions, cognitions and whatnot, but he can prove it’s logically valid that this or that happens when there are. It’s called theory, donchaknow. Or, speculative metaphysics.
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the cup which is experienced vs. the cup as it is in-itself — Bob Ross

I asked how a “cup-in-itself” got its name, and the correct answer is…..it doesn’t because there is no such thing as a cup as it is in-itself. No named thing is in-itself; no in-itself is ever named, and no case can be made for transcendental idealism, within its original view, that says otherwise.

I can't see where we disagree, then. — Astrophel

Oh, we disagree over a wide range, which is fine.



But, with respect to that comment, I’ve been there myself. Pure reason’s intrinsic circularity has been obvious for millennia, and advances in neurological science has made it even worse.

The brain goes so far as to manifest itself as an immaterial something-or-other, imbues the seemingness of knowledge into it, but prevents the seemingness of knowledge for informing the immaterial something-or-other of what it is or where it came from. Like, brain says…..YOU are allowed to know whatever YOU think YOU know, in a progressive series, but YOU are not allowed to even think YOU know anything at all in a regressive series, which, of course, includes YOU.

The brain in its mighty magnificence gives its self-manifested subjectivity QM science, a progressive series. One of the tenets of QM science is the fact that observation disrupts the quantum domain by intruding into it, also progressive. A sidebar given by the brain in its mighty magnificence is the incredible density of the constituent parts of itself, informing its self-manifested subjectivity of its ~3b/mm3 synaptic clefts, which is the very domain of QM science….progressive. So eventually the self-manifested subjectivity goes so far as to invent a device for exploring the quantum domain of itself, progressive, searching for a YOU that has been allowed to know…..oh crap!!!!…..regressive.

Now the self-manifested subjectivity takes the chance of disrupting itself, in which case….was it ever there? The brain has tacitly allowed the extermination of its own avatar.

YIKES!!!!