Guess I’m missing something here. If for every thing there is the thing in itself, therefore for a plurality of things it follows necessarily that there are a plurality of things in themselves. Just doesn’t seem like an assumption.
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What??? Two of you? What do you guys know that I can’t seem to get a grip on?

isn't Kant making an assumption by saying there are "things in themselves"? — Manuel

Nope. The rest of that thinking/cognizing quote reads: “…. For, otherwise, we should require to affirm the existence of an appearance, without something that appears, which would be absurd….”

Not knowing what a thing-in-itself is, is very far from knowing that there must be a thing-in-itself.

Oh. And how the HELL can “ that which is originally itself only appearance” have a name?

“….. It is, then, the matter of all phenomena that is given to us à posteriori (…) ….the undetermined object of an empirical intuition…. ”. When he fills in with “…e.g., a rose…” he’s already considered the time between the appearance of the undetermined object, and the name for understanding the phenomenon representing the appearance.

Matter, as such, cannot have a name, which is a representation derived from the synthesis of conceptions, hence given from thought, not sensation.

“…. Conceptions may be logically compared without the trouble of inquiring to what faculty their objects belong, whether as noumena, to the understanding, or as phenomena, to sensibility. If, however, we wish to employ these conceptions in respect of objects, previous transcendental reflection is necessary. Without this reflection I should make a very unsafe use of these conceptions, and construct pretended synthetical propositions which critical reason cannot acknowledge and which are based solely upon a transcendental amphiboly, that is, upon a substitution of an object of pure understanding for a phenomenon….”
(A270/B326, in Meiklejohn 1855)

Hmmmm. Round peg, round hole; square peg, square hole.

Got it.

Next?

Catastrophically irrelevant.

That’s some good stuff right there, and thank you for it.

….is Kant actually progressing critically and undogmatically as he claims? — Count Timothy von Icarus

“…. This critical science is not opposed to the dogmatic procedure of reason in pure cognition; for pure cognition must always be dogmatic, that is, must rest on strict demonstration from sure principles à priori—but to dogmatism, that is, to the presumption that it is possible to make any progress with a pure cognition, derived from (philosophical) conceptions, according to the principles which reason has long been in the habit of employing—without first inquiring in what way and by what right reason has come into the possession of these principles….”

It seems to me, that given the three listed “problems of pure reason”, for which no conclusions are to be obtained, he proves it is not possible to make any progress with at least some pure cognitions. On the other hand, while stipulating what those “sure principles a priori” actually are, he doesn’t say how reason comes into possession of them. Reason being the faculty of principles, I suppose we’re left with a rather loose end.

Which is why, in the end, metaphysics can never be a proper science.

that is just what language is, whether "ordinary" lingo or mathematical or formal logical. — Janus

Ahhhh…..of course you’re quite right. I got stuck on language = ordinary lingo. (head explodes)
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I agree, in principle, in that it is a legitimate criticism. Kant’s analysis generally concerns reason, which is internal to us and hence tacitly separates us from the world. “Entrapping us” is kinda harsh, but still true enough, beside the fact he pretty much admits to it, at A247/B303, insofar as…..paraphrased……“the proud name of ontology must give way to analysis”. And it is easy to see why this is so, given that the human system works exclusively with internal representations of things, but not external things in themselves.

I never would regard ChatGPT as an authoritative source. — Quixodian

WHEW!!! I regard you as perhaps the most well-read participant herein, so to see you reference a glorified typewriter…..well, ‘Nuff said.

the language that we speak fundementally shapes how we experience the world, turns out to be quite weak….. — Count Timothy von Icarus

As I think it surely must be. Nature shapes, words express the shape.

I detest OLP with a passion. I relegate the doctrine to cover those that would find more value in talk than thought. And while it may indeed be the case humans talk all the damn time (yawn), it is even more the case they one and all think even more than they talk, so……there ya go.

Kant altered the meaning of ‘noumena’ in line with his philosophical requirements. — Quixodian

Oddly true, and slightly disappointing, in juxtaposition to…..

“…. even if the original meaning of the word has become somewhat uncertain, from carelessness or want of caution on the part of the authors of it, it is always better to adhere to and confirm its proper meaning—even although it may be doubtful whether it was formerly used in exactly this sense—than to make our labour vain by want of sufficient care to render ourselves intelligible….” (A312/B369)

….and even if noumena wasn’t an example of what he was saying, it remains that he is tacitly suggesting the original meaning of some words are not as they should have been, which justifies the robbery of a word in its original sense, and substitute for it a different sense, in order to render himself more intelligible than the original would have allowed.

I guess the point was…better to rob an old word with its altered implications for which a reader might adjust himself, than to manufacture a new one for which he can’t.

As Mww has pointed out, and if he is right, things in themselves are not noumena. — Janus

Far be it from me to claim I’m right, but I know what I read and I’m pretty sure I understood what I read.

“…. things in themselves, while possessing a real existence….” (Bxx)

“…. cogitated by the understanding alone, and call them intelligible existences (noumena).” (B306)
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we can have no idea about its (our thinking’s) soundness except it has empirical or logical justification. — Janus

Exactly. Empirical justification is experience, logical justification is non-contradiction.
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Is abstract reasoning not all and only a matter of language use? — Janus

Interesting. In what way would that be true?
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I disagree that "anything experienced has already been conceptualized" is necessarily true. — T Clark

Absolutely. That proposition is merely a theoretical tenet, hence shouldn’t be considered as necessarily true. It is still worthy of being considered nonetheless logically consistent and sufficiently explanatory.
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This leads to the criticism that Kant's analysis cuts us off from the world, entrapping us in our own subjectively-modulated reality. — Quixodian

Do you consider that a legitimate criticism?

….an example of a concept that is easy to grasp in principle, but is almost impossible to form or recognise an image of. — Quixodian

Correctly stated in Descartes, its formal exposition found in “Schematism of the Pure Understanding”, for whatever it’s worth. It is actually quite impossible to prove with apodeictic certainty one has accurately constructed a complex image in complete homogenous correspondence to its mere thought.

Lao Tzu would say you can experience the Tao. You just can't conceptualize it or speak about it. — T Clark

I’m no Taoist, that's for sure, but in western philosophy generally and Enlightenment German idealism in particular, anything experienced has already been conceptualized, and therefore can be spoken about.

Experience is an end, not happening without the orderly means.

Ahhh…gotcha. Thanks.

I’d agree, but what was said that enabled that thought of yours?

So, it seems noumena belong to an empty set, which cannot even be named or categorized? — Janus

Pretty much spot on, I think. At least so by humans, iff our intelligence is properly described by transcendental speculative metaphysics. I mean, the one responsible for all this “…. ambiguity, which may easily occasion great misapprehension…..”, never once listed or gave an example of a proper noumenal object. In short because we are not equipped with the means for the experience of them. That doesn’t mean there are no such things as noumena, that noumena are impossible things, for we have no right to say what Nature provides, but only that experience of them is impossible for us, and strictly intuitive sensibilities in general.

…..it may be possible to give an example of some kind of thing. — Janus

So it should be clear now, it never was about kinds of things, but only about kinds of intellectual systems. Or maybe one could say, it isn’t about the kinds of things we can’t know, but only the kind of things we can, and THAT because of the kind of intellectual system we are supposed as possessing, and by which we know anything.

All this confusion simply because “…I can think whatever I wish…”,

……and I can think whatever I wish because…..

“… the understanding (…) is quite unable to do one thing, and that of very great importance, to determine, namely, the bounds that limit its employment, and to know what lies within or without its own sphere…”,

…..and it may just be that Kant painted himself into a corner, insofar as if he limits understanding he immediately falsifies the proposition that I can think whatever I wish, a contradiction because I can in fact do just that…..like, you know…..non-natural causality, a.k.a. freedom, and Planck scales and oh, yeah: noumena. In order to alleviate the conundrum, he made it so instead of limiting understanding, he limited the other faculties from being influenced by its contributions, antecedently making intuition strictly sensuous, thereby being undisturbed by intellectual infringements, and, by making reason the faculty of principles by which understanding is subsequently legislated a priori, in which case reason effectively blocks knowledge, which manifests in us as either the mistakes of a forced judgement, or the mere confusion of a judgement inconsistent with prior experience. Perfectly in order with overall Kantian dualism: intuitive perception on the one hand, logical judgement on the other and n’er the twain shall meet but work together they must for a common end, experience, or, which is the same thing, empirical knowledge.

Easy peasy. Plain as the nose on yer frontend skull covering.

can you give me an example of anything that would be classed as noumenal? — Janus

Absolutely not. Humans have an intuitive sensibility, which makes explicit the necessity for real physical things external to us, conditioned by space and time. Intuition is the means by which objects are represented in us; it follows that non-intuitive intelligences for us are incomprehensible. But noumena are not represented in sensuous intuition, if they were they’d be phenomena, being nothing but conceptions belonging to understanding alone, hence there is nothing whatsoever represented from intuition by them, hence nothing for which understanding to conjoin its otherwise empirical conceptions, hence nothing to cognize as object. Thought without content is void, remember?

This is why the title of the chapter is the division of objects into phenomena and noumena. The former is for those intelligences that have a sensuous faculty of intuitive representation conditioned by space and time, the latter is for those intelligences the sensuous faculty of which is non-intuitive and for which there may not even be any pure intuitions at all.

The purpose of the Critique is to show the proper limits of reason. But if Kant says I can think whatever I wish so long as I don’t contradict myself…what limits my thinking such that I can’t contradict myself? That limit is the mere conception of noumena, in that I can think it as I wish, but I can do not the least damn thing with it, and if I try, I must contradict myself, insofar as I am attempting the impossible because I must use faculties I don’t even have, or….what’s worse….misuse the only ones I do have.

If only objects of the senses, that is those things which appear to us are things in themselves…… — Janus

Things that appear to us, cannot be things as they are in themselves. Upon affecting us, things are no longer in or of themselves.

If only objects of the senses, that is those things which appear to us (….), would space, time, causality and the perceiving subject be noumena, according to Kant? — Janus

I’d have to say no. While it is the case these are never given as appearances, therefore can never be phenomena, doesn’t thereby mean they are noumena. Space and time are not conceptions understanding thinks on its own accord, they are pure intuitions, so do not meet the criteria for noumena. Causality is a derivative manifestation of a category, which is a conception but not one understanding thinks on its own accord, insofar as it arises from a transcendental deduction of reason, the faculty of principles, so also does not meet the criteria for noumena.

The perceiving subject is unclassifiable, I think. Or maybe I just don’t know to which class it belongs. Technically, subjects don’t perceive, that being the domain of the senses. Subjects are that which comprehends, or that to which comprehension belongs, is about as far as I’d go with what it is, but I’d be ok with stipulating what it isn’t, that being noumenon.

‘Tis a wicked game we play, innit? With our opinions?

Thanks. ‘Preciate it.

”What things things is not itself a thing” — T Clark

Marvelous subtelty in there as well.

Yes, with the caveat that an object of understanding is logical only, whereas an object of sense is empirical. Since both types of cognitions belong to a thinking subject, then it follows that the general conception acts as a logical object for whichever subjects thinks it. And, of course, first off, no mere conception of anything is sufficient for its existence, and second, very few of them bother.

Oh. And noumena are not thing-in-themselves, which are always real physical worldly objects. Noumena can never be an appearance to humans, according to transcendental philosophy, for otherwise a representation would follow, which it cannot insofar as noumena are nothing but objects the understanding thinks on its own, whereas representations from perception in humans, is always sensuous and never only intellectual. Other theories may have different conditions, but those are not being considered when Kant is the given author.

Nahhhh…..the text stipulates noumena may be treated as things-in-themselves, in that neither are subjected to the totality of the human intellectual system in the pursuit of knowledge a posteriori, but that does not make them the same. I mean, what warrant would there be to make the claim that they are, when it is impossible to know anything about either of them? I’d be forced into the absurdity of claiming….it is impossible that I know what this is, but I know that is just like it. (Sigh)

Noumena. What happens when that which is trained to be an eye doctor, wants to use that training to be a structural engineer. It isn’t as contradictory as it is misguided.

Understanding is misguided when it takes upon itself to think transcendentally, which it is fully entitled to do without self-contradiction, that object for which its cognitive training extends only to empirical referents.

It follows that to think noumena as a general conception is not contradictory, but to cognize a singular noumenal object as a referent for that general conception, is impossible, as it is for every transcendentally conceived object absent its intuitive representation.

Oh, so….I think, therefore thinking is occurring? I get it, but that reflects on ’s note on tautological truths and minimal relations, in that the switch wouldn’t lead to a productive philosophy. He wasn’t interested in the thinking, which was never in doubt, but only in that which thinks, and that as something other than object.

Descartes should have said: "thinking is occurring." — Tom Storm

“….. I take the word ‘thought’ to cover everything that we are aware of as happening within us, and it counts as ‘thought’ because we are aware of it. That includes not only understanding, willing and imagining, but also sensory awareness…..”
( Principia Philosophiae, 1. 9., 1644)

Pretty indicative of occurring, I should think.

Still, there will be those that insist heartbeats are thoughts…..occurring inside and conscious of, and all that…..hence the advent of a proposed substance not the kind to be laid out on the cutting table.

Have it your way.

Ok. Thanks.

Does Being present itself directly to humans, or do humans have to re-present being? — charles ferraro

Only things are presented, being is not a thing so is not presented. And while things that are presented presuppose the necessity of their existence, or if one wishes to say the necessity of their being, there is nothing gained by exchanging one for the other.

Cogito I understand. What is pre-reflective cogito?

I do not agree with your interpretation of Kant here. — Metaphysician Undercover

Be that as it may…..I mean, you pretty much disagree with everybody…..it is clear that priority in the mind, as such, cannot be phenomena.

I am focusing on our non-scientific a posteriori everyday experience of the "nature" of empirical objects. — charles ferraro

If this were the case, then..…

We simply have to posit the possible existence of empirical rules of sensory organization embedded in the sense data which spontaneously guide our brains' synthesizing activities. — charles ferraro

…..that would follow.

But it isn’t, so it doesn’t. Our experience is of representations of empirical objects, from which follows the rules cannot be embedded in the sense data, which are not representations, but only mere appearances.

Rules imply a logical form. If the faculty of sensibility from which sense data is obtained has no logical predication, then rules, principles or a priori legislation of any kind, cannot reside therein.
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Where in his works does Kant clearly and convincingly explain precisely how the "nature" of a given empirical object of everyday a posteriori experience can be generated by human sensibility and understanding simply applying space, time, and the categories to what he calls the given manifold of sensation? — charles ferraro

He goes to a relatively minor extent to expose the error in doing exactly that, the “clearly”, “convincingly” and “precisely” being judgements as subjective as the reader’s willingness to accede to the tenets of the work as a whole.

The nature of a given empirical object from which its matter alone is given a posteriori, is nothing more than an undeterminable change in our sensory condition, or, which is the same thing, the manner in which the senses are affected by the presentation of that object to them. That by which the matter is arranged, and by which the object is determinable, cannot be contained in the sensation, but must reside a priori in intuition. From which follows it isn’t the nature of the given empirical object, but the nature of the representation of that object, that is our experience. In short, it is we that say what that nature is, in accordance with the kind of intelligence incorporated in our nature.

Nevertheless, you’re kinda right, in that his implementation of imagination in both the faculties of sensibility and cognition, for which he admits (A76/B103) as having no clear, convincing, precise exposition, leaves one to either grant the necessity of it logically, or…..you know, like……question the very ground of the theory itself.

Same as it ever was…..

I understand you guys are talking about Plato, but I wanted to inject this in the interest of conformity with the textual record.

This is Kant's starting point (….) the priority of what's in the mind, phenomena. — Metaphysician Undercover

Priority of what’s in the mind…..yes; that the priority of what’s in the mind is phenomena……no.

At best, with respect to phenomena, it can only be said that the priority in the mind is the antecedent conceptual conditions by which they are possible, which is the deduction of the pure conceptions, better known as the categories.

Ideas, remaining with Kant, have priority in the mind regarding that which is not as yet, or may never be, phenomena.

Unless I misunderstood, in which case…..never mind.

…..really unique argument….. — charles ferraro

Yeah, considering the starting premises. Just as in any argument, change the initial premises, or the relation of words to conceptions, and any unique argument falls apart.

The problem for some of his successors was his affirmation of real things, but denial of matter, or as he calls it, “unthinking substance”, as the ground of real things. Note the concession to Descartes, re: thinking substance.

Anyway, ol’ George had some good stuff to say, setting the stage for later and rather more involved idealisms.

Berkeley's detailed analysis showed that SUBSTANCE and NOTHING have the same meaning. — charles ferraro

Wouldn’t that be a necessary precondition for the claim that all knowledge is of ideas imprinted on the senses? So saying, he has no need to prove substance as the substratum that supports time, but only the permanence of the real of ideas, in time.

From there he goes to minds as the perceivers of those ideas, and it’s off to the rodeo…..

….the origin of the categories would be transcendental….. — Janus

Remember Kant for the dualist he admitted to being. As such, empirically, we first sense then cognize then experience an object, but after that, rationally, we can still cognize that object without it having met with sensibility. We conventionally say we draw such objects from memory, whereas technically we cognize from the content of consciousness by means of “…the unity of apperception…” represented by “I think”. But never mind all that.

We sense objects from which experience follows, but we can also think an object, which alone affords no experience, yet later sense it and from that, experience follows. The question here is then….how is it that some object of sense, and the very same object of thought, contain enough of the same representations such that the judgement made on the one, which is always a posteriori, doesn’t conflict with the judgement made on the other, which is sometimes purely a priori, and from which the cognitions of identical representations is sustained, and the knowledge of that object stands in the one case or obtains on the other. In other words, what is it that conditions both the sensing of objects and the thinking of them, such that the contradiction of one by the other is either eliminated, or, demonstrated and then corrected, in accordance with rules. As it must be, otherwise the very notion of knowledge itself on the one hand, and possible knowledge on the other, becomes suspect, which, under certain circumstances, is altogether and utterly absurd. So it now becomes a matter of not so much what makes this or that possible, but rather, what is it that prohibits this and that from contradicting each other. The answer to that must be that there is that which conditions the human intellectual system in its entirety.

It isn’t really so much how do these contain the same conceptual representations, because they are put together…..synthesized…..under their respective happenstance by the same faculty, re: understanding. So what is it about understanding, by which representation of sensed objects in precise conformity to objects of mere thought, receives its consistency? Or, put another way….what are the rules? It is a fact objects can be conceived no one has ever experienced; they’re called inventions. But how does the one who didn’t invent understand the invented object as sufficiently proximate to the inventor himself? No other way than iff all humans have the same basic conceptual capacities, abide by the same cognitive rules. But having them isn’t enough; how did we get them, or even, what are they?

Well, we just don’t know, do we. We know the ends, insofar as there is cross-species agreement on some considerations, but haven’t a clue to the means in the same empirical manifestation as the end agreement. That which we don’t empirically know, which underlies what we do, which can only happen iff there is that which underpins the entire system, has been called transcendental. The transcendental has that which follows from it, re: all a priori representations and their respective offspring, and by which general speculation is logically validated, but it is fruitless to seek what comes before, insofar as continuous regressive speculation has no validation at all. With respect to the average smuck on the street….folks like me…..there is nothing gained with respect to knowledge of things, by asking about what comes before the transcendental ideality of space. And there is nothing gained from the necessary truth of the principle of cause/effect by asking about the time before relations.
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I don't see that it follows that the origin is transcendental in the sense of its coming from a transcendent "realm". — Janus

As you can see, it doesn’t follow. The origin of the transcendental is buried somewhere in a particular kind of intellect. The transcendent “realm” just represents what lies outside that intellect. So, e.g., transcendent principles, just means those that only work on things of transcendent origin, which we wouldn’t know anything about, so are useless to us.

Perhaps you see the evolution from Renaissance philosophy, in which the principles corresponding to our thought do originate in the transcendent realm of deities and such, graduating to the Enlightenment precept of limiting fundamental understanding to the subject himself rather than being force-fed by gods or the community, but still leaves the origin of the grounding conditions quite unknown, even if the place of them is credited as entirely internal to the subject. So the transcendent, which isn’t the origin, became the transcendental, which is. If the gods get dumped, gotta fill the void with something, right? And no one could use the term transcendent for that which resides internally in the subject, for then he would be considerable as are gods, which just might have been frown upon by organized religion, and all this philosophical evolution was happening during still-religious times, Galileo’s predicament still fresh in the minds of academia.

It might just be that Kant coined the term transcendental in order to grant the Church its notion of transcendent supremacy and thereby its raison d’etre in the exposition for it, but at the same time, he absolutely required the very same notion, a sort of unconditioned be-all-end-all explanatory device, albeit on a rather lesser scale, with respect to the critique of reason. He stipulates we can think anything we wish, which is decidedly god-like, so we need the conditions which permit it, but at the same time, we are not gods therefore cannot think whatever we wish and then expect to get what we want out of it. To think whatever we wish allows access to the transcendent realm; the limitations of transcendental reason remove the expectations, which makes such transcendent thought a waste of time, and THAT, is the critique in a nutshell.

Everybody wins: the Church gets to retain its version of absolute supremacy, Everydayman gets to see how he can let it go.

Anyway…..food for metaphysical indigestion.

Can we think of any other sets or extra members of the four sets, or can we argue that some do not belong? — Janus

Sure it can be done, but then it isn’t the same philosophy. According to Kant, his is the definitive list, even moreso than Aristotle’s, but there are a veritable plethora of conceptions subsumed under them, which he calls schema, the majors for each category detailed in the text. I think the minors continue being filled in, as science goes on, which he says we are welcome to do on our own. For instance, under quantity is numbers, under numbers is fractions, etc., but nowadays, under numbers is also Hawking’s imaginary time, probability distributions….ooooo, and my all-time favorite…..Schrodinger’s negative entropy. And with all that, makes one wonder why folks still quibble over whether 1 + 1 = 2. (Gasp)

Biggest issue I suppose, is the fact he doesn’t show how the pure conceptions come about, other than to posit that they reside transcendentally….make of that as you will….. in understanding, to serve as rules for the reduction of the diversity of representations in intuition to that which ties them all together under a conception.
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But are we not natural beings, with a natural capacity to reflect on experience and arrive at generalized ideas about the nature of that experience and the judgements we make about it? — Janus

Absolutely we are. And there are as many ways to reflect and generalize as there are theories as to how we do it. While the categories are necessary for one theory, they may not be for another. Whether fact or fiction, Kant’s theory is nothing if not the most drudgingly complete of all. I mean….wannabe theories abound, but none have 800 pages of technical support. Hell, he even wrote a CPR for Dummies!!! Gave it a title no dummy would understand, and upon seeing it wouldn’t read the essay anyway, but still…..

If you reduce a sensory input to a decontextualized quale, that perhaps might be a "bare perception". — Pantagruel

I think a decontexualized quale as an intuition. I could get away with calling that a bare perception, as long as I didn’t cross-examine myself too much.

Your visual perceptual system essentially performs inferences….. — Pantagruel

An inference is a logical construct, and I deny to my eyes, ears, nose, skin or tongue the capacity of syllogistic propositions.

I fear there will be a pervasive conceptual inconsistency if we continue here. We’ll be the Hatfield and McCoys of philosophical discourse, so to speak. So, carry on, and have fun with it.

…..the judgement infiltrates perception…. — Pantagruel

If perception is the affect of a real physical object on the sensory apparatus, and judgement infiltrates perception, then does it follow that judgement changes how we are affected by objects? If such is the case, then, e.g., the sound made by an object would be changed by a judgement. It doesn’t make sense that the sound an apple makes hitting the floor because it fell out of your hand, will be different than the sound an apple makes hitting the floor because a judgement is that it tastes bad.

Perception is entirely independent of understanding, even though, as you say, they are necessarily related by their job descriptions.

I think we are only able to perceive chaos against a background of order. — Pantagruel

I think we are only able to perceive objects. Order/chaos is a relative quality thought to belong to an object, but not as a property for the determination of what it is. To merely perceive an object affords no judgement as to its qualitative state.

We understand chaos against the background of its complement, but that is a logical conclusion given a certain set of conditions as premises. And while I agree there is an inherent relationship, it remains that perception doesn’t do logic any more than understanding does perception.

Just like anything, it all depends on one’s interpretation of the words being used.

Perception arises out of order, order (qua change) requires causality. — Pantagruel

I think perception arises merely from the presence of something to the sensory apparatus. It’s like it just waits around, not doing much of anything until something comes along that presents itself. Perception doesn’t care about order.

Or…..benefit of the doubt….why would perception care about order? How would it know of it? Is ordered perception different than chaotic perception?

But I don’t want to go off on a tangent here. We’re talking about awareness of time.

Not in the sense of fundamental awareness, I should think. Change presupposes causality, but causality doesn’t rise to immediate awareness, as does, say, motion.

You see that, then you might ask what caused that. If you ask what does this cause, then you don’t have fundamental awareness.

I would submit the irreducible awareness, that by which every single human ever, is affected, is change.

No big deal; just throwing it out there.

Perhaps the concept of time only makes sense in the context of awareness. — Pantagruel

I’d agree with that. But then, in order to justify the concept itself, one has to ask…..what is the irreducible awareness which limits the context, such that without it, the concept wouldn’t even occur.

Cool. Bear in mind the examples were superficial. Taking it down closer to the bone, you know just as well you don’t like Brussels sprouts as you know two straight lines cannot enclose a space. Two different kinds of knowing, two different ways of knowing.

we have constructed little conceptual 'prisons' for ourselves — Tom Storm

I’d call it limitations. One hardly subjects himself to inescapable imprisonment, but one can willingly acknowledge his limitations.

In one respect I’d agree, though. Not to do with conceptual explanation, but with logical necessity are we imprisoned, insofar as we in ourselves cannot escape its legislative authority.
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You and I are both human beings, with the same intellectual abilities in general, given the same natural operation of a brain we each possess as a physical organ. Yet you detest, e.g., Brussels sprouts but I find them delicious. You think you heard a firecracker but I know that sound as from a .38 stub-nose, probably pre-1954. That sensation is explicitly identical for both of us, yet we treat it differently. Natural law, by which both our brains work, should not allow such dissimilar treatments.

Cognitive neuroscience of course, has much to say about this, relying on massive brain complexity which it can demonstrate as sufficient reason for means, but cannot prove as necessarily the case as ends. Which, ironically enough, is precisely the limitations imposed on metaphysical speculation.

Would you agree that thinking space and time as the "pure forms of intuition" and discovering the categories of judgement do both entail reflection on experience? — Janus

Sure. Thinking about the doing, and setting the doing to theory, is one thing.The actual doing, in and of itself, as an intrinsic modus operandi, is quite another.

Nature is the boss, no doubt, and our experience is governed by it, which has never been contested. We still wish to understand what it is to experience, what may be the conditions by which it is possible for us, which puts us in somewhat of a jam, insofar as we ourselves determine those conditions, but whatever we come up with cannot be in contradiction with Nature.

Are there pure intuitions? Probably not, but experience informs us that objects have a relation to each other and to us. Are there pure conceptions of the understanding? Probably not, but experience informs us of quantities, of causes, of intensities, and so on. Or, does understanding inform experience of the specifics of all those because our intelligence is naturally disposed to recognize the universal form of each of them? It can only be one or the other and however we seek to explain all that makes no difference, as long as Nature remains uncontested.

“…..The understanding gives to experience, according to the subjective and formal conditions, of sensibility as well as of apperception, the rules which alone make this experience possible….”

There probably aren’t any of the metaphysical conceptions. No such thing as reason, judgement, knowledge and whatnot. They’re inventions, meant to explain in the absence of truth, but never intended to prove in the absence of fact. I’m sure you must see the problem, that historically takes so much care in exposing, in that it is we that propose to Nature the rules by which it operates, but in doing so, we should have prohibited ourselves from the capacity for proposing, re: the absolute determinism of natural law with respect to the brain, should not allow the indeterminate possibility of subjective inference.

We’re left with doing the best we can, in not making more of a shitstorm of things than we already have.