distinction between direct and indirect realism — frank

I do prefer the other names.

What we perceive is real directly; what our cognitive system works with, is real indirectly.
— Mww

How do you know that? — frank

Because I can tell you what a real basketball is, but I promise you there’s never been a real basketball in my head.

He just directly sees the tree. — frank

Everyone directly sees the tree.

I don't think there are any representations in direct realism. — frank

Maybe not, but there are representations necessarily. It is impossible that there are not. Or if not representations, than something that supports the fact that the real object directly sensed, is not what is present in the brain.

The confusion is in what the terms themselves are meant to indicate. What we perceive is real directly; what our cognitive system works with, is real indirectly.

The guy on the left. Take away the figure in his head, put in the cloud with the figure in it. The cloud indicates the figure is a representation of the object, the real object perceived directly but represented indirectly.

Notice there’s nothing indicating the operation of the senses, in the second illustration. And notice the figure is in the head, beyond sensory apparatus. This indicates the brain works with that which is not given from the senses, but rather, works with the representations for which the senses merely provide the occassion.

Do we need a different picture? — frank

Yes. Otherwise, you’d be forced to admit the two guy’s eyes don’t work the same way, and by association, it is indeterminable who’s eyes will see the cloud and whose will not, or, the world itself is different depending on who is looking at it, any one of which gets you into all kindsa trouble.

Why does the indirect guy have that cloudy thing in front of his face?

I find that an “objective norm” (or “categorical norm”) is a norm (i.e., an obligation) which is necessarily issued by a being’s faculty of normitivity; and it is implicit and involuntary. — Bob Ross

Is there a name you might use, by which this faculty is also known?

In other words, such a norm (which is objective) is because one exists with a nature that fundamentally has such and not an obligation that they decided to fixate upon. — Bob Ross

To say one exists with a nature that fundamentally includes such an objective obligation, as opposed to some other decidable kind, seems to question the need for a faculty to issue it necessarily.

I get what you’re driving at; just trying to see if I can arrange what you say in my terms.

To be a rock….. — 180 Proof

“…And a rock feels no pain.
And an island never cries…”

hidden behind a paywall — Gnomon

https://www.academia.edu/3843328/Watkins0002

Scroll down, past all the other stuff. No registration, no pay.

What are your thoughts on existential Transcendence? — Gnomon

Categorical error. Existence for humans is immanent, not transcendent. There may be possible transcendent existences, but impossible that they be empirical for us, and for that contingent existence which is empirical, it is necessarily immanent for us.

Is it irrational to imagine the unknowable "What-If" beyond the partly known "What-Is"? — Gnomon

Beyond the partially known is merely unknown, which is not irrational to imagine. It doesn’t make any sense to ask for the unknowable what-if under any conditions, which makes asking for it regarding the partially known, irrational.

Or is it reasonable for speculative Philosophers & holistic Cosmologists daring to venture into the "Great Beyond" where pragmatic Scientists "fear to tread"? — Gnomon

Dunno about holistic cosmologists, but the speculative philosopher sometimes operates by the construction of his concepts, not solely with the employment of those having been already determined, so he can be said to venture any damn where he likes, leaving the pragmatist far behind.

Still, the reasonable speculative philosophers do have their own regulatory parameters, just that those happen to be other than determined by Nature, even if related necessarily to it, which, if overstepped, ironically enough, allows the pragmatic scientist to catch up.

My thoughts……

A423/B451

Thing is, we are only impartial umpires for someone else’s judgements as expressed in his language. For each of us, for whatever our own reason concludes, there can be no impartiality, insofar as there are no disputants in a singular cognitive system.
—————

“…. In the course of our discussion of the antinomies, we stated that it is always possible to answer all the questions which pure reason may raise; and that the plea of the limited nature of our cognition, which is unavoidable and proper in many questions regarding natural phenomena, cannot in this case be admitted, because the questions raised do not relate to the nature of things, but are necessarily originated by the nature of reason itself, and relate to its own internal constitution.…”

So it is that reason always concludes to an answer its own questions, insofar as it is its nature to do so, but may without contradiction invoke different judgements as ground for them, insofar as its internal constitution is always a logical syllogism. It’s no different in principle than considering getting to Chicago from Tampa by way of St. Louis (the thesis), or considering the same thing but instead, by way of Seattle (the antithesis). Doesn’t matter….you get there either way (the conclusion) and while one route may be better in one respect (faster, cheaper, the major premise in a syllogism), it may be better in another (you get to stop in and see Grandma and Grandpa, the major in a different syllogism). As you say, on the one hand, a logical disjunction, but not on the other, a contradiction.

Going to Chicago is of course not a transcendental notion, but the logical method is the same as an antinomy. And while the antinomies themselves in the text exhibit negation…beginning of the world/no beginning, etc….in principle the trip to Chicago is thetic/antithetic as well, re:, go this way/don’t go this way, and furthermore, even if empirically conditioned hence certainly determinable post hoc by experience, the syllogistic method remains cum hoc consistent with reason itself.

The whole point of the antinomies is that for any transcendental idea, not just the four listed major examples of one, there is an antithesis for it, which follows logically from the fact any idea presupposes its own negation. And while it may be only the philosopher that dreams this shit up, every human is capable of it, assuming his sufficient rationality. Just because he seldom if ever does, doesn’t mean he can’t, and pursuant to the proper interest of philosophy, we want to know what we can do, along with the consequence of it, not what we can’t be bothered doing.

I just lose my patience sometimes — Janus

“…. As impartial umpires, we must lay aside entirely the consideration whether the combatants are fighting for the right or for the wrong side, for the true or for the false, and allow the combat to be first decided. Perhaps, after they have wearied more than injured each other, they will discover the nothingness of their cause of quarrel and part good friends….”

More of a politician than a philosopher. — Janus

HA!! I was thinking more Lucy to everybody else’s, except a scant few, Charlie Brown. Destroys the game by yanking the football, then thinks it a win.

It is fun, though, seeing how far apart the response is, from what the response is aimed at.

Stand by for the inevitable rebuke.

I do not understand what this is about. — Banno

C’mon, man. Don’t do me like that. The “which case?” is your discussion with , re: , then repeated in kind with , re:

You chastised me for not having an interest in clarifying my account, but I’m faced on the one hand with having it discounted as wrong, making clarification of it moot, and on the other, having the occasion for its relevance repeated, making my account superfluous, hence its clarification irrelevant.

Here’s some proper philosophy for ya:

The Platonic riddle is chock full of propositions representing ideas, which to you, and anyone generally, are only appearances;
At the time, during your perception of the riddle, the world in which you are a participant, is utterly irrelevant;
At some time, between your perception of the propositions constituting the riddle, and your response constituted as “pumice is a stone”…..there were no words. Not a single one.

As soon as one realizes no words are ever spoken that are not first thought, all language philosophy loses its stranglehold on our intelligence.

But it would be an error to conclude that therefore we are, or may be, always deceived. — Banno

Being deceived is already participating in a language game - and so being deceived is participating in a world, and involves other people. — Banno

See…this is where guys like me get lost in the modern shuffle.

I pointed out the error in the one case, where the initial condition was an idea but you forced in a proposition, supposing something of the one would apply to the other, re: negation. Now, you’re doing it again, in this case the initial condition is appearance, but you forced in language, supposing something of the one would apply to the other, re: deception.

As if that wasn’t enough, if being deceived is to participate in a world, and there is nothing whatsoever for any human to particulate in except a world…..why in the HELL is it that we may not always be deceived, if the guarantee of the truth of NOT being deceived relies on the very participation that may deceive us?????

So, you’ll allow me to be justified in quoting you….

quote="Banno;789928"]It remains that much of your post could not be understood, and what could be understood was, as argued, wrong.[/quote]

Ellipsis can be an eloquent tool….. — Banno

Ehhhh….I trusted you not to have any trouble putting the proper words in place of the dots.

….you seem uninterested in clarifying your account…. — Banno

No one asked for it.

But language is the tool of the philosopher, and we ought at least understand something of how it works, and seek to use it well. — Banno

And thinking is the tool of the human being…….

I don't understand what this says. — Banno

No problem, examples notwithstanding. That understanding is required nonetheless, in order for the argument following from it to hold. Basically all it says is an idea carries its own negation, a proposition carries its own negation, but an idea cannot carry the negation of a proposition, as you implied.
————-

I think that logic and philosophy of language have moved on considerably over the last two hundred years — Banno

No doubt, those being some of what we as humans do.

But one thing hasn’t, not one iota, that being how we do what we do.

An insult to our intelligence, I say, to move on from an inquiry into how we think, for no other reason than a satisfactory proof for it is inaccessible….a euphemism for ‘well geewhiz, it’s just too hard fur lil’ ol’ me to bother with’…..yet substitute an inquiry into how we speak, for which a satisfactory proof is not even required.

Or….how to dumb-down while attempting to maintain a respectable face.

…every idea contains the seeds of its own negation, — Janus

Then presumably there is an idea that negates "every idea contains the seeds of its own negation"...? — Banno

An idea is a “problematic conception”, a singular representation of the understanding, for which the intuition of an object belonging to it is impossible, or, the representation of an object inferred as belonging to it, does not relate, re: the idea is unintelligible.
(E.g., truth, justice, up)
(re: solid time)

A proposition is a subject/copula/object synthetic judgement, necessarily containing a plurality of conceptions in a relation to each other, and is for that, a cognition.
(E.g., idea/contains/seed)

To contain the seed of its own negation merely indicates the principle of complementarity intrinsic to the dualistic nature of human intelligence, insofar as the complement for any such problematic conception, is given immediately in the thought of the original, the complement, being immediately given, requires no thought at all, insofar as its representation is precisely whatever the original’s is not.
(E.g., fiction, corruption, down)

The negation of a proposition, on the other hand, is never given immediately by the construction of the original, but is itself a different judgement predicated on different conceptions, or different modalities of the same categorical conception, all of which, without exception, must be cognized as such.
(E.g., idea/contains/words; idea/does not contain/seed)

To posit the notion that an idea contains the seeds of the negation of a proposition, is a gross misunderstanding of the constructs of theoretical a priori human reason, to which the conflict properly belongs, by the insinuation of analytic language philosophy, to which it doesn’t.

every idea contains the seeds of its own negation, — Janus

Yep.

Such speculations are metaphysical, not physical. — Gnomon

Depending on whose terminology is used, such speculations are transcendental, insofar as ALL speculations, whether physical/empirical or transcendental, are metaphysical. Anything predicated on logic a priori, as opposed to observation a posteriori, is from a logical ground, hence the name transcendental. Other philosophies, or even other properly scientific doctrines, re: demonstrable cause/effect conclusions, may use other names, but reason itself remains as it is.

….was Kant saying that his own Transcendental Idealism is an illusion and an error? — Gnomon

No.

….was he merely warning about how easy it is for reason to accept "appearances" as reality, and also to imagine "ideals" as more real than the testimony of the senses? — Gnomon

Reason doesn’t concern itself with the reality of appearances, nor imagining ideals. Reason is a logical function, by which the principles we understand in support of science, are applied to that which science doesn’t support, or hasn’t yet supported. Sometimes it works, re: chasing light beams and standing in free-falling elevators, sometimes it doesn’t, re: an unconditioned cause.

The transgression occurs when we try to extend our metaphysical Minds beyond the physical limits of space-time-matter-energy. Is that excursion even permissible in modern empirical Philosophy? — Gnomon

From the prelude to the exposition of the antinomies….

“…. It may be said that the object of a merely transcendental idea is something of which we have no conception, although the idea may be a necessary product of reason according to its original laws. For, in fact, a conception of an object that is adequate to the idea given by reason, is impossible. For such an object must be capable of being presented and intuited in a possible experience. But we should express our meaning better, and with less risk of being misunderstood, if we said that we can have no knowledge of an object, which perfectly corresponds to an idea, although we may possess a problematical conception thereof.

Now the transcendental reality at least of the pure conceptions of reason rests upon the fact that we are led to such ideas by a necessary procedure of reason. There must therefore be syllogisms which contain no empirical premisses, and by means of which we conclude from something that we do know, to something of which we do not even possess a conception, to which we, nevertheless, by an unavoidable illusion, ascribe objective reality. Such arguments are, as regards their result, rather to be termed sophisms than syllogisms, although indeed, as regards their origin, they are very well entitled to the latter name, inasmuch as they are not fictions or accidental products of reason, but are necessitated by its very nature. They are sophisms, not of men, but of pure reason herself, from which the wisest cannot free himself. After long labour he may be able to guard against the error, but he can never be thoroughly rid of the illusion which continually mocks and misleads him.…”
(CPR, A339/B397)

…..the argument is that it isn’t so much a question of whether or not our metaphysical minds are permitted to wander beyond the limits of space-time-matter-energy, but that it has a tendency to so wander in accordance with its own nature. The antinomies themselves merely demonstrate, on the one hand, reason’s proclivity to transcendental illusion, and on the other, the very same reason’s exposition of the error contained in it.

Humans do this all the time, albeit not necessarily on the extreme scale shown in the antinomies, in that no matter what anybody says, from deities to theoretical physics, odds are that somebody else will find something wrong with it.

Ok. Thanks.

You’re overthinking it, perhaps.

The context is…..what exemplifies philosophical thought, pursuant to the OP, or elaborations on it. This asks for something in general, not a specific theory or its predicates. I’m just saying the erasure of us from the picture of that which exemplifies philosophical thought, is impossible, in that whatever it is, without us, there isn’t any philosophical thought to exemplify.

Kant erased real human individuals from the picture in favour of an abstraction, the transcendental subject: — Jamal

The context is what exemplifies philosophical thought. Real human individuals, in the form of “finite human beings” never are alone sufficient for that which exemplifies philosophical thought, even if such beings are necessary for it, hence the erasure of such beings thoroughly eliminates philosophical thought, but doesn’t exemplify what it is. This ultimately reduces to…..we weren’t so much erased, as we were merely presupposed, as finite human beings, in a picture of that by which philosophical thought is first possible, and subsequently exemplified.

The claim that the erasure of us, which in the stated context is merely a plurality of selfs, was something accomplished with respect to that which exemplifies philosophical thought, is the absurdity…or, apparent absurdity…..needing address.

Knitted my eyebrows right there myself.

…..none of the supposed solutions is tenable. — Banno

Yeah, it’s pretty much established, via the historical record in general and this article by Chalmers in particular, that philosophy’s main claim-to-fame is to never leave well-enough alone.

Yeah, my mistake. The quote says not plausible, which isn’t the same as implausible.

So this must be the joke everybody’s talking about….all positions are implausible but any of them might be true. And if one of them turns out to be true, it mustn’t have been implausible after all.

Which just says substance monism is no better or worse than any other -ism. So what’s the point of it? How is it not adding another implausibility on top of all the others?

I’d hope a guy with his credentials would posit something useful. And if one of them must be true, does he make any headway in showing his position is?

Far FAR too many -isms and their respective -ists for me.

So if no position on the mind-body problem is plausible, and substance monism is a position that addresses that problem, what advantage does it hold?

Thanks.

As in, “…. the thesis that the universe is fundamentally mental….that all concrete facts are grounded in mental facts….”?

Substance monism arises from that?

Do you take 'transcendental' to mean beyond experience, unknowable? — Janus

It is a method, a type, of reason, of thinking, by which, first and foremost, the possibility of synthetic a priori cognitions are proven. Subsequently, and using such cognitions as logical ground, transcendental this or that just indicates the conditions under which this or that is thought about.

So you can cognize beyond experience and knowledge by thinking transcendentally, but transcendental doesn’t mean a reality of things beyond even possible experience and knowledge, which technically, is termed transcendent.
————

All we know is that we think there must be such a reality, a transcendental (because unknowable-as-it-is-in-itself reality), but a reality nonetheless — Janus

Hmmm…..Do we think there must be, or is it more likely we only think it is not impossible that there may be?

that is why I say transcendental realism seems to logically follow. But again that is not an empirically established conclusion (…) It is, rather, an inference to the best explanation. — Janus

Interesting. Logically follow….from what? What do you think is better explained by inferring a transcendental realism?

Even more interesting….how does the consistency of our perceptual representations suggest our senses are representing the noumenal accurately enough for practical purposes?

I’m trying to think like you, so give me more to work with, maybe?
————

You said: This from the Chalmers paper seems to support my interpretation of Kant:

Kant’s transcendental idealism is not really a version of idealism in the metaphysical sense I am concerned with here.

What version of idealism in a metaphysical sense is Chalmers concerned with?

You agree the object in itself is transcendental (to experience) and real….so why not transcendental realism? — Janus

I suppose transcendental to experience just means has nothing to do with it. Transcendental merely indicates a method of reason, and is always a priori, so I’d agree the thing in itself has nothing to do with experience. Took me awhile to sort that out, and I’m still not sure if I read you correctly.

As to why not transcendental realism, is the assignment of a mere conception alone to validate a physical object, and as we all know, conception alone is in no way sufficient for empirical knowledge. On the other hand, the fact of perception makes explicit the reality necessary for its cause, which makes the thing in itself a necessary antecedent condition, even if nothing can be known of it in itself, insofar as it is the representation only, of the thing in itself, that is.

So….here we go.

There are established philosophies in which is found a mix of Kantian transcendental conceptions adjoined to real objects, re: Berkeley and successor dogmatic idealists, the ground of which is the attribution of Kantian transcendental conceptions of space and time as properties adhering in objects.
(The granting of singular space and time to an object, as opposed to the relation of object to space and time generally. This thing is right here, right now, therefore a space and a time belong to any object right here right now)

For those who think thus, a form of realism in which space and time are properties belonging to objects, they wouldn’t thereby consider themselves transcendental realists, insofar as, transcendentally, in Kant, space and time are two conceptions embracing the infinite, yet having no intrinsic substance belonging to them, the seriously contradictory results of that being quite obvious.

1.) If space and time are infinite, it is impossible to even think, must less determine, which space and which time belongs to a particular object immediately appearing to our senses.

2.) If a space and a time belong to an object, it is impossible to explain motion and duration, without claiming the space and time follow the object because it is a property belonging to it. But if that is the reality, it needs be said what fills the void left by change of position and change in successive durations of such object. While empty space is conceivable as having no object in it, it is impossible to conceive of no space at all, which must be admitted if a moving object includes its own space.
(Sidebar: back in my higher education days, in the theory of electron movement….electrons go this way, holes go the opposite way, insofar as a moving electron leaves a hole where it was. But this, just as for space and time, can be a misappropriated conceptual device)

3.) Without the possibility of determining which space and which time, of the infinite manifold of each, belongs to an object, it is impossible to prove that one and only one object can have that one singular spatial property and it is impossible to prove that an object can exhibit the very same existence in a succession of times. Before thinking this is preposterous, reflect on Feynman positing that if it is impossible to determine which path the particle takes through the slit, we must admit it took all of them., a.k.a., “sum over histories” hypothetical premise. And with that initial premise, is given the starting point for demonstrations otherwise.

So there may be a realism in which space and time are properties belonging to objects, but it is impossible for those holding with it to be transcendental realists in a Kantian sense. And if it be granted Kant defines transcendental philosophy, then the notion of transcendental realism itself, is refuted, from which follows necessarily, that those holding with it, have misunderstood the world.

For transcendental realism to be a valid doctrine, the concept of transcendental itself, and all that follows from it, must be conceived quite differently.
————

I'm not an adherent, so not what I had in mind. — Janus

Not an adherent taken to mean regarding the hard problem…..hence my question mark. So did you have something else in mind, as to where we are left when it is the case there is one world but for which we cannot have direct, unmediated knowledge?

If #1…..not so sure a reality is a collective representation.
If #2…..real, and indeterminable.
If #3….that object which appears to us is determinable/knowable. The object in itself is the object as it doesn’t appear, hence is not determinable/knowable.
————-

where does that leave us? — Janus

With the hard problem of consciousness?

It's an interesting question whether Kant's "in itself" denotes a reality — Janus

“…. The schema of reality is existence in a determined time….”
“…. For I can say only of a thing in itself that it exists without relation to the senses and experience….”
“…. we can have no cognition of an object, as a thing in itself, but only as an object of sensible intuition, that is, as phenomenon…”

Put them together, you get an affirmation that the thing in itself denotes an existence in a determined time.

controversy as to whether Kant's emprical/ transcendental dichotomy should be interpreted as a "dual aspect" or a "dual world" proposition. — Janus

If there is no direct knowledge of the world, but only of its representations, there is no need for a dual world. There is one world affecting the senses, half of a dual aspect, and the system by which it is understood, the other half.

Lots between the lines in all that, if you’re inclined to dig it out.

Everything I said here seven hours ago, doesn’t relate to the content of the post it was in response to. You did some serious editing, I must say.

Anyway…..I’m not up for a do-over, so, thanks for the talk.

That the truth depends on something isn’t that it depends on the existence of something. — Michael

Be that as it may, isn’t the prerogative of intelligence, insofar as it deems truth to be a valid idea, to determine what it does depends on, from whence does truth receive its justification?

I suppose you could argue for mathematical realism and claim that mathematical entities exist as abstract objects, but that seems both unnecessary and fantastical. — Michael

I’d go with fantastical, but I’d be reluctant to deny necessity. Just as for truth, there must be something by which the comprehending the appearance of natural relations, becomes possible.

What else is there?
— Mww

Probably nothing. The mistake is in thinking that a statement's truth depends on the existence of something. — Michael

On the existence of something, agreed. But it does seem as though truth must depend on something, and absent mind and matter there is probably nothing, that leaves truth to be dependent on probably something. Which probably causes the critical thinker to raise one incredulous eyebrow and the average thinker to raise ‘em both.
————

….there is a square root of 2. Its truth just has nothing to do with anything that exists. — Michael

Truth, here, just indicates there is no inherent self-contradiction in the proposition, which, again, requires a mind, does it not? Whether mind or reason, even if not attributed with existence, must be something. Or maybe it’s better to say must be not nothing.
————

And as a related point, (…) idealism doesn't entail solipsism. — Michael

No, it doesn’t and shouldn’t, but typically it happens. Definition-specific apparently.

…….there is a truth to the square root of 2 and this truth is independent of all the minds that exist. — Michael

……there is a truth to the square root of 2 and this truth is independent of all the matter that exists. — Michael

What else is there?