…….there is a truth to the square root of 2 and this truth is independent of all the minds that exist. — Michael

……there is a truth to the square root of 2 and this truth is independent of all the matter that exists. — Michael

What else is there?

I don't read that as Kant conceding dualism….. — Janus

“…..The transcendental idealist, on the other hand, may be an empirical realist, or as he is called, a dualist. (…) A370a

The transcendental idealist is, therefore an empirical realist, and allows matter, as appearance, a reality which does not permit of being inferred, but immediately perceived.(…) A371

From the start we have declared ourselves in favor of this transcendental idealism, and our doctrine thus removes all difficulty in the way of accepting the reality of matter…” A370b

A is B, B is C, therefore A is C? That’s one way to read Kant as conceding the dualism with which the present general dialectic is concerned.

But that’s not even the most important part. Notice no mention of particular things, no mention of determined objects, but only of matter. If one then concedes Kant to mean the appearance of matter is not, and cannot be, the perception of named things, it becomes clear in relation to your….

I would say that our senses are not pre-cognitively affected by objects — Janus

….that in a Kantian sense, our senses are indeed pre-cognitively affected by objects. Senses are affected pre-cognition. Affected antecedent to their phenomenal representation, hence, antecedent to being thought, which is antecedent to be cognized as a particular form of matter, or, which is the same thing, as a particular object.

You’re probably thinking along the lines that as soon as we know what a thing is, our senses are not pre-cognitively affected. Which is fine, as long as you don’t consider what happens within the cognitive system itself, that tells it it has nothing to do when it receives an input to the senses from something already determined.

All sorts of inconsistencies arise if one considers the system stops doing its job, no matter the reason. On the one hand we have a system that works one way for knowing a thing, and on the other hand we have a system that works some other way for remembering the thing it knows. So far, so good. But what tells the system the known thing and the remembered thing relate to each other, sufficiently enough to be identical, and furthermore, what happened in the case where they do not so relate?

What’s the difference between saying we know the thing as a tree and remember it as such, or, we cognize some matter as being, e.g. a tree, every single instance of that matter being an affect on our senses? If there is no difference, it then suffices to say the latter very well could be the case, the immediate advantage being the removal of any operational inconsistencies, insofar as the cognitive system works in its procedural entirety each and every instance of the appearance of matter to it.

And what entails that matter affects the senses in such a way as to be consistently represented? Why…its being given to us as extended and shaped in a certain way in space, of course. As such, as far as concerns the senses, there never is a tree, a branch, a leaf. Or even the dirt all that came out of. There isn’t even any “coming out of”. There is only matter of certain extension and shape that were once not given, then were.

In general, then, as long as the matter’s extension and shape don’t change, the representations of them won’t change, and they all will end up being known as a single consistent thing to all observers with congruent cognitive systems, so everybody experiences the same thing. So when you asked that guy how many branches he sees, by all accounts he should see just as many as you, insofar as his senses are affected in exactly the same way, by exactly the same matter, as yours. All else being given….language, rationality and so on.

TA-DAAAA!!!! I mean….how much simpler can it be!!!!

….could be interpreted to mean that they really are extended and that on account of that they can make their appearance to our senses. — Janus

That is what is meant by the term appearance, yes.

Not to take sides, but the question in this…..

What could it then mean to say that there was a time before human beings existed?
— Janus

I said that it is a matter of empirical fact. — Wayfarer

….is not supported by the answer, unless time is to be considered an empirical matter, a contradiction. A time before humans existed certainly has meaning, but the meaning is logical, in the form of inference to a self-sustaining series of regressive successions, which are not themselves matters of empirical fact, and that only possible insofar as there happen to be humans with the ability to think in terms of mere relations.
———-

given the challenging nature of the issue — Wayfarer

Yeah, about that. Humans: invent stuff to explain other stuff, but can’t explain the stuff they invent to explain that other stuff. They say that stuff is only possible for us if this stuff comes first, but can’t say how this stuff came first.

And that’s only the half of it, fercryin’outloud!!! On top of all that, they demand certain knowledge of that stuff, but predicate that very certainty on stuff the certainty of which is completely different in kind and measure than belongs to that which they want to know about!!!!

It’s what makes philosophy so much fun: finding out who’s got the most reasonable explanation for, and means for preventing, the nonsense we inevitably bring upon ourselves.
———

I'm also intrigued that Kant appears to concede dualism in that passage — Wayfarer

I’m intrigued as to why he said for the record he is a dualist in A, but sorta misplaced it in B. Maybe he figured he didn’t need to say it twice….dunno. But it is conspicuous in its absence.

The question about what the world would be like without any percipients in it seems unanswerable, even incoherent, — Janus

Agreed. Who what ask? Inferences as to what it might have been like without them, abound, now that there are percipients that do ask.

…..to my way of thinking extension just is spatiality. — Janus

That’s fine. Spatiality is merely another form of the conception of space, which we already have. Extension is spatiality and extended in space say the same thing. But do either of them tell us anything about space?
——-

With the "degrees of separation" thing I actually had in mind the simple fact that objects appear extended to us….. — Janus

As long as appears in “objects appear extended” means objects are presented to us as being extended. Or, objects make their appearance to our senses by being extended. And not…objects look to us like they are extended. Only in this distinction does ’s A369 quote make sense, and indeed the conception of spatial extension itself, re: “… outer appearances (if their reality is conceded)…”.

do we merely imagine that we know what we are talking about with such projections? — Janus

Ha!!! Saturn isn’t even thought about absent its rings, but there was a time when it didn’t have any. And I seriously doubt quarks are actually colored. One can possibly experience that which he imagines, but he can never simply imagine that which he has experienced.

If imagination as a faculty has the power attributed to it in theory, it occurs that one always imagines that which eventually he comes to know. But with respect to the projection of existence you’re asking about, though, there are serious contradictions if we deny the existence of the world before human experience, which at least allows us to project that it did, but the fact remains, we cannot possibly know the fact of it in the same fashion by which we know apodeitically that stupid-ass tree has three branches.
————

Kant could have said that the empirical world, time and space and all, possibly exist outside of human experience and judgement, whereas they necessarily exist within that context? — Janus

He does say that. Then demonstrates how it is impossible, iff a certain set of conditions are in fact the case. If they aren’t, well…..time for another demonstration of a different kind, and we find ourselves faced with stuff like logical positivism, OLP and quantum mechanics, in which case…..errr, you know…..we imagine we know what we’re talking about.
———-

Experience is of representations of objects in space, but not of space itself, which can never be represented in us.
— Mww

I think we do perceive dimension, or degrees of separation, which just is space, so it seems I disagree here. — Janus

Maybe, but you’re talking perception and I’m talking experience. Yours is on the one end of the cognitive spectrum, as means, mine is on the other, as ends. Nevertheless, I’d say we think dimension and degrees of separation, which are just representations for the appearance of one object’s relation to an observer, or objects in relation to each other, and for which we couldn’t represent at all if those objects weren’t to be found somewhere other than in the very system which is thinking about them.

Yes, we do perceive degrees of separation…this is closer than that, this is adjacent to that. This is of the same time as that. This is this now but was that before. But, what, in the most basic, primal way possible, makes all that, make sense to us? Gotta start somewhere, right?

….I’m not sure about universal truth as such.
— Mww

I'm assuming from this that you don't think there are moral or aesthetic truths? — Tom Storm

Deontological moral philosophy mandates compliance to a moral law, which is the same as there being a universal moral truth, that if one adheres to this mandate without regard for circumstance and therefore without exception, then he is a truly moral agent. It is in this case a universal truth but under entirely subjective conditions.

Needless to say, it follows that there may be as many universal moral truths as there are truly moral agents. And even if one guy recognizes another as adhering to his moral truth, is nonetheless disgusted by it, hence would never adhere to it, which is sufficient to render objective universal moral truths to vanishingly small possibility.

Aesthetic truths are very different in occasion even if similar in form, insofar as they merely reflect some condition of a perceiving subject prescribed by the feeling instilled in him through observation of something with which he had absolutely nothing whatsoever to do. A guy’s aesthetic truth may very well be that the Mona Lisa is the ugliest broad he’s ever seen, and enlightenment of him by established authorities regarding the artist’s technique, the physics of paint and application of it, physics of light and shadow, sway him not the least.

The mitigating factor is causality. In the former, even though the subjective condition is an aesthetic feeling, it is a feeing of satisfaction as an effect for being a moral agent, which he caused himself to be and for which no representation is possible; in the latter the subjective condition is still an aesthetic feeling, but of a relative pain/pleasure affect caused only by the object, but for which representation is necessary.

So…universal truths in Nature the causality for which has nothing to do with us? No, I don’t think there are any, insofar as the logic of pure speculative reason is against us, but if there were we couldn’t ignore them. Universal truths for which we ourselves are causality? Yes there are, insofar as the logic of pure practical reason demands it to be so, but those we can, and often do, ignore.
———-

“…. many a book would have been much clearer, if it had not been intended to be so very clear….”

Or….sometimes you just want a simple yes or no, but you end up with a miniature dissertation.

If I claim that the Universe existed prior to humans that is a claim about existence outside of the context of human experience and judgement. — Janus

That’s technically a logical inference, hence certainly not independent of human experience and judgement. Nevertheless, with this, you’re attributing a justified universal claim to existence, when we’ve been relating justified universal claims to human experience and judgement. Which reduces to….the specified existence is outside human experience and judgement, but the claim is not.
————

Our notion of existence is derived from our experience and the concept is fine in that context. But are we justified in projecting that concept beyond that context, by saying things like 'the world existed prior to humans' or the 'the world didn't exist prior to humans'? — Janus

Good point. It is a different kind of logical inference, however, that our existence….not the notion of it, but the fact of it….derives from experience on the one hand, which is deductive, and existences outside our experience, which is inductive. So, yes, I think we can project the concept, but not in that context; we invoke the category of necessity in the former, but possibility in the latter.
————

Not all experiences are spacial, but the body and all other objects are experienced as existing in spacetime. Does it follow that we and all other objects can only exist or be in spacetime? — Janus

Another good point. Yes, and no. Yes according to certain theories, no if other theories falsify the one that says yes. But there haven’t been any falsifying theories, at least no paradigm shifting, everybody’s on the new bandwagon kinda theory, so it seems we’re pretty much stuck with the paradigm-shifting theory we’ve already been given.

If I were to go all nit-picky, on ya, quibble-y even, I’d bring to your attention that no experience is spatial. They are temporal, as you said. Experience is of representations of objects in space, but not of space itself, which can never be represented in us.
————-

such claims are justified only if you believe that the very fact that we can imagine certain things reflects some higher, human-independent truth. — Janus

Ehhhh…maybe. I’m in the nature-of-the-human-beast camp myself; maybe we can imagine just about anything we want, just because we can. Even if there is a higher, human independent truth, it would only be comprehensible if our intelligence permits it, and if it did, it wouldn’t be either higher or human independent. And if it didn’t, then we’d never know about it anyway. You know…the ol’ transcendental illusion trick: reason thinks this stuff up, which is quite obviously within its purview, because we actually do it, but then can’t do anything with it.

Anyway….good talk.

….there can be no justifiable universal claims that purport to obtain independently of the context of human experience and judgement. — Janus

Ok, close enough. There certainly are justified universal claims, but there are no justified universal claims independent of human intelligence. I mean…where else but from human intelligence can any claim come from, justified or not?

There could be justifiable universal claims about human experience, but I understand such claims to be phenomenological, not metaphysical. — Janus

Sure, I guess. There is no such thing as universal human experience is itself a justified universal claim about human experience. Still, being tautological, the claim tells us nothing we didn’t already know, given the infinite conditions of space and time, which are the necessary conditions for experience in the first place, both of which are implied by universality, and is certainly contained in a metaphysical doctrine.

If phenomenology justifies universal claims about human experience other than the one I just stated…..so be it. I wouldn’t dare say there aren’t any, but I would dare you to offer one that isn’t every bit as metaphysical as it is phenomenological.
———-

Heidegger equates phenomenology with metaphysics, but then that would not be the kind of traditional metaphysics that does make claims that purport to obtain independently of the human context. — Janus

Hmmm. That presupposes there is such a traditional metaphysics, which may be true whether or not I’m even the least familiar with it. Which puts me in a tough spot, insofar as if you offer such a justified universal claim that purports to obtain independently of human context, in a non-traditional metaphysical way, in accordance with the phenomenological doctrine, I’m pretty sure I won’t understand it. But others seems to well enough, so…there ya go.

….would that not be to posit that such reasoning yields universal truth, at least as regards the human? — Janus

That’s not what kills the definition. Independent of human understanding, in the original post’s wording, does. But I see you’ve added the qualifier later.

There may be things that are true universally, re: pure mathematical and logical propositions, in accordance with our intelligence, but I’m not sure about universal truth as such. What could be true under any possible condition, including whatever kind of possible intelligence, when the totality of possible conditions is itself inconceivable?

I see a priori reasoning to principles as phenomenological and pragmatic, not metaphysical. — Janus

That’s fine, but with respect to Kant, from whence this exchange originated, metaphysics is a priori reasoning from principles, and the latter would always and necessarily consider the former as merely the tail wagging the dog. Unfairly perhaps, but from the meager top-down predisposition, there it is.

My definition of what qualifies as a metaphysical claim would be that it purports to be a universal and absolute truth, independent of human experience and understanding. — Janus

That definition would certainly turn any metaphysical doctrine endorsing it into irredeemable junk. Thankfully there are definitions without those conceptual relations, which do not.

As Kant has shown us, no metaphysical views are supported, because they are the erroneous attempt to extrapolate to an "ultimate" "god's eye" view of reality — Janus

Dogmatic metaphysical views, and metaphysical views as an empirical science, are not supported. And the metaphysical view regarding pure speculative reason’s attempts to obtain the unconditioned in any form, is not supported.

Some metaphysical views must be supported, otherwise transcendental philosophy as a doctrine grounded in synthetic a priori principles, is invalid. And even if the validity is subjected to dispute, it can only be from different initial conditions, which are themselves metaphysical views.
———-

There's an expression that captures what I was getting at: Cartesian anxiety….. — Wayfarer

I hadn’t considered Cartesian anxiety; just lending credence to….“the idea that we see the world as it is completely separately from us, as if we're not part of it - is mistaken”.

I'm not saying that our designation as 'beings' means that we are beings in the causative sense…. — Wayfarer

Cool. Just me, personalized conceptual analysis.

idealists" of a certain variety (…) have to bite the bullet and say that non-living things have some sort of experientialness…. — schopenhauer1

I hate the taste of bullets.

….the idea that we see the world as it is completely separately from us, as if we're not part of it - is mistaken…. — Wayfarer

It must be mistaken; it is self-contradictory. Twice.

If it was completely separate from us, we wouldn’t see anything at all;
Insofar as we do see, it is necessary that we be part of that something which is seen.
———-

…..through rational sentient creatures such as ourselves, the universe comes into being…. — Wayfarer

This seems dangerously close to sentience as sufficient existential causality. Might be more the philosophical case, that the universe assumes a form in accordance with the rationality of sentient creatures.

…..which is why we're designated 'beings'. — Wayfarer

I fail to grasp how that explanatory qualifier justifies the original assertion. Maybe just needs an elucidation of “being”…..

Me: idealism not in its strictest sense….external material reality granted;
You: strict idealism….external reality is material, denied.

What’s the difference? Not strict idealism grants; strict idealism denies. We’re saying the same fargin’ thing!!
———

Why Kant proposes an idealism, and that of a particular kind…..is in dispute to the empiricists of the day.

In the idealism Kant proposes…..noumena are proposed, superficially, in that they represent what not to do; or technically, in that they represent what understanding is capable of if left unchecked by itself. They are, after the paint has dried, metaphysically insignificant.

What I'm pointing out is that the claims of the idealists, such as Magee and Kant, are themselves delivered as "what actually is" about humans. — L'éléphant

“…. In order to prevent any misunderstanding, it will be requisite, in the first place, to recapitulate, as clearly as possible, what our opinion is with respect to the fundamental nature of our sensuous cognition in general….”

“… This completeness of the analysis of these radical conceptions, as well as of the deduction from the conceptions à priori which may be given by the analysis, we can, however, easily attain, provided only that we are in possession of all these radical conceptions, which are to serve as principles of the synthesis…”

“… Transcendental philosophy is the idea of a science, for which the Critique of Pure Reason must sketch the whole plan architectonically, that is, from principles, with a full guarantee for the validity and stability of all the parts which enter into the building.…”

Nothing in Kantian tripartite critical philosophy asserts “what actually is” about humans, but is merely a domain-specific series of if-then logical syllogisms writ large, which at most, says what actually is about a speculative theory.
———

On the other hand, there are “….claims (….) delivered as “what actually is”.…”, serving as premises for the logical method following from them….

“…. That all our knowledge begins with experience there can be no doubt. For how is it possible that the faculty of cognition should be awakened into exercise otherwise than by means of objects which affect our senses, and partly of themselves produce representations, partly rouse our powers of understanding into activity, to compare to connect, or to separate these, and so to convert the raw material of our sensuous impressions into a knowledge of objects, which is called experience….”

….and this, with respect to his theory of knowledge alone, is not idealism in its strictest sense, insofar as external material reality is tacitly granted as a necessary condition.

my prejudices are not as uncommon as it might seem — Banno

Nope, hardly uncommon. Everybody’s got ‘em, maybe not so overtly….you know…contrarian.

Your prejudices are showing.

Two cents. Or in this case….. kronenthalers.

We have to raise almost impossibly deep levels of presupposition….

Because the topic is an objector’s misunderstanding of a “Kantian demonstration”, and without an intrinsic dualism the demonstration wouldn’t be Kantian at all, there are exactly two “impossibly deep levels of presupposition” with respect to empirical conditions, the first being the treatment of space and time concerned with intuitions, and the second being the categories concerned with conceptions.

…..and thus achieve an understanding of transcendental idealism which is untainted by them.

Them being the concepts as we normally use them, as we usually use them is in regard to the whole of the empirical world, the inborn realism which arises from the original disposition of the intellect being the difficulty with which transcendental idealism always contends.

All that reduces to….the original disposition of the intellect is mere observation, from which arises the assumptions of the inborn, re: non-critical, realism, that the empirical world is in space and time.

Transcendental realism says it is, but, of course, it is not, and by which the untaintedness of transcendental idealism is justified. And THAT, is what Kantian transcendental philosophy, in the form of speculative pure reason, proves, given the validity of those aforementioned presuppositions.

As stated, Magee didn’t say, so I took the liberty. Hope you don’t mind.

I didn’t forget or ignore; just couldn’t come up with anything more to say.

Been real, all the same.

‘Til next time…..

….the thing that's 'out there'. It seems something of an odd pastime of philosophers to start fiddling with that. — Isaac

Logical thing to do, from their point of view, when fiddling with the ‘in here’ couldn’t be improved.

Mostly, we're grateful. — Isaac

I can….errr….‘see’ how that is likely true.

You know…the currently fashionable talk at the table. Linked herein some time ago by somebody. And, fortuitously enough, upon reconciliation of the ambiguity over the word “see” and other assorted and sundry “perceptual verbs”, the Bad Argument disappears. Still, as we all know only too well, only to be replaced with another one.

What is it about trees, for these people, that is so impenetrable, I wonder? — Isaac

Dunno about “these people”, but lil’ ol’ me…..go back to that picture on pg 4. See that word “tree beside the object? At the same time, notice the first condition of visual experience in Searle’s list? See where the picture says tree, but #1 says object?

In Searle’s list, object becomes tree at #3, and in the picture it can be a tree only after Searle’s #3, but without that condition, which is not even implied by the picture, it is the case that it should have been object on the left, at instance of perception, and never a tree. Nevertheless, the picture correctly represents the initial conditions for visual experience, demonstrating the presentation of an object directly to the system, according to physical law.
———-

Other oddities from indirect realists here….. — Isaac

Ehhhh….that’s just conflicts in domain of discourse. Over-extended physicalist reductionism adds nothing to the human physiological act of perceiving, such that without it knowledge of objects is impossible. Our intellect, in its empirical manifestations, concerns itself initially with the output of sensory devices rather than their input, and it shouldn’t be contentious that our intellect works indirectly with, and is necessarily conditioned by, the real in accordance with its own methodology, whatever that may in fact be.

Ya know, something I wondered about, given our conversations, fly on the wall kinda thing….are you and your colleagues appalled at the extent to which humans can’t find agreement among themselves on the most fundamental human considerations? To be honest, I might guess you guys just figure we all like to bark at the moon, confident in the pretension that it is listening.

Anything that is the “mechanics of human vision” is itself the perceiving…… — NOS4A2

The mechanics of any human sensory device makes the perceiving possible, being necessary but not sufficient for it, in accordance with their design alone.

…..and not the perceived. — NOS4A2

Obviously, hence trivially correct.

If indirect realism accepts this it is redundant. — NOS4A2

Redundancy is moot, insofar as the proper indirect realist accepts as given, that the mechanics is neither the perceiving nor the perceived. The former belongs strictly to agency, the latter belongs strictly to that which affects agency.

If sensation is removed, as output of sensory devices, and all else being undisturbed, is it rational to say perceiving remains intact?

Which tree do we perceive? And who is perceiving that tree? — NOS4A2

All that picture does is demonstrate the mechanics of human vision, from which the answer to that question is impossible, insofar as both forms of realism must accept that physiology.

Remove the word “tree”, then ask where and when the warrant for putting anything in its place, comes from.

Now let the games begin.

The particular is never conceptualized. — Metaphysician Undercover

No? Then what is? And what of the notion that all thoughts are singular and succession, which implies any thought is itself a particular instance of it? All conceptions are thought, so…..

The same sensation is not the consideration. Obviously, time conditions all of them, in that sensation now is not the sensation before or later. It is still logical that a sensation now is of the same thing as the sensation is of that thing at a later time. The mind doesn’t worry about the relative time of the thing itself, only the time at which we are affected by it.

Ehhhhh….Wittgenstein. I don’t care what he says. The bee sting I experienced last year is for all intents and purposes precisely the same experience I will have next time. How else to know it as caused by a bee?
————

You might call the senses information collecting tools. — Metaphysician Undercover

You might, I would not. I would limit the senses to information transferring devices, the information already residing in the things perceived. There isn’t any information collected per se, it is, rather, merely that which the mind employs as the instantiation of its methods.

Compromise: if we say my transferring is your collecting, I might still be inclined to grant intuition is the collecting tool, in that the matter of an object from which sensation proper arises, is represented as an empirical intuition. Dunno if that works for you.
———-

The information is received as formal, but it consists of forms created by something other than the mind which receives it, so the meaning inherent within must be interpreted — Metaphysician Undercover

Ok, so what something other than the mind creates forms? And if the information contains inherent meaning within it, what does understanding do? How is this not precisely the materialist doctrine writ large?
———-

And the mind receiving creates its own meaning according to what it knows in its interpretation. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ok, the mind abstracts meaning inherent within forms received as information, according to what it knows. But once again….what if the mind doesn’t know? Why would the mind create its own meaning, if there is already meaning inherent in the forms? Although, I’m beginning to see where your notion that judgement being the source of error, as I hold it to be, is not the case. I’m not sure it is legitimate to permit the mind to misinterpret, that is, mistake the meaning inherent in forms with the meaning it creates for itself.
————-

So the act of abstraction which occurs in the feeling of a sensation as per you example of a tickle, is an act of creation within the receiving mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ok. In Plato, this is “knowledge that” there is something affecting the sensory apparatus. But it is not “knowledge of” the particular object. As such, it is merely one of a general class of possibilities. The mind knows immediately what some causes of the sensation is not, but not yet as to what it is.

The mind classifies the information received, according to conceptions which it already has, and creates what appears to you as a conception of that particular instance. — Metaphysician Undercover

This works for objects received more than once. In other words, objects known to the mind as experience, re: according to conceptions which it already has. Once more, the question remains as to conceptions the mind does not have, in which case it would seem the mind couldn’t create a conception of that particular instance. Consider the alternative, wherein the mind classifies in accordance with conceptions it already has…..how is it determinable that none of them represent the forms inherent in the information it received? I don’t think ol’ Mother would imbue the human intellect with so inefficient a methodology, which requires it so eliminate all that doesn’t apply, only to find out nothing it already has, does.

But it is really just a particular instance of categorization, whereby the essentials are determined and a representation of a particular is produced. — Metaphysician Undercover

OK. This is better, in that conceptualization is really categorization, in which the essentials are determined. Now, the mind can certainly interpret the information contained in forms in accordance with categories it already has, and the categories are themselves conceptions, but of a very specific gender and origin. But no particular instance of an object of sense is ever to be conceptualized from a mere category. Th essentials determined by categorization, are necessary conditions for the possibility of knowing what an object may be in general, not properties for determining what it is in particular.

When you come into the room and see a chair, where there was a similar chair yesterday, you tend to think it is the same chair. — Metaphysician Undercover

Long before Wittgenstein, critical metaphysics established that tendency is unwarranted. Conventionally, perhaps, through lackadaisical thinking endorsed by herd mentality. Simply put, it’s just easier to say it’s the same chair because it’s too complicated to explain why it might not be, or indeed, isn’t.
————

The form of the sensed object inheres within the thing itself — Metaphysician Undercover

The primary, and probably irreconcilable, difference in our respective theories. The form resides in the mind. Sensation contributes nothing but the physical matter of the object affecting the senses.

What is a priori in the mind is some structure of universals by which the mind categorizes incoming information. — Metaphysician Undercover

YEA!!! Agreement!! Categorizes. What do you think this means? What is happening when categorizing occurs?

So the form of the thing which the mind knows is fundamentally different from the form which inheres within the thing itself, as a representation produced from placing the information within the conceptual structure. — Metaphysician Undercover

OK. The thing the mind knows as representation of sensation, is phenomenon, which is the matter of the object, arranged according to the form provided by the mind a priori, kinda like placing information within a conceptual structure.

There is no problem with "first instances" so long as we maintain the reality of the a priori which exists prior to the first instance, and makes the first instance possible. — Metaphysician Undercover

There is certainly still a problem, in that the a priori which exists prior to the first instance, the categorizing conceptual structure, and any instance at all, doesn’t have anything to do with the determination of what that thing is, only that knowing what it is, is possible from them.

Fair, but doesn’t answer the question.

The categorization of the particular according to an already held conceptual structure, isn’t the same as conceptualizing the particular sensation. So that structure isn’t how conceptualization works, but is merely the necessary criteria by which it is possible.

I would say the limitations on sensibility are physiological, and not the mind’s inherent capacity to apprehend that which is presented to it. This relates directly to the question above, insofar as there doesn’t seem to be a limit on our conceptualizing practices. The most rampant, uncontrolled faculty in human cognition, is imagination, after all, right? In fact, it is the case understanding does synthesize conceptual representations into the objects of sense that do not belong to it, re: optical illusion.

There may indeed be more information in sensation than is transferred to the mind, but such information would be irrelevant to the process of determining what an object is, insofar as understanding uses only whatever information is given to it, as phenomenon.

This is why the Aristotelian description was that the mind abstracts the form of the thing, through the means of the senses. — Metaphysician Undercover

Abstracts….from what? The thing itself? This presupposes the form is already contained in the sensation, and that the senses have some sort of self-contained deductive power. I usually resort to the ol’ tickle on the back of your neck scenario to refute such description. A tickle is a sensation, and if the form of the thing which causes the tickle is abstracted from it, it would seem we would know immediately what causes the tickle. But we do not. In fact, it is the case we sometimes sense a tickle not caused by any object at all.

There is a form belonging to any sensed object which becomes known as a certain thing, but it is not abstracted through sense, but resides a priori in the mind. This also relates to the question as to what do you do in the case of first instances.

Again….lots of what you say I agree with, but I can’t see an answer to the original question in it.

Kantian Stargazer. — Tom Storm

Useless trivia. Kant authored the precursor to currently accepted nebula dynamics. Theory of the Heavens, 1755.

Ok. So…best cast overall? Any favorite?

Is something is truly unfamiliar to us are we blind to it? — Tom Storm

In keeping with the scenario, in which perception presents to the reasoning mind, it is then contradictory to deny the presentation, so we couldn’t say we’re blind to it.

True story and case in point: So….I’m a stargazer, with all that implies. Local weather guy informs that at a certain time in a certain region of the night sky, I will experience first-hand….all else considered as given….what he has second-handedly represented for me in a mere snapshot, along with a brief strictly appearance-related description.

Next….I didn’t understand the snapshot representation properly, in that to me it looked like a time sequenced composite of a traversing single object, and all the description did was confirm the snapshot.

Now…..at the appointed time, and with the correct spatial orientation, I saw a string of pinpoint lights, musta been a hundred of ‘em, all in perfect linear succession, all at the same velocity, going my right to left, for six minutes.

I mean…can you even imagine the fascination of this experience, it having no antecedent conceptual representation whatsoever? As you say, an occasion of the truly unfamiliar? Pinpoints of light? Seen plenty of ‘em. This particular one here at this time of year, over there at that time of year? Been there, done that. A singular point moving at speed? Yep, first for me being Telstar, if I remember right. Noisey singular pinpoints a speed? Ehhh…big ol’ jet airliner. Big deal. None of which is sufficient to grant me immediate knowledge of what I saw this time. In fact, not only did I not know what I saw, I couldn’t even image something fitting the observation, such that I could guess what I saw. But still, there’s no possibility for being blind to it.

Anyway….I looked it up, updated my knowledge base, none the worse for wear. Damned if it wasn’t Elon Musk’s SpaceLink. Truth be told, I didn’t know there was such a thing in the first place.

One of those guess you had to be there moments? Despite that, hopefully you grasp the relevance.

Yeah, they weren’t that impressive.

Best cast overall…..LOTR series? Not counting old westerns and war epics.

Many favorites is a contradiction.

“A Few Good Men” for its content in general, the final courtroom scene in particular for the justification of it, and the ending for the subliminal ramifications because of it.

Outstanding critique. Well-thought, and asks pertinent questions, not all of which have answers.

Before itemizing responses, lemme ask ya, when considering this:

So perception presents all things to the reasoning mind as if they are symbols or representations of a concept already. — Metaphysician Undercover

…..what happens in the very first instance of a perception or an idea in a particular human cognitive system? By first instance I mean the very first observation of something in Nature, or the very first flash of a possibility a priori? The implicit ramification being of course, there is no experience on which to draw, therefore there is nothing in memory, re: consciousness, therefore the representation by already present conceptions is quite impossible.

Combine that scenario with the obviousness that everything whatsoever, is or was a first instance to some human intelligence. There is nothing in general known today that wasn’t first learned by someone, mostly long ago, but true nonetheless, and there is nothing known by an individual that didn’t begin with the not knowing of it.

What are you to do, when perception presents to your reasoning mind something for which it has no conceptual representations already?

Dunno about that. Maybe it’s just me. Got this thing about pigeonholes, donchaknow.

I wanna be in the canonical column, strike the anglo tag, and continental column, strike the existential/phenomenological tag.

Does that work?

Pretty good explanatory nutshell, right there.

“Cognition" for you, does not include imagination, judgement, or relating concepts. — Metaphysician Undercover

In the sense that “house” includes glass, wood, metals, it does, yes. One cannot cognize without these antecedents, but one can have those antecedents without being cognizant. This is partially why cognition regards perception alone, insofar as to say we are cognizant of our thinking, is quite superfluous.

But isn't "cognition" generally used to refer to all forms of mental activity, thinking, and understanding? — Metaphysician Undercover

Generally, perhaps. Critically, I would think not. Humans are a naturally inquisition lot, which reduces inevitably to the capacity to ask themselves questions for which there is no readily apparent answer. As soon as that happens, the quest for why not requires examination of that by which we do get answers to our questions, in order to find both, what the demarcation is, and, why there is one.

And I was earlier talking about logical processes being an activity of relating conceptions. Do you exclude logic from cognition then? — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, given the fact cognitions are of things, from which follows we are not conscious of the relating of conceptions, nor are we conscious of the judgement itself. We are conscious only of the relation of one cognition to another, which is reason. On the other hand, in aesthetic judgements having to do with conceptions alone, we are conscious of these as to how they make us feel, but we cognize nothing by them. It is easy to see that how we feel has no predication on logic, in that it is true we do in fact sometimes feel very differently than the judgement warrants. Like….the guy who fell off a ladder should have caused consternation, but you laugh because it looked so funny when he landed.
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How can you say that learning to do mathematics does not provide one with "experience"? I think that's exactly what practising things like that does, gives one experience. — Metaphysician Undercover

I’m ok with that. Except that my example is concerned with form, but yours is concerned with content. I’m saying the kid stacks numbers, gets a result, you’re saying the kid stacks 5 over 9 and gets 14. I’m saying the kid will necessarily get a result from any stack whatsoever, you’re saying the kid will only get a certain number contingent on the numbers he stacks. I’m constructing the math, which is not itself an experience, you’re using the constructs, which is.

There may be some underlying a priori principles involved in the learning process, but the method itself, which is what is employed in the judgements is learned through experience. Do you agree? — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, as long as the stipulation of being taught applies, because there are two distinct methods involved. In such case as being taught, the things being learned about are given to him, the method is presupposed, re: addition, also taught to him, which eliminates him having to exercise his pure a priori conceptions for the construction of them, an entirely different method. In other words, he needs not think what a two is, or how it came to be a two, nor does he need to understand the cause/effect of succession, but only that he should conform to an expectation.

A question of….why is it, that which is known by rote practice makes far less impression than that known from self-determination. Stands to reason it is because the mental effort of the former is far less stringent than the latter. If far less, which effort is not used, as opposed to when it is.
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And the words in my mind are representations of physical words. So why isn't such conceptualizing, cognition, as working with things? — Metaphysician Undercover

The phenomena in your mind are representations of physical words, just as in any perception. In the sense that you already know a language, you don’t need to conceptualize the words, you’ve already done it when you learned the words that constitute the language. All you need now is to judge the relation of the word you’ve learned, to the word you perceive. If you cognize a sufficient correlation, you understand what’s been said. In some cases, though, if you cognize a necessary correlation, you know what’s been said is true.
(Guy says…I just went to Home Depot. Ok, fine, you understand how that could be the case. Guy shows you a garden rake, says…I just went to Home Depot and bought this rake. Now you understand he more than likely actually did go to Home Depot. Guy says….I just went to Home Depot and bought this gallon of ice cream. Now, you understand he might have gone to Home Depot, but he more than likely didn’t buy the ice cream there, because yo have no experience of any Home Depot ever selling ice cream. Guy says…I just went to the bank and got a cashier’s check. Now you understand he had to have gone to a bank, because you know for certain there is no where else to get a cashier’s check.)
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I do not see the advantage of trying to separate the thing (as phenomenon) from the concepts — Metaphysician Undercover

In the words of The Right Honorable Professor Old Guy…..understanding does not intuit, intuition does not think. Regarding things…intuition without conception is empty, conceptions without intuition is blind.

Sustainable in application? Dunno, but it is necessary in speculative metaphysics, which is itself always in consideration of whether it is sustainable in application or not.

Maybe we've been misunderstanding each other all along, and that's why we can't work out our differences. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think it more the case we’ve been jumping around all over the place, initially talking about judgement in and of itself, whether it is false or dismissible, then bringing in “things”, then adding in will with its moral implications or not, whether judgement is this kind for this or that kind for that…..on and on and on.

Partly, too, is our posts are so long and involved, important stuff gets laid waste. I know I go back, and notice I should have commented on something.

Another is the speculative nature of metaphysics and human intelligence itself. Nobody knows what’s going on between the ears, which is license to theorize any way we wish, as long as it makes some kind of sense to somebody. As much as I spout this shit, I’d never declare with absolute certainty this method is the true rendition of it, and therefore he who denies it is missing the boat.

Anyway. Once more, into the breach…..
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You said a long time ago that cognition does not involve things
— Metaphysician Undercover

Starting five days ago, I said exactly the opposite. — Mww

I thought you said cognition doesn't involve things, it's only a matter of relating conceptions. — Metaphysician Undercover

Cognition is only of things, thus things, re: real spacetime objects, are always involved, albeit indirectly, as representations in the form of phenomena. Thing is…imagination, which is the matter of relating conceptions, and judgement, which is the relation of conceptions**, do not require things that are immediately sensed; as parts of understanding, these work on mediate things, re: prior experience, or, without any thing of sense whatsoever, re: fantoms, magic, or just possible experience.

**the adding of numbers, in the way kids are taught in school, put one number above another, draw a line under both, the implicit operation in the arithmetic above the line is analogous to the mental operation in understanding, called imagination, whereby numbers are exchanged for conceptions, regarding mere thought of things without the immediate presence of them, or even without any real sensed thing at all. This method is all a priori, and no experience is forthcoming from it.

Regarding things of sense, real spacetime objects, on the other hand, in the perception of them, one of the numbers in the arithmetic operation will be a conception, and the other number will be an intuition, in which case imagination is synthesizing a conception with a representation of the thing being perceived, which is a phenomenon. This method is a posteriori, from which is experience.

That which is below the line, regardless of which combination is above it, after the analogous arithmetic operation as sum, is the mental operation of judgement. And this for just a single perception, or a single thought. There are gazillions of them both but only one at a time, some of which we are conscious some of which we are not; reason is how they all relate to each other, how they are kept organized…..how we are not in a constant state of utter confusion yet still sometimes in a minor state. How we know things or not; how we remember things or don’t.

Just as all the number operations of different forms grouped together is mathematics, so too the entirety of the mental operation, is understanding, and thereby is it deemed the faculty of rules. It should be easy to see, that just as adding two numbers is exactly the same as adding a whole series of numbers, each stacked on top of the other in arithmetic form, two conceptions synthesized to each other is a simple, problematical, judgement, many conceptions synthesized all together, is a hypothetical judgement.
(Pointy ears may give the cognition of a dog, but pointy ears in conjunction with a bushy tail gives a more certain kind of dog. Pointy ears, bushy tail and brown spots yet a more certain kind. And so on. Sooner or later, the synthesis of sufficiently many conceptions whether from appearance or mannerisms, may very well end being the cognition of one single dog, YOUR dog, an apodeitic judgement.)
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Relating conceptions IS the judging. Mww

OK, I see now, you said judging is relating concepts, and we do not make a judgement about a thing. — Metaphysician Undercover

I made a mistake there, for which I beg forgiveness. We were at the beginning of this conversation, not yet having delved deeply enough to arrive at the subtleties. So saying, relating conceptions is imagination; the relation is judgement, perhaps clarified with the above. Sorry about that.

As for making judgement on things, I would hold with the notion we only make judgements on representations of things, whether those be phenomena regarding experience, or conceptions regarding mere thought of possible experience, or thought for which no experience is ever possible. These latter two is where reason performs its best, exerts its greatest authority, in that it will inform, given prior judgements, that current judgement just won’t work, if it contradicts either experience in the case of real objects, or logic in the case of the possibility of experience.

So it is from this, that reason is the faculty of principles. Understanding regulates conceptions according to rules; reason legislates understanding according to principles. From which follows, because judgement in part of understanding, and because rules have far less power than principles, insofar as rules presuppose their principles, judgement is the source of error in the human reasoning process.
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Now, I really do not understand the nature of this "thing" you were talking about back then, five days ago. — Metaphysician Undercover

I might take some fault here as well. You said….

…if we say that the mind reasons, i.e. thinks about things…. — Metaphysician Undercover

….to which I meant to offer…..“reasons, i.e., thinks about things”….. just doesn’t say enough. I went on to distinguish what a thing is, such that thinking as a whole does not necessary include them. In other words, reason concerns itself with everything we think, whether of real tangible things of perception, necessarily conditioned by space and time, or abstract intangible conceptual objects which understanding thinks for itself, conditioned only by time.
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Are you saying that the physical thing actually enters the mind as phenomena? — Metaphysician Undercover

Now we’re in the domain of sensibility, where we before in the domain of understanding. Human dualism, donchaknow.

What does it even mean to “enter the mind”?

To be continued?

…..philosophical dialectic practices.
— Mww

…..dialectical practises which are directed toward the understanding of reality — Metaphysician Undercover

Two different, unrelated things.
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You said a long time ago that cognition does not involve things — Metaphysician Undercover

Starting five days ago, I said exactly the opposite.
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In the end, right/wrong is inseparable from good/ bad, and they are both meant to be based in a true understanding of reality. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah, well….my true understanding of reality demands they be separated. Guess I just haven’t reached the end yet.

But this exchange is getting pretty close, what with the conversational inconsistencies, and the Platonic and the transcendental being fundamentally incompatible.

Suppose I am considering my course of action for tomorrow….. — Metaphysician Undercover

Oh my. A priori speculative metaphysics to a posteriori physical activity.

It (judgement) allows for the possibility of choice, and this same freedom of choice is what allows for the possibility of error — Metaphysician Undercover

And here we’ve switched from cognition of things, to that which can only be moral constructions.

Remind me….didn’t we agree feelings are not cognitions? And didn’t we agree the judgement of cognitions is discursive in the relation of empirical conceptions, but the judgement of feelings is aesthetic in the condition of the subject himself?

Why are they being intermingled, when each is of its own domain, and have no business interfering with each other? Allowing the one to cross over to the other weakens the human condition of intrinsic duality, the prelude to a blatant contradiction.

And don’t bother with the power of freedom in the domain of the beautiful or the sublime, insofar as these are nonetheless subjective conditions in themselves, and while certainly hinged on aesthetic judgements, cannot be concerned with errors in general, those being empirically right/wrong with respect to knowledge, or transcendentally good/bad with respect to morality.

I grant moral philosophy is more important than knowledge philosophy, insofar as in the former the subject is his own fundamental causality, which implies some relative control, whereas in the latter, Mother is the fundamental causality, which makes explicit the subject has no control whatsoever. Still, best to keep them separate in philosophical dialectic practices.