“Consciousness of the occurrence of the activity," and, "Consciousness of the activity itself" — Leontiskos

But I said consciousness of the one but not of the other.

The activity belongs to understanding; consciousness of the occurence of the activity, is merely a condition of being human.

You may still posit the two ways in which one can conceive consciousness of his own thoughts; just not this way. At least I don’t see it. Open to correction, of course.

not all thought is "first-personal,…" — Leontiskos

Which one isn’t?

A first-personal thought for Rodl is something like thinking "I think 2+2=4." — Leontiskos

Yeah, I kinda got that from him, too. But thing is….nobody does that. Or, to be fair, I question whether anybody does. Using your example, first personal thought with that content is 2 + 2 = 4. That’s it. No need for superfluous redundancies, no add-ons that make no modification.
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we are distinguishing two different ways in which one can be conscious of their own thought, — Leontiskos

Care to say more? What do you consider as two ways?

What is the difference between first and third person anyway? — Harry Hindu

Pretty open-ended question, isn’t it? Within the context I was talking about, though, there isn’t any third-person to be found, the very notion is absurd.

It seems to me that you are always stuck in one view…. — Harry Hindu

The view belonging to the subject, yet without the pitiful nonsense of Cartesian theater, right?

Thought is an activity….
— Mww

↪Mww - :up: — Leontiskos

At first, I was ok with Rödl’s initial premises; each published philosopher has his own. But later on, came to object to the development of them.

I mean…

“…. What is thought first-personally contains its being thought….” (Pg 2)

….what does that say except thought is what is thought; IS thought and BEING thought are exactly the same thing; was there ever a thought that wasn’t first-personal? Watahell’s a guy supposed to do with any of that?

Ehhhh…probably just me, too dense to unpack what’s being said.

Told you already: a contradiction on the one hand or a self-deprecation on the other.

Pick a kind of person for yourself, see which one works for that person.

I picked jackass, in which case I wouldn’t want to join a club full of jackasses. But being one, I should love to be a club full of them. Hence the contradiction.

On the other hand, when I pick Super Dad for myself, to join a club full of Super Dads puts me at risk of being too competitive, in which case I would have to lower my standards. But I wouldn’t lower my standards, which is a form of self-deprecation, hence would not want to join a club that may foist that upon me.

Then I guess I didn’t put one forward after all. Maybe it just means whatever you get out of it.

Just like anything else.

I didn’t read far enough: you said known in a different way (or not at all). I would have said not at all, re: unknown, and nothing more. As you are wont to say, to which I agree…the inaccessibility of first person experience to any subject other than the holder of it.

Still, I will treat your statement that your hand hurts very differently than if I were Bob, with respect to the conditions set forth in 2.2, re: John and his muddy face.
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I'm not sure Rödl spends sufficient time developing his notion of "first-person thinking." — Leontiskos

Agreed, albeit perhaps for different reasons. In the very beginning, we are beset with contradiction:

“…. independent of any character….”;
“….. whether it is right to think something depends (…) not on any character of the subject thinking it…..”

His notion of first-person thinking is purely mechanical, which is fine for methodology, thought is objective and all that. But the character of the subject himself is inescapable, in the determination of the conceptions he relates to each other in the manifestations of his thoughts.

It certainly seems subjectively character-laden, to represent an existence by thinking up the name “Slinky”. “Quark”. Ooooo….even a purely abstract nonsense thought….supercalifragilisticexpialidoesous!!!

But he has to be allowed his ideas, especially considering the peer group to whom he is responding; it’s up to the reader the satisfaction found in them.

…..only ever be something known to a third party…. — Wayfarer

Something un-known???

Rodl probably has only propositional, discursive thinking in mind in this essay. — J

Most of it, yeah. From which implies discursive judgements. When he talks like this, however,…

“…. In these cases, the validity of my judgment depends on something that characterizes me as the subject of the judgment: the time when I judge, the visual system whose deliverances my judgment expresses, the values that inform my judgment…”
(5.3)

….the notion behind it, is aesthetic judgements, re: necessary subjective quality thereof.

While you’re more to the point than not, I think the aesthetic kind of judgement has more to say than he’s giving it space. Meaning, I think it hard to deny that all judgement is conditioned by the quality of how the subject feels about it.

Maybe if or when he gets into moral judgements later on in the essay, that kind makes its appearance.

I just followed the required criteria, with particular interest in the puzzling part.

It’s a contradiction on the one hand, self-deprecation on the other, both merely aesthetic judgements.

Ol’ Groucho, of course, was just trying to be funny.

….an aphorism is meant to be pungent, short, and puzzling. — Bob Ross

“….I wouldn’t want to join a club that would have me as a member…”

Metallica, 1991, 1986, 1984

BOC 1972, 1973

Yeah, other’s tastes as well. Still, there are those insisting we gain nothing by deleting epistemological gnostic mysticism in order to make room for pure logic, and gain even less by inserting (gasp) a transcendental qualifier.

Another thing: in the text, 9.3, he talks about principles as they relate to and condition judgement. It’s a worthy exposé, but very far from Kantian, insofar as he treats the primacy of first judgement as conditioned by principles derived from experience, or, as he calls it, “the power of knowledge”, when in fact, these belong to pure reason. You can get to empirical judgements related to science from principles of experience, but you can’t get to judgement itself, as such, from there.
(Caveat: I skimmed; but the gist is pretty close I think. Open to deeper consideration if you’ve got some)

It must be an error to suppose that thought, in order to be objective, must be of something other than itself — Sebastian Rödl

It is an error. From a speculative metaphysical point of view, which is all we have for reference.

Thought. Not a thought, not the thought. Thought in general. Cannot be of anything but itself.

“…thought is cognition by means of the synthesis of conceptions …”, cognition in general being the object of thought in general, synthesis being the activity of thought, by which thought is represented as itself.

Hence…..wait foooorrr ittttt…..“I think”.

A thought, the thought, the cognition, is the objective to which active synthesis ascends, the conceptions conjoined therein judged according to the rules by which they do or do not belong to each other.

None of which even remotely presents, when I say I think the Yankees are a better baseball team than the Red Sox.

After spending a couple days, those linked papers/articles/essays give me a better understanding of Rödl’s general philosophy. I’m actually beginning to appreciate his neo-Kantianism in expression, if not so much in theory.

He leads us below the language barrier, re:….

“linguistic articulation” — Wayfarer

….whereas Kant had no choice but to put his speculative metaphysics to word. He expected the reader to understand the system as it’s articulated is not how the system works on its own, the only reason for its articulation is because it is not known.

Rödl attempts to show this, by saying we’re not being told anything we don’t “always already know”, but of course, we don’t always already know that, e.g., “I think” must accompany all my thoughts.

Exactly like one of Zeno’s Paradoxes.….cover half the distance with each step. Sooner or later, you’re gonna get to a point where the distance is measured in terms of outer shell electrons of different things, both of which have, of course, disappeared.

Where, in 3B neuroconnections/mm3 in the human brain, would the recording equipment probe be inserted, for recording the experience of reeling in a trophy fish, or, the memory of already having done such a thing?

At what measure of mass density, does the recording device effect that which the device is suppose to record, synonymous with the quantum “observer problem”?

The average human can’t explain his own experiences, so how would he be able to design equipment, to record what he doesn’t know how to find?

Nahhhhh…..a gigantic, cast iron, capital letter “not possible” from me.

Cool. All’s well….yaddayaddayadda.
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Kant says, "All hamburgers are able to be accompanied by ketchup." Rödl says, "Kant thinks every hamburger has ketchup on it." — Leontiskos

Brilliant!!!!

if it's wrong, it's wrong. — J

It may not be wrong; it just isn’t what Kant said. If anything, it’s wrong that he said Kant said it. Kant never once…that I’m aware….said “I think” accompanies all my thoughts, but it must be conceivable to finagle that notion out of “I think” must accompany all my representations, because Rödl’s apparently constructed a metaphysic based in its validity.

I'm still struggling to understand what's at stake in contrasting "representation" with "thought" in this context. Any help with that? — J

Maybe not, in that the only context for which I suppose for myself enough understanding to address, is Kantian. I can’t speak to Rödl’s philosophy. Or Frege, for that matter. And now that I think about it the word “representation” isn’t even used anywhere in the OP, which kinda implies there is no context to which it belongs with respect to this particular domain of discourse. It’s almost as if I put words in your mouth.

That being said, representation is absolutely necessary for any and all Kantian speculative metaphysics, but that only appears in this particular domain of discourse, as the initial major premise, re: “Kant says….”. I suppose the struggle might manifest in the disparity between the major premise requiring a representational context insofar as it is Kantian, and the body of the discussion, the context of which is Rödl’s, which doesn’t.

Apples and oranges? Mountains and molehills? I accept responsibility for the dialectical misdirect.

Then is the "I think" a sui generis kind of representation? — Leontiskos

That sounds reasonable, yes. It is said to be representation, it is said the representation “I think” “….in all acts of consciousness is one and the same….”.

You can’t have a 700-page treatise on the bare-bones purity of human cognition without accounting for it, but you can’t account for it with any of the faculties by which human cognition is possible. It isn’t even present to immediate awareness in fully half of the total of human intellectual activity, the empirical half concerned with perception.
(Sensation being physiological, hence we are physically aware but not cognitively)

And you most certainly cannot ignore its pervasiveness in human interaction.

If you can’t account for it with the faculties of human cognition, and you can’t ignore it, you are left with accounting for it by the essence of humanity in general. From there, you escape the requirement that “I think” actually do anything within the cognitive system, thus doesn’t need to belong to any of the relevant method-specific faculties.

Because it doesn’t belong to any relevant faculty, it is not the case “I think” can ever be a cognition of its own, and insofar as “….thought is cognition by means of the synthesis of conceptions…”, it is clear “I think” is no conception, which immediately relieves it from belonging to understanding, the faculty responsible for the spontaneity of conceptions as its representations, and it follows necessarily that we never ever think “I think” in the formulation of immediate cognitions.

The p/“p” simultaneity, the dualism implied, cannot stand. At least, according to the originating speculative metaphysics referenced herein. But not all are the same, so there’s room for others with sufficient affirmative explanatory power.

Another thing, from your quote: if there is representation given before all thought, re: phenomenon from the faculty of intuition, and representation which arises spontaneously, re: conception from the faculty of understanding, which is the same as arising without being thought, then it follows that whatever must accompany all representation does not necessarily accompanying all thought. If such is the case, Rödl’s footnote exposé, is misconceived.

Thought is an activity, in the synthesis of conceptions into a possible cognition; “I think” represents the consciousness of the occurrence of the activity, but not the activity itself.

I didn’t mention it, but the bolded part of that little bit I quoted, re: the unconditional command of reason, just IS an imperative, the exposition for which was already given in a 1785 treatise. He had scant motivation to mention the construct of imperatives in a response to a mere French journalist, who he might have considered too dumb to comprehend proper metaphysics anyway.

His footnote for the claim "Kant said: The I think accompanies all my thoughts" reads: "CPR, B 131. More precisely, he [Kant] says that the I think must be able to accompany all my representations — J

I don’t consider myself qualified to make footnotes with respect to verbatim text. I’m more inclined to attempt the understanding the text itself. I mean, the dude himself said, “Kant said, more precisely…” at the expense of his own statement’s accuracy.

But he’s got letters after his name and I don’t, so….there ya go.
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Good stuff. Thanks.

Yes, directly addressed; yes, hard to read, and it says….don’t lie. Ever. For any reason. IFF your intent is to be a moral agent in possession of rational cognition, and practical reason. Which is…everyone.

“…. To be truthful (honest) in all declarations is therefore a sacred unconditional command of reason, and not to be limited by any expediency….”

www.gutenberg.org, J. M. D. Meiklejohn, ca1856, searchable but w/o pagination;

https://cpb-us-w2.wpmucdn.com/u.osu.edu/dist/5/25851/files/2017/09/kant-first-critique-cambridge-1m89prv.pdf, Guyer/Wood, 1998, with pagination, but not searchable.

It is beyond the scope of the thread….not to mention the participants’ interest…..to quote that long B section. Besides, some interpretive liberty may be required, in that the idea contained in the thread OP isn’t given verbatim in the quote, but I think could be dug out of it.

Also, the small one-liner at B133 is only a correction to the initial premise in the OP, having little to do with the p/“p” discussion. Although, and the reason I presented it in the first place, is that if “I think” accompanies all my representations” is true, it makes the argument predicated on thread’s major “…I think accompanies all my thoughts…” critically false, insofar as the author is misrepresented.

Of course, is within his dialectical rights to argue from the major as he stated it, but he shouldn’t have attributed it to the specified author that didn’t actually say it.

Anyway….not that big a deal.

If to be a true moral agent is to act entirely free from self-interest…. — Janus

Well said.
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I want something that I can cite. — Tom Storm

“On a Supposed Right to Tell Lies From Beneficial Motives”, 1797

http://philosophical.space/f325/KantLies.pdf

The question of the OP is whether thinking p requires self-consciously thinking p; whether it requires thinking "I think p."

It is fairly clear that it doesn't, and J has yet to offer arguments for why it would. The only argument I have seen is an argument from authority from Kant, and yet the Kantians on TPF don't find the thesis in Kant. — Leontiskos

Typically Kantian, and perhaps not an exact iteration, the so-called thesis is in B407-413, concluded as “yielding nothing”, which is tantamount in Kant-speak to representing that which reason is inclined to ask when it doesn’t control itself.

Just sayin’….

for me the mistake he makes is transferring that truth to all particular situations as a rigid notion of duty. — Janus

Agreed, hence its relative unpopularity. But upon closer examination, all he’s saying is, it is by this means alone, that a human can call himself a true moral agent, even, at the same time, admitting it’s virtually impossible to actually be one, and even moreso, that we can all be one at the same time.
(Sidebar: this is why Schopenhauer took will out of the subject and put it in the world, so we could all be subjects of the same general criterion. Doing so removes our humanity, but somehow, he thought that was ok. (Sigh))

Moral philosophy according to respect for law, answers the question, what does it mean to be a true moral agent. Whether or not the criteria is met, is beside the point.

Hey you!!! As always, good to read your opinions. Respect, sincerely, and lots.

I think about things; I don’t think p.
— Mww

Sometimes we're thinking about propositions, utterances, statements, assertions, etc. Those are things too! — creativesoul

Ahhh, see? We agree on that, among other things. Objective linguistic assemblages are objects as much as dump trucks and phosporus ions. While it’s true enough we do think about propositions, and we do necessarily express ourselves by means of them, it remains they are not the content of our thoughts as such.
(All I just wrote never did exist in my head as it appears on this page; all I just wrote explaining what didn't happen, didn’t happen)

For those p’s not mine, but are mere perceptions of mine, those expressions of other subjects, it is the proposition that appears to me, but it is only the relation of the content of that proposition, in juxtaposition to my comprehension, that I call my thinking.

If I am informed the oak tree is loosing its leaves, my thinking is entirely concerned with whether or not it is comprehensible that this (leaves), can happen (fall off), to that (oak tree).

Try it: image you’re told the needles are falling off the pine tree.

What never happens, given this, and any congruent occassion, not once and not even in part, is the manifold of conceptions assembled into the very same proposition, however abstract a form it must have, that appeared to my senses. I never think the leaves are falling from the oak tree, even while I express my agreement with the originating information, with an utterance of my own.
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Thought (…) is 'essentially' correlational. That is, it all consists of correlations drawn between different things. All of it, not just some of it. — creativesoul

For years now, since our mutual dialectical Day One, this has been the major point of total agreement, as far as I’m concerned. And while there remains a disparity between what we each think those correlations are, it is very good that we agree on the necessity of them, as the ground of all else which follows.

There you are!!! I thought I’d let my mouth get away from me, there, I didn’t hear back. Done went and pissed you off somehow.

If something could be conditioned by the good alone, would that not entail that the good could not be conditioned by any further thing? — Janus

No, that statement only says the something cannot be conditioned by any further thing, which makes that something good in itself, not good for the attainment of something else.

Thing is, it is said there is only one thing that can be good in itself, for the attainment of no other end, except to duty according to law. Hence the limit of this good to a moral disposition alone. Got nothing to do with good things, of good feelings or good anything. Except a good will.

Not a popular doctrine, I must say. But a doctrine nonetheless.

….it seems reasonable enough except that traditionally p is used to refer to a proposition — J

I understand that, but I reject that we think in propositions, which makes explicit subjectivity in the form (“it is I who thinks p”), is absurd. If such is the case, then “p” suffers the same end.

I think about things; I don’t think p.

Not sure I got any more to contribute.

I wasn't as clear as I should have been…. — J

It ain’t easy, is it. The thing everyone does, what is impossible that they not do….and nobody knows what it is they’re doing.
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I hope to explore the question of how objectivity (“p”) relates to subjectivity (“It is I who thinks p”). — J

Disclaimer: none of the following is meant to be taken as truth, none meant to be taken as proven or even provable. It is meant as an aid to your exploration from the satisfaction of my own.

Why not just a simple cause/effect relation? To think of something presupposes its possibility; to be affected by something, to perceive it, presupposes its necessity.

Why isn’t the p/“p” dualism backwards? Objectivity is the thing given to sensibility, whatever it is, it is that thing, so should be denominated as p. What I think about is nothing more than the affect that thing has on my senses, the affect cannot possibly be identical to the (p) thing itself, so can justifiably be denominated “p”, which in turn is referred to as representation of p. Shouldn’t it be the case that objectivity is p, subjectivity being how I am affected by p, which would be thought by me, post hoc ergo propter hoc, as “p”.

How does the p/“p” signification account for my mistakes? Given p objectively, but I think the affect of p as something completely unrelated to p, how can I say I thought “p”? While it must be the case I thought something, it is not the case the something I thought held a relation to the objectively given p, and the “p”/p dualism fails.

P stands for some undetermined something. What I think, any thought of mine, must necessarily be determined, otherwise I wouldn’t have that thought. There is no such thing as an empty thought, a thought having no object of its own, but that is not sufficient in itself, to posit that all thoughts correspond to given things. Therefore, objectively given p does not necessarily belong to subjectively thought “p”.

If the p/“p” dualism is invalid by thought, it may still be valid for that which is not thought. For any objectively given p to be represented, such p must undergo that by which representation is possible, yet outside that faculty by which I think, and, it must occur with immediacy, for otherwise there is no justification for having been affected by the objectively given p in the first place.

For any objectively given p, there is an intuition which represents the affect of p on the sensory apparatuses, such affect called sensation, the mode of which accords with particular intrinsic physiologies, and can be denominated as “p”. Herein the objectively given p is directly related, by intuition, to its representation, called phenomenon, and the p/“p” dualism holds without the possibility of contradiction, and simultaneously without having thought anything.

The question of how objectivity (“p”) relates to subjectivity (“It is I who thinks p”), is invalid, for two reasons. First, objectivity (“p”) is in fact objectivity p, and secondly, (“it is I who thinks p”) is reducible to (“it is I who thinks”), insofar as there is no necessity whatsoever for the objectively given p to be found in that which I think about, for as it is just as possible that I think of that which can never be objectively given.
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What of the notion that the objectivity “p” is just meant to indicate the object of my thinking? Therein is mere redundancy, in that the objectivity “p” is just the same as the thought p, there is no objectivity “p” of my thoughts, unless I think p. Herein the relation between the objectivity “p” and the subjectivity (“it is I who thinks p), is subsumed under the principle of identity, whereas the above, objectivity therein being empirically conditioned, is subsumed under the principle of cause and effect.

Identity being the legitimate principle, because it is necessarily the case no thought is in error. It is impossible to think something then determine there was not that thought of that very something. Error related to thought, and cognition in general, falls under the auspices of judgement.

Or not. Either way….Happy exploring!!!

I was trying to include, in my possible replies to Pat, the possibility that this is meant as a report about experience, not a metaphysical position. — J

Ahhhh….now I understand you better.

Another reason I chose #3: thought is not an experience, it’s a function, represented by “I think”.

we don't want to beg the question that it is speculative metaphysics — J

No chance of that; you asked about a statement made from a thesis concerning pure speculative reason, which couldn’t be anything other than metaphysical, and I answered from the same thesis.

If you’d asked something similar, mere accompaniment in general, but without specifying Kantian authorship by the bolding of it, I’d agree.

….just what the heck does it mean for consciousness to "accompany" something? — J

Depends on what you want consciousness to represent. Simply put, I suppose, given that consciousness is a relative state of being conscious, and given it is necessary to be fully conscious to conceive anything at all, we just say one accompanies the other, insofar as the latter would be impossible without the former.

I’m guessing here, but I nevertheless doubt any decent PhD would admit to employing a mere figure of speech on its own, without first having given a sufficient exposition of the terms used, and their relation to each other. After having done that….all 700-odd pages of it…..Kant might have figured the average academic, the target of record for his thesis after all, would just accept the nomenclature.
———-

As a thesis, can it be falsified by experience? — J

As a thesis, speculative metaphysics can’t be falsified at all, without altering the parameters upon which it rests. ‘Course, neither can it be proved from experience.
———-

↪Mww See fdrake's post. — J

Oh, I did, but I’m far under that level, so….

Schelling,1795, was right, in saying “…thinking is not my thinking…”, insofar as thinking, in and of itself, is the systemic modus operandi of human intelligence, whereas my thinking is merely to represent that system in some specific metaphysical form. Kant, on the other hand, left all that as a unbespoken superfluous necessity with respect to his brand new paradigm-shifting metaphysical doctrine incorporating pinpoint focus on abstract subjective conditions.

At the time, of course, there being no proper science regarding the matter, the natural philosophical progression centered around the relative emptiness of the Kantian “transcendental subject”, simply referenced as “I”, and upon which is constructed an arguably unjustified theoretical system, itself centered around the related Cartesian cogito.

“…. Now to these conceptions relate four paralogisms of a transcendental psychology, which is falsely held to be a science of pure reason, touching the nature of our thinking being. We can, however, lay at the foundation of this science nothing but the simple and in itself perfectly contentless representation “I” which cannot even be called a conception, but merely a consciousness which accompanies all conceptions. By this “I,” or “He,” or “It,” who or which thinks, nothing more is represented than a transcendental subject of thought = x, which is cognized only by means of the thoughts that are its predicates, and of which, apart from these, we cannot form the least conception….” (A346/B404)

From there it’s an easy jump to absolute idealism as a logical consequence, insofar as the concept-which-isn’t-a-concept, transcendental subject, doesn’t help us with what we really want to know.

But then, it’s reallyreallyREALLY hard to substitute an allegedly phantasmic transcendental subject, with a (gaspsputterchoke)…..phenomenological spirit.

Anyway, typically me, I’ve said more than the simple “thanks for the info” obliged.

Do you think we reason to an aesthetically pleasing emotion?
— Mww

I think we can reason on all the contents of our perception…. — Corvus

Agreed, but does that make to reason on content the same as to reason to emotion?

It looks to me as if you’re hinting they are not, and if they are not, it may be because we don’t reason to emotion at all. To do so is equivalent to thinking a feeling, which would be difficult to explain.

On the other hand, I can see here I might reason to an emotion I’ve already felt, given a cause I’ve already experienced. But this is mediated emotion, rather than immediate affectation, so in these cases, I’d be less inclined to question the idea.

Anyway….thanks.

Do I think a representation? — J

I’m pretty sure the thesis says, not that we think them, but we think by means of them. Personally, I hold with the notion humans think in images, which are called representations, merely as a way to talk about what’s happening. I mean…we can’t express ourselves in image format, hence, we invent words in order to represent their fundamental composition or constituency objectively.

Anyway….that’s all I got.

I offer only that 3 is the least wrong.

The reason for my choice is that Kant says “I think” must accompany all my representations (B133, in three separate translations), not my thoughts. Some representations are not thought but merely products of sensibility, re: phenomena.

Thought is “….cognition by means of the synthesis of conceptions…”, conceptions are the representations of understanding. “I think” is not part of, nor is it necessary for, the synthesis by which thought is possible, but merely represents the consciousness that there can be one.

There’s a reason why “I think” is written that way when considering the systemic modus operandi, but not written that way when considered within a post hoc linguistic array.

But I know nothing of those other guys, so, there is that……

I was thinking that maybe you would agree that any cognitive system would be incapable of absolute knowledge because every cognitive system has an a priori structure to it — Bob Ross

I wouldn’t agree, unless you actually intended every human’s cognitive system has an a priori structure. But in saying every cognitive system generally, without the human qualifier, whatever kind of system that might be cannot be determined merely from the inference it is a system per se, which makes explicit there is no proper warrant for attributing an a priori structure to it, eliminating it as a condition for an argument.

Humans understand absolute empirical knowledge is impossible, humans have a representational, discursive tripartite cognitive system from which that understanding is given, from which follows, the best that can be said, the strongest affirmative judgement logically possible, is that systems congruent with the human system should also find that absolute empirical knowledge is impossible. We’ll know for certain if or when one presents itself to us.

I kinda question a priori structure as sufficient reason for human’s incapacity for absolute empirical knowledge. That such structure is an integral functionality of human cognition is not to say it is the reason for its limitations, if there is another more suitable reason.