If to be a true moral agent is to act entirely free from self-interest…. — Janus

Well said.
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I want something that I can cite. — Tom Storm

“On a Supposed Right to Tell Lies From Beneficial Motives”, 1797

http://philosophical.space/f325/KantLies.pdf

The question of the OP is whether thinking p requires self-consciously thinking p; whether it requires thinking "I think p."

It is fairly clear that it doesn't, and J has yet to offer arguments for why it would. The only argument I have seen is an argument from authority from Kant, and yet the Kantians on TPF don't find the thesis in Kant. — Leontiskos

Typically Kantian, and perhaps not an exact iteration, the so-called thesis is in B407-413, concluded as “yielding nothing”, which is tantamount in Kant-speak to representing that which reason is inclined to ask when it doesn’t control itself.

Just sayin’….

for me the mistake he makes is transferring that truth to all particular situations as a rigid notion of duty. — Janus

Agreed, hence its relative unpopularity. But upon closer examination, all he’s saying is, it is by this means alone, that a human can call himself a true moral agent, even, at the same time, admitting it’s virtually impossible to actually be one, and even moreso, that we can all be one at the same time.
(Sidebar: this is why Schopenhauer took will out of the subject and put it in the world, so we could all be subjects of the same general criterion. Doing so removes our humanity, but somehow, he thought that was ok. (Sigh))

Moral philosophy according to respect for law, answers the question, what does it mean to be a true moral agent. Whether or not the criteria is met, is beside the point.

Hey you!!! As always, good to read your opinions. Respect, sincerely, and lots.

I think about things; I don’t think p.
— Mww

Sometimes we're thinking about propositions, utterances, statements, assertions, etc. Those are things too! — creativesoul

Ahhh, see? We agree on that, among other things. Objective linguistic assemblages are objects as much as dump trucks and phosporus ions. While it’s true enough we do think about propositions, and we do necessarily express ourselves by means of them, it remains they are not the content of our thoughts as such.
(All I just wrote never did exist in my head as it appears on this page; all I just wrote explaining what didn't happen, didn’t happen)

For those p’s not mine, but are mere perceptions of mine, those expressions of other subjects, it is the proposition that appears to me, but it is only the relation of the content of that proposition, in juxtaposition to my comprehension, that I call my thinking.

If I am informed the oak tree is loosing its leaves, my thinking is entirely concerned with whether or not it is comprehensible that this (leaves), can happen (fall off), to that (oak tree).

Try it: image you’re told the needles are falling off the pine tree.

What never happens, given this, and any congruent occassion, not once and not even in part, is the manifold of conceptions assembled into the very same proposition, however abstract a form it must have, that appeared to my senses. I never think the leaves are falling from the oak tree, even while I express my agreement with the originating information, with an utterance of my own.
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Thought (…) is 'essentially' correlational. That is, it all consists of correlations drawn between different things. All of it, not just some of it. — creativesoul

For years now, since our mutual dialectical Day One, this has been the major point of total agreement, as far as I’m concerned. And while there remains a disparity between what we each think those correlations are, it is very good that we agree on the necessity of them, as the ground of all else which follows.

There you are!!! I thought I’d let my mouth get away from me, there, I didn’t hear back. Done went and pissed you off somehow.

If something could be conditioned by the good alone, would that not entail that the good could not be conditioned by any further thing? — Janus

No, that statement only says the something cannot be conditioned by any further thing, which makes that something good in itself, not good for the attainment of something else.

Thing is, it is said there is only one thing that can be good in itself, for the attainment of no other end, except to duty according to law. Hence the limit of this good to a moral disposition alone. Got nothing to do with good things, of good feelings or good anything. Except a good will.

Not a popular doctrine, I must say. But a doctrine nonetheless.

….it seems reasonable enough except that traditionally p is used to refer to a proposition — J

I understand that, but I reject that we think in propositions, which makes explicit subjectivity in the form (“it is I who thinks p”), is absurd. If such is the case, then “p” suffers the same end.

I think about things; I don’t think p.

Not sure I got any more to contribute.

I wasn't as clear as I should have been…. — J

It ain’t easy, is it. The thing everyone does, what is impossible that they not do….and nobody knows what it is they’re doing.
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I hope to explore the question of how objectivity (“p”) relates to subjectivity (“It is I who thinks p”). — J

Disclaimer: none of the following is meant to be taken as truth, none meant to be taken as proven or even provable. It is meant as an aid to your exploration from the satisfaction of my own.

Why not just a simple cause/effect relation? To think of something presupposes its possibility; to be affected by something, to perceive it, presupposes its necessity.

Why isn’t the p/“p” dualism backwards? Objectivity is the thing given to sensibility, whatever it is, it is that thing, so should be denominated as p. What I think about is nothing more than the affect that thing has on my senses, the affect cannot possibly be identical to the (p) thing itself, so can justifiably be denominated “p”, which in turn is referred to as representation of p. Shouldn’t it be the case that objectivity is p, subjectivity being how I am affected by p, which would be thought by me, post hoc ergo propter hoc, as “p”.

How does the p/“p” signification account for my mistakes? Given p objectively, but I think the affect of p as something completely unrelated to p, how can I say I thought “p”? While it must be the case I thought something, it is not the case the something I thought held a relation to the objectively given p, and the “p”/p dualism fails.

P stands for some undetermined something. What I think, any thought of mine, must necessarily be determined, otherwise I wouldn’t have that thought. There is no such thing as an empty thought, a thought having no object of its own, but that is not sufficient in itself, to posit that all thoughts correspond to given things. Therefore, objectively given p does not necessarily belong to subjectively thought “p”.

If the p/“p” dualism is invalid by thought, it may still be valid for that which is not thought. For any objectively given p to be represented, such p must undergo that by which representation is possible, yet outside that faculty by which I think, and, it must occur with immediacy, for otherwise there is no justification for having been affected by the objectively given p in the first place.

For any objectively given p, there is an intuition which represents the affect of p on the sensory apparatuses, such affect called sensation, the mode of which accords with particular intrinsic physiologies, and can be denominated as “p”. Herein the objectively given p is directly related, by intuition, to its representation, called phenomenon, and the p/“p” dualism holds without the possibility of contradiction, and simultaneously without having thought anything.

The question of how objectivity (“p”) relates to subjectivity (“It is I who thinks p”), is invalid, for two reasons. First, objectivity (“p”) is in fact objectivity p, and secondly, (“it is I who thinks p”) is reducible to (“it is I who thinks”), insofar as there is no necessity whatsoever for the objectively given p to be found in that which I think about, for as it is just as possible that I think of that which can never be objectively given.
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What of the notion that the objectivity “p” is just meant to indicate the object of my thinking? Therein is mere redundancy, in that the objectivity “p” is just the same as the thought p, there is no objectivity “p” of my thoughts, unless I think p. Herein the relation between the objectivity “p” and the subjectivity (“it is I who thinks p), is subsumed under the principle of identity, whereas the above, objectivity therein being empirically conditioned, is subsumed under the principle of cause and effect.

Identity being the legitimate principle, because it is necessarily the case no thought is in error. It is impossible to think something then determine there was not that thought of that very something. Error related to thought, and cognition in general, falls under the auspices of judgement.

Or not. Either way….Happy exploring!!!

I was trying to include, in my possible replies to Pat, the possibility that this is meant as a report about experience, not a metaphysical position. — J

Ahhhh….now I understand you better.

Another reason I chose #3: thought is not an experience, it’s a function, represented by “I think”.

we don't want to beg the question that it is speculative metaphysics — J

No chance of that; you asked about a statement made from a thesis concerning pure speculative reason, which couldn’t be anything other than metaphysical, and I answered from the same thesis.

If you’d asked something similar, mere accompaniment in general, but without specifying Kantian authorship by the bolding of it, I’d agree.

….just what the heck does it mean for consciousness to "accompany" something? — J

Depends on what you want consciousness to represent. Simply put, I suppose, given that consciousness is a relative state of being conscious, and given it is necessary to be fully conscious to conceive anything at all, we just say one accompanies the other, insofar as the latter would be impossible without the former.

I’m guessing here, but I nevertheless doubt any decent PhD would admit to employing a mere figure of speech on its own, without first having given a sufficient exposition of the terms used, and their relation to each other. After having done that….all 700-odd pages of it…..Kant might have figured the average academic, the target of record for his thesis after all, would just accept the nomenclature.
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As a thesis, can it be falsified by experience? — J

As a thesis, speculative metaphysics can’t be falsified at all, without altering the parameters upon which it rests. ‘Course, neither can it be proved from experience.
———-

↪Mww See fdrake's post. — J

Oh, I did, but I’m far under that level, so….

Schelling,1795, was right, in saying “…thinking is not my thinking…”, insofar as thinking, in and of itself, is the systemic modus operandi of human intelligence, whereas my thinking is merely to represent that system in some specific metaphysical form. Kant, on the other hand, left all that as a unbespoken superfluous necessity with respect to his brand new paradigm-shifting metaphysical doctrine incorporating pinpoint focus on abstract subjective conditions.

At the time, of course, there being no proper science regarding the matter, the natural philosophical progression centered around the relative emptiness of the Kantian “transcendental subject”, simply referenced as “I”, and upon which is constructed an arguably unjustified theoretical system, itself centered around the related Cartesian cogito.

“…. Now to these conceptions relate four paralogisms of a transcendental psychology, which is falsely held to be a science of pure reason, touching the nature of our thinking being. We can, however, lay at the foundation of this science nothing but the simple and in itself perfectly contentless representation “I” which cannot even be called a conception, but merely a consciousness which accompanies all conceptions. By this “I,” or “He,” or “It,” who or which thinks, nothing more is represented than a transcendental subject of thought = x, which is cognized only by means of the thoughts that are its predicates, and of which, apart from these, we cannot form the least conception….” (A346/B404)

From there it’s an easy jump to absolute idealism as a logical consequence, insofar as the concept-which-isn’t-a-concept, transcendental subject, doesn’t help us with what we really want to know.

But then, it’s reallyreallyREALLY hard to substitute an allegedly phantasmic transcendental subject, with a (gaspsputterchoke)…..phenomenological spirit.

Anyway, typically me, I’ve said more than the simple “thanks for the info” obliged.

Do you think we reason to an aesthetically pleasing emotion?
— Mww

I think we can reason on all the contents of our perception…. — Corvus

Agreed, but does that make to reason on content the same as to reason to emotion?

It looks to me as if you’re hinting they are not, and if they are not, it may be because we don’t reason to emotion at all. To do so is equivalent to thinking a feeling, which would be difficult to explain.

On the other hand, I can see here I might reason to an emotion I’ve already felt, given a cause I’ve already experienced. But this is mediated emotion, rather than immediate affectation, so in these cases, I’d be less inclined to question the idea.

Anyway….thanks.

Do I think a representation? — J

I’m pretty sure the thesis says, not that we think them, but we think by means of them. Personally, I hold with the notion humans think in images, which are called representations, merely as a way to talk about what’s happening. I mean…we can’t express ourselves in image format, hence, we invent words in order to represent their fundamental composition or constituency objectively.

Anyway….that’s all I got.

I offer only that 3 is the least wrong.

The reason for my choice is that Kant says “I think” must accompany all my representations (B133, in three separate translations), not my thoughts. Some representations are not thought but merely products of sensibility, re: phenomena.

Thought is “….cognition by means of the synthesis of conceptions…”, conceptions are the representations of understanding. “I think” is not part of, nor is it necessary for, the synthesis by which thought is possible, but merely represents the consciousness that there can be one.

There’s a reason why “I think” is written that way when considering the systemic modus operandi, but not written that way when considered within a post hoc linguistic array.

But I know nothing of those other guys, so, there is that……

I was thinking that maybe you would agree that any cognitive system would be incapable of absolute knowledge because every cognitive system has an a priori structure to it — Bob Ross

I wouldn’t agree, unless you actually intended every human’s cognitive system has an a priori structure. But in saying every cognitive system generally, without the human qualifier, whatever kind of system that might be cannot be determined merely from the inference it is a system per se, which makes explicit there is no proper warrant for attributing an a priori structure to it, eliminating it as a condition for an argument.

Humans understand absolute empirical knowledge is impossible, humans have a representational, discursive tripartite cognitive system from which that understanding is given, from which follows, the best that can be said, the strongest affirmative judgement logically possible, is that systems congruent with the human system should also find that absolute empirical knowledge is impossible. We’ll know for certain if or when one presents itself to us.

I kinda question a priori structure as sufficient reason for human’s incapacity for absolute empirical knowledge. That such structure is an integral functionality of human cognition is not to say it is the reason for its limitations, if there is another more suitable reason.

On “reasoned beauty”:

Do you think we reason to an aesthetically pleasing emotion?

I am just asking if you would concur that knowledge of reality as it were in-itself would always be impossible under any cognitive system. — Bob Ross

I don’t know of any cognitive system other than the human, so I won’t concur with any supposed impossibilities inherent in them. But I will concur nonetheless that knowledge of any conceivable “-in-itself” of empirical nature, is impossible from within the purview of human intelligence of certain speculative composition in particular, as well as such congruent representational, discursive, tripartite intelligences in general.

Reality-in-itself is altogether useless to us, so why would we care whether or not we can know anything about it?

Nothing to do with secrecy; ol’ Bob and me, we go down this dialectical inconsistency road every once in awhile.

The carry on is just meant to indicate my total shoulder-shrug with respect to the OP.

”See what I mean?”
-Mww

I don’t. Isn’t ultimate reality the same as absolute reality? — Bob Ross

I already granted the conceptual similarity, but, no, I wouldn’t say they are the same.

But that wasn’t the point. There’s a disconnect between what you were asked, re: knowing ultimate truth (about reality), and what you asked of me, re: knowing reality (absolutely).

One’s a truth claim conditioned by logic a priori, the other’s a knowledge claim conditioned by experience a posteriori. What you want from me doesn’t relate to what was asked of you, that’s all.

But never mind. Carry on.

If someone claims there is an unconditional good…. — Janus

Then he’s already shot himself in the foot, insofar as the uncondition-ed is beyond human reason, and the uncondition-al is itself a rather suspicious conception. Better he propose a claim that there is that which is conditioned by good alone, which makes good a quality under which the conceptual object of the claim is subsumed, rather than the condition of that conceptual object’s possibility. Thereby, he is justified in claiming that in which resides good as its sole quality, serves as the singular necessary condition for that which follows from it.
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…..“can that be more than a mere opinion? — Janus

That there is that in which resides good as a sole quality is a claim restricted to mere opinion, yes, but the justification for that which follows from it, in the form of pure speculative metaphysics, can be logically demonstrated as a prescriptive practice, which is not mere opinion.
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If anything is said to be good, we can always ask on what grounds is it deemed to be good. — Janus

While that which is claimed to be good in itself is mere opinion, it can still be the case that whatever follows from it, iff logically consistent hence irrational to deny, that the ground for the claim is the subsequent affirmative justifications given from it.

Here’s an opinion, found in the opening paragraph of F.P.M.M., 1785: “…. Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good, without qualification, except a good will….”.

Me, I dunno if that’s true or not, but it doesn’t have to be, as long as it cannot be apodeitically proven false, and, as long as that which follows is logically consistent with it.

But, as in any speculative domain, it’s off to the rodeo, and the commoners get lost in the minutia paving the way.

Prima facie, as Mww would tell you, the only way to know reality absolutely is if one’s cognition were capable of representing with 1:1 accuracy; but this is never actually possible….. — Bob Ross

Careful, Bob. Even granting no conceptual conflict between ultimate and absolute, the initial query regards knowing about the ultimate truth of reality, but you’re roping me into a situation regarding the truth of absolute reality. See what I mean? Absolute truth (of ___), or truth of (absolute _____)?

But all that aside, you’re right: I would never admit to, nor be convinced of, the idea, much less the possibility, of knowing ultimate truth about reality, or, knowing reality absolutely.

Still, as in all the other similar occasions….thanks for respecting my opinions.

Cool synopsis. I’m all for reduction from the naturalist attitude, but that realm of “transcendental experience”…..that just felt weird coming out of my mouth. To just call it “reason”, of course, doesn’t advance the phenomenological program, so I get it.

….and speaking of presenting questions, something I distinctly remember doing, which at my age, is rather significant.

Ain’t gonna happen. He’s rather well-known for the questions he presents his dialectical companions, the lack of relevant response from one or another of them, would probably make him think twice when it comes to associating himself with philosophers in general.

I did not mean to overlook your request. — Mapping the Medium

….yet it repeats itself.

Socrates would object in the most strenuous of terms.

Which would you prefer? — Mapping the Medium

I’m obviously not MU, but I asked first.

Nominalism. Denial of the reality of abstract objects? Or, denial of the reality of universals and/or general ideas? Something else? — Mww

Sorry, , for butting in, kinda. I recognize that you’re going deeper into the subject matter than my simple question asks.

A deflationist reading this will likely wonder what all the fuss is about…. — Srap Tasmaner

That’d be me, on the one hand, insofar as that which is, is given. But it is, on the other hand, the systemic function of my intelligence to internally model that which is given, in such a way as to accommodate my experience of it.

But that’s not the point herein, is it. There must already be an internally constructed model in order for there to be a duck as such, in the first place. Otherwise, there is merely some thing given, subsequently determinable by its behaviors. Or, as they liked to say back in The Good Ol’ Days, by its appearance to the senses.

So why do I need to model a real duck, if I’ve already done it? The duck I physically manufacture and situate in an environment adds nothing to my experience. Even if I discover the naturally real duck exhibits a behavior absent from my experience, and I manufacture Duck 2.0 incorporating it, the latest version must still have its own internal precursor, in order for its formally unperceived appearance to properly manifest.
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What do models model exactly? It's not a hard question; the answer is behavior. — Srap Tasmaner

While physically manufactured models model behavior, the necessarily antecedent intellectually assembled models, which do not exhibit naturally real behavior, do not. It still isn’t a hard question, it just doesn’t have a single, all-encompassing answer.

…..and then it joins a Forum. — Wayfarer

Yeah, well, you know….it’s a bitch not being able to find any decent gymnasia these days.

what do you make of it, dear reader? — Arcane Sandwich

“…. Human reason, in one sphere of its cognition, is called upon to consider questions, which it cannot decline, as they are presented by its own nature, but which it cannot answer, as they transcend every faculty of the mind. It falls into this difficulty without any fault of its own. It begins with principles, which cannot be dispensed with in the field of experience, and the truth and sufficiency of which are, at the same time, insured by experience. With these principles it rises, in obedience to the laws of its own nature, to ever higher and more remote conditions. But it quickly discovers that, in this way, its labours must remain ever incomplete, because new questions never cease to present themselves; and thus it finds itself compelled to have recourse to principles which transcend the region of experience, while they are regarded by common sense without distrust. It thus falls into confusion and contradictions, from which it conjectures the presence of latent errors, which, however, it is unable to discover, because the principles it employs, transcending the limits of experience, cannot be tested by that criterion….”

What do I make of it? The subject matter herein merely illustrates that not much has changed in 3-4,000 years of documented human thought.

I was not writing that comment for academic scrutinization. — Mapping the Medium

Awww damn. I’m all warm and fuzzy inside. (Grin)

….he was not speaking of metaphysics as a philosophical discipline. — Mapping the Medium

Agreed; he was commenting on the inacuteness of common sense, and that they are not proper metaphysical cognitions, re: Hume and assorted and sundry British empiricists, I’m guessing. My problem was that he implied bad logical quality to metaphysical cognitions, irrespective of their connection to common sense thinking. With the caveat, again, in that I may not have given Charles his just due.

Yes, understood. I was just carrying over what he did for himself he meant for all rational subjects to do for themselves.

Familiar, yes; studied….not so much.

From that essay, though, comes one of my more seriously held cognitive inclinations, re: to believe is no more than to think, from which follows one says nothing more when he says he believes, than what he has already thought. And insofar as no belief is possible without the arrangement of conceptions, which just is to think, to speak from belief alone, holds no power at all.

Peirce explores the idea that beliefs settle our doubts because doubts make us uncomfortable. — Mapping the Medium

I rather think doubt is merely a negative belief, both of which are cognitions, discursive judgements of relative truth, whereas comfort is a feeling. I don’t associate one with the other, myself. Smacks of psychology….the red-headed stepchild of proper metaphysics.

Also from the essay, “…. imbued with that bad logical quality to which the epithet metaphysical is commonly applied…”, which implies metaphysical cognitions possess bad logical quality, precisely the opposite of my personal opinion.
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Nominalism. Denial of the reality of abstract objects? Or, denial of the reality of universals and/or general ideas? Something else?

According to Kant…. — Corvus

Close enough, I suppose. I rather think accepting ideas and/or beliefs of others is dogmatism, which occurs when a subject presumes to advance in his own metaphysical thought without determining the validity of its ground as opposed to the habitual neglect of it, hence the proverbial “slumber”.

It follows that to awaken from a slumber is to begin what the slumbering prevented, in this case, determining the warrant for acceptance of any belief or idea, his own or someone else’s. So it isn’t what a subject falls into at all, but instead, what he comes out of.

So to awaken from dogmatic slumbers is to begin the critique of one’s own pure cognitions, for the origin, the warrant, hence the validity, of the principles upon which they necessarily rest, thereby promising that we “….must not be supposed to lend any countenance to that loquacious shallowness which arrogates to itself the name of popularity, nor yet to scepticism, which makes short work with the whole science of metaphysics...”

Now what was offered as opinion with respect to one purportedly missing the opportunity to be awakened, just indicates he chose not to examine, or, as I mentioned, gave no evidence that he did examine, the validity of the ground the pure cognitions of his dialectical opponent presented to him, but merely designated the words representing them as neither wise nor intelligent, the epitome of sceptical appraisal.
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And the dogmatic slumber to awaken from? To critique the grounding principles for? That to which I wished to direct your attention, but apparently failed miserably?

Why, the “nominalism thought virus”, of course. Maybe it’s just me, but the subtlety in that phrase, that concept…..(sigh)

Another word is "sublime" — RussellA

Yep; good catch.

In us, beauty is found; sublimity is excited.

So be it.

One purportedly missed the opportunity to be awakened from “dogmatic slumbers”, the other personifies Sisyphus with a generally unrecognized metaphysical doctrine.

Same as it ever was……

Maybe your two-party dialectical failure to continue, relates to a proposed affliction resident in the “nominalism thought virus”.

Ok.

…..you don’t think there is anything about how reality is that can dictate out it ought to be. — Bob Ross

I wouldn’t agree with that. If I judge something perceived as offensive to my moral sensibilities, it is possible I may determine an act whereby that offense is rectified, which is the same as changing reality into what I feel it ought to be.

…..the moral anti-realist has to note that the ontology of morality is really just grounded in the projections of subjects….. — Bob Ross

Dunno about moral anti-realists, but as far as I’m concerned, morality doesn’t have an ontology, in the commons sense of the conception. On the other hand, I’m ok with the projection of subjects being the exemplification, or the objectification, of their respective moral determinations.

But this arena is anthropology, or clinical psychology, whereas I’m only interested in moral philosophy itself. Just like in cognitive systems: it’s not that we know, it’s how it is that we know; so too in moral systems, it’s not that we are moral, but how it is that are we moral.

…..and this is exactly what I understand you to be saying by noting that the wills of subjects are introduce new chains of causality into the world and are not themselves causal. — Bob Ross

Hmmmm. Backwards? The will of subjects is causal, insofar as it determines what a moral act shall be, in accordance with the those conditions intrinsic to individual moral constitution. But the will cannot itself project that act onto the world, insofar as any act requires physical motivations. The missing piece, or, the controlling factor let’s say, between the determination of a moral act and the projection of it, is aesthetic judgement, re:, does the feeling I get from the effect of this act reflect the feeling I get from the cause.

See the problem? The feeling of good in having willed a moral act does not necessarily match the feeling of good in having done it. And that is the mark of ideal moral agency: the only act willed is always good, the aesthetic judgement will always be positive, the act shall be done without regard to the consequential feeling of having done it.

Hence, the ideal of pure practical reason, and the ground of what makes a will good, doesn’t have an answer, the philosophy describing its function justifiably predicated on it being so.

This is a equivocation between ontology and epistemology…. — Bob Ross

I understand what you’re saying, but there’s a conceptual divide in place. Ontology as you intend the concept, has to do with things, what is and why, how, etc, of them. Epistemology, by the same token, has to do with the method, and the system using that method, belonging to a certain kind of intelligence, for knowing about those things subsumed under the conception of natural ontology.

Those don’t work for what’s going on here. Ontology, insofar as for that Nature is causality, and the human subject is the intelligence that knows only what Nature provides.

For what’s going on here, the subject himself is the causality, and of those of which he is the cause it isn’t that he knows of them, but rather that he reasons to them. It makes no sense to say he knows, of that which fully and immediately belongs to him alone.

This is where that thing I said about feelings not being cognitions, fits. And also, why everything we’re talking about here is of a far different systemic formalism. And while it is true we need that standard discursive epistemology to talk about this stuff, and we need the standard phenomenal ontology to properly deploy it for its intended purpose, there is no need of either in its development, in first-person internal immediacy.

What good is, is only determinable by moral philosophy, in which hypotheticals and mere examples have no say.

If the answer is that we cannot say, then you have no reason to believe that a will can be good. — Bob Ross

I addressed that very concern: the evidence that humanity in general determines good acts, is sufficient reason to think the will as good. I only said there is no scientific cause/effect evidence for the will itself, which is to say there is objective or empirical knowledge of it.