So how many scientific laws should we need in order to understand the philosophically pure general law “all objects are extended in space”?

Science: researching the laws of the world......yes;
Philosophy: the science of general laws......yes;

You can’t get to a general from a manifold of particulars, but you can get from a general to certain particulars relative to it. So it would seem the general comes first, and if so, it is without scientific law, which implies the general must be pure thought. Then, the science laws of the world consequently either support or refute it.

So the OP is backwards: pure general laws come first, and understanding the world piece by piece by means of the science laws found in it, follows from the pure general law which grounds them.

No science is ever done that isn’t first thought, accidental causality being the singular exception.

The whole realty/appearance distinction. — Marchesk

Yeah, the subtleties and intricacies that make it so are usually overlooked, or dismissed outright, by the common sense realist opposition, because there are no empirical proofs for that distinction.

can we imagine a place without time? — TiredThinker

No problem for me at least. Just imagine no recording or measuring of change.

Because we have reliable, repeatable, valid sensory experience of the world, we can say we see the world as it is. — Bitter Crank

I’ve always been under the impression that’s exactly the opposite of what “as it is” implies, which technically expands to “as it is in itself”. Because of the very limitations of our experiential methodology, and the cognitive system inherent in humans in general by which such experience is given, we can only say we see the world as it appears to us, as it seems to be as far as we are equipped to say. Which is the off-hand source of the metaphysically-induced invention of qualia.

Does the world appear to us as it is in itself, is the question with no positive proof, but pure speculative epistemology says it is not, nor can it be. Just for fun, throw in energy conversion losses, and even the scientists should agree.

For whatever that’s worth.......

reality is exactly what we perceive......

Agreed.

......“Ah, but it is always incomplete”.....

Correct. We never perceive everything possible to perceive.

.......tell me the idea of ​​a complete reality that can be presentable to anyone. You cannot.....

Correct. The idea of a complete reality is given by itself, but that the object given by the idea is therefore presentable in its entirety, does not follow from its mere conception.

........showing itself only in certain aspects is proper to all reality, that is the structure of reality.....

Ehhhh.....error of equivocation: for reality to show itself implies intention, which cannot belong to entities having no conception of purpose. Negating the error then leaves the structure of reality undefined.

......Things that present themselves in all their aspects at the same time only exist ideally.....

That which is ideal does have all its aspects present in itself simultaneously, but cannot be a thing that presents itself as existing. The two familiar ideal conceptions, complete in themselves, are space and time, which do not exist in themselves but are merely sound logical conclusions.

.....the ideal cube that you draw on the paper shows six sides.....

No, it does not. It is possible to illustrate a three dimensional object on a two dimensional plane, but an ideal can never be a mere illustrated replica of an object in general.

.......So only this non-existent cube has six sides at the same time.....

No it does not. It is first a contradiction, insofar as non-existence has no extent in space nor duration in time, and second, cutting of the paper makes explicit the third dimension is in the construction of the cube, not the drawing of it.

.......That aspect of the cube that I perceive is the aspect that the cube can show me. It cannot show that same aspect of itself to an earthworm.....

Categorical errors of relation and modality: it is absurd to suppose an object common to differing perceptive physiologies or cognitive sophistication, changes itself in accordance with the system examining it. It is pathologically stupid to then suppose any one cognitive system has the apodeictic means to relate itself to another system diametrically opposed to it. It follows that, e.g, claiming an earthworm sees a cube, is unintelligible (relation), from which follows the claim that the cube presents itself, is empty (modality).

.....Only a human being can see this. Another animal will see it in yet another way.....

To see “this” or to see “it (this) in a different way” is a strictly human qualitative distinction, which suggests it is the capacities of the receiver of the impression, rather than the source of the impression, which generally determines various effects from common cause, but without any sense at all, of what the effects actually are. To claim an earthworm does not perceive as we perceive, is tautologically true, for the simple reason its negation is impossible. Hence, expositions on it are superfluous.

.......This is one of Kant’s mistakes, he thinks that all of these are limitations of our knowledge — Rafaella Leon

Nothing you’ve said is sufficient to prove a mistake. Not to say there isn’t one, but nothing this comment is in response to, serves the purpose of demonstrating it.

I don't see why the mere arrival of the observer should change the way the world is in the way you suggest, so that it is now dependent on his views, however misguided they may be. — Daemon

What the world was before us is different from what the world is with us, because of us. That does not say anything about what the world depends on. World still is, just is different.

The way the world is as it occurs to a human, is simply how he describes it to himself. That is the same as him saying the world is as he says it is. I mean.....what other choice does he have? He is necessarily stuck with his own cognitive system, so that system is what he must use when he says stuff about the world.

The interesting question is, if no-one can see it, is there a world as it is? — Echarmion

That actually is quite interesting. The world as it is does not necessarily imply observation of it. Just sitting there, all by itself, whilin’ away the hours, chillin’. Seems like that would be the world as it is. But then, what’s to say the world is just sittin’ there, all by itself? Takes an observer to come to that conclusion.

We’re left with nothing but the logic of it:

Good logic: we’re here now along with the world, we weren’t here before but the world was, so there was definitely a way the world was. If we allow the world to be as it was except now we’re in it, the world can’t be the way it was. But it can still be the way it is.

Bad logic: Now we’ve contradicted ourselves, if it is the case that the world as it is doesn’t imply observers, which are the only way to tell the way the world was is different than the way the world is.

Reconcile the bad logic by just saying the observer is the only difference between the way the world was and the way the world is now, therefore however the world is, is because that’s the way it occurs to the observer. Or, which is the same thing, the world is as the observer says it is.

Doesn’t mean he’s right; just means he’s the only one who can say, the world being merely something for him to say things about.

But I think the original concept of 'the unconditioned' is broader than that. — Wayfarer

Agreed, atomism was the extent of empirical reducibility, the unconditioned having far broader extent than mere individual substance.

So the 'unconditioned' was the source of 'the conditioned' - this was the concept of To Hen, the One of Plotinus, which morphed over time into the 'Divine Intellect'. — Wayfarer

Yep.....just like that. The fundamental principle therein carried over undiminished into 18th century German continental idealism, which relocated the source of the principle while maintaining its authority. It was upon internalizing the subject, that human thought itself could assume the former domain of the external, at least in a logical sense, in that attributes could now be associated with it, just as attributes used to be given to material substances in the world. And attributes imply functionality....and we’re off to the epistemological rodeo.
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”....Augustine concludes from these observations that intelligible objects cannot be part of reason's own nature or be produced by reason out of itself. They must exist independently of individual human minds....”

Again, I understand that this type of Platonist reasoning is generally out of favour, but it seems intuitively sound to me. — Wayfarer

Unless humans all operate under the auspices of the same rational methodology, in which case, all humans are naturally imbued with, if not the same intelligible objects, then at least the form to which intelligible objects must adhere. “2”, “II” and “द्वौ” are each intelligible objects subsumed under and representative of the unconditional “quantity”. Quantity has no representation of its own, no schemata by which it is necessarily conditioned, hence cannot be itself an intelligible object.

Woefully inadequate for the physicalists, the pure empiricists, rife with explanatory gaps as it may be, but they don’t have anything better, so......same as it ever was.

Do you think there's much awareness of 'the unconditioned, the irreducible', in most current philosophical discourse? — Wayfarer

In philosophical discourse.....not that I know of. But then, I don’t hold a lot of respect for current philosophical discourse anyway, so the idea might be out there somewhere and I never bothered looking for it. Still, the notion is, using your term......archaic. Archaic adjacent, more like.

Everydayman is sort of aware of it, in principle, insofar as he invents a placeholder for the unconditioned, taking the form of transcendent entities of one kind or another. When he isn’t aware of it at all, but the principle still holds, is whenever he asks the why of a thing, followed by the why of whatever answer he just got, etc. Or when he wonders, what if.

I had in mind as irreducible, Aristotle’s logical laws, Kant’s categories, Rene’s sum. I’m sure you might have some irreducible concepts yourself. Be surprised if you didn't, assuming you grant the validity of the idea.

As in some fact or statement that cannot be false that we can be absolutely sure of. I'm not so sold on why we would need such a thing — khaled

Not so much in support of capital T truth, which I hold as impossible both from inductive inference and the limitations of our own system of knowledge acquisition in the obtaining of it, but to justify something we can be absolutely sure of, and that is the unconditioned, a deductive inference that can’t be reduced further without self-contradiction, from within the same system. When we have that, whatever we build on it stands a better chance of being the case.

Why bother with “people that try to go for it”? Especially if you know they’re not going to get there?

I would say it's unavoidable that we must use reason at least to a certain extent and in some way. — Gregory

The conscious and otherwise rational human thinks constantly, and reason is thinking in accordance with rules. Except for pure reflex or sheer accident, reason is unavoidable. What we reason about changes over time; what we reason with, hasn’t changed noticeable since our attaining h. Sapiens evolutionary status.

What kind of a faculty is it? — Gregory

.....is fraught with circularities and inconsistencies, for it is a natural condition of humans to think according to rules, yet it can be none other than human reason which sets the rules to think in accordance with. The human doesn’t even know how his thinking comes about, he has no clue how his own brain operates with respect to his reason, or even that it does. He cannot use Nature as a definitive guide, for he must still think about what he gleans from Nature, again in accordance with the rules he himself constructs for his thinking, while he can, on the other hand, use Nature only to inform him if his self-constructed rules oppose each other. If they do, he must still use his thinking to construct new rules with respect to Nature, but constructing new rules is still thinking according to rules.

We find, then, after the dust of inquiry settles.....reason, not the faculty but rather, the method, is that which seeks for the unconditioned, the irreducible, in effect some semblance of certainty, and thereby that which minimizes the opportunities for rules to oppose each other. Reason the faculty then becomes that which grants that the rules are proper for the use to which they are directed.

Reason....the purely speculative method of rule construction and use.

Or not. Your rules may vary.

Now that is very old-fashioned view, some would even say archaic. But that's what I am arguing. — Wayfarer

Very old-fashioned view indeed. Which just goes to show they got the basics put down right early on. No matter what the human learns about, the internal system by which a human learns, hasn’t changed at all.

I've since dropped "mental", and "state of mind" from my account. — creativesoul

You mean from your “Mechanics.....” account as it stood three years ago? Evolution of thought is not unusual of course, but B.) of mine, above, is from 2 days ago on the Qualia thread, so “mental” is apparently still in play in some cases.

But yes, I see “mental correlations” evolved textually into “correlations”, which is why I thought to ask if they remained tacitly mental. I didn’t want to just assume so.

I disagree that "The snow is white" is as simple as it looks. — Marchesk

Yeah....don’t need no thinkin’ no mo’. Just listen to what yer tol’...poof...snow is white.

A.)

1. All thought/belief consists of mental correlation(s) — creativesoul

B.)

Belief is not a mental state, on my view. — creativesoul

I’ve examined that part of your corpus that appeared interesting to me.

Are mental correlations mental activities, and do mental activities reside in an agent, such agent being considered to be in possession of a “mind”? If not, where does the activity of correlating reside?
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C.)

thought/belief is any and all mental correlations drawn between 'objects' of physiological sensory perception and/or the agent's own state of mind. — creativesoul

Agent’s state of mind......ok, yes, state of mind presupposes mind, so agent considered as to be in possession of mind is given. But that still doesn’t say where the drawing of correlations themselves reside.

To say belief is the correlation, from C.), and because the correlation resides in the belief of which it is a constituent, per A.), and because belief is denied as a distinct mental state in itself, per B.), there appears to be a case of post hoc ergo propter hoc.

Granting, then, that such gross fallacy is not the case, implies the activity of correlating resides not in the belief itself, so it must remain that belief resides as the consequence of the correlating, from the process of elimination. If the correlating resides in the mind, the consequence can be said to reside in the mind, which makes explicit belief must be some condition the mind resolves itself into. Another way to say “condition the mind resolves into”, is to say “a state into which the mind attains”, from which follows incontestably, “a mental state”.

It appears belief is a mental state after all, and if all that is a valid deductive inference, in that the agent that is actively doing the correlating in order to bring himself to a mental state in which is found a belief, and the remaining aspect of such mental correlation involves the empirical reality of the ‘objects’ of physiological sensory perception, it seems sufficiently demonstrated that a subject/object dualism must be given necessarily, for it is quite impossible to correlate to a belief without an object to which the belief is about.

Furthermore, in keeping more with A.) than C.), even if there is no empirical object present, belief in general, as a mere mental state in itself without being about anything in particular, is an object of the equally general mental correlations which would be required for belief to be a consequence of. This denotes what we would understand a belief to be, as opposed to understanding something we believe in.

I’m not onboard with your rendering of consciousness....
— Mww

(...) Here's where I differ with Kant.....

In order to know that A is not equal to B, we must know what both consist of, because knowing that they are not equal requires comparison/contrast between the two. — creativesoul

None of that has to do with the Kantian philosophy pertaining to consciousness, even if it does have correlations to Kantian philosophy pertaining to empirical knowledge.
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Can we at least agree that there is a difference between our bodies and our reports thereof? — creativesoul

Absolutely. I’m going to insist I’ve satisfied the criteria for establishing the difference. Because it seems I’ve failed miserably at it, and in the interest of proper dialectic, the onus of enlightenment is on you.

Your body is not an account. Your account is most certainly in the world. — creativesoul

Ok.

Schopenhauer explains compassion metaphysically; through the concept of his will, all humans are manifestations of one identical will which lies beyond experience — jancanc

Because it’s Schopenhauer, it is classified as transcendental, which is a metaphysical rendering. And it isn’t a concept of his will, but his concept of a will, from WWR, 1844.

Notice that an ‘us’, a community, is a natural entity a plurality of individuals. No appeal to metaphysics, to a non-spatio-temporal unity, is required to explain its existence." — jancanc

Unity is a schema, a member, of the category of quantity, community is a schema of the category of relation, both primarily Kantian, CPR,1787, hence also transcendental, therefore also a metaphysical rendering.

The entire notion is metaphysical.

Hence when subjects try to understand subjectivity as an object, they must try to take a distance with their own subjectivity, which tends to lead to logical paradoxes. — Olivier5

The subjectivity being understood as an object, is the conception of subjectivity in general, the distance, as you say, I must try to take. It isn’t my subjectivity I’m attempting to understand, in which would be found the logical paradox.

You also need to understand that he wants money in exchange of the apples — Olivier5

No, I do not. There might be an apple give-away that day. He might wish to piss off his boss. While I may need to understand monetary exchange is the normal process, in that I should expect to pay for the apples, it is still not a necessary condition, such that if I don’t pay it becomes immediately impossible for me to get my apples.

Don’t mistake a need, for an interest. The difference becomes clear when some little old lady in abject poverty is selling apples on the streetcorner. Her need is something for me to consider, as opposed to a clerk who may very well be the owner of a multi-state chain of stores. I am much more disposed to understand a need as it relates to survival alleviated by paying for her apples, as opposed to an inclination to understand a mere want as it relates to just the grocer not getting yelled at for not collecting my money.

what you remember of an experience is yet another form of experience. — Olivier5

Correct, and its name is intuition.

experience still precedes any report, and can never be fully described by reporting. — Olivier5

Correct, there is no need to fully report on an experience, but only the need to report enough to demonstrate understanding of it, the rest being cognitively discarded.**

I understand some experience of fire without needing to report how hot the fire is, for if there is fire, hot is given necessarily, hence reporting hotness is superfluous.

** There is empirical evidence that enabled neural networks subsequently unused, become disentangled, in order to be re-used later. Forgetfulness explained.

Unless....... — Olivier5

Sure, but all those are amendments, qualifiers, if you will. Changing the conditions. You’re not wrong, just that such amendments are inadmissible with respect to the principle being discussed.

The poverty of Kant is the supposition that there is stuff we have to have before we can do the things......

Yes, the stuff we have to have is the categories.

.......We make the stuff by doing the things.......

No. Backwards. The stuff of categories make the doing of things possible.

.......Drop meaning, look to use. — Banno

Yes. Look to the use of the stuff of categories in order to do things.

In your view opposed to this, in what manner do you come up with numbers, without the stuff of “quantity” beforehand? How do you come up with cause and effect without the stuff of “relation” beforehand? How do you deny the supernatural domain without the stuff of “possibility” beforehand? How do you construct a triangle without the stuff of “necessity” beforehand.

Now, the standard rejoinder is, experience teaches all those things. True, but that presupposes experience and leaves unexplained what happens when there isn’t any.

The spin of an electron could never have been theorized, if it hadn’t first been thought possible that electrons could have what eventually became known as spin. By the same token, do you see that drawing three lines in a certain orientation does not give you the absolute necessity that the sum of the interior angles can only be one number?

It is not the poverty of Kant, but the genius. With some help, if not metaphysical robbery, from Aristotle, of course.

Witt and those guys did much for the human being, but there are others that did infinitely more towards being human.

While there are all sorts of language less creatures incapable of drawing correlations between different things, those aren't of interest here, for such creatures aren't capable of attributing meaning, and consciousness is the ability to attribute meaning. — creativesoul

Good. Now we can remove the ghost of anthropomorphism from the dialectic. I just needed assurance, if not actual verification, so....thanks for that.

I’m not onboard with your rendering of consciousness, but that’s ok.We may return to that after I’ve a better understanding of the intricacies of your account.

If it is the case that we are both objects in the world and subjects taking account of it and/or ourselves, then the dichotomy cannot be used as a means to draw a distinction between us and our accounts... — creativesoul

Us and our accounts are not the dichotomy, they are the same thing, in that the account is contained in us. An account is, after all, merely a judgement, thus the account belongs to that which judges.

The dichotomy is between the constituency of the account, and that which judges of what the constituency entails. My body (in the world of things) has arms and legs (objects included in the world of things) is an account I make as a judge of things in the world belonging to my body. My account is not in the world, it is in me as the judge of the relatedness of things.

The only way to reject the counter-argument favoring the necessary subject/object dualism, is to deny the human cognitive system is inherently a logical system. We don’t know with apodeitic certainty that the human system is in fact predicated on natural logic, but we certainly know we can’t talk about it unless it is. Besides, it is absurd to suppose Nature allows us to examine ourselves, and then not give us the means to do it with some measurable degree of rational assurance.

For you, the grocer is an object and his subjectivity is irrelevant to you. For the grocer, you are the object and your subjectivity is irrelevant to him.
— Mww

I realize this remark is partly in jest, and in response to a mind denier. I don’t think people treat other people as pure objects, without ever thinking of other people’s opinions — Olivier5

True enough, but in context, the discussion concerns not people in general but a person in particular, in relation to another person in particular, with respect to a certain activity. I have no consideration of opinion, when I require certain things from the only person in the position of grant the requirement. Opinion would count if I asked the grocer which apples would be better for me to want. But when I tell him to give me two apples, his opinion is completely irrelevant to me. Just as my opinion as to why I want apples and not bananas is irrelevant to him. He doesn’t give a damn why I want apples.
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what we have between the ears IS indeed primary, as a matter of fact, because it is necessary for any knowledge to accrue. That’s the purely logical aspect of the problem, the easiest aspect to fathom.......

Agreed.

.......The really tricky part is to realize what we do when we try to think of consciousness — or of phenomena as they ‘appear’ to our consciousness, (...) as an object of knowledge, when we study it as another phenomenon, as another object ‘out there’ as you put it. — Olivier5

Tricky indeed. To think of consciousness, and to think of phenomena as they appear to consciousness as objects of knowledge, are two completely difference domains within a system common to both. Consciousness cannot be a phenomenon, hence cannot be an object of knowledge. We don’t know consciousness in the same way we know skyscrapers, but we can think consciousness, that is, represent consciousness to ourselves, just as well as we can think skyscrapers without any contradiction, hence.....the primacy of subjectivity. Which is, at bottom, nothing but the activity of pure thought, or, reason itself.
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It extends to the need for the subject trying to understand himself to remain connected with his own subjectivity, to include himself as part of his description of any experience. — Olivier5

Extends to the need? If the subject is absolutely indissoluble from himself, how could he NOT include himself? Ever notice the absence of the first person personal pronoun “I” when you think to yourself? You never think “I think.....”, “I am....”, I want.....”, “I feel....”. If that first person personal pronoun is a representation, and in some cases there is no use of the representation, then all thinking IS the subject itself that thinks. Then it becomes the case that subjects don’t include themselves at all, but are that which includes.

To include himself as part of a description of any experience, on the other hand, because all descriptions carry objective implications, requires a representation of the subject that is describing experience as an object, and here the “I” stands as that representation. The description of the going, re: “The other day, I went to the grocery store to get two apples”, is very far removed from the going.
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don’t even start to get it. — Olivier5

Boy howdy. Metaphysical reductionism is your very best friend.

Ok. Thanks.

See top of pg 83 for context.

I reject the subject/object framework altogether. We are both objects in the world and subjects taking account of it — creativesoul

How are those two assertions not contradictory?
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I take similar issue with the very notion of "proposition" (....)....

Ehhhh....all discourse requires them, so we’re sorta stuck with them.

.....and the role that it plays in our experiences — creativesoul

I don’t think they play a role in our experiences, but necessarily play a role in the expression our experiences. But that’s just me.
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Sidebar: is a language-less creature one that has no language to use, or one that has no use of the language he has?

Red cups, apples, and pains in hands are not propositional content. — creativesoul

Can’t they be subjects or objects of propositions, hence contents of them? Or can propositions not have content?

They are most certainly always part of the correlational content of belief about them. — creativesoul

Yes, always, with the caveat that correlational content of belief is not propositional.

What happens in the head of the grocer is irrelevant. — Banno

Not to the grocer, it isn’t. For you, the grocer is an object and his subjectivity is irrelevant to you. For the grocer, you are the object and your subjectivity is irrelevant to him. You want two apples, the grocer must understand you want two apples, or he isn’t going to do anything, or he will do what doesn't conform to your ask.

If we have to have both, between the ears and not between the ears, as you say, this is the way. In order to have two apples in your hand, unless you get them yourself, you and the grocer must understand each other. How do you suppose it is you asked for two apples but it happens you were given two rutabagas? Asking for and getting in hand the same thing you asked for, makes explicit the happening of mutual understanding.
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Do you see that in order to understand each other, what goes on between our respective ears must be at least congruent, if not fully matching?
— Mww

No. What goes on between the ears is irrelevant. That's rather the point pushed by PI, that it's what happens that counts, not what goes on in heads. — Banno

Yes, what happens counts, as verification. But how does P.I. take account if what happens is wrong?

Oh no you don’t. Check it out:.

“The words you hear....” are every bit the same empirical perception as the itch, or the huge car. The sound of words, the touch of an itch, the sight of a car, are all empirical conditions of perception. The understanding and possible knowledge about all those things.....all things so perceived.....is the analysis of them, done between the ears. The difference is, with the discussion, the object is put out in the form of sentences by me; with the empirical perceptions, the objects of the discussion, the words in the sentences, are brought in by you. (Me too, but I don’t care....I wrote ‘em)

Do you see that in order to understand each other, what goes on between our respective ears must be at least congruent, if not fully matching? If they matched exactly, one of us would have what’s call an epiphany.

This discussion is not only going on in the space between your ears
— Banno

Of course it isn’t, only. But the ground of it, the beginnings, the source, the construction of it, are, and are only. — Mww

If everything begins with what is between your ears, — Banno

Oh my. The goalposts went from the end zone clear out to the farging parking lot!!
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I don't agree that everything begins with what is between your ears. — Banno

As well you shouldn’t; not everything does. No empirical stuff, as such, has its origin between the ears. If it did, there could be no such thing as an itch, or a ‘57 DeSoto. Knowing what an itch or a car with ridiculously over-sized fins is.....begins and ends only between the ears.
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Drop the notion that the stuff between your ears has primacy. — Banno

It absolutely must.....for certain stuff.

The stuff you might describe as "out there" is just as valid. — Banno

Not only valid, but necessary.

you can't have one without the other. — Banno

No, you cannot. Hence.....wait for it......the subjective and the objective. By whichever name you wish to call it.

Ahhh....so if we can’t talk about some things we can’t talk about anything?

Besides, there can be talk about.....has been for millennia.....the subjective, the private, the ineffable, just not at the same time as its use by the one talking. Hell....every time the first person personal pronoun is used in an objective expression, a subjective condition is rendered by the expression.
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But has he an argument for this? Or is it just obvious? — Banno

Yep, and, should be, assuming you think about stuff the same way I do. If you don’t think, or if you think in a different way, I got nothing.

Irreducibly, yes. But not practically.

We operate in terms of biological machinery, but we don’t think or talk in those terms.

he thinks that both are "between your ears". — Banno

Nope, he doesn’t think that.

There is stuff that is not between your ears. — Banno

Again.....there most obviously is stuff not between the ears. Nobody ever said all stuff was between the ears, not even ol’ Bishop Berkeley.

It is pointless to continue a discussion in which it cannot be agreed that some stuff is only between the ears.

This discussion is not only going on in the space between your ears — Banno

Of course it isn’t, only. But the ground of it, the beginnings, the source, the construction of it, are, and are only.

It’s the same hole everybody’s in; some admit it, some don’t.

All we would have is wrong, we all would have, is right.

‘Nother topic?

....and language itself can be quined away from the necessities of evolution, but maybe not the accidental convenience of it.

Dunno, I’m not much of an anthropologist. Seems odd, though, that Nature mandated us with reason, by which we confuse ourselves, then mandated we should have language, by which we confuse ourselves even more.

Cruel Mistress indeed.

why is it inaccessible to an observer? — Harry Hindu

An observer is so from his own perceptions; that which is inaccessible to an observer indicates that which is unperceivable by him. All perception is only possible from an empirical condition, the subjective, which is the rational activity of a subject, which is subjectivity, is never an empirical condition, hence subjectivity is never possibly given to perception, hence inaccessible to that which perceives as an observer.
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Isn't it (subjectivity) indirectly accessed via observation of behavior and neural activity? — Harry Hindu

No one, and I mean no one, has ever seen my neural activity, and if subjectivity is necessarily predicated on neural activity, it follows no one has, even indirectly, accessed my subjectivity.

Again, observation is perception, perception is empirical, no observation of other than the empirical is at all possible. If that which is observed must be empirical, and if it is behavior that is observed, behavior must be empirical. If it stands as proved that subjectivity is never empirical, it follows necessarily that observation of behavior can never be observation of subjectivity.
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In other words, is the subjective accessible objectively? — Harry Hindu

The subject may represent himself objectively, yes. But the observer only perceives the object of subjectivity, not the means by which the representation obtains its form.

it seems to me that yours is a path to an unneeded and misleading superstructure... — Banno

Generally speaking, sure. Precious little need for analytic or speculative philosophy fulfilling a grocery list. If life in general was only that mundane, we wouldn’t have gone to the moon.
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This is were I differ, since it seems to me that those things which are private, ineffable, inaccessible, are also not suitable for analysis. — Banno

Sure, but that still asks, do you not compare the words you hear, to the words you yourself use, and is that not an analysis? And doesn’t that analysis transpire between your ears? And is not the space between your ears your own personal private space? If that is the case, and every single rational agency does the same thing, it is clear none of them are analyzing each other, but each of them are analyzing themselves. In this sense, you are correct, insofar as it is not my analysis of your private, ineffable attributes, but is really my analysis of their affect on my private, ineffable attributes.

Problem is of course, all that analysis is almost always immediate because that to which it applies is familiar. Nature’s way of not cluttering up the works, doncha know. It is only when presented with something new and different, that the active analysis comes center-stage and we become conscious of its activity. Still, being inattentive to it doesn’t mean it isn’t happening.

Nahhhhh.....we analyze, to some extent, every damn thing we come in contact with, before, now or later; it’s called thinking.
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Kant, like Wittgenstein, pointed to stuff about which we cannot speak. We should take their advice, and not. — Banno

What kind of stuff can be pointed to, but not spoken about? Tell me that, in order that I can consider their advice.

Anything pointed to, that is, indicated by thought, is conceivable, anything conceivable has its representation, any representation has its schema. The schemata representing conceivable things are words, words are that which are spoken. If it can be thought, it can be spoken about.

Witt said that of which we cannot think is that of which we cannot speak, which is tautologically true, because there wouldn’t be anything to point to if it isn’t thought. Kant never makes mention of what we cannot think, meaning, for him, that which is not present to possible cognition, which translates to, we can speak about anything we do think. Kant generally seeks to affirm, rather than disavow.

Ever onward.....