Ok. So you think that because Kant gave a synopsis of the differences between analytic and synthetic judgements, truths...whatever...that he is responsible for the reality of them? Do you see there is scant difference between Aristotelian necessity/contingency propositional dualism, and Kantian analytic/synthetic propositional dualism? What is different, and strictly Kantian, is the a priori designation for synthetic propositions, those having nothing whatsoever to do with experience, not in their proofs, but in their construction, the validity of which neither Aristotle nor Hume considered.
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it is even not true to assert that Hume is close enough to Kant in this regard. — Sentience

Correct. Hume rejected a priori truths, and a priori reason in general, being a proponent “constant conjunction” rather than admitting the purposes and validity of pure a priori cognitions.
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Therefore, those who reject synthetic a priori propositions but adhere to the dichotomy itself are still Kantian enough to create a controversy I have formulated. — Sentience

Those who reject the a priori synthetic domain reject transcendental epistemological philosophy, hence cannot call themselves Kantian enough for anything. Adherence to the dichotomy itself, merely the distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions alone, could apply to anyone who thinks about it. But it all goes haywire for the common understanding when the a priori conditions are appended.

Not to say there isn’t some controversy formulated, but I don’t really understand what it is. Guess I’m just not feeling it, as you’ve put it forward.

Isn't a "singular concise, logical methodology" in question precisely the analytic/synthetic dichotomy in the first place?
— Sentience

Before I respond to that, I would ask, how would you think it is so? — Mww

Well, prima facie, because the dichotomy in question is perhaps the main logical innovation of Kant that occupies one of the central places in his argumentation. — Sentience

Kant didn’t innovate the analytic/synthetic dichotomy, those having been in philosophical existence for millennia, and to which he paid little mind. Aristotle, remember? All he did was propose, then prove, the validity of a certain kind of synthetic proposition, the a priori kind, which itself came to occupy a central place in his argumentation. The others he merely considered as given, and of no particular import with respect to transcendental philosophy.

So I still don’t know how you think this is so.

I don't fully understand why noumena are not things-in-themselves and would rather say that noumena are things-in-themselves from the point of view of Kant's implicit assumptions. — Sentience

That is a falsification of Kantian theoretical conditions. The thing of the thing-in-itself is a real physical object, the affect on our sensibility giving us sensations. The in-itself of the thing in itself is that which is not represented in us as phenomena, but is that which belongs to the thing as it is in itself without being represented. But that which is not so represented, is not thereby noumena. The common misunderstanding of Kantian theoretical conditions is that just because we don’t know the thing as it is in itself, and we do not know conceptions represented as noumena at all, that the thing in itself is noumenal. This is catastrophically false, from a purely transcendental Kantian point of view. There is no reason whatsoever to consider objects the understanding thinks, which are mere conceptions, as being equivalent to that which belongs to an object as it is in itself, the very conceptions of which are unavailable to us.
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Isn't a "singular concise, logical methodology" in question precisely the analytic/synthetic dichotomy in the first place? — Sentience

Before I respond to that, I would ask, how would you think it is so?

time, space, and causality are 'subjective' precisely because of grounding on synthetic a priori judgments.......

I think this is backwards. Pure intuitions are subjective, but by being subjective, that is, “...as the formal capacity of the subject's being affected by objects, and thereby of obtaining immediate representation...”, with respect to space and time only (not causality, which belongs to the pure categories of the understanding), synthetic a priori judgements become possible. From “...For there are no other subjective representations from which we can deduce synthetical propositions a priori, as we can from the intuition of space...”, it is clear the subjective representation is always antecedent to any proposition constructed by means of it.
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........the role of the latter in the Copernican turn is decisive. — Sentience

Granted, in as much as the logical proof of the possibility of synthetic a priori conditions justified the metaphysical leap from objects being necessary and sufficient for human knowledge, to objects being necessary, but not in themselves sufficient.
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As for the noumenal/phenomenal, (...) it is at least clear that this dualism is simply an integral part of the Copernican turn. — Sentience

I don’t see it, myself. The metaphysical paradigm shift, re: “...When he found that he could make no progress by assuming that all the heavenly bodies revolved round the spectator, he reversed the process, and tried the experiment of assuming that the spectator revolved, while the stars remained at rest. We may make the same experiment with regard to the intuition of objects. If the intuition must conform to the nature of the objects, I do not see how we can know anything of them a priori. If, on the other hand, the object conforms to the nature of our faculty of intuition, I can then easily conceive the possibility of such an a priori knowledge....”, has nothing to do with a dualism, per se, but only with a singular concise, logical methodology.

Key is “nature of our faculty of intuition”, which is the source of phenomena. Noumena, on the other hand, as has been mentioned, is the preview of understanding, and its propensity to think objects which never avail themselves to the human version of intuitive representation. In the Kantian cognitive system, understanding is far removed from intuition, requiring a synthesis with it, and in the case of pure thought, has no synthesis with it at all.

Now, you may be of the mind that noumena are things-in-themselves, which gives rise to a natural dualism. But noumena are not things-in-themselves, thus the dualism is destroyed. To say noumena could be things-in-themselves to rationalities other than those using the human representational variety, is an altogether empty assertion, for it would be impossible for us to even understand how such could be the case.
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whether there can be an explanation of how the Copernican turn could be possible without appeal to synthetic a priori truths. — Sentience

I would say not, at least from an Enlightenment approach. The necessity and universality of a priori cognitions in general had to be proven possible, in order to give the transcendental theory the power of logical law. To make it irreducible to inductive principles alone, in other words, which is the mistake he accused Hume of administering as a valid epistemological philosophy. It bears remembering that Kant was an Aristotelian logical advocate, thus grounded his theory on syllogisms out of respect for their susceptibility to empirical proofs, which Hume and the empiricists of the day could not provide.
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'positivists' consider metaphysics 'meaningless'. — Sentience

Do they? Or do they think the science of metaphysics is meaningless? If so, it’s probably because there is no such thing as a proper science of metaphysics, as even Kant himself came to admit. But that takes nothing away from metaphysics being a valid explanatory cognitive theory.

Anyway....if you’ve got decent counterarguments, fire away.

both distinctions are very important for Kant, so one could suspect that they are somehow interconnected. It seems that, after all, the connection is indirect — through the doctrine of synthetic a priori judgments. — Sentience

Neither one are that important, the one merely sets the stage for what Kant needed to logically prove, that Hume was wrong....or at least incomplete....insofar as there is such a thing as an priori pure reason, and one has a better understanding of his own knowledge, if he doesn’t “commit it to the flames”, and the other is merely a tacit admission that the human intuitively based representational system of a posteriori knowledge acquisition is not necessarily the only kind there is.

As for positivists and such.....ehhhh.....I don’t care that much. They’re just names, after all. All certain knowledge of real things is given from experience, to be sure, but not all certain knowledge is of real things. The problem rests entirely on the respective susceptibility to proofs, and the methodology by which they are obtained.

I’d be interested in an expansion on your line 3 reasoning. Without that, I’d withhold comment on the questions derived from the line of reasoning.....which I might not agree with.

It is not uncommon to assert that Kantian dualism between the noumenal and the phenomenal rests precisely on the analytic/synthetic dichotomy. — Sentience

First I’ve heard of it.

Analytic/synthetic distinction has to do with judgement or cognitions, in the form of logical propositions, in which the conception in the predicate directly relates to, in the case of the former, or indirectly adds to, in the case of the latter, the conception in the subject.

On the other hand, phenomena has to do with the faculty of sensibility and its representation of things which are perceived, which always relates to intuition, whereas noumena has to do with the faculty of understanding and its representation of things that are merely thought, hence never relate to intuition, but to conceptions alone.

Seems to me to be two very separate domains of discourse.

Kant is very clear on exactly what he means by both the analytic/synthetic dualism, and the phenomenal/noumenal dualism, each having its own named section within the pertinent chapter. Post-Kantians, neo-Kantians and non-Kantians alike are nonetheless rather fond of taking The Esteemed Professor epistemological places to which he would never have agreed to go, the thoroughness of his thesis being the clue. I mean.....in 800 pages, you’d think he would have covered just about everything he wanted covered. Still, he does shoot himself in the foot a couple times, so, there is that........(sigh)

Glad I’m not Thomas.

I read as much as the preview would allow, from your “reason transcends nature” link. Overall, the guy does a very good job of highlighting modernity’s miscalculations, I think, even if I, myself, have trouble with reason transcending anything. I understand what he’s trying to say; I just don’t think that’s what Kant would say, and it’s his book treatise, so......

On the other hand, and something I meant to add last time, Ferrarin says:

“Reason is the subject of thought and rules, and “I” is the way it (reason) operates. Both transcend the individual “I” who is the consciousness of rules it finds and has not made”

So we have reason transcending both empirical nature and the transcendental “I”, which seems to put reason completely out of reach of anything with which a human might find himself concerned. And if that’s the case, reason can hardly be thought as a speculative faculty, or a theoretical methodology, which Kant specifically nominates reason as being.

But, Ferrarin has letters after his name and I don’t, which I must admit, makes him the boss.

Oh. Well.......I always was a lousy guesser.

I was going with esse est percipi; no material objects except those perceived by a mind.

.....just guessing about your regret.

I regretted it — Wayfarer

Yeah, no material objects, except.....

we know self-awareness exists — 3017amen

Ya know.....there is a standing argument where existence cannot be the predicate of a proposition. The logical error, in this case at least, is that just because it seems I am aware of myself and therefore my mental activities, I cannot infer from that alone, that self-awareness is something that exists. The very best that can be claimed, is that self-awareness is a subjectively valid representation.

There’s no real harm in positing the existence of self-awareness, but a philosophical problem will arise when it is claimed that ping pong tables and self-awareness exist equally.

sense of wonderment is a feeling; wondering is thinking; consciousness is an idea.
— Mww

What do all of them have in common? — 3017amen

Humanity? Intellect? Rationality? All of the above? — Mww

Self-awareness. — 3017amen

Oh. Ok. I was going for the irreducible, in order to not affirm the consequent, that is to say, that which is both necessary and sufficient, rather than one or the other. But true enough, self-awareness is common to feeling, thinking, and consciousness, without being the primary condition for them.

Oh hell...I dunno. Humanity? Intellect? Rationality? All of the above?

Perhaps I'm at fault here — TheMadFool

There is no fault, there is only dialectical disagreement.

Faith and rationality are certainly not simple concepts; there is a clear distinction between them; I don’t agree the distinction is based on evidence. And unrecognizable is relative.

I'd like to know in what sense do we play with words? — TheMadFool

Why.....in whatever sense assuages the ego, of course.

It seems that our consciousness allows for certain intrinsic or innate wonder's about the causes of things, that exist all around us, including ourselves."

That's a generic statement about having a sense of wonderment (wondering) about what things causes other things to happen. — 3017amen

These are two distinct propositions. The second is given; the first, because it is qualified by consciousness, is not. At least not so much.

If you’d said being conscious allows...., I’d have agreed. But being conscious is not the same as consciousness. Being conscious is a state, consciousness is the quality of that state.

A sense of wonderment is a feeling; wondering is thinking; consciousness is an idea.

Philosophy is the science of nit-picking. (Grin)

Also, it's worth parsing (....) the concept of synthetic a priori knowledge — 3017amen

Yeah, that’s been done, much to the chagrin of continental philosophy, by Quine** mostly, insofar as the principle of necessity has no business being in conjunction with the concept of truth, and Popper*** somewhat, insofar as the a priori is merely a genetic expectation (gasp!!!), which essentially eviscerates Kantian rational epistemology.
** “Two Dogmas....”, 1953
*** “LofSD”, 1959

Nevertheless, from an Enlightenment continent perspective, the synthetic a priori....what it is, what it does and why it’s a valid predisposition, is very much worth parsing, absolutely.
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our consciousness allows for certain intrinsic or innate wonders — 3017amen

I’d be real careful with that notion, for the danger arises of making consciousness a causality in itself. I’d be reluctant to pursue that line of thought, myself. But if you have ideas in support of it, I’d be interested in reading them.

As for the rest, all good.

You're just playing with words. — TheMadFool

Aren’t we all?

Ideas are certainly real. But not real in any material sense. — tim wood

Agreed. You can’t blast an idea over the centerfield wall. And you can’t call a thing round without the antecedent idea of what a “round” thing must be.

Kant's philosophy is described as 'transcendental idealism', what it is transcendental in respect of — Wayfarer

Nutshell: the Kantian transcendental is that which is purely a priori. Anything purely a priori is an object created by the conscious thinking subject, hence the idealism. That which is purely a priori is that which is thought, without regard for sensibility.

Transcendental in respect of experience.
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Kant never claims to know what anything actually is. — Wayfarer

Anything empirical, yes; all we can ever know of the empirical is its appearance, its representation as phenomenon. Nevertheless, we must be able to know something with absolute certainty, otherwise the concept is empty. Epistemology ultimately reduces to certain knowledge only for that which is thought, because the negation of thought by contradiction is impossible. It is impossible to not know of what objects you think. But that still leaves the objects of which you think, to relate to what is the case or not in physical reality, which is an empirical judgement of truth, from which follows the instantiation and/or extension of meaning in common language.
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the general meaning of the term 'faith', as distinct from the narrower meaning of 'religious belief'. — Wayfarer

What I said can be reinforced by what you said, certainly, but I personally go further and distinguish the general meaning of the one, re: faith in.... in juxtaposition to the general meaning of its complement, re: knowledge that...... Faith and belief are much too similar in subjective validity to be distinguishable from each other, and practical knowledge literally flushes both right down the figurative existential crapper.

In addition, again personally.....

what is worthy of faith. — Wayfarer

.....is a perfectly subjective condition, standing for that which one cares enough to think about, but for which knowledge is not provided. Something like that. Or not...

Kant uses many and assorted (distorted?) descriptors for reason, but doesn’t posit or indicate that “reason transcends nature”, so I wonder what he would say to the author who put the notion in so many words. I suppose said author could have derived it on his own, from....

“....cognizing, a priori, by means of the categories, all objects which can possibly be presented to our senses, not, indeed, according to the form of their intuition, but according to the laws of their conjunction or synthesis, and thus, as it were, of prescribing laws to nature and even of rendering nature possible...”

....but that, to me, seems a pretty lopsided interpretation.

On the other hand, Kant never claims to know what reason actually is, and does in fact theoretically prove it is impossible to empirically know anything that transcends natural conditions, so maybe “reason transcends nature” merely indicates the impossibility of knowing what reason actually is. But still, for the language gamer’s benefit, The Good Doctor does say......

“....reason is the faculty which furnishes us with the principles of knowledge a priori.....”

..... in relation to the other participants in speculative transcendental philosophy, but that’s more what its job is, not what it actually is. And of course, ceremoniously grants Freewheelin’ Freddie the liberty of asking....

{...wtf IS a faculty anyway??? A pox on those discovering....no wait, I mean INVENTING.....even MORE of them!!!! Ahhhh...the “piping, singing” “malicious fairy” of German Romanticism, If I do say so myself}
(BG&E, 1.11, 1886, seriously personalized)

(Sigh) Ain’t speculative metaphysics grand???

Faith: requires no evidence. Rationality: requires evidence

Are they not different? — TheMadFool

Of course they’re different, but their differences have nothing to do with evidence.

Rationality: the use of reason according to principles, the judgements of which are logically consistent necessarily, from which cognitions follow and its objects are given;
Faith: the condition under which judgements are contingent on mere persuasion, the principles be what they may, from which its cognitions do not necessarily follow and the possibility of its objects are not necessarily given.

In the event I don’t know what I’m talking about, or, which is equally the case, in the event what I’m talking about is too systematically evolved to be properly understood by the lesser equipped......

Rationality: the natural inclination for the discovery and use of reason;
Faith: superficial, and possibly but not necessarily unwarranted, confidence in that for which reason is used.
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So, is reason fooling us or not? — TheMadFool

It isn’t so much that reason fools us, but rather, it may be that in which we are not being careful enough in guarding against fooling ourselves, by using reason under conditions where it doesn’t work.
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The content of your deleted comment is telling, just as much as is the deletion of it.

the problem is that there is no proper justification to not to fault the method. — TheMadFool

Oh, I would think there is. It is quite justified to not fault the method, when it is at least possible, if not probable, the use of it is the sole and complete fault. If it’s 50/50, it becomes proper NOT to fault the method alone, in disregard of its use, which is what I said. In order to prove the method at fault, it must be shown that irrationality is impossible, which historical precedent determines not to be the case.
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Demonstrate the impossibility of the absence of another method, different to rationality — TheMadFool

The impossibility of the absence of another method presupposes the method necessarily, the validity of which has yet to be established with any apodeictic certainty; such method being only an idea, or at best, a mere notion, the conceptual predicates for it being highly arguable.
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Do you think there's a good reason to believe on faith and faith alone? — TheMadFool

What is faith, but rationality without the ground of experience, or, which is the same thing, empirical knowledge? As such, it is not so much a different methodology, but rather, the same methodology operating under different conditions. It follows that it may be all well and good to have faith in that for which experience is merely possible, but it is not all well and good to have faith in that for which experience contradicts. Otherwise, the Earth would still be the center of the universe.

Now the typical rejoinder is: do you have faith in your perceptions, or, do you have faith that reason isn’t fooling you? Or that the fundamental laws of logic and mathematics are universally and necessarily irrefutable? Then it becomes a question of whether not yet having sufficient reason to doubt is the same as having faith. I suppose semantically it is, but still, that doesn’t magically turn faith into an entirely different methodology distinguishable from rationality. Technically, to have faith alone as a determinant quality is nothing more than using rationality without regard for its intrinsic logical legislation, again, in conformity to, and justified by, experience.

we're repeatedly cautioned to be skeptical when faced with claims people make — TheMadFool

Skepticism regarding the contents, or the objects, with which the method may be concerned, is hardly the same as the skepticism directed at the method itself.
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Methinks it's exactly when we doubt our method's capabilities that we look for something else. No? — TheMadFool

Not in the view from this armchair, no. It’s not so fine a line between doubting a method’s capabilities, and using the method such that its intrinsic capabilities are misguiding. If it is possible the method doesn’t correspond to its conditions, and if from that it is impossible to tell whether it is the method itself or the agent’s use of it that serves as causality for the discord, there is no proper justification for faulting the method alone.

Besides...how would one, as a human rational agent, ever be able to prove some alternative methodology to rationality, that isn’t itself an exposition given from the very unique and innate human condition it was meant to replace? In other words, what profit can there ever be in looking for that which the means for looking immediately makes the ends looked for, impossible to find? Hence the use of lackadaisical, tacitly indicating the absurdity of looking for impossible ends as opposed to correcting extant means.

Nevertheless.....benefit of the doubt: what form do you think an alternative to the human rational method would take?

All the incremental objects of the nature of an AI remain an AI, but the thesis on rationality implies a methodology better than, hence necessarily different from, rationality. The former is a consistent equivalence in itself, the latter is not, therefore they have no equivalence to each other.

“...We are actually in possession of a priori synthetical cognitions, as is proved by the existence of the principles of the understanding, which anticipate experience. If any one cannot comprehend the possibility of these principles, he may have some reason to doubt whether they are really a priori; but he cannot on this account declare them to be impossible, and affirm the nullity of the steps which reason may have taken under their guidance. He can only say: If we perceived their origin and their authenticity, we should be able to determine the extent and limits of reason; but, till we can do this, all propositions regarding the latter are mere random assertions. In this view, the doubt respecting all dogmatical philosophy, which proceeds without the guidance of criticism, is well grounded; but we cannot therefore deny to reason the ability to construct a sound philosophy, when the way has been prepared by a thorough critical investigation.

All the conceptions produced, and all the questions raised, by pure reason, do not lie in the sphere of experience, but in that of reason itself, and hence they must be solved, and shown to be either valid or inadmissible, by that faculty. We have no right to decline the solution of such problems, on the ground that the solution can be discovered only from the nature of things, and under pretence of the limitation of human faculties, for reason is the sole creator of all these ideas, and is therefore bound either to establish their validity or to expose their illusory nature.

The polemic of scepticism is properly directed against the dogmatist, who erects a system of philosophy without having examined the fundamental objective principles on which it is based, for the purpose of evidencing the futility of his designs, and thus bringing him to a knowledge of his own powers. But, in itself, scepticism does not give us any certain information in regard to the bounds of our knowledge. All unsuccessful dogmatical attempts of reason are facia, which it is always useful to submit to the censure of the sceptic. But this cannot help us to any decision regarding the expectations which reason cherishes of better success in future endeavours; the investigations of scepticism cannot, therefore, settle the dispute regarding the rights and powers of human reason....”
(CPR, A763,4/B791,2)

This attitude of doubt toward rationality reveals an important truth, to wit that it's just one method of removing doubt and there may be other, possibly better, methods out there to tackle the problem of doubt. — TheMadFool

It does not follow merely from the skepticism of one rationality, that another replacement methodology for it, is possible. Such methodology may very well be possible, but its possibility is given from a different kind of entity, rather than something so lackadaisical as skeptical analysis of the method already in play, by the possessor of it. Besides, how would a human rationality ever understand a rationality other than the human kind, and because he is necessarily at a complete loss to understand it due to the very limitations of his own, how would he ever claim the betterment of it?

It was a good read. Well done.

Supposition = contingency; presupposition = necessity (??)

to do any thinking, you've got to presuppose something — tim wood

Something must be presupposed, absolutely.

is reason infallible? — TheMadFool

The conditions for answering the question are contained by it, which makes it superfluous.

That is, that they're both empty - almost empty - concepts. — tim wood

Empty, in that neither has a specific object of their own by which they are identified. There are no schemata for the concept of ontology nor metaphysics. But being empty doesn’t make the concepts meaningless, for they may still stand as subsets of rational methods.

Post-Wolff, 1730, and pre-Quine, 1951,:
Metaphysics: the critical doctrine for the study of the principles of reason a priori;
Ontology: the dogmatic doctrine for the study of that which reason treats a posteriori.

The view from this armchair.....

Nothing irreparably wrong with most of that, but the point is being overlooked, in that the original PC claims knowledge is impossible. Knowledge herein pertaining not of things, but knowledge itself. In order to refute the PC, the negation of it must be demonstrated. We don’t need to prove we know about things, we only need to prove we have the capacity for knowledge, the things being whatever they may. It follows that rudimentary mathematical concepts are sufficient to justify the possibility of knowledge, because it is we ourselves who create the predicates mathematics employs. The added bonus being, that experience serves as the apodeictic proof that these definitive inventions are sound, and thus it is that we can prove our capacity for knowledge beyond its mere possibility.

Still, the vagueness you mentioned arises, in that the conditions under which mathematical concepts themselves are possible, being given from the very same notion of categories already mentioned, yours of the empirical kind, mine of the rational, remains valid, but for all that, nonetheless theoretically plausible. And when facts are absent, as is always the case with epistemological speculation, all that’s left to work with, is theory.

I would have thought we can be unconscious of thoughts just as we can of perceptions. — Janus

If we think of perceptions as affects by objects giving us sensations, I don’t see how we can be not conscious of them. And by the same token, if there are thoughts of which we are unconscious, how would be be able to call them thoughts? Some things do happen of which we are not aware, but we can’t think of them as thoughts, so we think of them as....wait for iiittttt.....phenomena!!!

I admit to being somewhat less than clear, in that we may not be conscious of the act of perception itself, but we must be conscious of the affect the sensations which follows from them, have on us.
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This "meta-noticing" is what constitutes phenomenology; it allows us to describe the nature of our general doings. — Janus

Understood, thanks. Dunno what advantage this gives us, over and above the established epistemological metaphysics already in play. I guess I’d have to agree, that because I can already describe my general doings, I must be doing phenomenology, even if I don’t call it that. Which is fine....”a rose is a rose is a rose, by any other name is still a rose”, right?

Vague — TheMadFool

‘S-ok. I’m not here to teach, so......as long as I can’t be proven wrong, I’m happy enough.

What say you? — TheMadFool

I say....pretty much agreeable, with the exception that in math there is not complete freedom, insofar as any mathematical structure must adhere to the principles of universality and necessity. But I understand you to mean we are free in our development of different mathematical structures, consistent with the paradigms to which they might apply. The usefulness of Schrodinger's Equation is itself predicated on Nicomachus‘ arithmetic, among others of course.
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To follow up:

What is the extent of our knowledge? — TheMadFool

Experience a posteriori, understanding a priori.

What is the criterion for deciding whether we have knowledge... — TheMadFool

Judgement pursuant to the categories of modality. To know anything whatsoever, it must first be possible, then it must exist, and from those, the necessity of it is given.

Ehhhhhh........or not. Lotsa things can only be assumed in philosophy, right?

I wonder what this leads to? Any ideas? — TheMadFool

Knowledge and truth are judgements - they need a criterion. — TheMadFool

The latter would have been my idea as well, with the antecedent indicating criteria themselves imply a system in which they serve as operative conditions. Ultimately, such system must relieve the self-contradiction inherent in the PC, because without at least a logical proof that knowledge is indeed possible, we are left with nothing but mere sophisms which hold no profit whatsoever. Mathematics provides sufficient reason for claiming proof that knowledge is possible, and from that, a system arises in which the criteria for all judgements, both a priori and a posteriori, follow necessarily.

Nevertheless, it remains an unavoidable scandal for the human condition in general, that there is no absolute unconditional proof of anything, including knowledge itself, derived from a system conjured solely by the possessor of it, because that possessor is himself a condition for the system.

So......metaphysical reductionism asks, is the validity and purposefulness of knowledge, its reality being tacitly given, worth neglecting the intrinsic circularity involved in justifying its very possibility. If worth neglecting, the PC falls; if not worth neglecting, the PC may or may not fall but the system itself does. Hence, the inevitable and altogether irreconcilable sophisms.

supposedly demonstrates the impossibility of knowledge. — TheMadFool

There seems to be an embedded contradiction..... — TheMadFool

A logical argument ends as merely a worthless sophism, when the means to create it necessarily presuppose the very impossibility it is meant to demonstrate. That is to say, on the one hand, if one believes there is a problem, the problem cannot be about knowledge, and on the other, if one knows there is a problem he contradicts himself by attempting to demonstrate knowledge is impossible.

Stereotypical human proclivity......use reason, the purpose of which is to alleviate confusion naturally, for the creation of it artificially.

I doubt that Bergson, as a practicing philosopher himself, intended to deny Kant's Metaphysics of Pure Reason. — Gnomon

Understood. Whomever authored the quote mischaracterized Bergson, then? The quote said....

Bergson on Metaphysics : "While Kant had dismissed metaphysics as groundless speculation..... — Gnomon

.....which is the only thing I took issue with.

trying to get a firmer grasp on your perspective, so I can understand as precisely as possible where it might differ from my perspective. — Janus

My modus operandi as well. Although, I admit to getting a little.....er, wordy sometimes. Most of the time. Almost always.

you say "we don't know our ideas; we think them" (....) I could equally say that "we don't know physical objects; we see (or hear, etc.) them". — Janus

Ok, but if you do that, doesn’t knowledge become undefined? And there are inconsistencies, insofar as there can be no ideas whatsoever that are not thought, but there can be perceptions that are not known.
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This noticing what we are doing when we see objects or think thoughts is a significant part of phenomenology. — Janus

Do you equate noticing and experiencing? How closely are they related, if at all?
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it seems clear that to me, from what I have read, that he thought there are real physical objects and entities, things that are something in themselves; but that we only know them as they appear to us. For me this counts (or should count) as knowing real physical objects and entities, even though their "final", "absolute" or exhaustive nature is not certainly known to us. — Janus

Yes to real physical objects; as you say...there must be something that appears. Appears herein meaning makes an appearance, or becomes present, as opposed to knowing them immediately by resemblance. The Kantian epistemological system is strictly representational, which makes explicit nothing in the system is the equivalent of that which is outside it, but can only, and must necessarily, relate to it. It follows that we don’t know the appearance, or, which is the same thing, the phenomenon representing the real object, but rather, we only know the precision of the relationship, which is itself predicated on the precision of our judgements about it.

Besides, if we can know the object by its appearance, its mere presence, why can we not know the object as it really is, in its exhaustive nature? To say an appearance is not a complete appearance such that exhaustive knowledge of it is impossible, implies the blame for being wrong about perceptions is possibly as much the fault of the object as it is our system for knowing it, which implies every appearance could be a sensory illusion. Now the argument is that no object ever gives us its complete appearance anyway, which only serves to justify a representational cognitive system in which the appearance of an object simply means its affect on our sensibility, rather than irreducible causality for our knowledge, which leaves us to figure out what it is possible to know it as, relieving the object itself of any fault.

Aristotle characterized your “counts (or should count) as knowing real physical objects and entities” as knowing that an object is present (epistêmê), as opposed to knowing what an object is, that is present (technê). In the former you’d be correct, in the latter, not so much. Knowing that we are affected doesn’t tell us what we are affected by.

By the way.....would you say phenomenology is a representational system?

I'd say people listen to what their sub-conscious is telling them all the time. — Isaac

If by “listen” it is meant to exhibit conscious attention, then by definition it is impossible to pay attention to that which is sub-conscious.
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When you go to catch a ball do you 'do the maths' or do you just put your hand where you 'feel' the ball is going to end up? — Isaac

If I go by “feel”, why would I ever need to look? While the coordination part, synonymous with the brain “doing the math”, of the hand-eye coordination system may be autonomic, the eye part is certainly a conscious activity, which implies I put my hand where my brain informs me of my best chance of catch success. Something needs to tell the brain what “math” to do.

I never trust my feel for the ball; I use my eye and trust my brain.
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I can't think of a single syllogism that describes any real life moral dilemma accurately. — Isaac

we no longer have any means of knowing who to trust, we scramble about for clues as to who's in 'our gang' and rhetorical expressions often provide these clues. — Isaac

Isn’t that a syllogism? Got your major, got your minor, got your conclusion. And by so doing, didn’t you at the same time, think to describe all moral dilemmas in general, even if not so much “any real-life moral dilemma” in particular?
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It's simply more efficient to trust someone else to have worked a thing out than it is to work it out yourself, — Isaac

True enough, yet we chastise others for argumentum ab auctoritate in dialectics, and argumentum ad verecundiam in the case of actions.

Anyway....thanks.

"While Kant had dismissed metaphysics as groundless speculation about things beyond human knowledge.... — Gnomon

“....But as to metaphysics, the miserable progress it has hitherto made, and the fact that of no one system yet brought forward, as far as regards its true aim, can it be said that this science really exists, leaves any one at liberty to doubt with reason the very possibility of its existence.  But, in a certain sense, this kind of knowledge must unquestionably be looked upon as given; in other words, metaphysics must be considered as really existing, if not as a science, nevertheless as a natural disposition of the human mind (metaphysica naturalis). For human reason, without any instigations imputable to the mere vanity of great knowledge, unceasingly progresses, urged on by its own feeling of need, towards such questions as cannot be answered by any empirical application of reason, or principles derived therefrom; and so there has ever really existed in every man some system of metaphysics. It will always exist, so soon as reason awakes to the exercise of its power of speculation. And now the question arises: "How is metaphysics, as a natural disposition, possible?" In other words, how, from the nature of universal human reason, do those questions arise which pure reason proposes to itself, and which it is impelled by its own feeling of need to answer as well as it can?

But as in all the attempts hitherto made to answer the questions which reason is prompted by its very nature to propose to itself, for example, whether the world had a beginning, or has existed from eternity, it has always met with unavoidable contradictions, we must not rest satisfied with the mere natural disposition of the mind to metaphysics, that is, with the existence of the faculty of pure reason, whence, indeed, some sort of metaphysical system always arises; but it must be possible to arrive at certainty in regard to the question whether we know or do not know the things of which metaphysics treats. We must be able to arrive at a decision on the subjects of its questions, or on the ability or inability of reason to form any judgement respecting them; and therefore either to extend with confidence the bounds of our pure reason, or to set strictly defined and safe limits to its action. This last question, which arises out of the above universal problem, would properly run thus: "How is metaphysics possible as a science?"....”

Dismissed? Absolutely not.
Groundless? Hardly.
Speculative? Yeah, certainly is that.
About things beyond human knowledge? A posteriori, yes. A priori....ehhhh, hard to say.

“...The science of Metaphysics has for the proper object of its inquiries only three grand ideas: GOD, FREEDOM, and IMMORTALITY...”

Empirical knowledge of any of those is of course, quite impossible for humans. But we can still think about them, and arrive at valid conclusions a priori with respect to them, which makes metaphysics a speculative theoretical science, while not a physical one.

About Bergson I don’t know, but it is clear the quote suggests a valid counter-argument from The Esteemed Professor Himself.